



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches

30 May 2025

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security, and safety issues.

Dispatches is a periodic collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Editor's Notes:

The next issue will be **13 June 2025**.

Quick links:

[Events](#)

[Publications](#)

[@RUSI NS on X](#)

[Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia on Facebook](#)

[Other Sources](#)

[Odds and sods](#)

[SAC Notes](#)

Contributions to RUSI(NS) social media

You are also encouraged to send material to be posted to the RUSI(NS) X and Facebook accounts to rusinsdispatches@gmail.com. Preferably, send the material ready to post. We are still looking for a volunteer(s) to be editor(s) for these accounts in order to keep them active.

Events

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

RUSI (NS) Events:

Media blackouts due to the calling of a federal election are impacting the short-term speaker engagement calendar.

18 June, Wednesday: “CBSA Border Security and Modernization.” The RCMP, CBSA and CCG have had their mandates changed to more effectively control and secure the border. There are other changes that will affect all these organizations to a greater or lesser degree to modernize and adapt to changing circumstances. This is an opportunity to hear directly from CBSA. This will be an in-person only event with restricted numbers, limited to 30 total. The event will take place at the CBSA Regional Office, 263 Susie Lake Crescent, Halifax NS B3S 0J5 on 18 June 2025 from 1300 to 1430 hrs. There is no parking at the CBSA office (or at its neighbour Mission Mart) however there are nearby parking lots and street parking, but a walk will be involved. To register for this event at rusinovascotia@gmail.com, attn: Vice-President NLT Saturday, 15 June 2025. This will be first come first served and the invitations will be restricted. A waiting list will be maintained if necessary.

16 July, Wednesday: Historical presentation with Tom Tulloch/Meet and Greet, which has a nominal charge of \$10.

17 September, Wednesday: Col Labbe, CAF Drone projects, virtual event.

15 October, Wednesday: BGen Mark Parsons, Commander 5 Cdn Div.

5 November, Wednesday: Remembrance Dinner.

9 November, Sunday: Remembrance Sunday at the RA Park Memorial.

Other Events:

New 23 June, Monday: Hosted by the Canadian Naval Memorial Trust, the Annual CNMT Golf Tournament at the Grandview Golf & Country Club in Dartmouth. Please poster at the end of the newsletter and/or [click here for all tournament information](#)

26-27 September: Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN - <https://www.cmsn.ca/>) conference on the future of Canadian Seapower. Live, Calgary. This will bring together academics, experts and serving and retired naval and coast guard personnel to examine the emerging maritime security threats facing Canada today, and the complex challenges that will define our future. At the end of *Dispatches* is a Save the Date poster, with more information to follow soon. CMSN welcomes further dissemination of the event to any colleagues that you think may be interested.

Wargaming Events:

Georgetown University Wargaming Society long-range schedule:

<https://www.guwargaming.org/guwsevents>

16 September 2025, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Naval Wargaming and Quantitative History." 1-2:30 pm ADT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/naval-wargaming-and-quantitative-history-tickets-1052463264957>

Publications

Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Spyships, Satellites, and SAMs" by Canadian Joint Warfare Centre staff [and RUSI(NS) member] David Redpath, discussing several professional wargames exploring a wide range of topics from spyships to satellites, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dhx48Xj8V2Y>

RUSI(NS) Comments "A Ground Force Option for an Arctic Policy" by John McLearn, Cate Belbin, 10 April 2025, https://rusi-ns.ca/arctic_ground_force/

RUSI(NS) Paper "Future Aircrew Training for the RCAF" by Murray Lee, 7 April 2025, https://rusi-ns.ca/future_aircrew_training/

RUSI(NS) Comments "Recruiting and Retention in the Reserve Force" by David Swan, 29 March 2025, <https://rusi-ns.ca/recruiting-retention/>

RUSI(NS) Paper "We Were America's Best Friend" by Tim Dunne, 22 February 2025, 26 November 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/we-were-americas-best-friend/>

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) presentation "Submarine Cables – a hidden weakness?" by Dr Samuel Bashfield, 27 February 2025, video recording: <https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/why8ij7udf7kuh7tj8sky/RUSIA-Vic-Dr-Samuel-Bashfield-Submarine-Cables-a-hidden-weakness-Feb-2025-SD-480p.mov?rlkey=lqvzot42ll4rcwyw7nj1ka0rz&dl=0>

The following publications are received by RUSI(S) from other associations. The latest edition, where not otherwise indicated, may be requested by emailing RUSI(NS). To readers of Dispatches from other associations, sharing of your publications is appreciated.

weekly:

Naval Association of Canada

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) Defence Update

Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver Members News

bi-weekly: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association On Watch

monthly:

Canadian Gunner News

Edmonton United Services Institute President's Enews

Military Institute of Windsor Communiqué

Naval Reserve Association of Canada Mess Deck ConneXions

Royal Alberta United Services Institute Dispatches

Royal Canadian Logistics Service The Logistician

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch Scuttlebutt

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island Newsletter

Veterans Affairs Canada Salute!

quarterly:

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) Quarterly Newsletter

@RUSI_NS on X

@RUSI_NS posts may be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>.

To have something posted or reposted, email RUSI(NS).


Royal Canadian Air Force @RCAF_ARC 28 May posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Introducing the CT-157 Siskin II advanced trainer to be based at Moose Jaw, SK. Pilots undergoing both Advanced Flying Training Fixed-Wing and Jet programs will train on this aircraft named for the Siskin I, the RCAF's first true fighter.







Royal Canadian Air Force @RCAF_ARC 28 May posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: The RCAF Future Aircrew Training program's basic flight training aircraft is the CT-102B Astra II (Grob G 120TP). Named after the CT-102A, the Astra II features improved avionics and higher performance.

Royal Canadian Air Force @RCAF_ARC 28 May posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: RCAF Rotary Wing pilots training under FAcT will learn on the CT-153 Juno. Named for Juno Beach, the site of Canada's D-Day landings in 1944, the fleet of 19 CT-153's will be based at Southport, near Portage la Prairie, MB.

