



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 7 October 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Defence Policy Update

It appears that there will be no public consultation by the federal government on the *Strong, Secure, Engaged* defence policy. The RUSI(NS) Security Affairs Committee intends to put together a submission anyways, and send it to the government. The plan is to write one-two pages, listing a number of items in a topic-comments-recommendation/observation format of a few lines for each item. Somewhat the lesson-learned observation format for those who have written those (and some of us have written/read so many of those!). If you have a topic you think should be addressed in the Defence Policy Update, you can email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com for it to be considered by the SAC for the RUSI(NS) submission.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

10 October, Monday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society “Panel: Military Exercises and Wargaming in Professional Military Education.” 12–2 pm EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/panel-military-exercises-and-wargaming-in-professional-military-education-tickets-421701098337>

New: 11 October, Tuesday - Naval Association of Canada Speaker's Evening with Commander Corey Gleason "Bringing HMCS Harry DeWolf To Life." 1900 Eastern. Via GoToMeeting. To register: <https://nac-o.wildapricot.org/event-4983074>.

New: 11 October, Tuesday - US Naval Institute discussion "A Conversation with Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, USN." 7:00 pm EDT. Livestream. VADM Brad Cooper is Commander, US Naval Forces, Central Command/Commander, Fifth Fleet and Commander, Combined Maritime Forces. See: <https://www.usni.org/events/conversation-vice-admiral-brad-cooper-usn>.

18 October, Tuesday - Royal Alberta United Services Institute speaker Dr Sean Maloney "Strategic Nuclear Forces in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict." 1900 hrs MT. Via Zoom. Free. To register: <https://www.rausi.ca/info-events/rmcsd/551-strategic-nuclear-forces-in-the-russia-ukraine-conflict>

19 October, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers Joe McGuinty and Ghislain Saulnier, Canada Border Services Agency, speaking on "CBSA's perspective on Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking." 1300-1500 Atlantic. Via Zoom. To register, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com by close-of-business Sunday, 16 October. As the subject line for your registration email, put: RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers 19 October 2022 Registration. In addition to your name, please provide whether you are RUSI(NS), otherwise indicate your organization (association, company or unit).

27 October, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Back to the Future: The 1980s Global War Games as a Campaign of Learning." 1800-2000 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/back-to-the-future-the-1980s-global-war-games-as-a-campaign-of-learning-tickets-358240826957>

New: 2 November, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Special Speaker Adam MacDonald "The Maritime Domain of the Russian-Ukrainian War: Implications, Considerations and Lessons for Canada and the Royal Canadian Navy." 1900 Atlantic. Via Zoom. Call for registration to follow.

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Presentations by Lieutenant-Colonel Julien Letarte, RCAF, and Major Drew Larned, USAF, *Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles – Canadian and US Programs*, 14 September 2022
<https://rusi-ns.ca/rpas/>

RUSI(NS) Comments *Mental Health Reform in National Security in North America: Building on Recent Progress* by Jay Heisler, 14 September 2022
<https://rusi-ns.ca/mental-health-reform/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note *Naming and Dedication of Canadian Coast Guard Ships*, 23 August 2022
<https://rusi-ns.ca/naming-dedication-canadian-coast-guard-ships/>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 28 September 2022
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute *President's Enews*, October 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 8, September 2022

Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada Newsletter *Seatimes*, August 2022

Naval Association of Canada *Starshell*, Summer 2022, Issue 95

New: Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, October 2022
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/155-rausi-october-2022-dispatches>

New: Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, October 2022

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* - Volume 5 Issue 7
<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 14, Issue 7, 3 October 2022

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2022


Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* September 2022
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-08>

Tweeted by @RUSI NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Royal Canadian Navy @RoyalCanNavy 26 Sep tweeted: 🍷 Northern Lights ❤️ Hudson Bay 🍷 Naval Reservists Naval Reserve Port Inspection Divers (PIDS) conduct a Dive Exercise in Churchill, MB. #WeTheNavy @NAVRESNAV @CanadianForces
RUSI(NS) retweeted: Good to see @RoyalCanNavy activity at Churchill Manitoba. Would make good location for naval/multi-agency northern/Arctic operating base even if only part-time. Possible location for a #RCNavy @NAVRESNAV unit (Indigenous?) especially if port operations/logistics specialized?

Ciro Nappi on Twitter 4:01 PM · Sep 30, 2022: "Italian Navy aftermath Nordstream pipeline explosion, launched a surveillance plan to safeguard gas pipelines, telephone cables, digital transmission networks in the strait of Sicily; as part of National security interest. <https://t.co/sASEnG4OAP>" / <https://twitter.com/CiroNappi6/status/1575923733989990405>
What are Canada's vulnerabilities (Nova Scotia has major submarine communications cable landing points), plans and capabilities (ships, submarines, autonomous underwater vehicles, with respect to underseas (communications cables, pipelines) security?



MARLANT @RCN_MARLANT Sep 21 tweeted:
 #KingstonClass ships are fitted with mine counter measure capabilities that allow them to neutralize mines as well as scan for other kinds of underwater explosives. These measures also include disposing of historical ordnance and keeping our waters safe. #WeTheNavy
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: .@RoyalCanNavy #KingstonClass mine warfare (really, multi-role) ships can, like all warships, carry out diplomatic function, clearing historic unexploded ordnance UXO from waters of other states. Ships due for replacement, should be overseas deployable & role flexible including MW




Veterans Affairs CA @VeteransENG_CA 2 Oct tweeted: 70 years ago, HMCS Iroquois was hit by enemy gunfire off the coast of Korea. That day, three Canadian sailors lost their lives and ten more were wounded in the explosion. We will remember them.
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/wars-and-conflicts/korean-war/> #CanadaRemembers (Korean War)
 RUSI(NS) retweeted: 'The Sasebo Bell' - IROQUOIS' bell was damaged by enemy gunfire. Replacement was ordered from base at Sasebo, Japan. Someone failed to tell civil foundry to cast naval bell - foundry cast Japanese traditional bell. Ship used it. Now at Naval Museum of Halifax @NavalMuseumHFX



Longer story below in "Other."

