



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches

1 July 2022 

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Editor for Dispatches

An editor is needed for the 29 July and 5 August editions. If interested, please email RUSI(NS).

(And there's the long-standing need for a permanent editor. Or at least a co-editor...)

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

29 June, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker by Lieutenant-Colonel Hope Carr, 5th Canadian Division Headquarters, "Op PRESENCE: Civil-Military Capacity Building for UN Peace Operations." 1300-1500. Cambridge Military Library. Registration not required.

Save the date: 13 July, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) and NORAD & USNORTHCOM are planning Distinguished Speakers from Canada and the US, presenting on cyber resiliency. 1300-1500. Via Zoom. More to follow – keep eye out for call-to-meeting and invitations beginning of July.

This may be interesting pre-event watching:

Cyber Powers Should Secure National Infrastructure to Prevent Future Attacks

<https://rusi.org/news-and-comment/video-commentary/cyber-powers-should-secure-national-infrastructure-prevent-future-attacks>

New: 14 July, Thursday - Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law seminar by Dr Nele Matz-Lück, "A Law of the Sea Perspective on Irregular Migration via the Ocean." See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

19 July, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Wargaming Operational Logistics Forward in Peer Adversary Conflict." 1800-2000 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/wargaming-operational-logistics-forward-in-peer-adversary-conflict-tickets-326907157107>

New: 26 July, Tuesday - Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law seminar by Dr Nele Matz-Lück, "Standard Setting for Arctic Shipping in a Rapidly Changing Environment." See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

27 October, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Back to the Future: The 1980s Global War Games as a Campaign of Learning." 1800-2000 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/back-to-the-future-the-1980s-global-war-games-as-a-campaign-of-learning-tickets-358240826957>

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Presentation "No. 2 Construction Battalion: A Short History & an Apology" by Colonel (retired John Boileau, 25 May 22, <https://rusi-ns.ca/no-2-construction-battalion/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Ship-to-Shore Connector Barges," 10 May 2022, <https://rusi-ns.ca/ship-to-shore-connector>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 22 June 2022
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

New: Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, July 2022.

New: Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 6, July-August 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, June 2022
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/131-rausi-dispatches-june-2022>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, June 2022 Edition.





New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 13, Issue 1, 27 June 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2022.

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* June 2022
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-06>

Tweeted by @RUSI_NS:


RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>.@CoastGuardCAN College this week hosted #HMSProtector, @RoyalNavy ice patrol ship, using simulators to exercise rescue of #Arctic ice-bound ship. CAN 🇨🇦 & UK 🇬🇧 coordination of operational & navigational training ensures close allied efforts for defence, security & safety of North</p>	
<p>Brett Ruskin @Brett_CBC 23 Jun tweeted: NEW: Two more Canadian warships will deploy overseas on Operation Reassurance this weekend. HMCS' Kingston & Summerside will join HMCS' Halifax & Montreal in Europe, as part of a mission to show solidarity in response to Russian aggression (in 2014 & 2022). RUSI(NS) retweeted: Sea mines are current&future threat globally to maritime trade. Balanced navies need maintain mine operations capability. @RoyalCanNavy Kingston-class ships useful contribution to #OpREASSURANCE https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-reassurance.html What are @NationalDefence plans to replace KIN-class vessels?</p>	
<p>#HMCSKingston deploying to Europe for #OpREASSURANCE with autonomous underwater vehicles (#drones #UAS #UUV, for sea mine countermeasure operations) aboard https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/her-majestys-canadian-ships-kingston-and-summerville-depart-for-operation-reassurance.html @RoyalCanNavy has increasingly integrated #UAS into ship deployments, increased fleet flexibility (Her Majesty's Canadian Ships <i>Kingston</i> and <i>Summerside</i> depart for Operation REASSURANCE)</p>	 <p><small>photo: Karly Barker</small></p>
<p>Canadian Armed Forces @CanadianForces Jun 26 tweeted: Today, #HMCSKingston and #HMCSSummerside left for a four month deployment in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic region on #OpREASSURANCE. Canada is deploying these ships to contribute to #NATO assurance and deterrence measures in Central and Eastern Europe. https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/her-majestys-canadian-ships-kingston-and-summerville-depart-for-operation-reassurance.html (Her Majesty's Canadian Ships <i>Kingston</i> and <i>Summerside</i> depart for Operation REASSURANCE)</p>	

