



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

Dispatches

15 Apr 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence and security issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Dispatches

Sanchez King has volunteered to edit the 8, 15 and 22 April editions of *Dispatches*. He will need material to include in the editions. RUSI(NS) members, really anyone receiving our bulletin, is asked to contribute content, preferably with value-added comments, that can be posted to our social media or directly into *Dispatches*. Please email them to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

28 April, Thursday - Royal Alberta United Services Institute presentation "Disinformation Campaigns as Force Multipliers in Armed Conflict" by BGen Gregory Mitchell, CA (Ret'd). 1900 Mountain time. Via Zoom. See: <https://rausi.ca/info-events/rmcsd/510-disinformation-campaigns-as-force-multipliers-in-armed-conflict>. To register: <https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZMlf-CppzkrGdVVG1VBohqUkzI6qxurOy7cj>.

Continuing the style of penetrating analysis that RAUSI enjoyed February 2022 in Dr Sean M Maloney's analysis of nuclear weapons in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, BGen Gregory B Mitchell (Ret'd) diagnoses misinformation campaigns and Russia's employment of them in its current dispute with Ukraine.

27 April, Wednesday – the RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers event on cyber resiliency has been deferred until later in 2022.

25 May, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Colonel (retired) John Boileau on “No. 2 Construction Battalion: A Short History & an Apology.” 1300-1500. Halifax Armouries. Note that it is understood the Government of Canada will issue an apology, summer 2022. This will be our first in-person event since we changed to virtual events because of the pandemic. Registration not required. Pre-event reading: No. 2 Construction Battalion: The Operational History
<http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol16/no3/page51-eng.asp>

22 June, Wednesday – **save the date**. RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker TBA.

Publications:

Except where otherwise indicated, publications are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Comments "What should an enlarged Canadian navy look like?" by Ken Hansen, 6 April 2022, <https://rusi-ns.ca/enlarged-canadian-navy/>

RUSI(NS) Presentation “Surveillance of Sea Surface Activities in Atlantic Canada” by Jan-Andrej Skopalik, 16 Mar 22, https://rusi-ns.ca/national_aerial_surveillance_program/

RUSI(NS) Information Note “RCN Ship Pennant Numbers,” 10 March 2022
https://rusi-ns.ca/pennant_numbers/

RUSI(NS) Presentation “RCAF Strategy: Air and Space in Formation” by Colonel Meghan Setter, 16 February 2022, <https://rusi-ns.ca/rcaf-strategy/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Ship-to-Shore Connector Barges,” 28 February 2022,
<https://rusi-ns.ca/ship-to-shore-connector/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Can We Stop a Rogue Vessel in the Arctic?" by Pierre Leblanc, 4 February 2022,
<https://rusi-ns.ca/rogue-vessel-arctic>

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association On Watch, 13 April edition
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Royal Alberta United Services Institute Dispatches, April 2022.
<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/115-april-dispatches>

United Services Institute of Nanaimo and North Island Newsletter Vol 30 No 04 - April 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 11, Issue 5, 4 April 2022.

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 16 March edition
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Company of Master Mariners of Canada Maritimes Division *Foghorn*, April 2022

Edmonton United Services Institute *President's Enews*, April 2022.

Military Institute of Windsor Communiqué, Volume XL, Number 4, April 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, March 2022
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/109-rausi-dispatches-march-2022>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, March 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver and Vancouver Artillery Association Members *News*, 1 March 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 1st Quarter 2022.

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 11, Issue 4, 28 March 2022

Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver Members News Mar 15, 2022

New: Veterans Affairs Canada *Veterans Benefit Guide 2022*
https://cdn.cyberimpact.com/clients/18057/public/05fa7c4d-c03c-48a0-3d00-932972a0cf27/files/VeteransBenefitsGuide2022-Eng_April.pdf
Or ask a member of our Veterans Affairs Committee, chaired by Dick Jamer, for a copy.

