



# Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

## Dispatches

### 7 January 2022

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence and security issues.*

*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

### Annual General Meeting 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia will meet for Annual General Meeting 2022 at 1900 hours Halifax time, Tuesday, **25 January 2022**. Zoom joining instructions will be emailed prior.

Don Moser  
Insp, RCMP  
President, RUSI(NS)

### RUSI(NS) 2021 Survey

The RUSI(NS) survey for how we did in 2021 will be emailed to members in January as part of the membership renewal email. It is short - please take a couple minutes to fill it in. Your feedback is important to the future activities of this Institute.

### Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**emended:** 26 January 2022, Wednesday – Distinguished Speakers Commander Corey Gleason, first Commanding Officer, HMCS *Harry DeWolf*, and Captain Al McCabe, United States Coast Guard 17th District, "Arctic Maritime Security: US Coast Guard and Canadian Navy Operations." 1300-1500. Via Zoom. Registration is required. To register, email RUSI(NS) by close-of-business Sun, 23 Jan. As

subject line for your registration email, put: RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers 26 January 2022 Registration. Participation is limited and later registrants may have to be put on a waiting list. If after registering your availability changes and you are no longer able to attend, please advise RUSI(NS) as soon as possible so your spot can be re-assigned. Zoom instructions will be emailed to registrants by end-of-day Mon, 24 Jan. If you have not received them by end-of-day 24 Jan, please check your spam folder and, if necessary, email RUSI(NS).

**emended:** 16 February 2022, Wednesday – Distinguished Speaker Col Meaghan Setter, RCAF, “RCAF Strategy.” 1300-1500. Via Zoom. Invitations to follow. Meanwhile, see: “Cultivating Future Airpower Strategists - On 'Developing Twenty-First-Century Airpower Strategists’”  
[https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15\\_Issue-4/R-Terino.pdf](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-4/R-Terino.pdf)

**New:** 22 February - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Off the Hex Map with the Center for Army Analysis." 1900-2100 EST. Via Zoom. "The Center for Army Analysis' Strategic Wargaming Division will discuss how they support Army Senior Leaders and senior leaders across the Joint Force." To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/off-the-hex-map-with-the-center-for-army-analysis-tickets-237526477087>

5 April, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Strategic Wargaming - The US Army War College Approach." 7:00–9:00 pm ADT. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/strategic-wargaming-the-us-army-war-college-approach-tickets-187766283007>.

### **Publications:**

Except where otherwise indicated, publications are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

**New:** RUSI(NS) Comments “Another Commemorative Medal Missed?” by Murray Lee, 2 January 2022  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/platinum\\_jubilee\\_medal/](https://rusi-ns.ca/platinum_jubilee_medal/)

RUSI(NS) presentation “Canadian Coast Guard Arctic Region – Implementation and Successes” by Assistant Commissioner Neil O’Rourke, 29 November 2021  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/ccg\\_arctic\\_region/](https://rusi-ns.ca/ccg_arctic_region/)

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 15 December 2021 edition  
[https://send.successbyemail.com/prvw\\_message2.aspx?chno=31ae3090-a6e8-4916-a569-d757b7edc2ca](https://send.successbyemail.com/prvw_message2.aspx?chno=31ae3090-a6e8-4916-a569-d757b7edc2ca)

**New:** Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, January 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 1, January 2022

Naval Association of Canada presentation "NORAD Modernization and Renewal" by Dr Andrea Charron, 6 December 2021  
<https://youtu.be/Vtf4g3qh26Q> (slides at [https://nac-o.wildapricot.org/resources/OTTAWA%20BRANCH/Documents/Meetings/2021-12-06-NORAD-Modernization\\_Charron.pdf](https://nac-o.wildapricot.org/resources/OTTAWA%20BRANCH/Documents/Meetings/2021-12-06-NORAD-Modernization_Charron.pdf)).

