



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

Dispatches

27 May 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

New: 13 June, Monday - Brookings Institution and the Lawfare Institute webinar "Allies: How American failed its partners in Afghanistan." 10:30 - 11:30 am EDT. To register: <https://connect.brookings.edu/register-to-watch-allies>

16 June, Thursday - Naval Association of Canada conference "Submarines: Canada's Strategic Requirement." 0900-1500 EDT. Via GoToMeeting. "To examine the strategic factors influencing a future Canadian submarine procurement project." To register: <https://nac-o.wildapricot.org/event-4820587>

Emended: 29 June, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker by Lieutenant-Colonel Hope Carr, 5th Canadian Division Headquarters, "Op PRESENCE: Civil-Military Capacity Building for UN Peace Operations." 1300-1500. Cambridge Military Library. Call-to-meeting will be emailed soon.

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

New: RUSI(NS) Presentation "No. 2 Construction Battalion: A Short History & an Apology" by Colonel (retired) John Boileau, 25 May 22, <https://rusi-ns.ca/no-2-construction-battalion/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Ship-to-Shore Connector Barges," 10 May 2022, <https://rusi-ns.ca/ship-to-shore-connector>

RUSI(NS) Comments "The Rise and Fall of Military Strategic Communications at National Defence 2015-2021: A Cautionary Tale for Canada and NATO, and a Roadmap for Reform" by Brett Boudreau, 9 May 2022, https://rusi-ns.ca/military_strategic_communications/

RUSI(NS) Comments "What should an enlarged Canadian navy look like?" by Ken Hansen, 6 April 2022, <https://rusi-ns.ca/enlarged-canadian-navy/>

Royal Alberta United Services Institute Note "Capability Gaps in U.S. and Canadian Forces," 18 April 2022, <https://rausi.ca/news/rausi-takes-note-of/514-capability-gaps-in-u-s-and-canadian-forces>

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 25 May 2022
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Company of Master Mariners of Canada Maritimes Division *Foghorn*, April 2022

Edmonton United Services Institute *President's Enews*, April 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 5, May 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, May 2022
<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/120-rausi-dispatches-may-2022>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, May 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 1st Quarter 2022


Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 12, Issue 3, 16 May 2022

United Services Institute of Nanaimo and North Island *Newsletter* Vol 30 No 04, April 2022

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* May 2022
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute>

Tweeted by @RUSI NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>RUSI @RUSI_org 16 May tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 'Currently, however, the global public are won over by #Ukraine; the country's collective soul is far more compelling on the international stage than Putin's delusions of grandeur' writes @EmmaButcher_ in the latest #RUSICommentary. (War of Narratives: Russia and Ukraine https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/war-narratives-russia-and-ukraine)</p>	
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
RUSI @RUSI_org May 17 tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 'In finally unlocking lethal assistance to a victim of armed aggression, Western capitals rediscovered – belatedly – the virtue of courage' writes @EHunterChristie in the latest #RUSICommentary.
 (Military Assistance to Ukraine: Rediscovering the Virtue of Courage
<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/military-assistance-ukraine-rediscovering-virtue-courage>)



RUSI @RUSI_org May 18 tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 'Despite the ostensibly self-evident need for a holistic understanding of the war, there tends to be little desire to analyse the strengths, weaknesses and intentions of one's allies' writes @jmichael424 in the latest #RUSICommentary.
 (Ukraine: The Daily Intelligence Event
<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-daily-intelligence-event>)



Canadian Armed Forces @CanadianForces 22 May tweeted: May 22 marks the completion of Exercise #MAPLERESOLVE 22. More than 3,200 soldiers from Canada, United States, and the United Kingdom participated in this force-on-force exercise.
<https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/05/exercise-maple-resolve-22-canadians-and-allies-successfully-tackle-new-challenges-and-complexities.html>



RUSI(NS) retweeted: Exercise scenario "DATE Europe focuses on creating a scenario centred on a deteriorating security situation in Eastern Europe. It theoretically proposes a situation where the Baltic States are invaded from the east by a fictional force (DONOVIA) and NATO is required to respond."

