




# Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

## Dispatches

### 9 September 2022

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.*



*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

### Home Dispatches

Content for the September 2022 edition of *Home Dispatches* is solicited. If you have something for our internal quarterly, whether you are a RUSI(NS) member or not, please email to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). The September edition will be distributed shortly after our September Distinguished Speaker event.

### Dispatches 23 September

An editor for the 23 September edition of *Dispatches* is needed. Anyone of brave heart and soul who is willing to undertake this awesome task is asked to contact [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

## **Events:**

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**9 September**, Friday - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies will host Dr Daniel Moore for a discussion "Understanding Offensive Cyber Operations." 1300-1400 BST. See: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/understanding-offensive-cyber-operations>

**emended: 14 September**, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Lieutenant-Colonel Julien Letarte, Royal Canadian Air Force, speaking about the RCAF's Remotely Piloted Aircraft System; and Major Drew Larned, United States Air Force, speaking about US uncrewed aerial vehicle programs. 1300-1500 ADT. Via Zoom. Registration is required. To register, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com) by close-of-business Sun, 11 Sep. As the subject line for your registration email, put: RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker 14 September 2022 Registration. Participation is limited and later registrants may have to be put on a waiting list. If after registering your availability changes and you are no longer able to attend, please advise RUSI(NS) as soon as possible so your spot can be re-assigned. *LCol Letarte;s JCSP paper: Les Plateformes Multi-Missions De l'ARC: Concepts Isolés ou un Système De Systèmes?*

<https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/22/305/Letarte.pdf>

*Advance reading:*

Canadian Defence Academy Theme Portal - Uncrewed Aircraft Systems <https://cfc-ca.libguides.com/c.php?g=709488&p=5055081&preview=8d01d4c58cd1fa4b02bc759f34e935be>

Team SkyGuardian Canada <https://www.ga-asi.com/teamskyguardiancanada/>

DoD Unmanned Aircraft Systems Training Programs

<https://www.icao.int/Meetings/RPAS/RPASSymposiumPresentation/Day%20%20Workshop%20%20Licensing%20Lance%20King%20-%20DoD%20Unmanned%20Aircraft%20Systems%20Training%20Programs.pdf>

Classification of the Unmanned Aerial Systems

<https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog892/node/5>

Canadian Drone Advisory Committee (CanaDAC)

<https://tc.canada.ca/en/aviation/drone-safety/drone-innovation-collaboration/canadian-drone-advisory-committee-canadac>

**New: 20 September**, Tuesday – Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies webinar “Russia and the Security of the Black Sea Region.” 1400-1530 BST. Online. To register: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/russia-and-security-black-sea-region>

**New: 21 September**, Wednesday – Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies webinar “Securing the Indo-Pacific: Re-setting the Security Agenda.” 1430-1530 BST. To register: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/securing-indo-pacific-re-setting-security-agenda>

**4 October**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Naval War College: Educational Wargaming." 6-8:30pm EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/naval-war-college-educational-wargaming-tickets-354893725687>

**27 October**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Back to the Future: The 1980s Global War Games as a Campaign of Learning." 1800-2000 EDT. Online. To register:

<https://www.eventbrite.com/e/back-to-the-future-the-1980s-global-war-games-as-a-campaign-of-learning-tickets-358240826957>

**Publications:**

Publications without links are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

RUSI(NS) Information Note *Naming and Dedication of Canadian Coast Guard Ships*, 23 August 2022  
<https://rusi-ns.ca/naming-dedication-canadian-coast-guard-ships/>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 31 August 2022  
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute *President's Enews*, September 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 8, September 2022

Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada Newsletter *Seatimes*, August 2022

Naval Association of Canada *Starshell*, Summer 2022, Issue 95

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, August 2022  
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/146-rausi-dispatches-august-2022>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, September 2022

**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 14, Issue 3, 5 September 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2022

**New:** Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* September 2022  
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-08>