CDN Defence Academy/L'Académie cdn de la défense @CDACanadaACD 3 Oct tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "🇨🇦 We owe it to our soldiers and our country to prepare ourselves as best as we possibly can – and reading is a key component of that long-term readiness." https://cfc-ca.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=35412374
 (Why We Study: Our Duty of Self-Development as Military Professionals)



NATO Association of Canada @NATOCanada 3 Oct tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: How can #Canada answer calls to contribute more to #NATO? Joseph Se Sapio in his article explores how the #Arctic theatre provides Canada with the opportunity to do so. Read here:
 (Protecting The Roof Of The World: Increasing Canadian Engagement In NATO's Northern Theatre
<https://natoassociation.ca/protecting-the-roof-of-the-world-increasing-canadian-engagement-in-natos-northern-theatre/>)



NAADSN_RDSNAA @NAADSN_RDSNAA 4 Oct tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 📖 New and launching tonight! Lines in the Snow: Thoughts on the Past and Future of Northern Canadian Policy Issues, edited by Clive Tesar (@arcticesox) and P. Whitney Lackenbauer (@WhitneyLackenb1) Free to download here, thanks to CARC: <http://lackenbauer.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/CARC-Lines-in-the-Snow-final-2021.pdf>



Lines in the Snow

Thoughts on the Past and Future of Northern Canadian Policy Issues

Edited by Clive Tesar and P. Whitney Lackenbauer

CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 3 Oct tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "We're now seeing opposition to the moderate left and right, which have historically governed this country. That's where we're seeing the opposition. Is that populist or is it anti elite? Is the sentiment real? Yes, it is." @Ipsos (Demographic Changes Are shaping CAF Recruitment & Future Crises <https://cdainstitute.ca/darrell-bricker-demographic-changes-are-shaping-caf-recruitment-future-crises/>)



.@CDS_Canada_CEMD / @DMDND_SMMDN Directive For @Canadian Forces Reconstitution <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/dm-cds-directives/cds-dm-directive-caf-reconstitution.html#concept-operations> "The CAF will reconstitute in order to ensure its ability to deliver strategic effects directed by the GC now and into the future."



The Canadian Armed Forces Retention Strategy is available on request to RUSI(NS).

CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 6 Oct tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Now 5 years into its 20-year lifespan we take a moment to reflect on how the policy came about, what it has achieved and what should come next...Transcript, audio, and summary included: (CDA Institute Expert Discussion / Defence Policy Update <https://cdainstitute.ca/expert-series-defence-policy-update/>)


CDA Institute Expert Discussion | Defence Policy Update

Refreshing Canada's Defence Policy & Lessons from SSE

LGen Guy Thibault (Ret'd), VAdm Darren Hawco (Ret'd), Gordon Verner



Canadian Army @CanadianArmy 6 Oct tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: We are transforming in order to survive and thrive in the digital battle space. The Digital Strategy is the CA Modernization's Vital Ground: <https://canada.ca/en/army/services/for-the-soldier/digital-strategy.html> #ProtectOurTomorrow #DigitallyArmed (Modernization Vital Ground: Digital Strategy)



Russia-Ukraine War Cyber Operations

CIGI @CIGIonline 22 Sep tweeted: The absence of visible cyber activity during the Russian-Ukraine conflict raises important questions about what a #cyberwar is and how we can know if one is taking place, writes @StephanieCarvin in her latest: Is Ukraine the Cyberwar That Wasn't?

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/is-ukraine-the-cyberwar-that-wasnt/>



“But perhaps the best takeaway from this discussion is that it is important not to overgeneralize the role of cyber when it comes to armed conflict.”

A counter-point from a RUSI(NS) colleague: David Swan @DavidSw48622117 replied: The reality of the Cyber aspects of the Russia vs Ukraine conflict are rather different than described. For additional reading I recommend: Cyberwarfare: Russia vs Ukraine <https://cscis.org/2022/09/30/1930/>

From that reading: The ideas expressed in the CIGI article are not merely wrong, they are dangerous.

OSINT Ship Tracking

Steffan Watkins on Twitter: "🇨🇦🇯 The RCN was promoting the #KingstonClass vessels last week, so let's go over where the Royal Canadian Navy #HalifaxClass multi-role patrol frigates have been identified by their AIS transmissions, received by <https://t.co/WIVCJcg9yT> shore-based AIS-T receivers, recently. <https://t.co/F5kTFiLdeh>" / Twitter



<https://mobile.twitter.com/steffanwatkins/status/1575553365345701888>

It is not known whether the RCN's recent 'campaign' to highlight the Kingston-class mine warfare/multi-role patrol vessels was deliberate or coincidental in response to some online criticisms of the class (see below), but the timing is good considering the need to start talking about their replacement (NSS 2.0?).

Maple Leaf Navy @mapleleafnavy Sep 29, 2022 tweeted:


(<https://mobile.twitter.com/mapleleafnavy/status/1575578990655733760>): A much more affordable RCN instead of the 15 (which will never be built in that number) unproven UK Type 26 frigates and how to replace the useless MCDV fleet

Tod Strickland @Todstrick 2 Oct tweeted: 34/2022 - Chinese Tactics - An American perspective on Chinese tactics. It is a bit of a tome, but a handy reference that gets after Chinese capabilities and how they are applied in battle. Warrants wide reading by western military members, particularly the planners amongst us.

