



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 29 April 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

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Dispatches

RUSI(NS) seeks co-editors, and ultimately an editor, for *Dispatches*. Doesn't have to be a continuous function, can be a short gig if you'd like to give it a try. If interested, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

And, as always, contributions to *Dispatches* are welcome. Can be shared article or, preferably, an article with some value-added comments added to it. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

6 May, Friday - Conference of Defence Associations Institute Roundtable "Promises and Pitfalls of Foreign Military Training - Implications for the Canadian Armed Forces." 1000-1200 EST. Virtual. To register: <https://cdainstitute.ca/fmt/>

emended: 25 May, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Colonel (retired) John Boileau on “No. 2 Construction Battalion: A Short History & an Apology.” 1300-1500. Was to be at the Halifax Armouries but now will be Zoomed. More to follow. ~~This will be our first in person event since we changed to virtual events because of the pandemic. Registration not required.~~ Note that it is understood the Government of Canada will issue an apology, summer 2022.

Pre-event reading: No. 2 Construction Battalion: The Operational History
<http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol16/no3/page51-eng.asp>

22 June, Wednesday – **save the date**. RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker TBA.

Publications:

Except where otherwise indicated, publications are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Comments "What should an enlarged Canadian navy look like?" by Ken Hansen, 6 April 2022
<https://rusi-ns.ca/enlarged-canadian-navy/>

RUSI(NS) Presentation "Surveillance of Sea Surface Activities in Atlantic Canada" by Jan-Andrej Skopalik, 16 March 2022
https://rusi-ns.ca/national_aerial_surveillance_program/

RUSI(NS) Information Note "RCN Ship Pennant Numbers," 10 March 2022
https://rusi-ns.ca/pennant_numbers/

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 27 April 2022
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Company of Master Mariners of Canada Maritimes Division *Foghorn*, April 2022

Edmonton United Services Institute *President's Enews*, April 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 4, April 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, April 2022.
<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/115-april-dispatches>

New: Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, May 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 1st Quarter 2022

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 11, Issue 8, 25 April 2022

United Services Institute of Nanaimo and North Island *Newsletter* Vol 30 No 04, April 2022

Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver *Members News* 15 March 2022

Veterans Affairs Canada *Veterans Benefit Guide 2022*
https://cdn.cyberimpact.com/clients/18057/public/05fa7c4d-c03c-48a0-3d00-932972a0cf27/files/VeteransBenefitsGuide2022-Eng_April.pdf
Or ask a member of our Veterans Affairs Committee, chaired by Dick Jamer, for a copy.

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* April 2022

Tweeted by @RUSI NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

CAN🇨🇦 delivered reportedly 4 M-177 howitzers to UKR <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/04/canada-announces-artillery-and-other-additional-military-aid-for-ukraine.html> Drawn from 37 held by @CanadianArmy. What plans to replace/augment #CAF artillery inventory? What capability to increase ammunition production?
(Canada announces artillery and other additional military aid for Ukraine)



RUSI RUSI_org 27 Apr tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 'Assessments about partners and allies cannot not be conducted solely by intelligence agencies, since diplomatic and policy personnel have unique and crucial relevant knowledge' writes Itai Shapira in the latest #RUSICommentary.
(The Unique Challenge of Assessing Partners and Allies <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/unique-challenge-assessing-partners-and-allies>)



Business Ukraine mag 25 Apr tweeted (https://twitter.com/Biz_Ukraine_Mag/status/1518747159017013249): "Only in Ukraine: turning Russian bombs into barbecues"

Ukraine continues to win the information war, humour category. Not an insignificant category.



Just a quotable: John Spencer on Twitter

(<https://twitter.com/SpencerGuard/status/1517902813824647168>): ""The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards." - Sir William Francis Butler in Charles George Gordon"

Alessio Patalano @alessionaval 25 Apr tweeted (<https://twitter.com/alessionaval/status/1518692138476875777>):

Good evening twitter. I promised I'd come back to the sinking of the RFN cruiser Moskva (Pennant no 121) once more info were to become available. Here I am now. A thread reflecting on the most severe naval loss since the Falklands Wars: what happened, and its consequences.

Good tweet thread.



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Behind friendly lines

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/behind-friendly-lines/>

"By understanding the historical importance of the liaison function, the current framework and tasks of liaison officers in partner nations, and the future potential for realizing our national objectives with allies, leadership in liaison becomes a critical capability."