**New:** Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, January 2022  
<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/91-rausi-dispatches-january-2022>

Royal Alberta United Service Institute *News* October-December 2021  
<https://www.rausi.ca/news/publications>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, Christmas/New Years Edition

Royal Canadian Naval Reserve *Link*, Vol 29, No 1, 2021  
<https://issuu.com/lencre-reservenaval-link-navalreserve/docs/link-2021-vol29-navalreserve>

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* - Volume 4 Issue 9  
<http://www.navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/en/news-ynt/2021/11-your-navy-today.page>

**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver and Vancouver Artillery Association *News*, 4 January 2022

**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022.



Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 20, Issue 4, December 2021

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 9, Issue 8, 20 December 2021

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, December 2021

**Tweeted by @RUSI NS:**

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

<p>CNA @CNA_org 30 Dec tweeted: Learn more about our work on #Arctic strategy and operations. (Arctic Strategy and Operations) RUSI(NS) retweeted: Hockey sock of #Arctic-related reading at @CNA_org <a href="https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/arctic">https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/sppp/arctic</a> Development of strategy in CAN🇨🇦Arctic/North should be whole-of-gov't with complete engagement of Northern peoples</p>	
<p>James Brun @LeBrunJames81 1 Jan tweeted: HMCS Swansea in rough seas off Bermuda. January 1944. Credit: Lieutenant Gilbert Alexander Milne. HMCS Yellowknife @HmcsYellowknife 1 Jan retweeted: Check out that paint scheme, #HMCSMoncton! #WeTheNavy RUSI(NS) Info Note "Naval Camouflage and its Application on HMC Ships REGINA and MONCTON: A Brief History" <a href="https://rusi-ns.ca/naval-camouflage-and-its-application-on-hmc-ships-regina-and-moncton-a-brief-history/">https://rusi-ns.ca/naval-camouflage-and-its-application-on-hmc-ships-regina-and-moncton-a-brief-history/</a> One of many Second World War Admiralty Disruptive Patterns</p>	

Public Safety Canada@Safety\_Canada 3 Jan tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: #HumanTrafficking is happening in Canada. Over 2/3 of police-reported incidents of human trafficking between 2009-2019 occurred in #Ontario, and generally in urban centres like #Toronto, #Ottawa, #Montréal and #Halifax. Get the facts at <http://Canada.ca/human-trafficktrafficking>  
*Recall the April 2019 RCMP brief to RUSI(NS) on human trafficking.*



RCMP Heritage Centre @RCMPHC Jan 2 tweeted: The RCMP has created a new investigator – one with cutting-edge skills – to support investigations into financial crime and cybercrime where criminals steal from, threaten, defraud and extort thousands of Canadians each year. <https://rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/gazette/civilian-investigators-coming-rcmp> (Civilian investigators coming to RCMP)  
RUSI(NS) retweeted: Civilian Criminal Investigators "will have specialized skillsets & up-to-date experience in fields such as computer science & financial markets." Good, hiring people to operate in two domains where criminals (& other bad actors including foreign powers) are working against CAN🇨🇦




NATO ACT @NATO\_ACT 3 Jan tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Several factors within the space domain cannot be under-estimated by the Alliance such as space-based strike weapons, space support for the Alliance's operations or dual-use material/devices. Learn more in the #NATO Legal Gazette issue 42: <https://act.nato.int/publications>



*Lots of interesting reading in the preceding issues, too.*

NATO STABILITY POLICING CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE @NSPCOE 3 Jan tweeted: The 2022-24 @NSPCOE's Strategic Plan is available @ <https://www.nspcoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Strategic-Plan-2022-2024.pdf>! It will inform our next 3-year activities, w/ the aim to lead our #SPCommunityOfInterest & the #Alliance's efforts in the field of #StabilityPolicing. #WeAreNATO #WeAreStabilityPolicing #StrongerTogether  
RUSI(NS) retweeted: Stability Policing = police-related activities intended to reinforce or replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration of public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights. (#NATO definition)



