



## Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 25 February 2022

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence and security issues.*

*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

### Help Wanted

RUSI(NS) is seeking temporary editors for *Dispatches* and our social media accounts for the first three weeks of April. If you can help, please contact RUSI(NS). Training will be available in the time ahead of the three week period.

### RUSI(NS) 2021 Survey – Last Call!

The link to the RUSI(NS) survey for how we did in 2021 was included in the email from our Secretary with the agenda for our AGM 2022. Please take a couple minutes to fill in the survey. Your feedback is important to the future activities of this Institute. If you can't find the link, email RUSI(NS).

### Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**New: 8 March**, Tuesday - DND Stakeholder Engagement Office Eastern Canada webinar "From one generation to the next, the place of Women in the combat role." 1200-1330 Eastern. See detail at end of *Dispatches*. To register: [https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN\\_qJPfbqZiQMS4v11It5OETQ](https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_qJPfbqZiQMS4v11It5OETQ).

**16 March**, Wednesday - Distinguished Speaker Jan-Andrej Skopalik, Regional Manager, National Aerial Surveillance Program, Transport Canada Atlantic Region, "Surveillance of Sea Surface Activities in Atlantic Canada." 1300-1500. Via Zoom. To register, email RUSI(NS) by close-of-business Sunday, 13 March. As the subject line for your registration email, put: RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker 16 March

2022 Registration. In addition to your name, include whether you are a RUSI(NS) member, otherwise please provide your organization (association, company or unit). Participation is limited and later registrants may have to be put on a waiting list. If after registering your availability changes and you are no longer able to attend, please advise RUSI(NS) as soon as possible so your spot can be re-assigned. Zoom instructions will be emailed to registrants by end Monday, 14 March. If you have not received them by end-of-day 14 March, please check your spam folder and, if necessary, email RUSI(NS).

**31 March**, Thursday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation by Phil Bolger-Cortez, Wargame Director, Air University LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, on "Air Force Wargaming." 7-9pm ADT. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/air-force-wargaming-tickets-241404436167>

**5 April**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Strategic Wargaming - The US Army War College Approach." 7:00–9:00 pm ADT. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/strategic-wargaming-the-us-army-war-college-approach-tickets-187766283007>.

### **Publications:**

Except where otherwise indicated, publications are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

**New:** RUSI(NS) Presentation “RCAF Strategy: Air and Space in Formation” by Colonel Meghan Setter, 16 February 2022,  
<https://rusi-ns.ca/rcaf-strategy/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Can We Stop a Rogue Vessel in the Arctic?" by Pierre Leblanc, 4 February 2022,  
<https://rusi-ns.ca/rogue-vessel-arctic>

RUSI(NS) Presentations “Arctic Maritime Security: US Coast Guard and Canadian Navy Operations” by Captain Al McCabe USCG and Commander Corey Gleason RCN, 29 January 2022,  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/arctic\\_maritime\\_security/](https://rusi-ns.ca/arctic_maritime_security/)

RUSI(NS) Paper “We Have No Air Defence For Our Army – Why?” by Murray Lee, 23 January 2022,  
<https://rusi-ns.ca/air-defence/>

RUSI(NS) Comments “An Evil Trinity” by Tim Dunne, 19 January 2022  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/evil\\_trinity/](https://rusi-ns.ca/evil_trinity/)

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 16 February edition  
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, February 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 2, February 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, February 2022  
<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/99-rausi-dispatches-february-2022>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, February 2022

**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver and Vancouver Artillery Association Members News, 22 February 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022.

**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 10, Issue 7, 21 February 2022

Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver Members News Feb 15, 2022