**Tweeted by @RUSI\_NS:**

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

Irving Shipbuilding @IrvingShipbuild 2 Sep tweeted: A proud shipbuilder stands on the deck of the future HMCS William Hall and watches the future HMCS Max Bernays depart Halifax Shipyard for the @RoyalCanNavy dockyard. It's a great day to be a shipbuilder. #ShipsForCanada  
RUSI(NS) retweeted: RUSI(NS) Info Note "Canadian Warship Acceptance" <https://rusi-ns.ca/canadian-warship-acceptance/> Future HMCS MAX BERNAYS 3rd #Arctic&Offshore Patrol Vessel to be accepted by @RoyalCanNavy, delivered by @IrvingShipbuild under Arctic&Offshore Patrol Ship #AOPS project



<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/09/third-new-arctic-and-offshore-patrol-ship-delivered-to-canada.html>

Canada at NATO @CanadaNATO 30 Aug tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: For more myth de-bunking about #NATO's relations with #Russia, check out NATO's webpage NATO-Russia: Setting the Record Straight. <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm>

**The facts** ✓

Russia's false claim ✗

NATO promised Russia not to expand after the Cold War

- NATO has never made such an agreement.
- NATO is committed to its Open Door policy for aspiring members.
- NATO respects the right of every country to choose its own security arrangements and does not coerce states to join the Alliance.
- Decisions regarding NATO membership are up to each individual applicant and the 30 NATO Allies.

Canada

CSIS Canada @csiscanada 30 Aug tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Canadians need to be aware that state-sponsored #disinformation campaigns represent one of the many avenues for foreign interference. Learn more about the threats facing Canada and how you can mitigate the threat: <https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/foreign-interference-and-you/foreign-interference-and-you-list.html>

(Foreign Interference and You)

FACT

Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien de renseignements de sécurité

Canada

Hybrid CoE @HybridCoE 1 Sep tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: “Employing humor to counter disinformation is a brilliant strategy”, Hybrid CoE's @kalenskyj comments to @POLITICOEurope the #NAFOfellas online fight against Russian #disinformation. Read the story: (The shit-posting, Twitter-trolling, dog-deploying social media army taking on Putin one meme at a time <https://www.politico.eu/article/nafo-doge-shiba-russia-putin-ukraine-twitter-trolling-social-media-meme/>)

*Crowd sourcing sardonic humour as a weapon.*



Canadian Armed Forces Operations @CFOperations 22 Aug tweeted: #PhotoOfTheDay 📷: Bdr Julia Currie, 31 Canadian Brigade Group. Members of the Arctic Response Company Group and the RCAF from 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron conduct a location Recce with the CH-146 Griffon helicopter, during Operation NANOOK in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut. Arctic presence and defence.

RUSI(NS) retweeted: RUSI(NS) Info Paper "#Arctic Response Company Group" <https://rusi-ns.ca/arctic-response-company-group/> @CanadianArmy #ARCG. #OpNANOOK = activities to exercise defence of CANCA& secure Northern regions <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-nanook.html>



Atlantic Council @AtlanticCouncil 7 Sep tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The notable absence of aerial drones early on in the war raised questions about Russia's ability to integrate modern high-tech equipment and lessons learned into an ongoing military operation, explains @sambendett. Read more: (The Ukraine war and its impact on Russian development of autonomous weapons <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/airpower-after-ukraine/the-ukraine-war-and-its-impact-on-russian-development-of-autonomous-weapons/>)



### Combat UGV

Special Kherson Cat @bayraktar\_1love 4 Sep on Twitter ([https://twitter.com/bayraktar\\_1love/status/1566456354390380546](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1566456354390380546)): The cutest and at the same time most deadly thing you will see today

*Cool. UGV with a missile. Watch the video.*



### Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

### Submarines rather than ships could be the Royal Navy's future

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2022/09/02/ben-wallace-submarines-rather-ships-could-royal-navys-future/>

(UK) "Defence Secretary has asked naval chiefs to assess the 'balance' between surface and submarine fleets as he launches a major review"



Interesting tweet thread (<https://twitter.com/IBallantyn/status/1565609689206906882>) about this article from a reporter who'd decades ago interviewed a UK Navy Minister about the future (UK) navy: "What it must not be today is another ploy to 'invest in more drones', dodging proper force levels growth."

