



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 25 March 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Dispatches

Sanchez King has volunteered to edit the 8, 15 and 22 April editions of *Dispatches*. He will need material to include in the editions. RUSI(NS) members, really anyone receiving our bulletin, is asked to contribute content, preferably with value-added comments, that can be posted to our social media or directly into *Dispatches*. Please email them to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

30 March, Wednesday – USNORTHCOM and University of Alaska Fairbanks speaker Brigadier General Shawn R. Satterfield, Commander, Special Operations Command North, “Special Operations in the North American Arctic and participation in ARCTIC EDGE 2022.” Noon EST. Via Zoom. Event website: https://www.uaf.edu/casr/activities/etalks_mar_2022.php. To register: https://alaska.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_SnGxenGTYyuGyfdOSSsxQ

31 March, Thursday – Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation by Phil Bolger-Cortez, Wargame Director, Air University LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, on "Air Force Wargaming." 7-9pm ADT. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/air-force-wargaming-tickets-241404436167>

New: 31 March, Thursday - Dalhousie University 2022 Annual Glyn Berry Lecture "From Coutts to Kyiv: Shifts in World Order" presented by Dr Andy Knight. 1-2pm. Room 3089, Kenneth Rowe management Building, Dalhousie University. See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

5 April, Tuesday – Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Strategic Wargaming - The US Army War College Approach." 7:00–9:00 pm ADT. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/strategic-wargaming-the-us-army-war-college-approach-tickets-187766283007>.

27 April, Wednesday – save the date. RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers on the topic of “Critical Infrastructure Resilience: Canada and the U.S. Partnering to Counter Cyber Threats.”

New: 25 May, Wednesday – **save the date**. RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Col John Boileau speaking on the No 2 Construction Battalion (note that it is understood the Government of Canada will issue an apology, summer 2022). 1300-1500. Halifax Armouries. This will be our first in-person event since we changed to virtual events because of the pandemic.

Publications:

Except where otherwise indicated, publications are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Presentation “Surveillance of Sea Surface Activities in Atlantic Canada” by Jan-Andrej Skopalik, 16 Mar 22, https://rusi-ns.ca/national_aerial_surveillance_program/

RUSI(NS) Information Note “RCN Ship Pennant Numbers,” 10 March 2022
https://rusi-ns.ca/pennant_numbers/

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Ship-to-Shore Connector Barges,” 28 February 2022,
<https://rusi-ns.ca/ship-to-shore-connector/>

RUSI(NS) Presentation “RCAF Strategy: Air and Space in Formation” by Colonel Meghan Setter, 16 February 2022,
<https://rusi-ns.ca/rcaf-strategy/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Can We Stop a Rogue Vessel in the Arctic?" by Pierre Leblanc, 4 February 2022,
<https://rusi-ns.ca/rogue-vessel-arctic>

RUSI(NS) Presentations “Arctic Maritime Security: US Coast Guard and Canadian Navy Operations” by Captain Al McCabe USCG and Commander Corey Gleason RCN, 29 January 2022,
https://rusi-ns.ca/arctic_maritime_security/

RUSI(NS) Paper “We Have No Air Defence For Our Army – Why?” by Murray Lee, 23 January 2022,
<https://rusi-ns.ca/air-defence/>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 16 March edition
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Company of Master Mariners of Canada Maritimes Division Foghorn, March 2022

Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, February 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 3, March 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, March 2022

<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/109-rausi-dispatches-march-2022>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, March 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver and Vancouver Artillery Association Members *News*, 1 March 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 1st Quarter 2022.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 11, Issue 3, 21 March 2022




Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver Members *News* Mar 15, 2022

New: Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, March 2022

<https://letstalkveterans.ca/1newsletters>

Tweeted by @RUSI NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>Adam P. MacDonald @AdamPMac tweeted 1 Mar: Happy to announce my new article 'Becoming an 'Arctic-Capable Navy': Not just the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship' has just been published in the Canadian Military Journal. 1/2 http://journal.forces.gc.ca/cmj-article-en-page7.html RUSI(NS) retweeted: CAN 🇨🇦 needs to maintain balanced, blue-water #RCNavy capable of supporting diplomatic, security & defence policies at home (all 3 oceans) & abroad (regional & global). We are a maritime trading nation. What happens overseas directly affects our safety & prosperity @RoyalCanNavy</p>	
<p>RUSI @RUSI_org Mar 14 tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Open-source intelligence is shaping our understanding and response to the war in Ukraine in a multitude of ways, argues @mattfear in the latest #RUSICommentary. (OSINT in an Age of Disinformation Warfare https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/osint-age-disinformation-warfare)</p>	
<p>"How the war in Ukraine showed that Canada is ill-equipped to fight a modern army" https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ukraine-russia-shoulder-mounted-missile-tank-javelin-stinger-1.6389525 Military equipment of @CanadianForces, particularly types & numbers of missiles, could do with a re-consideration. Is #CAF correctly outfitted for modern major conflict?</p>	

Wavell Room - British Military Thinking @wavellroom 18 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Is the West winning the disinformation war? New! "The use of classified intelligence to 'prebunk' Russian disinformation in Ukraine demonstrates a tool that the West and NATO can exploit to get ahead in the disinformation fight"
 (How the West is starting to win the disinformation war
<https://wavellroom.com/2022/03/18/disinformation-russia-nato/>)



STRATCOMCOE @STRATCOMCOE 14 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Kremlin's information influence operations, both internal and external, have always had one overriding objective - to prevent the possibility of a Russian color revolution, regarded as a main threat to the personal power of Putin. Read more
<https://stratcomcoe.org/pdfjs/?file=/publications/download/Report-Russian-Media-Landscape-2021.pdf?zoom=page-fit>
 (Russian Media landscape - Structures, Mechanisms, and Technologies of Information Operations)



Dave Perry @DavePerryCGAI 14 Mar tweeted: New @PBO_DPB report on defence capital spend provides important context for discussion of increased Cdn defence spending. Using the \$ available is as much a problem as the supply of funds. <https://distribution-a617274656661637473.pbo-dpb.ca/c7a9b6d526158fb08858faa6012bbe61777939997eb35e4fd6c510e843f21dc1>
 (Planned Capital Spending Under Strong, Secure, Engaged – Canada’s Defence Policy: 2022 Update)
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: Fix first the people issues (procurement staff expertise & availability; governance/leadership without political interference). Recognize when is time or not to apply additional factors (e.g., regional benefits) to procurement - sometimes (now) is best to procure quickly



National Newswatch @natnewswatch 14 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Canada looks to reinforce Arctic sovereignty through diplomacy, military, says minister | CBC News
 (Canada looks to reinforce Arctic sovereignty through diplomacy, military, says minister
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/arctic-sovereignty-concerns-russian-invasion-ukraine-1.6383410>)



RCMP @rcmpgrcpolice 17 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: #RCMP officers in the Democratic Republic of Congo are helping victims of sexual assault and training local police to handle the investigations. Read more about the UN mission in our latest #RCMPGazette story. <https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/feature/rcmp-congo-support-local-police-and-victims-violence>
 (RCMP in Congo support local police and victims of violence)



National Defence @NationalDefence 18 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Check out the Spring issue for articles on: ❄️🐻 Arctic Maritime Security, 🏔️🔍 Land Reconnaissance, 👤👩🏻👨🏻🏠 Personnel, History, 🏠📊 Strategy, and much more!
<http://journal.forces.gc.ca/cmj-22.2-toc-en.html>
 (Canadian Military Journal [Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 2022])



Public Safety Canada @Safety_Canada 21 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: (1/2) Today the #GoC launched its engagement process to help inform the co-development of federal First Nations police services legislation <https://canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2022/03/government-of-canada-launches-engagement-process-for-first-nations-police-services-legislation.html>
 (Government of Canada launches engagement process for First Nations police services legislation)

“
 Co-developing a First Nations police services legislative framework is an important step in recognizing policing as an essential service.
 - Marco E. L. Mendicino