#RCNavy Kingston-class multi-role patrol vessels can deploy long-distance, extended periods, beyond local region to operating areas of other continents. More than just CANCacoasts, due to abilities of @RoyalCanNavy sailors, logistics & engineering. Part of balanced navy

Ukraine War Map @War_Mapper 25 Jun tweeted: A look at the change to control over the last 2 weeks in the area around Lysychans'k and Severodonetsk. 12th June --> 26th June.

Mick Ryan, AM @WarintheFuture 25 Jun tweeted: This map from @war_mapper demonstrates the incremental nature of the Russian gains, and the significant resistance offered by Ukrainian defenders, over the past two weeks. 1/14



map: https://twitter.com/War_Mapper/status/1540852986125189121
thread unrolled; <https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1540870456542400512.html>

Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Liberals reject Erin O'Toole's proposal for a system to review military medals

<https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/liberals-reject-erin-otooles-proposal-for-a-system-to-review-military-medals>



Beware Small Fires

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/beware-small-fires>

"Current and potential major wars merit the attention given to them, but the perils of leaving small fires to burn should not be underestimated. If unattended, they can easily spread."



Just because the 'small fires' don't get much reporting doesn't mean they are not out there and can't grow. It would be wise for Canada to keep an eye out globally (watchtower) and to be prepared to engage (firefight) anywhere.

How Ukraine Is Winning the Propaganda War

<https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-propaganda-war/>

Lessons of strategic messaging. Tell the story, tell the true story.

(BTW, there is nothing wrong with propaganda in itself – it simply means information for political purposes. Government departments do it all the time. Propaganda becomes wrong when it uses mis- and disinformation for nefarious purposes.

Government of Canada definition: Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view.)



Is Canada's NORAD upgrade cash new? Defence chief uncertain

<https://globalnews.ca/news/8946037/canada-norad-upgrade-cash-wayne-eyre/>

"Sources have told Global News the military is uncertain about where the funds are coming from, and that there are meetings happening at the department trying to determine how much of the money is new."



Uncertainty in the media about the source of funding for recently announced NORAD upgrades. Appears to parallel uncertainty in the Department of Defence. Does lead one to wonder about the accounting. Might some other capability have to be deferred to free up funds?

Failure to fund the military adequately in the past is coming back to bite. Will funding be better in the future?

Canadian special forces are operating in Ukraine, N.Y. Times reports

<https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-special-forces-operating-in-ukraine-new-york-times-reports>

"Canadian special forces are in Ukraine as part of a NATO network to provide weapons, training and gather intelligence about the Russians, the New York Times is reporting."



Such support (equipment, training, intelligence) would be good support from Canada to Ukraine. And entirely appropriate that Canadian special forces are in Ukraine providing it. That is a major function of special operations forces, one that tends to get minimized by the general public attention in favour of 'direct action.'

Other Sources:

#Arctic

Bridging the Gap: How the United States can Immediately Address its Arctic Capability Limitations
<https://mwi.usma.edu/bridging-the-gap-how-the-united-states-can-immediately-address-its-arctic-capability-limitations/>

#Canadian Armed Forces

The Canadian Armed Forces Responding to Domestic Emergencies: Some Implications
<https://hillnotes.ca/2021/12/13/the-canadian-armed-forces-responding-to-domestic-emergencies-some-implications/>

#command

Trust in AI: Rethinking Future Command

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/trust-ai-rethinking-future-command>

HQ issues

<https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2022/06/hq-issues.html>

The Command Post Environment

<https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2022/06/the-command-post-environment/>

#cyber operations

Goodbye Cyberwar: Ukraine as Reality Check

https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP10-3_2022-EN.pdf

A Framework for Understanding Cyber

<https://wavellroom.com/2017/07/07/a-framework-for-understanding-cyber/>

#drones *(note that 'drones' is still being used as a header in Dispatches for loitering munitions and remotely piloted aerial systems)*

