



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 15 July 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

We Want Your Input to *Dispatches*

Readers of *Dispatches* are encouraged to submit content for your weekly at any time but especially during the upcoming weeks whilst a temporary-temporary (yes, we have got to that point) editor is managing the bulletin. Content can simply be a link to an article of possible interest that has been published somewhere (the more it is not from the few mainstream sources in Canada the better, as those articles will already have come to the attention of our readers), or, preferably, a link to an article with a few words from you 'of value added' or one to a few paragraphs of your comments. Please, we want your thoughts and perspectives. Email to RUSIDispatches@gmail.com.

RCAF Centennial

The Commander Royal Canadian Air Force has invited the RCAF Association to help find veterans approaching their 100th birthday. The goal is to acknowledge their service, and help celebrate achievement of such a significant milestone. If you can help, please reach out to neighbours, friends and family everywhere and find our veterans, and send their details to the Executive Director RCAF Association, Dean Black, at director@airforce.ca or write to RCAF Association PO Box 2460 Stn D Ottawa Ontario K1P 5W6. The information will be passed to the Commander RCAF for special mention as we approach the RCAF's 100th birthday 1 April 2024.



Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

Note: No RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker event is being planned for August.

19 July, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Wargaming Operational Logistics Forward in Peer Adversary Conflict." 1800-2000 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/wargaming-operational-logistics-forward-in-peer-adversary-conflict-tickets-326907157107>

26 July, Tuesday - Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law seminar by Dr Nele Matz-Lück, "Standard Setting for Arctic Shipping in a Rapidly Changing Environment." See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

Save the date: 14 September, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker to be announced. **Note** that is a second Wednesday of the month, not our normal third.

27 October, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Back to the Future: The 1980s Global War Games as a Campaign of Learning." 1800-2000 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/back-to-the-future-the-1980s-global-war-games-as-a-campaign-of-learning-tickets-358240826957>

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

New: On 13 Jul 22 RUSI(NS) hosted Distinguished Speakers Alexander Worobey, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security; and Natasha Cohen, US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency Liaison to the National Security Agency. The topic of their presentations was "Canada-United States: Strengthening Cyber Resilience." The presentations were not recorded and slides will not be posted. However, some links of interest were passed during the event, and are as follows:

Get Cyber Safe

<https://getcybersafe.gc.ca/en>

4 Things You Can Do To Keep Yourself Cyber Safe

<https://www.cisa.gov/4-things-you-can-do-keep-yourself-cyber-safe>

On the Internet: Be Cautious When Connected

<https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/on-the-internet>

Tallinn Manual 2.0 on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations

<https://ccdcoe.org/news/2020/ccdcoe-to-host-the-tallinn-manual-3-0-process/>

RUSI(NS) Presentation "No. 2 Construction Battalion: A Short History & an Apology" by Colonel (retired) John Boileau, 25 May 22, <https://rusi-ns.ca/no-2-construction-battalion/>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 22 June 2022

<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, July 2022.

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 6, July-August 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, June 2022
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/131-rausi-dispatches-june-2022>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, June 2022 Edition.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 13, Issue 32, 11 July 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2022.

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* July 2022
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-07>

Tweeted by @RUSI NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 7 Jul tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The recent announcement by the Gov that it will embark on a new Defence Policy Review should be welcomed by all. Any new policy initiatives will be nothing more than a “paper tiger” if Canada doesn’t have the capability to deliver on these policies.
(Defence Procurement | The Elephant in the Room
<https://cdainstitute.ca/the-elephant-in-the-room/>)



RUSI @RUSI_org 7 Jul tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 'A premature or partial peace is seen by #Ukrainians as likely to make things worse, and to leave Ukraine vulnerable to a third Russian attack with rebuilt resources' writes Andrew Wilson (@UCLSSEES) in the latest #RUSICommentary.
<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/resilient-ukraine>
(Resilient Ukraine)



Lease of Motor Vessel ASTERIX, serving as (only) replenishment oiler for @RoyalCanNavy, may be extended to 2025
<https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/07/12/canadas-new-fleet-of-supply-ships-get-hit-by-another-delay/> With 1st Joint Support Ship #JSS project oiler due 2025, CAN🇨🇦 should lease #ASTERIX longer. Oilers essential for global ops #BlueWaterNavy
(Canada’s new fleet of supply ships get hit by another delay)



David Pugliese @davidpugliese 14 Jul tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Military plans to create Canadian Space Division in coming weeks

<https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/military-plans-to-create-canadian-space-division-in-coming-weeks> via @ottawacitizen



Canadian Armed Forces @CanadianForces 14 Jul tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: We're acquiring two used aircraft that will later become part of our Strategic Tanker Transport Capability fleet. They will provide air-to-air refuelling, strategic airlift, aeromedical evacuations, and strategic Government of Canada transport.