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, February 2022

**Tweeted by @RUSI NS:** 🇨🇦


RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

<p>Irving Shipbuilding @IrvingShipbuild 17 Feb tweeted: Today marks the one year anniversary of the Keel Laying ceremony for the Future HMCS William Hall! What a difference a year makes! Our shipbuilders continue to make great progress. @RoyalCanNavy #SupportCanadianShipbuilding #ShipsForCanada RUSI(NS) retweeted: RUSI(NS) Information Note "Keel-Laying" <a href="https://rusi-ns.ca/keel-laying-2/">https://rusi-ns.ca/keel-laying-2/</a></p>	
<p>STRATCOMCOE @STRATCOMCOE 22 Feb tweeted: In these turbulent times society relies on media to provide unbiased and reliable representation of current events. Here's few tips to help journalists in recognizing and combating malicious activity in information environment by @DefendDemocracy (Twitter 101: The Basics of Dealing with Disinformation, Lies and Propaganda <a href="https://defenddemocracy.eu/stop-propaganda-twitter-101-the-basics-of-dealing-with-disinformation-lies-and-propaganda/">https://defenddemocracy.eu/stop-propaganda-twitter-101-the-basics-of-dealing-with-disinformation-lies-and-propaganda/</a>)</p>	
<p>Library of Parliament @LibraryParlCA 22 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Read our #HillNote for background information on the Emergencies Act, and the role of Parliament during a national emergency: #cdnpoli (The Emergencies Act: Parliament's Role During a National Emergency <a href="https://hillnotes.ca/2022/02/22/the-emergencies-act-parliaments-role-during-a-national-emergency/">https://hillnotes.ca/2022/02/22/the-emergencies-act-parliaments-role-during-a-national-emergency/</a>)</p>	

As @RoyalCanNavy grows with new/larger oilers&frigates, needs increased capable port service tugs & barges crewed by @NationalDefence civilians of Auxiliary Fleet. 4 large tugs being built by @Groupe\_Ocean "More powerful tugboats coming to Auxiliary Fleet"  
<https://www.lookoutnewspaper.com/more-powerful-tugboats-coming-to-auxiliary-fleet/>



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 19 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Our senior fellow @kolga argues in @TorontoStar that our democracy is under threat from foreign misinformation campaigns we need to take the warnings seriously and develop defensive cognitive tools to protect ourselves.  
 (Russian propagandists are exploiting protests to destabilize our democracy  
<https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2022/02/18/russian-propagandists-are-exploiting-protests-to-destabilize-our-democracy.html>)



Royal Canadian Air Force @RCAF\_ARC 22 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: CAN and its Combined Space Operations initiative allies released Vision 2031. Learn more about how allied collaboration in #space will help ensure the domain remains safe, secure, and accessible to all:  
<http://rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/article-template-standard.page?doc=canada-and-its-allies-release-combined-space-operations-vision-2031/kzwv11z6>  
 (Canada and its Allies Release Combined Space Operations Vision 2031)



**Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:**

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

**Canada considering sending military reinforcements to NATO in eastern Europe: Anand**  
<https://globalnews.ca/news/8627797/canada-military-reinforcements-nato-eastern-europe-anand/>



“What we are doing at Defence right now is addressing our capacity to continue to provide in multiple locations.”

'Addressing' would have called for building capacity in the decades past. Right now Canada is faced with the consequences of decisions made during that building. It would not be surprising if Canada can now maintain but one deployed battle group on a continuing basis. Deploying aircraft ('six packs') and ships may provide more responsiveness (and effective diplomatic signalling) at this time.



## What To Expect With Cyber Surprise

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-expect-cyber-surprise>

"The three critical characteristics of the cyber domain that differentiate it from the kinetic are that it is: connected across the globe; pervasive in the economic life-blood of the world; and asymmetric in its ability to enable power projection."



## The Growing Importance of Open-Source Intelligence to National Security

<https://hillnotes.ca/2022/02/17/the-growing-importance-of-open-source-intelligence-to-national-security/>

A lot of open source intelligence (OSINT) activities, by both official and private practitioners, is going on now during the Ukraine-Russia crisis. Maybe never before has such a situation had so many eyes on developments.

### Examples of Nations Whose Intelligence Agencies Have Artificial Intelligence (AI)-Enabled Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) Capabilities

#### MEMBERS OF THE FIVE EYES INTELLIGENCE ALLIANCE

All have AI-enabled OSINT capabilities and can be expected to cooperate in this area.



#### COUNTRIES WITH AI-ENABLED OSINT CAPABILITIES

Each of these countries has a cooperative relationship with the Five Eyes alliance.



#### The Russian and Chinese intelligence services have long exploited OSINT.

Their implication in recent large-scale data breaches in the United States and elsewhere suggests these intelligence services rely on AI to extract information of intelligence value from stolen data.



