



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

Dispatches

19 February 2021

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence and security issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of links and news of current interest, included those tweeted and posted by the Institute on social media. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some states other than Canada.

If you are not a routine recipient of *Dispatches* but wish to be so, email the Institute's Chief Information Officer (CIO) at RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. If you do not want to receive *Dispatches*, or wish to receive it at some different frequency, please inform the CIO. If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform the CIO. Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting the CIO.

Everyone is encouraged to email to the CIO links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*.

Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

RUSI(NS) also publishes:

1. a weekly Dimensions Newsletter, (formally called *Defence & Security Newsletter*) aimed at opinion leaders and industry. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, email admin@duncom.ca; and
2. a weekly *China Open Source Newsletter* of articles curated from Chinese military-related websites based inside mainland China. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email the CIO by noon Thursday. If you have an idea for a topic or speaker, please email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

New: 19 February, Friday - USNORTHCOM "The Watch" Command Magazine "Arctic eTalk." 8 am Alaska time. Arctic eTalks is a monthly forum for open discussion on key issues affecting the CircumpolarArctic for academics, defense, diplomatic and security professionals, and military leaders from Canada, Finland, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. To register: https://alaska.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_3c8PsoH7ROmlvqeOvIWB7g

24 February, Wednesday - Macdonald-Laurier Institute online expert panel "Standing Guard: The Enhanced Forward Presence on NATO's Frontier." 11 am - 12:30 pm EST. To register: https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/event/standing-guard-learned-enhanced-forward-presence-natos-frontier/?mc_cid=01b224c74f&mc_eid=a05364e0c5.

25 February, Thursday - Royal United Services Institute "Sea Power Virtual Conference 2021: Transforming Maritime Forces for an Age of Persistent Competition." To register: <https://rusi.org/event/sea-power-virtual-conference-2021-transforming-maritime-forces-age-persistent-competition>.

25 February, Thursday - J.W. Dafoe Political Studies Students' Conference and Canadian Global Affairs Institute "9/11 - The Day" with LGen (ret'd) Eric Findley, Director of Operations, NORAD on 9/11, and Paul Samyn, current editor Winnipeg Free Press but journalist in New York on 9/11. 8:30 PM AST. Via Zoom. To register: <https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZEkcU2prTliH9ekHxg5VDW0eEXrLWiKnxrT>.

New: 3 March, Wednesday - Navy League of Canada Maritime Affairs Virtual Speaker Deputy Commissioner Chris Henderson, Canadian Coast Guard, speaking on the "Future of the Canadian Coast Guard." 1200 EST. To register, email rsvp@navyleague.ca. You will receive an email confirming your registration and the meeting link will be sent out on 1 March 2021.

8 March, Monday - The Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University "Seapower from a South American Perspective & Colombian Naval Strategy." Via Zoom. To register, see: <https://kielseapowerseries.com/en/the-americas-series.html>.

9 March, Tuesday - Canadian International Council Victoria presentation "Struggles In The Spy House: Canada's Intelligence Efforts And Our Lost Secrets." 10-11:30 am PST. See: <https://thecic.org/event/cic-victoria-struggles-in-the-spy-house-canadas-intelligence-efforts-and-our-lost-secrets/>.

10-12 March, Wednesday-Friday - Canadian Defence Associations Institute Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence. In its 89th year, conference proposes a slate of speakers that includes: Minister Harjit Sajjan, former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Deputy Minister Jody Thomas, Deputy Minister Marta Morgan of Global Affairs Canada, NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoana, US Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten, NORAD/USNORTHCOM Commander General Glen VanHerck and experts from around the world. Topics range from great power competition and below the threshold warfare, AI and cyber threats, security in space, Arctic sovereignty and climate change, NATO 2030, NORAD modernization, and extremism. The event consists of half days for easier scheduling. For currently serving members with an @forces.gc.ca email, CAF/DND has taken care of the registration with no cost to the individuals. There is a DND/CAF button on the main registration page (<https://cdainstitute.ca/ottawa-conference-2021/>) that can be used. There is also a student price.

11 March, Thursday - The Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University "Brazilian Naval Strategy & China and IUU Problems in South America." Via Zoom. To register, see: <https://kielseapowerseries.com/en/the-americas-series.html>.

