



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

Dispatches

3 June 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

New: 10 June, Friday - Royal United Services Institute event "Ukraine, Connectivity and the Future of War." 1600-1700 BST. Online. To register: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/ukraine-connectivity-and-future-war>

16 June, Thursday - Naval Association of Canada conference "Submarines: Canada's Strategic Requirement." 0900-1500 EDT. Via GoToMeeting. "To examine the strategic factors influencing a future Canadian submarine procurement project." To register: <https://nac-o.wildapricot.org/event-4820587>

emended: 29 June, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker by Lieutenant-Colonel Hope Carr, 5th Canadian Division Headquarters, "Op PRESENCE: Civil-Military Capacity Building for UN Peace Operations." 1300-1500. **Cambridge Military Library**. Registration not required.

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Presentation "No. 2 Construction Battalion: A Short History & an Apology" by Colonel (retired) John Boileau, 25 May 22, <https://rusi-ns.ca/no-2-construction-battalion/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Ship-to-Shore Connector Barges," 10 May 2022, <https://rusi-ns.ca/ship-to-shore-connector>

RUSI(NS) Comments "The Rise and Fall of Military Strategic Communications at National Defence 2015-2021: A Cautionary Tale for Canada and NATO, and a Roadmap for Reform" by Brett Boudreau, 9 May 2022, https://rusi-ns.ca/military_strategic_communications/

RUSI(NS) Comments "What should an enlarged Canadian navy look like?" by Ken Hansen, 6 April 2022, <https://rusi-ns.ca/enlarged-canadian-navy/>

Royal Alberta United Services Institute Note "Capability Gaps in U.S. and Canadian Forces," 18 April 2022, <https://rausi.ca/news/rausi-takes-note-of/514-capability-gaps-in-u-s-and-canadian-forces>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 25 May 2022
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Company of Master Mariners of Canada Maritimes Division *Foghorn*, April 2022

Edmonton United Services Institute *President's Enews*, April 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 5, May 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, May 2022
<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/120-rausi-dispatches-may-2022>

New: Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, June 2022 Edition.

New: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies - Australia *United Service*, Winter 2022, Vol. 73 No. 2
<https://www.rusi.com.au/Publications.php>

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 1st Quarter 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 12, Issue 3, 16 May 2022

United Services Institute of Nanaimo and North Island *Newsletter* Vol 30 No 04, April 2022

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* May 2022
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute>

Tweeted by @RUSI_NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Irving Shipbuilding @IrvingShipbuild 27 May tweeted: We are days away from the naming ceremony of the future HMCS Margaret Brooke & the future HMCS Max Bernays. We're looking back at the badging ceremony for the future HMCS Max Bernays, held at Halifax Shipyard earlier this year. Learn more about the badge: (HMCS Max Bernays <https://www.gg.ca/en/heraldry/public-register/project/3223>) RUSI(NS) retweeted: RUSI(NS) Information Note "Royal Canadian Navy Ship's Badge" <https://rusi-ns.ca/royal-canadian-navy-ships-badge/> RUSI(NS) Information Note "Warship Naming Ceremonies" <https://rusi-ns.ca/warship-naming-ceremonies/> *Badge unveilings appear to be getting more PR than they did in the past. Great to see Irving Shipbuilding take advantage of pointing at the Public Register of Arms for Canada.*




Joint Naming Ceremony of MARGARET BROOKE & MAX BERNAYS, 2nd & 3rd Arctic & Offshore Patrol Vessels being built for @RoyalCanNavy under Arctic & Offshore Patrol Ship #AOPS project <https://shipsforcanada.ca/our-stories/halifax-shipyard-marks-major-milestone-joint-naming> RUSI(NS) Info Note "Warship Naming Ceremonies" <https://rusi-ns.ca/warship-naming-ceremonies/>




Andrea Charron @AndreaCharron 30 May tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Jim Fergusson and I unpack continental defence which is more than @NORADCommand modernization. (Defending the Continent: NORAD Modernization and Beyond https://www.cgai.ca/defending_the_continent_norad_modernization_and_beyond)



Words & slides of presentation 25 May 2022 by Colonel (ret'd) John Boileau "No. 2 Construction Battalion: A Short History & an Apology" to RUSI(NS) and guests <https://rusi-ns.ca/no-2-construction-battalion/> Recognition of Canada's  Black Battalion. National apology to occur July 2022



Canadian Army @CanadianArmy May 31 tweeted: The tradition continues: Second-Lieutenant Jerome Downey serves with The Princess Louise Fusiliers of Halifax, N.S. His great-grandfather Private George A. Downey served with No.2 Construction Battalion (CEF). Canadian Army @CanadianArmy May 31 retweeted: Go to <https://no2-cef.ca> to learn about the planned National Apology to the only all-Black battalion-sized formation in Canadian military history. RUSI(NS) retweeted: Details about battalion & apology at presentation by Colonel (ret'd) John Boileau to RUSI(NS) & guests 29 May 2022 "No. 2 Construction Battalion: A Short




History & an Apology" <https://rusi-ns.ca/no-2-construction-battalion/>

See CANFORGEN 79/22 near end of Dispatches.

