



**Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia
Dispatches
5 November 2021**



2021 Veterans' Week Poster

<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/get-involved/posters/2021>

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence and security issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).



2021 Marks the 100th Anniversary of the Remembrance Poppy in Canada

Madame Anna Guerin, later christened “The Poppy Lady from France”, inspired by John McCrae’s “In Flanders Fields”, had an idea: to adopt the distribution of the Poppy on Armistice Day as a way to raise money for Veterans’ needs and to remember those who had given their lives during the First World War. In July 1921 the Great War Veterans Association (which in 1925 would unify with other Veteran groups to form the Canadian Legion) adopted the Poppy as the flower of Remembrance. Since then, the Legion and its members have upheld this tradition of Remembrance.

Poppy-related items are available at the Legion Poppy Store (www.poppystore.ca).

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

RUSI(NS) will not be parading this year at Royal Artillery Park for Remembrance Day. Inspectors Don Moser and Dan Tanner, our President and Past-President, will lay a wreath on behalf of RUSI(NS).

New: 8 November, Monday – Canadian International Council live-streamed panel discussion "Our Arctic." 6pm. Streamed. Room 303, Student Union Building, Dalhousie University. See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

New: 10 November, Wednesday - USNORTHCOM, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM and the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network Arctic Academic eTalk "Order, Security, and Hybrid Threats to the Arctic." 1200 EST. See invitation at end of *Dispatches*.

Emended: 29 November, Monday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Assistant Commissioner Neil O'Rourke, Arctic Region, Canadian Coast Guard, presenting "Arctic Region Implementation and Successes." 1300-1500, via Zoom. Registration is required. To register, email RUSI(NS) by close-of-business Thu, 25 Nov. As subject line for your registration email, put: RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker 29 November 2021 Registration. Participation is limited and later registrants may have to be put on a waiting list. If after registering your availability changes and you are no longer able to attend, please advise RUSI(NS) as soon as possible so your spot can be re-assigned. Zoom instructions will be emailed to registrants by end-of-day Fri, 26 Nov. If you have not received them by end-of-day 26 Nov, please check your spam folder and, if necessary, email RUSI(NS).

Publications:

Except where otherwise indicated, publications are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

New: RUSI(NS) Presentation “Royal Canadian Navy – Globally Deployed for Strategic Effect” by Rear-Admiral Brian Santarpia, 27 Oct 21

https://rusi-ns.ca/royal_canadian_navy/

New: RUSI(NS) Presentation “Casualty Identification Program” by Dr Sarah Lockyer, 20 October 21

https://rusi-ns.ca/casualty_identificaton_program/

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 3 November edition

https://send.successbyemail.com/prvw_message2.aspx?chno=5f7e77e6-6e1e-4eee-b106-cd696b95c231

New: Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *ENews*, November 2021.

Macdonald-Laurier Institute Policy Brief "The need for transatlantic solidarity in the face of today’s security challenges" 31 August 2021

https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/20210811_NATO_solidarity_Thiele_Sannikov_Waschuk_COMMENTARY_FWeb.pdf

New: Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XXXIX Number 10 November 2021.

Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada Newsletter *Seatimes*, August 2021.

Royal Alberta United Services Institute Research Brief "Iranian–Israeli Drone Warfare, Diplomacy and the Alberta Connection" by LJ Howard, August 2021,

https://rausi.ca/images/edocman/research/Research_Brief_Vol_2_Iss_4_Iranian_Israeli_Drone_Warfare.pdf

New: Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches* November 2021

<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/87-rausi-dispatches-november-2021>

Royal Alberta United Service Institute *News* October-December 2021

<https://www.rausi.ca/news/publications>

Royal Canadian Military Institute General Sir William Otter Paper "The Korean War—A Naval ‘Sideshow’ With Major Ramifications" by Ken Hansen, September 2021

https://www.rcmi.org/getmedia/1ba8392b-e1d3-4a44-b9ff-577d2abef930/Ken_Hansen_Otter_Paper_2-21.aspx

[Ed: though Ken is not a member of RUSI(NS) he is active with our Security Affairs Committee.]

New: Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, November 2021 Edition.

Royal Canadian Naval Reserve *Link*, Vol 29, No 1, 2021

<https://issuu.com/lencre-reservenaval-link-navalreserve/docs/link-2021-vol29-navalreserve>

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 53, 4th Quarter - August/September 2021.

<https://rusiviccda.org/category/newsletter/>

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 20, Issue 3, October 2021.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Occasional*, Volume 9, Issue 1, 1 November 2021.

United Services Institute of Nanaimo and North Island *Newsletter*, Vol 29 No 09, September 2021.

University Naval Training Divisions Association of Canada *Gunroom Shots*, Volume 2, Issue 3, July 2021.


Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, October 2021.

Tweeted by @RUSI NS: 🇨🇦


RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

The Naval Association of Canada @navalassn 29 Oct tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: In response to the announcement this year by the @RoyalCanNavy of preparations for a replacement submarine project, Retired Capt(N) Norm Jolin looks at some options for a Canadian Patrol Submarine. #Submarines #RCNavy #cdnpoli <https://navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Jolin-Submarines.pdf> (A Canadian Patrol Submarine: What are the Options?)

An insider's comment on industry's capability to build (part or whole) and maintain submarines (focused on conventional power): Build – nope. It's too specialized (rolling the very thick high alloy steel that makes up the pressure hull and then welding it is super difficult). For the size of fleet required by Canada (4-6?) it makes way more sense to buy an existing design at a fixed price for a foreign nation. Our current naval procurement shows the incredibly high costs charged by Canadian shipbuilders compared to the world market.



Bellingcat @bellingcat 1 Nov tweeted: How can we tell whether the posts, articles and claims we see on the internet are true? As this guide to social media #verification explains, it doesn't need to be difficult. (A Beginner's Guide to Social Media Verification <https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/2021/11/01/a-beginners-guide-to-social-media-verification/>) STRATCOMCOE @STRATCOMCOE and RUSI(NS) retweeted 2 Nov: An essential guide on how to avoid #disinformation and survive in the social media jungle



Dave Perry @DavePerryCGAI 1 Nov tweeted: New from me in the latest @CdnNavalReview - how will the Canadian Patrol Submarine contribute to continental defence?
https://navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol17num2/cnr_vol17_2_Perry.pdf
(Canadian Patrol Submarines: Complementing or Competing with Continental Defence?)

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Good question. CAN should/will consider what want with having #submarine force (requirements). Can procure boats capable of regional defence & long-range overseas operations? With right design/alliances/logistics, can do both? Where might CAN want to deploy boats? Arctic?