<https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/07/canada-moves-forward-with-the-acquisition-of-aircraft-for-the-royal-canadian-air-force.html>
(Canada moves forward with the acquisition of aircraft for the Royal Canadian Air Force)



Picked off Twitter

Update on Russia-backed disinformation

July 7, 2022

- Russia has made **false claims** that:
 - Sabotage at chemical and nuclear sites in Ukraine have been planned by Ukrainian radicals.
 - Neo-Nazis in Ukraine are in possession of chemical weapons that could be used to conduct an attack on the civilian population.
 - Ukrainian radicals have planned attacks on chemical and nuclear sites in order to support accusations that Russia was using these weapons against the Ukrainian population.
 - Ukrainian radicals' planned sabotage at chemical and nuclear plants would create the preconditions for ecological catastrophes, which could result in mass casualties.

Communications Security Establishment Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications

Canada

CSE @cse_cst 7 Jul tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted:

CSE continues to observe numerous Russia-backed #disinformation campaigns online, which aim to support Russia's brazen and unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine.

Keep reading for observations pulled from our classified reporting on this issue.

Kremlin officials continue to be directly involved in guiding and coordinating Russia-backed #disinformation efforts.
 Russian #disinformation campaigns have falsely blamed Ukrainian radicals for the destruction of chemical and nuclear sites in Ukraine.
 Some of their #disinformation activities include:
 Suggesting that Neo-Nazis in Ukraine have chemical weapons that could be used to against the Ukrainian population
 Claiming that Ukrainian radicals have planned attacks on chemical and nuclear sites to support accusations that Russia was using these weapons against the Ukrainian population
 Insinuating that Ukrainian radicals' planned sabotage at chemical and nuclear plants would create the preconditions for ecological catastrophes and result in mass casualties.
 As the Government of Canada's foreign signals intelligence agency, CSE has a mandate to inform the government of the activities of foreign entities that threaten Canada or its allies, including #disinformation.
 All observations in this thread are based on CSE intelligence. We are sharing this information as part of the Government of Canada's efforts to help inform Canadians so they can protect themselves from #disinformation.
 You can take action against #disinformation and help stop the spread by familiarizing yourself with the signs: <https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/how-identify-misinformation-disinformation-and-malinformation-itsap00300> @cybercentre_ca
 (How to identify misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation)

Drone re-arming

<https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1545643691401936896>

Normally videos aren't included in *Dispatches*, but this short video of re-arming a drone in flight is interesting (simple logistics!).



Strategy

Four months since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian and Ukrainian strategy have evolved - an update on Russia's strategy in Ukraine.
<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1546039360973185024.html>



Information Operations

Gerald Butts on Twitter: "The FBI and MI5 had a joint release on China's malign influence operations. This is worth reading in full. It's an instruction manual for how to avoid being a useful idiot. Joint address by MI5 and FBI Heads | MI5 - The Security Service
<https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/speech-by-mi5-and-fbi/> /
<https://twitter.com/gmbutts/status/1546076596779589632>)



Fires

A discussion of range/accuracy versus mass - a noticeable change recently in the ranged war (which is the most important in this attritional phase) and that is Ukraine now showing an ability to hit back. *Map heavy:*
<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1546020369462591488.html>

Ukrainian campaign to target Russian munition depots

Source: Deep State monitoring group/LiveUaMap/Armed Forces of Ukraine, June 14 - July 7



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Driving the Dark Road to the Future: A Guide to Revitalizing Defense Planning and Strategic Analysis

<https://warontherocks.com/2022/07/driving-the-dark-road-to-the-future-a-guide-to-revitalizing-defense-planning-and-strategic-analysis/>



"... schoolhouses need to directly connect to current and future operational challenges and teach officers complex problem solving rather than rote memorization or tired historical epiphanies."

"History Doesn't Repeat Itself, but It Often Rhymes" (Mark Twain) The better leaders, planners and (dare I write?) warriors (okay, operators) are those who think (can problem solve), with a knowledge of history and thought to aid that thinking.

