



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

Dispatches

18 February 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence and security issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Help Wanted

RUSI(NS) is seeking temporary editors for *Dispatches* and our social media accounts for the first three weeks of April. If you can help, please contact RUSI(NS). Training will be available in the time ahead of the three week period.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

22 February, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Off the Hex Map with the Center for Army Analysis." 1900-2100 EST. Via Zoom. "The Center for Army Analysis' Strategic Wargaming Division will discuss how they support Army Senior Leaders and senior leaders across the Joint Force." To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/off-the-hex-map-with-the-center-for-army-analysis-tickets-237526477087>

New: 24 February, Thursday - Royal Alberta United Services Institute hosts Dr Sean Maloney, Royal Military College of Canada, speaking on "Strategic Nuclear Moves during the Ukrainian Crisis of 2022." 1900 MST. Via Zoom. Following a 20-45 minutes presentation, the audience will be encouraged to challenge and discuss with relevant questions. These will be non-partisan discussions aimed at generating thought-provoking responses allowing all parties to become better informed on security and defence. To register: <https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZYuc-2opzgtGdOvysDLxnQ8G8MTH4ftVj3>. See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

New: 16 March, Wednesday - Distinguished Speaker Jan-Andrej Skopalik, Regional Manager, National Aerial Surveillance Program, Transport Canada Atlantic Region, "Surveillance of Sea Surface Activities in Atlantic Canada." 1300-1500. Via Zoom. To register, email RUSI(NS) by close-of-business Sunday, 13 March. As the subject line for your registration email, put: RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker 16 March 2022 Registration. In addition to your name, include whether you are a RUSI(NS) member, otherwise please provide your organization (association, company or unit). Participation is limited and later registrants may have to be put on a waiting list. If after registering your availability changes and you are no longer able to attend, please advise RUSI(NS) as soon as possible so your spot can be re-assigned. Zoom instructions will be emailed to registrants by end Monday, 14 March. If you have not received them by end-of-day 14 March, please check your spam folder and, if necessary, email RUSI(NS).

31 March, Thursday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation by Phil Bolger-Cortez, Wargame Director, Air University LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, on "Air Force Wargaming." 7-9pm ADT. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/air-force-wargaming-tickets-241404436167>

5 April, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Strategic Wargaming - The US Army War College Approach." 7:00–9:00 pm ADT. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/strategic-wargaming-the-us-army-war-college-approach-tickets-187766283007>.

Publications:

Except where otherwise indicated, publications are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Comments "Can We Stop a Rogue Vessel in the Arctic?" by Pierre Leblanc, 4 February 2022, <https://rusi-ns.ca/rogue-vessel-arctic>
This Comments resulted from one of the questions during the RUSI(NS) and NORAD & USNORTHCOM Distinguished Speakers event 26 January 2022 "Arctic Maritime Security: US Coast Guard and Canadian Navy Operations."

RUSI(NS) Presentations "Arctic Maritime Security: US Coast Guard and Canadian Navy Operations" by CAPT Al McCabe USCG and Cdr Corey Gleason RCN, 29 Jan 22, https://rusi-ns.ca/arctic_maritime_security/

RUSI(NS) Paper "We Have No Air Defence For Our Army – Why?" by Murray Lee, 23 January 2022, <https://rusi-ns.ca/air-defence/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "An Evil Trinity" by Tim Dunne, 19 January 2022 https://rusi-ns.ca/evil_trinity/

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 16 February edition <https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, February 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 2, February 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, February 2022 <https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/99-rausi-dispatches-february-2022>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, February 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver and Vancouver Artillery Association Members *News*, 25 January 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 1st Quarter 2022.




New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 10, Issue 6, 14 February 2022

New: Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver Members News Feb 15, 2022

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, February 2022

Tweeted by @RUSI_NS: 🇨🇦


RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>Macdonald-Laurier Institute@MLInstitute 10 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "When the law is used to promote or shield specific causes and interests, people only obey the law when it is convenient to do so," warns @brianleecrowley. "We undermine the neutrality of the law at our peril." #cdnpoli #ottnews (We Undermine the Neutrality of the Law at Our Peril https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/undermine-neutrality-law-peril-brian-lee-crowley-line/)</p>	
<p>Macdonald-Laurier Institute@MLInstitute 8 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Countries like Canada need to recalibrate their approach toward #Ukraine, including by sending lethal aid. "The only way to successfully negotiate with Putin is with an iron fist in a velvet glove," writes Eugene Czolij. #cdnpoli #cdnfp (Canada's Package to Ukraine to Ensure Peace is Missing a Crucial Piece https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/canadas-package-ukraine-ensure-peace-missing-crucial-piece-eugene-czolij-inside-policy/)</p>	
<p>Ministry of Defence @DefenceHQ 12 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: You've probably heard people talking about @NATO recently, here's six reasons why the world needs the alliance: (Six reasons the world needs NATO https://medium.com/voices-of-the-armed-forces/six-reasons-the-world-needs-nato-f9ba48d23d8c)</p>	

