



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 24 December 2021

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence and security issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

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*Have a Happy &
Safe
Holiday Season!*



Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

Save the date: 26 January 2022, Wednesday – planned date for Distinguished Speakers, presenting on Arctic operations. 1300-1500. Via Zoom.

Save the date: 16 February 2022, Wednesday – planned date for Distinguished Speaker, presenting on RCAF strategy. 1300-1500. Via Zoom.

Publications:

Except where otherwise indicated, publications are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) presentation “Canadian Coast Guard Arctic Region – Implementation and Successes” by Assistant Commissioner Neil O’Rourke, 29 November 2021

https://rusi-ns.ca/ccg_arctic_region/

RUSI(NS) presentation “Royal Canadian Navy – Globally Deployed for Strategic Effect” by Rear-Admiral Brian Santarpia, 27 October 2021

https://rusi-ns.ca/royal_canadian_navy/

RUSI(NS) presentation “Casualty Identification Program” by Dr Sarah Lockyer, 20 October 2021

https://rusi-ns.ca/casualty_identificaton_program/

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 15 December 2021 edition

https://send.successbyemail.com/prvw_message2.aspx?chno=31ae3090-a6e8-4916-a569-d757b7edc2ca

Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, December 2021.

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 1, January 2022.

Naval Association of Canada presentation "NORAD Modernization and Renewal" by Dr Andrea Charron, 6 December 2021

<https://youtu.be/Vtf4g3qh26Q> (slides at https://nac-o.wildapricot.org/resources/OTTAWA%20BRANCH/Documents/Meetings/2021-12-06-NORAD-Modernization_Charron.pdf).

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, December 2021.

<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/88-rausi-dispatches-december-2021>

Royal Alberta United Service Institute *News* October-December 2021

<https://www.rausi.ca/news/publications>

New: Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, Christmas/New Years Edition.

Royal Canadian Naval Reserve *Link*, Vol 29, No 1, 2021

<https://issuu.com/lencre-reservenaval-link-navalreserve/docs/link-2021-vol29-navalreserve>

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* - Volume 4 Issue 9

<http://www.navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/en/news-ynt/2021/11-your-navy-today.page>





New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 20, Issue 4, December 2021.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 9, Issue 8, 20 December 2021.

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, December 2021.

Tweeted by @RUSI NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

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|---|--|
| <p>Government of CAN🇨🇦 Mandate Letters published 16 December 2022 https://pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters <i>Individual Minister's letters are available at this site.</i></p> |  |
| <p>STRATCOMCOE @STRATCOMCOE 17 Dec tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Inoculation interventions, including games have been shown to be effective at conferring psychological resistance against future unwanted persuasion attempts. More on inoculation theory as a tool to combat misinformation (Inoculation Theory and Misinformation https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/inoculation-theory-and-misinformation/217)</p> |  |
| <p>Hybrid CoE @HybridCoE 17 Dec tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: How do #HybridThreats manifest in the #Arctic, what kind of vulnerabilities are there, how do they relate to the interests and strategies of the EU, NATO, the US & Canada? Top experts from @HybridCoE, @fak_dk, @Deakin, @CDAInstitute + more explore: (Hybrid CoE Research Report 4: Security and hybrid threats in the Arctic: Challenges and vulnerabilities of securing the Transatlantic Arctic https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-research-report-4-security-and-hybrid-threats-in-the-arctic-challenges-and-vulnerabilities-of-securing-the-transatlantic-arctic/)</p> |  |
| <p>"Military packs up to leave Iqaluit" Bravo @CanadianForces for providing potable water to residents https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/military-packs-up-to-leave-igaluit/ Lessons learned include procuring/preparing equipment to operate in #Arctic/North. Also, let's work to prevent shortages of water for CAN🇨🇦 people</p> |  |

NAADSN_RDSNAA @NAADSN_RDSNAA 17 Dec tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The latest policy brief by NAADSN Graduate Fellow @AdamPMac outlines 3 recommendations for Canada to preserve its positionality in the Arctic. Read it here <https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/21-dec-Macdonald-policy-brief.pdf> (China-Russian Cooperation, American Hegemony, and Great Power Competition in the Arctic: Positioning Canada as an Arctic Power in an Uncertain Age)



"CCGS Hudson - more problems and other CCG challenges" <http://shipfax.blogspot.com/2021/12/ccgs-hudson-more-problems-and-other-ccg.html> Hydrographic/oceanographic research ship CCGS Hudson is unserviceable. What is CAN 🇨🇦 research fleet development plan to ensure enough ships in future? What options being developed (containerized labs)?