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* April 2022. [April 2022 - Salute! - Veterans Affairs Canada](#)

Tweeted by @RUSI NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Charlotte Duval-Lantoiné (she/her) @CharlotteDuLan 7 Apr tweeted: Want distraction from #Budget2022 but still want to read about policy? Man, do I have the paper for you — and the only numbers in there are dates!
Kristen Csenkey (she/her) @KCsenkey retweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: New & very thoughtful piece from @CharlotteDuLan @CAGlobalAffairs : "Reforming the Office of the Ombudsman: Establishing Meaningful Oversight of the Canadian Armed Forces" Read it here: https://cgai.ca/reforming_the_office_of_the_ombudsman_establishing_meaningful_oversight_of_the_canadian_arm_ed_forces

JMDavis @JessMarinDavis 7 Apr tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Our Financial Intelligence Unit @FINTRAC_Canada gets a budget increase (24%) for more staff to do more on #Crypto, and register those pesky crowdfunding and payment processing platforms (Read the thread: <https://twitter.com/JessMarinDavis/status/1512164477000683520>)



National Division RCMP @Nat_Div_RCMP 8 Apr tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police has opened a national investigation into allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity being committed as part of the Ukraine-Russia conflict. For more information, visit: <http://rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/ukraine>
 @JusticeCanadaEN @CanBorder @CitImmCanada
 (Canada’s investigation into allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine
<https://ukraine.rcmp.ca/responseForm?lang=en>)



Colin Dudeck @colin_dudeck 9 Apr tweeted: HMCS Victoria coming into Esquimalt Harbour on @Seaspan’s floating dock for a docking work period. Pretty sweet piece of engineering @RoyalCanNavy
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: Floating docks are important maintenance & repair assets for capable navies. How many floating docks does CAN 🇨🇦 have? Should be part of National Shipbuilding Strategy considerations. RUSI(NS) Info Note "Jetties, Piers and Wharfs" <https://rusi-ns.ca/jetties-piers-wharfs/>



Canadian Army Today @CdnArmyToday 11 Apr tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: In 2021, the @CanadianArmy appeared close to a replacement for the 9mm Browning Hi-Power semi-automatic pistol. A complaint to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal has caused the government to issue a new RFP. Writer Ken Pole explains why: <https://canadianarmytoday.com/tribunal-ruling-causes-pistol-reboot/>
 (Tribunal ruling causes pistol reboot)



CSE @cse_cst 13 Apr tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Since Russia’s brazen and unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine, CSE continues to observe numerous Russia-backed #disinformation campaigns online. Keep reading for observations pulled from our classified reporting on this issue.
Read the tweet thread: https://twitter.com/cse_cst/status/1514246874890395654

Drones

Rob Lee @RALee85 10 Apr tweeted (<https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1513326815892447232>): Video of Russian sappers employing a Uran-6 mine-clearing UGV in the Donbas. Notably, there has been no indication so far that Russia has used the armed Uran-9 UGV in this war. Later tweets claimed that the UGV is a “Stugna-P interception (detection?) vehicle,” old and slow. Still, interesting to see such wartime use.



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Seven lessons from Ukraine for Australia’s defence organisation

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/seven-lessons-from.../>

"The insight ... is that real military power—and an understood will to use it if required—is essential to deterrence."



Shipbuilding program: Cost overruns, delays for new navy fleet

<https://atlantic.ctvnews.ca/more-cost-overruns-delays...>

Canada's marine fleets, especially the Royal Canadian Navy, are suffering the consequences of decisions made decades ago by governments, supported, even if not knowingly so, by the Canadian public. Canada's failure to ensure a steady shipbuilding program resulted in the loss of people, in government and in industry, and their expertise and the building/procurement processes. If we as Canadians are unhappy with the current situation and apparent costs, and we are looking for someone to blame, look in the mirror.



The lesson: let's ensure a flow of shipbuilding orders that supports keeping our procurement staffs and ship designers and builders, and keeps our shipbuilding yards viable.

Getting Serious About SEAD: European Air Forces Must Learn from the Failure of the Russian Air Force over Ukraine

<https://rusi.org/.../getting-serious-about-sead-european...>

"If there is one clear lesson to take away from the air war over Ukraine, it is that if an air force cannot credibly find, suppress, fix and kill mobile, modern SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) operating as pop-up threats, it will not be able to gain air superiority over even moderately well-equipped state opponents."



The Tweet is Mightier than the Sword: Debunking Disinformation in Ukraine

<https://rusi.org/.../tweet-mightier-sword-debunking...>

"Information activities have their limitations – control of the narrative does not ensure control of physical geography."



"The war has demonstrated the powerful role that information activities can play in amplifying or attacking a force's will to fight; there is no doubt that the internet has been a force multiplier for Ukraine."

Strategic Foresight and the War in Ukraine

<https://rusi.org/.../strategic-foresight-and-war-ukraine>

Lesson for strategists and strategy students: "... a really good strategist considers all the options, including potential obstacles and blind spots, possible consequences and outcomes of actions and reactions – a process called strategic foresight."