Pub is available at:

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN33195-ATP_7-100.3-000-WEB-1.pdf

BGen Strickland is Commandant, Canadian Forces College.



Humour as a Weapon

Darth Putin on Twitter 3 Oct 22: "Despite sanctions, Russian made answer to HIMARS will soon arrive in Ukraine.

<https://t.co/AGCWDrjpSk>" / Twitter

<https://twitter.com/DarthPutinKGB/status/1576866013877919745>

Actually, the 'Tsar Cannon' (bombard):

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsar_Cannon



How to surrender an armoured vehicle

Jimmy Rushton on Twitter 5 Oct: "A prearranged surrender of a Russian BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle, as well as several Russian soldiers, to Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast.UA

<https://twitter.com/JimmySecUK/status/1577714144249352198>"

The tweet video and other videos in the tweet thread are worth watching.



Is there a convention for surrendering armoured vehicles? White flag (which really means parley) tied to the gun barrel, and the barrel raised?

Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Navy commander defends need for 15 new warships as Ottawa reassesses costs

<https://nationalpost.com/pmnn/news-pmnn/canada-news-pmnn/navy-commander-defends-need-for-15-new-warships-as-ottawa-reassesses-costs>



The force structure desired/necessary of a navy depends on a state's geo-political situation, foreign policy and budgetary restraints. Though Canada's foreign policy is more in what political leaders say in speeches than a singular document, it can be taken that Canada is continuing to remain engaged in the world with foci on the North Atlantic/Europe and on the Indo-Pacific regions. (The Arctic is more an 'at-home' game.) Fifteen frigates to be built under the Canadian Surface Combatant project allows for two naval task groups (three-four frigates each) plus another ship on each coast for local independent operations. A rule-of-thumb for warship availability is 'one-in-three': for every three ships, one is on operations, one is returning from or preparing to deploy, and one is unavailable due to maintenance. (A Canadian admiral did opine that, due to modern ship complexity, the rule may now be one-in-four.) So fifteen frigates allows for one task group deployed plus a local ship (the restraint of only two replenishment oilers is another factor, not addressed here), with the possibility of surging to two task groups as called for in Canada's Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy (though how long that can be kept up is another matter). One can ask how often such maximum effort would be

necessary, but it is responsible defence thinking to plan for a maximum scenario. Meanwhile, yes, 15 frigates is a worthwhile build target. Meanwhile, ongoing experience (one has to look at other than individual stories) is demonstrating the limits of a 12-frigate navy.

Comment: Attention on the CSC project costs and number of ships to be built misses out on the more important points of what the ships are for and how they and the navy would be employed/employable.

Comment: Going small also raises the possibility of overtaxing individual units - less ships means longer deployment per ship if a situation arises.

Mass, Mobilisation and Reserve Forces

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/mass-mobilisation-and-reserve-forces>

"The war in Ukraine has showed that mass is an important component of fighting power."



What is/should be the 'objective force' for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), that is, the force structure (size, number of different types of units and capabilities), that there should be to achieve Canada's foreign, defence and security aims if costs were not a restraint? What would a CAF of mass look like, and how would the Reserve Force contribute to that?

Identifying Ukraine's War Dead

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/identifying-ukraines-war-dead>

"Governments must ensure that the armed forces have the funding required to enact their duty to the dead not only to ensure operational capacity is not overwhelmed, but because of the moral, legal and political duty to ensure the dignity of the dead and their families in any future war."



Mortuary affairs (MA) is a logistics function. That said, there are many other considerations, such as relations with military families, public affairs, host nation relations, information operations, etc. Does Canada have adequate MA doctrine and TTP (tactics, techniques and procedures)? Has MA been planned, resourced and exercised, for both domestic and expeditionary scenarios? We've lost a lot of good people in recent conflicts, but nothing like the hundreds a day, if not more, that a major conflict would entail.

Further; see: Casualty Identification Program https://rusi-ns.ca/casualty_identificaton_program/ and <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/casualty-identification-military/casualty-identification-program.html>.

Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle: Navy Needs to Employ Better Management Practices to Ensure Swift Delivery to the Fleet

<https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105974>

"The (US) Navy is trying to deploy five large, robotic submarines to do the dangerous job of laying undersea mines."



One can be confident that potential adversaries are also developing this means to lay mines clandestinely with uncrewed underseas vehicles #UUV launched back from where they deploy their loads. The Royal Canadian Navy, for defence Canadian and allied ports and as a 'balanced navy', needs to include a strong mine countermeasures capability, of ships (Kingston-class and their replacements), divers and drones.

Nordic countries draft new playbook for defending NATO's north

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/09/30/nordic-countries-draft-new-playbook-for-defending-natos-north/>

A very Euro-centric perspective in the article. Really, the discussion noted in the article is about arrangements on NATO's north east flank, not its north. The NATO north is where Canada, the United States and Greenland/Denmark are directly facing Russia across the western hemisphere Arctic. Discussions should include the interface between NATO's northern and north-eastern regions.



Buying the wrong submarine

<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/buying-wrong-submarine>

Buying/leasing a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine is not/should not be an option for Canada, but the thinking in the article is interesting for its considerations of geo-strategic factors in deciding a major equipment acquisition. This is the sort of thinking Canadians should be doing, especially as our country is faced with soon replacing our Victoria-class diesel-electric powered submarines.