Jeff Collins @jeffreyfcollins 25 May tweeted: Why RCN's Op Projection matters "Washington increasingly uses the presence of its military and those of allies as deterrence...U.S. officials praise partner nations like Australia, Britain, **Canada** and France when their warships transit through the strait" (U.S. Speeds Up Reshaping of Taiwan's Defenses to Deter China

<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/us/politics/china-taiwan-military.html?smid=url-share>)

Though Canada does not do Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) - that is US doctrine.



The Naval Association of Canada @navalassn 25 May tweeted: Canada's Future Navy will comprise 15 Canadian Surface Combatants . The UK will have a mix of Type 26, Type 31 and Type 32 frigates Here's a guide to the capabilities of each of this mix.

(A guide to Britain's new frigate types

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/a-guide-to-britains-new-frigate-types/>)



Joetey Attariwala @JoeteyA 2 Jun tweeted: Breaking: Minister of Public Services and Procurement Canada just said that the @RCAF_ARC could receive its first @LockheedMartin F-35s in 2025! @CDRmagazine

Editor: Interesting. Not the way one expects big news. Not yet verified by official sources.



Joetey Attariwala @JoeteyA 2 Jun tweeted: Love the newly approved livery of the RCAF CH-149 Cormorant (AW101) search and rescue helicopter. Here is a view of what's to come once the aircraft are upgraded, as seen at the Leonardo Helicopters stand at #CANSEC2022

Editor: Not sure this is new. Same livery appears to feature in earlier stores (e.g.,

<https://www.airmedandrescue.com/latest/news/rcaf-marks-20th-anniversary-cormorant>). *Does highlight one has to check 'news.'*



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

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Towards Better Civilian Strategic Education: A Case for Tabletop Wargames

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/towards-better-civilian-strategic-education-a-case-for-tabletop-wargames/>



This is so on point. I was part of a unit that did the USMC University wargame during which we discussed whether the diplomats and politicians would be more informed if they knew the probable outcome of the military fight. Ukraine had virtually no long term hope of beating off the Russian attack, so a diplomatic ‘deal’ was paramount. Some possible actions to prevent/lessen the impact would also have been shown to be almost useless. Sanctions were never going to work if Russia had better sanction/denial of goods capability, as we are seeing in the wheat blockade and the gas and energy threats. I also keep reminding myself that few if any politicians have had real world/military experience – so it is as if we were giving surgical decisions to folks who had watched Grey’s Anatomy as the basis of their knowledge!

Canada Urgently Needs to Rethink Its National Security Strategy

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/canada-urgently-needs-rethink-its-national-security-strategy>



"First, Canada has not had a national security or foreign policy statement in over 15 years."

"Second, the government should ensure that its national security tools are up to date and fit for purpose."

"Third, Canada needs to revisit its national security governance framework."

"Finally, government needs to better engage the public."

Natural gas, rare earth minerals: What's at stake for Ukraine in the territory Russia is trying to conquer

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/natural-resources-ukraine-war-1.6467039>



"... all wars ultimately are about some kind of resource ..."

One Ocean, One War - The impact of a maritime perspective on land wars

<https://blog.usni.org/posts/2022/05/23/one-ocean-one-war>



"To use this leverage (that "sea-based mobility is still the central fact of maritime warfare, and it still makes sense to force a land power to disperse its strength"), the <insert name

of aspiring sea power here> must understand that there is only one ocean, over which ships and other maritime assets can maneuver more or less freely."

A lesson for Canadians, its leaders, general public and seafarers, especially naval. A counter to maritime blindness is to look at the world's oceans as one.

U.S. Ambassador says Canada didn't live up to its own hype on defence spending

<https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/u-s-ambassador-says-canada-didnt-live-up-to-its-own-hype-on-defence-spending>

"It's fair to say that although \$8 billion is more money, it was a little disappointing as matched against the rhetoric that we heard leading into the release of the budget."

An \$8 billion dollar budget promise is still rhetoric until it is turned into more people and equipment in defence. Until then, we are just talking and not walking.