Canadian Armed Forces @CanadianForces 20 Dec tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Check out the Winter issue of the Canadian Military Journal for articles on:
 🧑‍🎓 📖 Personnel, History,
 🎓 🧑‍🎓 Education, Strategy,
 🧑‍🌍 🧑‍🌍 Diversity
 and much more!
<http://journal.forces.gc.ca/cmj-22.1-toc-en.html>



Macdonald-Laurier Institute @MLInstitute 20 Dec tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: NEW: MLI Senior Fellow Richard Shimooka navigates the lessons, missteps, and outcomes of the Canadian Surface Combatant program, and finds that proposals for cutting costs will only mean more spending and less capability down the road. #cdnpoli #cdnfp (Full Steam Ahead: Why Canada's Shipbuilding Program Oughtn't to be Abandoned or Cut <https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/canadas-shipbuilding-program-oughtnt-abandoned-cut/>)



STRATCOMCOE @STRATCOMCOE 21 Dec tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: #AI and #ML has developed significantly over the last years, but do these #AI capabilities also boost the capacity of malicious actors to manipulate crowds? Learn what the latest @STRATCOMCOE research reveals on #AI role in spreading synthetic content (The Double-Edged Sword of AI: Enabler of Disinformation <https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/the-double-edged-sword-of-ai-enabler-of-disinformation/221>)



"Military shipbuilding facing fresh delays as a result of COVID-19: procurement chief"
<https://nationalpost.com/pmnn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/military-shipbuilding-facing-fresh-delays-as-a-result-of-covid-19-procurement-chief> Schedule slippages, higher project costs. Higher costs to maintain aging @RoyalCanNavy & @CoastGuardCAN fleets in service. Less sea time for people & mssn accomplishment?



"New equipment for Canadian Coast Guard will help clean up oil spills" <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2021/12/new-equipment-for-canadian-coast-guard-will-help-clean-up-oil-spills.html> @CoastGuardCAN to acquire 3 @GRIFFINEngSys skimmers "to recover oil in sheltered waters, calm waters & from inside small vessels likely to cause marine pollution."



Commandant_5Div_Commander @5Div_Comd_5Div 22 Dec tweeted: Great job to our #5DivSoldiers from 4 Engineer Support Regiment returning home from Nunavut. Your expertise in delivering emergency water assistance to the Iqaluit has been remarkable. We wish you a happy reunion with your loved ones during the holidays!
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: 4 Engineer Support Regiment [https://army.ca/wiki/index.php/4_Engineer_Support_Regiment_\(4_ESR\)](https://army.ca/wiki/index.php/4_Engineer_Support_Regiment_(4_ESR)) & <http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/5-canadian-division/4-engineer-support-regiment/index.page>
 4 ESR "primary operational task is the provision of sustainment engineering such as water supply, route maintenance and construction, vertical construction and the provision of utilities."



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

SECNAV Del Toro Sounds Alarm Over Chinese Illegal Fishing

<https://news.usni.org/2021/12/16/secnav-del-toro-sounds-alarm-over-chinese-illegal-fishing>

Fisheries is a matter of international relations, especially when challenges to a state to manage and protect its fisheries results in a major power engaging with that state to provide maritime security training and assistance. Is this cause for the major power's navy (or any power's navy) to become a means of that engagement? (The gray area between defence and security.) Should coast guards be the preferred means? Of course, not all coast guards are equal - some do not have an armed enforcement mandate or capability.



What is/should be the involvement of the Royal Canadian Navy in countering illegal fishing domestically and internationally? What is/should be the involvement of the Canadian Coast Guard in countering illegal fishing internationally?

Is Alfred Thayer Mahan Driving Today's U.S.-China Naval Interactions?

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/alfred-thayer-mahan-driving-todays-us-china-naval-interactions-198178>

Mis-reading, or failing to read enough of, Mahan, and therefore failing to understand enough the wide range and complexity of maritime strategy, needs to be considered in developing a state's international relations and approach to sea power.