Canada

The Strategy Bridge @Strategy_Bridge 21 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 'Today, actors both malign and mundane are wielding information weapons in pursuit of their political aims.' - @ZaknafeinDC #InformationEnvironment #InformationWarfare <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/12/2/myth-versus-lethality-losing-the-plot-in-the-information-war>
 (Myth Versus Lethality: Losing the Plot in the Information War)



Good to see reminder that Motor Vessel ASTERIX is more than just an oiler <http://shipfax.blogspot.com/2022/03/asterix-sails.html> As replenishment oiler, ship carries ammunition, spares, equipment & has facilities (medical, dental) to provide services to @RoyalCanNavy & allied ships <https://rusi-ns.ca/auxiliary-oiler-replenishment/> (Asterix Sails)



"The DOD Needs a Joint Wargaming Center"
<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/dod-needs-joint-wargaming-center/363202/> Good recommendations for way-ahead as militaries increasingly use wargaming (have for centuries). @CanadianArmedForces has joint wargaming: "Canadian Joint Warfare Centre – Wargaming" <https://rusi-ns.ca/wargaming/>



CSE @cse_cst 22 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: CSE's @cybercentre_ca supports U.S. White House (@POTUS) call for increased cyber security awareness. Read statement: <https://cyber.gc.ca/en/news/cyber-centre-supports-us-white-house-call-increased-cyber-security-awareness> (Cyber Centre supports U.S. White House call for increased cyber security awareness)
Take note in advance of our 27 Apr Distinguished Speakers on "Critical Infrastructure Resilience: Canada and the U.S. Partnering to Counter Cyber Threats."




RCAF Operations @RCAFOperations 21 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The Mobile Arrestor Gear System (MAGS) used during #NobleDefender provides #NORAD the ability to rapidly project air power, enabling @RCAF_ARC CF18s to operate from remote arctic airfields. #ArcticSecurity @NORADCommand



EUvsDisinfo @EUvsDisinfo 11 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The Kremlin has forbidden RU media to refer to the invasion of Ukraine as war. This is not only an attempt to hide the fact of aggression. If there's no war, there can be no war crimes. But hard facts can't be washed away. The world is not that stupid.
(The Chilling Background to Kremlin's "No War" Trope <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-chilling-background-to-kremlins-no-war-trope/>)



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 22 Mar retweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Excellent discussion on NORAD modernization, it is important to understand that the future of domain awareness includes a strong maritime element. 🇨🇦's lack of underwater surveillance capabilities in contrast to those being developed by RU was raised as a key concern. Anja Karadeglija @AnjaKaradeglija 18 Mar tweeted: Interesting line in the briefing binder for @melaniejoly about China expanding its "investments and engagement in the polar regions including seeking to influence Canadian Arctic communities." <https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/russias-invasion-has-ottawa-looking-to-protect-our-arctic-sovereignty> via @nationalpost
(Russia's invasion has Ottawa looking to 'protect our Arctic sovereignty')



Canadian Army @CanadianArmy Mar 22 tweeted: While Canadians have a reputation abroad for being able to live with cold winters, few of us have experienced Arctic temperatures. Maybe those bragging rights should only belong to those living in Canada's far North and participants on the CA's Arctic Operations Course.

RUSI(NS) retweeted: "Arctic Operations Course addresses emerging Arctic challenges" <http://army.gc.ca/en/news-publications/national-news-details-no-menu.page?doc=arctic-operations-course-addresses-emerging-arctic-challenges/10zx1jmw> "Graduates travel to @CanadianForces #Arctic Training Centre to learn how to assist in planning, organization, coordination, conduct & supervision of deployments & training ops in Arctic Region



Transport Canada @Transport_gc 25 Feb tweeted: Learn how #NASPCrew planes in the Atlantic protect our oceans from pollution. #OceansProtectionPlan (Oceans Protection Plan

<https://tc.canada.ca/en/campaigns/protecting-our-coasts-oceans-protection-plan>)

RUSI(NS) retweeted: 16Mar22 Jan-Andrej Skopalik, Regional Manager, National Aerial Surveillance Program, @Transport_gc Atlantic Region, spoke to RUSI(NS) & guests with presentation "Surveillance of Sea Surface Activities in Atlantic Canada" https://rusi-ns.ca/national_aerial_surveillance_program/




Tanks on Twitter

Chris Bolton @CcibChris 21 Mar tweeted: Number of tanks in service in each European country (data from 2022). Source: <https://buff.ly/37NvNko> If you can believe it...

Of course, the wags promptly had fun with this:
Gooney Bird Drone @GB_Drone 21 Mar replying to @CcibChris: Ukraine needs to be split to 1) # tanks that the Ukraine Army has, 2) # tanks that Ukrainian farmers have.

And there was serious comments (akin to "there are lies, there are d--- lies, and then there are statistics!"):



Thomas J. @Jancosek96 22 Mar replying to @kvitka3k: Good luck maintaining any kind of offensive without tanks and IFV's. The VAST majority of those 15000 are in storage and would need significant maintenance as well as trained crews. All this would need to be done with the aforementioned part shortages.

Nice forest...



NATO

NATO @NATO tweeted 24 Mar: We face a new reality for our security due to #Russia's illegal invasion of #Ukraine. In response, #NATO has reinforced its defensive presence in the eastern part of the Alliance with more troops, planes & ships. #NATOSummit

NATO has been tweeting versions of this graphic a lot recently. And quite active on social media about the defensive nature of the alliance, and that it will stand firm and respond.

Aspects of information campaigning.

More air defence icons have been added to the graphic recently.



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

The Ukraine War and the Future of the Arctic

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-war-and-future-arctic>

"Arctic stakeholders ... ought to be considering the implications of a vastly more crowded and competitive Arctic."



The Arctic Council's ties with Russia were quickly cut. They can as quickly be reinstated when the world geo-strategic situation supports.

Canada needs a new security strategy to deal with the new global order

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/opinion-canada-needs-a-new-security-strategy-to-deal-with-the-new-global-order>

"Ukraine is not a far-off war, but an emblem of a fundamental shift in the world order, which Canada must now respond to."


Canadians need to pay more attention, and demand more attention by their leaders, to Canada's security. More understanding, more debate, more action.



OSINT in an Age of Disinformation Warfare

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/osint-age-disinformation-warfare>

"OSINT is ... a fast and flexible response to conflict that shortcuts existing bureaucratic processes of intelligence gathering and assessment, while simultaneously impacting the battlefield and the media narrative."



How the West is starting to win the disinformation war

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/03/18/disinformation-russia-nato/>

"The use of intelligence to 'prebunk' disinformation can be powerful, but for it to be successful in tackling more divisive issues such as election interference it must be combined with more transparent intelligence practices."

Take the high ground (or at least the narrative space) before the adversary attempts to.



Gen. Rick Hillier: I was inspired by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and embarrassed for my country

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/gen-rick-hillier-i-was-inspired-by-volodymyr-zelenskyy-and-embarrassed-for-my-country>



Canadian aviation company caught in Russia’s confiscation of hundreds of foreign-owned jets

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-aviation-company-caught-in-russias-confiscation-of-hundreds/>



A Canadian-owned Dash 8 has been registered in Russia. Hmm, wonder how the Russians plan to source spares and maintain the aircraft. Can some sort of legal action be taken such that if the aircraft ever leaves Russia it would be seized? Can legal action be taken to seize some other Russian aircraft/asset in lieu (presuming Russian aircraft ever fly out of Russia again).

The courts are going to be busy for a long time once the Ukraine-Russia war is over (an issue may be is defining 'over').

Putin arrests own military chief and bank boss quits as inner circle crumbles

<https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/putin-arrests-military-chief-bank-26495554>




Has the economic warfare being waged in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine got to someone close to Putin?

The report of her quitting was later refuted by other articles.

