



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 28 May 2021

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence and security issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

If you are not a direct recipient of *Dispatches* but wish to be so, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. If you do not want to receive *Dispatches*, or wish to receive it at some different frequency, please inform RUSI(NS). If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

Your Institute Needs You!

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia is seeking Institute members to serve in the front trenches as *Dispatches* editors, Facebook admin and website admin. To enlist or to seek more information about these essential and other positions, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

You Can Help! Step Up Now!



Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

2 June, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Brigadier-General J.J. Major, Chief of Staff Operations, Canadian Army Headquarters. The topic of his presentation is "The Canadian Army at an Inflection Point - Delivering Excellence Today and into the Future." To register, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com by close of business Sunday, 30 May. As the subject line for your registration email, put: RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers 2 June 2021 Registration. Zoom joining instructions will be emailed to registrants by end Monday, 31 May.

Advance viewing for BGen Major's talk: Advancing with Purpose: The Canadian Army Modernization Strategy

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iYXLoNHAh5k>

6 June, Sunday - Halifax Military Heritage Preservation Society presentation by Dr Tim Cook, "The Fight For History." 7 pm Atlantic time. Via Zoom. On the occasion of the 77th D-Day Anniversary and the Battle of Normandy on 6 June 1944 - one of the most pivotal events of the Second World War in turning back the march of the Nazis across Europe - the HMHPS invites you to attend a presentation by military historian and author, Dr Tim Cook. Tim will share reflections from his latest book, "The Fight for History, 76 Years of Forgetting, Remembering, and Remaking Canada's Second World War," on how Canada remembered after the war - not only D-Day, but many other aspects of the war. To register, email Leo Deveau (leo.deveau@eastlink.ca) and you will receive later the web link and password to attend the presentation.

15 June, Tuesday - Save the date: Navy League of Canada Maritime Affairs Lunch will feature a prominent speaker from the Canadian Coast Guard. 1200-1300 EDT. Invitation and registration details to be announced.

Emended: 23 June, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Major Scott Roach, Canadian Joint Warfare Centre, will speak about Canadian Armed Forces use of wargaming. To register, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com by close of business Sunday, 20 June. As the subject line for your registration email, put: RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers 23 June 2021 Registration. Zoom joining instructions will be emailed to registrants by end Monday, 21 June.

Advance reading for Maj Roach's talk: Canada to launch wargaming course

<https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/training-simulation/canada-launch-wargaming-course/>

Recent Publications:

Except where otherwise indicated, publications are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

New: RUSI(NS) Presentations "Arctic Air Operations: Canada and United States Agile Fighter Employment in Defence of North America" by Colonels Moar and Fesler, 19 May 2021, https://rusi-ns.ca/arctic_air_operations/

New: The Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) Occasional Volume 6, Issue 2, 24 May 2021.

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association "On Watch" 19 May edition

https://send.successbyemail.com/prvw_message2.aspx?chno=b368be76-0abd-42d0-97be-d4dd6a7fe4ee.

Royal Alberta United Services Institute News Volume 30, Issue 2, April-June 2021

https://rausi.ca/images/edocman/newsletters/rausi/2020s/RAUSI_News_2021_Vol_30_Iss_2-April-June.pdf.

US Northern Command's The Watch, Issue 3, Great Power Competition

<https://thewatch-magazine.com/v3-eng/>.




Veterans Ombud Newsletter Volume 5: January - April, 2021

The Edmonton United Services Institute President's Enews May 2021.

The Military Institute of Windsor Communiqué Volume XXXIX Number 5, May 2021.

The Newsletter of the Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island, Volume 54, 2nd Quarter 2021.