The Naval Association of Canada @navalassn 12 Feb tweeted: What's the best way to move supplies and equipment from a ship to the shore when you don't have port facilities? NAC's Briefing Note 43 takes a look at ship to shore connectors. (Ship-to-Shore Connectors <https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/BN43-ship-to-shore.pdf>) RUSI(NS) retweeted: Ship-to-shore connector #SCC project to provide 5 Navamar-built powered barges as part of Joint Support Ship #JSS project <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=949&wbdisable=true> Add significant capability to @RoyalCanNavy to transfer people & material to/from shore for routine & contingency ops




Leah West @leahwest_nsl 14 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Still confused or want to know more about the law of emergencies? Check out this chapter from my text "National Security Law" with @cforcese: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3554318 See also Order In Council PC Number: 2022-0106 Date: 2022-02-14 <https://orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=41560&lang=en> Good summary at: https://twitter.com/leahwest_nsl/status/1489380259501944836



RUSI @RUSI_org 14 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 'To be successful, the UAF will have to inflict significant artillery losses on the Russian forces throughout their depth and degrade their ability to fight the kind of war that #Russian forces prefer' writes @Sam_Cranny in the latest #RUSICommentary. (The Role of Artillery in a War Between Russia and Ukraine <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/role-artillery-war-between-russia-and-ukraine>)




Official tartan created for @RoyalCanNavy <http://www.navy-marine.forces.gc.ca/en/news-operations/news-view.page?doc=official-tartan-created-for-the-rcn/kz5n37rv> 5 colours represent: black #RCN new uniform; dark blue old uniform; yellow laurel on cap badge; white anchor on cap badge; red ties to sovereign & sailors lost; purple non-seagoing members who wear naval uniform



NATO ACT @NATO_ACT 14 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The #NATO Legal Gazette is an educational outreach publication containing articles written by legal personnel working at NATO or in the governments of NATO and partner nations. Issue 42 covers the legal aspects of NATO's newest domain, space.
<https://act.nato.int/publications>



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 14 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Putin oligarchs are holding hundreds of millions of dollars in assets in Canada—it's in plain sight and can be found quite easily. I suspect that if you threatened sanctions on those assets, it would force Putin to quickly change his calculus.
(The Russia-Ukraine Crisis: Implications for Canada
<https://cdainstitute.ca/the-russia-ukraine-crisis-implications-for-nato-and-canada/>)



Public Safety Canada @Safety_Canada 12 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Have you ever wondered when/how/why #GoC departments and agencies share national security information? Learn more about the #NSInfoSharing process: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrnt/ntnl-trrrsm/shrng-ns-nfrmtn-en.aspx>
(Information Sharing for National Security)



Hybrid CoE @HybridCoE 16 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Given #Russia's forces along #Ukraine's border, the possibility of war must be taken seriously - even if Russia may not primarily aim at intervention, but at confusing and destabilizing, argues @MKlein1973 @SWPBerlin in our latest Strategic Analysis: <https://hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-strategic-analysis-31-russias-military-buildup-along-ukraines-border-what-to-expect/>
(Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 31: Russia's military buildup along Ukraine's border: What to expect?)



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

U.S. intel: Nine probable Russian routes into Ukraine in full-scale invasion

<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-intel-nine-probable-russian-routes-ukraine-full-scale-n1288922>

And then there's always the (tenth) route that nobody forecast...



Biden's Indo-Pac Strategy Will Rely On Partnerships To Counter China

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/02/bidens-indo-pac-strategy-will-rely-partnerships-counter-china/361909/>

The second of the five objectives that the United States is to pursue in the Indo-Pacific per its strategy (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf>) is: build connections within and beyond the region. Yet, whilst the word 'partner' in various forms can be found 76 times in the document, Canada (and other eastern Pacific states such as Chile and Peru) is not mentioned at all. The US strategy should be called an Indo-'Western Pacific' Strategy.



Canada is a three-ocean maritime state. One of those oceans is the Pacific. Canada is engaged in the Pacific.