And for those of you who enjoy concept terms (am thinking 'black swan' here): "In foresight terms, the war in Ukraine is known as a 'grey rhino' – a high-probability, high-impact development that took shape over a long period but was largely ignored."



The Intellectual Failures Behind Russia's Bungled Invasion

<https://rusi.org/.../intellectual-failures-behind-russias...>

"Some key questions from Russia's failures in Ukraine that future analysts and strategists will need to examine revolve around the depth of the intellectual failures in Russian military thought. First, their influence on the campaign plan will be critical to answering the question of whether its failure was primarily the result of faltering political leadership or wider institutional failings. Moreover, to the extent that Russian thinking about penetration at depth and non-linear warfare has been responsible for the current debacle, this may provide salutary lessons regarding non-Russian concepts of future warfare that are based on similar (though not identical) logic."



Feds pledge to add more than \$8-billion for defence, announce review of defence policy in new budget

<https://www.hilltimes.com/.../feds-pledge-to-add.../354906>

"The Liberal government is also announcing a review of its defence plan. The budget document notes that recent events require the government to reassess Canada's role, priorities, and needs in the face of a changing world.' The review will look at the 'size and capabilities' of the Armed Forces, as well as its 'roles and responsibilities' and ensuring that it has the resources to protect Canadians and contribute to operations globally. The budget notes that the review will look at what the Canadian military needs to 'fulfill their missions' in a world that has 'fundamentally changed in the face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.'"



Will this new review involve public consultation like that leading to the Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy of 2017? Hopefully there will be a public affairs effort to educate the general public as to the Canadian Armed Forces size and capabilities, roles and responsibilities, and missions to be fulfilled.

RUSI(NS) approached its submission to the SSE public consultations as three questions:

1. What do Canadians want their country to be able to do in the world?
2. What do Canadians want their Forces to be able to do in support of answer 1?
3. How should the Forces be structured to be able to support answer 2 (answer 3 should be answered by the admirals and generals, albeit with government and public engagement).

The new review should start with some foreign and security policies deliberations and discussions.

Politics delayed F-35 choice by over a decade, leaving Canada worse off: Richard Shimooka in the National Post

<https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/politics-delayed-f-35-choice.../>

"While many lessons can be gleaned from this series of events, perhaps the most important is how the deep expertise was ignored for superficial political considerations."



Condemning Russian War Crimes in Ukraine in Real Time Can Save Lives

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/.../condemning...>

"... it is important to focus on the immediate impact of public condemnations and documentation."

Crowd-sourcing evidence is a great approach. Will be a challenge for legal authorities, so much to sift through. Hmm, maybe crowd-sourcing evidence review could help, too. Legal version of what public OSINTers (open source intelligence) do. OSLEGINT (open-source legal intelligence)? Whatever, society is going to have to figure out how to deal with it.



Could social media hold evidence of alleged Russian war crimes?

<https://www.cbc.ca/.../social-media-war-crimes...>

"... platforms need to recognize their responsibility as 'social evidence lockers' and protect that data."

Platforms are used to legal proceedings. Interesting to get platforms involved in proceedings as important as war crimes.



As Ukraine Pummels Russians With Javelin Missiles, Can Production Keep Pace With Demand?

<https://www.thedrive.com/.../as-ukraine-pummels-russians...>

The strength of a state's military isn't simply in the number of troops, tanks, etc. True strength includes the state capabilities to maintain (and repair) equipment, and to sustain the forces.



That includes the industries to provide ammunition. Not wise to outsource those. Even allies may not be able to provide when consumption looks to run down stocks.

Logistics!

A Neutral Ukraine Is a Dangerous Idea

<https://www.theatlantic.com/.../ukraine.../629473/>

The author of the article "When (Bad) Strategy Drives Resources" (<https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/.../when-bad-strategy...>) makes the point that a better strategy is to deny (implicitly, deny early) rather than to punish. A punish strategy is vulnerable to a chip-away strategy. Russia has little to lose by chipping away at Ukraine. The atrocities will take their toll and only the West's full scale engagement has any hope of success. Putin will ignore any half measures or brokered negotiations and will not stop until he gets what he wants.



When (Bad) Strategy Drives Resources

<https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/.../when-bad-strategy...>

Putting aside any debate over the relationship between strategy and budget (a very American thing), this article is a good example of what a public strategy analysis should read like.