RCAF Operations @RCAFOperations 27 Oct tweeted: To aid in Saskatchewan's fight against COVID-19, members of the @CanadianForces Aeromedical Evacuation Flight conducted a patient transfer to Kingston, ON ,Oct 26, using an Aeromedical Bio-containment Evacuation System on board an @RCAF_ARC CC130J Hercules @CFOperations #OpLASER

RUSI(NS) retweeted: "RCAF implements new bio-containment capability to transport infectious patients"
<http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/article-template-standard.page?doc=rcaf-implements-new-bio-containment-capability-to-transport-infectious-patients/kkei2pmy>
"Ensuring Safe Aeromedical Evacuations in the Global Era of Infectious Diseases" <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2020/05/ensuring-safe-aeromedical-evacuations-in-the-global-era-of-infectious-diseases.html> @RCAF_ARC #RCAF #OpLASER



NAADSN_RDSNAA @NAADSN_RDSNAA 1 Nov tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "The reception of the CAO Fisheries Agreement demonstrates a marked shift and the acceptance and legitimization of Arctic Ocean governance by the A5 instead of the A8." Read more from the policy primer by NAADSN Graduate Fellow Nicole Covey here:
<https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/21-oct-Covey-CAOFA-PPrimer.pdf>


[Legitimization of the Arctic Coastal States (A5) through the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) Fisheries Agreement]

POLICY PRIMER


October 28, 2021

Legitimization of the Arctic Coastal States (A5) through the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) Fisheries Agreement

Nicole Covey
NAADSN Graduate Fellow



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 1 Nov tweeted: An offering from our latest ON TRACK: @ProfAnkersen says that 20 years after 9/11, it's time to look for the future. "We must re-imagine Canada's security in a more comprehensive fashion, properly integrating its various dimensions."
<https://cdainstitute.ca/20-years-since-9-11/>
 (20 Years Since 9/11: Time to Re-Imagine Canada's Security)
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: "With these priorities in mind, Canada could then develop a new, revised comprehensive security strategy, one that incorporates all the various dimensions of security, from military, to cyber, to economic, to individual."



STRATCOMCOE @STRATCOMCOE 22 Oct tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Term "hybrid warfare" is a concept that has expanded beyond the use of military tools - it aims to harm political, economic and social systems by undermining trust in democracy, deepening polarization and gaining geopolitical influence by questioning political leadership.




don d'entremont @DonaldEntremont Sep 18 tweeted: Tug life. #CUTLASSFURY21
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: Looking forward to Naval Large Tug project tugs joining @CanadianForces Auxiliary Vessel fleets of Queen's Harbour Masters Halifax & Esquimalt
<http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=952> Will be different shadows on frigate hull sides! @RoyalCanNavy



Canadian Global Affairs Institute @CAGlobalAffairs 9 Sep tweeted: "In the absence of formal interdepartmental examinations of major events... we will inevitably treat each crisis as a new experience and struggle to re-invent the wheel." writes @WHMTE, Howard Coombs and George Petrolekas.
 (Learning Lessons from Canada's Foreign (and Domestic) Engagements: Time to get Serious
https://www.cgai.ca/learning_lessons_from_canadas_foreign_and_domestic_engagements_time_to_get_serious)



Groupe Océan | Ocean Group @Groupe_Ocean tweeted 2 Nov: ***LNT Project*** The second large tug is taking shape! The engine room mega block and the prefabrication of the lower store block are well underway. Big steps are coming in November and we are excited to share them with you! RUSI(NS) retweeted: With such good progress, can expect 'keel laying' of Naval Large Tug project NLT2 to happen soon <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=952> RUSI(NS) Info Note "Keel-Laying" <https://rusi-ns.ca/keel-laying-2/> Announcement of names for 4 tugs pending?



Rear-Admiral of the Red @AngusTopshee 3 Nov tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Adorned with a poppy #HMCSVictoria passes #BickfordTower and @FortRoddFisgard to head to sea for local force generation (training and trials) #CanadaRemembers

New custom!



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:


RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Is the Internet a flaw in Multi Domain Operations?

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/10/27/is-the-internet-a-flaw-in-multi-domain-operations/>

"The civilian digital space in any future conflict needs to be considered as another critical domain but one in which influence is but one element. Its potential to generate vital intelligence and real time targeting information, or even to be exploited to generate digital deception, needs to be better understood and taken account of in understanding the character of future conflicts."

The Canadian Armed Forces must be prepared to operate in the civilian digital space.



When should the MOD use Social Media?

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/10/28/when-should-the-mod-use-social-media/>

"Getting operational media right in the future is going to need large changes to how content is produced, and having difficult



discussions about what goes into it." "This is about developing an understanding of how to communicate difficult concepts well with an audience on a variety of channels that they are likely to follow in perpetuity."

One can assume that discussions about such matters are ongoing within the Canadian Armed Forces, Department of national Defence and other government departments. It would be interesting if there were government-public discussions, in order that the public understands and can express its expectations.

"Operational media" - hmm, will in the future that be a label used more?

N.S. failing to protect against 'typosquatting,' doppelganger websites, says analyst

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/n-s-government-failing-to-protect-against-typosquatting-attacks-says-analyst-1.6220832>


The nature of this article is highly interesting and demonstrates the types of information technology security Issues that could be detrimental to websites of government departments and agencies.



Whistler Search and Rescue does not support the use of the What3Words app

<https://www.piquenewsmagazine.com/local-news/whistler-search-and-rescue-does-not-support-the-use-of-the-what3words-app-4695107>

Considering the utility of What3Words, search and rescue (SAR) is not one of them. Communications and information exchange in SAR can be challenging enough without an app like What3Words being involved. And there are more than enough position locating systems (hey, good ol' lat and long works great once you've made the effort to understand it).



Australia's defence conversation must be about more than submarines

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-defence-conversation-must-be-about-more-than-submarines/>

"The conversation we should have is about how other systems can provide the military effects we need in the short-to medium-term faster, more affordably and with less risk than SSNs (nuclear-powered submarines)." "The particularly important missing part of this conversation is an overriding interest in holding government officials (military and civilian), ministers, corporate leaders and project managers to account for plans and investment that have key delivery dates, and doing so while they are still in their jobs."



An Australian perspective, but could very well be applied to any state. Are Canadians, both general public and those focussed on defence affairs, asking the right questions and holding our officials to account using the right metrics? Hmm, maybe first we should be talking about what those metrics are.