Tweeted by @RUSI_NS: RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>Canadian Coast Guard @CoastGuardCAN May 19 tweeted: #BravoZulu to the Ahousaht First Nation and @CoastNations on acquiring a new dedicated response vessel through the Indigenous Community Boat Volunteer Pilot Program. #OceanProtectionPlan RUSI(NS) retweeted: Yes, #BravoZulu (well done) Ahousaht First Nation & @CoastNations "Government of Canada & Ahousaht First Nation partnering on new response vessel to strengthen marine safety in British Columbia" https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2021/05/government-of-canada-and-ahousaht-first-nation-partnering-on-new-response-vessel-to-strengthen-marine-safety-in-british-columbia.html Coastal Nations Coast Guard Auxiliary https://cn-cga.ca/</p>	 A photograph of a white and grey Coast Guard Auxiliary boat on a body of water. The boat is moving, creating a wake. In the background, there are mountains and a cloudy sky.
<p>Irving Shipbuilding @IrvingShipbuild 21 May tweeted: Irving Shipbuilding @IrvingShipbuild 21 May tweeted: The first of 440,000 parts of the future HMCS Frédéric Rolette, @RoyalCanNavy's 5th Arctic & Offshore Patrol Ship, this steel will be part of the keel unit. #ShipsForCanada #CdnShips RUSI(NS) retweeted: Bravo @IrvingShipbuilding! In modern ship construction (units, blocks, modules), 1st steel cutting has gained incr public attn. Keel-laying is traditional date marking start of constr & (for civil ships) locking in construction standards. "Keel-Laying" https://rusi-ns.ca/keel-laying-2/</p>	 A close-up photograph of a steel cutting process in a ship's hull. The scene is illuminated with bright red and purple lights, highlighting the intricate metalwork and the cutting tool.
<p>Canadian Armed Forces Operations @CFOperations 21 May tweeted: #DYK Canadian Armed Forces personnel provide specialized capabilities and expertise to the Multinational Forces & Observers and most of their current strength are members from The Royal Canadian Logistics Service? #OpCALUMET RUSI(NS) retweeted: Operation CALUMET = CAN support to Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), independent peacekeeping operation in Sinai Peninsula https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-calumet.html @CanadianForces provides leadership/expertise in logistics, engineering, training. Military Police provide policing & security</p>	 A photograph of a soldier in military uniform standing on a platform. The soldier is holding a large flag with multiple national symbols. To the right, a Canadian flag is flying on a pole. In the background, there is a wooden signpost with directional arrows and a clear blue sky.

RCAF Operations @RCAFOperations 22 May tweeted: Proud of our #RCAFOperations #450Sqn members flying and maintaining CH-147s Chinooks Helicopter to help @1CMBG_1GBMC and @CFHSvcs access remote communities in northern Manitoba to assist with vaccinations as part of #OPVECTOR
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: Operation VECTOR #OpVECTOR = @CanadianForces #CAF support to federal, provincial & territorial governments for distribution of #COVID19 vaccines <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-vector.html>



RCMP @rcmpgrcpolice 23 May tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Do you know our origin story? As we celebrate our 148th birthday, step back in time and read about our journey from the North-West Mounted Police to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. #RCMP150 <http://rcmp-grc.ca/10113> (History of the RCMP)



The Naval Association of Canada @navalassn 24 May tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The Royal Navy has issued a contract for construction of an Extra-Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicle commanded by Artificial Intelligence. This BBS article discusses some of the challenges faced by the developers. (The Navy sub commanded by artificial intelligence <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56993035>)



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia with comments:

Royal Navy Is Painting Its Patrol Boats In WWI-Style Dazzle Camouflage

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40355/royal-navy-is-painting-its-patrol-boats-in-wwi-style-dazzle-camouflage>



Dazzle is a First World War/Great War paint scheme. In the Second World War, Admiralty disruptive schemes were applied to Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) ships. Modern RCN HMC Ships REGINA and MONCTON are currently painted with 'Admiralty disruptive scheme for D-Day' in commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. See: "Naval Camouflage and its Application on HMC Ships REGINA and MONCTON: A Brief History" <https://rusi-ns.ca/naval-camouflage-and-its-application-on-hmc-ships-regina-and-moncton-a-brief-history/>

It is not apparent whether HM Ships TAMAR and SPEY and sister ships are being painted with a dazzle scheme for operational or other reasons.

HMS Spey @HMS_Spey tweeted 20 May 21: Yes, the weather might be a bit grey, but little do you know we ordered it specially to test the efficiency of our new paint... it's coming along nicely! #SorryNotSorry #Speytacular @apgroupuk @RNinScotland
https://twitter.com/HMS_Spey/status/1395414347967569926



New coast guard ship beset by malfunctions, training delays 18 months after N.S. arrival

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/coast-guard-ship-capt-jacques-cartier-behind-schedule-1.6031596>

It is normal for a first-of-class ship to have an extended period of trials, training and engineering work after being delivered.