It is not believed by outside observers that Canada has any regional strategies at the strategic level. The Policy Group of the Department of National Defence (DND) does produce a Global Engagement Strategy and it is understood that there were a series of regional strategies at the operational level that showed how operational and tactical activities of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and DND fit into and supported objectives in each region. Developing such strategies is a useful process that helps everyone to align their efforts. Such strategies would be classified but a serious observer could divine what they are about by taking note of where the CAF deploys and what they do.

Flurry of Russian naval activity explained

<https://navalinstitute.com.au/flurry-of-russian-naval-activity-explained/>

The article discusses Battalion Tactical Groups, Russian vehicles and Russian amphibious operations.



Convoy protest could change the way money is monitored, says watchdog agency

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/truck-convoy-fundraiser-gofundme-1.6346639>



"(Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada) FINTRAC and its American counterpart monitor transactions related to groups identified as being involved in what authorities call "Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism" (IMVE)."

To really understand and get a handle on conflict, from neighbourhood crime to international terrorism and all-out war/conflict, study the finances.

"Show me the money" is now "show me where the money came from...and why?"

FINTRAC is a significant national capability.

Acronym alert: IMVE.

Ukraine crisis: Is Russia waging an information war?

<https://www.bbc.com/news/60292915>



In Russia's Ukraine plans, how much does the mud matter?

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-joe-biden-moscow-kyiv-environment-and-nature-3aa7f3a45ceb57ba9ef1faa1c5f17ed8>



Russia and China devote more cyber forces to offensive operations than US, says new report

<https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2022/02/14/russia-and-china-devote-more-cyber-forces-to-offensive-operations-than-us-says-new-report/>



How autonomous wingmen will help fighter pilots in the next war

<https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/02/13/how-autonomous-wingmen-will-help-fighter-pilots-in-the-next-war/>



Tripwire for real war? Cyber's fuzzy rules of engagement

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-joe-biden-technology-business-hacking-5eadc06062f8c7acfc7b7302ec4c4478>



The Unorthodox Weapon We Need to Defend Democracy


<https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/01/16/russia-ukraine-gray-zone-warfare-autocrats-democracy-527022>

"The tool governments need is one that won't be easy to deploy: the rest of society. Companies and private citizens increasingly need to play a role in protecting democracy by shoring up their digital security, learning to detect misinformation and not succumbing to their worst instincts when cyberattacks or disinformation crises attempt to foment widespread panic."



What the Defense Department's 2021 China Military Power Report Tells Us About Defense Innovation

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-defense-departments-2021-china-military-power-report-tells-us-about-defense-innovation>



RFP Issued for Remotely Piloted Aircraft System

<https://mapleleafnavy.com/rfp-issued-for-remotely-piloted-aircraft-system/>

"This project will acquire a medium altitude and armed Remotely Piloted Aircraft System along with associated equipment, weapons, infrastructure and in-service sustainment capability that will support up to three concurrent lines of tasking, domestic or international."

For official project status, see: Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS)

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/remotely-piloted-aircraft-system.html>

It is planned for RPAS to be subject of a RUSI(NS) speaker presentation in later April 2022.



Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Project (RPAS) RFP has been published!

- ✔ Increased maritime and Arctic domain awareness for Canada
- ✔ New capability to modernize the Canadian Armed Forces
- ✔ Reduced risk to personnel

Canada

Careless posts cost lives

<https://www.aei.org/op-eds/careless-posts-cost-lives/>

"... everyone would benefit if everyone else curtailed their social media sharing of matters relating to the military."

"Today citizens of all ages can learn to think before they post. They can learn to consider the consequences which their mindless posting may have on soldiers, on the country and thus on themselves."



The west's focus on imminent invasion in Ukraine may backfire – and bolster Putin

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/14/the-west-invasion-ukraine-putin-russia>

"The case studies taken from incidents and confrontations over the decades show striking consistency: Russia achieves success when stronger adversaries back down in the face of threats, but retreats if those same adversaries demonstrate the will and determination to protect themselves, their allies or partners."



Just Whom Would a Russian 'False Flag' Operation Seek to Convince?

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/02/russia-has-been-prepping-its-population-false-flag-operation-months/361930/>

"What effect does the continuous repetition of a dubious statement have psychologically in an audience? Studies suggest it makes those statements more believable."



PAL Aerospace awarded new contract for Nova Scotia

<https://www.airmedandrescue.com/latest/news/pal-aerospace-awarded-new-contract-nova-scotia>

"... Nova Scotia has awarded a contract to PAL Aerospace for the continued provision of fixed-wing air ambulance services for up to ten more years."

PAL Aerospace and EHS LifeFlight have invested " 'significant engineering resources in the development of integrated patient handling systems' and 'developed specialized neonatal and bariatric patient handling and care services' ..."

