



# Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

## Dispatches

### 18 March 2022

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence and security issues.*

*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

### Help Wanted

RUSI(NS) is seeking temporary editors for *Dispatches* and our social media accounts for the first three weeks of April. If you can help, please contact RUSI(NS). Training will be available in the time ahead of the three week period.

### Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**New: 24 March**, Thursday - Royal Alberta United Services Institute presentation by Darryl Cathcart "Optimizing Opportunities for Military-Connected Students." 7 pm MDT. Via Zoom. The recognition of military-connected learners in Canada has garnered limited attention, but this area of study remains in its infancy. Military-connected students face real and perceived barriers to higher education that may negatively impact learning, post-military success, and employment if not systematically addressed. This presentation will discuss a conceptual framework which accounts for the inclusion of an underrepresented group of adult learners in postsecondary education. See poster at end of *Dispatches*. To register: <https://rausi.ca/info-events/rmcscd>.

**24 March**, Thursday - Navy League of Canada Maritime Affairs Luncheon with Vice-Admiral Baines, Commander Royal Canadian Navy. In-person, in Ottawa. See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

**24-25 March**, Thursday-Friday - North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, Nasiffik, the Ted Steven Center for Arctic Security Studies, the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience (CASR) and the Arctic Domain Awareness Center (ADAC) virtual Advancing Collaboration in Canada-U.S.

Arctic Regional Security (ACCUSARS) III virtual workshop. The workshop will focus on specific initiatives that will improve understanding and enhance collaboration between Canada, U.S., and Kingdom of Denmark/Greenlandic Arctic security and defence professionals, and seeks insights from participants for their professional and informed perspectives in order to create a report of concerns, opportunities, recommendations, and inquires to address anticipated challenges to the North American Arctic security environment. For more info, email RUSI(NS). To register:

[https://alaska.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN\\_qlKOpqpATT27S2R-bAgISA](https://alaska.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_qlKOpqpATT27S2R-bAgISA)

**New: 30 March**, Wednesday – USNORTHCOM and University of Alaska Fairbanks speaker Brigadier General Shawn R. Satterfield, Commander, Special Operations Command North, “Special Operations in the North American Arctic and participation in ARCTIC EDGE 2022.” Noon EST. Via Zoom. See details at end of *Dispatches*.

**31 March**, Thursday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation by Phil Bolger-Cortez, Wargame Director, Air University LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, on "Air Force Wargaming." 7-9pm ADT. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/air-force-wargaming-tickets-241404436167>

**5 April**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Strategic Wargaming - The US Army War College Approach." 7:00–9:00 pm ADT. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/strategic-wargaming-the-us-army-war-college-approach-tickets-187766283007>.

**New: 27 April**, Wednesday – **save the date**. RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers on the topic of “Critical Infrastructure Resilience: Canada and the U.S. Partnering to Counter Cyber Threats.”

### **Publications:**

Except where otherwise indicated, publications are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

**New:** RUSI(NS) Presentation “Surveillance of Sea Surface Activities in Atlantic Canada” by Jan-Andrej Skopalik, 16 Mar 22, [https://rusi-ns.ca/national\\_aerial\\_surveillance\\_program/](https://rusi-ns.ca/national_aerial_surveillance_program/)

RUSI(NS) Information Note “RCN Ship Pennant Numbers,” 10 March 2022  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/pennant\\_numbers/](https://rusi-ns.ca/pennant_numbers/)

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Ship-to-Shore Connector Barges,” 28 February 2022,  
<https://rusi-ns.ca/ship-to-shore-connector/>

RUSI(NS) Presentation “RCAF Strategy: Air and Space in Formation” by Colonel Meghan Setter, 16 February 2022,  
<https://rusi-ns.ca/rcaf-strategy/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Can We Stop a Rogue Vessel in the Arctic?" by Pierre Leblanc, 4 February 2022,  
<https://rusi-ns.ca/rogue-vessel-arctic>

RUSI(NS) Presentations “Arctic Maritime Security: US Coast Guard and Canadian Navy Operations” by Captain Al McCabe USCG and Commander Corey Gleason RCN, 29 January 2022,  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/arctic\\_maritime\\_security/](https://rusi-ns.ca/arctic_maritime_security/)

RUSI(NS) Paper “We Have No Air Defence For Our Army – Why?” by Murray Lee, 23 January 2022,

<https://rusi-ns.ca/air-defence/>

RUSI(NS) Comments “An Evil Trinity” by Tim Dunne, 19 January 2022  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/evil\\_trinity/](https://rusi-ns.ca/evil_trinity/)

**New:** Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 16 March edition  
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Company of Master Mariners of Canada Maritimes Division Foghorn, March 2022

Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, February 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 3, March 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, March 2022  
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/109-rausi-dispatches-march-2022>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, March 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver and Vancouver Artillery Association Members *News*, 1 March 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2022.

**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 11, Issue 2, 14 March 2022

Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver Members News Mar 15, 2022

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, February 2022

**Tweeted by @RUSI NS:**

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

RUSI @RUSI\_org 10 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted:  
"The unified response to Russia's aggression could easily be shattered by a direct #NATO military intervention, even if it was organised under the auspices of a 'coalition of the willing' writes @Justin\_Br0nk in the latest #RUSICommentary. (A Ukraine No-Fly Zone Would be Ineffective, Dangerous and a Gift to Putin  
<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-no-fly-zone-would-be-ineffective-dangerous-and-gift-putin>)



ASPI @ASPI\_org 9 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Protecting democracy from the reversibility of online information | Chris Zappone | <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/protecting-democracy-from-the-reversibility-of-online-information/>



NAADSN\_RDSNAA @NAADSN\_RDSNAA 9 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "International Arctic Responses to the Further Russian Invasion of Ukraine" is the latest Strategic Perspectives report published today and written by @AndrewBresnahan, @WhitneyLackenb1 & Bridget Larocque. Read it here: <https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22mar8-International-Arctic-responses-to-Russian-invasion-AB-PWL-BL.pdf>



Canadian Armed Forces Operations @CFOperations 11 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: @CanadianForces maintain #ArcticSecurity year-round through Canadian navy, army, and air force joint operations, exercises, and training activities at home and abroad. Learn about CAF participation in Arctic exercises <https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/news/2022/03/arctic-security-canadian-armed-forces-exercise-alongside-us-allies.html> #ARCTICEDGE22 (Arctic Security: Canadian Armed Forces Exercise Alongside U.S. Allies)