RCAF Operations @RCAFOperations May 19 tweeted: The @RCAF_ARC marked an important milestone this spring: the Block-IV CP-140 Aurora completing its first operational deployment, using its highly-advanced sensor suite on #OpCARIBBE to support @JIATFS-led efforts to counter trafficking of illegal narcotics. @CFoperations
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: #OpCARIBBE = CAN-US counter-narcotics ops in Caribbean Sea & eastern Pacific Ocean
<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-caribbe.html> Block IV last phase of Aurora Incremental Modernization Project to acquire, integrate & install new mission systems & sensors onto CP140 a/c for intell, surveillance & recce



Dr Sarah Lockyer @S_Lockyer May 10 tweeted: DAY 3: Today we start analyzing skeletal remains. I say "we" because the @CanadianForces Forensic Odontology Response Team is with me. Yes, CAF has forensic dentists! Major Tiffany Kisway will do a full dental analysis to compare against dental records in personnel files.
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: .@CanadianForces Forensic Odontology Response Team, aids @NationalDefence Casualty Identification Program https://rusi-ns.ca/casualty_identificaton_program/ & civil authorities in Disaster Victim Identification (DVI). See: "The Royal Canadian Dental Corps: Forensic Odontology" <https://www.cda-adc.ca/en/services/essentials/2015/issue3/files/assets/common/downloads/publication.pdf#26>



The Naval Association of Canada @navalassn 17 May tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: We're doing a lot of thinking about Canada's Strategic Need for #Submarines. You might want to review our current capabilities. <https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/BN5-submarines.pdf>
 (Canada's Submarine Assets)



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 19 May tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Putin's primary focus remains trying to undo the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union and loss of Russian influence and control over its near-abroad neighbours.
 (After Ukraine: Russia's Strategic Outlook <https://cdainstitute.ca/charles-davies-after-ukraine-russias-strategic-outlook/>)



RAS-NSA @RAS_NSA 24 May tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: #HotTakes | In his latest publication, Emerging Scholar @TancredeJankow1 (@SciencePo_UdeM) argues that learning from the war in Ukraine and its informational field will reduce the vulnerability of democracies to digital interference.
 (The Info War in Ukraine <https://ras-nsa.ca/the-info-war-in-ukraine/>)



Skies Magazine @SkiesMag 19 May tweeted: How a delay to CC-295 operations could impact RCAF search-and-rescue: <https://skiesmag.com/news/how-delay-cc-295-operations-impact-rcaf-search-and-rescue/>
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: Operation Salus = @RCAF_ARC short-term mitigation strategy, relocating detachment of two 435 Squadron CC-130H Hercules, aircrew, maintainers from Winnipeg to Comox in support Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Victoria search & rescue operations



Humour in Information Operations

The Ukrainians are winning the information operations war against the Russians, albeit it is a dark humour too many times.

Yaroslav Trofimov @yarotrof 22 May 22 tweeted: On day 88 of the war, Russian tanks have finally entered Kyiv.



Brian Santarpia @BrianSantarpia 23 May tweeted: Great thread that deserves the consideration of strategists and force developers. I think the most important point is that warfare is complex and requires deep study if we are to make the right choices for future capability requirements.

<https://twitter.com/BretDevereaux/status/1528581923446181898>

(A Whole Age of Warfare Sank With the Moskva)



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Canada must learn to play hardball on cyber deterrence

<https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/canada-must-learn-to-play-hardball-on-cyber-deterrence-alex-wilner-in-the-ottawa-citizen>

"First, we need to develop the resolve to punish adversaries for their aggression."

"Second, we must expand our capability to actually respond to cyber aggression."

"Third, we need to communicate our cyber deterrence posture."

A good strategic message, communicating our cyber deterrence posture.



The Emergence of Physically Mediated Cyberattacks?

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/emergence-physically-mediated-cyberattacks>

"Physical violence against personnel in lawless environments as an element of cyberattack is another dimension of cyber conflict, and its importance has been neglected for way too long."



Frigate factory could be coming to the Clyde

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/frigate-factory-could-be-coming-to-the-clyde/>

"With the news that welds on the first Type 26 Frigate are deforming because the ship is being assembled outside, more information has emerged over plans to build a 'frigate factory' on the Clyde."



Puts into perspective the effort, cost and time to erect building halls such as Irving Shipbuilding expended under the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) for the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship and Canadian Surface Combatant projects. Canada has invested in significant strategic capabilities with its NSS yards. We need to ensure there is a steady flow of building so that we retain the people and the infrastructure.