Royal Canadian Air Force @RCAF_ARC 28 May posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: The CT-145E Expedito II (King Air 260) will be the RCAF's multi-engine trainer under FAcT. The fleet will be based in Southport, near Portage la Prairie, MB and is named for the Expeditors that were in service from 1940-70s.

Royal Canadian Air Force @RCAF_ARC 28 May posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: The RCAF's future Air Combat Systems Officer and Air Combat Sensor Operator training aircraft is the CT-142Q Citadel! A part of FAcT, the 3-plane fleet will be based at 17 Wing Winnipeg.



	
<p>David Pugliese @davidpugliese 26 May posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: 3D-printed parts could keep Canadian subs operating for another decade https://ottawacitizen.com/public-service/defence-watch/3d-printed-parts-canadian-submarines via @ottawacitizen (https://ottawacitizen.com/public-service/defence-watch/3d-printed-parts-canadian-submarines)</p>	
<p>David Pugliese @davidpugliese 25 May posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Maintenance costs will spike as militaries add advanced planes such as the F-35: Report (https://www.defensenews.com/air/2025/05/23/maintenance-costs-will-spike-as-militaries-add-advanced-planes-report/)</p>	
<p>"General Motors under pressure to move production on Canadian military contracts to Canada" https://www.insauga.com/general-motors-under-pressure-to-move-production-on-canadian-military-contracts-to-canada/ Build independence/self-sufficiency in CAN🇨🇦 defence industries @NationalDefence @GM H/T @glennhendry</p>	
<p>CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 25 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Is creating a standalone defence procurement agency really the fix #Canada needs? The proven path forward may not be a new agency—but a smarter, integrated approach to defence procurement. 📖 Read more: https://cdainstitute.ca/is-a-defence-procurement-agency-really-the-answer/ (Is a Defence Procurement Agency Really the Answer?) It now almost appears that someone in government read his piece!</p>	
<p>Dr Elizabeth Buchanan @BuchananLiz 14 May posted: Naval facility in Canadian Arctic stalled by ‘concerns’ with jetty (https://www.ctvnews.ca/vancouver/article/naval-facility-in-canadian-arctic-stalled-by-concerns-with-jetty/) RUSI(NS) quoted: Challenges of constructing in #Arctic/North. CAN🇨🇦 needs integrated civil-military air-land-sea Arctic/North infrastructure development policy/plan, Maybe form specialized @CanadianForces engineering units? Meanwhile consider sea-basing with supplies/services ships</p>	

"Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia" on Facebook:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Russia's Hybrid Warfare Tactics Target the Baltics

<https://jamestown.org/program/russias-hybrid-warfare-tactics-target-the-baltics/>

This is the theatre of operations where Canada provides the 'framework' for a NATO brigade group (see: "Brigade and Brigade Group" https://rusi-ns.ca/brigade_group/). So Russian activities there should be of interest to Canadians.



If the U.S. Navy can't Repair Ships in Peacetime, how will it do so in War?

<https://cimsec.org/if-the-u-s-navy-cant-repair-ships-in-peacetime-how-will-it-do-so-in-war/>

"If the Navy is to meet the demands of a major conflict, it must prioritize not only shipbuilding but also ship repair and salvage capabilities. The lessons of the past are clear – effective battle damage repair and salvage can mean the difference between victory and defeat. This means not just adding to the capacity to repair current ships but also building capacity for the larger fleet of the future and creating a surge capacity for times of conflict."

Canadian shipyards are likely happy to say that they have the capability to expand to meet the necessary capacity to handle battle damage repair and salvage of the current and any enlarged (and allied) fleets in a major conflict. If government provides the funding. But do our yards have the people, training facilities, yard space, tools and suppliers/material sources for an increased demand? More (maybe most importantly), are there government and industry studies looking into what an increased demand might look like, what Canada has available and what are and how to fill the shortfalls? That is: is there a plan?



South Korea Concerned by China's 'No-Sail Zone' in Overlapping Waters

<https://thedefensepost.com/2025/05/24/south-korea-concerned-chinas-waters/>

"No sail zone." That doesn't sound like something from international law (unless it is a poor translation). Another Chinese grey zone tactic. Is Canada, its diplomatic, naval and civil sectors, ready to face and counter such aggression?



Defence spending is up — but on all the wrong things
<https://www.ft.com/content/11a6b844-fe57-4e39-86ba-bb04e839bf2f?shareType=nongift>


"Success in this new world may be measured less on budget size and more on tech savvy."

Yes, defence policy should be assessed and defence forces measured by what the capabilities being built can do (effectiveness) and not just by the numbers of ships, aircraft and soldiers. Even less, not just by a percentage of GDP.

Comment: Remarks by Alessio Patalano (a historian to follow) are well worth considering:

Alessio Patalano @alessionaval 25 May posted: Defence spending is up — but on all the wrong things
[LRI] @Mauro_Gilli [PDI] has already offered an excellent thread on the problems with this piece - but let me add a couple of broader reflection here:

(thread <https://x.com/alessionaval/status/1926556894648308086>)



German Navy Considers Tomahawk Missile for 'Inland Strike' Capability

<https://thedefensepost.com/2025/05/20/german-navy-considers-tomahawk/>

The Canadian River-class destroyers will be armed with Tomahawk missiles

(see: <https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/fleet-units/surface/river-class-destroyer/fact-sheet.html>). Probably won't be described as an 'inland strike capability' (those words may be a result of a translation from German). More likely the expression 'land attack' will be used when referring to the missile. 'Naval fires support' also is in public use, regrettably one of those military means-more-than-it-reads terms.



Could the UK operate MQ-9 drones from its aircraft carriers?

<https://www.naval-technology.com/news/could-the-uk-operate-mq-9-drones-from-its-aircraft-carriers/>

"The UK is considering the use of MQ-9 drones to fulfil the Royal Navy's carrier-borne airborne early warning (AEW) capability..."

Would Canada look at its Royal Canadian Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) project MQ-9 for the AEW role? Vice procuring Boeing E-7 Wedgetail AEW aircraft. Land based, in the absence of Canadian ships that could handle drones of the MQ-9 size.