The Vulnerabilities of the Drone Age: Established Threats and Emerging Issues out to 2035

https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/NATO_VDA_Policy_Report.pdf

UAS and Loitering Munitions for Light Role Infantry

<https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2022/04/uas-and-loitering-munitions-for-light-role-infantry/>

How Loitering Munitions Can Help Counter China

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/12/how-loitering-munitions-can-help-counter-china/359975/>

#information operations

Social Engineering as a Threat to Societies: The Cambridge Analytica Case

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/7/18/social-engineering-as-a-threat-to-societies-the-cambridge-analytica-case>

#NATO

The War Against Ukraine Shapes NATO's Future

https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP10-4_2022-EN.pdf

NATO's Adaptation to the Russia Threat

<https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse306-EN.pdf>

#Russia #training

Russia's 'Demonstration Army' Is a Red Flag for U.S. Security Force Assistance

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/russias-demonstration-army-red-flag-us-security-force-assistance>

#Ukraine-Russia War

What a 1904 War Can Teach Vladimir Putin

<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/06/russia-war-ukraine-japan/661312/>

Britain must be prepared to go to war with Russia

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/06/23/britain-must-prepared-go-war-russia/>

Urban Operations in Ukraine: Size, Ratios, and the Principles of War

<https://mwi.usma.edu/urban-operations-in-ukraine-size-ratios-and-the-principles-of-war/>

What the invasion of Ukraine has revealed about the nature of modern warfare

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-the-invasion-of-ukraine-has-revealed-about-the-nature-of-modern-warfare/>

Time Is Not on Kyiv's Side: Training, Weapons, and Attrition in Ukraine

<https://mwi.usma.edu/time-is-not-on-kyivs-side-training-weapons-and-attrition-in-ukraine/>

Ukraine's 'tactical realignment' in the east isn't a sign it's losing the war against Russia

<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-28/ukraine-tactical-alignment-luhansk-not-a-sign-of-losing-war/101186976>

The Ukraine War: The Longer The War, The More Likely It Is To Be Won By A Sea Power

<https://gcaptain.com/the-ukraine-war-the-longer-the-war-the-more-likely-it-is-to-be-won-by-a-sea-power/>

#information operations

Disinformation fight goes beyond Ukraine and its allies

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/disinformation-fight-goes-beyond-ukraine-and-its-allies>

#Russia #logistics

Russian Challenges in Missile Resupply

<https://jamestown.org/program/russian-challenges-in-missile-resupply/>

Russia will soon exhaust its combat capabilities, Western assessments predict

<https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russia-will-soon-exhaust-its-combat-capabilities-western-assessments-predict/ar-AAYQXFj>

#warfare

French Army Approaches to High Intensity Warfare in the 21st Century

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/06/22/french-army-warfare/>

LSCO Lessons: What the Army should be Learning about Large-Scale Combat Operations from the Ukraine War

<https://mwi.usma.edu/lSCO-lessons-what-the-army-should-be-learning-about-large-scale-combat-operations-from-the-ukraine-war/>

Other:

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

A point that RUSI(NS) wants to make very clear about our advocacy for defence and security issues. We believe in a wider idea of defence and security which encompasses more than just government agencies of all levels - it also includes the idea that businesses, charities and normal Canadian citizens have a major stake on these issues. As we have seen in the past two years, medical intelligence, border security, customs, coast guard, cyber-security and a vast number of other areas affect all Canadians. We believe everyone should be aware of issues, challenges and weaknesses that affect the overall safety of our country and its sovereignty. It does not mean that under current circumstances the government and other organizations expend a vast amount of energy, time and resources without thought. There are times when the shortage or age of a particular type of equipment put people at risk and we feel needs to be fixed yesterday, such as we will see with the Kingston-class patrol vessels or the lack of anti-armour weapons and ground-based air defence systems for our troops in Latvia, not to mention immediate action to fill needs for the forces as a whole. The need for a major ice breaker to replace a ship that is truly ancient by naval engineering standards for the Coast Guard or the fact that Canada's intelligence agencies are hamstrung by a lack of a proper single point of consolidation at the federal level. The role is filled by the Privy Council Office on what is really an ad hoc basis. Canada needs a thoughtful approach to defence and security based on non-partisan action and general agreement from all political parties on the way ahead on security issues, foreign affairs and defence, otherwise we will be to be caught like a deer in the headlights and our people are ill-equipped, trained and supported and in harm's way. We need to become more professional and get rid of the politics on key issues.