Canadian-donated howitzers prove deadly to Russian forces in Ukraine

<https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-donated-howitzers-prove-deadly-to-russian-forces-in-ukraine>

"Canada also reportedly sent Ukraine an undisclosed number of 'Excalibur' rounds; computer-controlled artillery shells that can guide themselves to a pre-determined target. After being fired, tiny wings spring out of the Excalibur, which then steer it to its destination using GPS data."



It's not just a simple matter of donating a number of guns. Towing vehicles, ammunition carrying vehicles, fire control systems, training and ammunition all are part of the gun system, and part of an effective donation. The Excalibur rounds multiply tremendously the effect of providing just four howitzers.

From Twitter: This will add 10km to the reach of Ukrainian M777 155mm guns (to 40km), plus three meter accuracy.

Shilo-based troops heading from Manitoba to Latvia to assist in Canada's Operation Reassurance

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/operation-reassurance-cfb-shilo-manitoba-latvia-1.6462603>

"The Canadian Armed Forces says approximately 1,455 troops are deployed in the mission, making it Canada's largest current international military operation. Of the troops there are:

- Roughly 500 sailors onboard two frigates, operating with NATO.
- 695 soldiers leading a NATO enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group in Latvia.
- 140 members of the Royal Canadian Air Force and approximately 5 CF-188 Hornet aircraft participating in - NATO enhanced Air Policing, and one CP-140 Aurora long range patrol aircraft.
- 120 soldiers in Poland to assist with efforts to support and care for Ukrainians fleeing violence."



Canada needs a 'more consistent' presence in North to bolster security, Inuit leader says

<https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thehouse/duane-smith-canada-presence-arctic-defence-1.6462260>

"Small military base would at least serve 'optics' purpose ..."

"... close co-operation with and investment in northern Indigenous communities as key to security in the region."

Whether at home or abroad, as matters of foreign, security and defence policies, being there consistently is much better than episodically showing up.



Philippine Coast Guard Stakes Out "Sovereign Markers" in S. China Sea

<https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/philippine-coast-guard-stakes-out-sovereign-markers-in-s-china-sea>

"In order to assert control over its waters in the face of aggressive Chinese inroads, the Philippine Coast Guard has begun installing navigation buoys that serve as 'sovereign markers' near five disputed islands in the Spratly archipelago."

This could make for interesting tit-for-tat 'buoy wars.' In support of sovereignty and fishing, noting that the buoys have sensing and reporting capabilities to what appear to be local portable/modular coast guard command posts. Lessons for Canada? Especially for inter-departmental co-ordination?



World leaders discuss deploying naval coalition to the Black Sea to help ship Ukrainian grain

<https://splash247.com/world-leaders-discuss-deploying-naval-coalition-to-the-black-sea-to-help-ship-ukrainian-grain/>

Blockade busting would be an interesting topic to discuss and plan. All the legalities and practicalities.



Other Sources:

#Arctic

Canadian Arctic Defence Policy: A Synthesis of Key Documents, 1970-2013

<https://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/dcass/82112.pdf>

#China

Fighting the CCP's Diplomatic Warfare Against Taiwan

https://www.theepochtimes.com/fighting-the-ccps-diplomatic-warfare-against-taiwan_4472454.html

"A definition of diplomatic warfare is the use of diplomacy to influence international bodies (such as the United Nations), other nations, and domestic audiences to support a course of action that benefits one nation while impairing another country."

The article is linked to the monograph "Recognizing and Adapting to Unrestricted Warfare Practices by China" which is available on request to RUSI(NS).



#command

Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century

book: <https://wavellroom.com/2022/05/17/something-rotten-jim-storr/>

#cyber operations #deception

The Science of Cyber and the Art of Deception

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/05/18/the-science-of-cyber-and-the-art-of-deception/>

#defence

Hedgehogs and foxes

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1526302123083718657.html>

This is more than just about hedgehogs and foxes, for those who know the analogy.

#drones

We Need a New Law to Counter Domestic Drone Threats

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/05/we-need-new-law-counter-domestic-drone-threats/367347/>
Canada, too?

28-Drone Swarm Just Led The Way For A Simulated Air Assault Mission

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/28-drone-swarm-just-paved-way-for-simulated-army-air-assault-mission>

"ALE is shorthand for various unmanned systems launched from aircraft that can then be controlled by the aircraft crew or fly autonomously and feed information back to both the helicopter and networked ground troops."

One operator controlling 28 drones. Science fiction is now.