OK, so it Wasn't a Special Reason for the DDG

<https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/ok-so-it-wasnt-a-special-reason-for>

"Sometimes you do a Coast Guard mission with the Navy you have, not the Coast Guard you wish you had."

A fleet design commentary. The author is (correctly) making the argument that a balanced fleet includes less-capable ships for less-demanding missions, missions for which using high-capable ships would be a misuse of resources ("high-demand, low-density assets"). Good argument for Canada to make as the Continental Defence Corvette Project gets more attention.

The author used the word tier to differentiate ship type levels, in this case between destroyers and LCS



(which, if it hadn't been for the US penchant to call ships other than doctrinal terms, might have been typed as corvettes).. Just as good as any other word (rate, rank, etc.), and does highlight the point that Canada doesn't have a similar differentiation.

Royal Navy's first XLUUV formally named XV Excalibur
<https://www.navylookout.com/royal-navys-first-xluuv-formally-named-xv-excalibur/>

Interesting to note XV ('uncrewed vessel'? 'experimental vessel?') as the identifier added to the name (the previous HMS Excalibur was also an experimental submarine). Makes sense as the XLUUV is not a commissioned vessel, 'commission' really applying when an officer is ordered (commissioned) to take command and put a vessel into active service. Interesting, too, is that at least one of the traditions for a commissioned vessel was followed, with the XLUUV christened (Canada now uses the terms 'named' and 'naming ceremony'), though by gin rather than traditional sparkling wine (not the first vessel where other than wine is used). And the article's author called it a 'she', a pronoun normally reserved for a vessel rather than an equipment (Canada uses 'it' rather than 'she'). No pennant number painted on the XLUUV.



Other Sources

#Arctic

Vehicle Mobility in the High North

<https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2021/08/vehicle-mobility-in-the-high-north/>

The Northern Flank - The Arctic: Implications for SOF

https://www.queensu.ca/cidp/sites/cidpwww/files/uploaded_files/The%20Northern%20Flank_WEB.pdf

#Canadian Armed Forces

The modernized CAF Universality of Service (U of S) policy became effective April 1st, 2025

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2025/05/modernized-caf-universality-service-policy-became-effective-april-1-2025.html>

#Canadian Army

On Canada's Army

<https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/4195353/on-canadas-army/> (podcast and transcript)

"Commander of the Canadian Army Lieutenant General Michael C. Wright discusses the Canadian Army, modernization, Ukraine, technology, and more."

#Canadian Army #defence procurement

Why HIMARS?

<https://noahscornerofrandomstuff.substack.com/p/why-himars>

"HIMARS with an Increment IV PRSM placed in the right location can effectively cover the Labrador Sea, or most of the Arctic Archipelago from Cambridge Bay."

#cyber operations

How Often Is CSE Receiving Ministerial Authorization to Launch Otherwise Prohibited Cyber Attacks - And Against Whom?

<https://www.cyberincontext.ca/p/how-often-is-cse-receiving-ministerial>

#defence industry

Keeping Canada safe

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/adv/article-keeping-canada-safe/>

Keeping an eye out for Canada's "national aerospace industrial strategy."

Comment from contributor: The article describes part of the FAcT program (see: "Future Aircrew Training for the RCAF" https://rusi-ns.ca/future_aircrew_training/).

#defence industry #United Kingdom

Building Britain's fighting economy

<https://www.britainworld.org.uk/p/the-memorandum-18-2025>

"Winning a conflict is a matter of economics and strategy."

Comment from contributor: Thoughts for Canada.

#defence policy

My Case for Conscription in Canada

<https://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2025/04/11/My-Case-Conscription-Canada/>

#defence policy #New Zealand

New Zealand's defence plan lifts spending, emphasises partnerships

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-zealands-defence-plan-lifts-spending-emphasises-partnerships/>

#defence policy #United States

President Trump's FY2026 defence budget: continuing priorities, new missions

<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/05/president-trumps-fy2026-defence-budget-continuing-priorities-new-missions/>

#defence policy #defence procurement

The following, worth reading, are available on request

to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com:

National defence is a key component of the economic strategy

Carney's defence industrial agenda: two steps forward, one step back

The procurement problem

The building blocks for procurement progress

Minister McGuinty faces challenge to modernize military under unstable U.S.

relationship: defence experts

Canada defence spending statistics

#defence procurement

Cheap is good enough

<https://wvrellroom.com/2025/05/14/cheap-is-good-enough/>

"You could itemize most kit in procurement and beg the question: but how would you replace this kit affordably, or at all, at the rates of attrition witnessed in the war in Ukraine. Could the foreign firms supply anyway?" "War's oxygen is money. If we don't find a way to create a cheap division we will suffocate."

To quote Stalin: "Quantity has a quality all its own."

#drones

Killing drones softly

<https://www.defenseone.com/business/2025/05/killing-drones-softly/405588/>

"...the (US) Army is funding a new research center at Virginia Tech to test the limits and develop training for non-kinetic counterdrone technologies."

‘Drone War Reaches a New Level’: Ukraine’s UAVs Now Saving Each Other on the Battlefield

<https://www.kyivpost.com/post/53456>

Comment from contributor: Cool: drones recovering damaged drones from the battlefield.

#drones #Russia-Ukraine War

Russia to unleash fibre-optic drone to get behind Ukrainian lines

<https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/europe/2025/05/21/russia-to-unleash-fibre-optic-drone-weapon-to-penetrate-ukraine-lines/>

The Russia-Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines and Beyond

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-drone-war-innovation-frontlines-and-beyond>

#force development

On War in 2027: Five Principles to Guide the Army Transformation Initiative

<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/on-war-in-2027-five-principles-to-guide-the-army-transformation-initiative/>

#government

Prime Minister of Canada Mandate Letter to Ministry

<https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/2025/05/21/mandate-letter>

#information operations

Why People Believe in Conspiracy Theories: A Summary of the Science

<https://matthewfacciani.substack.com/p/why-people-believe-in-conspiracy>

#land warfare #armour #drones

3rd ID experiments with new tank formations at Germany training rotation

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2025/05/3rd-id-experiments-new-tank-formations-germany-training-rotation/405479/>

Comment from contributor: Interesting developments; testing "...first-person viewer unmanned aerial vehicles with forward observers and other anti-tank elements" with armour for "massing of effects."