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## Boosting Signals Strength

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/boosting-signals-strength/>

"At a time when the Canadian Army seeks to digitize enterprise and operational practices, network sensors, shooters and command nodes to a unified digital backbone, and stream vast arrays of data to inform decision making, the strength of the Army's Signals Corps is low and at risk of becoming even weaker."



Increasing technology demands and decreasing numbers of people. A challenge for all the military occupations. It will be interesting to see what the Signal Corps comes up with as it rethinks "how it attracts, develops and retains its people."

## Bridge Appears In Chernobyl Exclusion Zone That Could Give Russia Unique Access To Ukraine

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44319/pontoon-bridge-appears-in-chernobyl-exclusion-zone-that-could-give-russia-unique-access-to-ukraine>

More concerning than a count of tanks or troops as indications of a buildup leading possibly to an invasion are the presence of significant logistics, medical and engineering capabilities.

Fascinating OSINT (open source intelligence)



## The Navy's Messaging Choke Point

<https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/02/navys-messaging-choke-point/362159/>

"... the Navy should talk far less about its role in safeguarding commerce and more about how it deters and fights wars."



States and their navies lose the peace and wars by failing to safeguard commerce. The general public should be respected that they are smart enough to appreciate that their military is more than just about warfighting. Certainly any Canadian reading news about the Canadian Armed Forces assisting Canadians in our own country respond to natural disasters (fires, floods, pandemics) understands that. Navies also contribute to security (the constabulary role) and to international relations (the diplomatic role). 'Messengers' can (should) talk about navies protecting maritime commerce (trade). Maritime trade is critical to prosperity, and ultimately in modern conflict to winning. Messengers should also talk about (yes, emphasize) the combat role of navies. And they should also use a language that correctly relates naval matters, if necessary explaining what terms mean. The public should understand what sea lines of communication and choke points are (probably many do after recently experiencing shortages of imported goods). Okay, agree, the tweet "Our sea-denial exercises with naval expeditionary integration and littoral allies prepares us to counter potential adversarial aggressive actions" should have been re-written in simpler terms. But the basic language of navies and maritime affairs work, and should be used if 'maritime blindness' (= lack of understanding by many people of the importance of and activities at sea) is to be countered.

Public-opinion polls of what service branch is 'most important to national defense' should be ceased. They appear to pit the navy against the army against the air force, and so on. National defence is not that simple. All contributions, military and non-military, must be considered, and what capabilities get attention (and therefore funding) should be based on considered analyses of the situation of our country in the world.

## In an Information War, Be Careful What You Amplify

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/02/information-war-be-careful-what-you-amplify/362235/>

"Verification is boring. Juicy news gets clicks. Perhaps there isn't much harm in people thinking Russia has called up its reserves for an invasion of Ukraine. But the harm in people forming opinions based on incorrect information is incalculable. So is the harm of people deciding they can't trust any information at all."



*(continued next page)*

Failing to verify before sharing makes you a tool of the other side.

Read: Think 'Sheep' before you share to avoid getting tricked by online misinformation

<https://firstdraftnews.org/articles/think-sheep-before-you-share-to-avoid-getting-tricked-by-online-misinformation/>

*One of these should be posted at every computer screen.*

## DON'T GET TRICKED BY ONLINE MISINFORMATION

Remember these checks when browsing social media

### Source

Look at what lies beneath. Check the about page of a website or account, look at any account info and search for names or usernames.

### History

Does this source have an agenda? Find out what subjects it regularly covers or if it promotes only one perspective.

### Evidence

Explore the details of a claim or meme and find out if it is backed up by reliable evidence from elsewhere.

### Emotion

Does the source rely on emotion to make a point? Check for sensational, inflammatory and divisive language.

### Pictures

Pictures paint a thousand words. Identify what message an image is portraying and whether the source is using images to get attention.

Think **SHEEP** before you share

FIRSTDRAFT

### A minute to midnight: The Ukraine Crisis.

<https://wavelroom.com/2022/02/16/a-minute-to-midnight-the-ukraine-crisis/>



### Trucker blockades expose the weaknesses of Canada's anti-money-laundering regime

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-trucker-blockades-expose-the-weaknesses-of-canadas-anti-money/>

"... Canada can't afford to take a ham-fisted approach to combatting financial crime."

