



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 24 June 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Editor for Dispatches

An editor is needed for the 29 July and 5 August editions. If interested, please email RUSI(NS).

(And there's the long-standing need for a permanent editor. Or at least a co-editor...)

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

29 June, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker by Lieutenant-Colonel Hope Carr, 5th Canadian Division Headquarters, "Op PRESENCE: Civil-Military Capacity Building for UN Peace Operations." 1300-1500. Cambridge Military Library. Registration not required.

Save the date: 13 July, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) and NORAD & USNORTHCOM are planning Distinguished Speakers from Canada and the US, presenting on cyber resiliency. 1300-1500. Via Zoom. More to follow – keep eye out for call-to-meeting and invitations beginning of July.

This may be interesting pre-event watching:

Cyber Powers Should Secure National Infrastructure to Prevent Future Attacks

<https://rusi.org/news-and-comment/video-commentary/cyber-powers-should-secure-national-infrastructure-prevent-future-attacks>

19 July, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Wargaming Operational Logistics Forward in Peer Adversary Conflict." 1800-2000 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/wargaming-operational-logistics-forward-in-peer-adversary-conflict-tickets-326907157107>

27 October, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Back to the Future: The 1980s Global War Games as a Campaign of Learning." 1800-2000 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/back-to-the-future-the-1980s-global-war-games-as-a-campaign-of-learning-tickets-358240826957>

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Presentation "No. 2 Construction Battalion: A Short History & an Apology" by Colonel (retired) John Boileau, 25 May 22, <https://rusi-ns.ca/no-2-construction-battalion/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Ship-to-Shore Connector Barges," 10 May 2022, <https://rusi-ns.ca/ship-to-shore-connector>

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 22 June 2022
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, June 2022.

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 6, June 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, June 2022
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/131-rausi-dispatches-june-2022>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, June 2022 Edition.




New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 12, Issue 8, 20 June 2022




New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2022.

New: Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* June 2022
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-06>

Tweeted by @RUSI_NS: 🇨🇦

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 16 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "The Chinese conception of freedom of the seas and the airspace above apparently does not include Canada, and no matter what freedoms international law allows all nations, China's actions have shown their desire to bring regional waters their control." (China's Dangerous Games in the Skies https://cdainstitute.ca/vadm-ret-drew-robertson-chinas-dangerous-games-in-the-skies/)</p>	
<p>.@RoyalCanNavy Kingston-class mine countermeasures ship to deploy with #NATO? https://blog.halifaxshippingnews.ca/2022/06/kingston-class-to-deploy-with-nato.html Ukraine-Russia War & de facto blockade of trade in Black Sea show mines remain potent threat. Balanced navy, with mid-size mine warfare ships, allows CAN options during crises&conflict</p>	
<p>RUSI @RUSI_org 17 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 'If competition between autocracies and democracies has really entered a military phase, then the arsenal of democracy must radically improve its approach to the production of materiel in wartime' writes Alex Vershinin in the latest #RUSICommentary. (The Return of Industrial Warfare https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare)</p>	
<p>NSIRACanada @nsiracanada 17 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Today, NSIRA released its Review arising from the Federal Court's Judgment in 2020 FC 616. The review titled Rebuilding Trust: Reforming the CSIS Warrant and Justice Legal Advisory Processes, can be found here (https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/nsira-review-arising-from-federal-courts-judgment-in-2020-fc-616). This review was led by NSIRA Members Deschamps and @cforce. The report focuses on how CSIS seeks and receives legal services from Justice and prepares and executes the warrants it needs to collect information. NSIRACanada @nsiracanada The report makes several findings and recommendations further to an in-depth analysis of the systemic, governance</p>	<div style="border: 2px solid red; padding: 10px;"><p style="text-align: center;">TOP SECRET // CEO SOLICITOR CLIENT PRIVILEGE</p><p style="text-align: center;">Rebuilding Trust: Reforming the CSIS Warrant and Justice Legal Advisory Processes</p><p style="text-align: center;">NSIRA Review arising from Federal Court's Judgment in 2020 FC 616</p><p style="text-align: center;">NSIRA REVIEW 21-18</p></div>

