



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 14 October 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Admirals' Medal

See poster at end of *Dispatches* for solicitation by the Naval Association of Canada for nominations for the Admirals' Medal.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

18 October, Tuesday - Royal Alberta United Services Institute, Rocky Mountain Conference on Security and Defence presents "Strategic Nuclear Forces in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict" with Dr Sean M Maloney from Royal Military College of Canada. 1900 hrs MT. Free and open to the public. Dr Maloney returns to RAUSI with an update to his 24 February 2022 presentation on nuclear force employment and deployment in the context of the current Russia-Ukraine conflict. For more information or to register: <https://rausi.ca/info-events/rmcscd/551-strategic-nuclear-forces-in-the-russia-ukraine-conflict>

19 October, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers Joe McGuinty and Ghislain Saulnier, Canada Border Services Agency, speaking on "CBSA's perspective on Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking." 1300-1500 Atlantic. Via Zoom. To register, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com by close-of-business Sunday, 16 October. As the subject line for your registration email, put: RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers 19 October 2022 Registration. In addition to your name, please provide whether you are RUSI(NS), otherwise indicate your organization (association, company or unit).

New: 25 October, Tuesday - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies webinar "Euro-Atlantic and Global security priorities following Russia's war in Ukraine." 1200-1330 BST.

Online. To register: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/euro-atlantic-and-global-security-priorities-following-russias-war-ukraine>

27 October, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Back to the Future: The 1980s Global War Games as a Campaign of Learning." 1800-2000 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/back-to-the-future-the-1980s-global-war-games-as-a-campaign-of-learning-tickets-358240826957>

2 November, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Special Speaker Adam MacDonald “The Maritime Domain of the Russian-Ukrainian War: Implications, Considerations and Lessons for Canada and the Royal Canadian Navy.” 1900 Atlantic. Via Zoom. Call for registration to follow.

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Presentations by Lieutenant-Colonel Julien Letarte, RCAF, and Major Drew Larned, USAF, *Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles – Canadian and US Programs*, 14 September 2022
<https://rusi-ns.ca/rpas/>

RUSI(NS) Comments *Mental Health Reform in National Security in North America: Building on Recent Progress* by Jay Heisler, 14 September 2022
<https://rusi-ns.ca/mental-health-reform/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note *Naming and Dedication of Canadian Coast Guard Ships*, 23 August 2022
<https://rusi-ns.ca/naming-dedication-canadian-coast-guard-ships/>

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 12 October 2022
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute *President's Enews*, October 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 8, September 2022

Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada Newsletter *Seatimes*, August 2022

Naval Association of Canada *Starshell*, Summer 2022, Issue 95

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, October 2022
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/155-rausi-october-2022-dispatches>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, October 2022

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* - Volume 5 Issue 7
<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 14, Issue 7, 10 October 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2022

New: Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* October 2022
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-10>
 See list contents in 'Other', below.

Tweeted by @RUSI NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>National Defence @NationalDefence 7 Oct tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Canada government organization Canada awards a contract for new Army pistols to M.D. Charlton Co. Ltd. for the Sig Sauer P320. This pistol will be lighter, more efficient and possess better ergonomics than its predecessor, the 9mm Browning. https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/10/canada-awards-contract-for-new-army-pistols.html (Canada awards contract for new Army pistols) <i>Note:</i> Canadian military to destroy Browning pistols, save some for museums https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-military-to-destroy-browning-pistols-save-some-for-museums</p>	
<p>Maple Leaf Navy @mapleleafnavy 7 Oct tweeted: Purga, Russia's first AOPS, was launched October 7th in Vyborg. RUSI(NS) retweeted: AOPS Arctic & Offshore Patrol Ship is title of 🇨🇦@NationalDefence project to build 6 #Arctic & Offshore Patrol Vessels #AOPV for @RoyalCanNavy (also 2 for @CoastGuardCAN, type TBA). #AOPS is not a ship type. PURGA is RU Project 23550 Border Guard Frontier Patrol Ship 1st Rank <i>Look similar, maybe inherent in design requirements/ constraints, though Purga is 2,000t larger.</i></p>	
<p>ISED @ISED_CA 17 Jul 18 tweeted: DYK: Canada is a world leader in aerospace. #CDNAerospace RUSI(NS) retweeted: Overview in "State of 🇨🇦 Aerospace Industry" rpt by Aerospace, Defence & Marine Branch; Innovation, Science & Economic Development Canada https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/aerospace-defence/en/state-canadian-aerospace-industry "Canada is only country that ranked in top 5 across civil flight simulator, engine, & aircraft sub-segments in 2021." @ISED_CA</p>	