Pandemic Warnings: Taking Stock of the Canadian Military's Flawed Early Intelligence

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/pandemic-warnings-taking-stock-of-the-canadian-militarys-flawed-early-intelligence/>

"What is required is a multi-agency fusion centre for biosecurity intelligence, early-warning and threat assessment."



MoD 'continually fails to learn from its mistakes' says report

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/mod-continually-fails-to-learn-from-its-mistakes-says-report/>

Lessons for Canadian defence procurement.



"The Department is in a disadvantageous position because it relies on a limited specialist supplier base to meet its needs and at times lacks the skilled personnel to effectively manage the performance of these suppliers." Sounds familiar, long a comment about Canadian procurement staff.

"...the Department had only established a central register of learning from experience (LFE) in December 2020." Does Canada have anything similar to the register? (We'd probably call it a lessons-learned system.)

It'd be interesting to read a Canadian version of the report "Improving the performance of major defence equipment contracts."

Report at: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5802/cmselect/cmpubacc/185/summary.html>

A search of "Government of Canada Publications" (<https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/home.html>) using 'defence procurement' results in many interesting hits, including:
Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition – Progress Report 2019-2020
<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/irpda-progress-report-2019-2020.html#panel>

From Little Green Men to Little Blue Helmets: Imagining the Future of Russian Aggression—And What to do About it

<https://mwi.usma.edu/from-little-green-men-to-little-blue-helmets-imagining-the-future-of-russian-aggression-and-what-to-do-about-it/>



"For the foreseeable future, Russia will remain a persistent power, and Western leaders must be willing to imagine the many possible characters of future Russian aggression, including the next Russian force will be dressed up in. Failing to do so—and underestimating Russian capabilities and intent—could easily mean the United States and NATO are caught flatfooted again the next time Putin conjures up an unexpected trick."

Defense Primer on U.S. Strategy and Force Design

<https://news.usni.org/2021/11/02/defense-primer-on-u-s-strategy-and-force-design>



The extract below from the report could be paraphrased to suit Canada. Of course, Canadian foreign policy does not have a distinct aim of 'preventing the emergence of regional hegemony in Eurasia' (very Mackinder, that), but historically and realistically Canada contributes efforts (forces) for peace (at times, through warfighting) and order overseas. So, yes, the adequacy of our forces should be assessed against Canada's (grand) strategic goals. This was addressed by Rear-Admiral Santarpia, recently our Distinguished Speaker, talking about naval strategy (https://rusi-ns.ca/royal_canadian_navy/).

"Measuring the Sufficiency of U.S. Forces

Countries have differing needs for military forces. The United States, as a country located in the Western Hemisphere with a goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemony in Eurasia, has defined a need for military forces that is quite different from the needs of countries that are located in Eurasia. The sufficiency of U.S. military forces consequently is best assessed not through comparison to the militaries of other countries (something that is done quite frequently), but against U.S. strategic goals, which in turn reflect U.S. policymaker judgments about the United States' role in the world."

Canadians should be asking and commenting about:

1. What do we want our country to do in this world?
 2. In light of the answer to question 1, what do we want our armed forces to be able to do in the world?
- To the question "In light of the answer to question 2, what do we want our armed forces to look like?," we should be leaving the answer to the professionals who have to work (live) with the results. Yes, we should be looking at and commenting about what the professionals advise (it's our tax dollars that are paying for it), but we the general public are not in the best position to design our forces.

Other Sources:

If you have issues accessing articles, check with RUSI(NS) for availability.

#Canadian Armed Forces

Message from the Acting Chief of Military Personnel on Diversity, Inclusion, and Culture Change Short-Term Initiatives

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2021/11/message-acting-cmp-diversity-inclusion-culture-change-initiatives.html>

#cyber operations

Strengthening Cybersecurity to Meet Emerging Threats

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/briefing-strengthening-cybersecurity-to-meet-emerging-threats/>

#grand strategy

Caught Between Giants: Hostage Diplomacy and Negotiation Strategy for Middle Powers

<https://tnsr.org/2021/11/caught-between-giants-hostage-diplomacy-and-negotiation-strategy-for-middle-powers/>

#Indo-Pacific

'Indo-Pacific' is the strategic term-de-jour.

Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China

<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF>

China Has World's Largest Navy With 355 Ships and Counting, Says Pentagon

<https://news.usni.org/2021/11/03/china-has-worlds-largest-navy-with-355-ships-and-counting-says-pentagon>

If China attacks, it must know Taiwan won't fight alone

<https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/10/31/opinion/if-china-attacks-it-must-know-taiwan-wont-fight-alone/>

How War With China Begins

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/11/how-war-china-begins/186522/>

Just how strong is the Chinese military?

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/29/just-how-strong-is-the-chinese-military>

Pentagon rattled by Chinese military push on multiple fronts

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/beijing-chinese-joe-biden-taiwan-mark-milley-b1948851.html>

The Implications of Simultaneous Conflicts in South Korea and Taiwan

<https://cimsec.org/the-implications-of-simultaneous-conflicts-in-south-korea-and-taiwan/>

Caught Between Giants: Hostage Diplomacy and Negotiation Strategy for Middle Powers

<https://tnsr.org/2021/11/caught-between-giants-hostage-diplomacy-and-negotiation-strategy-for-middle-powers/>

#influence operations

Conquest Without War: The Threat of Communist Chinese Political Influence Operations

video: <https://vimeo.com/641135794>

#intelligence

'Nine Eyes'? Bill Would Look at Adding Four Countries to Intel-Sharing Pact

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/11/nine-eyes-bill-would-look-adding-four-countries-intel-sharing-pact/186550/>

#lessons-learned

The US Military and the Challenge of Learning from Foreign Conflicts

<https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/363-other-peoples-wars-the-us-military-and-the-challenge-of-learning-from-foreign-conflicts/>

#maritime security

Counter Authoritarianism on the World's Vital Waterways

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/october/counter-authoritarianism-worlds-vital-waterways>

#naval air

Navy Aviation Vision 2030-2035

<https://news.usni.org/2021/10/29/navy-aviation-vision-2030-2035>

#security

International Security: Canada's Role in Meeting Global Threats

<https://www.cigionline.org/publications/international-security-canadas-role-in-meeting-global-threats/>

#space

US, China, Russia Test New Space War Tactics: Sats Buzzing, Spoofing, Spying

<https://breakingdefense.com/2021/10/us-china-russia-test-new-space-war-tactics-sats-buzzing-spoofing-spying/>

#training

DATE World: The U.S. Army's Training Environment

<https://www.tradoc.army.mil/2021/10/07/date-world-the-u-s-armys-training-environment/>

#weapons

Hypersonic Weapons: Fast, Furious...and Futile?