#legal #naval warfare

Attack on the MV Conscience: Issues Related to Blockade Law

<https://lieber.westpoint.edu/attack-mv-conscience-issues-related-blockade-law/>

This article has good points about blockades about which naval and joint staffs should be familiar.

#legal #Russia-Ukraine War

The Montreux Paradox: How a Ukraine Ceasefire Could Set the Stage for Escalation in the Black Sea

<https://warontherocks.com/2025/05/the-montreux-paradox-how-a-ukraine-ceasefire-could-set-the-stage-for-escalation-in-the-black-sea/>

#maritime security

Preparation of the Seabed Battlefield

<https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/preparation-of-the-seabed-battlefield>

Comment from contributor: Hmm, has mapping a seabed now become another indicator of impending offensive action?

90 days to economic collapse: UN and experts sound alarm over security at sea

<https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/05/106541/90-days-economic-collapse-un-and-experts-sound-alarm-over-security>

Finland Reports Russia Has Begun Naval Escorts for Shadow Fleet Tankers

<https://maritime-executive.com/article/finland-reports-russia-has-begun-naval-escorts-for-shadow-fleet-tankers>

Hmm, anytime a tanker is escorted by a warship, that should up tracking of the tanker on the vessels of interest list.

Poland Checks Baltic for Explosives as Tensions Continue Over Shadow Fleet

<https://maritime-executive.com/article/poland-checks-baltic-for-explosives-as-tensions-continue-over-shadow-fleet>

One can be confident that Canadian maritime security staff have a sea bottom/seabed layer to their Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) system against which to compare Vessel Of Interest (VOI) movements.

#maritime security #technology

Tracking the untrackable

<https://www.thebroadside.org.uk/p/05-2025-tracking-the-untrackable>

Comment from contributor: Basic, but may be of interest as a primer.

#NATO

NATO weighs a U.S. demand to massively hike defence spending as some struggle to meet the current goal

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/article/nato-weighs-a-us-demand-to-massively-hike-defence-spending-as-some-struggle-to-meet-the-current-goal/>

"The new spending plan under consideration is for all allies to aim for 3.5 per cent of GDP on their defence budgets by 2032, plus an extra 1.5 per cent on potentially defence-related things like infrastructure — roads, bridges, airports and seaports."

Note from contributor: Could make measurement challenging.

#NATO #strategy

Acting Today to Shape Tomorrow: A Proactive Approach to Building NATO's Advantage

<https://www.act.nato.int/article/shaping-proactive-approach-building-nato-advantage/>
"Long Term Military Strategic Shaping (LTMSS)"

#navigation warfare

GPS Needs To Toughen Up, Or Get Trampled Down

<https://aviationweek.com/business-aviation/safety-ops-regulation/gps-needs-toughen-or-get-trampled-down>

#policing

The Promises and Perils of Predictive Policing

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/the-promises-and-perils-of-predictive-policing/>

#Royal Canadian Air Force

RCAF CC-295 Kingfisher aircraft completes first operational parachute rescue

<https://skiesmag.com/news/rcaf-cc-295-kingfisher-aircraft-completes-first-operational-parachute-rescue/>

#strategy

Strategy and the role of the enemy

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/strategy-and-the-role-of-the-enemy/>

“The intelligent strategist must also consider the enemy, not only as an obstacle to be overcome, but something to learn from.”

Air Power in the Second Nuclear Age

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/air-power-in-the-second-nuclear-age>

The title may be air power but this article is about RADM Wylie's 'ideas' (theory) of strategy ('sequential' and 'cumulative') which are usually thought of in maritime/naval operations.

#veterans

Veterans' Writing Workshop

<https://warstoriessociety.com/workshop/free-veterans-writing-workshop>

#warfare #drones

Military Revolutions from the Spanish Tercio to First-Person View Drones

<https://warontherocks.com/2025/05/military-revolutions-from-the-spanish-tercio-to-first-person-view-drones/>

#warfare #Indo-Pacific

What If Our Assumptions About a War with China Are Wrong?

<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/what-if-our-assumptions-about-a-war-with-china-are-wrong/>

#wargaming

Wargaming the Future: A Year in Review of Wargaming at USC

<https://cimsec.org/wargaming-the-future-a-year-in-review-of-wargaming-at-usc/>

Are we ready for AI-powered wargaming?

<https://wargamingweekly.substack.com/p/are-we-ready-for-ai-powered-wargaming>

Are we ready for AI-powered wargaming? (Part 2)

<https://wargamingweekly.substack.com/p/are-we-ready-for-ai-powered-wargaming-part-2>

#weapons

Israel's Iron Beam Laser Air Defense System Has Downed Enemy Drones

<https://www.twz.com/news-features/israels-iron-beam-laser-air-defense-system-has-downed-enemy-drones>

Odds and sods...

Canadian Army Spring 2025 Volume 9 Issue 1

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/digital-catalogue/>

contents:

Modernizing for major combat ops

Brigade Concept

C4ISR for Latvia

Reserve Force

Canadian Army Yesterday (note: by John Boileau)

Science and Tech

On the Horizon

The Air Defence Plan

Q&A with the Army Sergeant Major\Int with Ease

Tank Centralization

The Next Big Gun

Eyes of the North

Arctic Mobility

Military Strategy Magazine Volume 10, Issue 2, spring 2025

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/>

contents:

Civil War Comes to the West, Part II: Strategic Realities


Strategy for a Complex Age: To Frame or Solve?

Political Obedience as a Military Strategic Asset: From Cyrus to the 2023 War in Gaza

A New Fight: Deception, Adaptation, and Regeneration

Distributed Maritime Operations, Logistics, Industry, and American Strategy in Asia

Multi-Dimensional Game-Theory Analysis of North Korean Nuclear Threat





MESSAGE FROM

THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

The Honourable David McGuinty



16 May 2025

Defence Team,

It is a profound honour to have been appointed as Canada's Minister of National Defence.

The Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence have a proud and enduring legacy of service to our country. It is a true privilege to join you in this mission. Your professionalism, dedication, and tireless efforts are fundamental to safeguarding Canada's security and upholding the values we cherish—both at home and abroad.

We are living in an increasingly dangerous and divided world. Now, more than ever, Canada must reaffirm its sovereignty and invest in its defence. The threats we face require us to be vigilant and prepared, and we must continue to defend our democracy from foreign interference and ensure Canada remains strong and free.

Canada is a sovereign nation, but that sovereignty is under new and growing pressures. As an Arctic nation, we must protect our northernmost regions and strengthen our presence in a warming Arctic. This work must be done in close collaboration with Arctic and Northern Indigenous Peoples, recognizing their leadership, experience, and rights.

At this pivotal moment in our history, we must build a modern, agile, and mission-ready military—one that reflects Canadian values and is equipped for the challenges of today and tomorrow. We will rebuild our defence capacity, rearm the Canadian Armed Forces, and invest in our defence industry to ensure it is both resilient and globally competitive. These investments will support Canadian innovation, create highly skilled jobs, and reinforce Canada's leadership in emerging defence technologies.

We will also modernize and streamline our defence procurement system to eliminate unnecessary delays, ensure that equipment is delivered when and where it is needed, and prioritize investment here in Canada—with every dollar spent wisely and effectively.

Most importantly, we will put people first. Across this country, brave individuals have put up their hands to serve. We ask a great deal of them—and in return, they deserve our full support. That means providing the right equipment and training, improving the military experience for members and their families, and making the Canadian Armed Forces one of the best workplaces in the country. It also means ensuring compensation reflects the sacrifices our people make in defence of

Canada.

Our plan will put Canada on track to exceed our NATO defence spending target before 2030—because meeting this moment requires urgency, clarity, and resolve.

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to my predecessor, the Honourable Bill Blair, for his leadership and dedication as Minister of National Defence. Minister Blair spoke often of his deep respect for the Defence Team, and I share that admiration.

I look forward to working closely with Deputy Minister Stefanie Beck, Chief of the Defence Staff General Jennie Carignan, and all of you across the Defence Team. Together, we will modernize our institutions, strengthen our capabilities, and ensure that Canada's military remains a force for peace, stability, and security in a rapidly changing world.

Thank you for your service, your commitment, and your continued dedication to Canada.

The Honourable David J. McGuinty
Minister of National Defence

Counter-UAS

The War Zone @thewarzonewire 19 May posted: Russia Testing Shotgun-Armed Yak-52 Trainer Aircraft To Down Ukrainian Drones
WWI-style air combat tactics applied to the long-range drone problem have been proven by Ukraine and are



now being adopted in Russia, but using shotguns is questionable.

<https://www.twz.com/air/russia-testing-shotgun-armed-yak-52-trainer-aircraft-to-down-ukrainian-drones>

Hmm, maybe the RCAF can convert to the CT-156 Harvard II trainers into CF-156 counter-drone fighters! Fast way to up our fighter force.

Rapid ground clearance UGV destined for Ukraine de-mining efforts

Cool tech:

<https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/land/16091-rapid-ground-clearance-ugvs-destined-for-ukraine-de-mining-efforts>

"The UGV will be integrated with route clearance systems..." And have an agricultural role!



Drone Warfare

Roy🇨🇦 @GrandpaRoy2 19 May posted (<https://x.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1924460602594099649>): China is developing bolt-on glide kits with terminal laser guidance for 152mm and 155mm artillery projectiles. They will apparently be launched from heavy drones, turning the projectiles into long-range precision-guided glide bombs.

Comment: Getting downright scary. Potentially thousands of high-capability bombers for an air force that procures such a capability



Northern Ports

This was in last edition of *Dispatches*:

Ontario Seeks Arctic Port on James Bay
<https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/ontario-seeks-arctic-port-on-james-bay>

All well and fine to say that ports can be built here and there on the Hudson and James Bays. But what is the state of the rail lines to these prospective locations (we know of the challenges of the line to Churchill)? What studies are there about what trade could flow along these routes? And most importantly, what are the challenges of the sea lanes from the ports to open seas? Apparently some might need dredging, and certainly there would need to be a lot of surveying and marking channels. These are all defence and civil-related concerns.



Now, a comment from one of our members:

While "thinking outside the box" is applauded, this suggestion strains the limits of credulity. The railhead being discussed is Moosonee, which possesses a river delta "port" serviced by barges and a shallow-draft "landing craft" styled ferry (M/V *Niska I*). No facility of significance currently exists at the site, the local population (~1500) is too small to sustain operation of a major port without massive augmentation, and heavy cargo ships of the size proposed would require a dredged channel of 30 metres draught extending +100 miles north of the port. Even with these issues, the real "elephant in the room" is that sufficient capacity already exists to economically transport goods to/from southern Ontario (east, west and south) with comfortable margins of redundancy. Indeed, a major concern for freight/cargo transport within southern Ontario is not rail, road or port capacity but lack of adequate warehousing, laypart areas, and product sorting facilities (which receives zero mention in the article). The suggestion to construct a port on James Bay is "an answer seeking a problem". There is no cargo traffic entering Hudson Bay in search of a shorter route to the southern roads, railways and ports of the Great Lakes, and almost none is envisioned if the means of transport was found available. Routing freight through James Bay would be a significant diversion for cargo ships with few tangible benefits for customers. By itself, building infrastructure does not generate need, and the risk of creating a "white elephant" is especially high where efficient,


competitive services already exist.

Enthusiasm for Arctic development deserves encouragement but proposals must be realistic to be sustainable. Perhaps funds for the proposed Moosonee port and shipping lane could be used to connect the two railheads of Churchill and Moosonee (~1200 km apart) by either rail or all-season road - a region currently serviced by a patch quilt of ice roads and provincial highways. Not only would this offer a unique transport loop linking the west (Winnipeg), north (Churchill) and south (Toronto), but it could offer alternate routing for minerals sourced in the Arctic (e.g., northern Quebec nickel/copper ore that is currently shipped south from Deception Bay [Hudson Strait] to Quebec City via the Atlantic for transfer by rail to Sudbury Ontario for smelter processing).