A Canadian Indo-Pacific strategy must link aspiration to pragmatism

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-canadian-indo-pacific-strategy-must-link-aspiration-to-pragmatism/>

"... a Canadian IPS (Indo-Pacific Strategy) will likely be built upon these pillars: inclusive development, trade and economic resilience, climate change, maritime security, energy and critical mineral security, and middle-power diplomacy."

How much will a Canadian IPS reflect aspirations of the current Government of Canada (policy, really) and how much will be an actual strategy (a resourced plan towards objectives)?




Ship-to-Shore Connector Barges

Think Defence @thinkdefence tweeted 30 May 2022 (<https://twitter.com/thinkdefence/status/1531197265922121728>): Ship to shore

Think Defence makes a point for Canadian consideration. Canada is procuring four powered barges under the Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC) project [see RUSI(NS)

Information note "Ship-to-Shore Connector Barges" <https://rusi-ns.ca/ship-to-shore-connector/>]. The barges may or may not get type designated as YS. The transport of aircraft may not have been specifically listed as part of the requirements for the SSC, but with the capability as part of the Royal Canadian Navy, how the YS are used is only limited by imagination (and practicality and safety checks). Strong logistics makes for strong defence, security and safety.

The UK wits made use of the tweet to comment about small aircraft carriers. Hmm, for Canada, a YSH?



Other Sources:

#armour

On protection of armoured vehicles

<https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2022/05/on-protection-of-armoured-vehicles.html>

#Canadian Armed Forces

Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review (Arbour Report)

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/report-of-the-independent-external-comprehensive-review.html>

Climate change is increasing the strain on Canadian Armed Forces for emergency response

<https://www.hilltimes.com/2022/05/30/climate-change-is-increasing-the-strain-on-canadian-armed-forces-for-emergency-response/363668>

Time for military to scrap harmful traditions, structures: Arbour

<https://torontosun.com/news/national/time-for-military-to-scrap-harmful-traditions-structures-arbour>

Canada's military a 'broken system' that's a 'liability' to the country, report finds

<https://globalnews.ca/news/8872532/louise-arbour-report-canadian-forces-sexual-misconduct/>

Reforming Canada's military colleges will be a 'Herculean task,' experts say

<https://globalnews.ca/news/8881967/canada-military-colleges-arbour-report/>

#cyber operations

Going the Extra Mile: What It Takes to Be a Responsible Cyber Power

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/going-extra-mile-what-it-takes-be-responsible-cyber-power>

#defence policy

Towards Better Civilian Strategic Education: A Case for Tabletop Wargames

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/towards-better-civilian-strategic-education-a-case-for-tabletop-wargames/>

#drones

China launches an autonomous mothership full of autonomous drones

<https://newatlas.com/marine/china-autonomous-mothership>

Report to Congress on Anti-Drone Weapons

<https://news.usni.org/2022/06/01/report-to-congress-on-anti-drone-weapons>

Phoenix Ghosts are part drones, part missiles. How does that change combat?

<https://thebulletin.org/2022/06/phoenix-ghosts-are-part-drones-part-missiles-how-does-that-change-combat/>

#Indo-Pacific

China has the power to take Taiwan, but it would cost an extremely bloody price

<https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/31/asia/china-taiwan-invasion-scenarios-analysis-intl-hnk-ml/index.html>

Why a Taiwan Invasion Would Look Nothing Like D-Day

<https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/why-a-taiwan-invasion-would-look-nothing-like-d-day/>

#strategy

Reality Check #10: China will not invade Taiwan

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/reality-check/reality-check-10-china-will-not-invade-taiwan/>

#wargaming

In CNAS-Led Taiwan Wargame, No Air Superiority, No Quick Win

<https://www.airforcemag.com/in-cn-as-led-taiwan-wargame-no-air-superiority-no-quick-win/>

#NATO

The Reality of Energy Vulnerability for NATO & the EU

<https://security.frontline.online/article/2022/1/19043-The-Reality-of-Energy-Vulnerability-for-NATO-EU>

NATO Secretary General Interview: The West's Long Haul in Ukraine

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/05/ukraine-russia-nato-jens-stoltenberg-interview/661140/>

#maritime security

One Team, One Playground, Various Players: Maritime Security Approaches of European NATO Members

<https://pulaski.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/One-Team-One-Playground-Various-Players.-Maritime-Security-Approaches-of-European-NATO-Members.pdf>

#NORAD

Canada needs to get on with NORAD modernization

<https://www.hilltimes.com/2022/05/30/canada-needs-to-get-on-with-norad-modernization/363855>

#policing

Organized Crime Strategy

<https://security.frontline.online/article/2022/1/19042-Organized-Crime-Strategy>

Policies and Practices to Minimize Police Use of Force Internationally

<https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26582/policies-and-practices-to-minimize-police-use-of-force-internationally>

#Public Safety Canada

New Mandate Letters from Public Safety

<https://security.frontline.online/blogs/1114-Scott-Newark/19049-New-Mandate-Letters-from-Public-Safety>

From Public Safety Minister to:

RCMP Commissioner

President of the Canada Border Services Agency

Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada

#seapower #United States

The Navy Made America a Superpower Once. Can It Again?