Crowley to Operate Ice-Class Tanker for Military Sealift Command

<https://seapowermagazine.org/crowley-to-operate-ice.../>

"Enhancements include adding at-sea refueling capabilities for the military."

It would be useful if Canada had the shipbuilding and supporting regulation/financial support that civil tankers, especially those that are capable of operating up north, had the capability of refueling government ships. When faced with long distances and lacking logistics support infrastructure in the operating area (thinking Arctic), a navy can be well served by having civil tankers enhanced to include replenishment-at-sea (RAS) capabilities to serve as auxiliary oilers.



IWP students and alumni practice exercising tools of statecraft in the South China Sea

<https://www.iwp.edu/.../iwp-students-and-alumni-practice.../>

Hopefully (one can suspect certainly) Canadian Armed Forces staff and students are wargaming the South China Sea.



It has been and will much be in the future a region of interesting.

International relations. Canadian military needs to have thought about the region and what could develop there - that is a purpose of wargaming

Tank Loss Rates in Combat: Then and Now

<http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/.../tank-loss-rates-in.../>

Analysis of loss rates of tanks (and other armoured vehicles) during the Ukraine-Russia war will make for an interesting comparison with previous conflicts, and be cause for reflection about what modern warfare is like and may become.



Reconsidering Russian Maritime Warfare

<https://cimsec.org/reconsidering-russian-maritime-warfare/>

"Moscow's potential opponents have effective and powerful militaries of their own, and are developing sophisticated concepts to deter or defeat Russia. Any clear-headed assessment of Russian maritime warfighting must take both perspectives into account."

Can say (write) that of any aspect of warfare. Strategists take note.

Assessments need to account for morale, leadership, logistics and many other factors difficult to quantify.



The Far-Right Idealized the Russian Military. Ukraine Exposes All the Ways They're Wrong.

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/far-right-idealized-russian...>

"In Ukraine, the world can see on display the weakness of Russia's antiquated and ineffective concept of power. Security experts should capitalize on the moment to dismiss once and for all the far-right fiction that masculinity wins wars, that security is not inclusive and that Russia represents any semblance of enviable military standards in the 21st century."



Bollinger Shipyards wins big with MCM USV production contract

<https://breakingdefense.com/.../bollinger-shipyards-wins.../>

The US Navy has contracted a shipyard to build three unmanned surface vessels (USV) equipped with various payloads to detect and destroy undersea mines, with options



for 24 more USV. Appears that the USN is moving beyond experimentation to producing a sizable number of vessels. The structure of mine countermeasures forces is changing, going more towards USV (drones). The Royal Canadian Navy's twelve Kingston-class vessels are mine warfare ships (the ships are designated MM - mine warfare - though often referred to by the project title MCDV - Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel). The Kingstons are coming up for replacement. Maybe the RCN will acquire USV for the mine countermeasures capability and replace the Kingstons with something else. The six Harry DeWolf-class provide a patrol capability, and oceanic (global) at that. The Kingstons could therefore be replaced with something smaller, say about 500 tonnes, configured for multiple roles (inshore patrol, diving operations, drone operations, training, survey, etc.).

Ukraine: Three ways this war could escalate and drag Nato in

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61051307>

"The bigger strategic question,' says one of Britain's most experienced military officers who asks not to be named, 'is whether our government is engaged in crisis management or actual strategy.'"

Whilst there can be strategy in crisis management, it doesn't have the effectiveness of strategy developed in advance and with due consideration of all factors and possibilities. Such strategic development should be undertaken by military and civil authorities, working together, on a continuing basis.



Royal Navy Tests Shore-to-Ship Heavy Cargo Drones

<https://www.maritime-executive.com/.../royal-navy-tests...>

Fixed-wing heavy cargo drones (unmanned aerial vehicles - UAV) wouldn't be any use for the Royal Canadian Navy what with its lack of a large deck ship (e.g., aircraft carrier). But a rotary-wing heavy cargo drone design might be useful, especially for supporting independent patrolling ships. What studies of requirements for such vehicles are there? Are any Canadian government offices or companies involved in developing such vehicles, either in Canada or in conjunction with foreign organizations?

And an allied fixed-wing heavy cargo drone would assist in the delivery of Canadian material when a Canadian ship is part of a multi-national task group which includes a large deck ship.

This testing highlights the benefits of a country having an experimental drone organization like the Royal Navy's 700X Naval Air Squadron. Maybe Canada should have one, with participation of all forces and agencies (e.g., Coast Guard) that are developing drone capabilities.