Challenges to Russian Arms Resupply: Tanks, Combat Aviation, Artillery Ammunition

<https://jamestown.org/program/challenges-to-russian-arms-resupply-tanks-combat-aviation-artillery-ammunition/>



Conflict, particularly major conflicts (and those obviously have not gone away) are consumers of massive amount of material (and, sadly, people). A state's military, no matter how many troops, tanks and other equipment are paraded, is but a brittle façade with no real deterrence effect unless there is a strong industrial sector behind it. Maybe that sector shouldn't be called a 'war industry' (bad messaging - the objective is to avoid war) but a capable, scalable capability needs to be there, understood and supported by the state's people and government.

UK reveals Royal Navy seizure of smuggled Iranian missiles

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-reveals-royal-navy-seizure-of-smuggled-iranian-missiles>



Canadians tend to think of seizures of drugs and irregular migration when they think of maritime security. Are our

maritime services ready to undertake an operation against smuggled heavy weapons (missiles and the like)? Could it happen in our hemisphere? Let's not presume no - that's the road to unreadiness.

Russian Separatists Seize Cargo Ships

<https://gcaptain.com/russian-separatists-seize-cargo-ships/>

Sal Mercogliano (WGOW Shipping) on Twitter: "The Donetsk People's Republic Has A Merchant Marine...THEY STOLE IT! Piracy or the Right of Angary? #Russia has seized six vessels in #Mariupol and now two have been nationalized by the DPR. Should they be returned by @USNavy or @NATO_MARCOM ? <https://t.co/EXxN35pX7w> (YouTube)" / Twitter
<https://twitter.com/mercoglianos/status/1544432898350129162>



Angary - the right of a belligerent (most commonly, a government or other party in conflict) to seize and apply, for the purposes of war or to prevent the enemy from doing so, any kind of property on belligerent territory including what may belong to subjects or citizens of a neutral state. (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angary>)

All sorts of discussion points here. Are Russia and Ukraine belligerents? Are they at war? Is seizing merchant ships, suspectedly in order to use them to ship grain, including stolen grain, a 'purpose of war'? Does 'purpose of war' include economic/trade war?

Would Canadian authorities be prepared to seize (hmm, what's the appropriate and legal word?) these ships if able to do so? That may be within the power of the Minister of Transport, especially what with the sanctions and other regulations Canada has declared operative.

U.S. Marines: Manage Your Message To Win In Strategic Competition

<https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/u-s-marines-manage-your-message-to-win-in-strategic-competition/>

This is not just an article about the Marines, but about information operations and, more so, strategy. Well worth a read.



Additionally, the author's point about propaganda is worth consideration. The Government of Canada definition of propaganda is: "Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view." Propaganda is not inherently bad. It is who uses it and how it is used (both depending on your point of view and objectives) that can make it 'bad.' It becomes a label to make a point against, a label of, another party. (Terminium <https://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tpv2alpha/alpha-eng.html?lang=eng>)

Future network concept

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/future-network-concept/>



Russia Seems to Be Running Low on Drones

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/07/russia-seems-be-running-low-drones/374157/>

Uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAS), whether they be used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (including targeting) or as loitering munitions, are, like aircraft and bombs, consumable, potentially in great numbers. A state must be prepared with large inventories of them prior to a conflict, and with an industrial capability to scale up to produce large quantities to replace losses and expenditures. Maybe we don't call this a 'war industry,' but planners should be considering a capable defence industry as part of routine preparations (including not depending on foreign production and spare parts). What is the state of Canada's industry to support UAS for use by the Canadian Armed Forces and other federal departments?



Other Sources:

#A2R (Attraction, Recruiting and Retention)

On Society and the Military Reflections in Recruitment Videos

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/7/1/on-society-and-the-military-reflections-in-recruitment-videos>

#Arctic

Arctic Maritime Security – ‘Wait, it’s always been militarized?’ The Royal Danish Navy in the Arctic

<https://www.strifeblog.org/2022/05/31/strife-series-arctic-maritime-security-wait-its-always-been-militarized-the-royal-danish-navy-in-the-arctic/>

Spitzbergen: A New Hotspot in the Cold North Between Russia and the West

Could where Canada faces Russia in the Arctic become another hotspot?:

<https://jamestown.org/program/spitzbergen-a-new-hotspot-in-the-cold-north-between-russia-and-the-west/>