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/30/us-navy-victory-at-sea-review-paul-kennedy-history/>

#strategy

Defining Grand Strategy

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/8/17/defining-grand-strategy>

#Ukraine-Russia War

Understanding the Russo-Ukrainian War: A Guide

<https://warontherocks.com/understanding-the-russo-ukrainian-war-a-guide-from-war-on-the-rocks/>

How Ukraine is using artillery to stop Russian forces in their tracks

<https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/ukraine-artillery-russia-invasion/>

Why Is the Kremlin Silent About Attacks on Russian Territory?

<https://jamestown.org/program/why-is-the-kremlin-silent-about-attacks-on-russian-territory/>

Russia's Military Has a Railroad Problem

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/21/russias-military-has-a-railroad-problem/>

Global Health Security and Ukraine: An Unhappy Alliance

<https://cdainstitute.ca/gemma-bowsher-global-health-security-and-ukraine-an-unhappy-alliance/>

What is America's end-game for the war in Ukraine?

<https://www.ft.com/content/315346dc-e1bd-485c-865b-979297f3fcf5?segmentID=7d17e2be-f805-4a42-dc3f-87fd464309c1&twclid=2-371far3i4fwjr7fk2sa0pqq8t>

Russian Military Is Repeating Mistakes in Eastern Ukraine, U.S. Says

<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/31/us/politics/russia-military-eastern-ukraine.html>

#Black Sea

Why the battle for the Black Sea may be the most important showdown in the war — for Ukraine and for the world

<https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/05/25/why-the-battle-for-the-black-sea-may-be-the-most-important-showdown-in-the-war-for-ukraine-and-for-the-world/>

Missiles and Escorts: Unblocking Ukraine's Ports on the Black Sea

<https://jamestown.org/program/ukraine-grain-blockade-escorts/>

Russia-Ukraine War: Break Putin's Blockade of Black Sea Wheat Ports

<https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-05-29/russia-ukraine-war-break-putin-s-blockade-of-black-sea-wheat-ports>

About those Ukrainian ton miles

<https://splash247.com/about-those-ukrainian-ton-miles/>

#information operations

Disinformation Fuelling Food Insecurity

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-fuelling-food-insecurity/>

#Russia

The Russian Military's People Problem

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-05-18/russian-militarys-people-problem>

#space

Russia's Space Satellite Problems and the War in Ukraine

<https://jamestown.org/program/russias-space-satellite-problems-and-the-war-in-ukraine/>

The graphic is a dark blue rectangular box with a yellow horizontal bar at the top. On the left, it features the Defence Intelligence logo. On the right, it says 'UPDATE ON UKRAINE 30 May 2022'. The main title 'INTELLIGENCE UPDATE' is in white text on the yellow bar. Below the bar, there are three bullet points in white text.

Defence Intelligence

UPDATE ON UKRAINE
30 May 2022

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russia has likely suffered devastating losses amongst its mid and junior ranking officers in the conflict. Brigade and battalion commanders likely deploy forwards into harm's way because they are held to an uncompromising level of responsibility for their units' performance. Similarly, junior officers have had to lead the lowest level tactical actions, as the army lacks the cadre of highly trained and empowered non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who fulfil that role in Western forces.
- The loss of large proportion of the younger generation of professional officers will likely exacerbate its ongoing problems in modernising its approach to command and control. More immediately, battalion tactical groups (BTGs) which are being reconstituted in Ukraine from survivors of multiple units are likely to be less effective due to a lack of junior leaders.
- With multiple credible reports of localised mutinies amongst Russia's forces in Ukraine, a lack of experienced and credible platoon and company commanders is likely to result to a further decrease in morale and continued poor discipline.

#veterans

Government failing disabled veterans with delays, long wait times: AG

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/injured-ill-veterans-still-face-unacceptable-delays-for-federal-assistance-ag-1.5925833>

and

2022 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada to the Parliament of Canada "Report 2—Processing Disability Benefits for Veterans"

https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_202205_02_e_44034.html

#war

War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First Century Great Power Competition and Conflict

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/05/25/war-transformed-mick-ryan/>

The book's author (whose tweet threads have several times been posted to *Dispatches*) is one to pay attention.