CMSS @CMSSCalgary 11 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: CMSS Fellow Dr. Alex Hill on "General Mud" -- ("General Mud" Has Usually Been on Russia's Side in War. Not This Time. <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/03/mud-in-ukraine-history-of-russian-army-and-rasputitsa.html>)



NATO ACT @NATO\_ACT 13 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: This Scowcroft Center Issue Brief outlines the strategic context that #NATO now faces, key principles for strengthening NATO's deterrence posture, and a menu of recommended posture enhancements for the Alliance. (Defending every inch of NATO territory: Force posture options for strengthening deterrence in Europe <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-and-nato-force-posture-options/>)



Globalnews.ca @globalnews 13 Mar tweeted: "We know from our defence policy that we will be increasing defence spending by 70 per cent over the nine-year period beginning in 2017," said the Defence Minister of Canada.

(Anand says Canada on track to hit defence spending targets but asks, 'is that enough?')

<https://globalnews.ca/news/8677478/canada-defence-spending-targets-anita-anand/>

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Is it time for another defence policy review or at least a public review of current Strong, Secure, Engaged? <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-defence-policy.html>

Certainly world geo-political situation has developed since 2017. Has CAN🇨🇦 & @NationalDefence @CanadianForces kept up with that?

Barry Walker retweeted: "@RUSI\_NS @NationalDefence @CanadianForces Yes a defence and security policy is needed, but it must be done in conjunction with a foreign policy review. I'd go further and say we need a complete rewrite of both. And perhaps it should look like the 2004 National Security Policy

(Securing an open society : Canada's national security policy <https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.665565/publication.html>)



*The MND chose to wear an Army mask the day the photo above was taken. For a CANEX selection of masks, see:*

<https://www.canex.ca/en/catalogsearch/result/?q=Masks>

Conference of Defence Associations Institute Closing Keynote speech by Minister Anand:

<https://cdainstitute.ca/closing-keynote-ottawa-conference-minister-anita-anand/>

"Canada's 56-Year-Old Heavy Icebreaker Goes for Another Life Extension" <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/canada-s-56-year-old-heavy-icebreaker-goes-for-another-life-extension> "to undergo major repair, refit & maintenance work to extend its lifespan & keep the ship in service, giving CAN🇨🇦 more time for construction of 2 replacement icebreakers" Pushing it...



RUSI @RUSI\_org 14 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 'The elimination of a large part of the country's regular armed forces could lead #Russia to claim it had achieved its goal of demilitarising #Ukraine' write @Sam\_Cranny and Sidharth Kaushal in the latest #RUSICommentary.

(Not Out of the Woods Yet: Assessing the Operational Situation in Ukraine

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/not-out-woods-yet-assessing-operational-situation-ukraine>)



National Defence @NationalDefence 14 Mar tweeted: The skies can be a crowded place. That's why we're improving @CanadianArmy capabilities for airspace coordination and monitoring in support of operations.

<https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/03/improving-land-forces-capabilities-for-airspace-coordination-and-monitoring.html>

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Elbit Systems UK to deliver TORCH-X Battle Management Solution to CAN🇨🇦 for Airspace Coordination Centre Modernisation Project

<https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/elbit-systems-torch-x-canada/> "alert troops to incoming direct/indirect fire, monitor unmanned aerial systems & other aircraft, prevent friendly fire incidents"



Jeff Collins @jeffreycollins 16 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: NEW ARTICLE: Off-the-shelf procurement is a phrase that pops up anytime folks talk about fixing Canada's defence procurement system. @TimDotChoi and I unpack just what the term means and why it's not the easy win some think it is. [https://cgai.ca/if\\_only\\_warships\\_grew\\_on\\_trees](https://cgai.ca/if_only_warships_grew_on_trees) via @CAGlobalAffairs



### Defence Funding

Power & Politics @PnPCBC 16 Mar tweeted: Defence Min. Anita Anand says she is bringing forward "aggressive options" that could see Canadian defence spending exceed NATO's 2% of GDP target, hit that 2% target or fall short of it: "My role is to bring forward a number of different options for our government to consider."



### Ukrainian Farmer Towing Russian Equipment Meme


*After a picture went viral on social media of a Ukrainian farmer towing away a Russian armoured vehicle, Twitterverse responded with hilarious tweets on the meme. Hey, we need some amusement during these times. Read the thread following the @Sputnik\_Not tweet.*

Sputnik @Sputnik\_Not 9 March 2022 tweeted

[https://twitter.com/Sputnik\\_Not/status/1501627667468140546](https://twitter.com/Sputnik_Not/status/1501627667468140546): BREAKING: Ukrainian farmer steals Soyuz rocket

Major General (just retired!) Mick Ryan @WarintheFuture 10 March 2022 retweeted: Ukrainian farmers have been audacious in their battlefield recovery of Russian armoured vehicles in the past two weeks, but this.....

*(next page)*



*It's effective information operations, too.*

**Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:**

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

**Navy's Next 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan Could Avoid Details—Again**

<https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/03/navys-new-30-year-shipbuilding-plan-will-avoid-detailsagain/362988/>



"If we aren't careful, sometimes you can get bogged down in what you think the needs are today instead of trying to be forward looking."

Warships are routinely, at least in Canada, retained for 40 plus years. Maintainability and room for growth (= changes to update onboard systems) need to be built into the ships. No one really can forecast what the situations in the world and specifically at sea will look like decades from now. The National Shipbuilding Strategy needs to reflect the long timings.

**Canada's new NATO role should be defending North America**

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/timothy-andrews-sayle-canadas-new-nato-role-should-be-defending-north-america>



"Canada must specialize and acquire the equipment, build the force, and shape the policy to guarantee the defence of North America and Canada within it."

NATO's western border is twelve miles into the Pacific, Canada's western territorial sea. More importantly, Canada faces Russia in the Arctic. (With China attempting to intrude.)

## U.S. Sanctions on Russia: Impact on Shipping Business and Contractual Considerations

<https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2022/03/us-sanctions-on-russia-impact-on-shipping-business>

US Department of Justice Task Force KleptoCapture, "an interagency law enforcement task force dedicated to enforcing the sweeping sanctions, export restrictions and economic countermeasures that the United States has imposed, along with allies and partners."