I Commanded U.S. Army Europe. Here's What I Saw in the Russian and Ukrainian Armies.

<https://www.thebulwark.com/i-commanded-u-s-army-europe.../>

Yes, a (the) measure of a military's strength is the people. Especially the leaders. All the counts of troops, tanks and artillery don't matter if the people don't count. Trained, trusted and leading.



Russian embassy in Canada weaponizes its social media accounts to fuel support for Ukraine war

<https://nationalpost.com/.../russian-embassy-in-canada...>

While much attention has been focused on Ukraine's successes on the Information Operations front, Russia is still very active and effective.



The Russian Decision to Start This War

<http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/.../the-russian-decision.../>

"... history has no shortage of leaders initiating disastrous wars, so obviously one must always be ready this." No matter how improbable a conflict appears to be, it can and will happen. All good states must be ready. Readiness costs. And it's not a simple count of ships, tanks and planes



With COVID mission over, Pentagon plans for next pandemic

<https://www.militarytimes.com/.../with-covid-mission.../>

"... planning wargames and other exercises to determine if the U.S. has the right balance of military medical staff in the active duty and reserves."

Cool, using wargaming to consider the needs for medical (forces?). Wargaming may be problematic in predicting future scenarios, but it can be very useful in getting decision makers to consider possibilities and relevant factors. I wonder whether the Canadian Forces Health Services Division and medical employers wargame medical capabilities.



An Anti-Access Denial Strategy For Ukraine

<https://cimsec.org/an-anti-access-denial-strategy-for.../>

The force structures of small navies need to be very different from that of large. 'Balance' as in balanced navy means



something different depending on so many geo-economic-political factors. That doesn't mean that the force structure is ineffective. Mines, coastal defence cruise missiles and strong scouting capability can be quite effective in ensuring a small navy state achieves its strategic aims and counters that of adversaries.

Latest US defense aid package for Ukraine

<https://twitter.com/CavasShips/status/1514315688831242244>

With reference to the 'unmanned coastal defence vessel' listed as security assistance for Ukraine:

Chris Cavas @CavasShips replied

(<https://twitter.com/CavasShips/status/1514315688831242244>

): In response to a question about the unmanned vessel

Pentagon spox Kirby said, "it's a surface vessel that can be used for a variety of coastal defense missions..It is provided by the US Navy." Kirby declined to be more specific and there was no illustration. Thanks @reporterjoe!

Interesting. Unmanned (uncrewed?) surface vessel (UAS - sea surface drone) as an emergency assistance defence item. Maybe not something that was being thought of as UAS were being developed. Almost like exporting/transferring (naval) mines. Hmm, develop UAS for export as coastal defence equipment?

\$800 Million in Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine

- 18 155mm Howitzers and 40,000 artillery rounds;
- Ten AN/TPQ-36 counter-artillery radars;
- Two AN/MQP-64 Sentinel air surveillance radars;
- 300 Switchblade Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems;
- 500 Javelin missiles and thousands of other anti-armor systems;
- 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers;
- 100 Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles;
- 11 Mi-17 helicopters;
- Unmanned Coastal Defense Vessels;
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear protective equipment;
- Medical equipment;
- 30,000 sets of body armor and helmets;
- Over 2,000 optics and laser rangefinders;
- C-4 explosives and demolition equipment for obstacle clearing; and
- M16A1 Claymore anti-personnel munitions configured to be consistent with the Ottawa



Ukrainian fighter pilots in old jets take on better-equipped Russians

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/.../ukrainian-fighter.../>

Pilots say they are 'just targets' in Soviet-era MiG-29s and want allies to send newer planes. Think about that as Canada buys new fighters. Buy anything other than front-line (5th+ generation) and you're condemning pilots to be targets.



Canadian troops being deployed to Poland on humanitarian mission

<https://www.cbc.ca/.../armed-forces-members-deployed...>

"Members of the Canadian Armed Forces are going to be deployed to Poland on a humanitarian mission to support Ukrainian refugees who have fled the Russian invasion."




"More than 4.7 million Ukrainians have fled to neighbouring countries since Russia's invasion began in February. Of those, more than half — nearly 2.7 million — have fled to Poland."