Passenger Vessel for Hire by Conservation and Protection for Patrols in waters surrounding the Eastern shore of New Brunswick

<https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-21-00955197>

On-call contracted fishing vessels for government regulatory/patrol functions, in this case "fisheries enforcement and surveillance responsibilities." Might this be divisive between community members? Hmm, might be better to develop a capability to deploy Fisheries craft and crew rapidly to operating areas.



Lawmakers Question MARAD on Sealift Readiness

<https://news.usni.org/2020/03/12/lawmakers-question-marad-on-sealift-readiness>

The US obviously has a much greater requirement than Canada does in shipping our forces overseas to where they may need to be to deter or counter aggression. But Canada does need to move stuff, and strategic airlift cannot match sealift. Canada has learned from the GTS KATIE incident, where army equipment was held up in a commercial dispute, what can happen when sealift is not under government control. For a while, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) had a full-time charter of a small container ship (I sailed in one, WLOCEWEK, a Soviet-era Polish container vessel apparently ready to be reconfigured as a landing ship). It can be a question, even with as little shipping as the CAF may need for likely operations, whether Canada would be able to access the shipping it could need in a major confrontation. Is there the infrastructure ashore to support a major deployment, and how would that be organized? Is there sufficient ship conversion and repair capability, and if a situation lasted, sufficient




shipbuilding? A study of current Canadian-flagged shipping and Canadian shipbuilding would be interesting to peruse.

Protecting Innocents in Combat - A Proposed New Act to Sanction and Deter Foreign Actors from Using Human Shields

<https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/protecting-innocents-combat-new-proposed-legislation-deter-use-human-shields/>
and paper:
https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/20210427_Protecting_innocents_in_combat_Teich_PAPER_FWeb.pdf

The protection of innocents in combat is a part of warfare. One hesitates to use the word routine as historically efforts to protect them are inadequate or not made. It is part of the environment in which our military operate. It has to be part of the knowledge of our military, of those civil authorities who direct military action and of the general population on whose support government direction and military action depend.



The U.S. Military In Competition: Supporting Effort One

<https://cimsec.org/the-u-s-military-in-competition-supporting-effort-one/>

Cribbed together from the article: The Joint Force Information Component Commander (JFICC) manages cross-domain interaction, synchronizing projected effects of all efforts in the region and deploying information-related capabilities as a demonstrable force, in line with the forces operating in the other domains.

Whether an organization (military or non-military, the utility is the same) includes a JFICC (by whatever title), it makes sense to ensure unity of information action.



Money wasted on tanks while maritime falters

<https://navalinstitute.com.au/money-wasted-on-tanks-while-maritime-falters/>

Putting aside the argument of buying one particular capability versus another capability (and there have been and are so many of those arguments), what makes this article worth reading is the example it provides of public comments about why a capability is suitable or not for a state's military and strategy. Commentary like that doesn't have to be confined to closeted debates of military commanders and staffs. The public, who ultimately are paying for capabilities and whose support is essential for state action using those capabilities, can learn from such public commentaries. And may be able to contribute thoughts that haven't necessarily arisen in staff talks.



And this Australian piece is another example of an increasing focus in public articles on the maritime domain in state strategies. There is increasing recognition that freedom of the ocean common is important for global (national, if you want to be insular) security and prosperity.

Congressional Budget Office "The U.S. Military's Force Structure: A Primer, 2021 Update"

<https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-05/57088-Force-Structure-Primer.pdf>

It would be super to see a Canadian version of this CBO report. Would be a great educational tool.



Bring Out Your Dead? Dealing with the Fallen in Future Conflict

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/05/19/bring-out-your-dead-dealing-fallen-future-conflict/>

Military mortuary affairs is a logistics function. But that doesn't mean it has to be carried out by people in uniform. Like other services, there can be consideration of civil-military collaboration. But to do so effectively calls for planning, training and exercising. Is Canada prepared for a conflict mass casualty incident?

(BTW, mass casualty is defined as a much smaller number in civil emergency management planning. A handful or so, essentially when responding resources are overwhelmed.)