One wonders how much information and technology exchange is occurring/could occur with the Canadian Armed Forces. May be good lessons for medical (medevac) and casualty (casevac) evacuation.



Government of Canada and Quatsino and Kitsoo Xai'xais First Nations Announce Launch of New Response Vessels to Strengthen Marine Safety in British Columbia

<https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2022/02/government-of-canada-and-quatsino-and-kitsoo-xai-xais-first-nations-announce-launch-of-new-response-vessels-to-strengthen-marine-safety-in-british.html>



The Canadian Coast Guard's Indigenous Community Boat Volunteer Pilot Program is doing well. Good move to engage with locals, especially Indigenous.

Stingers could be a game-changer in the battle for Ukraine

<https://thehill.com/opinion/international/592673-stingers-could-be-a-game-changer-in-the-battle-for-ukraine>

Ukraine has a shortage of air defense weaponry. There's a lesson there for Canada. See RUSI(NS) Comments "We Have No Air Defence For Our Army – Why?" (<https://rusi-ns.ca/air-defence/>).



Want to Innovate in the Military? Beware of the “Machiavelli Effect”

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/02/15/want_to_innovate_in_the_military_beware_of_the_machiavelli_effect_816846.html

The Machiavelli Effect - the "entrenched interests vested in the status quo (who) fight furiously against challengers."



"Modify the culture to reward innovation, and watch a hundred flowers bloom."

NATO Leaders Begin Considering Additional Battlegroups for Eastern Europe

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/02/nato-leaders-begin-considering-additional-battlegroups-eastern-europe/362085/>



"NATO already has four multinational battlegroups in eastern Europe that were established at NATO's 2016 Warsaw Summit in response to Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014. There are forces in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, which are led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States, respectively."

Any NATO consideration of establishing new battle groups would have to take into account that the Canadian commitment to lead and provide forces already for one battle group (Latvia) may well be as much as the Canadian Armed Forces and especially the Canadian Army can (should) support in a continuing basis at this time.

For more, see RUSI(NS) Information Note "What is a Battle Group in the Canadian Army?" (<https://rusi-ns.ca/battle-group/>).

Other Sources:

#Arctic

A Case Study of Russia's Arctic Posture

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/case-study-russias-arctic-posture>

#Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies ALEA

How Canadian law allows for military assistance in ending the Ottawa occupation

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canadian-law-allows-for-military-assistance-in-ending-the-ottawa/>

#deception

Sowing Darkness for Military Advantage: Deception

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/01/28/sowing-darkness-with-deception/>

#doctrine

Democratising Doctrine – Firing on the Wrong Lane

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/02/09/democratising-doctrine-response/>

A follow on to (posted to Dispatches 10 Dec 21): It's Time to Democratise Doctrine

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/12/03/its-time-to-democratise-doctrine/>

#grand strategy

Sun Tzu's Trap: The Illusion of Perpetual Competition

<https://mwi.usma.edu/sun-tzus-trap-the-illusion-of-perpetual-competition/>

#policing

Public Confidence in the Police: A New Low for the Service

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/public-confidence-police-new-low-service>

UK but worth a comparison.

In a free society, the government can, and sometimes must, direct the police

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/opinion-in-a-free-society-the-government-can-and-sometimes-must-direct-the-police>

Available to RUSI(NS) members on request if you cannot get past the subscription wall.

#urban warfare #FIBUA #MOUT (choose your term...)

Defending the City: An Overview of Defensive Tactics from the Modern History of Urban Warfare

<https://mwi.usma.edu/defending-the-city-an-overview-of-defensive-tactics-from-the-modern-history-of-urban-warfare/>

#war

Reviewing Why War?

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2022/2/15/reviewing-why-war>

#warfare

Plan to Fail

<https://wavellroom.com/2018/10/25/plan-to-fail-how-should-the-military-improve-its-planning-process/>

#wargaming

Getting the Most out of Your Wargame: Practical Advice for Decision-Makers

<https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/getting-the-most-out-of-your-wargame-practical-advice-for-decision-makers/>

Other:

NATO Library Special Focus LibGuide - Ukraine Crisis

<https://natolibguides.info/ukraine-crisis>

Updated daily.