Liaising. A critical function in allied and coalition forces.



Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/operation-z-death-throes-imperial-delusion>

"This Special Report seeks to examine how the interconnected challenges confronting Moscow are reshaping Russian policy, and the risks Moscow's potential courses of action pose as the war enters a new phase. The foremost conclusion is that Russia is now preparing, diplomatically, militarily and economically, for a protracted conflict."



Canada a NATO parasite

<https://defence.frontline.online/blogs/6238-Louis-Cuppens/18862-Canada-NATO-parasite>

A review of the Canadian defence policy would be timely (the world has changed since the 2017 policy came out) but should be preceded by new foreign and national security policies.



Next Generation Fighting Vehicles

In a recent RUSI(NS) meeting there arose discussion of a Tender Notice - Letter of Interest/Request for Information (<https://buyandsell.gc.ca/procurement-data/tender-notice/PW-BL-299-28290>) in Canada Buy & Sell for 'Next Generation Fighting Vehicles.' As there was unfamiliarity with the



project to provide 'fighting vehicles' (a term normally reserved for armoured and cannoned, often tracked, vehicles), a little searching was done and led to the Next Generation Fighting Vehicle project (<http://dgpapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=1239>).

"The Next Generation Fighting Vehicle (NGFV) will provide CANSOFCOM a tactical multi-role vehicle in the performance of their special operations specific and unique tasks and roles."

So, vehicles for CANSOFCOM. There is reporting about the project (e.g., see: "CANSOFCOM: Next Generation Fighting Vehicle – DEW Engineering Teams with Supacat" <http://espritdecorps.ca/eye-on-industry/cansofcom-next-generation-fighting-vehicle-dew-engineering-teams-with-supacat>) but it is not getting attention like the multi-billion dollar fighter and frigate projects.

One wonders what sort of operations and where in the world such vehicles would be employed. Canadian national security, foreign and defence policies are not forthcoming on answering those questions.

Is Canada abandoning collective security in favour of a new isolationism?

<https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/april-2022/is-canada-abandoning-collective-security-in-favour-of-a-new-isolationism/>



"All of this points to Canada forsaking a longstanding, meaningful commitment to the principles of collective security." "If Canada is moving toward a new isolationism, Canada risks becoming irrelevant to our friends and allies. It may also leave us with fewer friends when we confront our own security threats."

If there's one thing that modern states have learned (should learn), it is the utility of allies. Canada has long been a contributing partner in international affairs. We can't let that lapse, we need to be active.

Winston Churchill: "There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies and that is fighting without them."

U.S. ambassador says he's confident Canada will strengthen its defences in the Arctic

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-arctic-defence-norad-russia-china-1.6428066>



What's the Canadian whole-of-government plan for developing the Arctic? To include strengthening defences, which tends to benefit from strengthening infrastructure, communications and other civil-focused developments.

Canadian military getting advanced spy planes in \$247-million deal

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canadian-military-begins-taking-delivery-of-advanced-spy-planes-this/>

350ER King Air aircraft for Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) under the Manned Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (MAISR) project (<http://dgpapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=1699>).



Hostile Harbors: Taiwan's Ports and PLA Invasion Plans

<https://project2049.net/2021/07/22/hostile-harbors-taiwans-ports-and-pla-invasion-plans/>

An interesting 'estimate of the situation' and recognition of the importance of ports as a means for China to invade Taiwan successfully. Logisticians study ports. Considering the importance of ports for operations and as objectives of operations, whether in peace and for civil purposes (am thinking Arctic and Haitian infrastructure) or during conflict (look at the Second World War, the Ukraine-Russia War, and what would be involved in a China-Taiwan War), operators too should be studying ports and their activities to gain an understanding of them. Hmm, maybe Royal Canadian Navy staff should plan and exercise various scenarios with local port staffs. Then do the same with ports further away in Canada and in other countries.



And noteworthy points in the article: "On January 1, 2017, the PRC National Defense Transportation Law went into effect. Among other things, the law mandated that all of China's basic infrastructure and related transportation platforms would henceforth be treated as military-civil fusion assets. At the CCP's discretion, they were now legally required to be designed, built, and managed to support future military operations. In the event of conflict, they would be pressed into wartime service. Now they had to prepare accordingly in peacetime." Canadians need to be concerned about civil-military fusion efforts by China against Canada.