Research: ‘Ukraine war costs Russian military €20 billion per day’

<https://www.consultancy.eu/news/7433/research-ukraine-war-costs-russian-military-20-billion-per-day>



Whilst casualties and destroyed equipment, all with consequent cost, are indicators of how a war is going, really significant is how much progress is being made or not to achieving strategic objectives and the overall aim of the war.

That said, the invasion is costing Russia. Can the Ukrainians keep up the bill such that at some point the cost calculus weighs against the Russians continuing the conflict? On the other hand, that implies rational calculations on the part of the Russian leadership.

Inside the secret government unit returning fire on Vladimir Putin’s ‘weaponised lies’

<https://news.yahoo.com/inside-secret-government-unit-returning-155455557.html>



The UK Government Information Cell (GIC) "is responsible for trawling through online and broadcast material to identify disinformation and tackle it." "GIC reports have been distributed to some 30 Nato and EU allies ..."

Does Canada have a similar multi-agency organization? It should. Where are the UK reports being received in Canada and who is doing what (who is responsible for doing what) with them? There is a public information war going on (and it's not just because of and during the Ukraine-Russia war) and Canada needs strong whole-of-government and beyond (e.g., media companies, OSINT community) counter responses.

US seems to recognize the need for a GIC-like organization: The US Needs a Center to Counter Foreign Malign Influence at Home

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/us-needs-center-counter-foreign-malign-influence-home/363366/>

Military Bridging

A 17 March 2022 UK Defence Intelligence Update on Ukraine tweet had an interesting line: "Reluctance to manoeuvre cross-country, lack of control of the air and limited bridging Russia from effectively resupplying their forward troops with even the basic essentials such as food and

fuel." (<https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1504595426963509251>) Russian logistics has been getting attention from military commenters from before the invasion (e.g., noting Russian bridging and large-scale field hospitals at the border to Ukraine), and certainly, as reports come out of stalled Russian columns, since the attacks started. What does not seem to have as much public attention is engineering equipment, particularly mobility support. Yes, there were some articles predicting the effects of spring mud in Ukraine. But where was the reporting (public, for assuredly there was classified reporting within militaries) about Russians engineering units?

Hmm, the Ukrainians have wisely been targeting Russian fuel vehicles. Maybe it would be good to target Russian bridging vehicles, too.

See: Mud in Ukraine: how spring and fall conditions have affected armies fighting in the region.

<https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/03/mud-in-ukraine-history-of-russian-army-and-rasputitsa.html>



Russia's Richest Man, Alexei Mordashov, Has \$116M Property Seized

<https://www.businessinsider.com/alexei-mordashov-russia-richest-man-property-seized-italy-oligarch-2022-3>

Seizure of oligarchs' shipping, aircraft, mansions and buildings. Economic warfare. In some respects the Ukraine-Russia war is already a world war.



In Canada, what would be the legal authorities and who would undertake seizures of real property of sanctioned Russians?

Yes, Ukraine Could Beat Russia

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/03/18/yes_ukraine_could_beat_russia_822454.html

Lessons in strategy and Clausewitzian 'culminating points' from a master strategy student (only those who get to practice strategy are truly strategists).

If drawing out the war with the intent of exhasuting Russia is Ukraine's strategy and that strategy has a chance of winning (or, at least, not losing badly), then Western supporters of Ukraine should bear this in mind and act accordingly.



Ukraine Weapons Tracker @UAWeapons 11:24 AM · Mar 20, 2022 tweeted (<https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1505550833961910277>) (read the tweet thread - love the tractor parade idea): #Ukraine: Somewhere in the North East, Ukrainian forces captured another 2S19 Msta-S 152mm SPG, which was of course recovered with a tractor as per tradition.

The Ukrainians are definitely winning the information war. With humour as a major weapon. Cool, too, to post Russian equipment losses via Twitter. Candy for OSINT enthusiasts and mainstream analysts.

The tractor tradition will resonate for a long time.

Backpacks, beans and 60s-era rocket launchers: The military gear Canada pledged for Ukraine

<https://nationalpost.com/news/national/backpacks-beans-and-60s-era-rocket-launchers-the-military-gear-canada-has-pledged-for-ukraine>

Maybe Canada should send tractors to the Ukraine. We are, after all, a farming power.



The Russians seized the Ukrainian rescue ship “Sapphire” and lead her to Sevastopol

<https://odessa-journal.com/the-invaders-forcibly-lead-the-stolen-rescue-ship-sapphire-to-sevastopol/>

"The actions of the Russian occupiers are classified exclusively as piracy and direct violation of international maritime law and the International Convention on Safe Seas."



Some interesting legal questions/lessons here for naval staff and students. Is the Maritime Search and Rescue Service of Ukraine really a civil or naval service and how does that affect whether their ships can be captured by adversarial forces?

Interesting, too, that it was the Odessa Coordination and Rescue Center that called out the Russians vessels and that the Center named the Russian vessels involved. A record for legal action later?

Obangame Express 2022, West Africa’s largest multinational maritime exercise, is underway

<https://africaports.co.za/2022/03/13/africa-ports-ships-maritime-news-14-march-2022/#4963>

"Among the training exercises during OE22 are boarding techniques, search and rescue operations, medical casualty response, radio communication, and information management techniques."



Canada is listed as a participant. So much attention may be focused on the Ukraine-Russia war, but meanwhile elsewhere throughout the world (and maybe too quietly) the Canadian Armed Forces continues to be engaged in operations and exercises to strengthen security and diplomacy (and the Canadian brand).

More: Obangame Express brings a multinational approach to security in African waters

<https://www.africom.mil/article/34269/obangame-express-brings-a-multinational-approach-to-security-african-waters>

Battery operated

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/battery-operated/>

"... 129 Battery is now the sole operator of persistent ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) drone capabilities for the (Canadian) Army."

The Ukraine-Russia war is highlighting that there needs to be a great developments in Canadian Armed Forces operations and countermeasures of remotely piloted aerial systems (drones).



What is the ADF's 'core role' in today's complex strategic environment?

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-is-the-ads-core-role-in-todays-complex-strategic-environment/>

"In today's complex strategic environment, shaping is just as much Defence's core role as deterring and responding."

Questions that Canadian civil and military leaders, really, all Canadians, should be asking and debating about their military.



NATO Deployment Tests Readiness of Mobile Radar Asset

<https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/DACCCdeploymentmarch2022>

The Deployable Command and Control Centre "is the only NATO asset capable of providing an active and passive radar detection capability. Combined active and passive radar sensor networks are critical capabilities for NATO's air surveillance of Alliance airspace. Deployable active radars provide an efficient addition to existing static and airborne command and control platforms reinforcing the preparedness of NATO's air and space power."




Rightly, there will be a lot of attention on this sort of capability, and on accompanying ground-to-air missile systems. An iron curtain is not so much coming down on the border as being raised into the NATO/further east border airspace.

How Many Tanks Does Russia Have In Ukraine And How Many Has It Lost So Far?

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2022/03/15/how-many-tanks-does-russia-have-in-ukraine-and-how-many-have-they-lost-so-far/?sh=51f248535682>

An interesting analysis of Russian Battalion Tactical Groups. Of course, whilst the number of battalions, tanks, etc., are useful counts in predicting outcomes, there are so many other factors, of which strategy, morale and logistics are just three. Ultimately, the comparison to make is the correlation (love using that Soviet term) between forces and strategic aims.




Note the article's referencing to the tally "Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine" maintained by Oryx (<https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html>).

Doctrine Man on Twitter (https://twitter.com/Doctrine_Man/status/1505536581129670660): "I think this is the first war in recent memory where one of the loss columns is listed as "confiscated by farmers." <https://t.co/a7Z8OqNXc0>" /

Russia's war for Ukraine could be headed toward stalemate

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/20/russia-ukraine-military-offensive/>

"The Russian war of conquest in Ukraine is now entering a critical phase; a race to reach the culminating point of Russia's offensive capacity and Ukraine's defensive capacity ..."