Introducing 'The China Intelligence'

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/05/introducing-china-intelligence/174256/>

This article is about 'open source intelligence' (OSINT) and public messaging, two topics not often enough considered together. Intelligence has long been derived from reading the open or public media. Despite concerns about mixing truth (cynically one could say 'to the extent one gets truth in the public media') and falsehood, those who practice media operations and those who are in the business of affecting the thinking of competitors and adversaries and for whom truth is the best weapon, really do need to be coordinating if not collaborating. That includes exchanging procedures, studying competitors and potential adversaries, and even studying one's own people, for the last are the targets of the former. And to protect one's own, one has to know them and their environment.



No Ordinary Boats: Identifying China's Maritime Militia

<https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/no-ordinary-boats-identifying-china-s-maritime-militia>

The use by China of its fishing fleets, especially those that are maritime militia, for inter-state action make the vessels appropriate targets for intelligence tracking and analysis. This is not something that Canada can ignore, as Chinese vessels are intruding into the waters of our allies and friends, and are certainly encountered when our government vessels, including warships, and merchant ships carry out their legitimate sailings abroad. The Fisheries and Oceans Canada National Fishery Intelligence Service have an importance well beyond that of monitoring activity by local fisherman in Canadian waters.



See: National Fisheries Intelligence Service receives international award for excellence

<https://www.canada.ca/en/fisheries-oceans/news/2018/04/national-fisheries-intelligence-service-receives-international-award-for-excellence.html>

Also note: The China Maritime Militia Bookshelf: Latest Developments, Statements, Analysis, Fleet Estimates & Trilingual Wikipedia Entry

<https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/china-maritime-militia-bookshelf-latest-developments-fleet-erickson>

RUSI(NS) planners are considering seeking a speaker on the National Fisheries Intelligence Service.

Explosion rocks X-Press Pearl, all crew evacuated as Sri Lanka prepares for the worst

<https://splash247.com/explosion-rocks-x-press-pearl-all-crew-evacuated-as-sri-lanka-prepares-for-the-worst/>

Another containership fire resulting in a Hazardous & Noxious Substances (HNS) situation. Aside from harbour tugs and offshore support vessels with fire monitors, there is no defined at-sea HNS response capability in Canada. Interesting question to pose to Canadian Coast Guard where 16 multi-purpose vessels are to be built.



Within Europe, a Marine HNS Response Manual project was recently implemented through an inter-regional effort, including the participation of the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC), the Bonn Agreement for the Greater North Sea and its approaches and the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) for the Baltic Sea. The project benefits from the technical support and expertise of expert partner institutions such as Cedre, ISPRA and ITOPF.

Germany is currently building replacement multi-purpose vessels with comprehensive HNS response capability. Germany covers response to HNS in its National Contingency Plan. Germany's capability for responding to HNS spills is limited to the recovery of mainly packaged goods. However, interventions in highly explosive and toxic atmospheres are possible because of the very sophisticated gas protection and analyzing systems on board its 4 multipurpose vessels (2 stationed in the North Sea and 2 in the Baltic). These vessels are all equipped with detection, recovery and storage devices for hazardous substances and accommodation and equipment facilities for additional strike units of 30 people each. They can also do sampling of air and water and in situ atmospheric monitoring. Germany

has specialized response teams for HNS spills. The fire brigade are also available for HNS response. Regular exercises and training programs have been established for vessels and personnel. Germany has several experts from scientific agencies and industry who come together on a case by case basis to advise the CCME. Germany has been involved in the response to a number of HNS incidents, including IEVOLI SUN (2000, Styrene, methyl ethyl ketone, isopropyl alcohol and ANDINET (2003, Arsenic pentoxide). (Information from EMSA, 2008)

Imagine the incident occurring off Sri Lanka were to happen in Vancouver or Montreal, major population centers hemmed in by mountains or, a river respectively.

MBDA Wins Sea Ceptor Contract From UK MoD For Royal Navy Type 31 Frigates

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/05/mbda-wins-sea-ceptor-contract-from-uk-mod-for-royal-navy-type-31-frigates/>



With the extent to which the Sea Ceptor naval air defence system and its Common Anti-Air Modular Missile will be used by different navies, including Canada's, and ship classes, it is a reasonable expectation that maintenance and upgrading of the system and supply of missiles over the life of the Canadian Surface Combatant project ships will be eased.