<https://www.arctictoday.com/from-baffinland-to-deception-bay-canada-looks-north-for-its-mining-future-commentary/>



Northern Ontario Winter Roads Map



SAC Notes

O Canada

Canada's Parliament started the latest sitting on Monday, 26 May 2025. This first order of business is the selection of the new speaker who will be appointed shortly. (Note: Liberal MP Francis Scarpaleggia was elected speaker.) The next order of business is the reading of the "Speech from the Throne" by His Majesty Charles the III, King of Canada. It is the third time in Canadian history that a reigning monarch read this document. The first two times the Speech from the throne was by his Mother Queen Elizabeth the II.

The speech laid out the issues that will be covered by this Government. Prime Minister Carney only issued one mandate letter covering seven key areas for this government in this Parliamentary session.

Media pundits were concerned that the individual mandate letters like the kind used by former Prime Minister Trudeau gave little detail nor provided the details of the job of each Ministry. One might disagree though, as PM Carney has provided his guidance in broad terms and will likely extend time for Ministers to become familiar with their Ministry at this point. In my mind, this is a better way, allowing Ministers to develop their own

thoughts and ideas outside the influence of the Prime Minister's Office so prevalent in the last government. It is more like a “Commander’s Intent” paragraph allowing each Minister to evaluate and justify their actions in support of the overall goals of this Parliament.

Some pundits criticized this as a lack of transparency, but having bright members of Parliament actually use their own thoughts and views developed for their own Ministries is a throwback to better times when a Minister could be held accountable for their individual actions.

I believe this process will provide better results and allow for specific accountability for each Minister and not be forced fed talking points by the PMO. I have hopes but the devil will be in the details.

A quick note on foreign interference during this last election. This election saw about a dozen seats where the difference between one party or another was measured in a very few votes, one seat had a difference of four votes. The electoral commission decided that foreign interference was not a factor, but we now should be aware that even minor cases of foreign interference can have a major impact on at least a riding or two. A general review of the nature type and duration of the interference should be looked into by the commission. Long term interference can also be an issue such as the funding of the Chinese language press by the Chinese communist Party’s United Front works program. If Chinese efforts last long before and after an election, is this also a problem requiring review. The Chinese are not the only foreign interference admittedly, but it seems the most persistent and disturbing.

Australia

Some articles from our Australian correspondent.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/astute-lessons-for-australias-aukus-submarine-workforce/>

There are concerns about building the capabilities of Australia for implementation of AUKUS.

<https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/turning-canberra-class-lhds-into-aircraft-carriers/news-story/1f135571e6677236a19a48335bff9913>

The RAN could get back into the aircraft carrier business.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-and-deterrence-what-exactly-are-we-trying-to-deter/>

This article poses an interesting question.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/editors-pick-australias-security-architecture-must-evolve-not-regress/>

Despite the attack on lawyers, the forwarded article has some value

www.aspistrategist.org.au/showcasing-the-economic-benefits-of-aukus-today/

More promises of economic spin-offs from AUKUS.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-to-help-the-us-navy-as-it-helps-us-build-a-joint-submarine-facility/>

There is a lot to be done to get the AUKUS promises operational.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/pacific-island-countries-need-support-to-address->

[information-manipulation/](#)

Truthful information is a precious commodity that is hard to protect and disseminate.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/from-customer-to-catalyst-anchoring-australias-northern-marine-industry-through-government-procurement/>

It is interesting to see the challenge Australia is providing adequate security and other resources to its northern areas. There is a parallel to the challenges Canada has in its north.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ensuring-australias-defence-through-complex-interdependence/>

The existence of this article is interesting from a timing perspective. There is no new threat, but it appears that security thinkers are becoming uneasy with the current partnership dependency.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/mogami-class-offers-strong-technical-advantages-in-australias-frigate-competition/>

It is interesting to see the RAN favouring the Mogami Class frigate from Japan over the European competitors.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/astute-lessons-for-australias-aukus-submarine-workforce/>

There are concerns about building the capabilities of Australia for implementation of AUKUS.

https://youtu.be/foxbfFSRYQk?si=kFizP_PAUsvd0s1c

A summary of new defence cuts in Australia.

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/may/australias-army-adapting-littorals?>

This is an important article on the Australian security situation.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/learn-from-finland-australia-doesnt-assess-its-risks-isnt-ready-for-them/>

If Australia is in bad shape Canada is in even worse shape.

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/may/australias-army-adapting-littorals>

This is an important article on the Australian security situation.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-chance-for-australia-to-grab-europes-offer-of-a-security-pact/>

The attached is an interesting article. Europe and Australia are linked in almost every way except geography. It is time to tighten the linkages

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-zealands-defence-plan-lifts-spending-emphasises-partnerships/>

NZ government needs to get serious about its defence and contribution to AUKUS.

The US Administration continues to cause mayhem around the world with his tariff campaign. Exports and import continue to decline and major economies continue to suffer not so much from the tariffs but from the on again off again approach of the Trump Regime. If it continues there will be massive damage worldwide. As mentioned before the US has also expended its great trove of its real success, trust. This is the real damage. America's real power was taking that trust and creating positive changes. It is unlikely that it will ever return even if the Trump movement disappears into history. It is already the most damaging Presidency in US history, and it may tip the US into an isolated, autocratic regime from which the return will be difficult if not impossible. It is hard to be positive

under the corrupt regime of a convicted criminal.

Moldova

Moldova stands at a very real tipping point between pro-Russian and pro-European forces. The last Presidential election was won by the pro-Russian incumbent President, Maia Sandu 55% to the opposition candidate's 45 % of the popular vote. The election was actually much closer as it was the Moldovan Diaspora vote that provided the win for the pro-European view. The internal vote was also closer, although pro-European views still prevailed.