Navy Funding Drone that Can Fly for 10 Days Straight

<https://thedebrief.org/navy-funding-drone-that-can-fly-for-10-days-straight/>

#wargaming #Indo-Pacific

Massive Drone Swarm Over Strait Decisive In Taiwan Conflict Wargames

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/massive-drone-swarm-over-strait-decisive-in-taiwan-conflict-wargames>

#Indo-Pacific

Asymmetric warfare does not equal asymmetric weapons

<https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4548206>

#information operations

With Propaganda, Kremlin Seeks to Weaponize Its Version of History

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/with-propaganda-kremlin-seeks-to-weaponize-its-version-of-history/>

#intelligence

Open-Source Data is Everywhere — Except the Army's Concept of Information Advantage

<https://mwi.usma.edu/open-source-data-is-everywhere-except-the-armys-concept-of-information-advantage/>

#legal

What rights do prisoners of war have under international law?

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/20/ukraine-russia-war-prisoners-international-law/>

#NATO

NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china>

NATO Must Contest Russian Moves in Its Southern Underbelly

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/05/nato-must-contest-russian-moves-its-southern-underbelly/367335/>

Strategic considerations.

#Ukraine-Russia War

Ukraine Is in Worse Shape than You Think

<https://time.com/6176748/ukraine-war-economy/>

The war to rebuild Ukraine will be ongoing long after the shooting stops.

Learning from the Ukraine-Russia War

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1527847017635991552.html>

Note the books, e.g., Center for Army Lessons Learned "Establishing a Lessons Learned Program"

<https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/11-33.pdf>

Consider Designating Russia as a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern

<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/05/20/russia-jurisdiction-primary-money-laundering/>

Does Canada have similar empowerments?

A little terrain analysis from Eastern Ukraine

<https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2022/05/a-little-terrain-analysis-from-eastern.html>

U.S. intelligence document shows Russian naval blockade of Ukraine

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/05/24/naval-blockade-food-supply-ukraine-russia/>

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 25

<https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25>

Institute for the Study of War continues its excellent daily assessments.

#drones

Seven (Initial) Drone Warfare Lessons from Ukraine

<https://mwi.usma.edu/seven-initial-drone-warfare-lessons-from-ukraine/>

Incredible Success Of Ukraine's Bayraktar TB2: The Ghost Of Snake Island

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/05/surprising-success-of-ukraines-bayraktar-tb2-the-ghost-of-snake-island/>

#information operations

What to Expect from Russia on the Information War Front?

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/what-to-expect-from-russia-on-the-information-war-front/>

#intelligence


Intelligence and War: Does Secrecy Still Matter?

<https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/intelligence-and-war-does-secrecy-still-matter/>

#space #intelligence

New Satellite Blues and the war in Ukraine – is the UK ready to capitalize on commercial satellite imagery?

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/05/20/new-satellite-blues-and-the-war-in-ukraine-is-the-uk-ready-to-capitalize-on-commercial-satellite-imagery/>



The slide features a dark blue background with a faint map of Ukraine. In the top left corner is the Defence Intelligence logo, and in the top right corner is the text 'UPDATE ON UKRAINE 21 May 2022'. A yellow horizontal bar contains the title 'INTELLIGENCE UPDATE'. Below this, three bullet points discuss the role of UAVs, reconnaissance strikes, and crewed aircraft in the conflict.

Defence Intelligence

UPDATE ON UKRAINE
21 May 2022

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- The Russia-Ukraine war has seen Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) playing a pivotal role for both sides although they have suffered a high rate of attrition. UAVs have proved vulnerable both to being shot down and to electronic jamming.
- Russia has attempted to implement the concept of 'Reconnaissance Strike' it refined in Syria, which uses reconnaissance UAVs to identify targets to be struck by combat jets or artillery. Russia is likely experiencing a shortage of appropriate reconnaissance UAVs for this task, which is exacerbated by limitations in its domestic manufacturing capacity resulting from sanctions.
- Crewed Russian aircraft mostly continue to avoid conducting sorties over Ukrainian territory, likely because of the threat from intact Ukrainian air defence missiles systems. If Russia continues to lose UAVs at its current rate, Russian forces intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability will be further degraded, negatively impacting operational effectiveness.