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/hypersonic-weapons-fast-furiousand-futile>

Other:

Veterans Affairs Canada Social Media

<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/resources/stay-connected/social-media>

Naval War College Review Volume 74, Number 3 (2021) Summer 2021

<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/>

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

The inquiry into Lionel Desmond's shootings and subsequent suicide are ongoing this week. If one reads the Chronicle Herald one might have been appalled by an article which essentially blamed former Corporal Desmond. It is unfortunate that the person and his family who really needed the support were denied it. PTSD changes people in horrific ways. Formerly take-charge folks are sometimes reduced to tears even to do small tasks or are afraid to go outside or away from a comfort zone. Many are taken care of effectively but all too many are not for all sorts of reasons both self-imposed and systemic in nature.

When Medicare as we know it came into effect in the 1960s, the system put in place after the First World War to take care of veterans was dismantled and only those who were veterans of the First, Second and Korea up to the time of the armistice were grandfathered. Canada has somewhere between 600k to one million modern veterans now. Many veterans cannot get a family doctor and often they

fall through the cracks. As we have seen in the Desmond inquiry, there is no seamless transfer. The real answer is that the federal government should take care of the members who provided the country with “unlimited liability” services.

All is good in the Canada-China relationship, despite China saying otherwise in their party mouthpieces like Global Times. China is not a friend. There is no pot of gold and investments are not safe. We cannot simply ignore genocide, hostage diplomacy, the “Three Warfares Concept” including the economic attacks on Canada, not to mention the ongoing issue of Chinese police essentially threatening Chinese-Canadian citizens in our own country. There needs to be a radical change in Canada’s approach to our relations with China.

Russia

Russia is nearing 8.7m cases of Covid officially. Nearly 1m cases are currently active as of today and just under 250k have died of the disease. Russia’s population continue to be vaccine laggards as just over 30% are fully vaccinated with their own developed and produced vaccine, Spunik V. The main reason is a lack of trust in the central government. Rigged elections are one thing, securing one’s health is something different and Russians are voting with their arms. Unofficially and unverifiable these numbers could be two to three times higher than the official figures. The Moscow Times also reported that Russia’s excess death toll since the start of the epidemic is over 700k, thus there is some reason to believe that Covid deaths are under reported.

Senior Russian command appointments can be viewed at “Russian Defence Policy” at <https://russiandefpolicy.com>. It makes for fascinating reading. It also includes the name and some of the backgrounds for all 12 army commanders as well as many naval appointments of flag officers. What I like is their read on who is on fast track, on track or off the tracks for higher level appointments.

Speaking of Russian armies, many have adopted the forward deployment of equipment near the Baltic states and Ukraine. There are also some thoughts that many of these armies are under manned. While none of this is verifiable, civilian satellite imagery suggests this may be the case and that most armies are deficient in troops especially with ongoing foreign operations such as Syria and Libya as well as many African client states, with Mali being the latest after the announced French pull out. Russia is also beset with many potential problems around its borders. This has resulted in Russia practising its forces to move quickly and efficiently on the interior of the country. While these moves have created some concern, Russia is quite within its rights to practice reinforcing each of its military districts.

Russia continues to support several nations such as Belarus, Armenia, and Tajikistan as some on the periphery of Russia. Russia has many very real concerns along its borders and its actions are normally reactive to these needs.

Belarus

Belarus continues its unusual attacks on its EU neighbours, using refugees as the weapon of choice to punish the EU for its sanctions of Belarus and key individuals. Last year at this time there were only 26 incidents of refugees crossing the Belarus border into either the Baltics or Poland. This year it is over 8k to date.

The EU has provided support to the affected Baltic countries and Poland. The EU is also ramping up new sanctions to impose on Belarus as well. Most of the affected countries are putting up fences, etc. The refugees are often supported by Belarussian police and border guards. This support also has included jamming of EU border frequencies.

China

A big issue this week aside from China's ongoing property management company fiasco and the ongoing exodus of Western firms because of recent changes to Chinese regulations and the effects of US sanctions has made China less than an ideal investment opportunity. The big issue is its release of the 2020 census data which indicates slow growth. It was supposed to be released in April but was held back. Media from around the area now believe that it was held back to "adjust" the figures to show population growth continuing a little over 1%. There is considerable comment in various foreign press articles that in fact China is already in freefall population-wise. Earlier this year it was mentioned that there are now 40m fewer people in the labour force. What this new reporting says is that the actual population is actually smaller as well with one population analyst stating that the actual population of China is actually only 1.26b, a far cry from their touted 1.4b used in most of their statements. If true, it means that India is now the most populous country in the world at 1.387b folks.

If this is true, the Chinese Communist Party is almost totally responsible for this decline. This is a point not lost on Chinese leadership. It also means the promise of reunification with Taiwan becomes more important as it will contribute to the imagery of an invincible China under the leadership of the CCP. The CCP's China is slowing down and its actual growth is less than 3%; there is increasing need to be seen as vigorous. Can we expect the CCP to ratchet up rhetoric? The answer is yes and we can expect more over-the-top actions such as air and sea penetrations of Taiwan's air defence identification zone and potentially seizure of a small coastal island owned by Taiwan. If the West fails to act, there will be follow up. One can see parallels to 1938 and the German demands on another democratic state, Czechoslovakia. The Allies chose to sacrifice this democratic country at that time with Neville Chamberlain stating "I believe we will have peace in our time" on his return to Britain with a useless piece of paper. This didn't work out well in the end and it won't now.

Defence Procurement

The RUSI(NS) Facebook comment above ("MoD 'continually fails to learn from its mistakes' says report") resulted in some info sources being provided from DND:

- Internal to DND:
 - [Departmental Results Report - Canada.ca](#)
 - [Defence Investment Plan 2018](#)
 - [Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition – Progress Report April 2017 – December 2018](#)
 - [ADM RS report on Financial Management Control and Practices](#)
 - [ADM \(RS\) report on Readiness Assessment for Defence Procurement Strategy – Increased Contracting Authorities](#)
 - [Targeted Audit: Monitoring of the Implementation of Canada's Defence Policy: Strong, Secure, Engaged](#)
 - [Audit of Preliminary Requirement Development Process for Capital Equipment Projects](#)
- External to DND:
 - Le bureau du vérificateur général : [Government Purchasing \(oag-bvg.gc.ca\)](#)
 - L'ombudsman de l'approvisionnement : <https://opo-boa.gc.ca/rapports-reports/2019-2020/index-eng.html>
 - L'ombudsman pour la défense : [Annual reports and statistics - Canada.ca](#)
 - PBO : [Reports \(pbo-dpb.gc.ca\)](#)

Opening keynote address given by Acting **Chief of the Defence Staff, General Wayne Eyre** to the **Kingston Conference on International Security** “In Case of Emergency: The Military’s Role in the Pandemic & Future Crises” (<https://www.thekcis.org/conference/kcis-2021>) 25 October 2021.