This October will see the vote for the Moldovan Parliament. Russia has conducted a series of campaigns ranging from large scale bribery and vote buying, disinformation, threats, blackmail, vote buying etc to win. Most recently, they have started a major campaign to suggest that the current Moldovan President will create conditions for an attack on pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria. They have also started rumours to the effect that various officials are corrupt. Unfortunately, some of this is true, but what is omitted is the fact that Moldovan security forces caught them. The most recent claim was that a senior officer of the central customs area of Moldova had accepted bribes and possible conducting smuggling operations. It is not proven but it is possible, but pro-Russian forces are likely to try exploit this type of issue.

Moldova continues to be in the crosshairs of the Russian Federation and the Putin Regime. It is likely to increase in the coming months leading up to the election.

Belarus

The regime in Belarus walks a very fine line between autonomy and loyalty to the Russian Federation. Belarusian security forces number around 100 k of trained troops and police. It would be insufficient to meet Russian forces even in their depleted state. The Russian Federation has allegedly given nuclear weapons to Belarus under Russian supervision, however recent reports seem to indicate that the weapons systems are available in Belarus, but the actual warheads may not be there. Certainly, if true, it may be an actual indicator of Russia's actual trust in Belarus and its administration.

Russian troops allegedly from the Russian North are now in Belarus. The actual purpose of this is not known currently. Russia has occasionally moved troops into Belarus for exercises. If other formations also enter Belarus of brigade size or larger may indicate a change in the circumstances. Russia did use Belarus as a jumping off point in February 2022 into central Ukraine. It did not go well.

Belarus economy continues to slide because of sanctions, age of their equipment, old technology and lack of independent forward thinking for modernization of business, government and industry. It is unlikely that Belarus will be able to modernize in its own right without significant European support. This support is unlikely until a new democratic government is installed.

Georgia

On 26 May 1918, Georgia became an independent country. It has maintained that date of its independence to this day. World leaders congratulated the president of Georgia on this auspicious occasion, including King Charles the III.

On a more significant note, the Georgian opposition leader, Zurab Japaridze, was arrested last Thursday, 22 May 2025 according to Associated Press. The arrest resulted in major

demonstrations across the country which continue. A call by the president for unity fell on deaf ears. The general opposition to the Georgia Dream Party is widely supported and continues to be a thorn in the side of the current government. This ongoing challenge will not disappear in the near term. There is doubt the existing security forces will have the necessary endurance or support to stop the demonstrations and opposition. There is little doubt that Russia will be able to help in the near term.

Iran-Israel War

Israel continues to occupy five positions in Lebanon and key positions in Syria. Its reasoning is to prevent hostile forces from getting too close to Israel's border. It allows Israel to take action against hostile forces in a buffer zone before hostile forces can attack in some form. The Druse community of Syria have asked Israel to remain. It is the first time since the 1973 war that the larger Druse community has been united and there is no need to use "Shouting Hill" to organize major family and community events such as marriages and funerals.

Hamas still is using the Palestinian population to shield that organization from Israel. Hamas started this war knowing that casualties will be high. Hamas is the only organization that can end the war by giving up the hostages and surrendering their arms. Anyone who has watched the 7 October videos knows why Israel can never allow this organization to retain any control over Gaza or anywhere else for that matter. The two-state solution is largely dead and there is no viable alternative, it is a recipe for disaster and constant war.

The Houthis continue to be attacked by the US and Israel mainly through air strikes which are now largely ineffective.

The Trump regime has carried on with diplomatic efforts in the Arab world. Most notable is the President knowingly accepting a gift of a \$400 M USD aircraft from Qatar, a country that has materially supported terrorist organizations that have even killed US military personnel. One has to wonder what it would require bringing this corruption to a halt.

India-Pakistan

This conflict seems to have reached a period of calm with both sides claiming victories over their opposition. The conflict was mercifully short, and calmer minds have obviously taken the lead and navigated the two countries to a place where both sides could take some comfort and a victory lap.

It could have been different. At least in one air battle more than 100 aircraft took part. Aircraft were lost. At the same time there is suspicion that ground based air defences were damaged and put out of action. Much vaunted aircraft were seen to be lost including a French made Rafale. Aircraft are not invincible; they are a tool to be used and some are lost. There has been considerable discussion on how a major modern aircraft could be lost. There is no aircraft or any system that cannot be defeated at some point. The real question is did they accomplish their task prior to destruction? If they did, the loss becomes acceptable. Wars are not antiseptic, there will be losses even to key equipment.

Russia-Ukraine War

The war continues at its devastatingly slow pace in ground operations but with high casualties for both sides with Russia being willing to lose many for minor gains. More recently those gains are smaller than ever, and Ukraine has even been able to recover some ground in key areas. Ukraine also maintains small pieces of Russia's Kursk and Belgorod

oblasts.

The latest efforts from both sides are the increasingly heavy drone and missile strikes now into hundreds of drones and missiles from both sides. During the days leading to Russia's celebration of victory in the great patriotic war on 9 May 2025, Ukraine launched three days of drone attacks totaling more than 500 drones. Russia has also carried out a whole series of drone and missile attacks as well against key cities including the two largest attacks of the war between 24 and 26 May 2025. In the second largest, 355 drones and nine KH 101 missiles were used.

The timing of the Russian attacks after negotiations and ceasefire proposals plus Russia's constant new demands, seem to indicate there is little interest in the Kremlin for any peace deal. If anything, Russia seems to be weighing greater ground and air attacks around the front. Despite Russian losses, they continue to attack with limited success. One area of some success is within 10 kms of the front. It appears Ukrainian logistics is being dealt heavy blows to logistics vehicles although precise information is not available at this point. The general thought is that Russia will conduct a major offensive this summer. There are reports that Russia has accumulated 67 k troops near Sumy oblast. The level of equipment available is in question as Russian production has not kept up with losses. Still, it is plausible and if the numbers are correct and they continue mainly infantry attacks, it is likely. Use of drones by the Russians will increase during this period.