Japan protests Russian halt to World War Two peace treaty talks

<https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-halts-japan-peace-treaty-talks-over-sanctions-2022-03-21/>

"Japan reacted angrily on Tuesday after Russia withdrew from peace treaty talks with Japan and froze joint economic projects related to the disputed Kuril islands because of Japanese sanctions over Russia's invasion of Ukraine."



There truly are world war aspects to the Ukraine-Russia war.

Interesting to learn (relearn?) that Japan and Russia "have not formally ended World War Two hostilities ..."

Ukraine Weapons Tracker on Twitter: "#Ukraine: The 93rd Mechanized Brigade claimed to hit a Russian supply vehicle, which appears to be a civilian truck. However, given the explosion, it had ammo on board. <https://t.co/IDxjBsTWFU>" / Twitter

<https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1506222641753075715>



Given earlier reporting about Russia moving civilian vehicles into Ukraine to bolster the Russian logistics capacity, it is not surprising to see 'civilian trucks' struck. Certainly, though, makes targeting more difficult.

Can you print that?

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/can-you-print-that/>

Good to see additive manufacturing (AM) in use by forward military elements. Hopefully, quietly there is much collaboration ongoing between military services and with government departments on the use of AM. Shared files (see the article's mention of SharePoint) is a good practice. Acquiring part files when procuring equipment is another - likely something that Defence procurement agencies are doing.



Fleet Maintenance Facility Cape Scott, Halifax, has had a laser additive manufacturing capability for a number of years. Significant utility. There has also been experimentation with AM in Naval Fleet School Atlantic. The military recognizes the benefits (and limitations) of AM to their logistics, engineering and maintenance.

Railway War

Hanna Liubakova on Twitter: "The head of the Ukrainian Railways Alexander Kamyshin confirmed that there is no railway connection between #Ukraine and #Belarus "thanks to Belarusian railway workers". They've indeed launched what they called "a railway war" with many acts of sabotage to stop Russian equipment" /

<https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1505972610177421316>



Not verified. If true, the lack of a rail connection may have serious consequences on the resupply of Russian forces in northern Ukraine.

The Ukraine-Russia war is becoming a 'people's war' in so many ways, all around the world, not just in Ukraine.

World War Three?

<https://defenceindepth.co/2022/03/22/world-war-three/>

There are a lot of opinion writers, pundits and analysts (military and otherwise) trying to assess what are the possible outcomes (futurecast) of the Ukraine-Russia war. Really, maybe we should listen to what the economists and bankers think will happen. The current conflict is global and economic. Let's listen to the people who have been warring in that domain as their professional business.



The West is losing the information war with Russia – and hasn't even noticed

<https://news.yahoo.com/why-west-losing-information-war-173628620.html>

It has often been said that geography is different in cyberspace. It is evident from the different efforts and results in different parts of the world during the Ukraine-Russia war that geography is different in the public information domain, too. Makes sense - culture, history, access to media, governance, interests, vary from country to county and within countries, and what gets communicated or attempted to be communicated is received in various ways. The obvious conclusion of this is that states need to have different expertise (regional public information officers?), and efforts to understand and to inform (dare I write 'influence?'), different parts of the world.



Feds say new fighter jet selection is coming, but exact timing still unclear

<https://globalnews.ca/news/8702600/canada-fighter-jets-selection-committee/>



Two coast guard Arctic ships to cost \$1.5 billion, double the price of same vessels for navy

<https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/two-coast-guard-arctic-ships-to-cost-1-5-billion-double-the-price-of-same-vessels-for-navy>



And what will Irving Shipyards build if there is a gap between the last of the Canadian Coast Guard Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship project vessels and the first of the Canadian Surface Combatant project frigates?

Russians in retreat, blighted by frostbite and casualties, as Ukrainian troops regain key territory

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/03/22/russians-retreat-ukrainian-troops-regain-key-territory/>



Drone countermeasures are going to have to be much more an integral part of ground force operations.

Russia's invasion has Ottawa looking to 'protect our Arctic sovereignty'

<https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/russias-invasion-has-ottawa-looking-to-protect-our-arctic-sovereignty>



Ukraine conflict presents a minefield for Anonymous and hackers

<https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220323-ukraine-conflict-presents-a-minefield-for-anonymous-and-hackers>



"Instead of taking the risk of carrying out offensive actions that could go wrong, Anonymous and other hackers 'could help find the best ways to secure Ukrainian computer networks against attacks by Russian hackers'"

There can be serious issues for calling for foreign volunteers during a conflict, whether the volunteers carry rifles or laptops.

Russian tanks are taking a beating. Do they still have a place on the modern battlefield?

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/22/russia-invasion-ukraine-debate-future-war-tank-armor-drone/>

"The consensus of military experts is that armor still has a vital place on the battlefield in enabling offensive operations."
"The caveat is that they need to be used in a well-led combined arms team."



Aside: Maybe tanks can be protected better against drones if they are all issued with carpets...
("Russians in retreat, blighted by frostbite and casualties, as Ukrainian troops regain key territory"
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/03/22/russians-retreat-ukrainian-troops-regain-key-erritory/> "The Russians have also been putting carpets on top of their vehicles in an attempt to disguise them from Ukrainian drones.")

The Wargame Before the War: Russia Attacks Ukraine

<https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-wargame-before-the-war-russia-attacks-ukraine/>

"One must be very careful when using a wargame for predictive purposes. But, on the other hand, no one involved in this wargame has been much surprised by anything unfolding on the ground. Almost all of it took place within the game or was discussed at length among the players. This is in contrast with nearly every expert and pundit on the airwaves, who are expressing astonishment at how this conflict is unfolding. If this wargame had been played at the Pentagon or the White House in the weeks leading up to the war, no strategist or policymaker would be shocked by any event so far seen in the war."



Where Should Ships Go When They Die?

<https://theyee.ca/News/2022/03/17/Where-Should-Ships-Go-When-They-Die/>

"In an email, Transport Canada said it is 'currently analyzing' ways to strengthen domestic legislation and regulations around ship breaking and is considering signing on to the Hong Kong Convention, which should come into force internationally within the next three to five years."



Shipbreaking is not a business to be undertaken casually. Canada (Transport Canada) needs to sign the "Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships" (<https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/corporate/international-affairs/partnerships-organizations/safe-recycling-ships-hong-kong.html>). It is prudent, environmentally and otherwise, for breaking to be done by companies with the trained and experienced personnel and with the right equipment.

And there are penalties: see: "Appeal Court confirms prison sentence for Norwegian ship owner" (<https://mailchi.mp/shipbreakingplatform/press-release-appeal-court-confirms-prison-sentence-for-norwegian-ship-owner-15259863>).

Related podcast: <https://omny.fm/shows/ched-mid-morning/where-should-ships-go-when-they-die>

West curbs Russia's access to weather data that some fear could aid attack planning in Ukraine

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-receives-western-weather-data-that-some-fear-could-aide-attack-planning-2022-03-22/>

"... there was a risk the meteorological data that EUMETSAT (the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites) had provided (to Russia) could be used for military purposes, including to plan chemical and biological attacks, which are prohibited under international law."

Interesting to read of 'information sanctions.'



Subs, jets, sleeping bags with functioning zippers: Where Canada could put \$16B in additional defence spending

<https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/subs-jets-sleeping-bags-with-functioning-zippers-where-canada-could-put-16b-in-additional-defence-spending>

Before spending any additional defence funding, fix the system to spend defence funding.

And before that, update Canada's security and foreign policies so any spending is well spent.



Canadian military reports sagging recruitment as NATO ramps up deployment in eastern Europe

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-armed-forces-staff-shortfall-1.6395131>

No use buying additional equipment if it can't be crewed. Fix the military's culture and recruitment before going on a buying binge.