Members of navies, especially mid-grade officers, and a maritime state's leaders must educate themselves, especially through a strong reading regime of Mahan, Corbett, etc., in maritime strategy. Read, think, talk and act.



Is the cure for America's 'next war-itis' a military culture shift?

<https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/12/19/is-the-cure-for-americas-next-war-itis-a-military-culture-shift/>

Critically thinking through issues of readiness, modernization, and emerging threats will be essential ..."

Canada is attempting a culture change in its military to counter issues within the ranks of its Armed Forces. Whilst we reflect (and take action on) that change, likely to be consuming, let's not forget to 'critically think' about the multiple threats to this country, and what should, needs, to be done to ensure our defence and security. It all goes together.



Annual international collaboration Operation North Pacific Guard targets illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

<https://globalfishingwatch.org/impacts/on-the-high-seas/>

In 2021, the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans, United States Coast Guard and partners including international nonprofit organization Global Fishing Watch collaborated in Operation North Pacific Guard, addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the North Pacific. "The operation discovered multiple IUU indicators, including failure to maintain proper catch records, use of prohibited gear, undocumented retention of bycatch, and shark finning, ..." "Global Fishing Watch ... assisted ... by providing analysis on patrol area threats and the movements and behavior of vessels and fleets."

The Canadian Department of National Defence was one of the organizations that met at year end for an annual fisheries enforcement meeting, during which patrol summaries were delivered and collaboration for 2022 explored.



Fisheries enforcement is not a major defence mission, and in the eyes of some can (similarly to counter-drug patrols) detract from a Navy's focus on building and maintaining readiness for conflict operations. However, 'constabulary' functions, independent or in assistance of other government departments, has long been a naval role (see: Booth Triangle and "What does the RCN do?" <https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/BN4-WhatdoesRCNdo-May2019.pdf>). Sea time is sea time for sailors, whether chasing foreign submarines off our coast or undertaking fisheries patrols for Fisheries and Oceans Canada. And the practice of sharing information between disparate organizations makes for good maritime domain awareness.

IUU is a subject with which members of Canada's Navy and other marine departments need to familiarize themselves. [Aside: RUSI(NS) will be seeking to arrange a FOC Distinguished Speaker to talk about the National Fisheries Intelligence Service.]

Air Force launches “Space Flag” exercise inspired by IMAX-worthy Red Flag war games

<https://spacenews.com/air-force-launches-space-flag-exercise-inspired-by-imax-worthy-red-flag-war-games/>

The above may be the public media article about Exercise SPACE FLAG 22-1, but for a more interesting news bit, there is: <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2872127/deputy-secretary-of-defense-hicks-visits-michigan-and-colorado/source/GovDelivery/>.



"... SPACE FLAG 22-1, where Allied participants are planning and executing integrated operations, executing and refining tactics, exercising command and control (C2) relationships, and integrating intel and tactical space units to protect and defend vital U.S. and Coalition interests in space. SPACE FLAG 22-1 is the first coalition space exercise to use modeling and simulation."

One wonders whether Canadians were amongst the Allied participants. Canada does not have an equivalent to the US Space Command, but there are staff reporting to Director General Space in National Defence Headquarters who are engaged in many similar activities. Exercising integration of units and operations, and command and control relationships, is a good way to start developing a major organization. Really interesting, and understandable the approach, to read that modeling and simulation was used in the exercise.

China's PLA Is a Peasant Army No More

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/12/chinas-pla-peasant-army-no-more/360021/>

"Thus, unlike olden days when the Defense Department's core strategy was essentially to overwhelm challenges with resources, success will require imaginative strategies that allow us to do more with less. That will require capitalizing on our long-term strengths, exploiting asymmetric initiatives, creating operational concepts for use, and integrating disruptive technologies. The decisions that can have the greatest positive impact are the hardest to make and execute."



Austal USA Awarded Contract for Next Generation Logistics Ship Design Studies

<https://seapowermagazine.org/austal-usa-awarded-contract-for-next-generation-logistics-ship-design-studies/>

"Austal USA was awarded a contract to perform design studies for the U.S. Navy's next generation logistics ship program Dec. 20, ..."