Digitally Armed

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/digitally-armed/>

"... the (Canadian) Army now has a new term that better describes what it is trying to accomplish: Integrated Command and Control System or IC2S." "... the technology that enables and empowers the Command and Sense operational functions ..."

"The Army is testing the phrase, 'digitally armed to protect our tomorrow,' ..."



Building Royal Navy 2035 Means Rebuilding the UK Defence Industrial Base

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/04/15/building-royal-navy-2035-technology-means-rebuilding-industrial-base/>

Yes, (Western) navies can build smarter, focusing on technology, but they'd be wise, too, to ensure that people are all times considered as those technological ships are being designed and built.

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Marcus Faulkner on Twitter (<https://twitter.com/NavalHistWar/status/1518881196918427649>): "Here's the thing, military industrial capacity is part of deterrence too. And it's a foundation of alliance building. Use what you have to maximum effect. And it's business."

There have been a couple of tweets that it will take Russian industry several years to replace tank losses (see: <https://twitter.com/mjluxmoore/status/1518523955920973826> and "Russian Military's Next Front Line: Replacing Battlefield Equipment Destroyed in Ukraine"

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-militarys-next-front-line-replacing-battlefield-equipment-destroyed-in-ukraine-11650879002>). There are also reports that Russia has expended 70% of its precision-guided missiles.



Black Sea marine insurance costs now impossibly astronomical

<https://www.seanews.com.tr/black-sea-marine-insurance-costs-now-impossibly-astronomical/193096/>

Mines and cruising warships may be the first to affect the movement of merchant ships during a conflict, and they catch the public interest, but insurance rates are really what in the longer run is going to strangle trade.

Further: Insurers are scrambling to update the definition of war
<https://www.ft.com/content/1fbf82bb-7ad4-4131-90ea-1fe70f5600d3>

It's not just the insurance costs, it's the uncertainty of whose and what sanctions apply, and what are the ramifications of transgression.



Canada announces artillery and other additional military aid for Ukraine

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/04/canada-announces-artillery-and-other-additional-military-aid-for-ukraine.html>

"... Canada has provided heavy artillery to the Security Forces of Ukraine ..."

The M777 howitzer may be heavy compared to many other army weapons such as machine-guns and mortars, but it is not heavy artillery as the term is used within militaries. (And note the Canadian Armed Forces calls the M777 'lightweight' at 4200 kilograms -

<https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/equipment/weapons/m777-howitzer.html>.) There doesn't seem to be readily available (easily found public) a NATO or common classification of artillery, but



the US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2006 definition of field artillery includes the classifications (dropped in later editions):

- light — 120 mm and less,
- medium — 121-160 mm,
- heavy — 161-210 mm, and
- very heavy — greater than 210 mm.

The M777 is a correctly (doctrinally) a lightweight medium howitzer. So maybe the term heavy as used by Canadian government authorities can be taken as a relative perspective and read as part of public messaging.

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Threadreader on M177 and Excalibur rounds:

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1517724404612018177.html>


- - -

Further: How Much Can US Howitzers Help Ukraine?

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/04/how-much-can-us-howitzers-help-ukraine/366093/>

Analysis of Ukraine-Russia War by MGen Ryan, Australian Army (ret'd):

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1518018839610466304.html>



Interesting to read of 'fighting power,' used "in the Australian Army to describe the optimal development and combination of the intellectual, physical and moral aspects of war."

"The intellectual component of fighting power is knowledge and its application - of war, warfare, tactics, logistics, command and control. This includes organisational concepts, building a learning culture, adaptation, etc."

"The physical component is a military organisation's capabilities and functional effects. This includes equipment, training infrastructure, weapons, ammunition, trucks, personal equipment, sensors, physical comms networks, etc."

"the moral component is all about culture, values and legitimacy. Importantly, it includes leadership, purpose, and the will to fight of individuals and teams."

