



## Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 12 August 2022

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.*

*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

### *Dispatches*

A hearty thank you to Sanchez King for editing *Dispatches* the last three editions.

RUSI(NS) continues to seek editors and particularly a long-time (nothing is permanent) editor. Even if for only a single or small number of editions, if you're willing to give it a try, contact us ([RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com)).

Contributors ( social media, whatever) are also welcome any time, too.

### **Events:**

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

No RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker event is being planned for August.

**New: 15 August**, Monday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Norwegian Wargaming - Teaching Maritime Tactics." Noon-1400 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/norwegian-wargaming-teaching-maritime-tactics-tickets-353487038247>

**New: 9 September**, Friday - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies will host Dr Daniel Moore for a discussion "Understanding Offensive Cyber Operations." 1300-1400 BST. See: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/understanding-offensive-cyber-operations>

**Save the date: 14 September**, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker to be announced. Note that is a second Wednesday of the month, not our normal third.

**New: 4 October**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Naval War College: Educational Wargaming." 6-8:30pm EDT. Online. To register:  
<https://www.eventbrite.com/e/naval-war-college-educational-wargaming-tickets-354893725687>

**27 October**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Back to the Future: The 1980s Global War Games as a Campaign of Learning." 1800-2000 EDT. Online. To register:  
<https://www.eventbrite.com/e/back-to-the-future-the-1980s-global-war-games-as-a-campaign-of-learning-tickets-358240826957>

### **Publications:**

Publications without links are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

On 13 Jul 22 RUSI(NS) hosted Distinguished Speakers Alexander Worobey, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security; and Natasha Cohen, US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency Liaison to the National Security Agency. The topic of their presentations was "Canada-United States: Strengthening Cyber Resilience." The presentations were not recorded and slides will not be posted. However, some links of interest were passed during the event, and are as follows:

Get Cyber Safe

<https://getcybersafe.gc.ca/en>

4 Things You Can Do To Keep Yourself Cyber Safe

<https://www.cisa.gov/4-things-you-can-do-keep-yourself-cyber-safe>

On the Internet: Be Cautious When Connected

<https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/on-the-internet>

Tallinn Manual 2.0 on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations

<https://ccdcoe.org/news/2020/ccdcoe-to-host-the-tallinn-manual-3-0-process/>

**New:** Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association On Watch, 3 August 2022

<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President's Enews, July 2022

Military Institute of Windsor Communiqué, Volume XL, Number 6, July-August 2022.

Naval Association of Canada Starshell, Summer 2022, Issue 95

Royal Alberta United Services Institute Dispatches, August 2022

<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/146-rausi-dispatches-august-2022>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch Scuttlebutt, June 2022 Edition

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) Defence Update, Volume 13, Issue 6, 1 August 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) Quarterly Newsletter, Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2022

**New:** *Seatimes*, the Newsletter of the Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada, August 2022

Veterans Affairs Canada Salute! August 2022

<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-08>


**Tweeted by @RUSI\_NS:**

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).


The Naval Association of Canada @navalassn 2 Aug tweeted: The Summer 2022 edition of Starshell contains the papers presented at our June Conference on "#Submarines: Canada's Strategic Requirement". You can download your copy of this edition from <http://ow.ly/AVC250K7Igw> @RoyalCanNavy  
RUSI(NS) retweeted: #Submarines are national strategic assets, major deterrence to potential adversaries in defence of CAN🇨🇦. @navalassn Starshell excellent reading to help understand. How does @NationalDefence @RoyalCanNavy Submarine Replacement Project fit into National Shipbuilding Strategy #NSS?



STRATCOMCOE @STRATCOMCOE 4 Aug tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Current structures supporting information influence operations attribution are broken, so we have come up with a first attempt to fix them - a report that aims to open a debate about how to improve the ability of IIO analysts to assess the evidence.  
<https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/attributing-information-influence-operations-identifying-those-responsible-for-malicious-behaviour-online/244>  
(Attributing Information Influence Operations: Identifying those Responsible for Malicious Behaviour Online)



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 6 Aug tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 🇨🇦 benefited from the luxury of being extremely safe for 3 decades under the umbrella of the US. As of a few years ago, several trends have been accumulating, and we see some dark clouds gathering.' @thomasjuneau #ICYMI #ExpertSeries  
(What it Will Take for Canada to Get Serious About National Security  
<https://cdainstitute.ca/thomas-juneau-what-it-will-take-for-canada-to-get-serious-about-national-security/>)  
See #security below, mentioned in the article.



JTF North / FOI Nord @JTFN\_FOIN Aug 5 tweeted: Whisky Air Lift! As part of #OpNEVUS, CAF members move equipment used on the operation from remote sites such as this one, back to Eureka as part of our commitment to environmental stewardship.