Canada's Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC) rightly got attention during the protests. Civil affairs (protests, crime, etc.) are like states vulnerable to financial action (economic or financial or trade warfare, choose your term). Financial actions ('follow the money') should be more part of planning and of immediate consideration in response to crises developing. Canada should ensure FINTRAC and its other financial 'combat' arms and authorities are strong enough, sufficiently capable to undertake action. Gold is better than lead.

*This article is available on request to RUSI(NS) members who cannot get through the subscription wall.*



### **Test, break, repeat**

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/test-break-repeat/>

An article on Canada's new Armoured Combat Support Vehicle (ACSV) and the RAMD (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Durability) testing the vehicle is undergoing. Another highlighting that major capital projects take time, both at the front and at the back end.



People should not expect steel to be cut or sod to be turned right after a government announcement of a procurement project. It takes time to develop and refine requirements, develop and refine designs, and test and validate construction. There needs to be a certain amount of expectation management by authorities (explanations) and patient understanding by reporters and the general public of what's involved in major projects.

There was a certain amount of impatience in Halifax that it seemed to take so long before the first vessel of the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship project was launched. During that time a major shipyard was rebuilt and a large number of builders were trained. A new ship design was developed. The resulting Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels are still undergoing tests, even though hull 3 is in the water.

### **Pangolin Trafficking in West Africa**

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/02/18/pangolin-trafficking-in-west-africa/>

"The illegal wildlife trade, including this cross-border sale of pangolins, is an important source of funds for illicit weapons trafficking, and vice versa, across West Africa,"



Interesting to reflect, after reading this article, that defence and security people should include illegal wildlife trade in their studies and considerations. But it's just another aspect of understanding the economic basis of warfare. Follow the money. Cut your adversary off at the financial root. (A Canadian naval commander off eastern Africa did that, focusing staff on maritime smuggling of charcoal which was funding regional insurrection.)

### **French Navy uses mini-submarine Nautile to inspect a submarine cable**

<https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2022/february/11424-french-navy-uses-mini-submarine-nautile-to-inspect-a-submarine-cable.html>



"According to information published by the French Ministry of Armed Forces on February 2022, the French Navy used the Ifremer's Nautile mini-submarine to inspect a submarine cable during a demonstration."



One wonders whether France published about this demonstration as a counter to the implicit threat of Russian cutting of submarine (ocean bottom) communications cables, itself a counter to Western threat of economic sanctions in response to Russia's threat to Ukraine. Getting a bit convoluted...

Still, this aspect of underseas warfare ('cable wars?') is an important one to which states, like Canada with major cable landing points on both coasts, need to pay attention (and develop technology, tactics, etc.).

### UNHCR warns of increasing violence and human rights violations at European borders

<https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2022/2/62137a284/news-comment-unhcr-warns-increasing-violence-human-rights-violations-european.html>

"How Europe chooses to protect asylum-seekers and refugees matters and is precedent-setting not only in the region but also globally."

Canadians need to watch carefully the challenges and lessons with border security and asylum seekers in other parts of the world. Our country is not so much in a far corner of the globe as it used to be.

*UN reporting "increasing pushbacks and other violations at the European external borders." Border security will get increasing coverage within RUSI(NS).*



### Massive Russian Navy Armada Moves into Place off Ukraine

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/massive-russian-navy-armada-moves-into-place-off-ukraine/>

"These things (naval exercises and invasion preparations) take a long time prepare. Maybe because of this people can become desensitized to it. Social media and the 24 hour news cycle quickly moves on or seeks out some new angle. Yet the methodical preparations continue in plain sight."

Oft times situation analysis is a slow build. People need to pay attention over time, watching for trends and gradual change.

Good map (chart) usage to depict naval activity simply.



### French Military Reveals New Strategy to Control Seabed

<https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/02/22/france-military-seabed-strategy/>

A 'Seabed Control Operations' strategy would make sense, too, for Canada as a maritime state. Though maybe more as part of our maritime strategy overall, supported by detailed



plans, integrating with drone (autonomous unmanned vehicles AUV and remotely operated vehicles ROV), maritime economic development (e.g., seabed mining), communications (submarine telecommunications cables) and other activities.