Swedish jet maker complains about Ottawa negotiating to buy F-35

<https://www.thestar.com/politics/2022/09/30/swedish-jet-maker-complains-ottawa-not-following-rules-with-f-35-negotiations.html>



Canadian Forces exploring drone defenses at CFB Suffield

<https://globalnews.ca/news/9168437/canadian-forces-drone-cfb-suffield/>



Tanker tied to North Korean oil smuggling spoofed scrapped vessel: UN report

<https://www.nknews.org/2022/09/tanker-tied-to-north-korean-oil-smuggling-spoofed-scrapped-vessel-un-report/>



Hmm, leads one to think that the shipbreaking industry should be integrated into the surveillance and intelligence efforts to counter sanction busting. Of course, shipping companies should be part of those efforts from the beginning.

The scrapped (broken) ship list - another database to include in maritime security analysis systems.
- - -

A Master Mariner of Canada colleague relates that in his working years ship agents in Canada would receive requests for representation when a named ship would call at Canada for a crew change. Investigating the requests, he found that they were bogus attempts to send refugees to Canada as crew. The plan was that these crew would immediately disappear and the ship agent would be legally responsible for costs and penalties. He frequently found the name of the ship in a scrapyards somewhere. Chittagong was the source of many, but not all, of those fraudulent representation requests.

BBC Nagasaki with plane parts

<http://shipfax.blogspot.com/2022/10/bbc-nagasaki-with-plane-parts.html>



"Unlike many BBC ships its cranes are fairly light duty with a rated SWL of 60 tonnes each. They can work in tandem for a 120 tonne lift."

Kinda makes one wonder how many of these ships have been built by China and can be used for military amphibious and sealift operations to transport aircraft (whole or parts) and vehicles (tanks, etc.). Have Canadian military staffs researched how many of these vessels could be made available ('taken up from trade' - STUFT), by requisition or however, when needed?

EverWind, Svitzer to deploy 1st green fuel-powered tugs in Canso Strait

<https://www.offshore-energy.biz/everwind-svitzer-to-deploy-1st-green-fuel-powered-tugs-in-canso-strait/>

"...to deploy one of the world's first green fuel-powered commercial tug vessels in the Canso Strait in Nova Scotia."



"EverWind will provide green fuel from its green hydrogen and ammonia production facility in Point Tupper, Nova Scotia, in addition to the required infrastructure at its marine terminal to allow for green fuel storage and fueling."

Might the experience at Point Tupper be precedent for Canada's Department of National Defence when time next comes to procure tugs for the King's Harbour Masters Halifax and Esquimalt? Haro-class large harbour tugs (typed as YTB) are soon to be delivered by the Naval Large Tug project (<http://dgpapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=952> and <https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/naval-largeeng-eng.html>) to replace the current Glen-class YTB. The Haro-class were specified long enough ago that 'green fuel-power' was probably not one of the requirements. But the small Ville-class small harbour tugs (YTS) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ville-class_tug and <https://ral.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/WM-Feb19-Pgs-10-11-navy-tugs.pdf>) are approaching 50 years old - might that capability be candidates for green fuel-power?

Twitter Trackers Jeopardize Military Aircraft

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/september/twitter-trackers-jeopardize-military-aircraft-0>

From a RUSI(NS) colleague: I've read so many variations of this article from different people, weirdly many have been former marines! Twitter trackers are not the problem he portrays. Ten years ago the Aviationist published a very good article explaining how the USAF - when it was brought to their attention - didn't care at all that their RF/transmitter emissions were blasting out where their planes were over Iraq or other hotspots for the actual adversary to hear. Until it hit Twitter and Joe Public could see it - then they got upset. They frequently operate near Iranian, Russian, or Chinese borders in plain sight vis-a-vis their adversaries. What Gunny doesn't appreciate is who they're trying to hide from. It seems they get upset when it's the public seeing their activities for political rather than military reasons, and not the adversary at all. When they want to hide, they have encrypted modes, and Mode-C to fall back on (like the classic, and still flying, U-2S does). It's 2022 and there's no putting the genie back in the bottle, the public can see civil aviation, and the military needs to live in that space too. I'd also argue unless it's a full-on war-zone they don't *need* to hide, the vast majority of the time. The amount of American military air traffic is mind blowing. I can't imagine dealing with that congestion without transponders helping that civil/military interaction.



Even F-15 aircraft in Syrian airspace that intercept Iranian aircraft use transponders, because they're not hiding, they want to be identified by adversaries as American so they're not shot down or mistaken for Israelis (or whoever). I don't think Gunny appreciates the breadth of the issue and he comes from a culture of secrecy who believes the public shouldn't know anything. I come from a very different angle, that the public doesn't even understand what's public, let alone what's classified Secret or above. If the adversary knows where aircraft are operating, then the public should know using publicly

available tools too, because it nullifies any spin or politics that comes from keeping secrets from the people.

I can relate all that to NORAD and their policy of (needless) secrecy. I suspect they were behind the push to block flight trackers via the FAA, and that's pretty disappointing.

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Related:

RCAF increasing security for some operational flights

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/rcaf/2022/10/rcaf-increasing-security-for-some-operational-flights.html>

and

Ottawa reverses order to block PM's flights from tracking websites

<https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/ottawa-reverses-order-to-block-pms-flights-from-tracking-websites>

Other Sources:

#information operations

EU East StratCom Task Force Trends of the Week

<https://mailchi.mp/euvsdisinfo/dr305-882426?e=826e7edc60>

Note: Nord Stream 1 & 2 Sabotage – Disinformation a la MH-17?