.@CdnNavalReview "A Revisit of the 2001 Defence Policy Paper" <https://www.navalreview.ca/2021/12/a-revisit-of-the-2001-defence-policy-paper/> "When military requirements are being continually downscaled during lean times, the military capabilities that are needed never materialize when prosperous times return." @NationalDefence



### **Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:**

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

### **Canadian navy must recruit 1,000 sailors to crew new warships, vice-admiral says**

<https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-navy-needs-to-recruit-1000-sailors-to-crew-new-warships-commander>

It takes time to produce fleet-worthy sailors. Is Canada already too late to have sailors 'in the pipeline' to crew the new Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels and later the Canadian Surface Combatant frigates as the ships are accepted by the Navy? What sort of innovation and changes to the Navy (cultural, support, career progression, financial) might help attracting and retaining sailors? Are we going to be faced with having to put warships into reserve because there just aren't the people?




It takes time to build a navy. There are penalties to a state that allows its navy to atrophy.

### **China's Surprise Submarine Move Shows Its Growing Power**

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/12/chinas-surprise-submarine-move-shows-its-growing-power/>

Submarine Diplomacy: "Governments can supply submarines to help create, or reinforce, alliances."



Belt And Submarine - "While the Belt and Road projects are infrastructure, many will see a very blurred line between them and the submarine sales. Said another way, the submarines are part of an influence game and strategic positioning. They can be leveraged in a similar way to port or shipyard projects."

The Indo-Pacific south and south east is a region to which Canada is increasingly paying attention with Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) deployments. With more submarines being provided by China to local governments, the RCN's capabilities in anti-submarine warfare (ominous term for peace/competition times - let's just write contra-submarine activities) may be in good stead as part of Canada's diplomacy, and maritime strategy, there.

## A New Arctic Strategy for an Emerging Maritime Domain

<https://cimsec.org/a-new-arctic-strategy-for-an-emerging-maritime-domain/>

The US Department of the Navy has released an updated framework for the Arctic region, "A Blue Arctic: A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic"

(<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/05/2002560338/-1/-1/0/Arctic%20blueprint%202021%20final.Pdf/Arctic%20blueprint%202021%20final.PDF>) which "clearly stakes a claim to the Arctic as fundamentally maritime and littoral." Okay, doesn't take a US document to make that point. The framework "invites the <add federal marine departments and agencies of choice> to collaborate strategically where so far they have mostly done so operationally." That latter sentence could and should be applied to Canada.



## Congress Wants Answers On The Railgun It Just Funded Even Though The Navy No Longer Wants It

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43661/congress-wants-answers-about-the-railgun-it-just-funded-even-though-the-navy-no-longer-wants-it>

Even with the possibility that railguns may not be available in the near future to outfit warships, it makes sense to ensure that ship designs, including that of the Canadian Surface Combatant project, have the margins (power, volume, weight, cooling) to allow railguns and other power-hungry systems retrofitted.



## Parliamentary debate lacking as Canada edges closer to purchasing armed drones

<https://pbicanada.org/2022/01/03/parliamentary-debate-lacking-as-canada-edges-closer-to-purchasing-armed-drones/>

A cogent argument for parliamentary debate about the procurement of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) drones was not made in the article. Maybe an argument could be made for autonomous armed drones but that is a different capability. Besides, RPAS could easily have been (was?) subject to parliamentary debate when the 'Strong, Secure, Engaged' defence policy was tabled to Parliament, and certainly would have been subject to consideration by Treasury Board (parliamentarians) what with the estimated \$1 billion to \$5 billion acquisition cost.



ДЯ ЭММА J BRIANT @EmmaLBriant 2 Jan tweeted:  
Sweden has launched The **Swedish Psychological Defence Agency** - for identifying, analysing and responding to influence campaigns and 'misleading information' directed at Sweden or Swedish interests. (<https://www.mpf.se/en/>)

Canada should pay attention to how this works for Sweden. There is a 'public information war' going on. How well prepared are Canadians?