#warfare

A Whole Age of Warfare Sank With the Moskva

<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/ukraine-russia-moskva-military-marine-corps/629930/>

#Russia

The Russian Way of Warfare

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE231/RAND_PE231.pdf

Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements

<https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-19-1004-russian-military-thought-concepts-elements.pdf>

Russia's Military Was Doomed by Putin's Culture of Militarism

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30563/for-russian-military-russia-s-culture-of-militarism-was-toxic>

This article is more about warfare than about Russia.

"The first (key insight) is the fundamental distinction Vagts makes between militarism and what he describes as the 'military way.'"

The second key insight: "Warfare presents constantly shifting logistical, technological and social challenges, so those pursuing the military way need to be willing and able to adapt swiftly if they are to survive."

Other:

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

Hurricane season is about to begin on 1 June and run until 30 November 2022. The Canadian Hurricane Centre estimates that it will be an above average year which is normally around 14 named storms. We have also been greeted by a busier than normal fire season with several large fires in NS already worse than the previous seven years combined. Domestic issues will always be there and there will be a need for effective emergency management that will need the efforts of all the levels of government. Better to organize before the need rather than in the middle of a need (disaster).

On to foreign issues. Canada has announced that it will be sending more artillery and 20k rounds of 155mm for those guns at a cost of \$98m. These rounds allow the new guns to remain outside of the range of most Russian artillery, at the same time providing accurate fire on Russian targets. This will be badly needed in the coming days as the Russians ramp up yet another offensive.

Canada finally has announced that it will ban Huawei and ZTE equipment from Canadian communication networks. Unfortunately it is very late and our 4G system is full of Huawei and ZTE equipment. Companies have been given time to remove the equipment, although many in the cyber-security industry say too little, too late, but it is in keeping with the lack of concern about all types of security and defence issues, not only in government but throughout Canadian society in large part.

Huawei and ZTE have both denied the national security issue as have the Chinese Embassy which stated:

Remarks of the Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Canada on the Canadian Government's Decision to Ban Huawei and ZTE Products

驻加拿大大使馆

2022-05-20 11:57

On May 19, 2022, the Canadian Government announced to prohibit the inclusion of Huawei and ZTE products and services in Canada's telecommunications systems under the pretext of the so-called national security, and claimed that this decision was made after the assessment by independent security agencies and consultation with Canada's closest allies. The Chinese side expresses its grave concerns and strong dissatisfaction to this.

The Chinese government always requires Chinese enterprises operating overseas to strictly abide by international rules and local laws and regulations. Facts have proved that Huawei and ZTE have been maintaining a very good record on network security. Without any solid evidence, the Canadian side decided to exclude Huawei and ZTE from the Canadian market under the pretext of the so-called national security, which has flagrantly overstretched the concept of national security, blatantly violated market economy principles and free trade rules, and undermined the legitimate rights and interests of related Chinese enterprises. The Canadian side claimed it had consulted with its allies over the decision. To put it bluntly, the Canadian side is acting in collusion with the United States to suppress Chinese enterprises. Canada's so-called security concerns are nothing but a cover for political manipulation.

I want to emphasize that the erroneous actions of the Canadian side will certainly harm Canada's own interests and international image. China will evaluate this development in a comprehensive and serious manner and take all necessary measures to protect the legitimate and legal rights and interests of Chinese enterprises.

Australia found that the influence of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) was far reaching including into national politics. Canada is not immune. It is estimated that over 80% of the Chinese language press receives money from the CCP's United Front (the propaganda arm of the party). It affected our last election as it influenced up to 20 parliamentary seats by media estimates as the Chinese language press supported candidates more supportive of Beijing. Even our own prime minister has received money for the publication of his own book and a reprint of his father's book before his first election. The CCP can and will use people of influence within countries to further their cause and it can and will effect government policies in ways that leave us potentially exposed. Consideration should be given to excluding all foreign money for political purposes whether from the CCP or from right wing US sources or European environmentalists or at the very least force all organizations to be absolutely transparent about the sources of their funding, much more than is required now.