And from: Austal lands design study contract for Navy supply ship program

<https://www.al.com/news/mobile/2021/12/austal-lands-design-study-contract-for-navy-supply-ship-program.html>

"It will be at least 2023 before the contract to build the first ship in the class is awarded." Context for building the Joint Support Ship project replenishment oilers. These articles highlight how long the early stages of shipbuilding (especially warships) can take. This is a point that needs further messaging to the Canadian public.


Click 'Like', Get Punished Under Pentagon's New Anti-Extremism Policy

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/12/click-get-punished-under-pentagons-new-anti-extremism-policy/359999/>

and

One Social-Media 'Like' Doesn't Say Much About a Potential Extremist

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/12/one-social-media-doesnt-say-much-about-potential-extremist/360036/>



Okay, the two articles are the US approach. In the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), such matters would be covered by Defence Administrative Orders and Directive 5019-0, Conduct and Performance Deficiencies (<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/5000-series/5019/5019-0-conduct-and-performance-deficiencies.html>).


From the DAOD: "CAF members must be held accountable for conduct and performance deficiencies resulting from factors within their control. Hateful conduct by CAF members is prohibited."

(Interesting that the DAOD does not apply to the civilians of the Department of National Defence, DND.)

Generally when staff whose responsibilities include social media note online behaviour that would fall under hateful conduct, it is reported it to the military Commands, who route it down the chain of command. If the actions merit disciplinary or administrative action, then that proceeds per normal processes.

New trans-Arctic pathway for Asia-bound subsea cable

<https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2021/12/new-pathway-cinias-asia-bound-subsea-cable>



A subsea telecommunications cable between Europe and Asia, passing through Canadian waters. Such cables (a.k.a. submarine cables) are critical infrastructure, providing the majority of communication services between continents, islands, etc. They have been subject to accidents and deliberate interference (check out what the Russians have been building for sea bottom vehicles). Laying them is not easy, with special vessels involved, and consider how much of the sea bottom in Canada's North and Arctic has not been charted. If (when? It reads like a good project.) this cable goes through, its presence is going to add considerably to the challenges of the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Coast Guard and other government services to ensure the cable is integrated into defence and security plans and preparations in the region.

Navy Special Ops Has Adapted RQ-21 Blackjack Drones To Deploy Smaller Quadcopters

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43568/navy-special-ops-has-adapted-rq-21-blackjack-drones-to-deploy-smaller-quadcopters>



Drones carrying drones. Drone warfare (warfare generally) is getting more and more complicated.

Good to read that the at least one unmanned aircraft is configured to carrying different payloads. Aircraft, ships and other platforms should be thought of as 'trucks' capable of carrying a variety of weapons, sensors, cargo and other vehicles ('drone carriers'). Task-tailoring. That approach will put greater demands on unit staffing, training, command and control, etc. Imagine a drone unit switching from strike to re-supply to medevac to reconnaissance in a short period of time.

Other Sources:

#A2R

Army recruiting resuming normalcy

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/army-recruiting-resuming-normalcy/>

#cyber operations

The Law of Neutrality in Cyberspace

<https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2021-12-The-Law-of-Neutrality-in-Cyberspace.pdf>

Why Cyber War is Subversive, and How that Limits its Strategic Value

<https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/why-cyber-war-is-subversive-and-how-that-limits-its-strategic-value/>

Report on Use of Force in Cyberspace

<https://news.usni.org/2021/12/21/report-on-use-of-force-in-cyberspace>

Understanding the Offense's Systemwide Advantage in Cyberspace

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-offenses-systemwide-advantage-cyberspace>

The UK Government's New Cyber Strategy: A Whole of Society Response

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/uk-governments-new-cyber-strategy-whole-society-response>

#defence policy

He Moana Pukepuke E Ekengia E Te Waka - A Rough Sea Can Still Be Navigated

<https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/publication/file/Defence-Assessment-2021.pdf>

Interesting to compare New Zealand's defence policy to Canada's.

#drones

Tethered Drones

<https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2021/12/tethered-drones/>

Autonomous Weapons Are Here, but the World Isn't Ready for Them

<https://www.wired.com/story/autonomous-weapons-here-world-isnt-ready/>

#environment

A Climate Security Plan for Canada - How the Government of Canada can Combat the Security Risks of Climate Change

https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/A-Climate-Security-Plan-for-Canada_January-2021.pdf

#information operations

Preventing Violent Extremism Through Media and Communications

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/whitehall-reports/preventing-violent-extremism-through-media-and-communications>

#intelligence

In the Same Boat: Integrating Naval Intelligence

<https://cimsec.org/in-the-same-boat-integrating-naval-intelligence/>

Stress Tested: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Canadian National Security

book: <https://press.ucalgary.ca/books/9781773852430/>

There was a tweet this week from a contributor to the book that noted his chapter on health (medical?) intelligence.