One has to watch with sadness and not a little trepidation as HMCS *Kingston* and *Summerside*. The Kingstons, like the Halifax-class frigates, are now long in the tooth, all built in the nineties. They have been updated but are a mixture of old and new capabilities - the real issue is age of the overall hull and structure. One looked at the interviews of fresh-faced sailors looking happy and not entirely sure of what they are getting into as they got ready to sail. One Canadian citizen mentioned that they are doing what they want, they know what they are getting into, and I have to admit I was almost speechless at the ignorance and callousness of her comments. These sailors and our ill-equipped soldiers are now in harm's way and most except for soldiers who fought in Afghanistan have literally no understanding of what combat looks like. In some ways, it is great that Canada has been mainly able to ignore threats, but we might not be able to this time. Our Prime Minister this week tried to justify the lack of investment and action to correct immediate faults and argued that we are doing enough yet we are not coming close to the 2% of GDP goal agreed to by Canada years ago. As a G7 country we have been lax and overall only achieving 1.27% of GDP for this year.

The announced increase to NORAD and Arctic defence appears to be coming out of the existing budget. Minister Anand and Chief of Defence Staff Wayne Eyre were both asked about this by Global News. Both provided what can only be charitably called poor answers. This is not leadership and it reflects poorly on the government. One can only wonder what Canada can do if the situation continues to deteriorate internationally. Still Minister Joly said we have convening power, whatever that is, kind of useless in a shooting war. Canada in the past has been able to do wonderful things internationally, the United Nations Emergency Force after the 1956 Suez Crisis being one, but today's politicians forget that our soft power was supported by significant hard power as well; the ability to do tasks, if necessary, with well trained and equipped military forces of sufficient numbers. We are faced with an existential crisis that if it comes will change the world profoundly if action is not taken. Canada is running out of time, new policies and new clarity of thought on security, foreign and defence matters is needed.

The new spelling of Turkiye has been adopted from now on in this note.

The USA

The decision on the abortion issue, called *Roe versus Wade*, by the US Supreme Court this week past has unleashed anger across the nation. Most Americans believe that the matter should have been left as is and that abortion laws should continue, however, in a truly interesting set of mental gymnastics, a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the original decision was wrong despite being previously upheld even by conservative justices appointed by Republican presidents. Three new judges appointed by Donald Trump apparently lied or misled Senators during their hearings when questioned on this matter. All seemed to agree that the precedents were set, and that *Roe versus Wade* was safe. The fallout has badly damaged the court's reputation, probably permanently, and future decisions will be questioned. The fallout may also affect the mid-term elections in ways that are not clear as yet, but the damage has been done.

On the plus side, Congress has passed a non-partisan bill aimed at measures to help cut down gun violence. It is hoped that the Senate and House of Representatives can also come together to create a better balance on abortion between the federal government and the states. This took a bloody civil war to supposedly settle the idea of states' rights which supported slavery at that time. Given the amount of anger in the country, one hopes that this and other unfortunate decisions will not cause violence as the US leadership in the world is critical right now.

NATO

Turkiye, Sweden and Finland have come to an agreement at the NATO Summit held in Madrid. It would allow for unanimous agreement amongst current members of NATO for those two countries to ascend to NATO membership. Turkiye had been ready to veto their membership based on those countries support of PKK, the Kurdish separatist groups fighting a terrorist campaign against Turkiye. This trilateral agreement will allow for quick ratification of their membership. This process will start shortly.

The NATO Summit also saw the announcement of the expansion of NATO's rapid reaction force from 40k to more than 300k. The emphasis will be to vastly increase support to the north-eastern flank, in particular the Baltic states and Poland. Our Prime Minister when asked if Canada was going to increase Canada's commitment to the battle group in Latvia said very little that was useful. Canada supposedly has 3.4k military personnel on stand-by for more support to NATO. Canada used to have 4th Canadian Mechanized brigade Group in Germany with 5e Groupe Brigade du Canada as the Canadian Air Sea Transportable brigade for NATO's northern flank, another battle group of nearly 1.2k troops as part of the Allied Command Europe Force Land, a multi-national brigade or close to a division's worth of troops for NATO, and that was just the Army. Now we have difficulties fielding a tiny battalion group missing so many pieces it isn't funny. One hopes this will change.