#artificial intelligence

Leveraging Artificial Intelligence for Canada's Army

https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc385/p814574_A1b.pdf

#border security

Study of the Government of Canada's Use of Biometrics in the Border Continuum

<https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/study-of-the-government-of-canadas-use-of-biometrics-in-the-border-continuum>

#Canadian Armed Forces

Ottawa's plan to off-load military sexual assault cases sparks feud with provinces

Wry humour: a different sort of legal warfare (lawfare): <https://nationalpost.com/pmnn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/ottawas-plan-to-off-load-military-sexual-assault-cases-sparks-feud-with-provinces>

#China

A PRC in decline: A multitude of difficult challenges

<https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4593099>

#combined operations

Separated by a Common Language

<https://wavellroom.com/2017/08/24/separated-by-a-common-language/>

#cyber operations

The Science of Cyber and the Art of Deception

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/05/18/the-science-of-cyber-and-the-art-of-deception/>

Equipping U.S. Partners in Cyberspace is a Must

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/equipping-u-s-partners-in-cyberspace-is-a-must

The International Law Sovereignty Debate and Development of International Norms on Peacetime Cyber Operations

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/international-law-sovereignty-debate-and-development-international-norms-peacetime-cyber-operations>

Infiltrate, Exploit, Manipulate: Why the Subversive Nature of Cyber Conflict Explains Both Its Strategic Promise and Its Limitations

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/infiltrate-exploit-manipulate-why-subversive-nature-cyber-conflict-explains-both-its-strategic>

#information operations

Situational Awareness in Maritime Information Warfare Study

https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc388/p814793_A1b.pdf

The Biggest Threat to the Military May Not Be What You Think

<https://news.clearancejobs.com/2022/07/11/the-biggest-threat-to-the-military-may-not-be-what-you-think/>

United Nations

Guterres to Security Council: Access to information a human right

<https://www.un.org/pt/node/183182>

related articles:

Reliable information ‘a matter of life and death’ UN chief tells Security Council

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1122362>

and

Secretary-General's remarks at the Security Council Debate on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: The Key Role of Strategic Communications

<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2022-07-12/secretary-generals-remarks-the-security-council-debate-united-nations-peacekeeping-operations-the-key-role-of-strategic-communications-bilingual-delivered-scroll-down>

and

UN stresses strategic communications to combat disinformation ‘weapon of war’

<https://www.c4isrnet.com/2022/07/13/un-stresses-strategic-communications-to-combat-disinformation-weapon-of-war/>

What is the UN definition of ‘strategic communications’?

#innovation

Beat Bureaucracy or Transform It? A Cultural Convergence between Leaders and Disruptors to Unleash Military Innovation

<https://mwi.usma.edu/beat-bureaucracy-or-transform-it-a-cultural-convergence-between-leaders-and-disruptors-to-unleash-military-innovation/>

#intelligence

Joint Intelligence Collection and Analysis Capability—Intelligence Collection

https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc387/p814721_A1b.pdf

Applying Information Theory to Validate Commanders' Critical Information Requirements

https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc387/p814708_A1b.pdf

#media operations

Chinese foreign minister’s visit helped erode Pacific media freedom

Erosion of media freedom is the road to erosion of freedom: <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinese-foreign-ministers-visit-helped-erode-pacific-media-freedom/>

#NATO

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has renewed NATO — but the future depends on what comes next

<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-07-05/nato-summit-russia-ukraine-what-ext/100887998>

What NATO’s New Strategic Concept Gets Wrong

<https://mwi.usma.edu/what-natos-new-strategic-concept-gets-wrong/>

#NORAD

North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Modernization - Challenges and Opportunities

https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc388/p814791_A1b.pdf

The Economic Benefits of North Warning System Modernization - Benefits Depend on Major Policy Decisions

https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc388/p814777_A1b.pdf

#policing

Objective and Continuous Feedback of Police Officers in Realistic Training Conditions through Monitoring Technologies

This is taking 'plug and play' quite far: https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc388/p814764_A1b.pdf

#Russia-Ukraine War

The Ukraine War: Five Months On... Impact of Russia's Invasion and Lessons Learned

<https://cdainstitute.ca/the-ukraine-war-five-months-on-impact-of-russias-invasion-and-lessons-learned/>

Ukraine Has Exposed Russia as a Not-So-Great Power

<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/07/rethinking-russia-ukraine-international-political-power-military-strength/661452/>

Ukraine targets Russia's ammunition depots, undermining its artillery advantage

<https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/1234>

What It Will Take to Supply Ukraine for the Long Haul

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-it-will-take-to-supply-ukraine-for-the-long-haul-11657206373>

Western Ideas of War and the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

https://nipp.org/information_series/beatrice-heuser-western-ideas-of-war-and-the-russia-ukraine-conflict-no-528-july-12-2022/

Donetsk: Two exhausted armies are battling for eastern Ukraine. Can either of them strike a decisive blow?