<p>and cultural shortcomings at CSIS, with a focus on issues arising in the context of the warrant process. (NSIRA Review arising from Federal Court’s Judgment in 2020 FC 616)</p>	
<p>Project Ploughshares @ploughshares_ca 16 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Our live tally of Canadian military aid to Ukraine has been updated with the latest reported transfers. Current reported value of all transfers announced to date: ~\$240.8-million CAD. See the list here: https://ploughshares.ca/2022/06/canadian-military-aid-to-ukraine-in-2022/ (Canadian military aid to Ukraine in 2022) <i>Much looks to be a tally of official news releases.</i></p>	
<p>Black Cultural Centre for Nova Scotia @BCC_NS Jun 8 tweeted: The Black Cultural Centre in collaboration with the Department of National Defence will be holding a series of events in Honour and Remembrance of the No. 2 Construction Battalion July 5th - 9th, 2022 Learn more: https://no2-cef.ca/news-06-07-2022 Canadian Army @CanadianArmy 17 Jun retweeted: What is the No.2 Construction Battalion? Take a look at this enlightening video from the @BCC_NS as we approach the Government of Canada's historic apology. (Video is available in English only) https://no2-cef.ca RUSI(NS) retweeted: Info (text & pictures) about First World War #FWW CAN "Black Battalion" & impending Government apology. Briefing by Colonel (ret'd) John Boileau to RUSI(NS) 29May2022 "No. 2 Construction Battalion: A Short History & an Apology" https://rusi-ns.ca/no-2-construction-battalion/ #N2CB</p>	
<p>Canadian Armed Forces @CanadianForces 17 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: New legislation aims to align the Military Justice System with Canada’s civilian justice system to better support victims. The Victims’ Rights and the Summary Hearing Process will come into force on June 20. Learn more: https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2022/06/victims-rights-summary-hearing-process-soon.html (Victims’ Rights and the Summary Hearing Process will soon Come into Force) Remaining provisions of An Act to Amend the National Defence Act and to Make Related Consequential Amendments to Other Acts (also known as Bill C-77) came into force 20 June 2022.</p>	

Culture: addressing Apathy and Dishonesty within the British Army.

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/04/13/addressing-culture-apathy-dishonesty-british-army-part-2/>

Wavell Room - British Military Thinking @wavellroom 16 Jun tweeted: "Often people in Defence use words incorrectly, we link buzzwords as though it's a skill set, or we are so ambiguous with our use of prose that they are meaningless to those trying to act on them." Is this your experience?



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Ukraine to U.S. Defense Industry: We Need Long-Range, Precision Weapons

<https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/15/ukraine-to-us-defense-industry-we-need-long-range-precision-weapons>

Marcus Faulkner @NavalHistWar tweeted 18 Jun: 'After every artillery contact, we have to take two artillery pieces and take them back to the rear to maintain them because some of the subsystems are damaged by shrapnel. This happens every day.' - in reference to M777s

Yes, focus can't be just on the main kit. There has to be attention to training, sparring, maintenance, repair and all the other aspects that keeps a capability going. Good thing Canada is funding more barrels for M777 howitzers (the barrels can wear out fast).



Is Clausewitz dead? The problem with Centre of Gravity.

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/06/17/is-clausewitz-dead-complex-adaptive-systems-operations-planning/>

"The first step however, is to introduce the study of complex adaptive systems in PME so we can equip a new generation of planners and decision-makers with the ability to at least recognise the challenges and methodologies for working within such systems."

Strategy is not simple (certainly not as simple as when the first stratēgos practiced it) - it calls for a life of learning, and a breadth of interest. Even the strategists (the practitioners), those few who are in a position of authority and responsibility, and with resources, to undertake strategy, need to keep learning. The rest of us, the strategy students, can contribute through our studies and keeping the subject and all its aspects at the forefront.