#warfare

A UK Joint Methodology for Assuring Theatre Access

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/whitehall-reports/uk-joint-methodology-assuring-theatre-access>

War Will Never Be This Bulky Again

<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/ukraine-russia-putin-war/638423/>

Other:

Commander's Priorities

Extract from the speech by VAdm Topshee upon assuming command of the RCN, 30 May 2022:

And so now I will turn to my priorities as Commander of the Navy. First and foremost we must attract, recruit, and train as many sailors as possible, from across the full spectrum of Canadians. Mon principal objectif est d'attirer, de recruter et de former le plus grand nombre possible de marins venant de toutes les sphères de notre société. And we must retain those who have already made the choice to serve Canada in the Navy. To do this, we have to ensure that our culture is correct. That we have created a welcoming, inclusive and enabling environment where everyone, military and civilian, full and part time, feels as though belong and they are contributing to their full potential – and that their work is valued and appreciated. Nous devons-nous assurer que nous prenons soin de notre personnel et de leurs familles. Il faut que nous respections toujours la dignité de toute personne, que nous servions le Canada avant nous-mêmes et que nous obéissions à l'autorité légale et que nous l'appuyions.

Second, we must design, build, and deliver the future fleet. Thanks to the dedicated efforts of my predecessors and their hard working teams, you can see behind me that we have already made substantial progress in this regard. We must sustain this momentum and that is not just about the ships themselves (mais évidemment ils sont pas mal importants!) We must build the infrastructure we will need to operate and enable them in a digital age. We must design the training that will be required. And we must reshape our trades and personnel structures to ensure that we are ready to take full advantage of this great new fleet that Canada is building for us.

Finally, we must be ready. Il faut qu'on soit prêt. L'état de préparation est la qualité la plus importante de la Marine royale canadienne. Je suis extrêmement fier de notre héritage de premier intervenant du Canada en cas de guerre et de crise. HMC Ships have sailed immediately upon the outbreak of every war that Canada has fought and served with distinction. We have a long history of being ready to help – whether through lifesaving at sea, humanitarian assistance abroad or disaster response here at home – by our ships and by our 24 great naval reserve divisions across Canada.

The full speech is available on request to RUSI(NS).



Vice-Admiral Topshee's Flag Hoist Signal



I am proud to assume command of the Royal Canadian Navy. In this era of diminished trust in senior leadership, I recognize that I must earn your confidence. I promise that the RCN will place as much importance on character as it does on competence and that we will be fair, equitable, and transparent in facing the challenges that confront our navy today.

My main focus and the top priority for the RCN is to attract, recruit, and train as many sailors as possible from across the full spectrum of Canadians. This will take a collective effort across the entire institution. Success here will ease the burden on all those sailors who are working hard to overcome our present shortage of personnel.

We can only succeed if we create a welcoming, inclusive and enabling environment for our new sailors as well as everyone serving today. I am committed to ensuring that every member of the Navy team, military and civilian, part time and full time, is empowered to perform to their full potential and that they never doubt that we value and appreciate their hard work.

Finally, world events have made it clear that we must be a Navy that is Ready to Fight. I sincerely hope that we are never tested in combat but, should that come to pass, we must be ready as the lives of our sailors and shipmates depend upon it. That starts by being honest about how things are, not how we want them to be.

Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee,
38th Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy

Editor: for those who don't recognize the signal hoist ('read flags'), it's Charlie Numeral Three, Numeral Eight. VAdm Topshee is the 38th CRCN.

Military Strategy Magazine Volume 8, Issue 1

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/>

contents:

The Strategy of the Mind: Maoism and Culture War in the West

The Persistence of America's Way of Battle

Flexible Response and Integrated Deterrence at Sea in the 21st Century: Implications for the U.S. Navy

Practice Makes Perfect for Battlefield Coalitions

Towards Better Civilian Strategic Education: A Case for Tabletop Wargames

What is the Utility of the Principles of War?

US Air University *Æther*: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower

<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AetherJournal/>

contents:

Ten Propositions Regarding Great Power Politics

NATO at 70: Peace in a Changing Security Environment

US Conventional Deterrence and Taiwan's Independence: Necessary Investments

Nuclear Targeting Methods and Modern Deterrence

Nuclear Modernization and the Sentinel ICBM

Multi-Actor Deterrence: Defining the Concept

Not Cyberwar, but Cyberbalance



Do you receive health care benefits using your VAC, RCMP or CAF issued Health Care Identification Card?

If so, we need your feedback to improve how health benefits are authorized and reimbursed.

Visit Let's Talk Veterans (<https://letstalkveterans.ca/>) before 8 June 2022 to provide your input.