Now, a different point of view. First, can Russia sustain its offensive despite sanctions, loss of key factories and industrial equipment, skilled manpower shortage, shutdown of factories for economic reasons, lack of modernization of factories, high interest rates, inflation, and a lack of consumer goods are making for a perfect economic storm in Russia. Quite simply the Russian economy is near a very real collapse without assistance. When this might occur is a question without a current answer, but the signs are growing.

The question is whether the Putin regime can do anything else except to continue the war. A peace deal means the "grave train" ends and the economic and political fallout may be too much. One may assume that Putin and his allies are aware of this and will avoid a shutdown of the conflict. There is no peace in the near future and considerably more war.

China

China is not a friend to Canada. Once again it was found to be interfering in the most recent election as mentioned in the O Canada section. Allegedly, most of this effort was to support the Liberal Party, but details are scarce. China's embassy in Canada is too large and should be right sized to about fifty personnel or about the same number of Canadian diplomats in Beijing.

It is worth reminding folks that China is an imperial power that takes every effort to impose their will upon its neighbours. They still occupy the countries of Tibet and East Turkestan invaded in 1950. China trots out its minorities for show but actively suppresses their cultures. China is an authoritarian regime with little respect for any other country. It is to be kept in mind when dealing with them.

China's economy is currently under considerable pressure. Xi's economic policies have been questionable. The three key pillars of the economy are all undergoing significant strain or collapse. Property development has shown some health recently, but insufficient to be a main driver. Exports have been battered by the US tariff policy. Initially this year exports did well as companies tried to order goods from China before the imposition of these tariffs, now that they are imposed, exports have fallen especially to their biggest market the US. Their relationship with the EU is also poor. Exports are no longer in a

healthy place. This could change subject to negotiations, but the basic issues will remain. Xi also attacked private enterprises, favouring state owned enterprises for key loan rates. Entrepreneurs of key businesses were often arrested and essentially shaken down for money. Private enterprise was the largest employer of Chinese citizens, in particular college graduates. Xi accomplished the removal of free enterprise as a potential opposition to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Private enterprise has not recovered. Lastly and perhaps most important for any potential rise of China, consumer confidence. Through the actions of the CCP, consumer confidence is at an all time low. It will be difficult for the economy to recover.

One way to keep the masses busy is to create conditions for an outside challenge. In the case of China, it is the ongoing issue of the South China Sea and Taiwan. China has ramped up air and sea efforts to create the South China Sea as de facto Chinese waters despite court rulings that it is clearly not theirs.

Taiwan has recently been beset with large Chinese exercises that practice a blockade of the island and potentially actions taken in preparation for an invasion of that island. The CCP maintains that Taiwan is a breakaway province of China and that the One China Policy means that Taiwan is theirs even though the Republic of China's representatives also agree that there is one China but disagree which China is the "real" one. Taiwan has developed as a liberal democracy in its truest form. We have seen how China interprets its own one state, two systems approach when we see the results of their takeover of Hong Kong. It would be a travesty to allow this abhorrent authoritarian regime to ever take over Taiwan.

If allied forces were to oppose such an attack it would require movement of vast quantities of equipment and manpower. China has to overcome the problem of their own potential blockade because of the "Three Island chains" mainly controlled by Western or countries that are favourable to the West.

This paragraph used the aid of artificial intelligence system Co-Pilot for locations. In recent years China has started making inroads within the island chains and beyond. Airports are being built or modernized in the following locations: Solomon Islands, Papua - New Guinea, Fiji and Vanuatu. It should also be noted that China is aggressively approaching other island nations such as Kiribati to gain access to key infrastructure. China is actively seeking ways to breach the Three Island Chains thus making it possible to disrupt allied reinforcements from North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, South Asia, Japan and South Korea. They have taken the time and effort to achieve this goal. Will it be enough for a decision to act?

The unknown ally: Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS)

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2025/03/unknown-ally-osiss.html>



CNMT's Annual Golf Tournament

Grandview Golf & Country Club

Monday, June 23, 2025



Dear Friends,

We are thrilled to be hosting the *Annual CNMT Golf Tournament*, taking place on **Monday, June 23, 2025**, at **Grandview Golf & Country Club in Dartmouth**.

Using the link below you will find all the key details, including event schedule, registration info, and sponsorship opportunities. This promises to be a memorable afternoon of camaraderie, competition, and fun for all involved.

[Click here for all tournament information](#) :

[https://mcusercontent.com/30000c90c270c76899dc3298f/files/ed7ce3a8-8f59-2eab-5b70-ee79fee0ec3b/CNMT_Annual Gof Tournament 2025.pdf](https://mcusercontent.com/30000c90c270c76899dc3298f/files/ed7ce3a8-8f59-2eab-5b70-ee79fee0ec3b/CNMT_Annual_Gof_Tournament_2025.pdf)

We hope to see you all there, whether you are playing, sponsoring, or cheering us on!

Yours Aye,

Canadian Naval Memorial Trust

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CNMT.ca

SAVE THE DATE

Canadian Seapower 2025

Conference: September 26-27, 2025
University of Calgary

Today, Canada faces a more complex and dangerous security landscape than at any time since the Second World War. The country is at an inflection point, facing two great power competitors, a complicated ecosystem of malign non-state actors, persistent pressures eroding the rules based international order, and an uncertain partnership with the United States.

This conference will bring together academics, experts, and serving and retired naval and coast guard personnel to examine the emerging maritime security threats facing Canada and offer ideas for a path forward. Presentations and discussion will focus on several key questions:

- What threats does Canada face and how do we prioritize them?
- What platforms and capabilities are needed to meet emerging challenges?
- How does Canada manage hybrid and below-threshold security threats?
- How does Canada recapitalize its fleets to fit into a broader alliance framework?
- How does Canada manage a hostile USA?
- How does Canada prepare for war?

Join us in Calgary to discuss these vital questions and build a better understanding of what Canada needs to survive and thrive in the years ahead.

Admission

Regular: \$50.00

Student: Free

Serving Members or GoC: Free



For more information

Website: www.cmsn.ca/seapower

Contact: Mary Anderson | andersmk@ucalgary.ca