The strength of Canada's marine industry is in our community

<https://www.nsnews.com/sponsored/mark-lamarre-the-strength-of-canadas-marine-industry-is-in-our-community-5479405>

The photo in the article highlights a marine industry strategic asset - drydocks. Without them, Canada is limited in the size of ships, warships and civil, that it can build, maintain and repair. That may be behind the expansion of the Esquimalt graving dock and reports that more investment is needed in the Irving Halifax shipyard.



An inventory of Canadian drydocks, fixed and mobile, does not seem to be readily (publicly) available. Nor does the National Shipbuilding Strategy seem to highlight drydocks as an objective and in progress reports of building the Canadian shipbuilding industry.

(And, yes, as Mr Lamarre writes: The heart of our operations is skilled trades." It's the people that keep the ships and the marine industries sailing.)

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Jetties, Piers and Wharfs" <https://rusi-ns.ca/jetties-piers-wharfs/>.

Democracy vs Autocracy Is the Wrong Framing for Ukraine War

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30608/democracy-vs-autocracy-is-the-wrong-framing-for-ukraine-war>

"Appealing to national interests, rather than values, would be a more effective foundation for assembling an international coalition in opposition to Russian aggression."



An interesting strategic narrative analysis. Useful to do such analyses, by both internal and external analysts. Strategic narrative is a communications concept (approach, tool) that needs to be understood by senior decision makers and the general audience alike.

Canada requires first nine fully operational F-35 jets no later than 2027

<https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canada-requires-first-nine-fully-operational-f-35-jets-no-later-than-2027>

Delivery, not initial or final operational capability (IOC, FOC) of the aircraft and project in entirety.



David Pugliese on Twitter 20 Jun: "The 88th fully operational aircraft would have to be delivered to Canada no later than Dec. 31, 2031."

Other Sources:

#command and control

Auftragstaktik in one simple diagram

<https://slightlyeastofnew.com/2020/05/22/auftragstaktik-in-one-simple-diagram/>

How the Germans Defined Auftragstaktik[i]: What Mission Command is - AND - is Not

<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-germans-defined-auftragstaktik-what-mission-command-and-not>

#cyber security

Details on Bill C-26 addressing cyber security

<https://security.frontline.online/blogs/1114-Scott-Newark/19087-Details-on-Bill-C-26-addressing-cyber-security>

#Indo-Pacific

The Consequences of Conquest: Why Indo-Pacific Power Hinges on Taiwan

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-16/consequences-conquest-taiwan-indo-pacific>

China's real ambitions for the South Pacific

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-real-ambitions-for-the-south-pacific/>

How the US can sink China's new aircraft carrier

<https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/china-aircraft-carrier-us-military-sink/>

Article author James Holmes is a noted commentator on strategy.

#warfare

How the US military will fight China with 'island hopping'

<https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/military-china-taiwan-world-war-ii-pacific/>

#leadership

The Paradoxical Trinity of Leadership

<https://mwi.usma.edu/the-paradoxical-trinity-of-leadership/>

#logistics

Vehicle Transportability

<https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/vehicle-transportability/>

Dan Sloane on Twitter 18 Jun 22: "This is a really good read, especially for logistics geeks and production managers. 'Although the interior width and height are commonly quoted, the door aperture is more important' is something every production manager can relate to.

#NATO

The NATO 2030 Initiative: Overview and Implications for Canada

https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/202216E

#policing

'Thin blue line' patch complaint dismissed by Metro Vancouver Transit Police board

<https://bc.ctvnews.ca/thin-blue-line-patch-complaint-dismissed-by-metro-vancouver-transit-police-board-1.5953408>

Symbol-war

#space

RUSI(NS) is planning a speaker within the next year on the RCAF Space Division.

Launching LORIS: First Nova Scotia-made satellite heading to space

<https://atlantic.ctvnews.ca/launching-loris-first-nova-scotia-made-satellite-heading-to-space-1.5950482>

The Future for UK Defence Space

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/03/30/the-future-for-uk-defence-space/>

#strategy

Falklands 40: A Corbettian re-assessment

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/06/15/falklands-40-a-corbettian-re-assessment/>

#Ukraine-Russia War

How well do Russian weapons perform in Ukraine?