Myndigheten för  
psykologiskt försvar



### **A tale of two fighter jets — and what it means for Canada's defence and place in the world**

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-fighter-jets-defence-1.6296021>

Article focuses on economic and industrial benefits for Canada. What about the benefits of the two Future Fighter Capability contenders for the pilots who will fly the winner? Pilots who want an aircraft that will also win the fight and bring them home to family?



### **Toronto Police drone program soars to new heights**

<https://torontosun.com/news/local-news/the-law-above-toronto-police-drone-program-soars-to-new-heights>

"... the aircraft must be flown within range of the licensed pilot's sight line. ..."

Line-of-sight only operations is a restriction for which a work around needs to be found, especially for life-saving situations. Risks can be weighed, mitigation measures put in place, and appropriate people authorize beyond-line-of-sight operations.

Hmm, RPAS. Both the Toronto (and other?) police and the military (<https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/services/procurement/remotely-piloted-aircraft-system.html>) are using that acronym. Potential for confusion?



### **GameChangers 2021: How IUU Fishing Plundered Latin America's Oceans**

<https://insightcrime.org/news/gamechangers-2021-iuu-fishing-plundered-latin-americas-oceans>

It would be interesting to read such an analysis for North American (including Arctic) waters. To what extent might Canada have a problem with IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing? This could be a maritime security issue locally, certainly it is in other regions where Canadian ships operate. The Royal Canadian Navy has supported Fisheries and Oceans Canada (FOC) in the past with patrols (it's something navies do, part of their constabulary role) and is a partner with FOC in Canada's Marine Security Operations Centres (see: <https://rusi-ns.ca/marine-security-operations-centre-east/>). A recent article ("Canada wraps up Operation North Pacific Guard to combat global illegal fishing" <https://www.canada.ca/en/fisheries-oceans/news/2021/11/canada-wraps-up-operation-north-pacific-guard-to-combat-global-illegal-fishing3.html>) highlighted collaboration of a number of organizations including the Navy. What is the Navy's overall engagement in countering IUU fishing, and what more might the Navy be able to do?



**'It acknowledges our place': RCMP explores adding ribbon skirt as part of ceremonial uniform**

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/rcmp-ribbon-skirt-isabella-kulak-1.6067735>

A custom in the building?

Like existence of 'Indigenous Police Services Unit.'

- - -

*The article was re-posted with the following from one of our knowledgeable members:*



Indigenous Police Services (IPS) teams are part of a larger organizational strategy to ensure the RCMP is effectively connected to the communities it serves. IPS teams are modelled on respect and community collaboration to maintain trust with police and build awareness of what the Indigenous communities need and expect from those policing within their communities. There is a collateral benefit for the RCMP in attracting Indigenous peoples to the police calling where they can positively impact their own communities in a way not previously considered. The RCMP has the privilege of policing the majority of Indigenous reserves in Canada. This initiative is but one whereby the Force is demonstrating through actions, not just words, that they are listening and learning as an organization.

**What are Flag States in the Shipping Industry And What's Their Role?**

<https://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/what-are-flag-states-in-the-shipping-industry-2/>


An understanding of maritime trade and its aspects is important for naval personnel, defence decision makers and navalists/enthusiasts of naval and maritime affairs. The protection of trade in times of peace and of conflict is a (arguably, the) significant part of what a navy is for (Corbett and Mahan are still very relevant). The Royal Canadian Navy has a history of trade protection. Its current strategy, especially as a blue-water navy, should and appears to encompass freedom of the seas for trade.



**Canada's hesitancy on military defence is leaving us vulnerable**

<https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/canadas-hesitancy-on-military-defence-is-leaving-us-vulnerable/>

Is there more than a 'maritime blindness' in Canada? Is there also a 'defence blindness?' When we are undergoing so much conflict, albeit in the public information, economic/financial, legal and international relations domains?





### Getting Back On Top: How to Rebuild the Navy

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/january/getting-back-top-how-rebuild-navy>

The 'Key Points' in this article are well worth reading by anyone of any state concerned about the state of their navy.