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Operation NEVUS #OpNEVUS = @CanadianForces annual deployment of technical team to Ellesmere Island to performs essential maintenance on High #Arctic Data Communications System

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-nevus.html>




The Naval Association of Canada @navalasn 5 Aug tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: RIMPAC 2022 has concluded, with many lessons learned. USNI News reports on these, and quotes RCN RAdm Chris Robinson who was the deputy commander of the exercise.

(RIMPAC 2022 Officials Reflect on Lessons Learned, What to Change for RIMPAC 2024

<https://news.usni.org/2022/08/04/rimpac-2022-officials-reflect-on-lessons-learned-what-to-change-for-rimpac-2024>)



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 5 Aug tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: How can defence procurement be improved in  OSINTtechnical @Osinttechnical 6 Aug tweeted: A Russian Project 436 target barge equipped with a large number of radar reflectors near the Crimean Bridge. This is most likely intended to serve as a decoy for any terminal radar guided missiles aimed at the bridge.? Col (ret'd) Charles Davies suggests we need to dig deeper to target the root of the problem, as defence procurement is not a stand-alone activity. (Fixing Defence Procurement: Dig Deeper to Find the Real Problem

<https://cdainstitute.ca/fixing-defence-procurement-dig-deeper-to-find-the-real-problem/>)



Canadian Armed Forces Operations @CFOperations 8 Aug tweeted: #OpGLOBE A @RCAF\_ARC CC-177 flew to Santo Domingo yesterday carrying mining equipment to assist with the rescue of two trapped miners. Nine CAF members helped pack, load, and offload the equipment that is now at the mine site.

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Operation GLOBE #OpGLOBE: @CanadianForces assistance to other Gov't of CAN depts with tasks or activities abroad. #CAF members work alongside other gov't dept personnel as well as other nations <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/op-globe.html>

*Later, good news: Two miners trapped in Dominican Republic rescued with help from Canada*



<https://www.thestar.com/politics/2022/08/09/two-miners-trapped-in-dominican-republic-rescued-with-help-from-canada.html>

### Decoy?

OSINTtechnical @Osinttechnical 6 Aug tweeted: A Russian Project 436 target barge equipped with a large number of radar reflectors near the Crimean Bridge. This is most likely intended to serve as a decoy for any terminal radar guided missiles aimed at the bridge.

*Read the replies – humorous:*

<https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1556028550104367105>



### Innovation and Adaptation

Special Kherson Cat 7 Aug tweeted: @bayraktar\_1love Ukrainian strategic drone-bomber for carpet bombing 🤖 #Ukraine

*Lesson here: let your people innovate and adapt. Lots of books on that topic of late.*

*And, as often in this war, a wry sense of humour masking some significant messaging.*



### **Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:**

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

### Not a Big Honkin' Ship

Navy's joint support ship taking shape at Seaspan shipyard <https://www.nsnews.com/local-news/navys-joint-support-ship-taking-shape-at-seaspan-shipyard-5642201>

There have been a number of articles and posts recently based on Jane Seyd's reporting (above) of progress with the Joint Support Ship project. One had the headline that included the words "Big Honkin' Ship" but that headline seems to have



disappeared. Appropriate. "Big honkin' ship" was a CDS General Hillier-ism, part of his vision for the CAF in the early 2000s. The expression refers to a large transport with the primary role (strategic sealift) of moving land forces and material between ports (the ship also had a role as a landing ship, a.k.a. amphibious ship, a misleading contraction of amphibious warfare ship - see: "A New 'Big Honking Ship': Why Canada Should Procure An Amphibious Assault Ship (Part I/V)" <https://natoassociation.ca/a-new-big-honking-ship-why-canada-should-procure-an-amphibious-assault-ship-part-iv/>). The expression should not be used other than in its historical context. What Seaspan is building is a different ship, its type to be announced but likely to be 'replenishment oiler' (AOR). (And yes, the Forces could still benefit from having a strategic sealift/landing ship but it appears to be beyond current Navy requirements and government funding.)

### **Storm Chasing Drones Ready to Intercept Major Hurricanes At Sea**

<https://gcaptain.com/storm-chasing-drones-ready-to-intercept-major-hurricanes-at-sea/>

Storms have been and are a threat to naval forces. Use of uncrewed surface vessels (USV) to 'chase' storms in future or current operating areas could much add to the safety and effectiveness of those forces. The USV that ships will carry won't just be weapons and warfare sensor carriers - imagine frigates, oilers, etc., carrying meteorological and oceanographic USV (and UAV and UUV), maybe imagine a 'MetOc carrier.'