#maritime safety

Maritime Safety 2012-2021 – A decade of progress

<https://www.dnv.com/maritime/publications/maritime-safety-2012-2021-download.html>

#NATO

NATO 2022 Strategic Concept

TBP: <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>

NATO's Present and Future Role in the South

https://issuu.com/spp_plp/docs/nato_present_and_future_role_in_the_south

#naval weapons

Now, Imagine Lasers in 2030, 2040, ... or 2065

<https://blog.usni.org/posts/2021/12/15/now-imagine-lasers-in-2030-2040-or-2065>

#security

National Security Insider Fails to Deliver With New Book

Book reviews (reporter's perspective, and another, supportive): <http://espritdecorps.ca/between-the-covers/book-review-national-security-insider-fails-to-deliver-with-new-book>

and

<https://opencanada.org/book-review-stand-on-guard/>

#strategy

Interpreting Sun Tzu: The Art of Failure?

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/7/13/interpreting-sun-tzu-the-art-of-failure>

#warfare

Converging Ways of War: Russian, China and America

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/12/16/converging-ways-of-war/>

Stop Undermining Partners With 'Gifts'

<https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/stop-undermining-partners-with-gifts/>

Note in the article: "The procurement costs of any weapon system are generally a third of the lifetime costs" *and the linked Acquisition Logistics Guide* (<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA368108.pdf>) *with its history.*

Strength in Numbers: The Future of Coalition Building and Irregular Warfare

<https://mwi.usma.edu/strength-in-numbers-the-future-of-coalition-building-and-irregular-warfare/>

#wargaming

A Wargame at RAND Puts Teen Girls in Command

<https://www.rand.org/blog/rand-review/2019/08/a-wargame-at-rand-puts-teen-girls-in-command.html>

Other:

Canadian Army Magazine, Fall 2021, Nov 22, 2021

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/fall-2021/>

US Army University Press Research and Books

Some interesting books to read: <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/>

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

Russia

Russia is still maintaining approximately 175k troops in and around Ukraine. There is much satellite imagery showing this buildup in camps near the Ukraine border area. One of the pieces missing is the amount of fuel, ammunition, repair workshops of various sorts plus the vast quantity of transport required to maintain an army in action. There are the hard pieces: the field hospitals, temporary morgue units, crematorium units, and forensic identification units needed to return ones loved ones to the proper family. In the earlier part of the War with Ukraine Russia sent in crematory units so that the coffins were not as obvious and funerals were held to small numbers. We know from Russian budgetary figures that over 2k soldiers from the Russian Armed Forces were killed in various actions in Ukraine. Casualties are just as popular in Russia as they are in the West.

One issue not discussed is how much effort it takes to keep an army healthy in the field. Even a strain of influenza can cause major issues as it spreads so rapidly amongst close quartered men in temporary accommodations such as tents or temporary buildings. Long term temporary garrisons also start having issues with simple things like latrines, water purification and simply dealing with the vast amount of waste that 175k people with thousands of vehicles create in a short period. It is noted that Russia has not mobilized its reserves so there is a finite timeline for those troops to remain in the field and be effective without major expenditures of resources. Russia is in serious long-term economic decline from the Putin regime's inability to modernize and diversify the industries whether in finance, technology, power generation, infrastructure, etc. The Putin regime has focused on the energy industry and the armaments industry, both in dire need of modernization to remain viable. One other part that Putin tends to forget is how willing are Russians to enter a potential conflict with the West. The answer is they are not interested in such an event. Putin was elected because he had eliminated anyone else who may have been a potential rival, not because he is widely viewed for his leadership. He is hounded by the memories of the pension reform fiasco, and he is hounded by military deaths in the multitude of conflicts young Russians find themselves in at the moment through private military companies such as Wagner Group. Although not technically military casualties, these ongoing deaths do cause a constant drip on the Russian citizenry. A war would not be popular particularly if Putin is the chief instigator.