"Because undersea drones are an immature technology & while can in short to medium turn assist proper submarines in adding to their surveillance coverage, it needs a proper submarine to hunt and (if needs be) kill increasingly hostile potential foes..."

Navies (people and ships) take a long time to build. Decisions about sailor occupations and ship characteristics are based on forecasts of conditions decades later. Decisions are also within the context

of a state's geo-political conditions and relations with other states. The aim, therefore, is a 'balanced navy' best able to respond to whatever events arise. The balance needs to be re-assessed frequently and if necessary carefully adjusted in order to remain relevant the state's needs. Submarines are very capable vessels, strategic assets for a state's defence. Yes, the sub-surface force is developing towards employing uncrewed underseas vehicles (gotta find a better word than drones) but UUV still have their limits in addition to advantages over crewed submarine boats, so the balance for the Royal Canadian Navy needs to be: 1. sufficient submarines to provide a capability on three coasts and deployable further for alliance operations; and 2. some gradually increasing levels of UUV (different roles, ranges, etc., so different sizes).

### The Ukrainian Offensive Must Come in Stages

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukrainian-offensive-must-come-stages>

"Deliberate offensive operations must be conditions-based, and the Ukrainian military need assurances if they are to most effectively allocate the resources they have in order to liberate their territory."



### Most of the crime guns seized in Toronto are smuggled into Canada from U.S.: Police

<https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/most-of-the-crime-guns-in-toronto-this-summer-were-smuggled-into-canada-from-u-s>

This is the first time I've seen anyone refer to the ban on importing handguns as "temporary."



Also it is legal to purchase and transfer prohibited handguns if the person taking possession is grandfathered for that class.

Glocks are popular with gangs because, among other things, they're cheap so even illegal ones are inexpensive. They're also very common and popular in the US and that's where they're typically sourced.

The current round of gun control measures in Canada are aimed at and solely affect law abiding transactions.

### Ukraine handed over intelligence to OSCE about Russia's military build-up near its borders

<https://informnapalm.org/en/ukraine-intelligence-about-russias-military/>

July 2020. Looking back, even non-intelligence people can see the signs that were there early. Let's learn the lessons and not be caught like this again. (Said that before...)



## As Russian Oil Exports Rise, Governments and Shipping Companies Play Cat-and-Mouse

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/09/russian-oil-exports-rise-governments-and-shipping-companies-play-cat-and-mouse/376720/>



This is the sort of maritime domain awareness undertaken by our Canadian Marine Security Operations Centres. See: <https://tc.canada.ca/en/marine-transportation/marine-security/marine-security-operation-centres>, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/brdr-strtg/brdr-lw-nfrcmnt/mrn-scrty-prtns-cntrs-en.aspx> and <https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/maritime-security-surete-maritime/operational-facilities-installations-operationelles-eng.html>.

RUSI(NS) received a presentation about MSOC in March 2021; see: <https://rusi-ns.ca/marine-security-operations-centre-east/>

Maritime domain awareness and building a 'recognized maritime picture' is not easy. It is interesting, therefore, to read about what non-government organizations (open source intelligence - OSINT - serious and casual practitioners) can contribute.

## Navy takes delivery of third new warship while it can't deploy the first one

<https://www.saltwire.com/atlantic-canada/news/navy-takes-delivery-of-third-new-warship-while-it-cant-deploy-the-first-one-100769082/>



The Harry DeWolf-class are typed by the Royal Canadian Navy (and reflected in navies' ship reporting systems and messages around the world) as Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels (AOPV). AOPV is on the caps of the ship's company (crew, in civil language). The 'and' is important in the name as the vessels are employable anywhere, not just in the Arctic and off Arctic shores. Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship (sic, singular), AOPS, is the name of the project by which the vessels are being built. Theoretically the word AOPS should become history when the project is shut down, but people, official and not, will use AOPS long afterwards (just like MCDV is in use for the Kingston-class MM - mine warfare vessels, general purpose, though calling them patrol vessels is a better term for how they are employed). One just gets use to it, though the difference should be borne in mind, especially when searching terms.