Belarus

Belarus and President Alexandre Lukashenko are a wild card in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. In relatively recent past, Lukashenko has tried to hold an even balance between the European Union and the Russian Federation. From time to time, Lukashenko used one side or the other to gain leverage for any particular need. This balancing act disappeared when the 2020 election was clearly rigged and he declared himself president again by a landslide. He did have the security services onside as a new democratic government would almost assuredly remove and arrest many in leadership positions for corruption. Demonstrations were wide-spread and Lukashenko was forced to turn to Vladimir Putin to retain power. He owes Putin. He also knows that he cannot depend on the armed forces of Belarus if he were to actively participate. He did establish a union treaty with Russia after he regained control of the country and there are 28 separate areas where the two countries actively cooperate to achieve an economic block. This is a reluctantly settled treaty; he would have preferred to maintain this balance but the Western world largely condemned his rigged election and applied sanctions. He is trapped.

In February 2022, Lukashenko did manage to avoid taking any real action. When he did take action, he discovered that he was facing a security apparatus that was less than happy. Russia was able to use Belarus as a steppingstone but only for Russians. Belarussian troops held the start line and waved the Russians goodbye after they crossed the border. Even doing that resulted in resignations of principled leadership within the security apparatus. Sabotage is widespread in Belarus, the rail system crippled, computer networks collapsed or affected by viruses, street signs removed and directional signs pointed the wrong way. Nothing major in itself but there is a general unhappiness about attacking Ukraine, not to mention the Belarussian Regiment fighting for Ukraine. Putin needs more troops and it is strongly suspected Lukashenko has been given an option he cannot refuse by the Russian 'leader.' At this point, Lukashenko has now moved troops near the border once again. Exercises have been completed and the Belarussian army is just across the border from Kyiv. It does provide a threat in being if not in actual substance. Will it cross that border and if so under what circumstances and under whose direction? The situation inside his own country is not good and many support Ukraine. His support for Russia and his acceptance of the nuclear capable Iskander missiles also likely comes with Russian security

forces. It is not an effective long-term solution for the last dictator in Europe, he is yesterday's man and one with diminishing options and none of them are good and he knows it.

Ukraine and Russia

As of Tuesday, 28 June 2022, the war has lasted 125 days. It was assumed by many including many Western intelligence agencies that the war would last for only four or five days. It has had its ups and downs throughout for both sides and the casualties are on a massive scale for both sides, but Ukrainian civilians have been hurt the most with Ukrainian military casualties being approximately 10k+ killed, another 8k captured, and over 50k wounded. Civilian casualties are estimated to be in the tens of thousands with 25k being lost in Mariupol alone. Russian and allied casualties are even greater with the Ukrainian estimate of nearly four times the number killed in action alone, but this is hard to verify as are civilian casualties in occupied zones. Their economies are both badly hit, Ukraine from combat operations and bombardment by Russian forces, and Russia from war losses and Western imposed sanctions. Ukraine will receive help, Russia will be a pariah for years, even if it does manage to hold the 20% of the country it now holds.

The war has become one of attrition of manpower, equipment and resources. It is a race whether Ukraine can hold out until the full effects of sanctions take place thus effectively destroying Russia's economy and its industrial base or whether the weapons promised by Western allies finally turn the tide and inflict so much damage to Russian forces that their withdrawal has to take place. Historically, Russia has absorbed massive losses and still was able to win, but this is different. Nearly 6 million mainly young Russians have left the country - it has been a massive brain drain. There is some doubt whether they will return ever or at least until Putin's regime is gone. Russia's population is greatly diminished with somewhere around 140M minus the ones who have left since February. It is a rapidly aging population with a low birthrate, so the vast manpower reserves are no longer there. It seems that Putin is living in his own past that does not reflect reality. The levels of corruption within his regime has been breathtaking and so it shows on the battlefield in large quantities of defective equipment. Russian industry is not helped by the West either as most of Russia's electronics are now provided by Western sources. The price of this corruption is unfortunately being paid by young Russian soldiers led by dubiously capable, corrupt leaders.