### **Putin is banking on a failure of political will in the west before Russia runs out of firepower**

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/aug/05/ukraine-war-west-vladimir-putin-russia>

The war in Ukraine is not simply a war between Russian invaders and Ukrainian defenders, nor simply a war confined to the region of kinetic conflict. It is a war that includes the rest of the world, especially those states that value sovereignty, territorial integrity and the right of people to choose their government. The 'centre of gravity' of those states (that on which the continued engagement of a state depends) is the support of their people for whatever efforts those states are making to keep Ukraine in the war. Time and fatigue work against that centre. The people need to know they're involved and that the stakes will greatly affect them and their futures. The leaders of those states have a responsibility to inform the people about the stakes and efforts.

We can't let Field Marshal Time win.



### **These Ukrainian volunteers recover soldiers' remains to return them to their families**

<https://www.npr.org/2022/08/07/1113999223/these-ukrainian-volunteers-recover-soldiers-remains-to-return-them-to-their-fami>

"The term (Evacuation 200) made its way into public



consciousness in the 1980s, when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union and Soviet soldiers' bodies were brought home from the war in Afghanistan. Each body in its zinc coffin was said to weigh around 200 kilograms — about 440 pounds."

Interesting, civil volunteers assisting mortuary affairs (a logistics process). Hopefully Canada will not be faced with handling mass Canadian fatalities but it is useful, as part of studying warfare elsewhere, to reflect on their lessons.

Is conflict becoming more and more a matter involving civilians? Certainly it is (really, always has been) from the public information, cyber and economic warfare perspectives.

### **The World's Fishermen as a Maritime Sensor Network**

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/august/worlds-fishermen-maritime-sensor-network>

Crowd sourcing information from civil fishers to build maritime domain awareness (MDA) and counter illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU) is an idea well worth investigating.



### **Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia's War Machine**

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/silicon-lifeline-western-electronics-heart-russias-war-machine>

A vulnerability to economic warfare action? A consideration for extension of sanctions?



### **CBSA seizes “ghost guns” in British Columbia**

<https://www.canada.ca/en/border-services-agency/news/2022/08/cbsa-seizes-ghost-guns-in-british-columbia.html>

3D-printed guns. This is the sort of issue upon which government should be focusing.



See also: Police seize 3D-printed 'ghost guns' in B.C. Interior

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/cbsa-seizes-3d-ghost-guns-1.6540121>

### **Australia's UK-Designed 'Slower & Heavier' Frigates Are Facing 'Teething Problems' – British Defense Chief**

<https://eurasianimes.com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/eurasianimes.com/edited-australias-british-designed-slower-heavier-hunter-class-frigates/>



"The report found that integrating the US Aegis combat system and the Australian-designed CEAFAR2 phased-array radar into the Type 26 design has pushed Hunter's space, weight, power, and cooling margins class to their limits, thereby posing a 'significant potential risk.'"

A lesson there. How much will re-design of the Type 26 for the Canadian Surface Combatant will result in issues with space, weight, power and cooling margins? And with the number (15) of CSC project ships to be built?

### **Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation**

Russia revises naval strategy in hopes of curtailing US supremacy at sea

<https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2022-08-05/russia-doctrine-maritime-6888517.htm>

"An ambitious new Russian maritime strategy introduced this week aims to challenge the global reach of the U.S. Navy, but

it remains to be seen whether the plan is more than Moscow's standard bravado, analysts say."

Essential reading for strategists (strategy students), naval personnel and navy fans, and government leaders and staff. Troy Bouffard, University of Alaska Fairbanks, translated the doctrine into English:

<https://uaf.edu/casr/publications/other/>

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*A Russian's comments on the doctrine:* [https://www.linkedin.com/posts/sokolov-an\\_arctic-security-activity-6959624888189886464-R5FB/](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/sokolov-an_arctic-security-activity-6959624888189886464-R5FB/)

Russian Shipbuilding Program to be Modified under New Naval Doctrine

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/08/russian-shipbuilding-program-to-be-modified-under-new-naval-doctrine/>



### **Canadian Armed Forces to deploy to train Ukrainian soldiers in the United Kingdom**

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/08/defence-minister-anita-anand-announces-deployment-of-canadian-armed-forces-to-train-ukrainian-soldiers-in-the-united-kingdom.html>

"The first Canadian-led courses...will teach a flexible curriculum focused on individual skills required for frontline combat, including weapons handling, battlefield first aid, fieldcraft, patrol tactics and the Law of Armed Conflict."

Appropriate training for recruits, particularly if "frontline combat" includes actual attack and defence (there appears to be a lot of emphasis in government reporting on non-fighting aspects). It's long been a lesson (am thinking here of the Canadian Army in France and the Netherlands, 1944) that failure to integrate replacements into units ('collective training') results in a higher-than-normal loss rate amongst them in their first combat.