(Ed: text is in speech format.)

Good morning. Bonjour. Kwey.

I’d like to begin by acknowledging that I’m speaking from the traditional territory of the Algonquin Anishinaabeg people.

Thanks for that kind introduction, and thanks to Stéfanie for inviting me back to the KCIS.

You may not be aware, but Stéfanie is the Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of the Princess of Wales’ Own Regiment in Kingston.

She’s also co-host of the Battle Rhythm podcast, one which I listen to on a regular basis, as issues related to the CAF are routinely discussed.

In both of these roles, as well as through her work at the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s...

Stéfanie is an important voice, an important part of the conversation, at this pivotal moment in the history of the CAF.

Before we get into the subject of this keynote, I’ll say up front that we are determined to transform our institutional culture.

To rebuild our military to be more open and welcoming to the best people Canada has to offer.

To evolve and become the best that we can be – an inclusive organization where everyone is treated with dignity and respect.

Concrètement, nous sommes déterminés à être un employeur de choix dans un marché très concurrentiel.

Plus profondément, en tant qu’organisation qui représente et incarne les valeurs qui sont si chères aux Canadiens, nous sommes déterminés à regagner la confiance.

Je suis donc très heureux d’être ici avec Stéfanie aujourd’hui, et avec vous tous.

Je suis aussi heureux que cette importante conférence reprenne cette année, après avoir fait une pause l’an dernier, et j’ai hâte au jour où nous pourrions de nouveau nous réunir en personne.

This is actually my third time addressing this conference.

In 2017, I participated in a panel discussion about enhancing soldiers’ performance.

And in 2019 — drawing on my experience as Deputy Commander of UN Command in South Korea — I spoke about the tectonic changes we’re seeing in the global security environment...

Many of which are rooted in that part of the world.

In 2021, we're still seized with the challenge of the pandemic — which remains, after a year and a half, an unavoidable influence over every facet of our lives and work.

That we are together today — albeit virtually— to study COVID is testament to this conference's ongoing relevance.

And I'd like to thank the partners in the Kingston Consortium who've brought us together again...

- The Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen's University;
- The Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre;
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College;
- And the NATO Defense College;

A personal aside: I've got personal connections to three of the four partners: I'm a graduate of both Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre and the US Army War College.

And my wife is a graduate of Queen's.

So it's good to be back again.

Global Security Environment

The consortium is a great partnership doing important work.

It brings together the best minds from all sectors of society — government and NGOs, academia and the military, the private sector and other stakeholders — to deepen our understanding of an ever-evolving and more complex global security environment.

Un environnement dans lequel l'ordre international fondé sur des règles que nous connaissons depuis 70 ans est sous pression, fragile et vulnérable.

Devant ce qui constitue essentiellement une réorganisation des choses, nous ne pouvons plus tenir pour acquises la paix et la prospérité que cet environnement nous donne depuis des générations.

Ours is an increasingly multi-polar world – with authoritarian states on one side, liberal democracies on the other, and a number of states sitting in the middle...

Watching, waiting, wondering which way the balance is going to swing, and ready to line up behind whoever seems to have the most to offer them.

Our way of life — and the global stability that makes that way of life possible — hangs on them making the right choice.

And these authoritarian states are growing in influence...

Seeking to undermine the liberal democracies of the world...

Employing tools and tactics just below the threshold of violent conflict.

And during my time in Korea, I saw just how fragile peace is — and how easy it would be for aggressive competition to slip into open war.

En même temps, des groupes terroristes, des organisations criminelles complexes et des éléments extrémistes – dont certains se trouvent au Canada – menacent aussi la stabilité et la sécurité partout dans le monde.

Les nouvelles technologies, de l'intelligence artificielle aux armes hypersoniques, en passant par l'informatique quantique, changent le visage de la guerre.

For the first time in seven decades, liberal democracies are overmatched quantitatively and qualitatively.

We are called upon to defend our interests not just at sea, on land, and in the air, but now in emerging domains of conflict such as space and cyber.

And all this is happening in the context of a world disrupted by climate change, mass migration, resource scarcity, political polarization and cultural conflict.

Pandemic Response

Of course, the most immediate challenge is the COVID-19 pandemic.

It has occupied much of the CAF's energy and effort over the past year and half.

Operation LASER is our Armed Forces' general support for federal and provincial governments in response to pandemic.

And Operation VECTOR is our support specifically for the distribution of life-saving vaccines.

Right from the beginning, CAF members were there to help Canadians scrambling to return home from all corners of the world, before the borders shut down.

In fact, in March 2020 we put 24,000 members on standby to do whatever was required to fight the spread of COVID-19.

To express the magnitude of this mobilization — and the pressure it put on the CAF — consider this: Besides drawing on our regular forces, it included the largest activation of reservists since the Second World War.

As far as domestic operations go, the COVID-19 response has been historic — unprecedented in scope and tempo.

Since then, our people have responded to nearly 70 COVID-19-related requests for assistance from federal and provincial governments and agencies.

They've cared for the most vulnerable among us in long-term care homes.

They've assisted more than 100 First Nations communities.

They've worked with the Public Health Agency of Canada to make sure medical gear, Personal Protective Equipment, and most notably vaccines got where they were most needed across the country.

Nos gens ont aidé à planifier et à coordonner le transport, l'entreposage et la distribution des vaccins.

Ils ont soutenu l'Agence des services frontaliers du Canada et l'Agence de la santé publique du Canada dans l'établissement de sites de dépistage aux postes frontaliers terrestres, à la frontière canado-américaine.

Ils ont livré cinq congélateurs à basse température de qualité médicale dans nos territoires nordiques.

In Newfoundland, Canadian Rangers helped get vaccines to communities, or individuals to vaccines — whatever it took.

In Nova Scotia, CAF members assisted at test sites.

In Ontario, CAF members assisted with contact tracing and associated reporting.

In Ontario and Manitoba, CAF members made sure vaccines made it to the most remote settlements, and Indigenous communities.

In British Columbia, we provided the arena at CFB Comox to serve as a vaccination hub for the surrounding area.

In Alberta, right now, some of our CAF nurse officers are helping ease the load on overburdened hospitals, and we've just started helping out in Saskatchewan with medical support.