<https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/13/europe/ukraine-russia-next-stages-donetsk-intl/index.html>

#airpower

Does Ukraine Need Fighter Aircraft?

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/07/07/does-ukraine-need-fighter-aircraft/>

Ukraine – lessons for Western air power

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/07/13/ukraine-lessons-for-western-airpower/>

#information operations

How the Russian Media Spread False Claims About Ukrainian Nazis

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/07/02/world/europe/ukraine-nazis-russia-media.html>

Wikipedia remains one of the last propaganda-free corners of Internet in Russia

<https://thefix.media/2022/7/7/wikipedia-remains-one-of-the-last-propaganda-free-corners-of-internet-in-russia>

#logistics

Ukraine Ammo Stocks Become Crucial As Artillery Rages

<https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2022/07/ukraine-ammo-stocks-become-crucial-as-artillery-rages/>

Is the west running out of ammunition to supply Ukraine?

<https://www.ft.com/content/d413576c-c4d5-4ca6-9050-58f3f8dc3c00>



UPDATE ON UKRAINE

09 July 2022

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russia is moving reserve forces from across the country and assembling them near Ukraine for future offensive operations. A large proportion of the new infantry units are probably deploying with MT-LB armoured vehicles taken from long-term storage as their primary transport. While MT-LBs have previously been in service in support roles on both sides, Russia has long considered them unsuitable for most front-line infantry transport roles. It was originally designed in the 1950s as a tractor to pull artillery, has very limited armour, and only mounts a machine gun for protection.
- In contrast, most of Russia's first echelon assault units were equipped with BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles in February, featuring armour up to 33mm thick and mounting a powerful 30mm autocannon and an anti-tank missile launcher. Despite President Putin's claim on 07 July 2022 that the Russian military has 'not even started' its efforts in Ukraine, many of its reinforcements are ad hoc groupings, deploying with obsolete or inappropriate equipment.

#seapower


Europe, Cooperating for a Naval Ambition

<https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/cesm/Epreuve%205%20EN%20EM%20UE-min.pdf>

How High? The Future of European Naval Power and the High-End Challenge

<https://cms.polsci.ku.dk/english/publications/how-high-the-future-of-european-naval-power-and-the-high-end-challenge/>

Not that tonnage makes as much sense in ranking navies in it did in big-gunned, heavily-armoured ship times. Still, a nice graphic.



#strategy

A Strategic Mindset

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/10/31/a-strategic-mindset>

Global strategic studies: a manifesto

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2016.1269228>

#warfare

Deception and destruction can still blind the enemy

<https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2022/01/27/deception-and-destruction-can-still-blind-the-enemy>

James Bowder, the British Army's head of "Futures" and ex commander of 6th UK Division, gave an interesting and important talk at RUSI's land warfare conference last week, setting out the army's conceptual work on what the "first battle" in a future European war might look like.

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1545529720728686593.html>

How the Army is preparing leaders for war with China and Russia

<https://taskandpurpose.com/opinion/preparing-army-leaders-war-china-russia/>

and: ATP_7-100-3_Chinese Tactics

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34236-ATP_7-100.3-001-WEB-3.pdf

(All sorts of interesting reading available at:

<https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/ActiveInactiveRescSearch.aspx>)

#land

Fighting From Cities: The British Army after Ukraine

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/05/06/fighting-from-cities-the-british-army-after-ukraine/>

Rise of the Rocket Launcher: The end of the Armoured Division

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/02/23/rise-of-the-rocket-launcher/>

Battlegroup!

book review: <https://wavellroom.com/2022/01/13/wavellreviews-battlegroup-storr/>

#wargaming

Wargaming Intermediate Force Capabilities in a Complex Land-Based Scenario

https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc387/p814727_A1b.pdf

Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conflict over Taiwan

<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/dangerous-straits-wargaming-a-future-conflict-over-taiwans>

Other:

Canadian Military Journal [Vol. 22, No. 3, Summer 2022]

<http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/cmj-toc-en.html>

contents:

It's About Time: The Renewal of the Canadian Armed Forces' Ethos

Trusted to Serve: Rethinking the CAF Ethos for Culture Change

Improving Parliamentary Scrutiny of Defence

An International Perspective: Canada's Commitment to Peace and Stabilization Operations in Ukraine

The Canadians Fighting in Ukraine

"Let's StratCom the Shit Out of That": Task Force Latvia and Adventures with StratCom

NATO: Some Thoughts from a Canadian in the Alliance

The Greater Caribbean Basin as a Complex Littoral System: Implications for Joint Operations in the Region

Hybrid Warfare: Redefining and Responding to Hostile Intent

Turning Point



Military Strategy Magazine special edition "Strategic Misfortunes"

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/special-editions/strategic-misfortunes/>

Conference of Defence Associations Institute

On Track Vol 28

"Towards 2030 | Perspectives on Canadian Special Operations Forces"

<https://cdainstitute.ca/ontrack-vol-28/>

Table of Contents

Introduction: Towards 2030 | Perspectives on Canadian Special Operations Forces | Gaëlle Rivard Piché
Page 4

Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Competition: Four Emerging Themes | H. Christian Breede & Kevin D. Stringer
Page 7

A Typology for Engaging in the Information Environment: Inform, Influence, Impose Operations (I3O) | Bradley Sylvestre
Page 13

"We Will Find a Way": Recruiting, Training, and Sustaining Resilient Personnel in Canada's Special Forces | Meghan Fitzpatrick
Page 20

Canadian Special Operations Forces Culture: A Double-Edged Sword | Erin Yantzi
Page 26

Stadacona temporary fitness facility to be constructed by early fall 2023

<https://tridentnewspaper.com/stadfitnessfacility/>



Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

It is becoming increasingly clear that the federal government is not taking defence seriously despite the fact that the world is as close to a major war in quite some time. Our armed forces and security services are woefully unprepared for any action despite Russia's increasing assertiveness in the Arctic in the air and on the water. More than forty major bases have been rebuilt or built in the Arctic by Russia which is also proposing an Arctic Fleet as well as maintaining its Northern Fleet. The seven other Arctic countries may disagree about militarization but they have already missed the boat. Modernization of NORAD and northern defence will occur later and there does not seem to be any urgency on the part of the government to speed things up nor give the service the necessary tools to do stop gap measures such as arranging for air early warning aircraft and tanker support. There is even discussion to shut down existing facilities vital for our sovereignty. It is clear this is a recipe for potential disaster and in fact become an existential problem for Canada.

The other big issue this week has been the return of Siemen' turbines to Siemens in Germany. The gas turbines were in Canada for refit at a Canadian branch plant in Montreal. They are used to power the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline providing natural gas from Russia to Europe. Germany will in turn turn these turbines over to Russia to allow for natural gas to flow more effectively to Europe. The big issue is that turbines are under sanction because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Germany and other European Union countries are actively trying to get off Russian oil and gas but this will take time to do, which is reasonable. Ukraine has not taken this well and has accused Canada as being weak. It is unfortunate but there is little doubt that harming Germany and other allies in the short term will not help the issue either. It is unfortunate but necessary. It shows the real need for adequate solutions for Europe as soon as practical to eliminate Russia's ability to interfere in future. Russia's main goal is to disrupt and cause a splintering of the unified front.

Belarus

Belarus is in an interesting place at present. Its armed forces are mobilised and they are conducting major exercises near the Ukraine border. Russian troops are still present but are in small numbers insufficient for any major offensive but it does provide a "force in being" which has to be considered when Ukraine allocates troops. It was noted last week that ammunition types had been removed to sites in areas where Russia is making major moves or is conducting operations that destroy Ukrainian cities, towns and villages that are the Russian goals. There are unconfirmed reports that Belarussian armed forces are unhappy with the current situation and have apparently written an open letter to Lukashenko that state they are staunchly opposed to any war with Ukraine. Lukashenko has only kept his job with Putin's support but he still needs his own security forces for the survival of his own regime. He appears to be well aware that Russian forces are not doing well and have limited capacity to support him if his own security forces balk at operations. It appears the regime is left with pronouncements and little action if it hopes to survive. More than 85% of the population of Belarus oppose any action against Ukraine. It should also be noted that the Lukashenko regime has also changed the law to allow the Belarus secret service, known by the abbreviation KGB, to stop citizens of military age from leaving the country if necessary. Many have already voted with their feet and left.