New: 17 March, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker from Transport Canada, speaking about TC and the Marine Security Operations Centre (East). 1300-1500. Via Zoom. Call-to-meeting to follow.

Emended: 24 March, Wednesday – save the date, RUSI(NS) **Annual General Meeting**. TBC, 1900-?. Via Zoom.

30 March, Tuesday - Centre for International Governance Innovation presentation "National Security Challenges in the 21st Century: A discussion with Vincent Rigby, National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister." 1:30-2:30 pm EST. See: <https://www.cigionline.org/events/national-security-challenges-21st-century-discussion-vincent-rigby-national-security-and>.

Recent Publications:

RUSI(NS) Comments "North Warning System – A Question of Sovereignty" by John McLearn, 30 January 2021

<https://rusi-ns.ca/north-warning-system/>

RUSI(NS) Presentation "Against Daesh, and for the World Order: An Update on Operation IMPACT in the COVID-19 Era," by MGen St-Louis, 20 January 2021

<https://rusi-ns.ca/jtf-impact/>

The United Services Institute of Nanaimo and North Island (USINNI) Newsletter Vol 29 No 1 January 2021 is available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Royal Canadian Navy, in collaboration with Gale Force Wins (podcast hub of former RCN officers Allan Dale and Gerry Carew), Monthly Podcast Series for January 2021 "CPO1 David Steeves, CD – Chief Petty Officer of the Canadian Navy."

<https://galeforcewins.com/2021/01/19/8-cpo1-david-steeves-cd-chief-petty-officer-of-the-canadian-navy/>

Canada Marine Procurement Outlook 7 January 2021

<https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-21-00941112>

Public Services and Procurement hosted presentations by DND, DFO and CCG, and TC about upcoming procurements in small vessel construction, repair, refit and life extension, in-service support, sustainment, chartering, disposal and other special projects in the realm of marine equipment.

The Military Institute of Windsor Communiqué, Volume XXXIX Number 2 February 2021 is available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association "On Watch" 27 January 2021

https://send.successbyemail.com/prvw_message2.aspx?chno=224f55da-af46-4c9e-80ac-0346fcb55d01

The Edmonton United Services Institute President's Enews February 2021 is available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University "The Americas Series" (Zoom recording) presentation "Sealift and the Merchant Marine, and the US Coast Guard," 28 January 2021

<https://kielseapowerseries.com/en/the-americas-series.html>. See article reporting event: "Navy

Questioning How to Sustain Fleet in High-End Fight, Says Analyst"

<https://news.usni.org/2021/01/29/navy-questioning-how-to-sustain-fleet-in-high-end-fight-says-analyst>

Naval Association of Canada Presentation "AOPS/JSS In Service Support (AJISS)" by Jamie Turcotte, 1 February 2021

<https://nac->

o.wildapricot.org/resources/OTTAWA%20BRANCH/Documents/Meetings/Thales%20AJISS%20presentation%20to%20NAC%20Feb%201%202021%20Final.pdf.

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association On Watch 2nd Edition
https://send.successbyemail.com/prvw_message2.aspx?chno=ceb3a2d6-9bd4-42d2-89fd-c60758c6eed0.

Tweeted by @RUSI_NS: RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email the CIO at RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. Original article title in parentheses.

Kingston Consortium on International Security @TheKCIS 12 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The first episode of KCIS Talks, our new podcast series, is out now! The Deputy Director of @QueensCidp, @hcbreede talks with Major-General Craig Aitchison all about #Arctic politics. Listen now on Soundcloud: https://soundcloud.com/the_kcis/kcis-talks-the-arctic-with-mgen-aitchison



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 12 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: @RANDCorporation's @StephaniePezard on emerging challenges & competition in the Arctic. "The main issues are safety, search and rescue, as well as good stewardship of the region—preventing pollution and disaster preparation." <https://cdainstitute.ca/cda-institute-interview-with-stephanie-pezard-emerging-challenges-strategic-competition-in-the-arctic/>