For more than a year and a half now, when asked, CAF members have been there:

- Helping with wellness checks on individuals;
- Producing and distributing non-medical – but still vital – supplies such as food, water, firewood, and other necessities of life;
- Les membres des FAC ont assuré le transport de marchandises et de personnes vers les lieux où ils étaient le plus nécessaires;
- Ils ont donné des soins médicaux et du soutien;
- Ils ont aménagé des installations d'isolement pour les personnes atteintes du virus et formé du personnel civil pour assurer le fonctionnement et l'entretien de ces sites.

I could keep going with that list. It's been a long 19 months.

Now, when the average Canadian thinks of their Navy, Army, and Air Force, these are not the images that usually come to mind.

But the pandemic has drawn on the entire range of talent the CAF has to offer...

Skillsets many Canadians probably don't even realize we have:

Doctors and pharmacists. Planners and administrators. Engineers and IT experts.

Many, many, many different kinds of boots on the ground — but the people wearing them have two very important things in common:

They all wear our flag. And they're committed to serving Canada and Canadians.

Nous nous attendons à ce que ces services demeurent nécessaires dans un avenir prévisible... peut-être même pendant plusieurs années. Au pays, si le gouvernement en fait la demande, et ailleurs dans le monde.

The Pandemic's Impact on the CAF

But of all the challenges our people have faced, maybe the biggest has been doing all of this while dealing with the deeply personal aspects of the pandemic.

Comme tous les autres Canadiens, les membres des FAC ont dû se reprendre en main dans un monde chamboulé.

Nos maisons sont devenues des bureaux... des écoles... des services de garde....

We've been cut off from extended family, and our real-life social networks.

We've lived in fear for the health and safety of the people we love, with the despair of isolation, and with the stress of not knowing when — or, for a time, if — it would ever end.

But for an institution such as the CAF...

An institution dedicated to service...

To stepping up when others step aside or step back...

For our people, hunkering down at home to wait it out was never an option.

We made the health and safety of our members our top priority, found ways to adapt, and kept working.

I am beyond proud of each and every member of our team, and will be forever grateful for their service in these extraordinary times.

Still, the pandemic has had far-reaching effects on the CAF's strength and readiness.

Comme je l'ai expliqué, notre engagement nécessaire aux opérations au pays a réduit les ressources disponibles pour faire face aux défis et aux menaces à la sécurité mondiale dont le nombre ne cesse d'augmenter.

Et en termes de nombres, nous sommes loin de la force qu'il nous faudrait, surtout dans une cohorte particulièrement essentielle.

The Regular Force has shrunk by more than 2,700 since the beginning of the pandemic, a number mirrored in the Reserves.

Our recruiting is already challenged by an erosion in the CAF's public image, driven by revelations of misconduct...

And heightened competition with other employers for Canada's brightest and best.

But COVID has further exacerbated this challenge, and our recruiting has been at about one-third its normal rate due to pandemic-imposed restrictions.

In a recruiting system that was already challenged in throughput, COVID has extended these timelines.

Nos gens ont fait tout ce qui était humainement possible en utilisant les outils numériques pour continuer à attirer des recrues...

Mais pour certaines parties essentielles du processus – par exemple, les examens physiques – rien ne peut vraiment remplacer une interaction en personne.

This challenge in recruiting, combined with attrition heightened by the pressures of the pandemic, means we find ourselves short about 7,500 in our Regular Force trained effective strength.

And these are the heart of our command structure, the “missing middle” – Master Corporals, Sergeants, Lieutenants, Captains, Majors...

Master Sailors, Petty Officers, Lieutenant Commanders.

All vital leadership roles, both in the field and as we address the existential imperative of changing our internal culture.

And we reckon it could take about five to seven years to undo the damage.

Our training has also been hampered.

Les restrictions de santé publique ont exigé une adaptation de l'instruction...

Pour mettre l'accent sur l'amélioration individuelle, par exemple, ou sur des travaux qui peuvent se faire en ligne ou au moyen de simulations.

Parfois, il a fallu modifier l'instruction, par exemple en réduisant le nombre de participants.

Et dans certains cas, l'instruction a été carrément annulée.

MAPLE RESOLVE is our Armed Forces' largest and most complex annual training exercise.

In 2020, we had to cancel it.

In part for the safety of our troops, but also to allow our members to isolate and be ready to respond to requests for assistance from various governments...

Wisely, as it turned out, when our people were desperately needed to shore up or replace civilian staffing in long-term care homes.

This year MAPLE RESOLVE went ahead — albeit with restrictions, and reduced participation, especially regarding the participation of our international partners.

It's important to note that training with our international partners and allies has continued as much as possible.

For example, exercises with our NATO allies in the U.S. and Latvia.

Shutting down this training completely was never an option. It is essential to our ability to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our partners, friends, and allies against myriad adversaries who threaten global security and stability.

Through it all we have demonstrated, emphatically, that it is possible to train responsibly and effectively despite the challenges posed by COVID-19.

However, there is no denying the unfortunate truth: a training backlog still exists.

Ce n'est pas entièrement à cause de la pandémie. Ici aussi, le problème du « chaînon manquant » est un facteur.

Mais la COVID a empiré la situation.

And again, the effects of this will be felt for years to come.

Reconstitution

All this being the case, the CAF is in the front end of a substantial, Forceswide reconstitution program.

This program is being driven by two imperatives:

- First, the restoration of activities and readiness that have been adversely affected by the pandemic;
- And second, the ceaseless task of improving and modernizing our operational capabilities in the face of evolving threats, at the same time we are carrying out the essential work of culture change.

Like every element of society, the CAF has likely been forever changed by COVID-19.

The world we knew before March 2020 no longer exists.

Will the post-pandemic CAF be the same? No.

But we will never compromise excellence or readiness.

That means we will have to be hyper-disciplined — ruthless, even — in examining our institution and continually challenging the status quo:

Is this essential?

Is this discretionary?

Should this be left behind?

Notre réponse déterminera notre orientation pour l'avenir...

Et les améliorations que nous apporterons à notre état de préparation pour les opérations en cours, pour celles qu'on entrevoit déjà et pour la suite.

These will be difficult questions with no easy answers.

The CAF's reconstitution will prioritize three areas:

First, people and culture.

Meeting the challenges of the future will require an even more diverse and representative Armed Forces.

As I said earlier, every Canadian needs to see the CAF as a first-rate career choice, where they will feel welcome, valued, and safe to bring their talents to bear in service of our country.

And this will only happen when we take the painful but necessary step of confronting elements of our institutional history and culture that we're not proud of.