China

There are many Canadian leaders who have expressed a view that Canada needs to engage China for our own benefit. This actually is practical and as our second largest trade partner it makes sense. While this is pragmatic Canada and our government must be absolutely clear on what we are dealing with when we discuss China. China under the CCP is authoritarian; it represents only about 8% of the Chinese population and not the wishes of the population but rather emphasizes its own survival and power. It is at bare minimum culturally genocidal and anti-democratic, showing a tendency to imprison opposition or simply kill them or make them disappear. There is no 'rule of law' in that country as the courts are heavily controlled by the CCP as we saw with the Garrets and the 'Two Michaels' and more than a hundred other Canadians being held in Chinese prisons including four on death row. China is not a friend; it is not a trustworthy partner. It can and will use our own laws against us all the while preventing any real recourse within their 'justice system' heavily rigged against foreign individuals and companies. Every commitment Canada makes with this regime is subject to the whims of the CCP as we have seen with canola, beef, pork, and other products. They do not play fair, they play to win at the expense of all their partners.

The Quad, made up of the US, India, Japan and Australia, held a meeting in Japan this week. China ramped up air incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone and held major naval exercises independently and with Russia at the same time to try to intimidate the participants. They failed and ensured more unanimity than was possible. This particular meeting was interesting as the new Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, attended. China broke two years of diplomatic freeze to congratulate Mr Albanese on his election victory. There is hope in some portions of the Australian electorate to mend ties with China, but many are sceptical even now. China has continued to try to influence the Chinese diaspora to elect pro-Chinese members at all levels of government not only in Australia but in many democracies. It allows China to influence decisions that may impact heavily on Beijing's policies.

China's economy continues to have difficulties due to the CCP's zero Covid policy, the loss in foreign confidence in the Chinese economy, the flight of foreign and Chinese capital to safer countries and the meltdown of the Chinese property management industry. The zero Covid lockdown now affects more than 80 cities and therefore China's ability to meet contractual arrangements for goods and services. The area mainly affected is the Yangtze river delta where a major portion of Chinese manufacturing is located. This policy which worked for less contagious variants has proven to be disastrous for China's reputation as the world's factory. It will take years to recover from the effects of this policy decision if ever. In the meantime the world suffers from CCP decisions.

Iran

A colonel of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp was killed by two gunmen on a motorcycle as he arrived home on Sunday, 22 May 2022. Colonel Hassan Sayad Khodayari is believed to have been the planner for several attacks on Israeli targets in Thailand, Cyprus and also from Syria and Iraq. The colonel was allegedly working on the Iranian drone program and was considered a 'keeper of the sanctuary.' He apparently was instrumental in setting up the new drone factory in Tajikistan. Iran needless to say has vowed revenge on 'anti-revolution (groups) and agents of global arrogance,' a name for Israel and the US and allies. Iran's drones have been used in the Middle East including two flown from Gaza. US forces have also destroyed several in Iraq.

There has been a silver lining in the Russia Ukraine war, Russia has been undercutting Iran's oil sales around the world with many of Iran's customers choosing to purchase Russian oil rather than Iranian.

Both countries are under sanctions and both countries are extremely dependent on oil sales for their economies. This has caused considerable unrest as Iranian prices for basics have once again soared over 300% after government subsidies were cut for the general public. There have been major demonstration in over 40 cities and towns in Iran which called for the over throw of the regime. Iranian leadership has called out the IRGC and Basij Militia to deal with ongoing demonstrations which seem to be growing in size. There have been widespread arrests and injuries reported. The unofficial death toll stands at six. Despite the threats to the public, it is clear the regime is not widely supported by the public and it has increasingly has had to rely on brute force to keep power. As Mao stated 'all power comes from the barrel of a gun' still applies today unfortunately and it is the Iranian people who continue to suffer. It is expected that these current demonstrations will be put down again by irregular forces of the regime. One can also expect the regime to downplay casualties and the level of demonstrations. It may conduct some other operation outside the country to distract its citizens.

Russia, Ukraine Moldova and Belarus

The war that started on 24 February 2022 continues unabated. Both sides are making strong efforts to retain the initiative with varying degrees of results. It is not one sided as the Ukrainians have said they are losing about 100 fatalities today amongst combat troops. No matter how motivated, casualties will affect morale and the ability to continue the fight. Russia seems to be indifferent to the plight of its own troops who have taken immense losses in a short period. Time is not on Russia's side as sanctions are starting to affect even production of key weaponry and the ability to repair or modernize existing equipment. Pictures abound of Russian ad hoc solutions to difficult problems such as a civilian level global positioning system being used on their newest strike aircraft, the SU-34. Ukraine is receiving some of the newest kit available from NATO but their problem is to get the equipment and related gear and ammunition to the other side of the country while key transport systems are under fire. The situation could go badly for either party at the present time but as time goes on, it is likely to shift favourably towards Ukraine...but not yet.