Sincerely,
Stakeholder Engagement and Outreach Team
Veterans Affairs Canada

Editor - see: Health Claims Processing (<https://letstalkveterans.ca/health-claims-processing>)

C ARMY
CANFORGEN

UNCLAS
SIC WAA
CANFORGEN 79/22 CMP 40/22
BILINGUAL MESSAGE/MESSAGE BILINGUE
SUBJ: NO. 2 CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, CEF / HONOURS AND PERPETUATION
REFS: A. GENERAL ORDER 6 OF 1928, CONDITIONS OF AWARD OF BATTLE
HONOURS FOR THE GREAT WAR 1914-1919
B. THE PRINCIPLES AND ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR THE AWARD OF CANADIAN
FORCES BATTLE HONOURS, 18 OCTOBER 2011
1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS CANFORGEN IS TO RECOGNIZE NO. 2 CONSTRUCTION
BATTALION, CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (CEF) FOR ITS DISTINGUISHED
SERVICE DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR. A REVIEW OF HISTORICAL RECORDS
HAS DETERMINED THAT THIS BATTALION IS ELIGIBLE FOR BATTLE HONOURS IAW
REF A AND CAN BE PERPETUATED IAW REF B. RAISED ON THE INFANTRY LIST,
IT IS DEEMED TO BE COMBATANT, THEREFORE ELIGIBLE FOR BATTLE HONOURS
AND TO BE PERPETUATED BY A COMBATANT UNIT
2. IAW WITH REF A, THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF (CDS) HAS APPROVED THE
ALLOCATION OF THE BATTLE HONOUR QUOTE FRANCE AND FLANDERS, 1917-18
UNQUOTE TO NO. 2 CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, CEF
3. IAW WITH REF B, THE CDS HAS APPROVED THE PERPETUATION OF NO. 2
CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, CEF BY THE BRANCH OF CANADIAN MILITARY
ENGINEERS AND BE PUBLICLY RECOGNIZED BY 4 ENGINEER SUPPORT REGIMENT
4. THE AWARDED OF THIS LONG OVERDUE BATTLE HONOUR, SERVES AS A MEANS
TO CELEBRATE AND HIGHLIGHT THE SIGNIFICANT AND DISTINGUISHED EFFORTS
OF ALL MEMBERS OF NO. 2 CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, CEF DURING THE GREAT
WAR. THIS HONOUR ALSO HIGHLIGHTS NATIONAL DEFENCE S COMMITMENT
TOWARDS CULTURE CHANGE BY CORRECTING THIS LONG STANDING HISTORICAL
INJUSTICE AND ADDRESSING SYSTEMIC RACISM. THE PERPETUATION OF NO. 2
CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, CEF WILL ENSURE THAT IDENTITY AND HONOURS
GAINED BY THIS UNIT WILL ENDURE IN THE CAF AND DND
5. QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DISPLAY OF THE BATTLE HONOUR AND
PERPETUATION CAN BE DIRECTED TO THE DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY AND
HERITAGE BY EMAIL AT DHH6HERITAGE-DHP6PATRIMOINE AT FORCES.GC.CA

OBJ : NO. 2 CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, DU CORPS EXPEDITIONNAIRE CANADIEN/HONNEURS ET PERENNISATION
REFERENCES : A. ORDRE GENERAL NO. 6 DE 1928, CONDITIONS D ATTRIBUTION DES HONNEURS DE GUERRE POUR LA GRANDE GUERRE 1914-1919
B. LES PRINCIPES ET LES CRITERES D ADMISSIBILITE POUR L ATTRIBUTION DES HONNEURS DE GUERRE DES FORCES CANADIENNES, 18 OCTOBRE 2011
1. LE PRESENT CANFORGEN VISE A SOULIGNER LE SERVICE DISTINGUE DU NO. 2 CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, DU CORPS EXPEDITIONNAIRE CANADIEN (CEC) PENDANT LA PREMIERE GUERRE MONDIALE. UN EXAMEN DES DOCUMENTS HISTORIQUES A PERMIS DE DETERMINER QUE CE BATAILLON EST ADMISSIBLE AUX HONNEURS DE GUERRE CONFORMEMENT A LA REFERENCE A ET PEUT ETRE PERENNISE CONFORMEMENT A LA REFERENCE B. INSCRIT SUR LA LISTE DE L INFANTERIE, LE BATAILLON EST CONSIDERE COMME COMBATTANT, DONC ADMISSIBLE AUX HONNEURS DE GUERRE ET PEUT ETRE PERENNISE PAR UNE UNITE COMBATTANTE
2. CONFORMEMENT A LA REFERENCE A, LE CHEF D ETAT-MAJOR DE LA DEFENSE (CEMD) A APPROUVE L ATTRIBUTION DE L HONNEUR DE GUERRE CIT FRANCE ET FLANDRES, 1917-18 FINCIT AU NO. 2 CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, CEC
3. CONFORMEMENT A LA REFERENCE B, LE CEMD A APPROUVE LA PERENNISATION DU NO. 2 CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, CEC, PAR LE GENIE MILITAIRE CANADIEN ET LA RECONNAISSANCE PUBLIQUE DU NO. 2 CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, CEC, PAR LE 4E REGIMENT D APPUI DU GENIE
4. L ATTRIBUTION DE CET HONNEUR DE GUERRE, QUI N A QUE TROP TARDE, EST UN MOYEN DE CELEBRER ET DE SOULIGNER LES EFFORTS IMPORTANTS ET DISTINGUES DE TOUS LES MEMBRES DU NO. 2 CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, CEC, PENDANT LA GRANDE GUERRE. CET HONNEUR SOULIGNE EGALEMENT L ENGAGEMENT DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE A CORRIGER L INJUSTICE HISTORIQUE ET LUTTER CONTRE LE RACISME SYSTEMIQUE. LA PERENNISATION DU NO. 2 CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, CEC, GARANTIRA QUE L IDENTITE ET LES HONNEURS DE CETTE UNITE PERDURERONT AU SEIN DES FAC ET DU MDN
5. LES QUESTIONS RELATIVES A LA PRESENTATION DE L HONNEUR DE GUERRE ET A LA PERENNISATION PEUVENT ETRE ADRESSEES A LA DIRECTION HISTOIRE ET PATRIMOINE PAR COURRIEL A L ADRESSE SUIVANTE:
DHH6HERITAGEDHP6PATRIMOINE AT FORCES.GC.CA