Germany to Send Heavy Weapons to Ukraine Following Allied Pressure

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-to-send-heavy-weapons-to-ukraine-following-allied-pressure-11650965385>

"Dozens of anti-aircraft cannon tanks will be refurbished and sent to the war zone amid a renewed Russian offensive"



The use of 'anti-aircraft cannon tanks' is likely the result of a German to English translation confusion. The vehicle in question is the Flugabwehrkanonenpanzer Gepard, sometimes known as a Flakpanzer. Panzer in German means armoured, as in Panzerschiffe, meaning armoured ship, and in Panzerkampfwagen, meaning armoured

fighting vehicle or tank, but with time the word panzer alone has taken on the meaning of tank ('Achtung! Panzer!'). (By the way, in English 'tank' started as a codeword for landship or land battleship - see His Majesty's Land Ship Nutty and HMLS Sir Archibald, 2nd Battle of Gaza, 1917.) So a translation confusion is understandable. However, that confusion should have been picked up by an editor. Tanks are generally heavily armoured, large gunned, tracked vehicles (all characteristics relevant to the times). Calling a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun a tank can misinform (possibly badly when writing about international affairs) the general reading audience. It is debatable whether this case (and there are others) is a sign of a lack of defence correspondents or of general military knowledge amongst reporters and editors. Readers can be supportive and help by adding corrections to the information flow.

A little less tender: OSINTdefender on Twitter

(<https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1518861636571996160>): "I'm unsure if this is just Non-Military people confusing the Flakpanzer Gepard for a Tank because "WOW IT HAS TREADS MUST BE A TANK", or if this is in addition to that and the Approval to send the 88 Leopard 1s and 100 Marder IFVs to Ukraine has finally been given to Rheinmetall."

Russian sanctions prove Canadian military mission in Ukraine had impact: Commander

<https://nationalpost.com/pmnn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/russian-sanctions-prove-canadian-military-mission-in-ukraine-had-impact-commander>

The value of training other states' forces. This is something that Canada can do well in contributing to global security.

Operation UNIFIER is the "Canadian Armed Forces mission to support the Security Forces of Ukraine. The operation's focus is to assist with security force training. This will help them improve and build their capability and capacity."



The US needs a new approach to producing weapons. Just look at Ukraine.

<https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2022/04/26/the-us-needs-a-new-approach-to-producing-weapons-just-look-at-ukraine/>

"It is thus imperative for the United States and its allies to both increase their munitions capacity and adopt innovative approaches to munitions production."

Modern war consumes munitions at a prodigious rate. How strong is Canada's munitions industry in its capability to backfill stocks, used either by the Canadian Armed Forces or provided to allies and partners? The state of the industry and what can be done to ensure its robustness should be part of the next national defence policy.

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Further: It Will Be Years Before Raytheon Can Build New Stinger Missiles

<https://www.defenseone.com/business/2022/04/it-will-be-years-raytheon-can-build-new-stinger-missiles/366105/>

Hmm, maybe the defence industry should be 'mobilized' early when a crisis hits.



How rotten is Russia's army?

<https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/04/30/how-rotten-is-russias-army>

"The best way to be safe from Mr Putin and his rotten army is to deter him from fighting at all."



Are the Canadian Armed Forces strong enough to contribute to that deterrence? The next defence policy review should include public discussion of this.

The questions for Canadians in considering a defence policy review:

1. What do Canadians want their country to be able to do in this world?
2. What do Canadians want their military to be able to do in contribution to the answer to the first question?
3. What do Canadians want their military to be in answer to the second question? This really is a question that the generals and admirals should answer, but there should be public understanding and discussion of what that answer is.

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Further: Sorrows in battalions - Russia's army is in a woeful state

<https://www.economist.com/briefing/how-deep-does-the-rot-in-the-russian-army-go/21808989>

and

Start with the Political: Explaining Russia's Bungled Invasion of Ukraine

<https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/start-with-the-political-explaining-russias-bungled-invasion-of-ukraine/>

Other Sources:

#airpower

GAO Report on F-35 Cost Growth, Schedule Delays

<https://news.usni.org/2022/04/26/gao-report-on-f-35-cost-growth-schedule-delays>

Thinking Canada's Future Fighter Capability project.


#amphibious operations

Amphibious Black: Guerrilla Warfighting in the Maritime Domain

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/april/amphibious-black-guerrilla-warfighting-maritime-domain>

Okay, blue-water, green-water and brown-water ops have their place in naval thinking (I am not going to raise black-water and grey-water...). Going havta now add 'amphibious black' to the colour spectrum?

And for anyone who thinks the RCN doesn't (didn't) do amphibious operations ('amphibiosity' to throw in a RN term and confuse further the buzz), see the picture.



#China #strategy

China's Belt and Road Initiative is a Geopolitical Offensive

https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2022/04/chinas_belt_and_road_initiative_is_a_geopolitical_offensive.html

#defence policy

How would Canada approach the prospect of war?