Also see: MBDA Confirms Sea Ceptor Order For Canadian Surface Combatant

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/04/mbda-confirms-sea-ceptor-order-for-canadian-surface-combatant/>

Other Sources:

#Arctic

Report to Congress on Changes in the Arctic

<https://news.usni.org/2021/05/20/report-to-congress-on-changes-in-the-arctic-9>

A New Guide to the Heating Arctic

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-guide-heating-arctic>

Reflections on Arctic Arms Control and Proposals for an Arctic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (ANWFZ)

<https://www.naadsn.ca/research/>

US military options to enhance Arctic defense

<https://www.brookings.edu/research/us-military-options-to-enhance-arctic-defense/>

The Navy has a new ocean to worry about, it's not clear how it's going to deal with it, top lawmaker says

<https://www.businessinsider.com/luria-not-clear-how-navy-will-handle-arctic-russia-china-2021-5>

Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress

<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41153>

#artillery

Fire Support in Time and Space Lessons from the Ivy Division's Joint Air-Ground Integration Center
<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2021/Lewin-Fire-Support/>

#Canadian Surface Combatant

How to move Canadian shipbuilding forward
<https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/williams-how-to-move-canadian-shipbuilding-forward>

#cognitive warfare

Countering cognitive warfare: awareness and resilience
<https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/05/20/countering-cognitive-warfare-awareness-and-resilience/index.html>

#cyber security

The Next Big Gasoline Shortage Is Coming
<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2021/05/ransomware-attack-network-pipeline-hack/618893/>

Top Cybersecurity Trends For 2021 and Beyond
<https://www.hsaj.org/articles/17153>

Protecting Canada and improving cyber defence: three challenges
<https://www.hilltimes.com/2021/05/24/protecting-canada-and-improving-cyber-defence-three-challenges/298196>

Article available from RUSI(NS) if you are unable to access otherwise.

#defence policy

Opposition MPs say they're worried about lack of defence spending in budget, as experts to future of NORAD
<https://www.hilltimes.com/2021/05/24/lack-of-defence-spending-in-budget-worries-mps-as-experts-to-future-of-norad/298294>

Article available from RUSI(NS) if you are unable to access otherwise.

How secure is defence funding in the future?
<https://www.hilltimes.com/2021/05/24/how-secure-is-defence-funding-in-the-future/298031>

Article available from RUSI(NS) if you are unable to access otherwise.

The cost of Defence ASPI defence budget brief 2021–2022
Comparison with Australia: <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cost-defence-aspi-defence-budget-brief-2021-2022>

and report itself:

The Cost of Defence - ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2021–2022
<https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2021-05/The%20Cost%20of%20Defence%202021-2022.pdf>

#drones #logistics #China

Sustaining China's Sovereignty Claims: The PLA's Embrace of Unmanned Logistics

<https://jamestown.org/program/sustaining-chinas-sovereignty-claims-the-plas-embrace-of-unmanned-logistics/>

#emergency management planning

Theoretical to Practical: Documents that Take Us from Planning to Response

<https://www.hsaj.org/articles/17172>

#human smuggling

MV Sun Sea (Canada)

https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/case-law-doc/migrantsmugglingcrimetype/can/2013/mv_sun_sea_canada.html

#human trafficking

Simons Center National Security Forum focuses on human trafficking

<https://thesimonscenter.org/simons-center-national-security-forum-focuses-on-human-trafficking/>
RUSI(NS) members may recall the our Distinguished Speaker from the RCMP who spoke on human trafficking. This is much a local problem

#influence activities

Facebook Threat Report - The State of Influence Operations 2017-2020

<https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/IO-Threat-Report-May-20-2021.pdf>

"This problem of online influence operations requires a 'whole-of-society' response, the report's authors warn."