### **Feds commit \$140M to keep temporary staff hired to eliminate veterans' backlog**

<https://www.thestar.com/politics/2022/02/23/feds-commit-140m-to-keep-temporary-staff-hired-to-eliminate-veterans-backlog.html>

This is needed. The wait times for veterans are out of control. I suppose they believe that the number of submissions will decline as we get farther from Afghanistan, but many problems show up or become unmanageable long after the fact. It will take a while.



### **Making Allied Interoperability Second Nature**

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/making-allied-interoperability-second-nature-200720>

"Let the allied maneuvers and exercises continue—and let's lose no opportunity to put to sea a genuinely unified, culturally coherent fighting force."



Surest counter to the bullying states (China, Russia) is to band together, committing resources (real resources: people, finances, equipment - not just words and token actions) to planning, practicing and acting together. This is the time for strong alliances like NATO. History well tells us that.

### **CDS Message to the Defence Team regarding the Invasion of Ukraine**

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2022/02/cds-message-invasion-ukraine.html>



### **Other Sources:**

#### **#drones**

The Militant Drone Threat Is No Longer New. Why Does It Still Feel Novel?

<https://mwi.usma.edu/the-militant-drone-threat-is-no-longer-new-why-does-it-still-feel-novel/>

#### **#policing**

Should Judges Defer to Police Expertise?

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/should-judges-defer-police-expertise>

## **#Russia**

### **#influence operations**

Russia quietly gains military influence in growing number of African countries

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-russia-quietly-gains-military-influence-in-growing-number-of-african/>

"... the Kremlin has been quietly scoring victories for its military influence operations in another region: Africa."

*This article is available on request to RUSI(NS) members who are unable to access it through the subscription wall.*

### **#information operations**

The Kremlin's Playbook: Fabricating Pretext to Invade Ukraine - More Myths

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-kremlins-playbook-fabricating-pretext-to-invade-ukraine-more-myths/>

Russia's Soft Power Projection in the Middle East

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2021/Borschevskaya-Russia-Soft-Power/>

## **#warfare**

Multi Dimensional and Domain Operations (MDDO)

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/01/26/mddo/>

## **#wargaming**

Wargaming: A Tool for Naval Intelligence Analysis

<https://cimsec.org/wargaming-a-tool-for-naval-intelligence-analysis/>

Use Wargaming to Sharpen the Tactical Edge

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/wargaming-room/tactical-edge/>

## **Other:**

NATO Library Special Focus LibGuide - Ukraine Crisis

<https://natolibguides.info/ukraine-crisis>

*Continues to be updated daily.*

## MESSAGE FROM THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF



24 February 2022

For many Canadians, Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine represents the return of history. The return of a time of struggle and great power competition: when larger nations employed force to conquer their neighbours, redrawing borders in the hopes of regaining a past glory that was never truly theirs. This attack is an attack against the international rules based order, with changes to the geopolitical situation that will reverberate for years to come.

While the future is uncertain, the events in Ukraine have underscored the primacy of our core mission as a fighting force: the defence of Canada and Canadian interests.

These events have also given me cause to reflect upon the paradox that lies at the heart of a professional military. We train our entire lives – spending blood, tears, toil, and sweat – to prepare ourselves to fight in defence of our homeland, against threats we dearly hope will never come. For our brothers and sisters in Ukraine, that fight is upon them now.

For the close to 3,000 members of the Canadian Armed Forces who have served on Operation UNIFIER since 2015, this may be an especially difficult time. Your thoughts, like mine, will no doubt be with your friends and comrades as they face the ultimate test. This is only natural.

Know that we, and our allies, have done everything our Governments have asked of us to help prepare Ukraine for these challenging times. No matter the outcome of this invasion, the training you provided, to more than 33,000 members of the Ukrainian Security Forces, will be invaluable in the days to come. You have helped save lives that would otherwise have been lost, and you have helped prepare the Ukrainian Forces to fight tyranny and unbridled aggression.

As these events unfold, know that our work with our allies will become ever more important. Since 2014, almost 13,000 of us have supported NATO Assurance Measures throughout Central and Eastern Europe on Operation REASSURANCE, either through support to our initial Land Task Force in Poland; or our current enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia; through our near-persistent presence in Euro-Atlantic waters as part of NATO Standing Naval Forces; or through our support to NATO air policing efforts in Romania, Iceland, and Lithuania over the years.

To those currently deployed to the region, and to all those who will, or may join them in the coming weeks and months, know that your work, which has contributed greatly to our Alliance's deterrence and defence efforts, is now more vital than ever.