Renewal of the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure

Public Safety Canada ran a survey about renewing the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure (<https://www.letstalkcriticalinfrastructure.ca/>), however, your editor only came across it just as the survey was closing 1 Jun. The link was distributed to the RUSI(NS) Security Affairs Committee so there was some return from us. One SAC member further commented:

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Most critical infrastructure cyberattacks are perpetrated by insiders (e.g., disgruntled employees). So, I would initially upgrade all critical infrastructure computer networks by powered security platforms like Veriato Cerebral (utilizing artificial intelligence) or ActivTrak, which are security platforms which track, collect, analyse and assess the engagements of employees. Such platforms minimize threats and risky engagements by:

"- unmatched visibility into employee activity and communication,

- helpful risk score dashboard detects various types of threats,
- powerful insider-threat detection security alerts,
- measures and analyzes employee engagement, and
- solid blend of monitoring and analytics in one interface."

Lack of privacy may be perceived as a con but providing an immediate overview of high risk and user behavior within the organization to mitigate threats is a pro.

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The "Let's Talk Critical Infrastructure - Discussion Paper and Questions" is available as a PDF on request to RUSI(NS).

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

Canada continues to support Ukraine with ammunition and equipment. Armoured vehicles were delivered but were found to be unsuitable for operations. It is quite damning as there are Ukrainian units using civilian SUV. There was no explanation why but disappointing. Canada also continues to supply 155mm ammunition, this time up to 20k rounds, enough to supply up to 200 artillery pieces for one day apparently based on usage rates currently. Still, with our partners, it helps and it is appreciated.

Plans to replace the artillery pieces we sent to Ukraine are not in place and having them built may be a bit of a problem as they are in high demand. It may be time to re-think whether towed artillery is adequate given some of the potential hostile actors that are peer or near peer adversaries. There is also no action being taken to equip our battle group in Latvia properly. It is missing critical elements that are necessary for operations. There seems to be a lack of urgency in the current planning by the government to equip properly this battle group and follow on forces. The *Secure, Strong, Engaged* defence policy is no longer adequate to meet the new normal and needs to be reviewed and procurement processes sped up to meet a looming conflict. Even MacKenzie-King understood when the time came to stand up.

The latest Arbour Report said its usual and expected comments and recommendations, and as she said herself, more than 100 recommendations are still being examined and are stalled through inertia of sorts. One has to wonder whether the service has the necessary resources to do this work and still defend the country. She also mentioned that the service is unable to do the task on its own, and this seems to be the case but why may be argued. The old joke about when being up to your backside in alligators it is hard to remember your job is to drain the swamp. In talking to some female members including both my daughters who have served, this is a massive problem that needs correction. RUSI(NS) has a strong interest in seeing this done and done well.

While we support this initiative, we are very concerned about the lack of urgency on the immediate threats of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, and the growing move to become less reliant on autocratic regimes. The Canadian Armed Forces, Global Affairs, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Border Services, Transport Canada, Environment Canada and others do not have the resources necessary to protect the country, certainly on the coasts. As RUSI(NS) has said before, there is an immediate need to review our national security, foreign affairs and defence policies in a detailed and integrated way. At the moment, the country seem to be blinkered as to the threats -- we need to get our act together quickly and not run from fad to fad as we currently seem to be doing.