#NATO

Knowledge security: insights for NATO

<https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/09/30/knowledge-security-insights-for-nato/index.html>

"Knowledge security entails mitigating the risks of espionage, unwanted knowledge transfers, intellectual property theft, data leakage and the misuse of dual-use technology (technology that is primarily “focused on commercial markets but may also have defence and security applications”)."

#operational security

Twitter Trackers Jeopardize Military Aircraft

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/september/twitter-trackers-jeopardize-military-aircraft-0>

#professional military education

Weaponize PME to Improve the Force

<https://cimsec.org/weaponize-pme-to-improve-the-force/>

#Russia-Ukraine War

Annexation and mobilization

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1575519717829537793.html>

Comments to the thread are worth reading and are at:

<https://twitter.com/MassDara/status/1575519717829537793>

What Does Russia's 'Partial Mobilization' Mean?

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-russias-partial-mobilization-mean>

Implications of Putin's latest 'bold' move

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1575967494657179648.html>

How Ukraine is winning in the adaptation battle against Russia

<https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/how-ukraine-is-winning-in-the-adaptation-battle-against-russia/>

Putin's Botched Mobilization and Nuclear Non-Option

<https://jamestown.org/program/putins-botched-mobilization-and-nuclear-non-option/>

Russia's New Soldiers Unprepared For Battle That Awaits Them

<https://www.newsweek.com/russias-new-soldiers-unprepared-battle-that-awaits-them-1747654>

"Barring some kind of black swan regime change event in Russia," Gorenburg said, "this war will still be a long one."

Putin's Roulette: Sacrificing His Core Supporters in a Race Against Defeat

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putin-roulette-sacrificing-supporters-race-against-defeat>

The Russian Warship and the South China Sea

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/01/moskva-south-china-sea-russia/>

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 2 - Focus on changes in the Russian information space

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2>

Good to read an information domain analysis as part of a campaign analysis.

Mobilization Can't Save Russia's War

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/04/mobilization-russia-ukraine-war/>

Success denied: Finding ground truth in the air war over Ukraine

<https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/09/21/success-denied-finding-ground-truth-in-the-air-war-over-ukraine/>

Russia's Army Keeps Collapsing After Falling Back in Kherson

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/04/russia-army-retreating-kherson-ukraine/>

Russia's Nuclear Threats Are All Putin Has Left

<https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2022/09/russias-nuclear-threats/671571/>

Nuclear Experts On Chances Of Russia Using Atomic Weapons In Ukraine

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/nuclear-experts-on-chances-of-russia-using-atomic-weapons-in-ukraine>

Putin faces limits of his military power as Ukraine recaptures land

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/10/05/putin-military-losses/>

Putin's annexation speech: more angry taxi driver than head of state

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/30/putin-annexation-speech-more-angry-taxi-driver-than-head-of-state-ukraine>

What Surprised One Drone Maker About Russia's War on Ukraine

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/10/what-surprised-one-drone-maker-about-russias-war-ukraine/377994/>

A Moment of Strategic Clarity

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/moment-strategic-clarity>

#information operations

EU East StratCom Task Force Special Bulletin on Illegal Annexation of Four Temporarily Occupied Regions of Ukraine

<https://mailchi.mp/euvsdisinfo/sb1-882422?e=826e7edc60>

How Ukraine Won The #LikeWar

<https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/03/12/ukraine-russia-information-warfare-likewar-00016562>

The shit-posting, Twitter-trolling, dog-deploying social media army taking on Putin one meme at a time

<https://www.politico.eu/article/nafo-doge-shiba-russia-putin-ukraine-twitter-trolling-social-media-meme/>

#wargaming

What war games tell us about a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/02/23/war-games-tell-us-possible-russian-invasion-ukraine/>



UPDATE ON UKRAINE
6 October 2022

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Ukraine's Armed Forces started a new phase of offensive operations in Kherson Oblast on 2 October 2022. Advancing south, Ukrainian units have pushed the front line forwards by up to an additional 20km, primarily making gains along the east bank of the Inhulets and west bank of the Dnipro, but not yet threatening the main Russian defensive positions.
- Russian forces have typically broken contact and withdrawn. Russian commanders are likely to see the growing threat to the Nova Kakhovka sector as one of their most pressing concerns. The damaged river crossing over the Dnipro in this area remains one of the few routes available for them to resupply forces. Russia faces a dilemma: withdrawal of combat forces across the Dnipro makes defence of the rest of Kherson Oblast more tenable; but the political imperative will be to remain and defend.
- Russia has committed the majority of its severely undermanned airborne forces, the VDV, to the defence of Kherson. Therefore, Russia currently has few additional, high quality rapidly deployable forces available to stabilise the front: it likely aims to deploy mobilised reservists to the sector.

#security

Revisiting Counter-Narcotics Policy in the Western Hemisphere

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/revisiting-counter-narcotics-policy-western-hemisphere>

Odessa Network "Mapping Facilitators of Russian and Ukrainian Arms Transfers"

<https://c4ads.org/reports/the-odessa-network/>

Which Canadian departments and agencies track weapons transfers (large scale, not individual/small scale) affecting Canada and Canadians?

#staffwork #information operations

4 Tips from Sir Winston Churchill to Write Better Emails

<https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2020/05/07/4-tips-from-sir-winston-churchill-to-write-better-emails/>

#warfare

#naval

The Combat Information Center (CIC) of the future

<https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide-defence/naval-forces/magazine/combat-information-center-cic-future>

#cyber operations

Geopolitical risk - Gray-zone aggression

<https://www.wtwco.com/en-GB/Insights/2022/09/geopolitical-risk-gray-zone-aggression>

Economic/insurance considerations.