This means, among other things:

- investing substantially in the work of our newest L1, the Chief Professional Conduct and Culture;
- aligning our military justice system with contemporary values and legal norms by implementing recommendations of the Third Independent Review of the National Defence Act;
- établir un cadre réglementaire pour promulguer le projet de loi C-77, ce qui comprend la Déclaration des droits des victimes;
- et examiner attentivement les recommandations qui émergeront de l'examen interne complet et indépendant mené par la juge Louise Arbour.

These are all positive steps toward renewing – rebuilding - our culture so we are the safe and inclusive organization that Canadians – and our own membership – expect us to be.

And this renewal is the responsibility of every single person who wears the uniform, no matter their rank, role, or service.

But our crisis of culture is also a crisis of leadership.

And in my role as acting Chief of the Defence Staff – I am personally committed to repairing our military's credibility – to rebuilding the trust – that is essential to our success as an institution.

We must also acknowledge the personal toll the pandemic has had on our personnel and place a renewed emphasis on rebuilding personal strength...

Indeed, the strength of our people and our culture are issues of national security — because Canada needs us to be at our best.

If there ever was any doubt, I hope the pandemic has provided laser-like clarity in that regard.

The second priority in our reconstitution will be operational excellence.

This means reviewing and assessing all operations and plans, including our readiness training, — at every level and in every command — against strict and specific criteria:

Ces opérations et ces plans sont-ils durables?

Est-ce qu'ils correspondent-ils à notre mission et à notre vision globales?

Comportent-ils une valeur?

Quelles sont les répercussions de ces opérations et de ces plans sur nos alliés?

And then setting our operational expectations accordingly.

In all we do, we must always be ready to conduct contingency operations.

The third priority for our reconstitution is modernization.

To remain ready and relevant, it's imperative that we invest in sweeping upgrades to our sustainment function, and our digitization efforts.

And we have to recognize that our current force design...

How we approach operations and manage our people, both Regular Forces and Reserves...

Is still rooted in the Cold War era.

It's difficult and often painful to upend traditional approaches that go back generations... the tried, trusted, and true...

But this too is work that must be done — up to and including structural changes to the Services.

Tout cela se passait avant la COVID-19, et n'est donc pas un résultat direct de la pandémie.

Mais il reste que cette reconstitution doit se faire dans le contexte de la pandémie de COVID...

... et parallèlement à un examen post-opérationnel détaillé de la réponse des FAC à la pandémie. Cet examen est à venir.

Initial Observations

But that said, let me share some initial observations:

1. Doing command and control virtually will never completely replace hands-on supervision, or face-to-face intervention. The human interaction is still needed.

2. Given a do-over, and the critical importance of readiness, I would find ways to maintain higher levels of training and recruiting.

3. The pandemic revealed the vulnerabilities of supply chains, ours included.

We work closely with many industry and government partners.

Where they were affected — by necessary restrictions, border closures, regulations, and, most importantly, concern for everyone’s health and safety — so were we.

But through constant communication and collaboration, we kept moving forward.

4. Le rôle des Rangers canadiens consiste à être nos yeux et nos oreilles dans le Nord, et leurs activités sont censées se limiter à un mandat très précis : ils ne devraient pas aider les autorités civiles dans des situations qui comportent un risque de confrontation.

Bref, leur rôle consiste à soutenir les FAC, et non pas à agir comme agents de la paix ou à faire du travail de développement communautaire ou d’aide sociale.

Or la portée du travail accompli par les Rangers canadiens depuis le début de la pandémie est considérable, et les risques sont allés bien au-delà de leur mandat original.

5. CAF health services — which are really just intended to support members of the CAF, who are not covered by provincial and territorial health services under the Canada Health Act — were already at a strained capacity pre-COVID...

...and the pandemic pushed that even further.

Every medical professional who’s called upon to assist our government partners here at home is one who’s not free to deploy on other operations...

Or available for CAF members who need their help here at home.

Or to process recruit medical files.

This is part of a broader issue — the CAF’s evolution over the years from a resource of last resort to a force of first choice — that, going forward, needs to be addressed in a national context.

Readiness in the New World

The CAF’s leading role in Canada’s national effort to combat COVID-19 is really just the culmination of a trend that’s been quietly creeping upwards for years now.

Between 2014 and 2019, we saw a 10 fold increase in person-days devoted to domestic operations when compared to the preceding five years.

More and more frequently, our federal and provincial partners are calling on the CAF to perform non-traditional tasks.

Why is this?

Well, to put it simply, we're up to the job.

When the CAF responds to a request for assistance, the requesting party gets a disciplined labour pool of highly trained professionals with its own internal command-and-control capacity.

With an internal communications system already established.

With its own resources to draw upon.

Un bassin capable d'effectuer des tâches très diverses de façon efficiente et efficace, et dont le succès est presque certain.

Un bassin de main-d'œuvre autosuffisant, qui se déploie et s'administre de façon autonome — un effectif prêt à l'action. On épargne beaucoup de temps, en évitant l'intégration des employés, les tracas liés à la paye et d'autres tâches administratives et de bureau.

And its planning capability, its mastery of logistics, has a sophistication that is simply an easy solution when crisis hits.

And here I have to give a nod to the Canadian Army Command and Staff College.

Ce que le Collège enseigne à nos officiers, c'est exactement de cela que je parle. C'est cette formation professionnelle exceptionnelle qui nous permet d'exécuter ces opérations.

The skills necessary to integrate various capabilities, to provide some structure over chaos, and to plan a way forward has its roots right here in the training and education at Canadian Army Staff College.

The value of this education and training has been proven hundreds of times over the course of this pandemic.

Takeaways from the Pandemic and an Evolving Role for the CAF

The pandemic has provided some valuable takeaways for everyone involved in the response.

One is this: We need — as a country — to take a long, hard look at the domestic role of the Canadian Armed Forces.

What it has become, and why.

It's clear that, as I've said, the CAF has in recent years gone from being the force of last resort to often a force of first choice.

This year alone, besides our full-on commitment to pandemic response, we've deployed hundreds of personnel to British Columbia and Manitoba to help fight wildfires, while other troops and Canadian Rangers helped with forest-fire evacuations in remote communities in Ontario.

We've been called upon to help mitigate flooding in Yukon.

Last year, when a major snowstorm shut down parts of Newfoundland and Labrador, we got the call.

En 2019, les membres des FAC:

- ont été déployés en Nouvelle-Écosse après le passage de l'ouragan Dorian;
- ont aidé à évacuer les membres de la Première nation de Pikangikum en Ontario en raison de la fumée intense provenant des feux de forêt au Manitoba;
- ont envoyé plus de 2 500 militaires pour soutenir les efforts déployés pour aider les victimes d'inondations au Nouveau-Brunswick, au Québec et en Ontario.