<https://theconversation.com/how-would-canada-approach-the-prospect-of-war-181106>

#drones

What We Know About Future Maritime Wars

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/what-we-know-about-future-maritime-wars

#information operations

Military Guide to Social Media

<https://combatboot.co.uk/blog-1/f/military-guide-to-social-media>

#medical

Surgeons to the Front: Twentieth-Century Warfare and the Metamorphosis of Battlefield Surgery

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/Browse-Books/iBooks-and-EPUBs/Surgeons_to_the_Front/linkId/162072378/

Part of:

The Last 100 Yards - The Crucible of Close Combat in Large-Scale Combat Operations

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/Large-Scale-Combat-Operations-Book-Set/>

#naval warfare

Fleet Maintenance and Sustainment for Naval Maneuver Warfare More Than Ship Salvage and Battle Damage Repair

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/5/15/fleet-maintenance-and-sustainment-for-naval-maneuver-warfare-more-than-ship-salvage-and-battle-damage-repair>

#Ukraine-Russia War

Silence, Starvation and Savagery: Countering Putin's Brutal One-Two-Three

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/04/23/drones-can-provide-vital-edge-to-defeat-putin/>

Why are so many Russian generals dying in Ukraine?

<https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/03/31/why-are-so-many-russian-generals-dying-in-ukraine>

Leading Strategist Questions Russian Forces' Ability To 'Act Like A Western Army'

<https://www.rferl.org/a/foggo-russia-western-army/31817580.html>

Russian defense industry - export versus domestic orders

<https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1518568542861414402>

An interesting tweet thread. Industry/financial aspects of war.

Some Clausewitzian Thoughts on the Ukrainian Defense

<https://mwi.usma.edu/some-clausewitzian-thoughts-on-the-ukrainian-defense/>

If Russia is Serious about De-Nazification, it Should Start at Home

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/if-russia-serious-about-de-nazification-it-should-start-home>

The Lessons of the Sinking of Moskva for Canadians

<https://www.navalreview.ca/2022/04/the-lesson-of-the-sinking-of-moskva-for-canadians/>

No Feasible End-Game for Russia in Badly Mismatched War

<https://jamestown.org/program/no-feasible-end-game-for-russia-in-badly-mismatched-war/>

What Can We Learn about Amphibious Warfare from a Conflict That Has Had Very Little of It? A Lot

<https://mwi.usma.edu/what-can-we-learn-about-amphibious-warfare-from-a-conflict-that-has-had-very-little-of-it-a-lot/>

Russia's tanks in Ukraine have a 'jack-in-the-box' design flaw. And the West has known about it since the Gulf war

<https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/27/europe/russia-tanks-blown-turrets-intl-hnk-ml/index.html>

Memo to General Secretary Xi Jinping

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/memo-general-secretary-xi-jinping>

#cyber operations

Ukraine's Other Front: The Battle in the Cyber Domain

<https://jamestown.org/program/ukraines-other-front-the-battle-in-the-cyber-domain/>

#drones

The Big 'Show-Down' Of Drones – Decoding Why Super-Power Russia Is Losing The UAV War To An Impuissant Ukraine

<https://eurasianimes.com/why-russia-is-losing-the-uav-war-to-an-impuissant-ukraine/>

#information operations

Where Disinformation Meets Geopolitics: Parsing Beijing's Alternative Narrative on Ukraine

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/where-disinformation-meets-geopolitics-parsing-beijings-alternative-narrative-on-ukraine/>

#legal

Russian Leaders Know They're Committing War Crimes. Their Laws of War Manual Says So.

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/russian-leaders-know-theyre-committing-war-crimes-their-laws-war-manual-says-so>

#veterans

Best Advice Guide: Caring for Veterans

<https://patientsmedicalhome.ca/resources/best-advice-guides/best-advice-guide-caring-for-veterans/>

"The College of Family Physicians of Canada has released a new guide to provide recommendations for family physicians and other primary care providers in caring for Canada's veteran population."