I wonder whether there is a similar integrated approach amongst Canadian law enforcement agencies to sanction enforcement.

## The Kremlin's Weapons of Deception: 7 Things You Need to Know about RT and Sputnik

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-kremlins-weapons-of-deception-7-things-you-need-to-know-about-rt-sputnik/>

"As the Russian missiles are falling on Ukrainian cities, both RT and Sputnik continue to disinform and obfuscate the true nature and extent of Putin's war against Ukraine."



## The Kremlin Hashtagging Ze War

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-kremlin-hashtagging-ze-war/>

"The Z is an attempt to create a cool symbol of the war."

Symbology information operations...



## A Ukrainian Insurgency will be Long and Bloody

<https://mwi.usma.edu/a-ukrainian-insurgency-will-be-long-and-bloody/>

"... if the history of modern insurgent warfare around the world is any guide, then the conflict is likely to be exceedingly violent and protracted, with difficult political implications."



## How the Ukrainian Military Went from 'Decrepit' to Surprisingly Strong

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/how-ukrainian-military-went-decrepit-surprisingly-strong/362897/>

"A new culture has emerged, and the Ukrainians are fighting now with a newer version of the ends justify the means: Outcomes are more important than processes." An analysis with lessons for the militaries of other states.





### Russia's Rocket Barrages Reveal Bad Planning, Cruelty—and the Absence of Crucial Skills

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/russias-rocket-barrages-reveal-bad-planning-crueltyand-absence-crucial-skills/362911/>



"“This clearly was not planned as a combined arms operation, and because of that much of the expected organization and planning didn't go into their campaign.”"

### Urgent call to create safe corridors in the Black Sea

<https://splash247.com/urgent-call-to-create-safe-corridors-in-the-black-sea/>



Considering what lack of success humanitarian corridors have had so far in the Ukraine-Russia war ashore, establishment of safe corridors in the Black Sea may necessitate capable escort of merchant vessels. What capable navy is currently not arraigned on one side or the other in the conflict and is available (can make it to the Black Sea) to provide escorts? Maybe more significantly, there could need to be a major effort to ensure none of the corridors are mined. All rather risky.

The war will be an interesting case for naval planners and students of naval affairs studying exclusion zones and other such measures.

### Leaders of truck convoy protests sought to overthrow government, national security adviser says

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-leaders-of-truck-convoy-protests-sought-overthrow-of-government/>



Canadian National Security Adviser says Canada and the United States are determined to beef up Arctic defences through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), noting the Russian military build up in the Arctic and the Chinese threat there. This "... necessitates a significant rebuild of NORAD defences above and beyond the upgrading of the early-warning system ..."

### Dear Congress, The U.S. Needs Innovation in the Navy

<http://blogs.shu.edu/journalofdiplomacy/2022/03/dear-congress-the-u-s-needs-innovation-in-the-navy/>



"By pairing these new fleet concepts (such as building light carriers) with increased involvement and investment with the navies of U.S. allies, the U.S. can supplement its forces within the Indo-Pacific and demonstrate U.S. trust and faith in its allies."

Canada has a good involvement with the US Navy already in the Indo-Pacific. The idea of increased investment is intriguing - not sure if/how that can apply to a middle power like Canada. Like the idea, though, in a US focus on allies.

Adaptation and innovation (read book: "Mars Adapting: Military Change During War") have received attention in the Canadian Armed Forces. Could do with more.


### **Russia's Logistical Problems May Slow Down Russia's Advance—But They Are Unlikely To Stop It**

<https://mwi.usma.edu/russias-logistical-problems-may-slow-down-russias-advance-but-they-are-unlikely-to-stop-it/>



### **Water Wars: Indo-Pac Is Back: Biden Administration Releases New Indo-Pacific Strategy as Tensions Between China and Its Neighbors Simmer**

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/water-wars-indo-pac-back-biden-administration-releases-new-indo-pacific-strategy-tensions-between>



The Indo-Pacific may not be showing in Canada's foreign policy and Forces strategy to the same extent that it does in the US, but that region of the world definitely has been getting Canadian attention for some time what with naval and other military deployments there. There may not be much public attention but our leadership is quietly engaging.

Also note: Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf>

### **Welcome back, Canada: flying the NATO E-3A AWACS aircraft**

<https://skiesmag.com/features/welcome-back-canada-flying-nato-e-3a-awacs-aircraft/>



### **Canada treats defence as a joke, but the party's over**

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/np-view-canada-treats-defence-as-a-joke-but-the-partys-over>

"Canada needs a military that is strong enough to defend its borders and aid its allies in conflicts and peacekeeping missions overseas. This is a goal that will take a lot of money and effort to achieve, but it is one we cannot afford to do without."



## France Arrests Russian Heavylift Ship Owned By Sanctioned Oligarch

<https://gcaptain.com/france-arrests-russian-heavylift-ship-owned-by-sanctioned-oligarch/>

"French sea police seized a ship on (26 February 2022) that authorities suspect belongs to a Russian company targeted by European Union sanctions over the war in Ukraine..."



Targeting super yachts owned by Russian oligarchs could hit a nerve in Moscow

<https://www.cbc.ca/radio/day6/russian-oligarchs-super-yachts-sanctions-1.6380862>

Seizing oligarchs' yachts is "a highly symbolic attack on something coveted by the oligarchs."

These two articles highlight the utility of having strong financial intelligence organizations to determine who owns what, and of having capable maritime tracking organizations to determine where these and other vessels of interest are located.

Leads to questions: what are the Canadian laws and regulations, and who (which ministers) have the authority and responsibility of ordering such arrests and seizures? Is 'crown prerogative' a factor? What would a seizure directive look like? Presuming that a seizure, alongside or at sea, would be an inter-agency operation of several federal departments (almost assuredly it would be), who would be involved and, importantly, who would be the lead? Have departments planned and exercised such an activity? They certainly have for vessels engaged in terrorism and other illegal activities. Have they for vessels legitimately belonging to companies of other (including major) states?

## Combat Support Experiment

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/combat-support-experiment/>

"Last year the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB) began a two-year experiment to evaluate how it can best integrate ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) sensors, electronic warfare, influence activities, and other critical enablers into a manoeuvre brigade headquarters."