Canadian firm Draganfly's drones tapped for Ukraine search-and-rescue, medical missions

<https://financialpost.com/news/canadian-firm-draganflys-drones-tapped-for-ukraine-search-and-rescue-medical-missions>

"A Canadian drone manufacturer's aircraft will soon be searching for wounded civilians and ferrying medical supplies in hard-hit areas of Ukraine after receiving an order from a humanitarian group."

Hopefully the humanitarian workers will de-conflict airspace management with military flights (hmm, there're some doctrine and practices to work out). Thought whether the Russians pay attention humanitarian flights is another question...



Ukraine Just Captured Part Of One Of Russia's Most Capable Electronic Warfare Systems

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44879/ukraine-just-captured-part-of-one-of-russias-most-capable-electronic-warfare-systems>

Hopefully the West will spirit this quickly out of Ukraine for analysis.



Canada's Arctic Security Moves to Forefront After Russian Invasion of Ukraine

<https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/03/23/canada-arctic-security-forefront/>

"Going forward, he expects to see 'two Arctics:' One where Russia collaborates with China to tap undersea energy and mineral resources and develop the Northern Sea Route for shipping, 'and the seven others wanting nothing to do with Russia and cooperating amongst themselves.'"



MV Asterix supply ship to support NATO operations in northern Europe

<https://www.saltwire.com/atlantic-canada/news/mv-asterix-supply-ship-to-support-nato-operations-in-northern-europe-100710167/>

"The supply ship supports the Royal Canadian Navy 'and allied navies around the world, in any theatre of operations,' said (Federal Fleet Services). "



Only one Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) frigate where ASTERIX is deploying, so ASTERIX is likely to provide support to many allied ships, too. That's what replenishment oilers (AOR) can do. They are a significant part in making a navy 'blue water,' that is, capable of extended operations in open ocean at a far distance from home ports.

It will be some time yet before the RCN gets its first AOR from the Joint Support Ship project. The deployment of ASTERIX highlights the utility of the ship type - Canada should aim to procure (by new build or conversion) at least three AOR.

See: "Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment" <https://rusi-ns.ca/auxiliary-oiler-replenishment/>

Inuit voices to be heard at IMO on critical shipping issues

In February, RUSI(NS) posted on social media about Inuit engagement in the operation of Arctic shipping ("Inuit voices to be heard at IMO on critical shipping issues")

<https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/op-ed-inuit-voices-to-be-heard-at-imo-on-critical-shipping-issues/#.Yf01Sc3nduI.twitter>) and about CCG Arctic Region's



excellent efforts with Northern peoples as briefed to RUSI(NS) by Assistant Commissioner O'Rourke ("Canadian Coast Guard Arctic Region – Implementation and Successes" (https://rusi-ns.ca/ccg_arctic_region/)). Further to the RUSI(NS) February posting, the following has been learned:

Regarding the Indigenous Deckhand Recruitment (<https://emploisfp-psjobs.cfp-psc.gc.ca/psrs-srfp/applicant/page1800?poster=1701681>), the posting specifies these positions will be out of Hay River, NT, and employed by Canadian Coast Guard (CCG). As a part of Fisheries and Oceans Canada and CCG's work supporting reconciliation, the process prioritizes diversity and inclusion by hiring more Inuit, First Nations and Métis individuals into CCG's workforce.

The CCG Auxiliary is an independent, non-profit organization dedicated to search and rescue and safe boating activities. The CCG provides funding through contribution agreements to Auxiliary units, performs oversight of training and certification, and provides support to CCG Auxiliary units through programs like the Indigenous Community Boat Volunteer Pilot Program. However, the CCG Auxiliary is not directly a part of CCG so the afore-mentioned hiring process does not apply to Auxiliary units.

Other Sources:

#Arctic

Arctic Yearbook 2021 Defining and Mapping the Arctic: Sovereignties, Policies, and Perceptions
<https://arcticyearbook.com/>

including: FONOP in Vain: The Legal Logics of a U.S. Navy FONOP in the Canadian or Russian Arctic

https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2021/Scholarly-Papers/2_AY2021_Overfield.pdf

On our Forum: A new course for the Arctic after Russian invasion of Ukraine

<https://maritimemag.com/en/on-our-forum-a-new-course-for-the-arctic-after-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/>

#China

Inside China's National Defense Mobilization Reform: Capacity Surveys, Mobilization Resources, and "New-Type" Militias

<https://www.recordedfuture.com/inside-chinas-national-defense-mobilization-reform/>

#defence policy

I'm not holding my breath defence spending will increase

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/andrew-richter-im-not-holding-my-breath-defence-spending-will-increase>

Top military leader calls for 'accelerated' defence investments in response to Russian aggression

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wayne-eyre-house-procurement-1.6390525>

To truly support our allies, Canada needs a C.D. Howe moment

<https://www.colinrobertson.ca/?p=2815>

After decades of timidity, can Canada's allies still take us seriously?

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-after-decades-of-timidity-can-canadas-allies-still-take-us-seriously/>

#drones

Navy Examines UAS Remote Identification Platform

<https://www.afcea.org/content/navy-examines-uas-remote-identification-platform>

"To understand and counter unmanned system activity, the service is examining solutions to remotely identify autonomous aerial vehicles."

Navy-led Task Force Trials Drones in Gulf

<https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2022/march/17/220317-sail-drones-gulf>

#intelligence

Commercial remote sensing firms seek government help to plan for, respond to sat attacks

note 'hybrid architecture': <https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2022/03/commercial-remote-sensing-firms-seek-government-help-to-plan-for-respond-to-sat-attacks/>

(see: NRO Taps AI For Future 'Hybrid Architecture')

<https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/nro-taps-ai-for-future-hybrid-architecture/>

#law

What counts as a war crime and why they're so hard to prosecute

<https://news.yahoo.com/counts-war-crime-why-theyre-223016367.html>

#NATO

Congress Still Needs to Protect America's NATO Membership

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/congress-still-needs-protect-americas-nato-membership/363354/>

Interesting centralizing of authority on the US.

#NORAD

NORAD to conduct arctic air defence operation

<https://www.norad.mil/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Article/2936096/norad-to-conduct-arctic-air-defence-operation/>

War shows need to bolster our air defences: NORAD official

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-shows-need-to-bolster-north-american/>

#professional military education

Better Curricula, Better Strategic Outcomes: Irregular Warfare, Great Power Competition, and Professional Military Education

<https://mwi.usma.edu/better-curricula-better-strategic-outcomes-irregular-warfare-great-power-competition-and-professional-military-education/>

#Royal Canadian Navy

RCN Studies Enrollment and Examine Sailor Workload

<https://mapleleafnavy.com/rcn-studies-enrollment-and-examine-sailor-workload/>

#Ukraine-Russia War

Economic Impact on Canada of the War in Ukraine

<https://www.conferenceboard.ca/insights/featured/canadian-economics/economic-impact-on-canada-of-the-war-in-ukraine>

#information operations

Russian War Report: Hacked news program and deepfake video spread false Zelenskyy claims

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-hacked-news-program-and-deepfake-video-spread-false-zelenskyy-claims/>

Only NATO Can Save Putin

<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/putin-war-nato-intervention/627092/>

Lessons from the Ukraine War (1-3)

<https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2022/03/lessons-from-ukraine-war-1-3.html>

What Will the Battle of Kyiv Look Like?

<https://mwi.usma.edu/what-will-the-battle-of-kyiv-look-like/>

The Plot to Destroy Ukraine

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/plot-destroy-ukraine>

The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/mysterious-case-missing-russian-air-force>

Experts break down why Ukraine is so dangerous for Russian pilots

<https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/russian-aircraft-shoot-down-ukraine/>

Ukraine Found Dart-Like Mystery Warheads. They're Russia's New Weapon.

<https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-found-dart-like-mystery-warheads-theyre-russias-new-weapon-2022-3>

Russian Troops Have 'Deliberately Punched Holes' in Their Own Gas Tanks: US Official

<https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-troops-have-punched-holes-their-own-gas-tanks-2022-3>
Maybe the Russians should armour their own gas tanks against their own troops...