Ukraine-Russia

The war has become one of attrition with Russia having some success in recent weeks because of a slow but devastating use of indiscriminate artillery fire on Ukrainian cities and towns. With the recent fall of Lysychansk, the Russian president has ordered that the army rest and rearm. It has been generally understood that Russia has had massive casualties forcing the Putin regime to take action to find new soldiers, hampered by the lack of a general mobilization order. One rumoured action is to

offer prisoners an opportunity to gain their freedom by fighting for Russia. Recruiting efforts have taken place across the country with offers of up to three times the normal salary for those willing to go to Ukraine. This apparently has had some success as there are approximately 85k new troops available just inside the Russian borders near Ukraine. These troops are of various quality but Russia has not been noted historically for really worrying about the quality or even life expectancy of their soldiers. Would this be enough to change the situation to any great degree? The answer is likely no.

Russia made a request to Iran for the purchase and provision of Iranian drones. In fact, President Putin is currently scheduled to visit Iran to discuss this and other issues. A short while ago, Iran stated that it would not provide these drones after all despite rumours to the contrary. Acquisition of modern drones would be a major advantage to the Russian effort. Russian drones have proven to be rudimentary at best and Iran has developed a wide range of drones which have been used effectively by the Houthis in Yemen civil war. Any improvement in Russian capacity would be unfortunate at best and a disaster at worst.

Ukraine has received a considerable amount of artillery from various nations, meaning they have a small smattering of virtually every type of NATO artillery pieces in existence. This is better known as a logistical nightmare, but one they will have to put up with for the time being. One benefit of NATO equipment is that it is accurate and longer range than most Russian systems and built to "shoot and scoot." Ukraine has worked with NATO forces long enough to be able to use better tactics and more finesse than the Russians as well. They have therefore used NATO equipment to fight the deep battle or certainly a much deeper battle than their ability to do so before being re-equipped. The main target of Ukraine's new capability has been Russia's large ammunition depots and rear headquarters. This makes eminent sense as these were thought to be safe, well behind the forward line of battle. More than twenty large ammunition depots have so far been destroyed in spectacular fashion. Vehicle repair depots have also been hit but at a lower number. Destruction of Russia's logistics system, which was already in a precarious state, means they suffered badly recently. Still, Russians are not slow in learning lessons and they will find at least a temporary solution in the longer term.

One other tactic is the use of partisan forces well behind the line. Ukrainian partisans have been involved in targeted killing of newly appointed Russian administrators, destruction of infrastructure and ambushes of occupation forces as well as target acquisition and target marking. This effort is growing and Russia has displayed little capacity to deal with these actions in an effective way. This means routine actions and movement all require escorts and guards for vital points and people. This in itself will draw on the manpower resources that Russia simply does not have at present. It also means there will be little rest and recovery for units that remain in the area. As we have seen and experienced no hostile army can succeed in the long term with this type of ongoing hostility.

The other issue for Russia is the recent sanctions by the EU and the implementation of older sanctions that provided time for countries to adjust. Lithuania just imposed some of these sanctions on the semi-exclave of Kaliningrad. Although this only affected less than 1% of Russian goods, Russia is using it as a pretext for potential further action against NATO or at the very least threaten something more as retaliation. Lithuania has clearly stated that it is imposing EU sanctions, that the material in question was well-known to Russian authorities. They also mentioned that Russia can still bring in these sanctioned materials by sea just not through Lithuania.

The bottom line is that this war will have its ups and downs. It appears that Ukraine is likely to set conditions for a longer term success with NATO help but this is not absolute. NATO unity is not an absolute either and there is the problem of those individuals and groups that simply do not view any war as beneficial and may try to impose that idea amongst various governments. This would essentially be a point of view advocating a "peace at any price" on Ukraine and therefore rewarding the attacking forces. Ukraine is taking offensive action in the south - it will be how this battle is fought

and its fallout that will give an idea of future success or failure for either Ukraine or Russia. As always, time will tell.

China

China's zero Covid policy will be tested once again as the main industrial area of the mainland, Shanghai appears to be facing yet another lockdown in real terms as the BA variant of the Covid virus appears to have spread across all 16 districts in the city. Numbers are not large as yet and Chinese authorities are blaming people who returned to China from the outside as cause for the latest series of outbreaks. China is never the blame and that continues the ongoing story that Covid is not a Chinese issue but rather an outside problem despite the outbreak starting in Wuhan. The real problem is that when China lockdowns, it has a very real effect on the Chinese economy and its ability to be the world's manufacturer. World supply chains are failing and China's position as a reliable partner has been dimmed. As mentioned before a number of other countries are now receiving the benefits of China's insistence on Zero Covid. Countries such as Viet Nam, Bangladesh, India, Laos, etc., have all benefitted from this new view of China.