The rest of us will continue to be prepared to do what our government asks of us, in support of our country and our fellow Canadians.



The world has just become a much more dangerous place, and we must do all that we can to stand as one and be ready.

General Wayne Eyre  
Chief of the Defence Staff

## Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

### O Canada

The truckers' convoy or 'Freedom Convoy' is now out of Ottawa, although some apparently are lurking in the rural area around Ottawa waiting for a chance to return. Ottawa was besieged for 23 days before action was taken physically to remove the vehicles and their occupants after the declaration of the *Emergency Act*. I have to admit I am looking forward to a review of this entire issue including the merits of the use of the *Emergency Act* when good old local cooperation between police forces and local government were able to negotiate a clearance of border crossings before the institution of the act. One has to wonder why the convoy was able to get downtown at all. One comment that was heard over and over again was why weren't police prepared in Ottawa? Certainly, police forces around the country seemed to grasp the situation a bit better by keeping big rigs out of downtowns such as in Halifax or Fredericton. One has to wonder why there were no memoranda of understanding or something between police forces at different levels which allows for easy call up or requests for different levels of policing. One thing about domestic operations is that everyone is already here. One can 'wargame' how such things could occur on a regular basis including exercising having the military conduct Aid to Law Enforcement Agencies or ALEA. ALEA was always a last ditch, everything is destroyed 'hail Mary' type of operation and not one to be 'practiced' for the first time in a disaster. In Nova Scotia and the Maritimes, even though there is very little chance that the military will be needed, we still practice with emergency measures organizations and local law enforcement for a major incident. Swiss Air 111 or Hurricane Juan would be a good examples of why one might want to practise before it becomes necessary.

It should be noted that the Maritimes do practice if for no other reason to know 'who's who in the zoo.' It saves a bundle of time when it truly matters. The Maritime provinces generally are well prepared and we are blessed with excellent folks in emergency management organizations. No system is perfect and bad things can happen but it won't be from a lack of effort or planning and preparation at all levels of government and their agencies.

Ottawa's issues are because they are in the vortex of municipal, provincial and federal politics, so there should be some sympathy. The security of the parliamentary precinct was breached and breached badly because I suspect no one knew who was in charge for starters and whether that agency really had the wherewithal to meet this challenge. The local force had no chance once things were in place. I know from painful experience that bad things happen when big trucks enter places where they are not really suited. An 18-wheeler truck should be nowhere near any embassy, consulate or government building without a specific reason to be there and closely monitored. I saw one in Kandahar that got close to where they were counting election ballots. I believe 125 people died in the explosion but my memory fades - all I remember is watching the video post-explosion. It was bad. There are some who state it couldn't happen here but neither did we think this last piece of nonsense would occur. But it did. Security is an afterthought in this country and we had a fine demonstration.

A National Security Policy is an absolute necessity and needs to be detailed and analysed by well trained individuals who have some knowledge of how it should be done. It also needs to be reviewed to ensure the least effect on civil liberties, therefore judicially reviewed by a supreme court judge and passed through Parliament by way of a properly security cleared group of Parliamentarians. It is too important to be left as we are now.

Speaking of embarrassments, the government announced that an artillery battery and HMCS *Halifax* would be departing by late March to reinforce NATO forces. I was part of the Allied Command Europe Land element, which was a brigade-sized force of over 4000 personnel from several countries including a 1200 man battle group for northern NATO. This battle group consisted of a light battery of artillery, a troop of Very Low Level Air Defence with Blowpipe missiles, an armour squadron with armoured tank trainers called Cougars, a troop of engineers, a full battalion of infantry all from the same unit and not drawn from all over the regiment, and of course logistics and medical services. Most importantly, we trained for this role all the time, just awaiting that 2am call which saw us move to our base to see how long we took to arrive with our gear and draw weapons and equipment. Sometimes we didn't really know and within 24 hrs, troops would be landing somewhere in Northern Europe. The navy used to have a standby ship that actually deployed on 12 hrs notice or less. The air force was able to provide a full wing of fighters, plus assets such as recce helicopters, utility helicopters and heavy lift CH-147C Chinook helicopters. This is all the while we had a mechanized brigade group and a fighter wing in Germany as well as various UN missions. The 80s and 90s were wild times but no less so than now. Defence and security are not what get politicians elected, mind you, these issues can certainly help you lose if things go badly; things are going badly and we are not prepared nor have we planned nor have we started even to think. Just to remind people of all stripes, the penalty for this is death or injury of our sailors, soldiers and aviators. Time to wake up.