This should cause us to pose the question as to if we need a comprehensive review of roles, responsibilities, and resourcing of all branches and levels of government to update their delineation in light of the increasing demand, the increasing frequency and intensity of domestic disasters.

This includes for the CAF so that we can prioritize our force development, training, and readiness accordingly.

The essential function of the Canadian Armed Forces is to defend Canada and Canadians.

How do we need to define “defend” going forward?

How our Reserves fit into this picture is another element we have to consider: Does Canada need troops dedicated to civil defence, like during the Cold War?

Les réponses à ces questions guideront notre planification en termes de conception et de développement de la force dans le futur — et ces réponses doivent s'inscrire dans un contexte national.

Un large débat national au sujet de qui fait quoi, à quel moment et pourquoi. Et où se situent les FAC dans ce contexte plus large, celui de l'ensemble du gouvernement.

The future of military conflict is one of precision, of advanced technology, of engagements in non-tradition domains such as space and cyber.

While domestic operations, like the ones we've undertaken more and more often of late, depend on deploying large numbers of CAF members, many boots on the ground, to do hard, physical work.

Precision versus mass. This is one of the force develop tensions we will face.

How we find a balance between these two vastly different visions of a modern military is one of the great questions of our time.

We do know this:

Meeting the demands of the post-pandemic world will demand creativity, adaptability, and resilience.

It will require a relentless identification of priorities, and shrewd stewardship of our resources — our materiel and, even more importantly, our people.

Je pense que nous pouvons affirmer sans risque de nous tromper que le rôle des FAC dans les situations de crise au pays continuera de s'élargir, de même que nos militaires seront appelés à effectuer davantage de tâches non traditionnelles.

This is key to our post-pandemic operational review.

As is this: It will happen again. There will be another pandemic.

We don't know when. But we must be ready. Eternally vigilant.

We owe it to future generations of Canadians.

The world is more dangerous now than it has been since the end of the Cold War. The threats and risks to our country are multiplying.

To address the future security environment, the demands on the CAF will only increase. Canada needs the CAF now more than ever — even if not all Canadians realize it.

Thank you, Merci, Megwitch.



The
**Canadian
Military Memorials
Database**

Is there a military memorial
in your community?

Is it in the
Canadian Military Memorials Database?

Check the database at
<http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/national-inventory-canadian-memorials>
and send an update!



The
**Canadian
Military Memorials
Database**

Is there a military memorial
in your place of worship?

Is it in the
Canadian Military Memorials Database?

Check the database at
<http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/national-inventory-canadian-memorials>
and send an update!




The
**Canadian
Military Memorials
Database**

Is there a military memorial
in your place of work or recreation?

Is it in the
Canadian Military Memorials Database?

Check the inventory at
<http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/national-inventory-canadian-memorials>
and send an update!



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A Canada Speaks Event hosted by CIC Halifax
 A live-streamed panel discussion featuring:

Lloyd Axworthy Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Madeleine Redfern Former Mayor of Iqaluit
Leah Sarson Asst. Professor, Int. Relations, Dalhousie U.
Ben Rowswell President, CIC (Moderator)

November 8TH 2021
Doors open 6PM (AST) 5PM (EST)
Streaming begins 6PM (EST)

Dalhousie University
 Student Union Building, Room 303

Arctic Academic eTalk

Dear Arctic Academic eTalks Members and Invited Attendees,

On behalf of USNORTHCOM and the Command’s “[The Watch](#)” Magazine, United States European Command (USEUCOM), United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), and the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network ([NAADSN](#)), we would like to invite you to our November 2021 Arctic Academic eTalks presentation on “Order, Security, and Hybrid Threats to the Arctic” with Dr. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen and Dr. Gunhild Hoogensen Gjörv on Wednesday November 10th at 0800 AK/ 1000 MT/ 1200 EST/ 1800 CET.

Please register at the following link: https://alaska.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_MehFIF-NSXGNp3MfH_JExA

The Arctic Academic eTalks is an academically-focused bimonthly forum for open discussion (non-attribution) on key issues affecting the Circumpolar Arctic for scholars and practitioners from Canada, Finland, Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland and Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States, as well as the United Kingdom and Germany.

Dr. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, Professor of Northern Studies and Barents Chair in Politics at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway (Tromsø) and Dr. Gunhild Hoogensen Gjörv, Professor in Security, Peace and Conflict Studies at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway (Tromsø) will each provide a 15-minute presentation which will be followed by a 60-minute moderated Q&A session (non-attribution). Biographies of our speakers are attached.

Note: Past Arctic Academic eTalks presentations are posted on the NAADSN website: <https://www.naadsn.ca/arctic-academic-etalks/>. However, the Q&A discussions are not posted and open only to registered Arctic Academic eTalks participants during the live event.

Our Arctic Academic eTalks partners include:

- Center for Arctic Security and Resilience ([CASR](#)) - University of Alaska Fairbanks

- Defence Science and Technology Laboratory - [United Kingdom](#)
- George C. Marshall European [Center](#) for Security Studies
- Joint Task Force ([North](#)) - Canadian Armed Forces
- Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom ([UK MOD](#))
- NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence ([StratCom](#))
- Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies ([IFS](#))
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs ([NUPI](#))
- Royal Danish Defence College ([fak.dk](#))
- United States Coast Guard ([Arctic](#))
- William J. Perry Center, National Defense University ([NDU](#))

We look forward to your participation. Thank you for your support and consideration,

Shannon and Dr. Ben

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Event Topic:

Order, Security, and Hybrid Threats to the Arctic

Featuring:



Dr. Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen
 Professor of Northern Studies and Barents Chair in Politics at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway (Tromsø)



Dr. Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørsv
 Professor in Security, Peace and Conflict Studies at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway (Tromsø)

PRESENTED BY:

-  "The Watch" Command Magazine
-  United States Northern Command
-  United States European Command
-  United States Indo-Pacific Command
-  North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network

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-  Center for Arctic Security and Intelligence
-  Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
-  Defence Science and Technology Laboratory United Kingdom
-  Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
-  George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
-  Royal Danish Defence College
-  Joint Task Force North Canadian Armed Forces
-  United States Coast Guard
-  Ministry of Defence United Kingdom
-  William J. Perry Center National Defense University
-  NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

Date: Wednesday, November 10th, 2021
Time: 0800AK/1000MT/1200EST/1800CET

Visit www.naadsn.ca/events to register for this event
Contact for more information: info@naadsn.ca