### Opinion: How Canada can improve security if American democracy collapses

<https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/opinion-how-canada-can-improve-security-if-american-democracy-collapses/ar-AA5uxfS>

"Canada needs a military that can ... think Arctic security; early warning systems crucial to the maintenance of NORAD; defence and deterrence against foreign espionage and interference; and adversarial relations with China."



### Maritime Search and Rescue and Shipping Risk: How does it Work in Canada?

<https://clearseas.org/en/blog/maritime-search-and-rescue-and-shipping-risk-how-does-it-work-in-canada/>

Gitga'at Guardians (<https://coastfunds.ca/stories/start-up-and-expansion-of-the-gitgaat-guardians/>) a model for marine security in other locations?



### 750 F-35s Now Delivered, Navy To Put Some Of Its Oldest Test Models Into Storage

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43722/750-f-35s-now-delivered-navy-to-put-some-of-its-oldest-test-models-into-storage>

One hopes that there will be a production line still running if/when Canada makes a decision on the Future Fighter capability...

Maybe we can un-shrink wrap some of the USAF aircraft and use them for initial training, etc.



### Other Sources:

#### #airpower

Cultivating Future Airpower Strategists - On 'Developing Twenty-First-Century Airpower Strategists'

[https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15\\_Issue-4/R-Terino.pdf](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-4/R-Terino.pdf)

*Advance reading before our February Distinguished Speaker. From the USAF Air University Strategic Studies Quarterly, well worth perusing.*

## **#Arctic**

A New Arctic Strategy for an Emerging Maritime Domain

<https://cimsec.org/a-new-arctic-strategy-for-an-emerging-maritime-domain/>

## **#defence procurement**

The Evolution of Defence Procurement in Canada: A Hundred-Year History

[https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en\\_CA/ResearchPublications/202054E](https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/202054E)

## **#military culture**

Doing Less to do Better: Why the Military Can't Solve its Overwork Problem

<https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/doing-less-to-do-better-why-the-military-cant-solve-its-overwork-problem/>

The British Army has a Blackbelt in 'Bullshito'

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/03/19/blackbelt-in-bullshito/>

## **#intelligence**

Opinion: Canada will be weakened if it loosens rules around releasing intelligence

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-will-be-weakened-if-it-loosens-rules-around-releasing/>

*Available to RUSI(NS) members on request to RUSI(NS), if unable to access directly.*

## **#maritime security**

Mind the AIS gap

<https://windward.ai/blog/mind-the-ais-gap/>

## **#NATO**

NATO Strategic Concept

'trailer': <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>

How to deal with the Kremlin-created crisis in Europe

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-to-deal-with-the-kremlin-created-crisis-in-europe/>

## **#naval force development**

From Trafalgar to Jutland: The Atrophy of a Great Naval Power

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/04/02/from-trafalgar-to-jutland-the-atrophy-of-a-great-naval-power/>

## **#robots**

The First (and Only) Law of Robotic Warfare

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/11/17/the-first-and-only-law-of-robotic-warfare>

## **#space**

On Space War

<https://mwi.usma.edu/on-space-war/>

## #warfare

Cognitive warfare and the use of force

<https://www.stratagem.no/cognitive-warfare-and-the-use-of-force/>

## #wargaming

On Wargaming

US Naval War College Newport Paper: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/newport-papers/43/>  
926 hits on wargaming at the site for anyone who searches (31 Dec 21).

Wargaming has a Diversity Problem

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/01/15/wargaming-has-a-diversity-problem/>






Wargaming at CNA

<https://www.cna.org/centers/cna/operational-warfighting/wargaming>

## Other:

Anita Anand @AnitaAnandMP 1 Jan tweeted: Happy New Year to all Canadians, including the hardworking and dedicated members of Canada's defence community. In 2022, I will continue to work hard on your behalf to keep Canada secure and to build a workplace where everyone feels safe, protected and respected.