#wargaming

The Utility of War Gaming

<https://wavellroom.com/2017/11/21/the-utility-of-war-gaming/>

Other:

Communication from the Minister of Veterans Affairs

Dear Stakeholders,

Hurricane Fiona has had a significant impact on folks across Atlantic Canada and parts of Quebec. Homes have been damaged, are without power and some are still isolated due to road blockages. Our hearts go out to all those who have been impacted by the storm. It is our hope that things begin to improve quickly.

We know that many Veterans were impacted by this. We are reaching out to vulnerable Veterans in the affected areas to ensure that they are safe and check if they need any assistance. While Veterans Affairs Canada offices and personnel have been greatly affected in the Atlantic provinces, our incredible staff are working remotely to ensure all Veterans continue to receive the support they need.

Veterans and their families can call us toll free at 1-866-522-2122 to discuss how VAC can be of help. During natural disasters, distress and urgent circumstances, Veterans may be able to access the Veteran Emergency Fund. For more information, call us at the number above.

If any Veterans or family members are having difficulty coping with the ongoing situation, they can also call the VAC Assistance Service at 1-800-268-7708 (TDD/TYY: 1-800-567-5803) to speak to a mental health professional. This service is free, confidential and available 24/7.

There are difficult days ahead but Canadians are tough and we will get through this together. We hope all Veterans, their families, stakeholders, and Canadians take care and stay safe.

Sincerely,
Lawrence MacAulay
Minister of Veterans Affairs
and Associate Minister of National Defence

Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies Special Collection (20 Sep 2022)

Military exercises and wargaming in professional military education

<https://sjms.nu/collections/special/military-exercises-and-wargaming-in-professional-military-education/>
contents include:

Wargaming and the Cycle of Research and Learning

The Use and Misuse of Wargames

Wargaming Dos and Don'ts – Eight Lessons for Planning and Conducting Wargames

Professional Knowledge through Wargames and Exercises

Developing Strategic Mindsets with Matrix Games

To Learn or not to Learn: On the Importance of Mode Switching in Educational Wargames

Learning (Better) From Stories: Wargames, Narratives, and Rhetoric in Military Education

Wargaming for the Purpose of Knowledge Development: Lessons Learned from Studying Allied Courses of Action

Simulation-Supported Wargaming for Assessing Force Structures

Operation LENTUS

The following was sent to media [RUSI(NS) often exchanges communications with media) at the beginning to the response to Hurricane FIONA:

You all probably are much familiar with LENTUS (#OpLENTUS), the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) operation that provides support in response to civil authority requests for assistance (RFA) to natural disasters. The Government of Canada LENTUS website (<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-lentus.html>), which I believe takes its content from the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), has some information, and there has been so many occasions for and reporting about the operation in the decade plus since the operation plan (Oplan LENTUS) was first written. Your reporting about LENTUS has gotten quite good. Still, having listened to colleagues of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia talk about reporting, I'd like to make some comments.

LENTUS is a joint operation, meaning it involves members of the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), plus members of other CAF commands and units. Whilst the nature of natural disasters means the army, with its Territorial Battalion Groups (TBG - <https://rusi-ns.ca/territorial-battalion-group/>) and Domestic Response Companies (DRC - <https://rusi-ns.ca/drc/>), predominates, the RCN and RCAF are there even if their contributions don't show as well. Serving and retired members of the CAF, and knowledgeable public, question articles when reporting seems to indicate that only the army is providing assistance. There are more than 'soldiers' involved; that term only applies to members of the army. Sailors and members of the air force (aside:

unfortunately, no good term for them) are also assisting. Yes, CAF public affairs should be making the distinction and providing appropriate imagery (e.g., sailors operating rescue boats in flooded areas, helicopters delivering essential supplies) but sometimes the message doesn't get emphasized enough or correctly received.

There are great stories in the air and on the water during disaster responses, stories not just of the CAF helping Canadians, but of the capabilities of the CAF, inherent to what they are and reflective of what Canada has bought and developed. As an example, HMCS MARGARET BROOKE, an Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessel returning from a Northern operation (#OpNANOOK), was able to retask quickly to assess damage and do wellness checks in outlying areas of NL. This is a great demonstration of the Navy's capabilities, of seapower - anyone who has experienced a ship immediately switching to a search and rescue knows how fast a ship and its company of sailors can make a change of mission. Another example, this time of airpower, is how quickly the RCAF deployed an air detachment into NL after Hurricane Igor in 2010 in order to provide logistics and surveillance flights. Whether that is happening now with Hurricane FIONA is not evident in public reporting.

I hope you will consider these words as you write about LENTUS today and in the future, and I wish you well in your reporting. Stay safe.

International Security Consultant and Former RCMP Inspector Named CEO of Commissionaires Nova Scotia

<https://commissionaires.ca/en/articles/international-security-consultant-and-former-rcmp-inspector-named-ceo-of-cns/>

Congratulations, Barry!

Many of us know Barry as former RCMP and Commanding Officer, Princess Louise Fusiliers.



Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

The SAC has begun work on a letter to be sent to the Minister of Defence that will cover areas of concern for consideration within the Defence Policy Review currently underway. If one was watching Rosie Barton on CBC this past Sunday or listened to Matt Galloway on the Current on Tuesday (the link, courtesy of Dave Swan, is at: https://www.cbc.ca/listen/live-radio/1-63-the-current?cmp=DM_SEM_Listen_Titles), one can see that at least there is some discussion on the possible way ahead for the Canadian Armed Forces. We understand that this review is being done without a national security review or a foreign policy review. We do have the "Strong, Secure, Engaged" policy, which is out of date as the world's situation has changed completely. Situational awareness has not a strong suit for Canadians, with governments accused more for wishful thinking and pontification without doing anything. Still, some notice that there is a problem is somewhat positive, although some suggestions give pause for thought and not in a good way especially without a national security and foreign policy review first. SAC believes that we can ask the right questions and perhaps get a response or recognition - to do nothing would be worse.