Just when one thought it could not get any worse, Canada figures prominently in the latest issue of the *Economist* dated 19 February 2022 but not for good reasons. It is worth the read and it is something we should all be very concerned about no matter what your political stripe. In the various stories, one point came out clearly, the move against freedom of speech within Canada. Read it for yourselves, but as a Canadian if what they suggest is true or even partially true then we have a major problem. It is disturbing. A truly sad day when one's country is hoisted up as having undemocratic tendencies.

## **Russia**

This week saw the Russian President recognize the application for recognition of the two 'rebel' statelets of Luhansk and Donetsk. The rebels held on to these small sections against the Ukrainian Army but only with massive assistance of the Russian Army. Their own pay and service records became open source through their budgeting process which indicates up to 25k soldiers at a time 'volunteered' to support the separatist cause in 2014. This week saw this recognition and then saw the authorization of Russian troops for out-of-Russia operations which could have many meanings. What it meant on the ground is that marked Russian Army troops and equipment entered Ukraine under false pretenses. The West has implemented massive sanctions and promises more. The West has also stated that although it won't fight in Ukraine, it will continue to give Ukraine financial support and most importantly, weapons, equipment ammunition and resources to help counter any Russian incursion. One estimate said there were enough missiles for every tank, armoured vehicle and aircraft in the Russian inventory.

President Zelenskiy has generally rallied the nation and support within Ukraine's population no matter what political stripe is unified in its opposition to Russia's actions. More pointedly, the Ukrainian President has been a model of composure and has shown a backbone that is seldom seen in politics.

On calling up Ukraine's reserve, he stated that the Ukrainian Army of 2022 is not the same army of 2014. Once mobilised the Ukrainians will have over 600k troops available for operations within geographic boundaries. It appears that they have exercised diligently specializing in low level warfare that will bleed the Russian Army dry just as the partisans did to the Germans in the Second World War. Whether they will be able to withstand the Russian onslaught is another question. Still, the price Russia might pay may be significant and an unsuccessful attack may cause wide spread dissatisfaction within Russia's elite especially if something unexpected happened such as Ukrainians counter-attacking into Belarus and non-security forces there also revolt because of Russian occupiers. What a mess that would make and relatively quickly as well. Keep in mind Lukashenko is not very popular there in Belarus and one can imagine something like that occurring. Tactical and strategic surprise goes both ways and the army of 2022 is not the army of 2014.

Another loser in this situation is Belarus and its erstwhile leader Alexander Lukashenko, whose country is actually occupied by 30k+ Russian troops and he now is relegated to be a servant to Vladimir Putin who only trots him out for show. All real decisions are made by Putin, even regarding those issues inside Belarus. Lukashenko deserves this fall, he richly deserves it and I suspect when the time is right, his services will be terminated, probably in an unfortunate helicopter accident or perhaps a car crash. He has made his deal with a very corrupt leader and one I think we can safely say, evil man, a true product of KGB thinking and training. Neither Putin nor Lukashenko can show the love of country and dedication to his people that Zelenskiy can. Fortunately for the Ukrainian president he has Putin's almost incomprehensible comments on Ukrainian history to help solidify his position within Ukraine, so who is the loser even if Russia attacks?

The other issue that is amazing is the rise in commercial satellite imagery which has been ubiquitous throughout this campaign including some very impressive cloud penetrating radar imagery. Supposedly, every piece of ground is photographed in 3 km swaths everyday meaning even the most unsophisticated country can have satellite imagery. The days of the big attack being undetected are perhaps over as we know it. Anti-satellite systems are available but the act of destroying an early warning satellite may be a cause for war so even thinking of destroying one comes with grave risks. Still one must be at least amazed that news organizations, large companies and others have opportunities to purchase time on the system. It may also apply to non-state actors such as ISIS if they are able to set up a shell company. It makes one wonder where it will end.