<https://www.jpost.com/international/article-709818>

The War at Sea

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/04/18/the_war_at_sea_827579.html

A Geopolitical Disaster: Putin's War on Ukraine

<https://defence.frontline.online/blogs/57821-Taillon/19064-Geopolitical-Disaster-Putins-War-on-Ukraine>

Observations from the Ukraine War

<https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/observations-ukraine-war>

#airpower

In Denial About Denial: Why Ukraine's Air Success Should Worry the West

<https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/in-denial-about-denial-why-ukraines-air-success-should-worry-the-west/>

#armour

Does the tank have a future?

<https://www.economist.com/interactive/international/2022/06/15/does-the-tank-have-a-future>

#cyber operations

Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War - Microsoft On the Issues

<https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/>

Note link to report: <https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE50KOK>

Microsoft: Russian Cyber Spying Targets 42 Ukraine Allies

<https://www.securityweek.com/microsoft-russian-cyber-spying-targets-42-ukraine-allies>

Russian cyber spies attack Ukraine's allies, Microsoft says

<https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-hacking-groups-step-up-cyber-espionage-ukraine-allies-microsoft-says-2022-06-22/>

Russian hacking groups step up cyber espionage on Ukraine allies: Microsoft

<https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20220622/NEWS06/912350696/Russian-hacking-groups-step-up-cyber-espionage-on-Ukraine-allies-Microsoft>

#warfare

Density of Deployment in Ukraine

<http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2022/06/23/density-of-deployment-in-ukraine/>

#warfare

Surprise and Shock in Warfare: An Enduring Challenge

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/10/27/surprise-and-shock-in-warfare-an-enduring-challenge>

#wargaming

Wargaming Unpredictable Adversaries (and Unreliable Allies)

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/3/28/wargaming-unpredictable-adversaries-and-unreliable-allies>

Other:

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

The Canadian government has announced the modernization of the North Warning System, budgeting \$5b to the upgrade program. The total cost is expected to be around \$11b in total with the US expected to pick up approximately 60% of the overall cost. This is good news although far too late as the world situation has deteriorated to a level of threat not seen since the end of the Cold War. The old case of too little, too late, but better late than never. It was especially good to see CBC use General (ret'd) Tom Lawson on Power and Politics on Monday night to explain the issues and concerns. He did an excellent job and was a perfect guest as a former Chief of Defence Staff but also as the former Deputy Commander of NORAD. He was asked about Canada's reputation as a freeloader on defence and although he was circumspect, he was also clear that, yes, Canada has been derelict in its duty to friends and allies. Although it was not said, derelict in its duties to Canadian service personnel who have not had modern equipment for years such as the nearly 40-year-old CF188 Hornet or the CP140 Aurora, not to mention 30 year old ships and a lack of ground-based air defence, modern anti-tank systems, etc.

Modern procurement takes time to arrange new facilities, training, spare parts inventories, etc., it is not simply buying an airplane and fly. When one builds a fleet of aircraft, ships, weapons systems, whatever, each requires a significant amount of time, money, resources and effort, usually requiring years before actual full operational capability is attained. Just look at the troubled procurement of the

fleet of CH148 Cyclone to replace the Sea King helicopter, still not fully capable. We may not have years and the penalty as we saw in Afghanistan is death for some poor ‘bugger’ who isn’t properly equipped and trained the way they should be. Remember we deployed to Afghanistan with green temperate clothing in a brown desert environment, and people were killed in light utility vehicles which never should have been there in the first place. Yet eleven years after we left Afghanistan, we find ourselves in a very similar situation again. The lessons of Afghanistan are already lost and familiarity of dealing with a near-peer adversary also lost as in the past with the end of the Cold War. We need to rebuild and rebuild now.