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

Can we say, “Freedom Convoys,” a Canadian initiative spread around the world and giving hope to the truly paranoid, disenfranchised, and anyone with a grudge in a large semi-organized road rally that stopped in all sorts of places they shouldn’t. Most of these in Canada have been relatively peaceful in nature if noisy. Most cities prevented large trucks from entering the downtown core but somehow the City of Ottawa showed a passive approach to the impending “invasion” and allowed large vehicles virtually next to Parliament. Anyone who served in Kandahar knows that large trucks in key areas of any city can make a huge mess even if they do not explode. Those in Kandahar did, especially around elections. The lack of preparation and thought reflects a lack of security mindset in services whether national or provincial or municipal. It leads back to a topic we have discussed and written about within RUSI(NS) and that is a lack of a National Security Policy. One could go on for days about the security lapses but the real issue is the understanding of security issues and threats from a national point of view. There needs to be a clear method to get information to cities and provinces so they can act appropriately. There needs to be setup a mechanism(s) to allow for rapid liaison between all levels of the security apparatus so that there are systems in place to ensure RCMP or provincial police can mesh quickly and seamlessly with local law enforcement. It is also becoming painfully clear that the structure, size and capability of all levels of police must be examined. Do we need to create provincial police forces in all provinces and get the federal police doing federal challenges? Canada’s current system is that they will rob one jurisdiction to fill another but leaves localities without their police protection.

The military has been used in past for major events such as the Cape Breton Miners’ Strike in the 1920s, the FLQ crisis in Quebec in 1970 and of course Oka in the early 1990s. No soldier I have ever worked with wanted anything to do with the quagmire that is Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (ALEA) nor did the police necessarily like the idea either. The military is a very blunt instrument meant to deliver violence if necessary. It is by no means a police force. This being said, the use of the military in an insurrection might be considered and therefore contingency plans of some sort should be considered and how does one legally do this and under what circumstances? No one likes the idea but one shouldn’t be developing a policy of this nature while under duress or stress as we apparently are doing now.

The Emergency Act is a product of the 1980s and replaced the First World War’s Emergency Measures Act. This is its first use but unfortunately it seems to be a very large sledgehammer for what is in fact a

small walnut. It appears to be more a federal political matter in nature as opposed to a necessity. Time will tell but most of the convoys and blockages were simply negotiated away by police using negotiating tactics. Most importantly, despite weapons being found in the Coutts border crossing, no one has been killed and police have used virtually anything they could not to create a situation that would require brute force. If one takes a look at media from around the world, one can see that our security efforts have been soundly mocked. One could get depressed about it fairly quickly, but keep in mind that many countries that this situation would have been bloody indeed. Fortunately, local politicians, professional police and the demonstrators themselves found a way out of the situation without heads being cracked or shots being fired. So, aside from Ottawa most situations have been well handled in many ways even if more than a little annoying. I prefer my Canadians alive as a rule as opposed to being dead in a hail of bullets or by head bashing with billy clubs, so let's take this as at least a partial win.

One other issue that has come from this event is the recognition of foreign influence and money. One thing that should be retained after this event becomes a matter of historical interest, is the examination of foreign influence and its continued effect on Canada's politics. If reporting is correct, China's undue influence in the last election, which included lies and disinformation through the Chinese language press within Canada which may have affected the outcome in a number of seats, should also be examined. Certainly, the picture of our current supporters within the Chinese community is troubling especially as we are still waiting for an answer on Huawei. It may be innocent but it does not look good, especially if those supporters have links to the United Front. This does not take away from the effects of US influence particularly of the US right wing elements on issues in Canada. Scrutiny of all foreign financing must be clear particularly if it will affect the security and wellbeing of our country whether from a friendly country or an adversary such as China.

Russia

If President Putin wanted the full attention of NATO and the EU, he has certainly achieved it. Thursday morning it is reported by multiple media outlets that more than 7000 extra Russian troops have been added to the numbers surrounding Ukraine and that there has been no appreciable withdrawal of Russian troops from the forward areas and some media have suggested that tanks and self-propelled guns have moved forward to "attack" positions. This being said, there is a very real difference between having the ability to attack and actually attacking especially since just being there and exercising on one's own territory is achieving virtually all Putin's goals. Already the tainted Minsk 2 Accords are mentioned as a way ahead despite Ukraine never agreeing to this. Can Putin get the Western powers to coerce Ukraine into accepting the unacceptable? Keep in mind that Putin has also threatened nuclear war. Putin deserves sanctions now as a method of showing him at least some teeth, yet he is being rewarded with talks and possible concessions. Putin will only stop pushing once he is no longer in power and we should be aware of that point.

Russia continues to fail Covid as nearly 15m cases have been officially recorded and just under 350k deaths officially recorded. Most Russians have chosen not to receive vaccines as uptake is still low. Russia's excess deaths above normal rates are now well above a million, a fact noticed by most Russians.