## It's time for an Arctic Council 2.0

<https://maritimemag.com/en/on-our-forum-its-time-for-an-arctic-council-2-0/>


Time to reconsider the functioning of the Arctic Council. Can we ignore security issues when so flagrantly other states are not?



## Ukrainian Theater of War, Day 16

<https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1502528320369569792/photo/1>

Good summary. Note the refugee symbols (internally displaced persons) now depicted on the map.



In 2014, the 'decrepit' Ukrainian army hit the refresh button. Eight years later, it's paying off

<https://theconversation.com/in-2014-the-decrepit-ukrainian-army-hit-the-refresh-button-eight-years-later-its-paying-off-177881>



"A new culture has emerged, and the Ukrainians are fighting now with a newer version of the ends justify the means: Outcomes are more important than processes."

Culture has a (the?) major role in determining a military's effectiveness. In changing the Canadian Armed Forces culture, let's ensure we retain the parts that support warfighting effectiveness.

The Canadian Armed Forces certainly seemed to have helped in developing the culture of the Ukrainian military.

### **Gulf Of Guinea: Nigeria, Canada, 30 Others Deploy Warships, Helicopters For Joint Military Exercise**

<https://thewillnigeria.com/news/gulf-of-guinea-nigeria-canada-30-others-deploy-warships-helicopters-for-joint-military-exercise/>

"... a report from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), released on March 3, indicated that Nigeria had exited from the list of piracy prone countries."

Might deployments of Royal Canadian Navy ships to the region and the training Canadian sailors provided to navies and coast guards there have contributed, if just a little, to this progress against piracy?

HMC Ships GOOSE BAY and MONCTON, two Kingston-class patrol vessels, are currently participating in Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS 2022 as part of Canada's Operation PROJECTION West Africa (<https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-projection.html>).



### **Ukraine: Spam website set up to reach millions of Russians**

<https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60697261>

A mark of how different even war is in this connected world. Not only is there greater situational awareness of what's going on on the ground (open source intelligence - OSINT), but people of other countries are taking matters into their own hands and subjecting the citizens of the assailant with an information operations effort of emails attempting to influence them (hmm, to what extent does 'public opinion' really have a say in an authoritarian regime?). Modern day 'people's war.'

An 'electronic leaflets' campaign.



### **Desperate Russian Rear-Area Troops Are Armoring Their Vehicles With Wood Logs**

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44604/desperate-russian-rear-area-troops-are-armoring-their-vehicles-with-wood-logs>

Russia invades Ukraine, kills trees.

Hmm, maybe there is still room in modern military organizations for forestry companies...



### How the West can help level the playing field in Ukraine

<https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/how-the-west-can-help-level-the-playing-field-in-ukraine-balkan-devlen-in-the-toronto-sun/>

"Weakening Russia's ability to engage in further aggression in Europe and elsewhere is in Canada's and our NATO allies' interest."



Strategy is the province of military leaders (I'm using 'strategy' in its original sense, meaning art of the general). Good though, for the general public, including opinion writers, to be considering and talking about the relationships we want our country to take with other states.

### Checking Putin: How to Counter Russia in Ukraine

<https://mwi.usma.edu/checking-putin-how-to-counter-russia-in-ukraine/>

"... should now be asking the military for a range of options to counter the Russian invasion and to prepare for its aftermath. A menu of such options should include cyber, electromagnetic, and information operations. It should also include practical steps to aid a post-invasion resistance movement."



### The Russian Army Depends On Civilians to Keep It Supplied. This Could Be A Problem In Ukraine.

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/01/14/the-russian-army-depends-on-civilians-to-keep-it-supplied-this-could-be-a-problem-in-ukraine/?sh=958326272e37>



This article was highlighted by: Phillips P. O'Brien @PhillipsPOBrien 5 Mar tweeted: A tweet thread on why we are almost certainly overestimating the amount of strength the Russian Army has on hand, and the amount they can actually get to Ukraine when their first force losses get so high that it starts becoming combat ineffective. Yes, its logistics. @BoringWar (<https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1500213943012319252>)

An interesting tweet thread to read. Particularly the videos of Russia purportedly bringing forward civilian vehicles by train to augment (replace?) military trucks. Also a report that the Ukrainians have (wisely) been targeting Russian fuel trucks.

See also: Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli <https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/feeding-the-bear-a-closer-look-at-russian-army-logistics/>

**UK: New multi-billion pound strategy to deliver 150 naval and civil vessels**

<https://www.navaltoday.com/2022/03/10/uk-new-multi-billion-pound-strategy-to-deliver-150-naval-and-civil-vessels/>

UK Ministry of Defence has published a 'refreshed' National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSbS). Worth a comparative read and a consideration whether the Canadian National Shipbuilding Strategy could do with a new edition (NSS 2.0?). (Aside: good to see the UK de-conflict initialisms by their using NSbS.)

The NSbS: National Shipbuilding Strategy - A refreshed strategy for a globally successful, innovative and sustainable shipbuilding enterprise (<http://shorturl.at/qwMO2>)



**Putin's Propaganda Machine Is What America's Far-Right Wants**

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/putins-propaganda-machine-what-americas-far-right-wants/363083/>

<enter any country name here> "... needs freedom of speech, and it needs the widest possible range of voices to be heard to sustain the marketplace of ideas a democracy needs."

Propaganda, disinformation, misinformation, etc., are not problems just 'over there.' Let's learn the lessons from everywhere and ensure we are information literate and not being led by information apparatuses of those with evil intent.



**Russia's State-Owned Fleet of Oil Tankers Is Coming to a Standstill**

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-11/russia-s-state-owned-fleet-of-oil-tankers-is-starting-to-idle>

"Sovcomflot's fleet isn't subject to measures that would prevent it from trading, but countries including the U.K. and Canada aren't allowing Russian ships to dock following Russia's invasion of Ukraine."

The Canadian Order in Council banning Russian ships from Canadian ports is having an effect against Russian trade. See: Special Economic Measures Act 4(2)(h): (<https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/s-14.5/page-1.html#h-434049>). Economic/trade warfare doesn't have to be confined to belligerents, in fact, many maritime trading states become involved.



### 2022 US Shipbuilding Report

<https://www.marinelink.com/news/us-shipbuilding-report-494956>

Many of the issues afflicting US naval and civil shipbuilding (labour issues and supply chain disruptions) are the same for Canadian shipbuilders. Difficult to specify but there has to have been contributions by these issues to delays in Canadian government ship maintenance and building.