Anita Anand @AnitaAnandMP 2 Jan tweeted: Spoke with the @OakvilleBeaver about my priorities for 2022, including:

-  Building a military where everyone feels protected & respected
-  Equipping our forces
-  Supporting Ukraine's security
-  Climate action
-  Economic growth & fiscal responsibility



## The Unplanned Costs of an Unmanned Fleet

<https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/the-unplanned-costs-of-an-unmanned-fleet/>

*This article was in last week's Dispatches, with retweets from RAdm Santarpia and RUSI(NS). Now James Goldrick*

*@GoldrickJames 28 Dec has retweeted: "Very much worth a read. Uncrewed units have much potential, but there is no free lunch involved. Pundits advocating them need to consider the first, second and third order organisational effects of operating them - and all the overheads."*

*Readers of naval matters know that RAdm Goldrick RAN (ret'd) is well worth paying attention to (and reading his books).*



*Nice to see (and there were comments on Twitter in favour of) a tweet highlighting an exercise. There are lots of tweets about operations, not so many about exercises despite their roles in building readiness and in international affairs.*

RCAF Operations @RCAFOperations 12:51 PM · Dec 30, 2021 tweeted

(<https://twitter.com/RCAFOperations/status/1476596867995680772>): There is no universal formula for building resilience.. #NORAD stands ready against threats that come from beyond borders or emerge from within. Continued training with our 🇺🇸 partners ensures we'll both be ready when that time comes.




The Strategy Bridge on Twitter 3 Jan: "In the first tranche of 2021 articles, our contributors looked to economic and agricultural dominance as lenses through which to view the contest between the #US and #China far from the battlefield.

<https://t.co/MIAh2b8L1d>" / Twitter

[https://twitter.com/Strategy\\_Bridge/status/1477985343613792263](https://twitter.com/Strategy_Bridge/status/1477985343613792263)

(The Roots of Victory

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/11/1/4th-quarter-2021-journal-introduction-the-roots-of-victory>)



## Ship Posters

Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force ships: <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/national-defense-reserve-fleet/rrf/marad-rrf-ship-poster>

Maritime Security Program ships: <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/national-security/strategic-sealift/msp-ship-poster-july-2019>

Ships of the US Navy's Military Sealift Command:

[https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/Portals/43/Posters/MSC\\_USNavyShips.pdf?ver=eNK5\\_GHCwqJ2exBRXDNJDg%3d%3d](https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/Portals/43/Posters/MSC_USNavyShips.pdf?ver=eNK5_GHCwqJ2exBRXDNJDg%3d%3d)

## Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

### O Canada

New fighter aircraft selection will likely occur this spring. The final two aircraft are the SAAB Grypen and the Lockheed Martin F-35. Canada has sunk a large amount of money into the F-35 program as one of the first-tier countries and has also received numerous contracts for Canadian firms to produce parts for this aircraft no matter who purchases the aircraft. The PM stated that Canada would never buy the F-35 and had created conditions such that the Boeing entry, the F-18 E/F models called the Super Hornet, would receive a major penalty because of Boeing's actions against Bombardier and what is now the Airbus 220. The bottom line is that all the aircraft are now tainted with politics. Even Saab has been accused of dubious business practices with other sales. As much as I would like to see IMP Aerospace 'win' the contract and have the aircraft built here in Halifax, I cannot in good conscience accept that we take a 4<sup>th</sup> generation aircraft as an aircraft for the next forty years. It does not make sense, but with politics involved anything is possible. Canada does not take its security, defence or even policy seriously. In Australia, they seem to have general all-party support; in Canada the parties

don't seem to understand the house is on fire yet. We need all parties to understand the needs of the security services and why. Even now with our sovereignty at stake, one cannot find any party that is serious enough to see that the country is adequately defended.