Canada once again is in a position for a major tragedy. The country now faces adversaries that do not follow moral norms. Genocide is taking place in China at the hands of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) who continue to threaten its neighbours including offering extreme violence. Russia as well is another example of perverse cruelty in its ongoing attacks on Ukraine. Canada has once again let its forces deteriorate to the extent that they are scarcely useable. It also hasn’t taken into account how to deal with an attack on a Canadian city and how we would muster the resources of the country to meet this type of tragedy where the casualty toll would be massive. Canada had the Halifax explosion on 6 December 1917. In that event nearly 2000 died and more than 9k injured within seconds. There needs to be a real review of how to deal with such an event, it is no longer unthinkable given President Putin’s recent comments about nuclear weapons.

China

China is reaching a difficult point internationally, economically, socially and politically all at the same time just before the CCP’s 20th Congress to be held this fall. The Congress is held every five years, this year it is expected to be held before 7 December 2022. It is unusual as President Xi will be expected to be granted a third term - recent leaders have only had two terms by the CCP constitution, which was changed to allow for Xi’s potential third term. The buildup of problems and issues now put this third term in potential jeopardy.

China has been forced to send a diplomat on a ‘relationship repair’ trip to Europe as China’s position on the recent war plus ‘lone wolf’ diplomacy have been extremely detrimental to relations with the largest economies in the world that the EU represents as a collective. China’s lack of support for Ukraine despite its own comments and position on other countries not getting involved in the internal matters of their neighbours has caused China to lose credibility in major markets. They have tried this earlier this year but it failed as the West is less than happy with China’s response to date. China’s efforts in the Pacific have also fallen flat as even small Pacific nations question China’s actual motivation in the latest diplomatic efforts. China also continues to be bellicose in relations with most of its neighbours, in particular Taiwan, and more recently India. The efforts of China internationally have been less than stellar and have affected foreign investment and the economy.

Economically, China’s crack down on the tech sector last year has been devastating, which coupled with uncontrolled spending at the provincial level and with the meltdown of the grossly mismanaged property management sector have killed prosperity and hurt government revenues. The CCP instead of opening up the economy has largely brought it back to ineffective central management by people and organizations that are less than competent and are ideologically motivated. The result is that government revenue is down by some accounts nearly a third. More importantly, in an attempt to correct things, the CCP has started a massive infrastructure program at both the national and provincial levels thus taking resources away from actual productive enterprises. The Chinese economy will not grow by 5.5% but may be less productive as debt servicing grows and money for enterprises further shrinks. The CCP’s deal with the population has always been based on a constantly improving economy which helps everyone, thus providing stability. Unemployment is growing and so are prices.

Some of this can be laid on the war in Ukraine which is raising food prices around the world; the other is hoarding of food by operatives of the CCP for personal gain. This last phenomena is widespread and shows the level of corruption of the CCP itself. A real ongoing factor of course is the CCP's Zero Covid policy which has caused widespread distrust of the government.

The Zero Covid policy did work in China initially but despite having information about the omicron variant of Covid 19 and its increased infectiousness China continued to follow this policy. The other piece is that Chinese vaccines are less effective than MRNA vaccines of Pfizer and Moderna, thus the possibility of a much greater spread was very possible. China has stated that very few Chinese have died from Covid and that their policies have worked; what is not clear is the number of extra or unexpected deaths which is still in the millions - they didn't die of Covid, they died because they couldn't get medication on time, delays in getting treatment, mental health issues, starvation, etc. The Chinese people are not mentally infirm, they are fully aware that the current lockdowns are destroying lives and industry. Demonstrations are increasingly widespread and authorities' capacity to deal with these demonstrations is not overwhelming. This has led to other factions in the CCP to question Xi's ability to lead. Whether this stops his renewed mandate is questionable but it seems certain that China will undergo a potentially unstable period this fall and winter. Whether China's economy can survive in the new normal is a question as is how much more will the Chinese people take of an incompetent regime.

Russia-Belarus and Ukraine

This war is dragging on, a war of attrition with both sides inflicting massive damage on the other over an increasing length of time. Russia has had massive losses of personnel and equipment but they have access to a lot more though the quality is deteriorating quickly. One estimate places Russia's available troops in theatre to 330k, mainly found in the Donbass area with smaller but significant forces in the north around Kharkiv and in the south around Kherson. Russia has made gains using massive amounts of artillery and by taking smaller incremental slices of Ukrainian territory. Yet they still have not taken the Donbass after months of fighting.