### NATO Warns Ships Away From Russia's Largest Port

<https://gcaptain.com/nato-warning-novorossiysk-russian-oil-port/>

Both Russia and NATO are using various tools to exclude maritime shipping from areas, though one can be confident they have different reasons. Interesting that NATO includes the risk of GPS jamming, AIS spoofing, communications jamming, electronic interference and cyber-attacks, not just physical attacks.

An overriding factor, really, in the decisions of shippers to traverse the region will be insurance rates. Shipping insurers greatly affect the movement of vessels, and naval planners are cognizant of that.



### Top American generals on three key lessons learned from Ukraine

<https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/top-american-generals-on-three-key-lessons-learned-from-ukraine/>

"We have to understand there's a human component to fighting — a brutality. All the technology in the world allows [Russia] to win, but it doesn't replace the human."



### U.S. Navy CNO Says Light Destroyers Are Possible In Future Fleet

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/03/u-s-navy-cno-says-light-destroyers-are-possible-in-future-fleet/>

Not sure I agree with the type 'light destroyer.' A destroyer is a destroyer, and the official definition allows for a range of capabilities and size. 'Light destroyer' only makes sense when a navy has allowed its destroyers to grow and now are the size and capabilities of cruisers of previous generation (and..., one could argue, battleships before that).

Hmm, the Canadian Surface Combatant is the size and capabilities of cruisers...





## Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Threatens The Already Fragile Global Food System

<https://gcaptain.com/russias-invasion-ukraine-threatens-fragile-global-food-system/>

"If grain supplies from the Black Sea remain cut off, it would require even more significant rerouting of global agricultural trade ..."



Food security and its greater, at times global, impacts is sometimes underappreciated topic of understanding and study by military planners and operators. Especially as it affects maritime trade and world economics (war is a matter of budgets). Food security needs to be routinely recognized as a strategic consideration.

## Industry continues to pull out of Russia

<https://splash247.com/industry-continues-to-pull-out-of-russia/>

"The Russian Maritime Register of Shipping has been withdrawn from the International Association of Classification Societies, and class societies Lloyd's Register and DNV have started to pull out of Russia."



Significant actions in the maritime trade sector. An interesting aspect of 'trade warfare.' Lessons for naval planners.

*Further:* Class societies start pulling out of Russia :: Lloyd's List

<https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL1140117/Lloyds-Register-pulls-out-of-Russia>

## Russian airlines will keep planes leased from foreign firms

<https://toronto.citynews.ca/2022/03/14/russian-airlines-will-keep-planes-leased-from-foreign-firms/>

Hmm, what Canadian authorities (laws) and who would be involved in seizing Russian aircraft, either of their airlines or belonging to sanctioned Russians?



An earlier article (behind subscription wall):

Owners Fear Planes 'Are Gone Forever' After Russia Shields Them From Seizure

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-08/owners-outfoxed-as-russia-absconds-with-10-billion-of-jets>

### Ukraine conflict: Russia employs Forpost-R UCAV

<https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ukraine-conflict-russia-employs-forpost-r-ucav>

The evidence in the article is Russian-sourced (yes, Janes is trustworthy). A careful reader would want also to see reporting and imagery from trusted Ukraine and Western sources.



### Canadian navy cocaine seizure: HMCS Yellowknife intercepts 800kgs of drugs

<https://vancouverisland.ctvnews.ca/canadian-warship-intercepts-destroys-shipment-of-cocaine-off-central-america-1.5820646>

And whilst most of the Canadians' attention is focused elsewhere, the Canadian Armed Forces carries on with operations and training to secure our country.

Note the use by YELLOWKNIFE of an aerial drone.

Note, too, that the captain of the ship has built up quite the experience with Operation CARIBBE.

Operation CARIBBE (<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-caribbe.html>)

"Operation CARIBBE is Canada's participation in U.S.-led enhanced counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean.

Under this operation, Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) ships and aircraft deploy to the region on a rotational basis to support the U.S. mission to suppress trafficking in international waters."



### Russian invasion 'a terrible blow to Arctic co-operation', says Nunavut senator

<https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/russian-invasion-a-terrible-blow-to-arctic-co-operation-says-nunavut-senator/>

Will the Arctic Council survive? Certainly there needs to be a radical rethink of aims and activities.



### Ukraine's wartime rail chief has to be faster than the Russians tracking him

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60755198>

If Russia takes Ukraine's ports and cuts Ukraine off from trade by sea, then the Ukrainian connections by rail west to Europe are going to become even more important to the security and prosperity of Ukraine (assuming it doesn't become a vassal state).

*Logistics! (See the rail map below)*





Trent Telenko @TrentTelenko Mar 13 tweeted:

(<https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1503127727557259265>) Since I'm seeing a lot of misinformation surfacing about the Ukrainian logistical posture. It is time for a thread on planes, trains and automobiles in the Ukraine war in relation to NATO Lend Lease. Where are the Russian red arrows compared to the Ukrainian train tracks? 1/ (Read the thread)

To which another Tweeter added the map of Ukrainian rail lines with Russian axes of advance overlaid. (<https://twitter.com/SukDukDong1/status/1503145121126232064>)

### A Planned Mars Rover Is the Latest Victim of Russia's War on Ukraine

<https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/03/planned-mars-rover-latest-victim-russias-war-ukraine/363287/>

Impacts of the Ukraine-Russia war go off world...



### Other Sources:

#### #Canadian Armed Forces

Ontario Improving Day Job Protection for Military Reservists

<https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/1001700/ontario-improving-day-job-protection-for-military-reservists>

#### #China #Russia

Articles available on request to RUSI(NS) to members who cannot access the subscription wall.

A War-Weakened Russia Has No Strategic Value to China

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30384/the-ukraine-russia-war-is-devaluing-china-russia-relations>

China Bet on Russia: Why Does the CCP Think It Will Always Win?