The actual conflict has mainly settled on the area of Severodonesk and Lysychansk in Luhansk Oblast. Russia has gone all out taking smaller areas rather than any grand tactical efforts. It has been rewarded with the fall of Severodonetsk in eastern Ukraine; its sister city is now under heavy bombardment. The Russians have had some success fighting on the southern edge of that pocket and only 18 kms remain between the northern and southern edges of the pocket to seal it. Unfortunately, the closing of the pocket would also mean the loss of a major part of the professional Ukrainian Army.

In the north, Russia has been able to field a large enough force to make inroads towards Kharkiv which is once again under bombardment. It is unlikely that they have sufficient combat power to actually take the city of two million. It is thought this is to prevent Ukraine from moving resources from that front to other fronts such as Kherson to conduct a counterattack. The other northern danger which would affect Kyiv itself has been discussed as Belarussian forces seem to be getting ready to attack. This is not a certainty given the state of the Lukashenko regime and that Russia keeps taking Belarussian resources for other fronts. Still, it cannot be ignored, and it still holds down Ukrainian troops.

The Kherson region seems to be a place of Ukrainian success with troops now within 10 kms of that city and Russian troops being unable to create sufficiently large defensive positions to stop them for any length of time. Russian troops are also hampered by partisans which now make the rear areas

insecure and local Russian appointed government increasingly unstable. In the longer term, it is likely that Russia will be forced to deal with the possible cutting of the land bridge to Crimea as a result of Ukrainian action.

Ukraine has had success at keeping the Black Sea Fleet from being able to conduct any actions near Ukraine's coastline. Ukraine has consistently attacked Snake Island and seems to have destroyed or damaged a good proportion of Russian long range fire capacity. Ukraine does not have the capacity to take the island, but it can starve it out; the new surface to surface missiles make the island impossible to re-supply and there is some doubt whether it was sufficiently supplied for a long siege.

Bayraktar is planning a Ukrainian factory, starting shortly on its construction. Bayraktar is also shortly providing a small number of Bayraktars TB 2s drone for free to Ukraine. Turkiye has been trying hard to take a middle road between Ukraine and Russia but given Turkiye's agreement on Sweden and Finland and now this generous offer, this seems to be a thing of the past. Russia is paying an increasingly severe price for an unnecessary war.

China

China under the CCP is a genocidal, authoritarian regime which has and continues to conduct predatory operations against virtually all its neighbouring countries as well as using debt traps against poorer countries as seen in Sri Lanka and Pakistan. The CCP represents only 7% of China's population. It uses surveillance and coercive measures to maintain control. It does not represent the will or the best interest of the Chinese population who deserve so much better. It is not competent except as it relates to its own survival. All its actions all return to this one point - it will do anything to ensure its survival.

China continues its mischief throughout Southeast Asia. The most recent incident of note is that Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered Japanese coastal waters around the Senkaku islands for a prolonged period approaching with 1.9 kms of the islands at one point. Japan is rather unhappy with this issue. Unfortunately, China is likely to continue such actions for the foreseeable future or it achieves its aims. China seems to take its time, relying on other countries simply tiring out, just simply worn down by China's small actions and incremental approach. None of these actions by themselves technically cross the line but it is the constant pressure that causes the opposition to break. It is the proverbial drip of water gradually wearing down a stone. The fact is it works most of the time is a warning to all democracies that in the minds of China's leaders, they play for keeps with the view to achieving "victory" over its enemies.

China does have its problems. There are major floods in the southeast once again destroying critical agricultural areas which gives rise to concerns about China's food security. The weather continues to be an issue with longer term implications such as the contamination of farms and the death of livestock caused by difficulties as a result of the inundation.