Unfortunately for the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) this has led to an increasing unemployment rate as Western and even Chinese companies move to countries with weaker economies and fewer rules. The party has always been clear about its role in providing jobs and an increasing economy to meet the expectations of the Chinese people. Unemployment and a failing economy will not go over well. Fortunately for the CCP, the growing disaffection is not coordinated to become a real threat. Still, demonstrations about the ongoing battle with virus and the fallout from lockdowns continue to be a concern in the longer term.

China's reaction to the death of Shinzo Abe, the former Prime Minister of Japan, has been mixed at best. Officially, the Government of China took a rather positive view in his assassination.. Chinese netizens have been overall very negative in their views. This is not going well and even the Global Times have taken a more conciliatory line and has criticized some of the more virulent comments. Chinese-Japanese relations are somewhat frosty especially after Chinese coast guard vessels entered Japanese waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands recently. The comments by netizens will certainly not help.

China offered the new Australian Foreign Minister Julie Wong a way to improve China-Australia relation. China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented China's demands, after which Prime Minister Albanese stated that Australia didn't take too well to demands. Needless to say, Australia-China relations are not likely to get any better in the near term.

The last note for this week is in regard to China's military or rather the military of the CCP. The Chinese military consists of about two million members. This does not include other security forces or police. Less than half are what would be considered army troops. the rest are navy, air force, cyber-security, space forces, logistics, etc., that are national vice specific service. They also recently created six commands which are multi-service. While this looks more impressive than say Russia's armed forces in its modern organizational groups, how good is it? Much of its equipment is based on Russian designs or back-engineered equipment from other foreign militaries. The Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) has not seen any large scale action since 1979 during its war with Vietnam. It did not do well, although it was eventually able to get its way because of sheer numbers. China has gone to greater quality rather than sheer numbers. Still, it is largely untried although apparently well-equipped. Russia and China have another key factor that is very similar and that is large scale corruption. While forces look good on paper their actual performance leaves a lot to be desired. Russia lacks good leadership at lower levels and much of its "new" equipment wasn't actually new and kept the same flaws that they knew existed even in the early 1980s. Is China the same way? The answer is probably yes.

JOINT SEMINAR

"Standard Setting for Arctic Shipping in a Rapidly Changing Environment"



The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea only addresses ice-covered areas in one of its 320 articles. Partially or permanently frozen seas are generally submitted to the same international framework that applies to all other areas of the world's ocean. At the same time the Law of the Sea Convention as a framework agreement offers room for flexibility and standard-setting by international organizations as well as regional agreements. The Polar Code is one attempt to address the issue of navigation in Polar areas from a technical perspective. The talk will address the question how increasing shipping in the Arctic can be addressed in a multilevel regulatory system that takes account of a rapidly changing environment and due diligence obligations.



Steele Ocean Sciences Building
Dalhousie University
1355 Oxford Street
P.O. Box 15000
Halifax, NS, Canada B3H 4R2
crc-maritime.law@dal.ca

About Professor Dr. Nele Matz-Lück, LL.M.

Professor Dr. Nele Matz-Lück, LL.M., is professor at Kiel University Law School where she holds a chair for Public Law with a focus on Public International Law particularly the Law of the Sea. She was elected Vice President of Kiel University in October 2020. Since 2011 she is co-director of the Walther Schücking Institute for International Law at Kiel University. She also maintains the status of adjunct professor at Dalhousie University since 2014. Her main areas of research and publications focus upon the law of the sea and international environmental law. As far as the law of the sea is concerned she publishes regularly on the sustainable use of marine resources, the protection of the marine environment, e.g. marine protected areas and ship emissions, as well as on rights over maritime zones.



MARINE & ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INSTITUTE
Schulich School of Law
6061 University Avenue
Halifax, NS B3H 4R2
melaw@dal.ca
dal.ca/law/MELAW

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2022

- ▶ **12pm**
*Schulich School of Law
Faculty Lounge - Room 312,
Weldon Law Building
6061 University Avenue, Halifax, NS*
Lunch will be served.

EVERYONE IS WELCOME !

Please RSVP to lisa.sillito@dal.ca

This seminar is co-sponsored by the OFI Module N and the Marine & Environmental Law Institute