Putin has made several demands to the US and NATO. Even here he is making further errors, such as not dealing with the EU which is also supportive of the Ukraine particularly after Russia's support for the Belarussian President's efforts using refugees as weapons against the EU. Russia has no friends in this circumstance. Even former Soviet republics would be less than enthusiastic in entering a conflict on Russia's behalf.

So what are Putin's demands? First and most important, "The US shall undertake to prevent further eastward expansion of NATO and deny ascension of any former Soviet Republic to the alliance." Second, to not build US or NATO bases on any territory of the former USSR, and third to stop positioning NATO troops and bases in former eastern block countries and stop any activity that Russia views as a threat near Russian territory. These demands have been turned down by NATO as unacceptable already but it is believed that Russia understands this and is using these as a way to create a starting point for negotiation. Still, one wonders about the thinking within the Kremlin; how far would they go to make their point? It is this type of gambling that could lead to a full blown war which Russia would ultimately lose but would extract a horrific price on the world.

The other limitation on any conflict for Russia is Covid. Russia continues to fail miserably in getting people vaccinated. Excess deaths in Russia is now approaching 900k and official Covid related deaths is now over 300k with over 25k cases being added per day. One concern with these figures is whether Russia has the Omicron variant, the stats do not say. As Canada and others have found, Omicron is very infectious as it relates to other variants seen so far. It seems that Russia is heading down in overall cases but again the stats shown do not indicate the Omicron variant. An outbreak of Omicron in Russia's large unvaccinated population would quickly overwhelm their medical system which is already strained. On another note, Russia has a two-tier system, one public medicine and second a pay as you go private system. The contrasts between the systems are stark with the public system largely bureaucratic and uncaring, the other modern and efficient, at least in the short blogs from Russia.

Belarus

Belarus' attempt to destabilize the EU by weaponizing migrants was a major failure and an embarrassment for Russia as well. The latest is that Belarus is attempting to shift blame to Poland, stating that Poland practiced torture and beating of migrants out of the eyes of the international press corps. Poland did take rather severe methods during the attempt by Belarus to force migrants across the border. Poland also tried to limit press access to the area along the border. A free press is always going to be somewhat double-edged sword. In this case, providing openings for the press would have provided an opportunity to get the message across in a more favourable light even if the news is not necessarily good. Being open and transparent in this case probably would have been better for Poland. Instead, Belarus provided some carefully orchestrated press visits and got some good press out of the situation. Instead, Poland caused doubt in its actions.

Belarus is accepting a second shipment of Chinese vaccines, while not an issue as such, it does make one wonder why not the Russian Sputnik V. Belarus is also negotiating with China at the ministerial level about future ventures. Is Belarus now trying to get China to be the guarantor of Belarussian independence instead of playing off the EU, so that Lukashenko can remain in power?

China

Hong Kong completed its elections on 19 December 2021 with around 30% of the electorate participating. The elections were a contrivance of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) which decided who could run based on the need for the candidates to be "patriots." It eliminated any pro-democracy candidates and left 90 pro-Beijing supporters now controlling the 7th Legislative Council of Hong Kong. The CCP was quick to say there were reasons for the low turnout including foreign interference and the pandemic. In fact the whole program was a complete sham as it the only way the CCP could win any election is to rig it. The CCP has had a completely wonderful election that fulfilled the wishes of the CCP leadership; a completely rubber stamp legislature. It is another nail in the coffin of democracy in Hong Kong and the true end of any illusions of what the "One country two systems" truly is. It should be a clear sign to Taiwan and the rest of the world what China is, an authoritarian genocidal state that will not honour its treaties or agreements. It should be a note for the investment community as well. None of your investments are safe in Xi's China and the safety of your staff is only as good as the relationship with China and your home country. Hostage diplomacy is the name of the game. Rule of law is missing, replaced by the whims of the leadership of the CCP. The true sign of what people really think is the population loss this year which is the highest on record, over 90k have left as of August 2021. The real vote is clear.

Speaking of potential hostages, the Winter Olympics are due to start on 4 February and last until 20 February 2022. The Para-Olympics follows shortly, starting on 4 March and continuing until 13 March

2022. The International Olympic Committee and of course the CCP leadership have said that the Olympics should not be politicized, all the while China does exactly that in its overall propaganda program. The US, UK, Australia, Canada and Lithuania have so far decided to do a diplomatic boycott of the games. The Women's Tennis Association and the National Hockey league have also pulled out, the WTA over the actions against Chinese tennis champion Peng Shuai and the NHL because of Covid issues. The Olympics have lost their meaning and the IOC have lost their way. They say they are apolitical but, personally, I cannot think of making a stronger political statement than their support of a genocidal regime; their actions or lack thereof speaks volumes.