Loss Of Russian Cruiser Moskva: What We Know So Far

<https://www.navalnews.com/.../loss-of-russian-cruiser.../>

"... the loss of Moskva is undoubtedly the most significant casualty of Russian forces since the beginning of the war. The loss of such significant warships usually triggers a national trauma, and the name of the ship, which stands for the capital of Russia, intensifies the psychological effect. The loss of a warship is quite different from that of other assets, as the ships are considered part of the countries' mainland, but the name and the role of the Moskva increase the significance of the loss."

The loss of MOSKVA highlights the need for a state to be prepared for such sinking when naming a warship after the state or the state capital. Canada lost the first HMCS OTTAWA to a German submarine torpedo in 1942. That loss didn't traumatize the Canadian national psyche - two more ships have been named OTTAWA since. HMCS CANADA fortunately was paid off (taken out of naval service) and renamed before it ignominiously (at least, to sailors) foundered in 1926. But the lesson of MOSKVA (and DEUTSCHLAND, renamed LUTZOW, and other warships in history) should be a consideration when the Canadian Surface Combatant frigates are named. (And warships are not territory, mainland or island, of a state. See: "Warships: Sovereign Immunity versus Sovereign Territory" <https://rusi-ns.ca/warships-sovereign-immunity-versus.../>.)



Other Sources:

#cyber operations

Can't Sail Away from Cyber Attacks: 'Sea-Hacking' from Land

<https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/cant-sail-away-from-cyber-attacks-sea-hacking-from-land/>

Securing & Protecting the Nation's Cybersecurity Infrastructure

<https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/commentary/securing-protecting-the-nations-cybersecurity-infrastructure/>

Some reading in advance of our Distinguished Speakers event with NORAD & USNORTHCOM, "Critical Infrastructure Resilience: Canada and the U.S. Partnering to Counter Cyber Threats," deferred from April to sometime later this year.

#navigation warfare

AFRL's little NTS-3 test satellite holds 100 possibilities to help secure or backup GPS

<https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/afrls-little-nts-3-test-satellite-holds-100-possibilities-to-help-secure-or-backup-gps/>

#policing

Artificial intelligence and policing in Australia

https://www.aspi.org.au/report/ai_policing_australia

#space

DIA Warns China's Space Tech Seeks to Block U.S. Radars, Jam Munitions

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/04/dia-warns-chinas-space-tech-seeks-block-us-radars-jam-munitions/365549/>

Note "Challenges to Security in Space - 2022" report via: <https://www.dia.mil/News-Features/Articles/Article-View/Article/2997352/challenges-mount-against-us-allies-in-race-to-maintain-stability-in-space/>

#Ukraine-Russia War

Russia, Ukraine, and the Misuse of History

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/04/russia-ukraine-and-misuse-history/364113/>

#Ukraine-Russia war #drones

Witness to War: A Nova Scotian's one-man mission to Kyiv

<https://www.saltwire.com/halifax/news/witness-to-war-a-nova-scotians-one-man-mission-to-kyiv-100714492/>

#war

Studying The Conduct of War: "We Surely Must Do Better"

<http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2016/08/30/studying-the-conduct-of-war-we-surely-must-do-better/>

#wargaming

IDA Insights on Women Wargamers, Researchers and leaders

<https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/i/id/ida-insights-on-women-wargamers-researchers-and-leaders/d-32994.pdf>

Other:**Security Affairs Committee Synopsis****O Canada**

Canada's national interests. One of the biggest issues is that Canada has never set out what our national interests are. We continue to stumble around and are often unpleasantly surprised by factors that with thought and understanding and just perhaps planning, would help us avoid problems that unfortunately occur. What do we mean when we discuss national interests? These are issues or statements that directly effect the well being and potentially survival of our nation, they are therefore such interests that help define us and sets out conditions where would have to take action in some form to survive. For example, one might offer the following: the survival of the citizenry of the country is essential, prevention of major internal disorder, conditions by which the country would react with potential military or other action to prevent, what are key industries that must be maintained and protected, the sovereignty of our landmass and internal waterways both legally and physically. This type of thought into what is essential to the survival of our country should be the guide, but this understanding of national interest is essential before one develops any policy. From these points one can develop a growth policy in a defined way, security policy which falls out of national interests, foreign policy and of course defence policy amongst others.