China

China is maybe the most populous country in the world. It is ruled by an authoritarian and culturally genocidal regime that is structured and operates more like a crime family. Its justice system would not be recognized as anything resembling justice as most would understand it. Torture is a key method of acquiring "confessions" from the accused. During the pandemic, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) conducted a "Zero Covid" policy that likely killed far more people than the disease itself due to an unreasonable attempt to stop fully the progression of the disease.

At the moment, the regime is undergoing a massive economic meltdown in its property management; also the CCP attack on the tech sector and private enterprise has left investors within the China investment community with a bad taste. CCP actions to correct the situation have failed, so banks are now failing. Zero Covid policies have caused the loss of their reputation as a reliable supplier and of course there is the ongoing effect of US sanctions. More recently is the fiasco of supporting Russia to a degree in the Ukraine war plus its own threats against Taiwan which have caused difficulties with the international community. This has been discussed in previous SAC notes.

What has become more apparent in the CCP system is that in order to receive favourable views from superiors there is a culture of "overstating" success in meeting centrally assigned economic goals. These favourable goal achievements are amplified at each level at town, province and at the national level. The financial media in South-East Asia is well aware that these figures are fiction and do not actually reflect the real condition of the Chinese economy and finances. Senior leadership does appear to have some understanding of this problem but are limited in their ability to correct the situation in a meaningful way. In all probability they did the same thing in order to rise in the Party.

The problem also includes population figures for China from the most recent census. There are suspicions that China has already entered into population decline and may have started this trend much earlier. Thus the population may have decreased below that of India, with one demographer suggesting that the population could be 1.26b people and with a large population of folks who are old and out of the official workforce, a product of the CCP's draconian "one child policy." So why revisit these issues? The reason is that President Xi is supposed to be appointed for an unprecedented third term as the CCP General Secretary and as president of the country at the 20th CCP Congress scheduled to start on 16 October 2022. The Congress usually sets out the goals for the country for the next five to ten years. Many of these goals, etc., are set out by the Party elite at the Bedehei Conference attended by approximately 200 members from the Vice-Minister level up to the current serving Party Secretary, Xi Jinping and all his predecessors. Allegedly, Xi suffered two assassination attempts at the 2012 gathering immediately prior to taking over.

The 20th Party Congress generally is a "rubber stamp" to the decisions made at the Bedehei Conference. The nearly 3000 Peoples' Representatives are limited in their ability to adjust the main course of action determined by the elite of the Party. While this would cause delight to the beating hearts of authoritarians, it does have some issues. First, although the Chinese media attempts to show the Party as a unified entity, it is not. It is made up of various factions that can be defined as regional or leader based, such as the factions led by Zheng Chemin or Hu Jintao. There are other less well-known groups that will adjust their loyalty to the faction with the strongest hand. At the moment this may be the Xi faction, but strange events are occurring, such as 218k people attending the flag raising event at Tiananmen Square, most without masks even after the event was downplayed because of the possibility of a Covid outbreak. Factions may cause issues especially as they may see Xi as weakened by events such as the Russia Ukraine war, Zero Covid backlash and economic woes. The 20th Congress of the CCP may be more interesting than in the past.

One of the concerns is that the CCP may try to unify Taiwan before 2027, the end of Xi's third term. Xi has often pronounced his desire to do so before he finally retires. The CCP has also said this could be done by force if necessary. This brings us to a short overview of the military forces of the CCP.

There is no doubt that China has made great effort to modernize its armed forces. It has also taken a broader view of warfare which allows the CCP to other means such as fishing fleets, civilian enforcement, merchant marine and all manner of personnel and equipment that can be used on behalf of a national goal. Canada has seen other methods such as kidnapping, false arrests, economic boycotts, and dangling favourable agreements in front of the business community. Any review of the capability and equipment of the CCP forces must start with understanding that there are a vast number of other agencies, capabilities and personnel that China could bring to bear beyond the military. Today, just a quick look at the military.

In rough terms, the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) consists of approximately 2m personnel in the regular military and a half million in an organized reserve. China also can call on more than 600k paramilitary police (not military but internal security) and in theory have another 57m in their not-so-organized reserve based on people with prior military service. It is broken down into the PLA, the PLA Navy and the PLA Air Force as the force generators responsible to train and equip the forces properly to be used at the command level or the organizations responsible for the employment of those forces assigned to those commands. It has not seen any active combat since the war with Vietnam in 1979. It has modernized and is continuing to modernize all the services, especially relatively recently, but most are reverse-engineered Russian technology, especially in the air force. They have strategic forces based around nuclear weapons including submarine launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, free falling nuclear bombs, cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles with somewhere approaching nearly a thousand warheads. They are estimated by some to be the third largest military power in the world.

One should be impressed but there are very real problems. The first and most important is corruption. Employment and promotion are more based on loyalty not just to the party but to a particular faction as opposed to competence at one's job. Like the Russian forces, it is also beset with internal corruption such as selling equipment or positions for cash. The PLA itself has commercial ventures which it uses for various gain both for the service and for those involved.