### Canada's Air Task Force – Romania begins NATO Air Policing mission

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/08/canadas-air-task-force--romania-begins-nato-air-policing-mission.html>

"...nearly every Wing across Canada is represented in the Task Force."

Kinda leads one to wonder - do we have enough air force (pilots, maintainers, aircraft) to sustain a large deployment in times of tension and conflict?



### RCMP spyware use: privacy commissioner calls for new laws

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/rcmp-s-use-of-spyware-tools-under-scrutiny-at-parliamentary-committee-1.6018467>

A definition of 'spyware' from Termium, the Government of Canada's terminology and linguistic data bank: A software that uses the Internet connection of a user, without any knowledge, for collecting and exploiting information.



From the same source: "Spyware is installed on a user's computer for the purpose of spying. Some spyware programs record keystrokes, [while] others capture and store images from the monitor at preset intervals so another party can see everything the unsuspecting user saw. Advanced spyware programs can email the captured data to the spy. Spyware is invisible to the user."

From one of our colleagues: Any software, loaded into a device without the owner's permission, that covertly sends data to a third party.

### Canadian warships missing from NATO naval forces for first time since 2014

<https://www.thestar.com/politics/2022/08/08/canadian-warships-missing-from-nato-naval-forces-for-first-time-since-2014.html>

The point in the article about absence of Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) frigates deployed with NATO is understandable (the reporter quoted Defence spokesperson Jessica Lamirande "With the return home of HMCS Montreal and Halifax on July 15, the CAF does not currently have a ship tasked to either Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 or 2,") but the headline as written (by a headline editor?) is misleading. The RCN mine warfare vessels KINGSTON and SUMMERSIDE (often miscalled coast defence vessels, but that is the title of the project which built them) are currently part of Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One (<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/her-majestys-canadian-ships-kingston-and-summerside-depart-for-operation-reassurance.html>). Canada has warships with NATO naval forces.



The article does lead one to wonder, though, about the capacity of the RCN to sustain overseas deployments.

### U.S. Navy Recovers F/A-18E From Mediterranean Sea

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/08/u-s-navy-recovers-f-a-18e-from-mediterranean-sea/>


"The recovery efforts demonstrate the U.S. Navy's capabilities to conduct deep-water search and recovery operations worldwide."



Does Canada have a deep-water search and recovery capability?

### Overspec'd, Overpriced, all Navy: Bob Work on Institutional Addictions

<https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/overspecd-overpriced-all-navy-bob>



"The problems the Navy has faced has less to do about technological hubris and more with incompetence in developing cost-informed requirements and executable support processes."

Lessons for Canada?

### 3rd Fleet boss proposes new group to coordinate Pacific security

<https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/08/01/3rd-fleet-boss-proposes-new-group-to-coordinate-pacific-security/>

Commander US 3rd Fleet "... has called for a centralized command-and-control structure — a standing maritime force similar to those elsewhere around the globe — that could rapidly respond to a crisis in the Indo-Pacific region."



A combined (= multi-national) Standing Naval Force Pacific?

Will any forthcoming Canadian Indo-Pacific strategy or the upcoming Defence Policy Update address, if only to note the potential, of such collaboration? Certainly determining command and control is a good start towards ensuring ships and other units from multiple nations can work together. Many more challenges beyond that (e.g., communications, logistics). Whatever arrangement is developed doesn't have to be an alliance (could benefit from adopting NATO standards) but considering the concerns about and focus on the region, this could be a good next step for the security of states bordering the Pacific.

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See also: "Exercise RIMPAC 2022: Canadian Armed Forces participated in the world's premier joint and combined maritime exercise"

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/08/exercise-rimpac-2022-canadian-armed-forces-participated-in-the-worlds-premier-joint-and-combined-maritime-exercise.html>

RIMPAC 2022 Sets Stage for Interoperability with U.S., Allies

<https://news.usni.org/2022/08/09/rimpac-2022-sets-stage-for-interoperability-with-u-s-allies>

*'Interchangeability' seems to be a new buzz term.*

### Canada's 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron

<https://greydynamics.com/canadas-427-special-operations-aviation-squadron/>

The article is a good read, a description of the squadron and the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command.



### Canada Mission-Ready in Romania to Secure NATO Airspace in Black Sea Region

[https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/RCAF\\_eAP\\_ROU\\_22](https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/RCAF_eAP_ROU_22)

"Six Royal Canadian Air Force's CF-188 fighters and personnel from Canada's Armed Force Air Task Force-Romania (ATF-R) deployed to Romania in early August 2022. This is the seventh time that Canada has deployed an ATF to Romania on Operation Reassurance since 2014."