Alexi Navalny is on trial again, this time in prison. His organization which covered corruption amongst the supporters and members of the Putin regime has been essentially eliminated. The trial is expected to be over quickly and Mr Navalny will likely receive a further lengthy sentence in one of the most brutal prisons in Russia. The Putin regime has used the current situation to crack down on organizations that have been a thorn in the backside of the regime. Even well-respected organizations have been deemed foreign agents or worse and many have been forced to close their operations.

The bottom line here is that Russia under Putin is not trustworthy and the West should impose sanctions in a graduated way now as a “shot across the bow” of a corrupt authoritarian regime. Talk yes, agree, no or as Churchill said, “it is better to jaw, jaw than war, war.” At the same time, the regime should not be rewarded with concessions by the West or poor Ukraine until concrete actions are taken by the regime.

China

China has managed to run the Olympic games during a time of Covid. Its glaring deficiencies are readily apparent in its Zero Covid campaign now blown apart with a major outbreak in Hong Kong where daily case counts now exceed official counts for the entire pandemic. The real truth is the CCP has never been able to actually lock down or eliminate the virus and like Russia. Its actual excess death count is astronomical with one source placing it over 14m. It is also suspected that China’s vaccines are only about 50% effective and may have led to other countries’ outbreaks because of its ineffectiveness. China’s own population may be very ripe for a major outbreak especially with new variants. Time will tell.

In real terms, the fact that China carried off the Olympics at all is significant. It means if you are bloody minded enough, one can push through anything...but should you? I think the real answer from a responsible nation would have been to postpone or cancel the games especially as some of the restrictions led to athletes being unable to compete, and other athletes competing after isolation but poor meals and a loss of preparation time. This was not a good look for anyone. The CCP is one factor but the actions of the International Olympic Committee are probably worse as they were adamant that the games go on despite Covid and of course the cultural genocidal actions of the host country. One has to wonder about what really constitutes the Olympic spirit?

The CCP also continues to add troops to the Ladakh area including new robotic “dogs” as shown in the Chinese media. The robotic dogs are meant to carry heavier equipment in rough terrain and take it off the backs of soldiers. There is some concern that these may be more problem than benefit but it is similar to a US designed all terrain “pack animal” being considered for operations.

Pakistan

Pakistan is having more difficulty with the Taliban. The same organization that the Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) fostered during the Afghan war. These same Taliban are now training Baluchistan insurgents fighting for their independence from Pakistan. These insurgents have targeted Chinese construction and mining operations in the area which has caused considerable anger from Beijing. It seems what goes around comes around and it seems fitting that Pakistan is hoisted on its own petard. Pakistan is already shaky economically and is in dire need of support from China. This will not go well and any solution will take a good deal of time. This will not go away quickly and causes concern over the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Coups in Africa

Lastly, Sub-Saharan Africa is located on the “Belt of Fire” which follows the whole circumference of the world. This area has been noted as an area that has seen constant or nearly constant insurgencies and difficulties. The *Economist* of February 5th to 11th has a short article on the role of the drug trade on the coups. The coup against the Ghaddafi regime also accelerated the issues across Africa as a large number of weapons of all types fell into the hands of various factions and tribes, not to mention Islamist insurgents. Western Africa especially has been rocked with three attempted coups, one in


Mali, one in Burkina Faso and, most recently, an attempted coup in Guinea-Bissau. All of these have had some initial stirrings within the drug trade and weak or relatively newly hatched governments are easy targets. They are also difficult to deal with and are likely to cause instability for some time. Wednesday, France announced the withdrawal of French forces from Mali because of the actions of the coup leaders suggesting that the goals were divergent from France's goals.

One of the other issues is the rise of Russian private military companies (PMC) being requested by various coup leaders. The Russians are requested because they tend not to put up with a free and open press or opposition. Thus many countries now have mercenaries with few if any scruples doing their bidding for a price. Russia is not the only country providing PMCs but it seems like the PMC source of choice because of a lack of scruples. This will not go away as long as these companies are tolerated, PMCs are a disease and not a solution. Africa will remain unstable without a very different view of PMCs and foreign influence. By the way, Sudan has the dubious honour of having had 16 coups and therefore is the "winner" in the coup category.

Russian forces in the Mediterranean - Wk06/2022

<https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2022/02/russian-forces-in-mediterranean-wk062022.html>

Some open source intelligence (OSINT) reporting on the Ukraine-Russia crisis is interesting for depictions of forces. This one almost has an intelligence report feel to it. Like the use of ship graphics.



There are good land (force disposition and imagery) and air (aircraft track) OSINT reports publicly available, too. It will be interesting to see to what extent public OSINT follows forces during any conflict.