Paul Wells wrote a piece that will be published in the February copy of MacLean's called "Canada's Hesitancy on Military Defence is Leaving us Vulnerable" (<https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/canadas-hesitancy-on-military-defence-is-leaving-us-vulnerable/>) dated 4 January 2022. The article is a step in the right direction and worthy of note and comment. Yet, his final three paragraphs state the real issue - there is no benefit to any politician to support expenditures on military equipment. Mr Wells also forgets that the military is just one aspect of our overall security. The needs of the RCMP, Coast Guard, CSIS, CSE, CBSA, plus the myriad of other smaller intelligence gathering agencies need to be revamped and modernised and made to work together to support a more comprehensive approach to Canada's overall security. We also need a focal point for all these organizations, where the material is assessed in a more global manner. Reliance on a task group within the Privy Council Office no longer remotely cuts the mustard.

Mr Wells does point out the fact that our US friends are getting a bit chuffed about our lack of any meaningful action in defence and security. Canada's inaction is a major failing that also affects our friends to the south. For example, the North Warning System was built in the 1980s. It badly needs to be upgraded to meet new threats not only to the US but to us. This needed to be started several years ago but one could almost hear the crickets chirp from our media and politicians. This lack of effort has direct implications for our sovereignty, both from our potential adversaries but also friends including the US and UK - both have been increasingly concerned about Canada's direction. New Russian and Chinese systems which Mr Wells discusses are not hypothetical, they exist. Nuclear upgrades are taking place in Russia and China. Even this Christmas season, Mr Putin talked about a possible nuclear event as a way of pressuring NATO, yet, this government continues to focus on one item, Covid while many lesser countries can walk and talk at the same time. The NORAD Commander visited Ottawa to brief the government on the new threats - it is in fact a friendly warning that Washington is aware of our inactivity and lack of effort. This is especially important as the liberal democratic world is under a major threat by nuclear armed players, Russia and China, as well as Iran and non-state players.

Speaking of China the PM stated that like-minded states need to band together to meet the Chinese threat. The irony of having Mr Trudeau stating this after months of inactivity against China's action against us is almost risible if it were not so blatantly true. The Canadian public is way ahead of the government on this issue. Action is needed, not words.

Canada is still developing its CSC concepts. Inspiring it is. In the meantime, the British have three ships started in batch one, with batch two contracts for five more thought to be close behind. One is nearing completion sufficiently to be able to being floated out as the future HMS *Glasgow*. The Australians have started cutting metal on their nine of what they call the Hunter-class. The British have also started more meaningful progress on the new Type 31 selection and have signed or are about to sign contracts for five new frigates. The Type 32 is an additional five with increased capability and is also being developed as well. The British will soon have three new warship types on trials including the Type 26, the Type 31 and the new replenishment ships to support the carriers. We have AOPV which does give us an interesting capability that we do need as shown by the journey of HMCS *Harry DeWolf* recently with its circum-navigation of the North American continent. It is not our sailors, soldiers or aviators that our problem except for the lack of them, it is an governance that is ill-equipped for the world and its issues and challenges.

## Russia

Russia continues its battle with Covid with total official cases being nearly 10.5m, but the real battle is convincing people to get the vaccine in their arms. People simply do not trust the government. Excess deaths are well over 900k although not all Covid deaths many but probably are due to under reporting in official numbers. Quite simply, the Putin regime is not believed or trusted - their actions, which may be quite benign in this case are actually creating more distrust.

Putin's official popularity is around 63% but the issue of vaccine acceptance shows a potentially different view in the population. Anecdotally, some social media outlets in Russia estimate he is closer to 30% or slightly less. There is little doubt that the general public is losing its 'love' of the authoritarian regime and its fake elections that essentially have no real opposition party. How does an authoritarian leader gain in popularity? Well, one finds an outsider such as NATO or Ukraine to be their threat. The Putin regime and in fact President Putin himself believe in the 18<sup>th</sup> century idea of sphere of influence in that a dominant country has de facto control over the fate of its subordinate neighbours. He has been consistent with his view that NATO should not expand into Eastern Europe or former Soviet republics. What he tends to forget is that these countries are now independent and will make their own decisions on their friends and business and diplomatic partners. Russia could have done the same as well but chose the 'strong man' authoritarianism and older ideas from the past such as spheres of influence. He also does not seem to understand that the demise of the Soviet Union was actually seen as the actual liberation of Eastern Europe and that it was only achieved in 1992. He continues to seek the past.