### Arctic Chiefs of Defence meet in Canada

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/08/statement-by-the-chief-of-the-defence-staff-on-the-conclusion-of-the-arctic-chiefs-of-defence-meeting.html>



"For our part, the Canadian Armed Forces remains committed to defending Canada's Northern sovereignty, and protecting Canadian interests at home and abroad. We will continue to work closely with our allies and partners in strengthening our domain awareness, surveillance, and command and control capabilities through a wide range of initiatives in the Arctic, including modernizing NORAD, improving the CAF's capabilities, mobility and presence in the North, and increasing our participation in multinational exercises in the region."

### Russian disinformation spreading in new ways despite bans

<https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-misinformation-european-union-government-and-politics-e5a1330e834fde428aab599b5c423530>



"Sleeper sites are websites created for a disinformation campaign that lay largely dormant, slowly building an audience through innocuous or unrelated posts, and then switching to propaganda or disinformation at an appointed time."

Sleeper sites is a concept in emergency management and IT ('warm' and 'cold' sites); it is not surprising to see it in information operations.

"...shifted some propaganda duties to diplomats..." Hopefully no free state's diplomatic corps would allow themselves to be used like that.

### **Russia struggles to replenish its troops in Ukraine**

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/russia-seemingly-struggles-to-replenish-its-troops-in-ukraine-1.6022741>

How to sustain units in combat with replacement troops should be a continuous staff study by all militaries including those of free states.



### **Canada plans to buy four new Airbus tankers, requests proposal**

<https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/08/10/canada-unveils-planned-deadline-to-buy-four-airbus-tanker-aircraft/>



### **Other Sources:**

#### **#Arctic**

Statement by the Chief of the Defence Staff on the Conclusion of the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Meeting  
<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/08/statement-by-the-chief-of-the-defence-staff-on-the-conclusion-of-the-arctic-chiefs-of-defence-meeting.html>

#### **#Australia**

The Task Ahead for Rapid Capability Enhancement in Australian Defense  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/task-ahead-rapid-capability-enhancement-australian-defense>

#### **#cyber operations**

Prescribing a New Paradigm For Cyber Competition  
<https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/prescribing-a-new-paradigm-for-cyber-competition/>

#### **#drones**

Attention Turns to Extra Large Unmanned Underwater Vessels  
<https://www.marinelink.com/news/attention-turns-extra-large-unmanned-498317>  
*When will Canada develop and employ such vessels?*

#### **#environmental (warfare?)**

Useful Fiction – Fragmented Future  
<https://wavellroom.com/2022/04/29/useful-fiction-fragmented-future/>

### **#Indo-Pacific**

A US-China War Over Taiwan Isn't Happening Anytime Soon  
<https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-08-09/a-us-china-war-over-taiwan-isn-t-happening-anytime-soon>

*The article's author, ADM James Stavridis USN (ret'd), is always worth reading.*

### **#wargaming**

War Game Finds U.S., Taiwan Can Defend Against a Chinese Invasion

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/war-game-finds-u-s-taiwan-can-defend-against-a-chinese-invasion-11660047804>

### **#information operations**

China Illustrations Need More Than Dragons, Pandas, and Propaganda

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/31/illustrations-china-stereotypes-xi-dragon/>

*The messaging inherent in illustrations. A (should be a) PA focus.*

Tactical TikTok for Great Power Competition - Applying the Lessons of Ukraine's IO Campaign to Future Large-Scale Conventional Operations

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2022/Kleisner/>

Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War

[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph\\_reports/2005/MR661.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR661.pdf)

### **#intelligence**

Intelligence and the State: Analysts and Decision Makers

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2022/8/10/-reviewing-intelligence-and-the-state>

### **#NORAD**

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/north-american-aerospace-defense-command-norad.html>

Keep an eye on NORAD and other matters of defence and security in the North as the Defence Policy Review gets going.

### **#Russia-Ukraine War**

Interactive Map: Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

<https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375>

Understanding the Russo-Ukrainian War: A Guide from War on the Rocks

<https://warontherocks.com/understanding-the-russo-ukrainian-war-a-guide-from-war-on-the-rocks/>

Pondering what happens when Ukraine takes back the south

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1551873063272136706.html>

An examination of whether there may be a pending shift in the initiative in Ukraine

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1556092549474820097.html>

European security after Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine

<https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/european-security-after-russias-war-of-aggression-in-ukraine/>

War at sea is critical to Ukraine's survival against Russia

<https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3489580-war-at-sea-is-critical-to-ukraines-survival-against-russia/>

*An older article but proving insightful.*

#### **#drones**

Ukraine's Drone Spotters on Front Lines Wage New Kind of War

[https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-drone-spotters-on-front-lines-wage-new-kind-of-war-11659870805?st=zjtbptyhngqncjd&reflink=share\\_mobilewebshare](https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-drone-spotters-on-front-lines-wage-new-kind-of-war-11659870805?st=zjtbptyhngqncjd&reflink=share_mobilewebshare)