The latest budget and the eight billion dollars, now we are only 4.5 B in the hole! After listening to various opinions on the requirement for new defence spending, one might think the world is sunshine and roses to certain elements of society. Authoritarianism is on the rise around the world, and we now have a major war in Europe once again for the first time since 1945. Canada unfortunately has left the lid off the continent and has put our own country and our ally to the South in peril because we consistently fail to keep up our military agreements. Like our fighters, the North Warning System is ancient by military technology terms. It is typical of Canadian inaction and denial. The cost of delaying its modernization and now an imperative need will raise the costs. The changing nature of weapons systems means that Canada should encompass the idea of ballistic missile defence at least to identify the attacking system whether the attacking system is air breathing, hypersonic or ballistic

The increased defence spending is more than a little murky. While I am happy that there is at least recognition of defence issues. It is unclear what it is for and how it will be used. Defence needs to be overhauled completely because successive Governments have failed to pay their dues or even maintain vital capabilities. Key capabilities were sacrificed for budget cutting. Successive Governments at least allowed the service to cut its own throat when budget issues occurred. One can clearly see this in the misbegotten battle group in Latvia. First it is less than a battalion in size, it is missing all sorts of pieces such as anti-armour, mortars, tanks and air defence and I suspect communications, maintenance and logistics issues. It is a pathetic effort from one of the richest countries in the world. The battle group should look very similar to what we put into Afghanistan. We only sent one, but it was the meanest organization there, but it was still missing pieces. If there are to be expenditures, may we suggest that an immediate operational requirement (IOR) be made for at least anti-armour weapons and perhaps very low-level air defence weapons systems? Most Canadian efforts were lacking especially in the Cold War when tank trainers were sent to Norway as part of the Allied Command Europe Land (AMF (L)) contingent. Fortunately, we had TOW launchers and other weapons such as Carl Gustav and M 72 anti-tank rocket launchers; no air defence though and we had about a week to deploy. No run up training as we trained for the task constantly and we were mainly fully manned, about 1200 personnel. If we have money to spend, let's increase our units to full strength so that we no longer rob one battalion to fill another and that the battalions make sense thus allowing Commanders to pick the right type of unit for a specific task and to give it all the resources it needs from units designated to provide it.

China

Sanctions are something that Communist Chinese Party (CCP) are very wary of in the current situation in Europe. The CCP has a public opinion that pretends to be neutral, but essentially blames the West for the unfortunate attack on the Ukraine, although it is calling for parties to respect borders and the internal affairs of each country. The Chinese language press however is anything but neutral thus giving citizens of China the Russian version of events leading to Russia's attack on Ukraine. A group of Chinese speaking Westerners are fortunately reading and translating the Chinese language version and are calling out the CCP's two faced approach. Needless to say, the official outlets such as the Peoples' Daily have been vigorous in their denials but also have attacked the people translating their own material and ensuring everyone knows that the CCP has been dishonest.

One thing that is of note is that the CCP has kept Chinese entities and organizations from acquiring Russian oil and gas thus taking advantage of Western sanctions against the Russian economy and the loss of sales. The CCP has watched with concern about the very united Western effort to impose major sanctions on Putin's regime. Currently, China has actually followed most of the Western sanctions as failure to follow them closely would result in a major round of possible sanctions on the CCP regime. A united and long-term sanctions effort would have grave consequences for the Chinese economy thus slowing growth even more.

The property management industry is continuing its meltdown in China. It will require an extensive bail out package to survive. It is expected that not every company will survive even if there is a bail out. Property is one of the key avenues for middle income families to protect their wealth and until recently, actually increased their wealth. The meltdown of the property management sector is not just an unfortunate event where companies cease to exist; it also means that thousands if not millions of Chinese middle-class citizens could lose their entire savings and investments. China announced this week that they would inject 2.3 T USD equivalents as a stimulus for the economy. In past this has meant more property development in order to keep the facade of growth. It is suggested by some Asian and beyond to be a short-term solution and does not address the very real problem that the whole system is built on everyone stating that there is growth and success even when there is none. The CCP does not take bad news well and usually some scape goat goes to jail. The CCP has built the country on

a significant amount of debt, as we have seen in Canada, each level of Government also creates their own debt (OK, cities have to balance books). China has done so in an absolutely massive way and using some interesting accounting procedures more akin to a Ponzi scheme.

China has also never controlled the pandemic. At the time of writing, 67% of the population is now in some form of lockdown. This also means supply chains are affected by the CCP's ham-fisted Zero Covid solution which has likely killed more heart disease and diabetes patients rather than save COVID sufferers. The combination of the almost mindless adherence to a failed strategy on COVID, existing sanctions, financial mismanagement, supply chain issues and the possibility of antagonizing major customers in Europe and the Americas with their pro-Russian stance with the potential to incur a new round of major sanctions, should cause most investors to leave the country.