Other:

MND Advisory Panel Report on Systemic Racism and Discrimination

Video of the report release proceedings:

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/CanadianForces/videos/538217321007114/>

YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zhyI7o0N41I>

A copy of the final report, news release and backgrounder are available from RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Background information can be found at:

Minister's Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism, Discrimination with a focus on anti-Indigenous and anti-Black racism, LGBTQ2 Prejudice, Gender Bias and White Supremacy

(<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/defence-portfolio/minister-advisory-panel.html>)

Minister of National Defence announce Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism, Discrimination with a focus on anti-Indigenous and anti-Black racism, LGBTQ2 Prejudice, Gender Bias and White Supremacy - Canada.ca

(<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2020/12/minister-of-national-defence-announces-advisory-panel-on-systemic-racism-discrimination-lgbtq2-prejudice-gender-bias-and-white-supremacy.html>)

See also: The Path to Dignity and Respect: The Canadian Armed Forces Strategy to Address Sexual Misconduct

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/the-path-to-dignity-and-respect.html>

"The Path to Dignity and Respect is a culture change strategy designed to prevent and address sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces."

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

Canada is giving eight civilian pattern armoured vehicles and four M777 155 mm howitzers to Ukraine along with continued provision of small arms ammunition and M72 66mm disposable rocket launchers as well as providing money to finance other acquisitions. It is a minimalist effort but not surprising given Canada's neglect of its own armed forces. Four artillery pieces is 10% roughly of our available active artillery. This means that Canadian gunners once again do not the chance to train. As this war continues it is spreading in various forms, and the possibility of Canadian involvement is increasing whether our government likes it or not. Despite this increasingly likely event, the biggest issue receiving the most attention is the report on racism and not the necessary increase in training as well as immediate acquisition of weapons and equipment our soldiers might need. Call me silly, but a little preparation and planning for the possibility of conflict might be more important right now. Maybe a practice call up of primary reservists, maybe a pre-deployment checklist, maybe we learn how to call up our supplementary holding list of the recently retired but still have practical experience, or maybe fixing a dysfunctional recruiting system. There are dozens of things that we should be doing but are not. Part of these particular principles of war: "I hope this doesn't happen" and "Didn't see that one coming." Current defence priorities are wrong – right is getting ready to fight and ensuring our

soldiers are in sufficient numbers and are well-equipped and trained, that there are provisions in place to replace losses and that there is a system of call up, and that is just the Army. Get the Air Force ready to defend the North, figure out if we can get temporary transfer of Airborne Warning and Control System from the US to at least temporarily fix the gaping hole in our North that Canada has neglected to fill for so long. Canada's efforts are and continue to be an embarrassment in front of the entire world. We need a rethink.

On another issue but in some ways a greater security threat are two bills that are currently being considered before Parliament: one is Bill C11 also known as "The Online Streaming Act" and the other is Bill C 18 "The Online News Act." Both bills/acts can readily be found on Government of Canada web sites. The two bills seem to give an unprecedented level of power to essentially restrict free speech and also make the news media at least partially funded by government. I am sure that those who developed these bills are doing it with the best intentions. Even cursory readings of the bills leave a feeling that the second and third order effects or rather potential effects have not been fully thought out. Several commentators have stated that the bills resemble something within an authoritarian regime, which is a little harsh. One cannot help feeling that a sledgehammer is being used to crack an egg and that the cure will cause more issues than the original problem. Please take a look at this; I do not mind being wrong, but reading the bills makes one uneasy. It needs more thought.

China

China has a number of major problems not counting its megalomaniac President for life (so he apparently hopes) Xi Jinping. The issues they are currently dealing with are the out-of-control Covid 19 pandemic, the crash of their economy (including already imposed sanctions), the longer-term demographic problem and the Ukraine-Russian war (which could result in more sanctions if China is not careful). Xi is hoping for a third term as President, he even had the Constitution of the Party changed to accommodate his whim. He has skillfully removed most of his immediate opposition, usually accusing said individuals as corrupt. The celebration of being acclaimed for a third time has been endangered by these issues, not seriously but enough to be concerned, especially if other factions within the Communist Chinese Party smell blood in the water.