Ukraine has also taken significant losses but Ukraine has fully mobilized and is training large numbers of troops and is starting to receive larger quantities of weapons and ammunition, though most of this new Western material will not arrive until later this summer. Some has and it has been put to good use as we have seen the destruction of a large naval tug, the *Vasily Bekh*, on a re-supply mission to Snake Island, and the damage to a Russian corvette. The most effective attack was against oil platforms taken by the Russians in 2014 - three were destroyed by naval missiles. These rigs were also used for early warning and were part of Russia's de facto blockade of Ukrainian ports. There were also suggestions the Ukrainians also attacked Snake Island's air defence and surface to surface missiles capability. The real issue is that how does Russia re-supply the garrison? If Ukraine has damaged the capacity of the island to defend itself and get re-supplied it also means that the Russian Black Sea fleet will be limited to long range attacks only and that amphibious assault is now virtually impossible. Ukraine is also making headway around Kherson and expects to be in a position to take the city back within a relatively short period of time. Kherson has also seen significant action by partisans which have generally made the occupation hazardous.

Russia has made several moves, one being to get Belarus to mobilize its armed forces including reserves. President Lukashenko has indicated that Belarus intends to join in Russia's attack. There have been no specific big moves but units and artillery including rockets are near the border. Russia also maintains a sizeable garrison at Belgorod inside Russia which also threatens the north. The question is will Belarus actually attack? The regime of Lukashenko only just held on to power despite massive demonstrations. Even now pro-democracy operatives have heavily damaged the rail system

and government networked systems; the regime is not popular and lacks the support of the people of Belarus. Strangely, Ukraine has a Belarussian Legion - it would be interesting if the Legion and the Belarussian Army met, especially with the call up of ill-prepared and equipped reservists who may not be supporters of the regime. It is possible that the leadership of Belarus has more to lose if they decide to attack. The Belarus and the Russian forces at Belgorod seem to be more of a demonstration of force rather than one to be actually used. Their role is to tie up Ukrainian forces not actually fighting. In both cases, they would not have the capacity to avoid a Ukrainian backlash especially once equipment and newly trained troops arrive for operations.

There has been a lot of discussion about how well the ruble is doing despite sanctions throughout media. There was an interesting series of videos on You Tube on this 'magical' success by Russia, however, the explanations of how they did it were enlightening. One stated that there were five actions taken by the Russian central bank which created conditions for a strong rouble:

1. It restricted the ability of foreigners to sell assets they hold in Russia.
2. It restricted the amount of foreign currency available to Russian citizens.
3. The bank purchased its own currency using its foreign currency reserve (useable for one time only, once expended it is gone).
4. It raised interest rates to nearly 20%.
5. Exports exceeded the cost of imports (no one will sell them anything hence no imports. Oil is still king and that is what Russia sells).

The problem with all these actions is that they are temporary. The bottom line is that Russian industry is shutting down because of sanctions. Even friends are following the Western applied sanctions, even China. Russians are sitting on what is left of their money or leaving the country anyway - nearly five million have done so to date. Russia has essentially used a good portion of their foreign reserves which will not be easily replaced. They are receiving money from exports that somewhat compensates but not everything and as Europe further restricts the use of Russian oil and gas this too will dry up. As mentioned, no one is selling goods for Russia to import so this will also dry up as supplies are steadily depleted. The other issue is that Russia's much vaunted defence industry is pretty well destroyed courtesy of Russia's abysmal efforts in Ukraine and examinations of Russia's rudimentary equipment. The special military operation has been an overall dismal failure despite recent successes. Longer term, the actions of the Putin regime have been absolutely lethal to the Russian economy. It is well known that Russians are tough and can take considerable punishment, but they can and will take action if pushed and one suspects the 'Mothers' of Soldiers' are going to make a difference and will impact the survival of the regime.