MAX BERNAYS (legally, it is HMCS now that the ship has been accepted by the RCN and a naval officer is in command; see: Canadian Warship Acceptance <https://rusi-ns.ca/canadian-warship-acceptance/>) will now undergo post-acceptance trials at sea and alongside. That is how ship projects are conducted. Sometimes those trials aren't even ones done by the first-of-class ship. HARRY DEWOLF may or may not still be conducting trials. Certainly, especially after as long as the HARRY DEWOLF has already been in service, issues will arise. But that doesn't necessarily mean that progress on other ships of the class is affected and delivery delayed. The delivery/acceptance of one ship of a multi-ship project is part of an intricate arrangement of

building ships, developing shore support infrastructure, training ships' companies, acquiring spares and more. That symphony can't stop just because one violin is off.

Breakages and other issues happen throughout a ship's life and not just because equipment gets old (design fault? maintenance fault?). A mark of a capable navy is one that can respond to breakages whenever and wherever they happen, keeping ships operational.

### **Other Sources:**

#### **#China**

Seeing the CCP's external influence work through Beijing's eyes

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/seeing-the-ccps-external-influence-work-through-beijings-eyes/>

#### **#information operations**

The Chinese Communist Party's Information Operations to Shape International Perception of its Regime in Xinjiang

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-chinese-communist-partys-information-operations-to-shape-international-perception-of-its-regime-in-xinjiang/>

#### **#drones**

Report on Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles

<https://news.usni.org/2022/09/01/report-on-navy-large-unmanned-surface-and-undersea-vehicles-10>

Drones and the Legality and Ethics of War

<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drones-and-legality-and-ethics-war>

Militants and Drones: A Trend That is Here to Stay

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/militants-and-drones-trend-here-stay>

#### **#intelligence**

Analytic Reflection: Measuring the Attributes of Open and All-Source

Intelligence <https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/intelligence/analytic-reflection-measuring-the-attributes-of-open-and-all-source-intelligence/>

Feedback Driven Decisions and the Evolution of Intelligence Analysis in the United

States, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/1/23/feedback-driven-decisions-and-the-evolution-of-intelligence-analysis-in-the-united-states>

A Short History of Maritime Intelligence Integration

[https://nmio.ise.gov/Portals/16/Tech%20Bulletins/Docs/NMIO%20Technical%20Bulletin\\_V13\\_Apr2019.pdf?ver=2019-05-08-111947-730](https://nmio.ise.gov/Portals/16/Tech%20Bulletins/Docs/NMIO%20Technical%20Bulletin_V13_Apr2019.pdf?ver=2019-05-08-111947-730)



## #logistics

Is logistics the ultimate conventional deterrent?

<https://logisticsinwar.com/2018/08/22/is-logistics-the-ultimate-deterrent/>

Kevin M. Woods @kmwwde tweeted 3 Sep: Repeat after me..."Effective deterrence requires effective logistics. The threat of armed conflict is always a factor in strategic competition, but logistics capacity and capability are an important, if understated, part of the calculus."

## #marine security

How Fake GPS Coordinates Are Leading to Lawlessness on the High Seas

<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/03/world/americas/ships-gps-international-law.html>

## #Russia-Ukraine War

Analysis of Russian weapons

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1566413646854602753.html>

TechInt. Gotta give the Russians credit for keeping things simple. Hmm, opportunities for targeted sanctions?

## # warfare, air

Ukraine air war examined: A glimpse at the future of air warfare

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/airpower-after-ukraine/ukraine-air-war-examined-a-glimpse-at-the-future-of-air-warfare/>

## Other:

### Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

#### O Canada

A recent article on various Chinese organizations in Canada supporting Beijing should have been a rallying call to the Canadian government. These groups are not representative of Chinese-Canadians. The rise of such groups is straight out of the Chinese play book for the 'Three Wars Concept' developed in the late 1990s and approved by the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2003. It is a form of information warfare, whereby Chinese operatives create various groups that suggest that they reflect the will of people of Chinese extraction yet their actual membership and organizers are small in number, often people do not even know they are listed as members. The dead giveaway is that they tend to speak Mandarin although most Chinese-Canadians speak Cantonese. As much as 80% of the Chinese language press is funded at least in part by the United Front, the CCP propaganda arm.