#### **#information operations**

Ukraine and the Words That Lead to Mass Murder

<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/06/ukraine-mass-murder-hate-speech-soviet/629629/>

*Words as weapons.*

#### **#logistics**

Logistics Determine Your Destiny: What Russia's Invasion is (Re)Teaching Us about Contested Logistics

<https://mwi.usma.edu/logistics-determine-your-destiny-what-russias-invasion-is-reteaching-us-about-contested-logistics/>

#### **#NATO**

Time for NATO to Take the Lead in Ukraine

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/time-nato-take-lead-ukraine>

#### **#security**

A (Canadian) National Security Strategy for the 2020s

<https://socialsciences.uottawa.ca/public-international-affairs/ns2022en>

*and report itself:*

[https://socialsciences.uottawa.ca/public-international-affairs/sites/socialsciences.uottawa.ca/public-international-affairs/files/natsec\\_report\\_gspia\\_may2022.pdf](https://socialsciences.uottawa.ca/public-international-affairs/sites/socialsciences.uottawa.ca/public-international-affairs/files/natsec_report_gspia_may2022.pdf)

#### **#security, energy**

Reviving the Petroleum Administration for War: A Case for Government-Industry Partnership

<https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/reviving-the-petroleum-administration-for-war-a-case-for-government-industry-partnership/>

#### **#strategy**

##### **#strategy, maritime**

Assured Sovereignty: A Concept for Naval Partnership and Persistent Engagement

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/assured-sovereignty-concept-naval-partnership-and-persistent-engagement>

##### **#reading**

Science Fiction Short Stories and the Strategist

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/3/18/science-fiction-short-stories-and-the-strategist>

## #warfare

Ten rules of the Australian way of war

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ten-rules-of-the-australian-way-of-war/>

*Applicable to Canada, too.*

The War in Ukraine: A New Paradigm of Sanctions Practice

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/war-ukraine-new-paradigm-sanctions-practice>

*Editor: wasn't sure how to tag this. Legal warfare? Economic warfare? Diplomatic warfare?*

Falklands 40: A Corbettian re-assessment

<https://wavelroom.com/2022/06/15/falklands-40-a-corbettian-re-assessment/>

"No British serviceperson has had to undertake opposed theatre entry against a peer competitor in a generation, and unlike 40 years ago, few have experienced comparable conflicts; as Carleton-Smith intimated, today we are in a 'pre-war generation'"

Strategic Substitution: China's Search for Coercive Leverage in the Information Age

<https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/1/46/112581/Strategic-Substitution-China-s-Search-for-Coercive>

## #warfare, land #artillery


Debunking the myth that long range fires can replace Marine cannon artillery

<https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/opinion/2022/08/08/correcting-the-myth-that-long-range-fires-can-replace-marine-cannon-artillery/>

## Other:

### Militaria

Clerisy Entertainment, a television production company located in Dartmouth, is developing a new season of *Militaria*, an Eastlink Community TV program that showcases a selection of military artifacts and explores their war stories and historical significance. They are currently seeking out collectors in Nova Scotia who would be keen to share a piece and its story with them on the show. They can be from any era (Ed: I think Clerisy means the artifacts, not the collectors)! If interested, contact Gen Oliver, Development Coordinator at Clerisy Entertainment, (647) 746-6294, [genevievejnoliver@gmail.com](mailto:genevievejnoliver@gmail.com).



## **Security Affairs Committee Synopsis**

### **O Canada**

The Honourable Bill Graham passed away on 7 August 2022 at the age of 83. A former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Jean Chretien government and Minister of Defence in the Paul Martin government, he was also the Opposition Leader after the defeat of the Martin government. He was instrumental in developing the Canadian Army as lightly equipped peacekeepers but also saw a major increase in the overall defence budget as well including major new equipment purchases such as the CC130J and the CC177 transport aircraft after Prime Minister Chretien's "Decade of Darkness." He was respected by all sides of the House.

The Canadian government is reviewing its current China policy as part of a wider study of policy on the Indo-Pacific led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Melanie Joly. The Minister is reviewing the structure and organization of Global Affairs Canada at the same time. One of the panel reviewing this area was the former Ambassador to China, Dominic Barton. Mr Barton was found to be in conflict of interest as a board member of Rio Tinto, a company with extensive connections to China, and once known he resigned voluntarily. Canada continues to have a difficult time with China in light of imprisonment on dubious charges in an opaque legal system and more recently the Canadian government decision not to allow Huawei equipment into Canadian communications systems. Canada has not replaced Ambassador Barton at this time. A policy that is too lenient on China would be detrimental to the country given the Chinese current world actions. Canada must be more realistic and approach China as one might approach an untrustworthy character. China is not a friend and will attempt to harm Canada to further their aims.