[https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-bet-on-russia-why-does-the-ccp-think-it-will-always-win\\_4327134.html](https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-bet-on-russia-why-does-the-ccp-think-it-will-always-win_4327134.html)

China Must Choose Between Two Bad Options on Putin's War

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30377/the-ukraine-russia-war-is-complicating-china-russia-relations>

The Ukraine-Russia War Is Devaluing China-Russia Relations

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30384/the-ukraine-russia-war-is-devaluing-china-russia-relations>

### **#cyber operations**

Renewed cyber security strategy needs industry involved

<https://www.hilltimes.com/2022/03/09/renewed-cyber-security-strategy-needs-industry-involved/348852>

*Available on request to RUSI(NS) to members who cannot access the subscription wall.*

Cyber lessons in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/cyber-lessons-in-the-wake-of-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/>

### **#information operations**

Women at War

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/women-at-war/>

Russian nuclear and biological disinformation undermines treaties on weapons of mass destruction

<https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russian-nuclear-and-biological-disinformation-undermines-treaties-on-weapons-of-mass-destruction/>

Information Advantage Contribution to Operational Success

<https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/389-information-advantage-contribution-to-operational-success/>

The Information War Isn't Over Yet

<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2022/03/russia-ukraine-war-propaganda/626975/>

History Is a Good Antidote to Disinformation About the Invasion of Ukraine

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/history-is-a-good-antidote-to-disinformation-about-the-invasion-of-ukraine/>

Hybrid CoE Working Paper 13: The Kremlin's messaging on Ukraine: Authorities and "media" hand in hand

<https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-working-paper-13-the-kremlins-messaging-on-ukraine-authorities-and-media-hand-in-hand/>

Disinformation at the Border of War

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-at-the-border-of-war/>

## **#law**

Supplying Arms to Ukraine is Not an Act of War

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/supplying-arms-ukraine-not-act-war>

The 'No-Fly Zone' Test

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/no-fly-zone-test/363099/>

Who's a war criminal, and who gets to decide?

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-biden-united-nations-jen-psaki-40e21508055f7ff65424afe2d8e406d8>

## **#logistics**

The complete idiot's guide to military logistics

<https://timothy.noah.substack.com/p/the-complete-idiots-guide-to-military>

## **#NATO**

3 NATO gambles that have played a big role in the horrors of war in Ukraine

<https://theconversation.com/3-nato-gambles-that-have-played-a-big-role-in-the-horrors-of-war-in-ukraine-178815>

## **#naval warfare**

Manning the Unmanned Systems of SSN(X)

<https://cimsec.org/manning-the-unmanned-systems-of-ssnx/>

## **#planning**

Planning isn't everything: we need more focus on the execute

<https://wavellroom.com/2019/10/22/planning-isnt-everything-we-need-more-focus-on-the-execute/>

## **#shipbuilding**

Seaspan Shipyards Launches HoloShip Facility

*Cool tech:* <http://www.canadiandefencereview.com/news?news/3363>

## **#strategy**

One if by invasion, two if by coercion: US military capacity to protect Taiwan from China

<https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-03/one-if-by-invasion-two-if-by-coercion-us-military-capacity-to-protect-taiwan-from-china/>

## **#Ukraine-Russia War**

The war in Ukraine in maps: Russian forces advance in the south

<https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-03-16/the-war-in-ukraine-in-maps-russian-forces-advance-in-the-south.html>

Ukraine Could Become The Far Right's Afghanistan

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30392/ukraine-could-become-the-far-right-s-afghanistan>

Weapons of the war in Ukraine

<https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/WEAPONS/lbvgnzdnlpq/>

A Civil War is Brewing In Russian Tech Circles

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/03/civil-war-brewing-russian-tech-circles/363228/>

*'Technical' aspects of the Ukraine-Russia war. Interesting, the shortage of servers.*

Russia's 'Special Military Operation' and Its Impact on the European Land-Based Radar Market

<https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/wordpress/2022/03/14/russias-special-military-operation-and-its-impact-on-the-european-land-based-radar-market/>

NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_192648.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm)

Sanctions-savaged Russia teeters on brink of historic default

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-sanctions-savaged-russia-teeters-on-brink-of-historic-default-2/>

*Financial warfare.*

What Will the Battle of Kyiv Look Like?

<https://mwi.usma.edu/what-will-the-battle-of-kyiv-look-like/>

No Fly Zones

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/03/16/no-fly-zones/>

Without sending troops, the U.S. wages 'hybrid warfare' against Russia

<https://www.npr.org/2022/03/15/1086641007/without-sending-troops-the-u-s-wages-hybrid-warfare-against-russia>

Cheap but lethal Turkish drones bolster Ukraine's defenses

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-middle-east-africa-libya-europe-ecb9e820ea4bddb4464d7e8cb40e82fc>

Russia may have used a killer robot in Ukraine. Now what?

<https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/russia-may-have-used-a-killer-robot-in-ukraine-now-what/>

The role of naval forces in Russia's war against Ukraine and its implications

<https://defenceindepth.co/2022/03/17/the-role-of-naval-forces-in-russias-war-against-ukraine-and-its-implications>

A Ukrainian Town Deals Putin One of His Most Decisive Routs

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-russia-voznnesensk-town-battle-11647444734>

## **#urban warfare**

Better Urban Training

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/03/10/better-urban-combat-training/>

## **#warfare**

Russia 'canceled': Is this an effective new way of waging war?

<https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2022/0309/Russia-canceled-Is-this-an-effective-new-way-of-waging-war>

## Other:

NATO Library Thematic Bibliography no. 3/22 International Sanctions  
[https://natolibguides.info/ld.php?content\\_id=34072618](https://natolibguides.info/ld.php?content_id=34072618)

### **Security Affairs Committee Synopsis**

#### **O Canada**

These past weeks have been almost unbelievable. Who would have thought such a thing as a major invasion of a European country would occur in Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> century? Still, once again, it is a country that seems to have gone from an authoritarian state to a totalitarian state, in some respects like Nazi Germany. It once again shows how democracies always seem to end up being unprepared for conflict. Young men and women of the armed forces pay the price of those politicians unwilling to pay the insurance bill that are our defence and security services. Canada has been getting a peace dividend since the 1960s and has left the work to the US rather than protect our own sovereignty. Although this week the media reported on Russian designs in the Arctic, we tend to forget that it is the US and Denmark which actually are causing us grief in regard to our Arctic claims. You pay insurance so you are prepared for the worst, that time period when everything goes wrong. Yet, there are still those who are left looking at the wreckage and wonder why they didn't keep up the premiums. I hate insurance, it is a drain on the bank account and I hope I never have to use that policy ever, but I know I have it and it is updated regularly with considerable thought.