The property management issue continues to be a growing problem with foreign creditors asking for Evergrande to be liquidated. Other property management companies are also in poor shape and this action maybe the start of many such actions. The CCP has failed spectacularly in dealing with this issue. There is potential for a domino effect throughout China's economy not only in property management but also throughout Chinese businesses that have loaned to each other. The CCP has added to its already monstrous debt by spending on more needless infrastructure not only at the national level but also at the provincial and city levels - the result is the creation of unnecessary infrastructure that may not be sustainable or simply poorly located and unable to be used. The CCP remains in power because it has been able to sustain growth and generally improving life of its citizens

(so long as they aren't minorities). This year saw the largest number of university graduates ever, yet many are unemployed. The loss of jobs is also being felt as foreign firms re-locate to other countries.

On the plus side, Shanghai is declaring success with its lockdown under the Zero Covid policy advocated by Xi. These lockdowns have been devastating for the economy and for Chinese citizens so declaring a "victory" at this stage is vital given the proximity of the 20th session of the CCP scheduled for this fall. This session is expected to confer a third term as President to Xi Jinping, however, there is some thought that his enemies may try to prevent this from happening. While Xi has been less than a good partner internationally, there is perhaps more concern of who may takeover in his place if he is defeated by these other factions. China is likely to have a period of unease no matter what happens for the foreseeable future. Crackdowns are likely on members of other factions.

Xi is expected to attend national holiday celebrations in Hong Kong on 1 July 2022. This is a "victory" lap over democratic forces in Hong Kong but it may also be the start of Hong Kong's decline as a financial centre. More than 300k have left the former British colony since the implementation of the National Security Law. This celebration will see the use of Chinese military drill by police and cadets vice British colonial drill. It is a sign of China's triumph but also a very clear indication to Taiwan that China under the CCP is not to be trusted. It is something that all democracies should note.

Defence Information

防衛省統合幕僚監部 @jointstaffpa 23 Jun tweeted: Trends in Chinese aircraft
<https://mod.go.jp/js/Press/press2022.htm>

Steffan Watkins @steffanwatkins 23 Jun retweeted: My dream is for @NORADCommand to demystify their routine intercepts of the RuAF by providing exactly the same level of detail presented by the Japanese MoD to their citizens. I see no reason for less. Proactive disclosure de-politicizes the facts denying leakers anything to leak

The image is a composite of four parts. At the top left is a purple header for the 'JOINT STAFF PRESS RELEASE' dated June 23, 2022. Below it is a map titled '行動概要' (Summary of Movement) showing the flight path of three H-6 bombers from the East China Sea, through the Pacific, and back to the East China Sea. At the bottom are two side-by-side photographs of H-6 bombers, labeled '対象機 (H-6爆撃機①)' and '対象機 (H-6爆撃機②)', both taken by the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force.

When NORAD doesn't issue press releases when intercepts of Russian Air Force aircraft occur in the Alaskan ADIZ, NORAD enables those who would leak that information for opportunistic political gain. In order to deny any partisan political benefit of potential leaks, I would like NORAD to be transparent with the public about every ADIZ intercept. Dates, times, and the type of aircraft intercepted are all details the adversary would already know. These events are facts, and do not divulge any information the Russian Federation or Chinese governments wouldn't already know. I would like NORAD to actively disclose that sort of information going forward, and publish the historical data retroactively, so the public can be informed, and those who would make political hay are denied the opportunity.

For examples of this, refer to Bill Gertz's articles regarding ADIZ intercepts during the Obama administration, when many intercepts were not being disclosed by NORAD.

Countering political propaganda and disinformation requires a whole-government approach. Being transparent about some topics that are not explicitly flattering, but don't give up any information the adversary doesn't already know, denies the initiative from anyone (domestic or foreign) who would create a story that was disparaging or political from otherwise routine events. The public goodwill provided by disclosing these events breeds trust at no significant opportunity cost.

NORAD can also leverage the online OSINT community by releasing pictures, tail numbers, markings, etc. I know there is a mob of people who would like to do analysis of Russian Air Force Tu-142 and Tu-95 airframes from the aircraft that are being sent into the ADIZ. If that information doesn't give away NORAD capabilities, NORAD can reap the free labour of open source researchers.