Changes of administrations or fallout from the retirement of key mentors or sponsors can lead to the removal of officers who were loyal in favour of those being brought in by another faction. This often means there is a steady flow of inexperienced yet "loyal" officers put in place with the new man in charge. And lastly, a true communist procedure taken to its illogical conclusion, the double system of command element and the political element. In the Chinese system, the political officer (Commissar) outranks the command element. The rules and point of view of the Party come first and always. This system works badly, which is good thing for us as it creates stagnation and a system built to sit rather than take action until a political solution is found. This is somewhat overstated but any system where there is a potential to create internal competition is not a good idea. The combination of these problem areas is likely to be deadly for the rank and file of the PLA. Numbers are great, numbers used well in a relatively straight forward system are better. The PLA is not invincible but must be taken seriously with understanding it has massive issues which can and will affect its ability to fight a near peer opposition.

Russia-Ukraine War

The war appears to be going well for Ukraine, with major strides in the north against Russian forces. More importantly, Ukraine has eliminated most of the supply routes available to Russian and the so-

called independent Republics in Luhansk and Donetsk. It appears that unless something spectacular occurs, the remaining small piece of Kharkiv Oblast will return completely to Ukrainian control, and Ukrainian forces will enter Luhansk Oblast with the view of ending Russian occupation.

In the south, the Russian forces in Kherson Oblast have been forced to retreat in the northern part. Russian forces have been without a major re-supply route for over a month. Ukrainian attacks have steadily whittled away Russian capabilities and supplies by a controlled bombardment of key cross river bridges, headquarters locations, storage and repair facilities, eliminating Russia's ability to maintain their forces over time. Without large bridging efforts along the Dnipro River, Russian troops will be forced to either surrender or leave their heavy equipment and move as many troops as possible out of the area of the western bank of the Kherson Oblast.

On another issue, the newly recruited reservists have started reaching the forward areas, some with little more than a day's refresher training. Ukraine has stated that many are using the "hotline" to discover how to surrender to Ukraine long before they reach the front. There are already a significant number of interviews with these soldiers on YouTube and similar applications. Some have requested to go to the Russian units of the Ukrainian Army. I would say that is a very bad sign for the Putin regime. Unlike Russia, Ukraine trains their troops.

Russia annexed four oblasts last week despite Russia being unable to control any one of them. It became clear that President Putin was going to throw good money after bad and try to salvage the situation with the appearance of a win. President Zelensky has now passed legislation stating that Ukraine will not negotiate while Putin is still in power. Peace is not likely in the near term unless it is on Ukraine's terms.

Nord Stream 1 and 2 were subject to at least two blasts each causing major damage to both pipelines. No one has claimed responsibility at this point and the initial investigations have been publicly inconclusive. Considerable gas was leaked into the water causing disruptions to shipping. It seems to be more of a warning rather than an attack. Still, it pointed out to NATO and Europe that infrastructure will have to be defended immediately, especially in light of Russian capabilities held in GUBI, the naval intelligence branch, and Russian naval capabilities. Of note, Russia sortied the largest submarine in the world, the *Belgorod*, into the Arctic. It is the carrier of the Poseidon nuclear torpedo designed to create a tsunami along coastal areas. It is also designed to be a mother ship for large mini-submarines as well. Her exact role in future operations in this conflict is unknown.

Belarus

The self-appointed leader of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, has stated that Belarus supports Russia and that it will participate in the conflict with Ukraine. This being said, although Belarussian forces have moved near the border with Ukraine it is unlikely that there will be any action by Belarus actually into Ukraine. Lukashenko knows that any diminishing of his security forces will result in his removal from power. There is a government-in-waiting in the Baltic States under Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. A wrong move on Lukashenko's part will result in a Belarussian regime change. Even his military is unlikely to permit such a foolish action as attacking their neighbour, Ukraine. Ukraine has moved more than 15k troops to their mutual border. Video of Lukashenko making his announcement showed him in uniform - it was a sad event.

Iran


This note would be remiss without mentioning the brutal killing of a 22-year-old Iranian woman by the "morality police" for not wearing her hijab the right way. That is certainly worth the death

penalty...NOT! The population of Iran is deeply divided between those who support the hardline theocratic regime and those who oppose it. Most Iranians have known no other regime in their lifetime. There are statistics suggesting that a large proportion of the younger population are using drugs and alcohol on a regular basis. They are also capable of seeing another route for the country and it means not putting up with the current regime. The regime has kept in power through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij militia. Students have maintained their demonstrations despite arrests and sometimes lethal force. People who have lost their fear are very dangerous indeed; the regime may find out the hard way that this does not bode well for remaining in power.

North Korea

It is expected that North Korea may set off a nuclear warhead in the near term after firing five ballistic missiles including one that flew over Japan. North Korea is suffering from a major food shortage with the failure of this year's crops as well as major international sanctions. Like Russia, North Korea is nothing more than a group of nuclear warheads estimated to be around 25 or so, unlike Russia which has nuclear weapons and gas and oil. Long term, not a winning combination. The real problem is an accident resulting in a military confrontation. Could this happen, yes, but it is not what North Korea wants either. They want their cake and be able to eat it as well. We will know within the next week what they intend to do. Note that the US is sending a carrier battle group off the Korean peninsula this week.

There are a great number of other issues occurring especially in the former Soviet Republics and in Africa, if only there was time or if I could duplicate myself.



The above is a photo of a description at the Naval Museum of Halifax. It was sent, with a picture of the Sasebo bell, to Veterans Affairs Canada Commemoration Division. VAC was appreciative, as they didn't have this story. This demonstrates the utility of us dredging our memories, photos, etc., and contributing to public knowledge about history of defence, security and safety affairs. Send your stories to RUSI(NS)!