Europe After the Ukraine War

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/europe-after-ukraine-war>

Intel Sharing Between U.S. and Ukraine 'Revolutionary' Says DIA Director

<https://news.usni.org/2022/03/18/intel-sharing-between-u-s-and-ukraine-revolutionary-says-dia-director>

How the Telegram app became a war-messaging service for Ukraine's official channels after the Russia invasion

<https://inews.co.uk/news/how-telegram-app-became-war-messaging-service-ukraine-military-1529546>

Minorities in the Russian Army

interesting thread: <https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1506479259866394625>

threadreader: <https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1506479259866394625.html>

How Ukraine's Outgunned Air Force Is Fighting Back Against Russian Jets

<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/22/world/europe/ukraine-air-force-russia.html>

Military briefing: the make-or-break fight for the Donbas

<https://www.ft.com/content/384d981b-d3da-4fca-b6ab-21b1136bd2ab>

Concerns Grow That Belarusian Forces Are About To Join Russia's War In Ukraine

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44872/concerns-grow-that-belarusian-forces-are-about-to-join-russias-war-in-ukraine>

Russia Has Already Lost

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44592/russia-has-already-lost>

Secretive American Stocks Of Soviet Air Defense Systems Are Headed To Ukraine: Report

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44859/secretive-american-stocks-of-soviet-air-defense-systems-are-headed-to-ukraine-report>

Russian Attack Helicopters Are Now Wildly Lobbing Rockets Over Ukraine

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44803/russian-attack-helicopters-are-now-wildly-lobbing-rockets-over-ukraine>

"While this tactic is likely forced upon Russian helicopters by Ukrainian air defenses, the military value of it is questionable, to say the least."

#warfare

The San Juan Island Boundary Dispute, 1859: Conditions for Peace and Dominance in a Very Gray Zone

<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/san-juan-island-boundary-dispute-1859-conditions-peace-and-dominance-very-gray-zone>

Enough of us have sailed these waters in Piffles and other vessels that the context of the lessons resonate for us.

(Don't Fear) Irregular Warfare: Getting IW Right in the Upcoming National Defense Strategy

<https://mwi.usma.edu/dont-fear-irregular-warfare-getting-iw-right-in-the-upcoming-national-defense-strategy/>

Other:

RUSI(NS) colleague David Swan was interviewed by CHQR 770 re: **CyberWarfare & Russia vs Ukraine**. The interview starts about 3:08: <https://globalnews.ca/pages/on-demand-newstalk770-calgary/>. Set the date for March 21 (2022) and the time for 3:00 PM. You get to hear Russell Skeet doing the 3 PM news and then Dave is the opening guest on 'The Drive' hosted by Ted Henley. Enjoy.

Join Our Community

<https://letstalkveterans.ca/join-our-community>

"Join the **Veterans Affairs Canada** community by clicking on stay informed. Let's Talk Veterans allows more people to have their say on issues related to Veterans and their families. This consultation platform allows the Veteran community and Canadians to provide VAC with direct feedback that helps us improve our programs and services."

War in Ukraine: free to read | **Financial Times**

<https://www.ft.com/content/77ab8dcf-cb02-4e57-aff0-85c8a84f5a1f>

The challenge is that there is too much to read...

Drones

As drones, UAS, etc., is a topic of interest to RUSI(NS).

APStylebook on Twitter: "The term autonomous vehicles describes those that can drive for all or part of a trip on public roads without the need for a human to monitor the road and surroundings. Also can be called self-driving. The term driverless should not be used unless there is no human backup driver." /

Twitter <https://twitter.com/APStylebook/status/1506305460571418633>

Canadian Army Journal

<http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/canadian-army-journal/index.page>

contents:

THREATS THROUGH, TO, AND IN THE ARCTIC: NORTH AMERICAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY THROUGH A CANADIAN LENS

P. Whitney Lackenbauer

3RD SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE: A PARATROOP/MARINE INFANTRY ARCTIC CONTINGENCY FORCE FOR CANADA?

Major (Ret'd) Les Mader, MMM, CD, RCA

THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN MISSILE DEFENCE

Nancy Teeple, Ph.D.

WHERE THE HELL ARE THE DRONES? WHY EVERY GUNNER SHOULD BE A REMOTE PILOT

Captain Conway Hui, CD, P.Eng.

THE CASE FOR RENEWAL: THE NORTH WARNING SYSTEM AND CANADA

Nicole Covey, Ph.D.

NO. 1 FIELD AMBULANCE AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939–45

Capt(N) J. A. (Jeff) Biddiscombe, MMM, CD

LEVERAGING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR CANADA'S ARMY: CURRENT POSSIBILITIES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

Major Geoffrey Priems and Peter Gizewski

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Lieutenant-General Wayne Eyre

THE LEOPARD TANK REPLACEMENT PROJECT: DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AGAINST THE ODDS

Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Perry Wells

OPINION: NOTES ON BEING AN OPERATIONS OFFICER

Major Jeff Caselton

War in Ukraine: Understanding Russia's Military Strategy

Summary

On 16 March, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) UK hosted a virtual panel discussion to examine what the war in Ukraine reveals about Russia's military strategy, including its political,

economic, and diplomatic considerations. Moderated by Dr Jonathan Eyal, Associate Director of Strategic Research Partnerships at RUSI, the event featured Emily Ferris, RUSI Research Fellow in International Security Studies; Dr Richard Connolly, Director of the RUSI Eastern Advisory Group; and D. Andrew Monaghan, RUSI Senior Associate Fellow and George F Kennan Fellow at the Wilson Center. The panellists considered the possible implications of the conflict on Russia's military capabilities, industry, economy, and political stability, while agreeing that a protracted conflict would likely require the wider mobilization of the Russian state and society.

Full details of the event and a recording can be found at <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/war-ukraine-understanding-russias-military-strategy>.

Highlights / Key Issues

Russian warfighting in theory and practice: Dr Monaghan explained that from a theoretical perspective, Russia sees war as a “strategic activity” guided by political aims incorporating diplomatic, economic, and military measures to achieve the permanent resolution of a ‘policy clash.’ War is classified by Russia according to four levels: armed conflict of a ‘limited’ scale; local war between two states pursuing *limited* political-military objectives; regional war involving several states pursuing *important* military-political objectives; and large-scale war between coalitions of states or major states in multiple regions pursuing *radical* military-political objectives. In practice, Dr Monaghan noted that Russia has traditionally been challenged by poor grand strategy, including a lack of coherence between its political strategists and military planners, command and control problems, and a disconnect between how the Russian military is designed and the ‘tools that it is provided in wartime.

Politics by other means: Turning to the war in Ukraine, Ms Ferris warned that Moscow had moved to a strategy of destroying territories rather than holding them to achieve political victory by compelling Kyiv to surrender. Dr Monaghan said that the world is witnessing the ‘rebirth’ of Russian grand strategy in Ukraine, arguing that the war was not caused by a Western failure to deter Russia but rather by a lack of Western ‘political investment,’ in contrast to the Kremlin’s prioritization of Ukraine as a key foreign policy issue. He also recalled that Russia had expressed concerns about the international use of force by the United States for many years, alluding to Russian demands for ‘security guarantees,’ and noted that Moscow had gone to war several times under Putin’s leadership to secure its own strategic interests.

Preparing the war chest: Dr Connolly said that Russia had prepared for economic warfare since 2014 as part of its planning for a ‘geopolitical conflict’ with the West, adding that it has one of the most ‘self-reliant’ defence sectors in the world. In addition, sanctions have only reduced Russian exports ‘marginally’ as the country’s economy is ‘dominated’ by the sale of oil and gas to international markets, which has continued with minimal interruption. He predicted that the Kremlin would be able to continue to pay bills denominated in roubles due to its ‘healthy’ reserves of the currency, but would need to increase military spending and pursue greater involvement in the economy in the event of a prolonged conflict. Moreover, a ‘long term rupture’ in relations with the West would inevitably accelerate Russia’s economic relationship with China and push them closer together.