JOINT SEMINAR

"A Law of the Sea Perspective on Irregular Migration via the Ocean"



Professor Dr. Nele Matz-Lück. So called "irregular migration" via the sea has claimed and continues to claim a high death toll when humans board unseaworthy boats to reach foreign shores in search for safety, security, freedom from persecution or better economic prospects. The Convention on the Law of the Sea only provides for basic regulations for assistance to vessels in distress and was never designed for a phenomenon of mass migration via the sea and the resulting need for large scale search and rescue and the disembarkation of irregular migrants. Even if viewed together, international refugee law, human rights law and the law of the sea do not coherently address all relevant issues in this context. The lecture will point to gaps and legal grey zones and discuss topical legal questions such as the relevance of SAR zones, the role of private rescue vessels and the closure of ports to prevent disembarkation.



Steele Ocean Sciences Building
Dalhousie University
1355 Oxford Street
P.O. Box 15000
Halifax, NS, Canada B3H 4R2
crc-maritime.law@dal.ca

About Professor Dr. Nele Matz-Lück, LL.M.

Professor Dr. Nele Matz-Lück, LL.M., is professor at Kiel University Law School where she holds a chair for Public Law with a focus on Public International Law particularly the Law of the Sea. She was elected Vice President of Kiel University in October 2020. Since 2011 she is co-director of the Walther Schücking Institute for International Law at Kiel University. She also maintains the status of adjunct professor at Dalhousie University since 2014. Her main areas of research and publications focus upon the law of the sea and international environmental law. As far as the law of the sea is concerned she publishes regularly on the sustainable use of marine resources, the protection of the marine environment, e.g. marine protected areas and ship emissions, as well as on rights over maritime zones.



MARINE & ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INSTITUTE

Schulich School of Law
6061 University Avenue
Halifax, NS B3H 4R2
melaw@dal.ca
dal.ca/law/MELAW

THURSDAY JULY 14, 2022

- ▶ **12pm**
*Schulich School of Law
Faculty Lounge - Room 312,
Weldon Law Building
6061 University Avenue, Halifax, NS*
Lunch will be served.

EVERYONE IS WELCOME !
Please RSVP to lisa.sillito@dal.ca
This seminar is co-sponsored by the OFI Module N and the Marine & Environmental Law Institute

JOINT SEMINAR

"Standard Setting for Arctic Shipping in a Rapidly Changing Environment"



The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea only addresses ice-covered areas in one of its 320 articles. Partially or permanently frozen seas are generally submitted to the same international framework that applies to all other areas of the world's ocean. At the same time the Law of the Sea Convention as a framework agreement offers room for flexibility and standard-setting by international organizations as well as regional agreements. The Polar Code is one attempt to address the issue of navigation in Polar areas from a technical perspective. The talk will address the question how increasing shipping in the Arctic can be addressed in a multilevel regulatory system that takes account of a rapidly changing environment and due diligence obligations.



Steele Ocean Sciences Building
Dalhousie University
1355 Oxford Street
P.O. Box 15000
Halifax, NS, Canada B3H 4R2
crc-maritime.law@dal.ca

About Professor Dr. Nele Matz-Lück, LL.M.

Professor Dr. Nele Matz-Lück, LL.M., is professor at Kiel University Law School where she holds a chair for Public Law with a focus on Public International Law particularly the Law of the Sea. She was elected Vice President of Kiel University in October 2020. Since 2011 she is co-director of the Walther Schücking Institute for International Law at Kiel University. She also maintains the status of adjunct professor at Dalhousie University since 2014. Her main areas of research and publications focus upon the law of the sea and international environmental law. As far as the law of the sea is concerned she publishes regularly on the sustainable use of marine resources, the protection of the marine environment, e.g. marine protected areas and ship emissions, as well as on rights over maritime zones.



MARINE & ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INSTITUTE
Schulich School of Law
6061 University Avenue
Halifax, NS B3H 4R2
melaw@dal.ca
dal.ca/law/MELAW

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2022

- ▶ **12pm**
*Schulich School of Law
Faculty Lounge - Room 312,
Weldon Law Building
6061 University Avenue, Halifax, NS*
Lunch will be served.

EVERYONE IS WELCOME !
Please RSVP to lisa.sillito@dal.ca

This seminar is co-sponsored by the OFI Module N and the Marine & Environmental Law Institute