#information operations

More than Half the Battle - Information and Command in a New American Way of War

<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/more-than-half-the-battle>

#irregular warfare

Irregular Warfare - A Leadership Challenge

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2021/April/Irregular-Warfare/linkId/119227939/>

#law of war

Three Myths About the Laws of War and the Israel-Hamas Conflict

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29669/a-closer-look-at-hamas-israel-war-crimes-and-international-law>

#leadership

Balancing People First and Mission Always

<https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2021/05/24/balancing-people-first-and-mission-always/>

On Joint #Leadership: The Importance of Communication

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/4/7/on-joint-leadership-the-importance-of-communication>

#learning

Learning for Warfighters: A Conversation with Major General William F. Mullen III (ret.)

<https://cimsec.org/learning-for-warfighters-a-conversation-with-major-general-william-f-mullen-iii-ret/>

#logistics

Sustaining the Fight: Resilient Maritime Logistics for a New Era

<https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/sustaining-the-fight-resilient-maritime-logistics-for-a-new-era/publication/1>

Force Multiplying Technologies for Logistics Support to Military Operations

<https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18832/force-multiplying-technologies-for-logistics-support-to-military-operations>

#readiness

Moving Toward A Holistic, Rigorous, Analytical Readiness Framework

<https://cimsec.org/moving-toward-a-holistic-rigorous-analytical-readiness-framework/>

#space #air defence

Evaluating Integrated Defense Systems: How to Proactively Defend the Final Frontier

<https://thestategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/7/3/evaluating-integrated-defense-systems-how-to-proactively-defend-the-final-frontier>

#strategy

Deterrence through denial: A strategy for an era of reduced warning time

<https://www.aspi.org.au/report/deterrence-through-denial-strategy-era-reduced-warning-time>

Japan's Backwards Island Defense Strategy Against China Is a Mistake

<https://www.19fortyfive.com/2021/05/japans-backwards-island-defense-strategy-against-china-is-a-mistake/>

#United States

The U.S. Military's Force Structure: A Primer, 2021 Update

<https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-05/57088-Force-Structure-Primer.pdf>

#urban operations

Experts address the challenges of urban operations

<https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2021/05/experts-address-the-challenges-of-urban-operations/>

#warfare #Russia

War by Other Means - Russia's Use of Private Military Contractors at Home and Abroad

<https://jamestown.org/programs/russ-pmc/>

Other:

Online Survey: Proposed designs for the **National Monument to Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan**

<https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/art-monuments/upcoming-projects/survey-national-monument-afghanistan.html>

Available until **9 Jun**.

Canadian Armed Forces Current Operations

Go to <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations.html> and click on the pins.



Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

Belarus

President Lukashenko has outdone himself by creating a new form of air piracy: ‘state air piracy.’ On Sunday, 23 May 2021, President Lukashenko personally ordered a Belarussian fighter to ‘escort’ a Ryanair flight to Lithuania back to land at Minsk. The reason given to the pilot was that there was a bomb on board and that he had to land in Minsk under threat. It became apparent quickly that there was no bomb and that the real target was Mr Roman Protasevich, a well-known activist who was involved with last year’s demonstrations against the Lukashenko regime. Mr Protasevich was arrested with his girlfriend Sofiya Sapega (She is a Russian citizen. Russia said she will be released shortly.) who was accompanying him back to Lithuania and his job with the Belarussian exile media outlet ‘Nexta.’ Mr Protasevich had been declared a terrorist by the Lukashenko regime.

Almost all western airlines are now avoiding Belarussian airspace and Belarussian airlines are now banned in many countries. There is every evidence that further bans and sanctions will be coming shortly from the EU and others. The Lukashenko regime which has very little credibility in most of the

world, has taken short term gain for massive pain in the long run. The only country that has shown any support is Russia. Belarus will become an increasing burden on Russia's already weakened economy. Further sanctions, however, will be of limited value as the Belarussian economy is stagnant, moribund and already under sanctions. Something more substantial must be done to discourage future acts of this nature. The real question is whether the western nations will act effectively or by their lack of action actually encourage future use of this method by other state actors. Russia has said that it is unfortunate that airlines are avoiding Belarussian airspace, saying it will be more uncomfortable for passengers as flights will take so much longer...one has to wonder who writes their stuff as it goes in the category of truth is stranger than fiction.