Lithuania has taken further action to ensure EU sanctions are followed. They have blocked the rail line to the Kaliningrad enclave this week. This has caused panic buying in the enclave and much angst in Russia itself which is stating the block is illegal. It will force all goods coming from Russia to move by sea from St Petersburg to Kaliningrad. Russian authorities intend to have seven more vessels available on top of the two already in service on that run. The Baltic can freeze over during the winter and resupply may become an issue. Estonia also had a Russian helicopter intrude into Estonian airspace on Tuesday; Estonia protested but it does show the desperation of the Putin regime.

Kaliningrad is the home of the Baltic Fleet and considerable military forces. The Baltic Fleet is small, basically two destroyers, four frigates, ten corvettes and four submarines as well as numerous small craft and auxiliaries supported by naval aircraft and missile defences and surface to surface missiles which may be nuclear armed as in the case of the Iskander missile system. Total manpower is around 45k normally but many were taken to join the fight in the Ukraine so the numbers are down somewhat. It is limited in what it can do and Russia has insufficient forces in the area to take any really

meaningful action as the Baltic states are all NATO members or countries willing to join. Russia has limited capacities to act except for a nuclear option.

The bottom line is that Russia has every intention of using all means at its disposal to gain leverage. It should be noted that NATO has been very unified in their response from every member state. This is not what President Putin planned and certainly expressed at his St Petersburg Economic Forum this past week where he stated that the old rules-based order is gone and that a new order will now replace it, based on Russia, China, Iran and other authoritarian regimes. It is this type of 'might makes right thinking' and spheres of influence which is an 18th to 20th century concept and makes clear his continued leadership must be opposed. Suggestions by France and others that Ukraine should negotiate now and cede parts of its country should be shut down. There is only one way this gets resolved and that is with a Ukrainian military victory and Putin's loss of power from the Russian Federation. If he remains in power, it will set conditions for further mischief or worse and NATO will have to deal with it or disband, allowing the authoritarian regime to run rampant. As the old commercials used to say now about maintenance, you can pay a little now for maintenance delayed or a whole lot more tomorrow when major systems fail. Ukraine must be allowed to attack Russian logistical centres in occupied Ukraine. Not allowing them the systems means they have their hands tied behind their backs thus allowing the aggressor to have free rein. This is the old cry of 'peace in our time.' It was not acceptable then and it is not acceptable now.

Canada's efforts to counter disinformation - Russian invasion of Ukraine

Canadian Armed Forces @CanadianForces 17 Jun tweeted: We're working with international partners to detect, correct, and call out the Kremlin's state-sponsored disinformation about Ukraine. Read the latest facts.

The infographic is a dark green slide with white text. At the top left is the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command logo and name in both English and French. The slide is divided into two main sections by white headers. The first section, 'RUSSIA'S CLAIM:', contains a paragraph stating that Russia claims to successfully target Western-supplied military equipment. The second section, 'RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE: THE FACTS', contains three bullet points with right-pointing arrows, detailing that Russia's strikes are mostly against infrastructure, that it uses older missiles, and that it is facing supply chain issues due to sanctions. At the bottom left, it says 'UKRAINE / RUSSIA UPDATE // 2022-06-17'. At the bottom right is the Canadian flag and the text 'National Defence / Défense nationale'.

CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
COMMANDEMENT DU RENSEIGNEMENT DES FORCES CANADIENNES

RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

Russia claims that it is successfully targeting shipments of Western-supplied military equipment being provided to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE: THE FACTS

- Most of Russia's long-range strikes have been against Ukrainian infrastructure. Russia is likely having difficulty targeting the Ukrainian military logistics network and is resorting to easier static targets, including civilian facilities.
- Russia has also resorted to using older, less-accurate missiles as its strike campaign has significantly depleted its stockpile of more modern munitions while failing to achieve a decisive strategic effect.
- Now facing unprecedented sanctions, Russian industry and supply chains will have significant difficulty replenishing stocks of advanced munitions and the other large-scale losses of Russian military equipment.

UKRAINE / RUSSIA UPDATE // 2022-06-17

National Defence / Défense nationale

Learn more about Canada's efforts to counter disinformation: https://international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crisis/ukraine-disinfo-desinfo.aspx?lang=eng