Once again, the world is faced with an unscrupulous leader with no 'governors' on his actions. Canada now has a direct threat to our national sovereignty in the Arctic. Threats to our sovereignty have been growing including Russia with its expansionist policies in the Arctic and of course Communist China with its new Arctic Policy which also puts major pressure on Canada. Canada lacks a security policy that is actually a security policy, a foreign policy, a defence policy and the sub-policies such as a cyber-security policy with teeth. We have none of these at the moment. The situation has changed and action and thought are needed in Ottawa to better place the country's future. At the moment the main effort seems to be 'hope' as in we hope nothing serious happens as a policy. Successive governments have not taken these policies seriously - we need thought and action. We need the necessary hardware to back up the policies we develop. It is evident that laws without enforcement or the equipment and resources to do so are not sufficient when there are countries led by authoritarians. Wishful thinking will not get the job done.

The war has finally caused some interest from our media on defence issues. A member of RUSI(NS) had the pleasure of discussing anti-armour weapons or the lack thereof in the Canadian Army with Evan Dyer of CBC. It is hoped that the comments provided to Mr Dyer were somewhat useful. In the research it became clear that Canada has only three weapons within the infantry that are available: the 66 mm M72 (a long-in-the-tooth disposable light anti-armour weapon) and the venerable but updated Carl Gustav, an 84mm anti-armour weapon. Canada also retains 40 improved Tube launched, Optically sighted, Wire guided (TOW) anti-tank missile systems, but their employment is not known at this point. The Special Operations Force has several others that they have acquired but these weapons are in small numbers and are allocated to SOF alone. In conversations with contacts in Ottawa, it was noted that the anti-armour project may have a solution in 2032 or around that year, long past the time it is needed...which is now. Mr Dyer was also surprised that any anti-armour plan is layered and involves an all arms effort to attrite armour forces from as far away as possible using fighter ground attack, attack helicopters and specialized artillery ammunition, but also allowing for individual infantrymen to keep up hitting armour right on to the main battle position or even past when necessary. In the early 2000s the Army was forced to downsize its combat support companies, losing pioneer

platoons, anti-armour platoons and mortar platoons. These platoons allowed an infantry battalion to hit the enemy out to approximately 4500m; newer ammunition types have slightly better range. The mortars ended up in the artillery who use them for their own purposes. The infantry no longer had that capacity and has to a large extent lost the ability to re-constitute this capability and that is just one example out of many of just basic capabilities.

## **China**

China is in an interesting place at the moment, with its key ally engaged in an unprovoked war with Ukraine. Both countries are good Chinese customers and China has badly needed some aspects of Ukrainian expertise when developing the ability to back engineer Russian technology, particularly for aircraft and missiles. Russia on the other hand has just become China's greatest defender and partner. Although China denies it, it is suspected that China was aware of Russia's plan to invade Ukraine. This was originally suspected of happening when President Putin attended the opening of the Olympics in early February 2022. If it wasn't discussed, the invasion on 24 February must have been an unpleasant shock to Chinese leaders. The situation is difficult - whether to fully support Russia with its anemic economy or draw the wrath of the liberal democratic world with huge markets and economies if they do support Russia. To date, China has tried to balance on a very sharp edge. Russia is a fellow authoritarian regime that has been essential to the rise of Chinese military technology especially in the air and on the sea. China, however, has to try to retain the goodwill and markets of the European Union, the US and the other liberal democracies. Russia isn't even remotely a replacement for being shut out of the liberal democracies.

China's own economy is doing poorly even by official numbers. China is seeing the lowest growth in decades, a mere 5.5% for this coming year, and there are indications that the property management meltdown is being less than kind to many middle-class Chinese citizens. The overall downturn in the world economy is fortunately starting to resolve but there are China's actions against most of its neighbours plus its unresolved issues of cultural genocide against Uyghurs and Tibetans plus its attacks on the democratic institutions of Hong Kong and the ongoing attacks against organized religion of virtually all faith groups. Many countries have opted to try to get their own companies to leave China. Japan in particular has had considerable success in recent times. The Southeast Asia press is less than happy with the state of the Chinese government's official figures, whether on the economy or even population figures with some suggesting that China's population is already declining rapidly. The bottom line is that China wants and needs stability to keep growing. This war and the increasingly difficult relations with neighbours and the liberal democracies do not bode well in the long term. Instability affects the very survival of the Communist Chinese Party so therefore careful thought by the Chinese leadership in this critical year will be essential.

The other problem digging at Chinese peace and stability is the ongoing pandemic. China has hidden all aspects of the pandemic numbers including preventing foreign correspondents from travelling to areas under lock down. At the moment China is now having the worst outbreak since the start of this pandemic with more than 5000 cases on Tuesday. Hong Kong (HK) has also had a massive outbreak which has overwhelmed its available medical system. HK will undergo a massive testing program that will cover most if not all the population. This has had another effect, a brain drain to other countries and cities that have a more progressive method of dealing with the virus. China's Zero Covid policy has not been a success and the actual loss of life within China is well in excess of normal. One figure from over a month ago assesses excess deaths to be substantial. These excess deaths could be from a number of ways as we have seen in our own country including heart attacks, other diseases, untreated chronic diseases such as cancer, diabetes, etc. China has not necessarily done well, but we have no way of verifying and the CCP has been much less than transparent in their actions and results.



The CCP relies on providing a safe, stable environment that is conducive for the survival of the Party. This autumn, President Xi will be seeking an unprecedented third term as President after the change of the Party Constitution. Stability is paramount. Xi is likely going to receive a third term as President; unless there is a major event or series of events such as a pandemic, war, sanctions and a deteriorating economic picture causing loss of wealth of the middle class and a growing unemployment rate that indicate that his stewardship of the CCP has been lacking. A misstep during this time will be damaging to his legacy. Successful actions to mitigate these issues are absolutely necessary for his own survival and the survival of his faction within the CCP. There are many in the wings that would be happy to see his efforts fail in his efforts to gain a third term. A big ask from Russia could provide this instability to crush Xi's dreams. The downside is authoritarian regimes losing face try other things such as cause a war, so Taiwan be watchful.