The real question to be asked is whether China is a future partner or whether it is an adversary. This is a very real question given China's recent actions in Hong Kong, Xinjiang Province also known as occupied East Turkistan, and occupied Tibet. One also has to look at China's massive crackdown on religion and of course its massive disruption of the global supply chain while fighting Covid 19 on the basis of flawed science, especially in light of more recent variant of the disease which is far more contagious. One has to remember that Canada is considered to be an influential target and even preferred target by the Communist Chinese Party. Both CSIS and CSE view them as a threat especially for espionage and influence operations. Our last election was apparently influenced by the Chinese United Front which has funded 80% of the Chinese language press in Canada. It is estimated that up to twenty seats within Parliament were affected by these actions and it is possible that the current Liberal government is elected at least in part by this influence operation by China. It may explain why, legislation of foreign influence has not been acted upon by the current government despite the advice from the intelligence services. It seems that China is in fact an adversary by way of its actions - maybe it is time to deal with the situation in a more concrete fashion.

The good news is that Canadian soldiers will be joining their British counter-parts in training Ukrainian soldiers within Britain. Up to 225 Canadian soldiers will be designated to conduct this training.

### **United States**

The big news is that the FBI conducted a legal search of Mar-a-Lago, the Trump Florida Resort. The former President was suspected of removing at least fifteen boxes of documents from the White House



which is against the law as they were to be turned over to the National Archives for preservation. Normally, this would be used by scholars for research and potentially for the production of biographies or even a memoir from the former President. The Trump administration was more noted for its destruction of material including by flushing paper notes down the toilet causing blockages. The full fallout from this event has yet to occur but given past experience it is likely to turn a very ugly situation, more so in the near term. This is not over. He is the very first former President to have had their business required to undergo a search because of illegal actions on the part of the president.

Just before this event, new polling seems to indicate that the Democrats may keep one or both houses of Congress in the upcoming mid-terms. It seems the actions of former President Trump and the Republican Party are now starting to be noticed. How recent events like the search of Mar-a-Lago affect peoples' views is unknown at this time. Depending on how the "spin" goes spun by either party or the official reports of law officials will likely have a major effect.

### **Russia-Ukraine War**

There are no official figures for Russian losses, the US estimate is approximately 75k have been killed, missing or wounded, nearly half of the original Russian contingent. Ukrainian estimates place Russian deaths over 4 k with two times as many wounded meaning that total Russian losses would be over 120k. Somewhere there is a true figure. Russia still has not declared a general mobilization but has actively sought volunteers from more rural areas although there are some attempts in major cities as well. Higher wages are offered, sometimes two or three times what people might receive in their home towns. Each of the 85 autonomous areas, independent regions, etc., have been asked to create a single battalion group for action in Ukraine. One estimate suggests that 85k troops would become available if this is successful. The Wagner group, a private military company, apparently went to Russian prisons to recruit prisoners as well. These troops are likely receiving minimal training and will be forced to use older equipment. Still badly trained infantry is marginally better than no infantry at all. Russia's manpower issues will have a greater effect in the long run. It does not bode well for Russian success.

The other large change is that Russia is now forced to react to Ukrainian efforts. Until recently, Russia has determined the nature of the battlefield and its location. Since the arrival of modern Western weapons Ukraine has been developing and conducting planned attacks whether by artillery rocket and missile systems or by small powerful local attacks with well-coordinated all arms teams. Ukraine is slowly but confidently moving forward and has been successful in limiting Russian aggressive actions throughout the line of battle. Announcements of a Ukrainian offensive around Kherson forced the Russians to deploy more forces to that region in anticipation, often denuding other areas of the necessary manpower and equipment. At the same time the Russian air force has proven to be largely ineffective with downed aircraft showing jury rigged navigation and targeting systems. Now Ukraine has a decided advantage in Western missile systems able to strike key targets in the rear areas. The vaunted Russian air defence systems are unable to eliminate this threat. More than fifty facilities have been destroyed using these systems along with key bridges. It is anticipated that Ukraine will continue to hammer key installations by all means possible. We have seen special forces and partisans also attack deep in the enemy's rear with Russian forces having little success in coping. The most recent success appears to be an attack on the Russian Crimean air base of Novofedorivka in western Crimea just north of Sevastopol, the key Russian base for the Black Sea Fleet. This main base was attacked by a locally produced UAV which flew into the main headquarters of the fleet.

Ukraine is doing well given its limited resources. It has shown a strong ability to conduct infantry attacks coordinated with other arms. It has also shown that they are rapidly becoming masters of the use of UAV in many creative ways that have turned the battlefield into a meat grinder for Russian men and equipment. Russia has been less than stellar in its operations; unless Russia can renew its

capacities with modern effective equipment coupled by trained manpower they cannot win in an environment that is hostile. They will be continuously forced to react to ever increasingly effective attacks by modern weapons and a well-trained foe.