Another issue is the internet and social media. I was especially impressed with the pictures of underfed Russian soldiers selling fuel and equipment for vodka and other alcoholic beverages. Other images of drunken Russians unloading railcars and promptly dropping the vehicle off the side. Alcoholism is a major part of the Russian Army. Should we expect otherwise? Now we see it virtually daily courtesy of social media. Even Russian soldiers use dash cameras and show their routes as they trundle along in their vehicles. This being said, our field security was abysmal in Afghanistan and cell phone usage was out of control. How we handle this going forward, both how we might exploit this if the bad guys are dumb enough and how we stop our own guys will be almost insurmountable. Social media is a good way to get dead.

Sanctions are being widely applied by a large number of countries and they are kicking in already with the rouble losing 3% of its value Wednesday - the Russian markets have lost between 10 and 13% of their value. This will get much worse according to a ranking member of the Duma upon being interviewed by DW media, a German network. He did downplay the effect of sanctions of individuals such as himself but others who have holdings overseas may have a different view.

Russia continues to have major difficulties with Covid with nearly 16m cases in total with more than 2.6m active cases as of and with 137k+ just Wednesday. The excess death rate is almost 1.2m since the start of the pandemic.

## **China**

The Olympics are over and it was considered a success for China as they were able to pull it off without too many Covid cases. Those who did get sick found the food and the lack of practice time to be a detriment. One thing was clear, the Chinese staff were pleasant and cheerful and did their best to help make things as normal as possible which is a plus for the Chinese people but under no circumstances is the success of the CCP but rather individual citizens of China. Many broadcasters apparently lost money while covering this set of games.

China has not given its complete support to Russia in its claims against Ukraine although it has not condemned Russia either. China has written rules for the reporting of the news on Ukraine, also known as censorship. China by supporting Russia would in fact be doing what it insists other countries not do to it; interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. China will be careful not to be seen to be hypocritical on this issue. Ukraine also has come up in CCP daily briefs. Some questions were oriented toward the similarities between Ukraine and Taiwan. Needless to say it did not go well and essentially the matter was shut down immediately by the spokesman.

An Indian representative was asked at the recent Munich Security Conference held late last week, about the Ukraine issue. He quite rightly remarked that why should India pay attention when they are having similar issues with China in the Ladakh region where China continues to push the envelope in that area. India also needs support as well in dealing with this situation. Essentially, he was saying how does this challenge in Europe really cause a concern for India while India is dealing with its own attacks on its sovereign territory? India has also failed to condemn the Russian efforts in Ukraine. He has a point. India is key for any future confrontation with China. It needs to know that it too has the support of the Western countries in dealing with China's incursions.

## **Webinar: From One generation to the next, women's place in the combat role.**

Speakers :

- Captain Julie Pagé, Unit Information Officer with the 2nd Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (2 CRPG), she is one of the first ten women to complete the infantry officer qualifications in the Canadian Armed Forces. Through her courage, she has proven for almost 30 years that women can hold any position in the CAF, including operational trades, and can serve in any environment.
- Anik St-Pierre, a professor at Collège Montmorency and project leader for "Les Filles ont le feu sacré", was appointed as Canada's representative to the Commission for Women in Fire and Rescue Services on an international committee. Her continued commitment and expertise in equality, equity and inclusion will help advance the firefighting profession here and around the world.
- Officer Cadet Laurence Gagnon, an infantry officer who has made her mark in a combat unit, and at the Royal Military College. A woman who meets all challenges with courage and above all with success.
- Lieutenant Mélanie Drainville, a firefighter with the Montreal Fire Department (SIM) and a member of the next generation of SIM officers. A woman who proves every day that women have their place in the fire department.



These women from different generations form a kaleidoscope that highlights the importance of removing all obstacles to the participation of women in traditionally male professions and in the decision-making process.

Moderator:

Louise Leroux, winner of numerous awards as a writer, director and producer. She has made documentary film her primary passion. Her work reflects her great interest in the place of women in environments traditionally male dominated.

The discussion will be in French. Simultaneous translation services will be offered.

For more information, email Capt Marie-Christine De Tilly [Marie-Christine.Detilly@forces.gc.ca](mailto:Marie-Christine.Detilly@forces.gc.ca).

To register: [https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN\\_qJPfbqZiQMS4v11It5OETQ](https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_qJPfbqZiQMS4v11It5OETQ).