### **Russia and Belarus**

Just when I thought I could lump these two countries together, something strange has possibly occurred. Belarus has apparently stopped the use of Belarussians airfields by Russian aircraft. There is apparently growing unrest in Belarus which could see the end of the Lukashenko regime. The Belarussian Army essentially has refused to fight the Ukrainians and instead members simply resigned rather than take up arms against their neighbour. They also have stopped trains at the border of Ukraine and thus have further complicated Russian logistics. If true, this will set back Russian efforts in the north to surround Kyiv. Russia's immediate reaction to this has been so far muted, but it is suspected that this will not please the Putin regime. A reaction will be forthcoming but the timing could not be worse.

Speaking of getting worse, despite changes to the laws, etc., and mass arrests, demonstrations are continuing throughout Russia. More than 15k people have been arrested so far by authorities including an editor of Channel One on state television where the woman identified as Marina Ovsyannikova held up an anti-war protest sign during the evening news broadcast. One of her parents is Ukrainian. She was quickly arrested and questioned by local police for 14 hours before being taken to court where she only received the equivalent of a \$280 USD fine. She is apparently out and will be looking for a new line of work. The point being is that it is increasingly clear that the Russian people are not the enemy in this case; they are doing their best with the limited resources they have available which is not a lot. They have shown very real courage and determination that Russians are actually known for in their protests. Many Russians can make no sense of this action as there are many inter-marriages between the two nations. President Putin has polluted this very real relationship for a very long time.

Russia's economy continues to decline with the rouble losing over 50% of its value this week. Yesterday, a USD was worth 155 roubles, a real contrast to the rouble being under 100 roubles to the USD prior to the invasion. The bottom line is that sanctions are hurting combined with the seizure of the wealth of major oligarchs supporting the Putin regime. The inability to use USD and the SWIFT system make bill payments almost impossible for Russia. It is expected to default on loan payments this week. The Russian stock market is not likely to open in the near future. In one state television interview, a financial expert showed up in casual clothes and drank a toast (in soda water) to the death of the Russian stock market on prime-time television to the horror of the woman hosting the program. The bottom line is without Chinese assistance, Russia has very little time before a major collapse of their economy. Sanctions are also cutting into the capability of highly technical weapons systems especially aircraft and specialised systems. This will cut the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces within a very short time. One estimate was under three weeks before major impacts. Time will tell.

The war continues and there are many new and not necessarily reliable sources roaming the countryside at the moment. One thing is clear, the Russians have taken considerable losses. Some numbers are fairly vast such as the official Ukrainian figures for Russian fatalities which they estimated at over 13.5k and suggested that injured soldiers are two to three times higher putting the killed and wound figure at over 50k. The Russian figures have not changed and are still listed below 500 fatalities. Somewhere between the two figures is an actual one.

### **Special Note**

The author has Russian neighbours, they are wonderful folks. The husband was in the Soviet Naval air force as an aero engineer. They, like so many Russian families who now live in Canada, did not have anything to do with these events except to watch in horror knowing they still have relatives in the 'old' country. The Russians living here or playing in the NHL are not our enemies now or in the future. They came here for a reason and that is to share in our way of life. Remember that if you hear folks saying otherwise; they do not need the harassment at this time either.

### **#wargaming**

The topic of wargaming continues to be covered by RUSI(NS) following Maj Scott Roach's presentation to us last June ("Canadian Joint Warfare Centre – Wargaming" <https://rusi-ns.ca/wargaming/>). That coverage includes RUSI(NS) listing forthcoming Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentations (past presentations are available on YouTube). The latest GUWS presentation, Principles of International Relations in Commercial Board Games, 15 March, provided some links:

Russian Logistics for the Invasion of Ukraine

<https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2022/03/10/russian-logistics-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine/>

Toward serious matrix games

<https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2014/09/21/toward-serious-matrix-games/>

Active Learning in Political Science Simulation And Game Index

<https://activelearningps.com/simulation-index/>

Model Diplomacy

<https://modeldiplomacy.cfr.org/>

International Studies Association Simulations

<https://www.isanet.org/Professional-Resources/Join>

## Arctic eTalk

USNORTHCOM "The Watch" Command [Magazine](#) and the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience ([CASR](#)) - University of Alaska Fairbanks invite you to attend our Special March 2022 Arctic eTalks on "Special Operations in the North American Arctic and participation in ARCTIC EDGE 2022" featuring Brigadier General Shawn R. Satterfield, Commander, Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH), on Wednesday, March 30th, 2022 at 0800 AK/ 1000 MT/ 1200 EST/ 1800 CET.

We would like to recognize our Global Partners including United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), United States European Command (USEUCOM), and United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) for supporting the Arctic eTalks speaker series.

The Arctic eTalks is a monthly forum for open discussion (non-attribution, Chatham House Rule) on key issues affecting the Circumpolar Arctic for academics, defense and security professionals, as well as military and foreign affairs authorities from Canada, Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States, as well as the United Kingdom and Germany.

BG Satterfield ([biography](#)) will provide a 30-minute presentation followed by a ~45-minute Q&A session (non-attribution) that will be moderated by Dr. James Morton, LTC, US Army, SF and Cam Kovarek, LCDR, US Navy, Deputy Mission Chief, Buckley SFB.

Note: Past Arctic eTalks presentations are posted on our Arctic eTalks [website](#). However, the Q&A discussions are not posted and available only to registered Arctic eTalks participants during the live event.

Please register at the following

link: [https://alaska.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN\\_SnGgxeNGTYyuGyfdOSSsxQ](https://alaska.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_SnGgxeNGTYyuGyfdOSSsxQ)

Event website: [https://www.uaf.edu/casr/activities/etalks\\_mar\\_2022.php](https://www.uaf.edu/casr/activities/etalks_mar_2022.php)

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We look forward to your participation. Thank you for your support!

Respectfully,  
Dr. Ben and Troy

Dr. Benjamin P. Gochman, DAFC  
 Chief, Engagements  
 Arctic, Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean  
 Directorate of Operations (N&NC/J39)  
 HQ NORAD - USNORTHCOM/J3

Troy J. Bouffard  
 Director - Center for Arctic Security and Resilience  
 University of Alaska Fairbanks

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**Featuring:**  
**Brigadier General Shawn R. Satterfield**  
 Commander  
 Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH)

Wednesday, March 30<sup>th</sup>, 2022  
 0800 AK/1000 MT/1200 EST/1800 CET

Registration required  
 Contact for more information:  
 casr@alaska.edu

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