The article courtesy of RUSI(NS) member James Simiana called "Other Regimes will Hijack Planes Too" by Anne Applebaum in the *Atlantic*, 24 May 2021, (<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/05/belarus-lukashenko-hijack-plane-precedent-dictators/618971/>) is a great read and worthy of thought.

Even Canada has joined the chorus against Belarus, calling the actions of the Belarus leadership outrageous and illegal. Canada also stated that there are sanctions coming shortly in consultation with our allies. Canada already has significant sanctions on Belarus individuals. Belarus announced that it was closing its embassy in Canada by 1 September 2021. Wow, too bad Canada doesn't take action against China for its genocidal efforts against Uyghurs, Mongolians, Tibetans, Muslims minorities around the country, Falun Gong, Buddhist and Christian Protestants and many, many others, but that is OK because of all the great business we will do with China. Time to get real.

Late this week, Alexandre Lukashenko lashed out at the international community, complaining about the international reaction to his air piracy. He even said the plane could have been used by terrorists to crash into a Belarus nuclear power plant, and continued as well with the idea of a bomb on board. One has to wonder about his state of mind by this point. Imagine being totally fearful of your own people, seeing a boogeyman at every turn, being afraid to even leave one's own house without security forces in vast quantity. Living in your own bubble knowing that you are hated and despised by your own people. One also has to wonder how long it is before one starts wondering about your own security services? There are articles that say the movement to remove him is dead...is it or is it laying in wait for better weather and conditions? Belarus' story is far from over one might suspect.

Russia

Alexei Navalny is being charged with further criminal activities; this time the charge is insulting a judge. Mr Navalny joked that his 'crime syndicate' is growing given the number and nature of the charges. This is the third set of charges he is facing. The first is misuse of funds from his organization the Anti-Corruption Foundation, the second is the creation of an organization that "infringes on the identity and rights of citizens" by pointing out gross corruption of government officials including Vladimir Putin. The third was insulting a Second World War veteran who spoke highly of Putin, and now includes insulting a judge...the same judge who has presided over a kangaroo court, Judge Vera Akimova. What is interesting is that each time the regime makes up these various charges, the more they seem to draw attention to their own failings. Navalny is not popular but the constant drum beat of actions against him draw further attention to him and his crusade against the Putin regime and its overall corruption. This is not a good practice in the long run. The Putin regime is widely disliked within the younger generation. Last year's demonstrations also showed how widespread the growing movement against the regime is, it is literally country wide. Thus far the regime and security forces have managed to keep things in check but cracks are showing.

Russia continues to fight the coronavirus with over 5 million people affected to date. Some have placed the figure as much higher due to under reporting. There is also wide-spread distrust of the Sputnik vaccine which is causing reluctance by people to get the shot. Russia's overall fatalities are also not effectively reported; some have suggested by about three times the official figure.

The article by Mark Galeotti "Hacking Controversy Highlights Kremlin's self-Destructive Approach" (<https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/05/19/hacking-controversy-highlights-kremlins-self-destructive-approach-a73943>) is an interesting and thought-provoking piece. The controversy over the Solarwinds hack and subsequent exploitation by criminal gangs has caused a great deal of harm in the west. Mr Galeotti wants us to believe that the initial hack was done by the security services as espionage not to do damage but the handing off to criminal gangs within Russia has done harm and caused a considerable economic loss which is still the responsibility of the Kremlin despite Mr Galeotti's argument. Russia can be trusted to be totally untrustworthy, anything they do should be examined with increased scrutiny for malicious intent. Mr Galeotti is right, they are rightly assumed to be a mafia state as Mr Navalny has pointed out. The Kremlin has also gone after folks who have criticized it, such as Ben Browder and others who have pointed out the Putin regime's extreme corruption. There is very little room for real cooperation or trust while the Putin regime exists.

Israel-Palestine

The truce is holding as of the writing of this article after eleven days of fighting between Hamas militants and Israel. Hamas fired over 4000 rockets and missiles, showing greater sophistication than in previous efforts. Israel's Iron Dome Missile Defence System proved quite capable but the expenditure of missiles was very high to the point that perhaps Israel would have run out. Twelve Israelis died and approximately 250 Palestinians were killed and thousands more displaced. There was a lot of damage and the imagery of large buildings tumbling to the ground after air strikes was memorable to say the least. Who won? Is there ever a winner in conflict...the answer is yes, Hamas has won the battle for peoples' minds, especially in the West where we are seeing a surprising back lash against Israel.