Irving Shipbuilding @IrvingShipbuild 12 Feb tweeted: This week marks the 30th anniversary of the Keel Laying for HMCS Montreal by Irving Shipbuilding. Next week we will hold the Keel Laying for the future HMCS William Hall, the @RoyalCanNavy's 4th Arctic & Offshore Patrol Ship! #cdnships #ShipsForCanada
RUSI(NS) retweeted: RUSI(NS) Information Note "Keel-Laying" <https://rusi-ns.ca/keel-laying/>
Biography: Petty Officer William Hall, VC <http://www.navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/en/navy-life/hall-bio.page>



Medevac'ing sailors 450km off coast is example of why @RCAF_ARC needs & has long-range/capable rotary & fixed-wing search & rescue #SAR aircraft
<https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/air-force-squadron-medevacs-injured-sailors-450-km-off-st-johns-coast/ar-BB1dHEim?ocid=se>
(Air Force squadron medevacs injured sailors 450 km off St. John's coast)



Canadian Armed Forces Operations @CFOperations 15 Feb tweeted: The Canadian Armed Forces continued its support to our French allies in the Sahel, by helping the French military transport supplies to Mali via a Royal Canadian Air Force CC-177 Globemaster from 429 Squadron.
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: #OpFREQUENCE - @CanadianForces aircraft move French military equipment & personnel between France & the Sahel, Africa, in support of global efforts in the region against terrorism & to help make region more secure & stable <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-frequence.html>



Royal Canadian Navy @RoyalCanNavy 17 Feb tweeted: Well and truly laid. A keel-laying ceremony was held today to mark a significant milestone for the future HMCS WILLIAM HALL <http://navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/en/news-operations/news-view.page?doc=ceremony-marks-keel-laying-for-future-hmcs-william-hall/kkei8gxu>
 (Ceremony marks keel laying for future HMCS William Hall)
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: Keel-laying = marine tradition, placing/welding of coin to ship keel/large piece of ship frame, to provide good luck & safety to ship & crew. RUSI(NS) Information Note "Keel-Laying" <https://rusi-ns.ca/keel-laying/>



STRATCOMCOE @STRATCOMCOE 12 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: We have just published a new report "Social Media Monitoring: A Primer" that provides an overview of social media monitoring & reviews tools and services, particularly focusing on disinformation and information influence. <https://stratcomcoe.org/social-media-monitoring-primer>
 (Social Media Monitoring: A Primer)



SHAPE_NATO Allied Command Operations @SHAPE_NATO 17 Feb tweeted: Did you know...The #NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system consisting of Keycap digit five RQ-4D Phoenix remotely piloted aircraft are one of the few assets owned and operated by NATO? More about this intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform here http://bit.ly/AGS_IOC
 (NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force Achieves Initial Operational Capability)
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: Hopefully CAN is participating (assigning staff) to #NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance system. Besides benefiting from shared intelligence, experience could be beneficial when @CanadianForces operate own long-range/high-endurance remotely piloted aircraft #drones



Public Services @PSPC_SPAC 18 Feb tweeted: Another milestone is achieved under the #NationalShipbuildingStrategy! We've awarded a \$453.8M contract to @MoreThanShips for the construction of an #OffshoreOceanographicScienceVessel for the @CoastGuardCAN <http://ow.ly/7CkY50DDLGH> (Government of Canada takes next step toward construction of offshore oceanographic science vessel for Canadian Coast Guard)

RUSI(NS) retweeted: New Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessels for @CoastGuardCAN welcome/necessary addition to our maritime scientific research capability. @MEOPAR_NCE report "Assessment of Needs and Opportunities for Research Vessel Use in Atlantic Canada" https://meopar.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/MEOPAR_RV_needs_assessment_report_Final.pdf



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute NS with comments:

It will be at least a decade before Canada sees any of its new frigates

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-shipbuilding-decade-frigates-1.5912961>



"One of the ways they could do that [accelerate the project in order to deliver ... as soon as possible], (the National Defence spokesperson) said, would be to construct some, less complex modules of the warship early, the way it has been in the navy's Joint Support Ship project at Seaspan's Vancouver Shipyard."