Belarus is not actively participating at present but it has moved certain units of their special forces and air defence units near the Ukraine border. It isn't hostile in that the Belarussians are attacking but rather are a continued presence that has to be taken into account by Ukraine thus tying up Ukrainian troops that might be better used in the south and east.

Ukraine has suffered its biggest defeat to date and that is the defenders of Mariupol in the Azovstal plant have been forced to surrender after three months of resistance. More than two thousand have been forced to surrender. The troops have been handed over to the 'government of the Donetsk Peoples' Republic' or DPR. Ukraine has just tried one Russian sergeant for the murder of a unarmed 62 year old man. The young sergeant plead guilty and expressed some remorse. He was sentenced to life in prison. While a trial is good, it does leave Ukrainian prisoners in a bind, especially ones from the Azov Regiment, which Russia has trumpeted as Nazis. One can probably guess that there will be another type of trial, one with limited capacity for the world to interfere. There are already calls for executions from certain elements in the DPR. This could get very ugly, very fast.

The war has gone reasonably well for Ukraine in some respects; Kyiv and Kharkiv are cleared of Russian forces. Ukrainian troops continue to push Russian troops out of the northern border area with Russia. Some troops are left in place in areas providing good positions for the defence in the north but those going across the border are usually in a short refit period then redeployed to the east through Russia. This has allowed Russia to concentrate large groups of forces around Izyum and just north of the Kherson area. Russia's main effort appears to be eliminating Ukrainian troops from the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts completely at the same time hoping to surround the main Ukrainian force near Sieverodonetsk. Russia has had some success at the tactical level in trying to surround Ukrainian

forces but thus far they have been unable to close the ring although the entire 25 km gap is now under the range of Russian artillery. Ukrainian forces continue to hold most of the ground.

At one point, it seemed like the climax was going to occur within a relatively short time period of about two weeks. It seems that some aspects have come true as Ukraine was able to remove major threats to the capital and Kharkiv with considerable success. Russia has also changed its mission to a lesser goal, that of capturing the Donbass. They also seem to be willing to use other resources such as the Belarussians to keep Ukraine from using all its forces against them. They also seem to be willing to keep a force in place such that the entire north is under threat even though those units may be combat non-effective. There now seems to be a central direction to their actions unlike the start of the war. They seem to be taking smaller pieces of ground but with considerable thought in direction as opposed to a 'grand plan.' Their logistic lines are shorter from Russia allowing for a greater ability to re-supply. Their overall goal seems capable of being expanded if there is operational success such as the taking of a major portion of the Ukrainian Army in the Donbass. Could Russia then use this success to regain the full initiative and strike while Ukraine is still building? It is possible, but they are using up resources and manpower to do it without having a steady stream of replacements. They have to succeed now in a relatively short time and not later than 1 July 2022. Once Ukraine is fully mobilized and its forces trained and equipped by the West the pendulum will change its direction. The most likely estimate is that Ukraine will be able to conduct a comprehensive attack in late July and August with little to stop them conventionally. Russia does control the Black Sea to a point and has essentially stolen Ukraine's grain supply at Mariupol and there is little to stop this at this point. Russia's continued aggression puts several parts of the world at risk of starvation because of its actions. There may be little to stop this at present.

This raises the very real possibility of a nuclear response from Russia as it will be the only capability left to use. Putin has stated that he would only use this option if the state (meaning him) were in danger of falling. Hopefully, saner minds will stop this before it gets to this point, but the possibility is still there. Leaving Russia with any part of Ukraine would give rise to an ongoing war; at some point this has to be stopped.

Moldova is the stated second stop on President Putin's list. Moldova is tiny and is the poorest nation in Europe. It is currently requesting European Union membership with its relatively newly elected President Maia Sandu. Moldova's army is only 6k soldiers mainly equipped with small arms, mortars, light anti-armour weapons and a few armoured vehicles. It is mainly used for natural disasters and on the border with Transnistria, the breakaway portion of the country manned with 6k pro-Russian militia and 1.8k Russian peacekeepers. The EU has just recently announced that they will start supplying Moldova with military equipment before any conflict. The EU is taking pre-emptive measures to hopefully stop any aggression before it starts. In order to get to Moldova, Russia will have to take the remainder of the Ukrainian coastline, something they do not have the capacity to do at present.