China's CCP continues its crackdown on private firms including shaking down the owners for cash. The concern is that these actions will have a cascading effect on many businesses which have used informal banking methods to fund expansions, etc. As the Chinese financial system is opaque it is uncertain what exactly is occurring in each instance. What is certain is that investment by private firms from the international community is not protected and will likely be endangered by recent Chinese government legislation. According to some South Asian press, the Chinese economy is in poor shape, but officially released figures seem to tell a different story. As we have seen in the latest Chinese census information official figures are somewhat suspect. As mentioned before Chinese population figures could be off considerably, with one estimate being as low as 1.26b vice 1.4b people.

China's latest aircraft carrier, which is larger and conventionally powered than its last carrier the *Shandong*, will likely be floated out early in 2022. The new carrier is expected to be equipped with electro-magnetic catapults and arrest wires allowing the carrier to launch heavier aircraft with increased fuel and weapons loads. In some Chinese videos the carrier seems to be equipped with new aircraft including an air early warning aircraft. It will be China's third carrier and also its third different design. The new fighter is supposedly equipped with a Chinese designed and built engine vice a Russian designed one. Still, carrier aviation is complex and a hull is vastly different than a fully capable worked up carrier.

Maximum Expected Time of Rescue in the Canadian Arctic

Invitation to participate in a questionnaire

20 December 2021

Hello,

My name is Jack Gallagher I am a researcher who is working on a project in conjunction with Dalhousie University, the Marine Institute (Memorial University) and St. Francis Xavier University. Our team is conducting research to enhance the understanding of Maximum Expected Time of Rescue (METR) in the Canadian Arctic. I received your contact information from either previous contact when preparing for this project or from other researchers or contacts.

We are currently seeking the participation from Arctic search and rescue planners, responders and managers, as well as classification societies, shipping regulators, shipping companies, and Northern SAR organizations to participate in a short, voluntary, online questionnaire. The questionnaire will take approximately 10-15 minutes of your time and will help us gauge the knowledge and understanding surrounding METR, to be used as a benchmark for our research. Should you wish to participate, you will be added to the contact list to receive a similarly structured follow-up questionnaire near the end of the project to determine whether the general understanding of METR has changed throughout this project lifecycle (date TBD late 2023/early 2024).

This questionnaire is part of a larger study which aims to develop a multi-variable assessment method to assist in determining METR for ships' Polar Code Certificates. Should you wish to be contacted for future engagement opportunities regarding this research please contact Ronald Pelot at ronald.pelot@dal.ca.

Please feel free to share this email within your network if you think there are others who might be interested in completing this questionnaire.

Thank you in advance for your time and consideration, your participation is greatly appreciated. You can find the link to the online questionnaire [here](#) or by copy/pasting the following link into your web browser <https://surveys.dal.ca/opinio/s?s=65644>. The questionnaire will begin once you have had a chance to read the project consent form.

Please feel free to contact me if you have any comments, questions and concerns related to this study.

Alternatively, if you do not wish to participate and would like to be removed from our contact list for this project please send us a message at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Jack

Jack Gallagher

Mobile: + 1 902 489 2378

jack@hammurabi.ca

Web: www.hammurabi.ca

The Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security Job Opportunities

RUSI(NS) has for some years had a connection with The Romeo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative (now The Dallaire Institute for Children, Peace and Security) ever since we received a presentation (Veteran Trainers to Eradicate the use of Child Soldiers; <https://rusi-ns.ca/event/veteran-trainers-eradicate-use-child-soldiers/>; reported at <https://rusi-ns.ca/vtecs/>) and assisted with some of the Initiative's social media efforts. For your consideration, the Institute has now informed us of two employment opportunities:

Research Advisor (<https://dallaireinstitute.org/employment-opportunity-research-advisor/>)

and

Participatory Action Research (PAR) Consultant (<https://dallaireinstitute.org/employment-opportunity-participatory-action-research-par-consultant/>).