Frederik Van Lokeren on Twitter 12 Feb

<https://twitter.com/KaptainLOMA/status/1492497484551180293>: "#BMΦ #Russia's naval deployment in the #Mediterranean on the morning of Feb 12, as reported by #OSINT. Unusual deployment of Slava class cruisers in the Mediterranean and the planned departure of six amphibious landing vessels. <https://t.co/kc7QVpJatX> <https://t.co/RdKiLW1Boq>"

See graphic next page.

RUSSIAN NAVY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

@KaptainLoma February 12, Week 06-2022, Feb 05 - 11



	Vessel	Last Sighting
	B-237 Rostov-on-Don – Improved Kilo Class – SSK	Port of Tartus, Syria, on Oct-10
	B-265 Krasnodar – Improved Kilo Class – SSK	Port of Tartus, Syria, on Oct-10
	B-261 Novorossiysk – Improved Kilo Class – SSK	NW of Algiers on Dec-28
	055 Marshal Ustinov – Slava Class – CG	Central Mediterranean on Feb-11
	011 Varyag – Slava Class – CG	Near Tartus, Syria, on Feb-07
	626 Vice-Admiral Kulakov – Udaloy Class – DDG	Central Mediterranean on Feb-11
	564 Admiral Tributs – Udaloy Class – DDG	Near Tartus, Syria, on Feb-07
	461 Admiral Kasatonov – Gorshkov Class – FFG	Central Mediterranean on Feb-11
	494 Admiral Grigorovich – Grigorovich Class – FGG	Central Mediterranean on Feb-09
	626 Orekhovo-Zuyevo – Buyan-M Class – COR	Inbound on Jan-21
	375 Dmitry Rogachev – Bykov Class – PT	Flight Deck Operations on Dec-15
	466 Vladimir Emelyanov – Alkesandrit Class – MCM	Inbound on Jan-22
	BB Boris Butoma – Boris Chilikin – AUX	Inbound on Feb-02
	VAP Vice-Admiral Paromov – Project 03182 - AUX	Port of Limassol, Cyprus, on Dec-15
	275 Vyazma – Kaliningradneft Class – AUX	Central Mediterranean on Feb-11
	402 Vasily Tatishchev – Vishnya Class – AGI	North of the Balearic Islands on Jan-23
	130 RFS Korolev – Ropucha Class – LST	Outbound on Feb-08
	102 RFS Kaliningrad – Ropucha Class – LST	Outbound on Feb-08
	127 RFS Minsk – Ropucha Class – LST	Outbound on Feb-08
	012 RFS Olenegorsky Gornyyak – Ropucha Class – LST	Outbound on Feb-09
	016 RFS Georgy Pobedonosets – Ropucha Class – LST	Outbound on Feb-09
	017 RFS Pyotr Morgunov – Ivan Grenn Class – LST	Outbound on Feb-09

Veterans Awareness and Media Consumption Survey

Dear Stakeholders,

We need your help reaching Veterans who do not receive VAC benefits and services. We are surveying Veterans, CAF members, former RCMP members, family members and caregivers on how they learn about and access our programs and services. Their feedback will help us better serve the Veteran community and reach more Veterans.

We kindly ask that you share the below message with your network:

VAC wants your opinion!

Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) is surveying the Veteran community to find out how you learn about and access VAC programs and services. They're looking for Veterans, Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members, former RCMP members, family members and caregivers. Even if you have never contacted VAC or do not currently receive VAC benefits and services, they want to hear from you.

The survey will take about 15 minutes to complete. It is being conducted on behalf of VAC by the independent Canadian research firm, EKOS Research Associates Inc.

Please visit the [EKOS Research website](#) for more information and to participate.

Participation is voluntary and your responses and personal information are confidential in accordance with the [Privacy Act](#). Your responses, whether by phone or online, are anonymous; they are not kept or shared with VAC, and will not have any impact on the benefits or services you receive or may receive in the future.

If you would like to share this survey with your followers on social media, feel free to use the following message:

Veterans Affairs Canada wants to know how it can better communicate with the Veteran community. Tell them how you like to receive information and what you know about their services, by taking part in the survey below.

If someone you know served in the Canadian Armed Forces or RCMP, Veterans Affairs Canada want to hear from them. www.ekos.com/veteransurvey

Your assistance is greatly appreciated.

Thank you,

Stakeholder Engagement and Outreach Team

Veterans Affairs Canada

vac.engagement.acc@veterans.gc.ca

Social Media Security

Good to see this effort/education.

Blain Potvin
@BlainPotvin_THW 15 Feb
tweeted
(https://twitter.com/BlainPotvin_THW/status/1493734112460361729): A little reminder on social media policy to my fellow members of the #CanadianArmedForces

(And, yes, someone did pick up that the graphic figure has an officer's cap with NCM cap badge...)