The economy is not doing well. The biggest single issue is the meltdown of the property management/infrastructure. Too much infrastructure and a mountain of debt and no one to purchase the new homes and apartments and an inability to pay back the loans. Keep in mind this particular area constitutes nearly 30% of the Chinese economy. Property is the investment of choice for many middle-class Chinese. This collapse has destroyed the wealth and life savings of many, and the CCP appear to be almost stunned by this turn of events. The senior leadership of the CCP knows full well that this situation has the potential to cause more disruption and chaos. The CCP likes stability and has linked its very survival on its ability to quell problems one way or another. They have opted to double down by making regulatory changes to financial matters and adding more money into the development of infrastructure despite its inability to deal with what they already have. Foreign investors have also started to see the full implications of this collapse and are pulling out, with billions leaving the country. Infrastructure development is part of the problem and adding more infrastructure will not be a wise choice given the inability of people to take advantage of the current availability of homes and apartments. China is full of unused infrastructure built by both the national level programs and by the local levels. In order to get good assessments of the management of various levels of local authorities, they created investment companies and even banks to gain the necessary investment loans to create more infrastructure. Infrastructure was the quickest way to gain results. It did not seem to matter whether the infrastructure was needed or not, just that it was applied to reports of success and thus achieving favourable results on their personal management of resources and showing successful "leadership" of the province, county city town or village. It was, in other words, a giant Ponzi scheme

but instead of being about wealth as the West would know it, it was to gain favourable views as a leader within the Party.

Covid has also had a chilling effect on the economy. The CCP has chosen the Zero-Covid approach to the pandemic, and quite frankly at the start of the pandemic it may have been a wise choice although absolutely brutal in its execution. China never really had a real grip on the disease although they told the world they did. No one has an accurate picture of the total human cost of the pandemic in China as once again the CCP chose to leave the rest of the world in the dark and did not allow independent review of their findings or the actual success of their program. There are anecdotal reports that thousands died not because of Covid but because of the infamous lockdowns imposed by force, thus many were without vital medicines, medical care, even food during the periods of lockdown. As vaccines became available, most nations created effective vaccination programs (some with a bit of trial and error). China developed its own vaccines and they quickly and effectively were made and distributed. The unfortunate downside was these vaccines were not as effective as the mRNA vaccines by Pfizer and Moderna. Despite China's success early on, the CCP has chosen to carry on with the Zero-Covid policy. This was OK when they were dealing earlier variants, but the Omicron variant was more infectious. Recently Omicron has swept through China with amazing speed, far faster than anticipated. This has led to major lockdowns of major cities. The Yangtze River delta is one of the largest economic and production zones on the planet. Its shutdown has had wide reaching effects not only in China but around the world. It has essentially led countries to wonder about the long-term reliability of China as a supplier. The CCP has been unable to understand the problems they have created, nor have they understood the full implications for their citizens nor for its own or the world economies. It has certainly disrupted most supply chains.

China released its census data earlier this year after delaying its release for over six months. The bottom line is that China's demographics are declining at a much faster rate than expected. The fallout from the "one child policy" is now reaching the economy. One US estimate now places the Chinese population at 1.24B people as opposed to the slight gain according to official figures. What is known is that there are 40M fewer workers in China by their own estimates. One other factor that has essentially caught the CCP off guard is the growing number of university graduates who cannot get jobs. More than 10M graduates were created last year. Jobs requiring this level are simply not available within China, especially with the crackdown on private enterprise. The CCP have created a perfect storm and they will start to feel the full effects.

Lastly, the Ukraine-Russia war has created further uncertainty. As mentioned in previous notes China has publicly sided with Russia but in practical terms has generally followed the sanctions imposed by the US and the EU. The country is already suffering from earlier sanctions from the US. A move to actually support Russia or to re-supply Russian systems would likely result in massive sanctions from the West. Although China is the number two economy, it needs the trade from the West more than Russia. At the same time, China also sees Russia as an ally but President Putin's actions have jeopardized China's move on the world stage. The CCP knows full well that the US, Japan, India and Australia are watching, and the ability of China to have any meaningful effect at the moment is almost nil. It is not a great position for a country which wishes to be number one.

Russia and Ukraine

The Russian Army has an establishment of about 1.2M soldiers, however, they have not been able to achieve this number for many years. It is closer to 900k. In 2008, the armed forces were re-organized into armies and brigade groups, taking more than 200 divisions with equipment down to 93 brigade groups that were initially fairly close to fully manned. The VDV or airborne forces were an exception but even there, although they were remaining with a division structure, the number of regiments was

dropped from three to two. Most of these divisions within the ground forces were paper only with older equipment; it was a good way to hide lots of senior officers with little real authority or responsibility. These were to be filled with reservists when the time came. In those days they had on paper some 20M names in the reserve. This was also cleaned up to a more reasonable number. The other part was the move towards a professional vice conscript army. This was done with the air force, navy, rocket forces and VDV being given access to “contractees” or professional soldiers. Unfortunately for the ground forces, they were still a conscript army. As part of the reform package conscripts only served one year and then were released; this has led to manpower shortages throughout the ground forces. The re-organization also did not create a non-commissioned officer corps as found in Western armies nor did it train their armed forces to allow for initiative at relatively junior levels. The army entering Ukraine was ill-prepared or briefed for the action to be taken. Thus far none of the prisoners who chose to speak seemed to have any understanding of why they ended up in Ukraine. Now we find ourselves at the second phase of Russian operations in Ukraine.