Canada has been under a non-kinetic attack by the CCP including using our laws against us in the Meng Wenzhou affair, the arrest and sentencing of the Two Michaels and the awarding of the death penalty to four Canadian citizens. This is known as "lawfair." Let us not forget the economic attack on our canola farmers, as well as our beef, pork and chicken producers and threats against importing Canadian lobsters. This is financial warfare, usually practiced when a country has too much to lose because China imports are large percentage of a particular product as we saw with canola. As we saw in the previous paragraph, information warfare. These are the 'three wars' that China uses to gain traction and support within a target country, and China has attacked us with all three. The CCP operates by gaining access to influential people - they do this by flattery, business opportunities, funding such as contributions to a particular foundation, and deals for key honorary appointments

such an advisory role. As reported by CSIS, there are Canadian politicians who are involved in CCP efforts whether they realize it or not. There are some who know very well that they are involved with providing opportunities for the CCP. The CCP has also, according to CSIS, penetrated academia, business and community groups. Most actions are inoffensive but support of Beijing's position is a notable departure from this policy. The CCP relies on people passing on Beijing's point of view in discussions or negotiations. In the Three Wars Concept, the CCP relies on people forgetting that the CCP government is authoritarian and culturally genocidal, as one has most recently seen in the UN report on Xinjiang Province and their treatment of the Uyghur population. Canadians should not be fooled. A more robust security conscious policy regarding China and investigation into Chinese penetrations are absolutely necessary.

As a last point, Taiwan has assisted Canada during the pandemic and continues to assist Canada in understanding China's cyber capabilities including how to minimize the effects of a Chinese attack. Taiwan is a liberal democracy that has been steadfast in this time period. Is it not time to help our friends and cause havoc to our somewhat dangerous other "friend" in the Peoples' Republic?

### **The Russia-Ukraine War**

The war has tipped into a new phase. Russia has lost, at least temporarily and perhaps for good, the initiative in this war. It is now Russia being forced to react to Ukraine's actions as Kyiv is now on the offensive in many locations. In a 5 September 2022 interview with David Muir of the US ABC network, President Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine is involved or is planning multiple offensive actions around the entire front. Russia added a further 10% of the Russian forces to defend against the much announced Kherson offensive. He also stated that there would be no negotiations with Russia due to Russia's ongoing terrorist actions especially at the nuclear power plant south of Zaporizhia. This sets the tone for the foreseeable future.

Ukraine has started its offensive using small all-arms teams taking manageable bites of terrain in the Kherson region after setting conditions using the superior range of US and other Western artillery systems. The Ukrainians systematically have been destroying or disrupting the ability of the Russian army to supply forces to the west of the Dnipro River by destroying or damaging bridges and ferries, as well as knocking out key headquarters, often inflicting heavy casualties on the Russian staff. Russia's ability to use its artillery has been hampered by Ukraine's program of destruction of ammunition, supply and maintenance depots, all absolutely vital for any army to operate. Attacks generally have had success as a result of measured actions designed to inflict casualties and damage and to force their retirement by taking key terrain rather than fight a straight on fight by frontal assault. Other actions have occurred just south of Iziurm and in the north by Kharkiv where key positions were taken. At the moment, a minimum of 36 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) seem to be trapped in the area west of the Dnipro River with few routes to withdraw. Losses to the north apparently have been based on observations of troops concentrations or lack thereof in certain areas, thus Russia has continued to lose small towns and villages when the Ukrainians strike where the enemy isn't.

Ukrainian success is leading to Russian problems. Much of their best troops were lost on the ill-considered and organized first operations when parachute and air assault elements went into their tasks unprepared for a major fight with a talented foe. They paid a terrible cost in troops and personnel. Many other units were badly handled and required extensive refit. It was apparent that Russian troops expected a totally different operation. The main point is Russia expended its best troops on ill-considered and often botched objectives.