All roads lead to Beijing: Ms Ferris underscored that while Russia and China have often flouted their economic ties, Beijing has historically been ‘unwilling’ to invest in Russian infrastructure and has avoided aligning ‘too closely’ with Russia on Ukraine, while Putin is keen to prevent Russia from becoming a ‘junior export partner’ for China. From a logistical perspective, she noted that Russia lacks the infrastructure to support a sudden increase in exports to Asia to offset sanctions, with ‘massive’ investments required to build new transport networks in its eastern regions. Dr Connolly agreed that

China has been 'reluctant' to invest in Russia, while Russia has eschewed foreign investment in its strategic sectors. However, he suggested that China could fill some 'gaps' in the Russian market, while Russia would continue to sell energy and capital goods to China and other Asian partners.

A family affair: On Belarus, Ms Ferris said that although the Kremlin sees its smaller neighbour as part of a 'Slavic brotherhood,' Alexander Lukashenko had long resisted Putin's efforts to formalize the Union State between the two countries until widespread anti-regime protests in 2020 pushed Minsk firmly into Russia's orbit. She argued that this convergence had effectively paved the way for Russia to use Belarus as a 'springboard' to invade Ukraine from the north, with Belarus permitting the use of its railways to facilitate the transportation of Russian personnel and equipment. Ms Ferris contended that the Belarusian military is not 'essential' to the Russian war effort and she speculated that Lukashenko's troops could even prove to be 'disloyal' to the regime if they are deployed to Ukraine, which may generate further instability in Belarus.

Sanctions as a double-edged sword: Dr Connolly suggested that while some people see sanctions as a path to regime change in Russia, most Western politicians consider them to be the main avenue for imposing costs on Russia while avoiding a direct military conflict. He reasoned that in the event of an 'early conclusion' to the war in Ukraine, some 'marginal' sanctions would likely need to be lifted in order to give the Kremlin an incentive to 'behave' and to ensure that sanctions remain a credible tool in the future. However, Ms Ferris cautioned that sanctions would affect 'ordinary' Russians and the 'most powerful' people would find ways around them, although the repression of civil society and media would make it 'extremely difficult' to assess their impact on public opinion and support for Putin within Russia.

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

China

China is a wild card. Its actions will have a profound effect on the future not only of the Ukraine-Russia war but on the future of many aspects of world affairs. At the start of the Olympics, Xi and Putin met and drafted an agreement that would see the two countries have an unlimited partnership in the future especially in dealing with the current world order. On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. It is not absolutely certain that Xi was fully informed of Russia's planned action against Ukraine at that time. What is certain is that China did not absolutely and whole-heartedly support Russia's actions. It abstained at the UN Security Council emergency meeting on the Ukraine-Russia war and again at the General Assembly vote. Although China has publicly supported the idea that the real culprit was NATO expansion, it has privately supported the sanctions levied against Russia. It does get 13% of its oil and gas from Russia through the 'Power of Siberia' pipeline which opened in 2021 - a second pipeline is still under construction due to open at this time in 2025. This should once it opens enable China to increase its purchase of Russian oil and gas to around 25%. It is Russia's oil and gas sector that provides around half of its government budget, absolutely essential for ongoing operation of the country. China has already set in place a system whereby Russia and China can do payments with each other's' currency thus eliminating at least some of the issue of Russia no longer being part of the US SWIFT system of inter-bank communications allowing for large currency payments and transfers.

China has officially blamed the West for the need for an 'special operation' as the Russian's call the invasion. China has refused to use the words war and invasion. At least publicly China supports Russia, but why? One aspect is that Xi is up for support for an unprecedented third term as President. Second, Putin and Xi are authoritarian leaders and have generally supported each other. Third, the

partnership agreement is new; if China refused to support Russia there are major implications for any country making any agreement with China. Xi needs to have this be successful for he is not without detractors within the Communist Chinese Party (CCP). Keep in mind that China's current economy is the worst in decades with many questioning the validity of almost all their financial figures. China has also failed in controlling the Covid 19 virus with large outbreaks in key and the most productive areas of the country.

China, however, is not without serious concerns. Russia is not winning and appears to be doing poorly despite the large size of its military and its advanced technical advantage. Russia may need to be 'rescued' in some fashion by China in a greater way than anticipated, such as replacement vehicles, weapon manufacturing, ammunition, food, cyber-security support (offensive and defensive), loans, transport and moral support. If China is seen to be too close and supportive of Russia, the West will likely introduce major sanctions on China's already delicately balanced economy. The Chinese leadership want to keep the larger Western markets open as they are much larger and stronger than Russia's comparatively small economy, yet it has to at least try to assist Russia where and when it can. It is a narrow edge to be balancing on at present.

The bottom line is that China has a great deal to lose either way. Its action or inaction in the coming days will be telling.

Belarus

Belarus is another wild card in the Ukraine-Russia war. The war is hated by the general public. Last week the Deputy Minister of Defence resigned when it became increasingly clear that the war was not supported by the armed forces leadership as well as rank and file. It is also very clear that the general population is still seething at Lukashenko's actions post-election where he retained the Presidency despite an acceptance that Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya was the actual winner. Opposition leadership have created a cabinet in exile and have been increasingly active again on social media and have asked soldiers and workers not to support the Russian aggression. It has had an effect with the rail union members actively sabotaging and re-directing Russian trains away from the border. The Belarussian public have also tended to treat the Russian soldiers as occupiers and disrupting of other forms of ground traffic including between airports. The Belarussian Army has been somewhat re-organized and is said to be nearing the Ukraine border, but it is also in poor shape and said to be less than happy about the prospect of supporting the Russian invasion. The bottom line for Belarus is that there is very little enthusiasm to support the Russians or even the current Lukashenko regime. A recent commercial for the opposition showed 'President' Tsikhanouskaya accepting membership in the European Union after a free and fair election and then asking the Belarus citizens to dream of that day...and then stating it can be so. The Lukashenko regime may owe a debt to Putin's regime, but will it also cost the regime its existence? One hopes President Tsikhanouskaya will soon be in her rightful place and that Mr Lukashenko is also in a perfectly good jail cell awaiting his much-deserved trial.

Russia

If one still can find video-logs (VLOGs) from Russia, one can see that sanctions are biting into daily life of ordinary citizens. Line ups similar to the late 80s are now common in Russia. Russians have been one of the top group of tourists in the world. Russians are used to travel and relished the opportunity to explore the world. One can get a sense of mourning in those deeply unhappy with the turn of events in Russia. The common Russian citizen is affected but the elites are hurting now, too. One can also occasionally find commentary from certain oligarchs that state they really are not close to Putin...really. One can even find some who are stating they got rid of those mansions before the sanctions. The bottom line is this: the sanctions which are the most powerful ever used are having an

effect in Russia. As it was pointed out last week, the Putin regime will try to find ways to skirt the sanctions. One method is to use criminal elements to help launder money at a cost. Syria has offered to help Russia by showing some of the ways it has found to prosper despite the sanctions on the regime and its members. Still, it is a sad come down that Russia is now depending on criminals and murderous regimes as its key allies in hopes of keeping its economy somewhat intact.