The Russians made a bloody withdrawal, leaving a large number of Ukrainians civilians dead due to war crimes. Most of the troops were withdrawn through Belarus and the Belgorod area. Units were reformed and re-equipped when possible. Some units were shattered and are essentially little more than shells. The new cunning plan according to Baldrick (sorry a Blackadder comment seems appropriate here) is for Russian forces to attack in the east and the south with the view in mind to ensure a land bridge to Crimea and to secure a route to Transnistria, currently a separatist mini-state carved out of Moldova. Currently, Russia is estimated to having 76 battalion tactical groups (BTG) in the area with 22 more refitting for a total of around 98 BTG. Mariupol still is holding out and has apparently managed a re-supply, but thousands of civilians are still trapped with some inside the “Azovstal” steel plant along with approximately 2000 Ukrainian members of the Marines and the Azov Regiment. These troops are holding down more than ten times their number and makes the city somewhat unsafe for the Russians. In the North, Russians have had some success taking a series of towns. It appears that they are trying to trap a large portion of Ukrainian troops in a small pocket that they currently occupy in western Luhansk and Donetsk. In the south around Kherson, it is the Ukrainians that are making considerable headway, re-taking several villages around Kherson. Attempts by Russian authorities to replace Ukrainian administrations have failed. Ukrainian citizens continue to demonstrate against Russian appointed staff. The “referendum” due to occur this week in that area has been postponed. Reality is that Kherson is occupied and Ukraine is limited to smaller counterattacks. The bottom line is that Russians have not been able to progress in this area.

The biggest issue is time. For the Russians, can they make their offensive work using battered units fast enough before Ukraine gets all the war material being sent by NATO? For the Ukrainians, can they move the material to where it is needed? There is another concern: Ukraine will transition to NATO weaponry and standards during this fight including tanks, armoured personnel carriers, armoured cars, artillery and possibly NATO aircraft. Certainly, former Warsaw Pact equipment is being dusted off and sent as well but continuation of this process will eventually produce a much better and powerful Ukrainian Armed Forces whilst Russia is unable to replace modern equipment. The longer the war the less able they will be able to repair and update more complex systems. Time is a friend to neither country in this conflict.

In Transnistria this week there were several explosions against a radio tower and the offices of the FSB and the Russian “peacekeeping force.” There were no casualties but the tower broadcasting Russian news was destroyed and the offices damaged. The Russians and local separatists have called this an act of terror and have suggested Ukrainians did the deed. Given Russia’s new plan could there be a false flag operation in effect. Residents of the breakaway area have been leaving for Moldova as a result. Moldova is calling for calm but has increased security.

Lastly, fuel and ammunition storage facilities were attacked in the Russian cities of Belgorod, Kursk and Voronezh early Wednesday morning. Although the Ukrainians did not admit to any attack on Russian soil, their spokesman apparently stated that karma is cruel in answer to the question. If it is true that they once again attacked into Russia, it shows a widening of the war and also points out that Russia is not immune. These cities provided notable support to the Russian attack. They are all rail hubs, vital for Russian re-supply.

In answer to NATO stating that member countries' ambassadors and staff would be returning to Ukraine's capital, Russian spokesperson stated that they could be targeted with long range missiles given their military support to Ukraine.

The bottom line is this: Ukraine will need a lot of money and support to re-build the country. Russia is rapidly becoming an economic basket case due to sanctions and their long-term inability to diversify. Sanctions are slower, but these latest ones are decisive and will destroy the Russian economy. China and the CCP knows there is more to lose if they prop up the weakened Putin regime. The US and others have concluded that after this war, it is essential that Russia no longer have the capacity to attack its neighbours.

There are many other areas of the world needing a look see, as I have said in past, so many challenges so little time to look at significant conflicts.