This week apparently Colonel General Dvornikov has once again been appointed the commander of the overall operation. He is also known as the "butcher of Syria" for his attacks using massive artillery and

air attacks to flatten opposition. He had been similarly appointed before but seemed to disappear for a while until this week. He is also known for expending non-Russians as cannon fodder. His return does not bode well for a more humane war.

Only half of the autonomous regions have formed new BTGs which are now part of the Russian 3rd Army Corps, supposedly stationed at this point around Mariupol. These troops are volunteers, allegedly drawn to the extra bonuses for signing up. Pictures seem to show rather older men who appear less than physically fit. The 1st and 2nd Army Corps are from the two self-declared independent republics which have taken extensive casualties. One battalion, the 109th, surrendered to Ukrainian forces. Most prisoners cited a lack of training, equipment and pay as great demoralizers. Several battalions refused to leave the borders of their own republic as well - this also is not a good sign in the long term. It is unlikely these corps will be used as the front line in any new offensive, but moral and lack of incentives may cause other issues if an offensive action is considered by the Russian commander.

A word of caution with all of this information, it is all best guess from open sources. It has been known to be somewhat less than true and at all times be treated with some credulity. Ukraine is not unwilling to use misinformation to achieve its goals such as we have all seen with the much announced Kherson offensive. Russia took the bait and now about a third of its Army is in jeopardy, but it started with a narrative that was not absolutely a true story but one of several stories, the others untold until the circumstances were correct at Russia's expense. The Russian military commander now appointed is experienced and noted for his aggression and violence. The war is not over, how much is Russia willing to sacrifice to achieve its aims and how willing are soldiers to accept their fate especially when they haven't been paid? Time will tell, but a Russian victory or some semblance of it is going to be a near run thing, not impossible but increasingly unlikely at least in the immediate future.

The IAEA has asked for a security zone around the nuclear power plant. Whether Russia will allow something of this nature is another big question. The downwind fallout charts from the UN show that Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkiye and Greece will all be affected by such a problem. There is some question of whether this will possibly become a request for article 5 to be invoked by one or more countries if Russia does cause a meltdown. It is food for thought...a lot of thought.

On another issue, former President Trump heaped praise on "Smart Putin" and iron fisted rule of the CCP's President Xi in a bizarre speech to Republicans. One questions the sanity of such comments.

### **Chechnya**

The leader of the Chechens, Ramzan Kadyrov, is resigning as the political leader of Chechnya. He is just 45 years of age but has been in the leader for 15 years. He suggests it is for family reasons, but is there more to this announcement. His family's support of Putin in the Second Chechen War was instrumental to Putin's success. His father took control shortly after the end of the war and then young Ramzan took over. The family is forever tied to Putin and that is a problem especially since there are large elements of the citizens that believe the family were traitors. Large elements of the Chechen security force are in Ukraine including apparently two battalions now fighting for Kyiv and an increasingly restive population that does not really like the family. One wonders if the rats are leaving a sinking ship?

### **Belarus**

If there were such a thing as a wild card in this conflict it is Belarus and its self-appointed ruler, Alexander Lukashenko. If Belarus attacked Ukraine from the north along with Russian troops before

or during scheduled exercises starting shortly and running to 16 September, would the surprise be complete or would it be the final nail in Lukashenko's coffin? He owes Putin for his current position and may be strong-armed into making a very serious situation worse for everyone including himself. Would he do it especially if given few other options by Putin and would the country support such a move? It is highly unlikely that he would survive the effort, but what could give him no choice?

### **China**

Just a short note on China this week. It is entirely possible that Xi will get his third term as president despite the major issues facing China's economy and population, especially with the spectacular failure of the CCP's Zero Covid policies resulting in major demonstrations coupled with large demonstrations against the banks especially in rural China. The full scope of these demonstrations is not fully known but it is enough to draw censure down on Xi by party elders. Xi will likely consolidate his position but whether he gets to hold it for the full term must be examined in more detail. There will be more in the next note on our biggest opposition in the world. Keep in mind, Xi is not universally liked and has been the target for at least two known assassination attempts.