Long-lead procurement and construction of some parts, those not likely to change as a design is finalized, are ways to expedite a modern large shipbuilding project. Such construction can be known as 'early block build' (as with the Joint Support Ship project) or 'zonal construction.' When there is a focus, at times public and critical, on the start of a large shipbuilding project, there is a risk of missing points. First cutting of steel and keel-laying, the latter important when building a civil ship as it is then that building standards are locked in but not so important when building a warship, have become public relations dates more than significant dates in a ship's life. What should really be the focus of public attention is the date of acceptance (delivery, from the builder's perspective) of the warship. That is when the Navy has to plan to have available the trained people, ammunition, spare parts, jetty space and other things to operate the warship.

So, the questions could (should) be: what are the delivery dates of the first-of-class and following ships of the Canadian Surface Ship project, and how have those dates changed so far over the life of the project?

Meanwhile, the Canadian public can be assured that everything that can be done to 'move acceptance dates left' on the project calendar is being considered.

Report to Congress on Constellation-class Frigate Program (FFG-62)

<https://news.usni.org/2021/02/15/report-to-congress-on-constellation-class-frigate-program-ffg-62-2>

Report to Congress on DDG(X)

<https://news.usni.org/2021/02/16/report-to-congress-on-ddgx>



In view of the impending Parliamentary Budget Officer report on the Canadian Surface Combatant project, these two US reports can make for comparison readings. Comparing costs, though, has to be done very carefully, with appreciation of all aspects involved (e.g., building of marine infrastructure, training, weapon stock acquisition).

China's New Coast Guard Law and Implications for Maritime Security in the East and South China Seas

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-new-coast-guard-law-and-implications-maritime-security-east-and-south-china-seas>



"The CCG (China Coast Guard) has been transformed into a military-like organization under the centralized command of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission..."

Considering the potential for interaction between CCG and Royal Canadian Navy ships, whether when the latter are operating in South East Asia waters or as the former expands its activities further afield, it is important for Canadian naval personnel to understand the capabilities of the CCG. Just like studying potential adversary navies.

Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute NS: RUSI(NS) postings may be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email the CIO by noon Thursday.



<https://mailchi.mp/rusi.org/weekly12february2021?e=813c0cd331>



Spy chief says China is bent on stealing Canadian secrets, silencing critics

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/spy-chief-says-china-is-bent-on-stealing-canadian-secrets-silencing-critics-1.5301971>



Iran's Guard begins ground forces drill near Iraqi border

<https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/02/11/irans-guard-begins-ground-forces-drill-near-iraqi-border/>



German MoD pledges to sort out air defense portfolio within weeks

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/02/11/german-mod-pledges-to-sort-out-its-air-defense-portfolio-within-weeks/>



Canadian military short thousands of troops as COVID-19 impedes recruitment, training

<https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/canadian-military-short-thousands-of-troops-as-covid-19-impedes-training-efforts/ar-BB1dGbZX?ocid=se>



Canada set to benefit as NATO alliance considers paying for military deployments

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-set-to-benefit-as-nato-alliance-considers-paying-for-military/>



CAF deploys reconnaissance teams to border as feds ready COVID-19 screening centres

<https://timesnewsexpress.com/news/world/canada/caf-deploys-reconnaissance-teams-to-border-as-feds-ready-covid-19-screening-centres/>



DND unable to say exactly when delays in \$70-billion warship program began

<https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/dnd-unable-to-say-exactly-when-delays-in-70-billion-warship-program-began>



Russia Is Working to Pair Combat Jets and Drones, Too

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/02/russia-working-pair-combat-jets-and-drones-too/172109/>



Rouhani renews Iran's pledge not to pursue nuclear arms

<https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2021/02/iran-rouhani-pledge-nuclear-arms-weapons-mahmoud-alavi.html>



Cyber War

SolarWinds Update:

Observations:

210216

[The malicious code in SolarWinds attack was the work of 1,000+ developers](#)

[Many SolarWinds Customers Failed to Secure Systems Following Hack](#)

[France agency ANSSI links Russia's Sandworm APT to attacks on hosting providers](#)

[Sandworm Hackers Hit French Monitoring Software Vendor Centreon](#)

[France's cyber-agency says Centreon IT management software sabotaged by Russian Sandworm](#)

210217

[France ties Russia's Sandworm to a multiyear hacking spree](#)

[Centreon says that recently disclosed campaigns only targeted obsolete versions of its open-source software](#)

Comments:

1. SolarWinds:

A. While I agree that many people worked on SolarWinds, experience suggests that only a very few people have the genius, the inspiration required to create malware. Many engineers are useful in analyzing existing code. Teams of skilled programmers, under strict control, might be good at rapid exploitation of a vulnerability.