Belarus continues to walk a tight rope. President Lukashenko continues toe the Russian party line publicly yet the actions of his forces indicate that there will be no attack from Belarus on Ukrainian territory. Russia does not have the "horse power" to impose its will on Belarus if the population becomes hostile. There are some indications that Belarussians are less than happy with the de facto occupation by Russian forces who have generally hidden themselves behind Belarussian forces. Russia still uses Belarus for UAV flights into western Ukraine, the occasional missile and use the air space for air attacks into Ukraine's rear areas. If Russia is unsuccessful, it is likely Lukashenko will be forced to flee as well and Belarus will have to forge its own way forward.

The agreement between Russia, Ukraine, the UN and Türkiye seems to be holding with seventeen vessels leaving Ukrainian ports with over a 100k tons of grain and corn. Ukraine estimates that they will have around 45m tons of grain available from grain in storage and this year's crops for foreign buyers. It is a bright light in an otherwise dark situation.

## **China**

China continues its zero Covid policy, inflicting largely unnecessary lockdown rules affecting large numbers of people whether or not there is a real concern. Most of China's recent cases are asymptomatic. The real concern by the Communist Chinese Party is stability within the population overall with the main effort being the absolute survival of the CCP. Most recently there was the island resort of Hainan where more than 80 k tourists are currently locked down and unable to leave. There are close to one hundred cities affected one way or another by Covid with variants of the omicron being the most prevalent at the present time. These lockdowns and near lockdowns are affecting the global supply chain. It has been highly disruptive across the globe calling into question China's role in the global supply chain. This is on top of the effects of US sanctions first placed by Trump and maintained by the Biden White House. China's own self-inflicted wounds also occurred when the CCP started a crackdown on major tech companies and the educational sector. The full effects of this crackdown are still being felt as many qualified teachers lost their jobs in the educational private sector, thus creating a well-educated cadre of unemployed younger members of society. The unemployment rate for new workers is over 20% and thus is a cause for concern for overall stability within the country. Foreign capital has also left the country especially in the Hong Kong area as people chose to "vote with their feet" and leave the city once beloved now condemned to be a shadow of its former self as the new national security law takes full effect.

China is an authoritarian state with little or no legal system that would be recognized by anyone. The CCP's main interest is its survival and not the best interests of the country. The leadership of the CCP is often puzzled by the negative views held by most of the world including Africa where Chinese arrogance and xenophobia create a negative view by the citizens of the affected countries. China does not play by rules and any Chinese suggestion of win-win means two wins for China most often. China continues to be its own worst enemy.

The visit of Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan created ideal conditions for the CCP to ramp up the campaign of terror against Taiwan and its neighbours. During the visit China announced major exercises that essentially surrounded the island state. These exercises included both the *Liaoning* and *Shandong* carrier battle groups as well as a significant surface and undersea fleet. The exercises included a large number of live fire exercises and the PLAAF sent large numbers of aircraft into the Straits of Taiwan as well as sending several ballistic missiles across the island to land on the other side. The fear is not

that China held these exercises but rather that these exercises are the new normal and Taiwan may see these on a routine basis. A recent wargame showed that any attack on Taiwan would likely fail but at a huge cost to all the participants setting world affairs back decades or cause a nuclear response at worst. The leadership of the CCP want a peaceful reunification and understand that a major conflict for the island would be a long term battle causing conditions that may cause the survival of the CCP to be less than secure. Over confidence on the part of Chinese leadership is a major concern and its inability to understand its adversaries may be their undoing.

## Russia's losses 08.08.2022

Approximate assessment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 24.02.2022

### Personnel

**~170.360**

killed ~42340  
wounded ~127020  
prisoner of war ~1000



| Machinery               | Invasion forces |       | Army of the Russian Federation |       | Losses              |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-------|--------------------------------|-------|---------------------|
| Armored combat vehicles | 2900            | 100%  | 13758                          | 29.6% | 4070 <sup>+15</sup> |
| Tanks                   | 1200            | 100%  | 3300                           | 54.9% | 1811 <sup>+6</sup>  |
| Artillery               | 1600            | 60%   | 5689                           | 16.9% | 960 <sup>+2</sup>   |
| Aircrafts               | 330             | 67.6% | 1379                           | 16.2% | 223                 |
| Helicopters             | 240             | 80%   | 961                            | 20%   | 192 <sup>+1</sup>   |
| Ships and boats         | 75              | 20%   | 519                            | 2.9%  | 15                  |

Invasion grouping - approximate estimate of 22.02.2022

The number of armed forces of the Russian Federation - a Military Balance catalog

<https://www.minusrus.com/en/>