National Defence / Défense nationale
VICE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF
DIRECTOR GENERAL DEFENCE SECURITY

Let's talk social!

You are probably on multiple platforms such as: Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc.

Don't forget that you represent the Department of National Defence (DND)/Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) ON and OFF duty. Everything you post may potentially compromise DND/CAF information, assets and resources, and could have severe consequences to operational tasks and to the safety of personnel.

KEY FACTS

- 1 Be careful what you post or comment, it is public and should be considered a permanent part of the public record.
- 2 If not careful, your personal information (and your family's information) could be readily accessible to the general public and to undesirable audiences.
- 3 It is important to remain respectful and ethical, and to follow security policies that are in place.

Think before you click!

- ✓ **Ask yourself before you post:** Could the video, images or comments have an inappropriate impact or reflect discredit on DND/CAF or on any of its members?
- ✓ **Be aware of your affiliation with the DND/CAF** This may seem harmless to you, but you must be careful when you share any information which could compromise the personal security with details such as:
 - Pictures of you in uniform
 - Event photos with family or colleagues
 - Current or past information on postings/deployments
- ✓ **Remember to review your account's security and privacy policies often** They change with little notice.
- ✓ **Be informed before releasing DND/CAF information on social media** You must follow release procedures as found in NDSOD Chapter 6: Security of Information.

Don't be THAT person!

- ✗ **Do not share DND/CAF information on social media** Unclassified information does not automatically mean it can be released to the public or be open to all DND/CAF without a need-to-know. Approved release procedures must be followed.
- ✗ **Do not tag or share photos of colleagues or friends without their permission** Ensure that all individuals whose images or personal information you use, have given their consent.
- ✗ **Do not over share personal information** Only YOU need to know your home address, phone number, social insurance number and banking information.
- ✗ **Do not share your official or personal e-mail** Use a generic e-mail address instead.
- ✗ **Do not include images or identifiers** DND/CAF logos, badges, crests and emblems.
- ✗ **Do not speak on behalf of DND/CAF, unless you are designated as an official spokesperson**
- ✗ **Do not post to, like, comment or share from, an organization that is known to promote discriminatory views** (CANFORGEN 016/08, CDS Direction on Professional Military Conduct, Para 8; and QR&O 19.14 - Improper comments.)

Suspected security incidents related to social media may be reported to the Director General - Defence Security (DGDS) Security Incident Management at **++DGDS SIMGIS@VCDS DGDS@Ottawa-Hull (DWAN)**
Or to your Chain of Command, USS, ISSO, or the Military Police.
Follow the procedures in NDSOD Chapter 12: Security Incident Management.

FOR MORE TIPS AND INFORMATION:
NDSOD Chapter 17: Security and Social Media
collaboration-admpa.forces.mil.ca/sites/D1/SafetySecurity/vcds-ndsod-cl17.pdf

A-57-007-000/DA-098
DPI, DCEA, BPR, DGDS
2020/10

SECURITY NEVER TAKES A BREAK. | VIGILANCE!



Take your shot:

Participate in the Ocean Shot: Military Veterans Career Pivot Focus Groups

COVE has partnered with the Information and Communications Technology Council (ICTC) on research that will inform the development of a COVE pilot program, "Ocean Shot - Military Veterans Career Pivot". This program aims to upskill Nova Scotian veterans for in-demand occupations in the province's ocean technology sector.

As part of this study, ICTC will host Focus Groups with recently released veterans and CAF members slated to retire in the coming year, to better understand employment backgrounds and skillsets vis-à-vis in-demand ocean sector roles. These Focus Groups will be held virtually and leverage various engagement tools, including small group discussions and polling to understand key considerations for transitions into the sector.

ICTC invites Nova Scotia (pending retirement in 2022) and recently retired veterans to participate in the Focus Groups. All interested parties are welcome, and we are especially interested in hearing from those with experience in technology or technical roles (e.g., marine technicians, engineers).

Focus Groups will be held on February 23rd, 25th, and 28th from 3-5 pm AST. Register below and save your spot! Registration will remain open until February 21st. Invitations with event details will be sent to registered participants on a rolling basis.

Click **HERE** to participate in the Ocean Shot Focus Groups:

<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/VetsPivotFocusGroups>



ROCKY MOUNTAIN
Conference on Security and Defence



RAUSI presents Dr Sean M Maloney

Strategic Nuclear Moves During the Ukrainian Crisis of 2022

24 February 2022, 19:00 MST via Zoom

Find out more at www.rausi.ca/rmcsd