Russia

This is the first war fought in front of the world in real time. Much of the video is in small snippets of film, usually with limited context as to the actual event. Some new businesses are making money sorting out what is likely true versus absolute fiction from each side. Both are guilty of using social media to their own advantage. This being said, Ukraine has been vastly more open and transparent, allowing foreign journalists a wide latitude to investigate various allegations and stories within their control. Russia has virtually shut down any real media. The message from the Kremlin is strictly controlled through a captive media. Any story that is written or shown must be carefully examined for its source and the reliability of that source. One must also understand that even the most well-meaning organization can sometimes get things wrong. All that to say, look at your information flow always with a bit of scepticism.

By the time one may read this note, the city of Mariupol may have fallen. Late Wednesday afternoon apparently up to 1 k Ukrainian Marines laid down their arms and surrendered to Russian forces. Ukrainian forces were pushed back into a small industrial area of the city. They had fought for 47 days without let up and with few if any reinforcements or resupply. If true, it was a worthy stand, showing skill and fortitude against overwhelming odds and for the most part holding off defeat for an exponentially longer time than expected. Time will tell if Russia actually has something to celebrate or whether it is just another step in a protracted war. One big issue is the alleged use of chemical weapons use by Russia in Mariupol Tuesday. There is also the alleged use of white phosphorus as well during shelling. The issue of any use of chemical weapons is considered a major escalation of this conflict. One must be aware that chemical weapons is considered just another "arrow" in the Russian quiver, the West has another opinion. More to follow on this issue.

Currently, Russian forces have with drawn from the region of Kyiv and Chernihiv, essentially most of the areas occupied by Russia in the North are now gone. There is debate whether some Russian forces remain in Belarus which may be used to "threaten" the Kyiv area thus preventing the use of Ukrainian forces from reinforcing efforts in the South and East. Most Russian forces appear to have moved into Russia and are now proceeding into the area around the Donbass. The common thought of the talking heads is that this will create conditions for a major Russian offensive in the area of the Donbass which would see the whole oblast of both the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts fall into Russian hands and that Mariupol all the way to the Crimea would be in Russian hands. There is some debate whether these forces would be able to attack and take Odesa. Time is a problem for both sides at the moment, one Russia's mobilization is not going well, casualties have been high possibly as high as 60 K killed wounded and captured. Aircraft and armour losses are almost impossible to replace in the short term. The effect of sanctions on Russian industries is rapidly degrading the ability of Russia to maintain a technologically based armed forces in the medium term. Right now, as weapons are destroyed, there are no new ones coming off assembly lines as they are missing vital Western made parts and China is

extremely reluctant to provide replacements due to the potential damage from further Western sanctions that could also be imposed on them.

Ukraine needs time to gain access and do some familiarization training on new equipment including tanks, self-propelled guns, armour personnel carriers and aircraft to prepare for a Ukrainian counter moves action to thwart Russian attacks in the east. Ukrainian troops have far exceeded expectations in the use of infantry and artillery supported by logistics efforts to succeed in the north and blunt actions in the East and South. This next part of the battle will be one of mobility requiring tanks and greater support according to some analysts. One point to be made here is that Ukrainian troops are out of their vehicles they use the ground and are aggressive in the use of their anti-armour and air defence systems. Russian troops seem to lack that get and go needed for success in an infantry battle. Ukrainian efforts seem well coordinated and seem to use all available systems at once to achieve dominance of the battlefield, something totally missing from Russian efforts to date.

Russia has appointed a single commander for this next offensive, Colonel General Dvornikov a veteran of the Chechnya, and Syria. He was apparently noted for his brutal actions that seem to use brute strength rather than an all arms approach to minimize casualties. He was successful in both operations. Will he do the same here, it seems likely.

This war is barely started, and it seems likely to last longer than expected by pundits. It is increasingly clear, there is only one way this will end with the absolute defeat of either Ukraine or the fall of the Putin regime, otherwise it can and will continue as long as it takes until one side or the other stops.

There is so much more this week that could be discussed including refugees, the fallout from the Solomon Islands agreement with China, the possibility of Sweden and Finland joining NATO and Ukraine being able to join the European Union and the brutal conflicts affecting Africa and India's ongoing conflict with China over the Ladakh not to mention Pakistan's new Government. So many disasters so little time to define them with research.



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