Hamas is a terrorist organization. Its own charter requires the destruction of Israel and it will conduct itself in a way that inflicts massive damage to its own people. How? Hamas has taken large quantities of material such as concrete to build large tunnel systems directly under homes and buildings. It has also built underground factories for the building of rockets and missiles either of old Soviet-style rockets or more recently Iranian developed systems. As seen on released video of air strikes rocket launchers were often set up in civilian yards or court yards in between buildings. Even if the rocket launcher was destroyed, the effect on the local population was significant. The scenes of crying mothers and relatives on film were seen in the west notably at 6 pm suppertime. So Hamas did win the information war whether we like it or not. Too many folks do not believe that anyone would purposely set up their own people for this effect and therefore, to the delight of Hamas, Israel looks like the 'bad guy.' When all is said and done, the efforts of Hamas need to be studied and countermeasures found on their long-term development of their information warfare program. Hamas is a recognized terror organization and they are utterly ruthless but somehow they have become the 'good guy.' Go figure.

Iran

Iran will no longer provide the International Atomic Energy Agency access through remote cameras to Iranian nuclear facilities. This is in part an effort by hardliners to gain support from hardline factions to their Presidential candidate. This is partially in response to the United States trying to reinvigorate the treaty that limited Iran's efforts in purifying nuclear fuels, now reported by the Iranians to be significantly more than allowed under the old treaty.

This week also saw a major explosion in a factory producing drones in Iran - significant damage was done to the facility. It is the latest in a whole series of bomb attacks throughout Iran which also saw the Nantaz nuclear works sabotaged and a major air base suffer damage. No one has claimed responsibility at this point although Israel is suspected. It seems that the regime is unable to effectively stop these efforts at this point which is weakening the 'moderates' in Iran in the forthcoming elections. This would likely mean that hard-liners take control of the government which does not seem to be of benefit to anyone and would likely mean the end of any hope to restart negotiations on the nuclear agreement forged by Six Nations plus Iran.

China

This week saw China threaten Sweden as the Swedes determine whether to allow Huawei or not into the country's communications and telephone system. China responded in the typical ways of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) and of course threatened Sweden. At least Sweden is making a decision which is far cry from Canada's laggardly efforts.

China is continuing its crackdown on dissidents in Hong Kong, making sure that only patriots are capable of being elected to the Legislative Assembly. No real surprise but the real change is the move against big landowners in Hong Kong who have been responsible for high land prices in the city. These powerful and rich landowners have been supporters of the CCP's overall actions within the former colony as 'stability' also helped them. As with other Communist takeovers, the party will use the gullible to assist the takeover until they are no longer needed. It is a story that bears repeating to those who are looking for their riches in China. It is only temporary/ One will have no real loyalty from the CCP and anything one can build or invest in mainland China is subject to the whims of the CCP. This effort should be considered along with the crackdown on mainland Chinese oligarchs that have had the temerity to complain about the administration of the CCP. Long conversations in a small room are likely the future for these folks.

China also has continued its slow methodical approach to the theft of Nepalese and Bhutanese territory, setting up 'villages' and border points within the territory of those two countries. Mount Everest is one site that is affected by the Chinese incursion.

South Korea has also complained about illegal Chinese fishing fleets fishing in South Korea's exclusive economic zone. North Korea has also had difficulties with the same but has apparently fired warning shots through the hulls and fishermen. It seems that is a little over the top but it is a way having getting folks to understand the seriousness of their offence. Japan also has commented that the ongoing incursions into Japanese waters are still taking place.

On a more pleasant note, the CCP is apparently concerned that the winter Olympics may be boycotted as more pressure is being placed on the CCP's ongoing genocidal actions against the Uyghurs. The IOC's comments that they are not political cannot be believed and, to my knowledge, genocide is not political it is a moral and ethical issue, something that the IOC understands very little. The CCP can and will use this event not as a sporting event but as a showcase for their 'system.' What is political will be the actions of governments that support these games. There is a moral duty to stop providing these gross human rights abusers with a venue and a platform.