The Putin regime is now attempting to pressure NATO and the EU into accepting Russia's point of view in regard to security, again based on the idea of spheres of influence. He has demanded that Ukraine and Georgia not be permitted to join NATO ever, nor can any other former Soviet republic. He also has made similar threats in regard to Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Lastly, he has demanded that NATO troops in Eastern Europe be withdrawn. He has offered nothing in return. This is at this point unacceptable to NATO but there will be further discussions this month on these issues.

Russia has moved around 120k troops to the Ukraine border area. There are troops in place in Crimea as well including the Black Sea Fleet and several divisions with airborne and Spetnaz units as well as extensive air assets. The figure is around 35 to 45k troops. Russia also has its erstwhile friend Belarus with extra Russian security forces also totalling 100k. Russia's rail system is also well-exercised and can bring in large numbers of troops and equipment in short order. They have been known to successfully do this for more than a century. Could they attack Ukraine? The answer is yes, but at what cost? How much would the Russian public be willing to put up with given Russia's already over extended military?

Russia has continued to use Wagner Group and other Private Military Companies to replace Russian troops in a number of foreign actions throughout Africa and Asia. This includes Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali, (allegedly) Cameroon, and Libya. It has also been involved in putting up to 25k Russian volunteers into the Donbass to support the 'separatists' who are fighting for Russian citizens. Putin's argument in this case is the same as Hitler's and the Sudetenland in 1938. He also has to contend with warring countries from the former Soviet Union including South Ossetia, Transnistria, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and most recently, Kazakhstan and the bloody riots that have taken dozens of lives. Russia also has the problem of 'friends' such as Iran that has major issues with Azerbaijan, with Turkey over that country's move to consolidate 'Turkic ethnic' groups into a new international alignment, and in Libya and Syria, plus China's growing influence in the 'stans.' The Russian public is aware of Putin's adventurism and is increasingly aware of and are not happy especially with an

increased number of bodies returning home. Russia has no friends under the Putin regime, just increasing opposition. There is increasing knowledge that Putin's game is potentially disastrous. How will this work itself out is the real question. Will he gamble, will NATO through its major partners give in once again? I think the potential for a stupid move that will be costly is possible.

## **China**

China eliminated the last opposition/democratic critics within Hong Kong last week by arresting key reporters and editors. It has also run a largely ridiculed election in which only 'patriots' could run and with somewhere around 30% of the public voting. China has certainly eliminated any chance of Taiwan accepting the 'one country, two systems' approach after seeing this debacle. It means that democratic Taiwan has grown more entrenched in its views about its place in the world and China appears to be more on the defensive in front of the world. This is not likely to change in the future given China's authoritarian and some would say increasingly totalitarian regime, and China is increasingly upset over the world's reaction.

China's economy continues to falter as it is now more apparent that much of what is officially stated about their economy is false or inflated. Changes to financial regulations have also had a major negative effect on the private business community. Companies including some Chinese companies are now moving their operations to other countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam and other areas with low labour costs. This trend is continuing and is likely to have a longer term negative effect on the Chinese economy. Although not shown in Western press articles, those in Asia are very aware of the Communist Chinese Party's actions. Why the CCP has accepted the loss of the 'golden goose' by attacking its own entrepreneurs is unknown but likely due to their increasing influence and resources that potentially effect the survival of the CCP. In the reptilian brain that is the CCP, their survival is all that matters.

China has now moved about 100k troops to the Ladakh border area with India. There are ongoing talks at the corps commander level but both sides seem to be able to reinforce their side fairly quickly. The real issue is the weather and terrain; in this regard the Indians have more troops trained and acclimatised to the altitude and colder weather than China. Both countries are relatively sparsely populated in the region with limited infrastructure to support ongoing operations. This has not stopped the two countries from conflict.