### **Australia**

A number of issues and points involving the future Australian nuclear submarine force. Australian submarine officers will start training with the UK on Astute-class submarines fairly shortly. All parties were quick to point out that it does not mean the selection of either the US Virginia-class nor an Astute-class. Any future boat would be an Australian design based on information provided by the US and UK. Neither the US or UK can accommodate building Australian nuclear submarines as their approved yards are at full capacity for the next generation of submarines, both ballistic missile boats and hunter-killers. The UK is looking at reintroducing conventional submarines to increase the size of its fleet. Four designs are apparently being examined for possible production including German, Japanese, French and South Korean, all of whom have an air independent design. Canada might look at this ourselves.

### **Solomon Islands**

The Solomon Islands has banned all naval vessels from its ports including those assisting in fisheries patrols. This meant denying US and UK ships from entry this past week. The Solomon Islands quickly clarified that this did not include Australian or New Zealand warships there by treaty.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since 29 August 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been conducting renewed offensive operations in the south of Ukraine. One element of this offensive is an ongoing advance on a broad front, west of the Dnipro River, focusing on three axes within Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast.
- The operation has limited immediate objectives, but Ukraine's forces have likely achieved a degree of tactical surprise; exploiting poor logistics, administration and leadership in the Russian armed forces.
- With fighting also continuing in the Donbas and Kharkiv sectors, a key decision for Russian commanders in coming days will be where to commit any operational reserve force they can generate.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Despite its effects to contain recent Ukrainian offensive action, Russia's main effort in Ukraine almost certainly remain its Donbas offensive operation. Its principal axes of advance in the Donbas remain at Avdiivka near Donetsk City and, 60km to the north, around Bakhmut. Although Russia has had the most success in this sector, its forces have still only been advancing around 1km per week towards Bakhmut.
- The political goal of the Donbas operation almost certainly remains to secure the whole of Donetsk Oblast, which would enable the Kremlin to announce the 'liberation' of the Donbas. Russian forces have highly likely repeatedly missed deadlines to achieve this aim.
- The Ukrainian authorities have claimed that Russian forces are now under orders to complete this mission by 15 September 2022. The force is highly unlikely to achieve this, which will further complicate Russia's plans to run referendums on the occupied areas joining the Russian Federation.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In Kherson Oblast, Ukrainian brigades continue to conduct offensive operations. Ukraine has probably destroyed a military pontoon bridge at Darivka, which Russian forces had deployed after the nearby road bridge was severely damaged.
- The Darivka crossing is one of the main routes between the northern and southern sectors of Russia's military presence along the Dnipro river. Ukraine's systematic precision targeting of vulnerable crossing points likely continues to impose pressure on Russian forces as they attempt to contain Ukrainian attacks: it slows their ability to deploy operational reserves and resupply materiel from the east.



## Ambasáid na hÉireann Embassy of Ireland

### Open Ship - L.É. *James Joyce*

Mark your calendars for 22 September because the Irish Naval Service Patrol Ship the L.É. *James Joyce* will be arriving in Halifax, NS.

During it's time in Halifax, the *James Joyce* will be open to the public, and the crew will be on-hand to answer any and all questions, so come hop aboard!

*The ship will be open to the public on:*

*22 September from 13:00-17:00*

*23 September from 10:00-17:00*

*24 September from 11:00-17:00*

*No reservations necessary*

The *James Joyce* will be docked opposite the Nova Scotia Power Building at:  
1223 Lower Water Street, Halifax, NS, B3J 3S8



The L.É. *James Joyce* is an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) and represents an updated and lengthened version of the original RÓISÍN Class OPVs, which were designed and built to the Irish Naval Service's specifications by Babcock Marine Appledore. She is truly a state of the art ship. She is built and fitted out to the highest international standards in terms of safety, equipment, technological innovation and crew comfort. She is also designed to cope with the rigors of the North East Atlantic.

L.É. *James Joyce* was commissioned in September 2015. Since commissioning, she has been constantly engaged in Maritime Security and Defence patrolling of the Irish coast. From July to the end-of-September, she was deployed to the Defence Forces mission in the Mediterranean, rescuing 2491 persons.

Photo and description courtesy of [military.ie](http://military.ie).