B. This is something I warned about. In my experience many organizations refuse to admit cyber security issues and in this case since there is no direct evidence that they were hacked, not admitting they were hacked means not admitting to any liability. Lawyers might recommend this as the safest policy.

This infers that people who think like this don't understand the implications of a network breach. Again experience suggests they don't. Organizations are most often run by Lawyers, Accountants, MBA etc. Executives at that level have no requirement (and no interest) in learning cyber security or other forms of computer literacy.

2. Centreon: Centreon is the French equivalent to SolarWinds. It is a computer security company that sells advanced network security systems. The articles suggest that Russia's Security/Intelligence organizations made a multi-year attempt to penetrate Centreon and its network security software. The scope of the attack is not yet clear. Centreon itself probably has been compromised. Centreon admits that some of its clients were compromised. It is not clear how many clients have been compromised.

Analysis:

1. What is immediately evident is that SolarWinds was not a 'one of' hack. It is already described as a complex multi-year hack. This requires: years of planning, infrastructure to support the effort, manning by highly skilled personnel, command and control, and among other things, political will.

This infers an extremely advanced cyber warfare organization or organizations on the order of the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.

2. Given the SolarWinds and the Centreon hacks I ASSESS it is highly likely that there are more Russian major hacks and hacking efforts that remain undetected.

3. Politically Russia has claimed the 'SolarWinds hack' was only cyber-espionage, inferring there is nothing to get excited about. This is a necessary political position that Russia must take to cover any additional hacking efforts.

4. To date no country has been held accountable for cyber espionage, cyber sabotage or cyber warfare. Given the scope of SolarWinds in the United States the Biden Administration will be pushed to generate a substantive response.

A. Although there have been substantial cyber attacks on nations, somehow the international community has not managed to recognize them as such. The reality of cyber warfare has been ignored. This is a major obstacle that will have to be overcome.

B. The United Nations will not be a useful venue for creating a response given that Russia and China both hold seats on the U.N. Security Council.

C. One of the few alternatives is that a defensive organization such as NATO would have to step up. NATO would have to recognize the cyber attacks as substantive attacks on one or more members.

5. Given the obstacles to holding any nation accountable for hacking, nations will continue to use hacking / cyber espionage as unlimited tools for the near to middle term. Even if treaties limiting the use of hacking are brokered, those treaties will most probably be ineffective.

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https://cscis.org/dt_team/12/

Other Sources: Recommendations for ‘themes’ (e.g., #drones) to list in this section are welcome.

#Arctic

Breaking Down the US Navy’s Blueprint for a Blue Arctic

<https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/breaking-down-the-us-navy-s-blueprint-for-a-blue-arctic>

Arctic Strategy and Operations

Note the links to news, reports and podcasts: <https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/arctic>

#airpower

Desert Storm: A View from the Front

<https://balloonstodrones.com/2021/02/13/desertstorm30-desert-storm-a-view-from-the-front/>

#China

A Guide to China's Unprecedented Naval Shipbuilding Drive

<https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/a-guide-to-china-s-unprecedented-naval-shipbuilding-drive>

#communications

It is time to kill our darlings

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/02/12/it-is-time-to-kill-our-darlings-rhetoric/>

#domestic operations

Defence should train more for MACA

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/02/10/op-ed-defence-should-train-more-for-maca-military-assistance-civil-authority/>

#drones

Rise of a “Drone Superpower?” Turkish Drones Upending Russia’s Near Abroad

<https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/turkish-drones/>

U.S. Department of Defense Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Strategy

<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/07/2002561080/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-COUNTER-SMALL-UNMANNED-AIRCRAFT-SYSTEMS-STRATEGY.PDF>

The drone defense dilemma: How unmanned aircraft are redrawing battle lines

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/02/15/the-drone-defense-dilemma-how-unmanned-aircraft-are-redrawing-battle-lines/>