The Russian Army, Airborne Forces, FSB, Special Forces, Naval Forces and Air Forces invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Some of the early reporting suggested that the Russians expected to be greeted as liberators. Some videos show that now dead Russian soldiers actually brought dress uniforms for the victory parade. The offensive followed on four separate and unsupported axes, each requiring a separate logistics tail. Apparently, the idea was to seize those cities which were also rail hubs to allow the offensive to continue effectively using trucks only for 60 to 90 kms maximum. There were a number of issues to contend with that for some reason were not anticipated. First, the rail hubs had to be seized and, well, the Ukrainians wrecked this part of the planning by fighting tooth and nail so only one hub, Kherson was taken. This meant greater reliance on trucks that simply did not exist in the Army inventory. The other big issue is that it is spring and large numbers of heavy vehicles going over marginal roads tear them up rather quickly, and temporary roads through fields quickly turned into quagmires. Communications have been a mess as Russian combat radio systems have been unable to deal with the heavy traffic and use, not to mention the breakdown of radios and other communication systems. Lastly, although many maps show solid red around the countryside, the Russian Army does not have the capacity to provide the necessary security for logistics convoys as well as fight. The Ukrainians were using light infantry effectively, infantry who were well trained, innovative and equipped with some of the most modern man packable anti-armour and anti-air defence systems available in the world. Where the Russians are able to mass, they do have very real control, but where they don't have the necessary mass, they rapidly become targets.

Speaking of losses, a Russian government-sponsored tabloid may have accidentally released actual casualty figures briefly before they were taken down. These figures showed that just shy of 10k have been killed with nearly 17k wounded or missing, or basically between 1 out of 7 Russian soldiers originally deployed have become casualties; more than the US suffered in Afghanistan and Iraq in 20 years of war. More importantly, Ukraine has been able to target Russian senior leadership including five General-Majors and one General-Lieutenant. Confirmed killed this week was also the deputy fleet commander of the Black Sea fleet at Mariupol. Apparently, more than twenty other senior leaders of the LCol and Col level have also been killed to date. Senior leadership has proven vulnerable. Equipment casualties have been heavy as well, but the Russians have huge numbers of tanks and vehicles to replace current losses, although soft skinned vehicles are in short supply. What has also become apparent, the maintenance has been lacking on virtually all vehicle fleets and they were prone to breakdowns. It is likely this trend will continue. As a result of these losses Russian authorities have chosen to increase the amount of artillery, rockets, missiles, aircraft bombs, and naval fire support against Ukrainian targets, which are increasingly civilian infrastructure to compensate for their inability to gain traction. Time will tell whether this ultimately works in a country that feels betrayed and has now risen in anger at the Russian attack.

Russia has also cracked down on its potential opposition. Most notably, Alexei Navalny was tried on fraud charges that are generally felt to be bogus. He was charged from stealing funds from his own organization. He was sentenced to a further nine years on top of the two and half years he had previously been sentenced to before. He is in a penal colony about 100 kms to the east of Moscow. The regime has also charged reporters who have tried to tell the truth such as Alexander Nevzarov charged with spreading false information when he reported on the bombing of the maternity hospital in Mariupol which was well documented. Truth will not get in the way of the regime message. The other crackdown has been on organizations that do investigations. One is Memorial, an organization

documenting the excesses of the Stalin regime. Several weeks ago it was declared an illegal organization, and has now been forced to close its doors with many members leaving the country. The regime has closed virtually all outlets including some that were pro-regime in order to ensure the 'fake news' never saw light of day. There are still some brave outlets using VPN that are still functioning carefully, trying to bring aspects of current Russian life and the real feelings of Russian citizens. One should not forget that most young people are firmly anti-war and are embarrassed by the actions of their government. Many seem to be voting with their feet and leaving Russia, and Russia will be the poorer for their loss.

Ukraine has been more successfully able to counter virtually all Russian disinformation and propaganda activities. Russian efforts by comparison have been slow and lacklustre, to date relying more on older media styles. Ukraine has maximised its efforts on all media types with outstanding success. Ukraine was quickly able to portray itself as the plucky underdog even before the start of the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022. It seems that the younger and more popular Ukrainian leadership was able to gain world attention and support, where Russia's efforts seem to ring untrue. The best proof of this was the vote in the UN General Assembly where 141 voted to support Ukraine and censure Russia. 35 abstained; only five countries supported Russia including Russia itself. These countries were Russia, Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea and Syria. Russia, on the other hand, seems to have doubled down by repeating the lies often and loudly and also ensuring no reliable reports can be gathered in areas where they control the ground and access. The question is why has this occurred? Ukraine has been actively trying to gain international support and therefore has chosen to be relatively speaking open and transparent in its use of the information environment. Russia was initially not concerned about international support and was mainly interested in ensuring support within Russia through its use of its monopoly on traditional media. This message resonated with Putin's base supporters but fell on deaf ears with regard to younger Russians who get most of their information on social media. Recently, Putin had even cracked down on the last of the independent media but to no avail, as the younger generation has not accepted the Putin story regarding the invasion. The bottom line is that both approaches have been at least somewhat successful in reaching the target audience. It must be admitted that Ukraine has generally won this part of the war according to meaningful results..

In regard to Russian losses, the Russian authorities have chosen not to be transparent, releasing some figures early in March which were never revised or updated. This was apparent to the international community, thus once again Russia lost in the international information arena but maintained the image of success at home. This type of move is continuing as it supports Putin's narrative and has the support of Putin's base of support.

Turkey has been a key player in some respects as it has provided Ukraine with the very successful Bayraktar drones used in both Azerbaijan-Armenia war and now in Ukraine, where the drones have been involved in highly publicized drone strikes on a variety of Russian targets. The drone is simple to build and operate. It is most notably slow, hard to see or detect but with a relatively long ability to linger over a target area. As part of Canada's military support to Ukraine, Canada has supplied a better targeting camera which vastly improves the ability of the operator to be able differentiate between friend or foe but also details such as the type of specific vehicle which is a great help. Turkey has also closed the Bosphorus to Russian ships, cutting off the Mediterranean squadron and preventing reinforcement of the Black Sea Fleet. There are unconfirmed reports that the US and Turkey are negotiating over whether Turkey will give up its two sets of S-400 air defence missiles in favour of getting the F-35 in its place. This particular issue is ongoing.

Ukraine continues to surprise the world with its tenacity. This week saw the first offensive action pushing Russian formations back nearly 70 kms from Kyiv. There are also suggestions that one city and over thirty towns and villages have been retaken so things are changing. There is a suggestion that

a group of Russian units will in fact be the ones encircled shortly, one hopes. This group may have come out of Belarus; considering how Belarussians are reacting this group may lose all its logistic support. It is early days of yet, but a major battlefield loss could tip the issue.

'Cause we need a chuckle

Oryx @oryxspioenkop 24 Mar tweeted: Can't park there mate

Elena Wicker @ElenaWicker 24 Mar retweeted: Is this combined arms maneuver in a maritime-dominated environment?



2022 GLYN BERRY LECTURE

On January 15, 2006, senior Canadian diplomat Glyn R. Berry was tragically killed in a terrorist attack in Afghanistan. At that time, he was the Political Director of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar. Mr. Berry was a principled humanitarian, passionately devoted to improving conditions for ordinary people in desperate circumstances. He graduated with a PhD (Political Science) from Dalhousie University in 1981.



Dr. Andy Knight

From Coutts to Kyiv: Shifts in World Order

W. Andy Knight is a Distinguished Professor of International Relations at the University of Alberta and former Director of the Institute of International Relations (IIR), the University of the West Indies (UWI), Trinidad & Tobago. A Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada (FRSC), Professor Knight was named by Venture Magazine among Alberta's top 50 most influential people and, by the Black Business and Professional Association of Canada, as the Harry Jerome Trailblazer. He has been a member of the Board of Governors of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and is currently the 2021-22 Fulbright Distinguished Chair in International and Area Studies at Yale University.

March 31, 2022
1:00 – 2:30 pm
Kenneth Rowe
Management Building
RM: 3089

Professor Knight has written and edited several books on, among other themes, the United Nations, Global Politics, the Verification of Arms Embargoes, the Dignity of Difference, Remapping the Americas and the Responsibility to Protect. His ongoing research and publications address issues of global health governance, global health security, Children and war, Piracy in the Horn of Africa, Hegemony, Democracy and Good Governance, the vulnerabilities and resiliency of small island developing states (SIDS), Boko Haram and the Women who did not detonate, and Homegrown Terrorism.