China

The Communist Chinese Party (CCP) has been trying for years to 'break' the island chains that could be used in any future conflict essentially to blockade China. The CCP issued a draft called the "China-Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision." Ten Pacific Islands nations were invited including: Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Nieu, Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and Fiji. The proposal is based on a five year program and included five areas of discussion including post-Covid recovery plans, new agricultural centres, a new disaster assistance centre, environmental concerns including sea rise, and trade. What was missing from this document was 'security and defence issues.' Foreign Minister Yang Li visited seven countries and met by Zoom with the governments of the other three. The Prime Minister of Fiji expressed strong concerns about such an agreement stating that it could place these countries within the context of a new 'cold war,' and about the vagueness of the document's language. China responded by stating that they have assisted countries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean without difficulty. It might be mentioned that this is the CCP's view only -- some countries may have other opinions. Overall this initiative, imaginative as it was, was not successful. China has achieved some success on an individual country basis such as the Solomon Islands and Kiribati. This information is provided mainly by the *Nikkei Asia* editorial staff on 30 May 2022.

The CCP has ramped up its provocations of Taiwan including incursions by large numbers of combat aircraft including fighters, bombers, electronic warfare aircraft and air early warning aircraft into the air defence identification zone (ADIZ). At one point PLA attack helicopters apparently may have crossed the median line in the Taiwan Straits. The US has provided Taiwan with suitable missiles for air defence and intends to provide 65 Fighting Falcons for Taiwan's defence.

China's economy continues to be a mess. The structure of the CCP ensures that real economic figures are not made public to any extent; it is doubtful that even the leadership fully understand the actual state of the economy. This is now noted by financial leaders in the East Asian area. It is not mentioned within Canada and the West and one still hears how 'wonderful' the Chinese economy is, except it is based on fiction. Until the CCP is able to provide real and transparent information, investment in China is a major risk. The Canada Pension Plan is heavily invested in China and it will affect all Canadians if things go badly, and it is increasingly seems to be heading in that direction. Closer attention must be made to China's actions economically, and China must be made to be more transparent in its economic position.

Russia

Russia is continuing its overall offensive in Ukraine's east around the last major communities in Luhansk. Russia's attacks seem to be better coordinated as there is a single commander and aim. The attacks tend to be smaller and well-resourced in incremental stages. They have had considerable but limited success around the city of Severodonetsk. The Ukrainians seem to be voluntarily withdrawing into the industrial area of that unfortunate city. Most civilians were evacuated. As time goes on, it seems that Russian objectives have narrowed to the small area in Luhansk. Russia continues to suffer serious personnel losses. It has allowed Ukraine to conduct small counter-attacks in the area of Kherson with some success.

Russia still has not declared this as a war and therefore has not called up reserves and members with former service. They have offered cash incentives to volunteers with previous service. What is becoming increasingly clear is that without proof of a death, service benefits are not being paid nor the bonuses to the member's family, thus saving funds. While this may work for a while, this information will get out. It is also the normal spring call up of new conscripts. This is normal and all physically fit

males are supposed to do National Service for one year. These new soldiers will take about three months to be of some use. At this point in the war, conscripts were not to be used, however, manpower losses have been evidently heavy. Ukraine has managed to collect and store the bodies of Russian service personnel and has tried to get Russia to collect them through the Red Cross and the UN. Both these organizations have demanded that Russia take its war dead but so far they have not done so as it is assumed that it would really confirm to Russian citizenry the full extent of the conflict and force the government to pay the service estates.

Russia's economy continues to be relatively robust at present but they are running out of financial resources and reserves. The EU has announced a compromise that allows Hungary and others to agree to the overall sanctions on oil and gas. Oil and gas produce a sizeable portion of Russia's overall budget. These sanctions once in place will cut the EU's dependence on Russian oil and gas and thus cut what Russia is able to fund in future.

Sanctions will have an effect in a growing way. Ukraine and Western allies have been examining Russian equipment - most are using US manufactured microchips in virtually all their more complex systems. As the sanctions continue to take effect, Russia's ability to even maintain their auto sector, as well as their defence industries, will deteriorate over a relatively short time.

Belarus

Belarus has created a Southern Command that will be responsible for the Ukraine-Belarus border. Belarus did not participate as such in this war except to provide a jumping off point for Russian forces in the initial invasion. Belarus is likely to provide the same type of support if Russia is more successful. The one point that is increasingly clear to Belarussians is that Lukashenko is a pawn of Putin and not a leader of the Belarussians people.