#information security

The greatest security threat of the post-truth age

"Epistemic security": <https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20210209-the-greatest-security-threat-of-the-post-truth-age>

#land warfare

Run Silent, Fight Deep: Reimagining the Mechanized Force

<https://iron-man-actual.medium.com/run-silent-fight-deep-reimagining-the-mechanized-force-6fec2634d1fe>

#leadership

Humility, The Inconspicuous Quality of a Master of War

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2021/Clark-Master-of-War/linkId/111419064/>

#training

The Training Mandate







<https://cimsec.org/the-training-mandate/47621>

#transition

Ministers of National Defence and Veterans Affairs mark progress on transition initiative related to Strong, Secure, Engaged

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2021/02/ministers-of-national-defence-and-veterans-affairs-mark-progress-on-transition-initiative-related-to-strong-secure-engaged.html>

Other:

Terminology Errors	How is it seen by:		
	sailors	ordinary people	
<p>Ain't it the truth. Especially painful when such errors are made by the media (maybe, noting the paucity of defence correspondents in Canada, we could allow some leeway), even by official communications staff who should know their subject better. Of course, there are so many teeth-gritting versions of this: 'tanks' to describe armoured cars and tracked carriers, 'battleships' for destroyers, 'troops' for sailors (!).</p> <p>Okay, readers, what are your unfavorite mis-uses of military terms?</p>		Tanker	Ship Boat
		Bulker	Ship Boat
		LNG Carrier	Ship Boat
		Ro-Ro	Ship Boat
		Container ship	Ship Boat
		Submarine Boat	Submarine

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

This is a CNBC article by Sam Snead (not the golfer, I think he is dead) [Why China banned the BBC, and why it matters \(msn.com\)](#) which discusses the implications of the Chinese ban on the BBC International service. One thing I didn't realize is that China had already banned the Chinese language version. The main reason given is that the BBC has damaged China's national interest through its articles. It should be noted that China's national interests are not damaged but rather it is the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) which has bungled the production of China; the BBC doesn't need to do anything for the CCP is inept all by itself. It does focus the fact that the CCP is eliminating any organization that does not toe the CCP line. What we recently saw with the WHO investigation is an excellent example. The CCP refused entry of the investigation team for months and also most recently didn't allow the team to visit key areas nor did the CCP provide the initial data thus making an absolute mockery of the issue. The CCP is a danger to the entire world.

Canadian leaders have somehow slept through the attacks on the Canadian economy by the CCP, the arrest of the 'Two Michaels' on bogus charges as well as the death sentences being handed to four other Canadians by the CCP, the ongoing religious crackdown on Christians, Buddhists, Muslims and members of other religions, the imposition of new security laws which essentially outlaws democracy in Hong Kong (HK) as well as new proposed laws that will restrict who can leave HK, not to mention the crackdown in occupied Tibet and occupied East Turkistan, also known as Xinxiang Province, with increasing evidence of genocide against Uyghurs. It makes one cringe; how can anyone get this so wrong ethically and morally?

Canada has championed the campaign against hostage diplomacy, which has gained the support of 58 countries out of a possible 195 in the world. This new initiative does not specifically name China or the CCP directly. The CCP has still taken offence at Canada's campaign and states that megaphone diplomacy will not work, essentially saying that only abject surrender will do, which is pretty close to our current government's approach to the CCP to begin with. China has been engaged in grey area warfare long before the Michaels, including propaganda efforts, extra-national policing against Canadian citizens of Chinese extraction, economic warfare as we saw with our canola crop, all again long before the Michaels. The CCP's espionage efforts are reputed to have led to the economic downfall of Nortel through industrial espionage. This has been repeated through the Sino-Can agreement of Covid-19 vaccine research which saw Canada handing over disease samples to the CCP and then having the agreement cancelled by China after they got the samples. Now this week we see that Huawei is being invited to participate in research with the University of Ottawa despite security concerns. According to Marc Garneau this agreement was undertaken by an arms-length body which selects research partners. It should be noticed that Huawei is the 18th largest contributor to R&D growth and investment in Canada. The article written by Robert Fife in the Globe and Mail on 15 February 2021 (<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-ottawa-funds-cutting-edge-huawei-research-at-canadian-universities/>) notes strong reservations by Canada's security community. The head of CSIS has recently reported on the issue of the actions of the CCP in public, which has been ignored by the current Canadian government. At some point, even this government has to understand that the CCP is a threat to Canada and the world. It is not a friend or anything close to it. Substantial counter-action needs to be taken in conjunction with allies to meet the increasing and ongoing threat posed by the CCP.

The Canadian government has decided not to decide whether what the CCP is doing to Uyghurs is genocide or not, but is looking for more information. Apparently witnesses and survivors are not enough nor the apparent decisions by the US and others that in fact the CCP is conducting a genocidal campaign. Opposition parties within Canada have also been concerned about the lack of action in this regard. At least one party has suggested that the Olympics be either cancelled or that the location of the 2022 Winter Olympics be moved to some other location because of the CCP actions. The government of Canada has stated that this is a decision of the International Olympic Committee and any Canadian participation is the responsibility of the Canadian Olympic Committee. The actions of the CCP are clear and so should the decision by any thinking person.

Now Russia, where demonstrations against the Putin regime have continued for a third weekend. The opposition moved to individual courtyard demonstrations with social media used to bring people together. This new tactic, taken from the example of activities of the opposition in Belarus, was largely successful in keeping arrests down. The Putin regime has used large numbers of police and National Guard to stop the demonstrations and to threaten demonstrators, to no avail. Russia continues to have high numbers of Covid cases, far beyond the official count of over 4M folks - one internal Russian estimate was stated as being nearly three times that number which also includes death statistics.

One interesting point is many of the demonstrators are not pro-Navalny but rather are using his arrest as a catalyst against overall corruption. Opposition also includes groups that are opposed to Russian adventurism in Syria, Libya and other places around the world with an ongoing and steady drip of casualties, the actions of the government against the LBGTQ+ community, lack of opportunities within Russia and the ongoing efforts against folks leaving the country as well as arrest on trumped-up charges of opposition leaders and leaders who are not pro-Putin. Leadership of these diverse groups is still not really clear but there is a general increase in dissatisfaction within Russia in general over Putin who is increasingly seen as last year's man. The other interesting piece is that the majority of demonstrators are the youth of the country but also includes an increasing number of what used to be firm Putin supporters, such as pensioners and people of middle age.

Speaking of Belarus, demonstrations are ongoing as are the regime's actions to crush them. The weather is poor now and that in itself has taken a toll on demonstrations. In interview with the German media outlet DW, many spoke of the loss of fear within the public and the loss of credibility of the Lukashenko regime. Many expressed the opinion that the regime is dead and will never recover its previous position. The opposition is changing tactics to meet the regime's new tactics. On 15 Feb 2021, the regime started raiding the homes of journalists and known activists, with limited success. Foreign correspondence have not received renewed visas or have had their visas cancelled. Despite all the regime's efforts, there is a steady and ongoing decline in their ability to influence the situation. It does not look like the regime will ever really recover.

Ukraine has been involved with negotiations with NATO and the ongoing training mission. The biggest news is that Ukraine also stopped the broadcasting of three pro-Russian television channels, stating that propaganda financed by the aggressor is not free speech. One does not have to give your enemies a voice particularly if that is a voice of an authoritarian regime. Something Canada might remember when dealing with the CCP and its support of the Chinese language press in Canada, amongst other issues with the CCP. Latvia has also taken similar measures recently.

Nagorno Karabakh has been relatively quiet although there are continuing conflicts. The Putin regime has put in a Russian peacekeeping force and has conducted meetings chaired by President Putin to develop a more permanent solution to the issue. The general thought is that this issue is not finished and that Turkey will likely impose its will to a degree, especially as Russia tried to "freeze" it out of the negotiations.

Myanmar continues to have major demonstrations even as the military cracks down on demonstrators, which apparently also include a large number of police. Gen Hlang is considered a human rights abuser and is suspected as being a war criminal because of his actions against the Rohingya population. There is also suspicion that he is involved in several Chinese initiatives under the "Belt and Road" program whereby he is alleged to get a slice of the action. These projects were likely to be cancelled by the civilian government. Currently, government politicians are being held as prisoners.

There are many more issues and concerns this past few weeks than can be written here and many of these issues are long standing.