David Pugliese @davidpugliese Oct 4 tweeted: Ottawa providing half the troops requested in wake of Fiona, N.S. premier says | CBC News

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nova-scotia-premier-more-troops-fiona-1.6604929>

(Ottawa providing half the troops requested in wake of Fiona, N.S. premier says)

RUSI(NS) retweeted: In military-provincial exercises @JTFA_FOIA stressed to civil authorities they should ask for 'effects' when submitting RequestsForAssistance, not number of people, vehicles, etc. @CanadianForces assesses what necessary/avail, may come up with solution civilians did not consider



"🇨🇦 & Canadian Railway Industry to provide rail assistance to Ukraine"

<https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2022/09/the-government-of-canada-and-the-canadian-railway-industry-to-provide-rail-assistance-to-ukraine.html> "established working group to support reconstruction of UKR transportation infrastructure & resiliency of Ukraine's rail infrastructure."

Good move to ensure essential logistics movement (The Government of Canada and the Canadian Railway Industry to provide rail assistance to Ukraine)



Mid-Career Army Officer @MidOfficer 5 Oct tweeted (thread at

<https://twitter.com/MidOfficer/status/1577611866884509699>):

Great thread on loitering munitions & very relevant to 🇨🇦 as a nation that still has no ground based air defence. Resource constrained defence planners will be tempted to pursue electronic warfare solutions, but they are ineffective against GPS & autonomously guided systems.

RUSI(NS) retweeted: RUSI(NS) Paper "We Have No Air Defence For Our Army – Why?" <https://rusi-ns.ca/air-defence/>



Dave Mazur @WestCoastCmdre Sep 22 tweeted: Training with the new RCN Sea Shore Connector (SSC) continues to progress. Capable of carrying 80t and propelling itself at 5kts, it will support the movement of people and heavy equipment from sea to ashore in ways that have not been previously possible - putting the J In JSS.

RUSI(NS) retweeted: RUSI(NS) Info Note "Ship-to-Shore Connector Barges" <https://rusi-ns.ca/ship-to-shore-connector/> Powered barges will enhance @RoyalCanNavy capability to land/embark equipment, stores, people in austere/devastated locations for conflict, humanitarian, regular re-supply missions

Video at: <https://twitter.com/LeBrunJames81/status/1572989005939245062>




RCAF Operations @RCAFOperations 10 Oct tweeted: Last week, @RCAF_ARC members deployed on #NobleDefender installed a mobile arrestor gear system used for the CF-18s. This system is used to rapidly decelerate an aircraft as it lands and enables #NORAD to operate from remote locations. @NORADCommand #WeHaveTheWatch RUSI(NS) retweeted: .@NORADCommand Operation Noble Defender #OpNOBLEDEFENDER <https://www.norad.mil/Newsroom/Fact-Sheets/Article-View/Article/2928028/operation-noble-defender/> @RCAF_ARC Mobile Aircraft Arresting System (MMAS) <https://cmea-agmc.ca/fr/86-airfield-support-utilities-flight-during-covid-19>



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 12 Oct tweeted: "Matthews is going to have to find some way to move the needle on procurement, and he's going to be stuck with the same issue that all the other deputies have had, which is, you can't solve this problem by simply moving all the responsibility into DND." (Refreshing Canada's Defence Policy & Lessons from SSE <https://cdainstitute.ca/expert-series-defence-policy-update/>) Defence & security procurement in CAN needs to be more agile/flexible (=faster, innovative, less admin) in order to meet demands of modern global environment. More 'made in CAN' to ensure availability. Scalable when affairs go bad. Less process, more results #DefencePolicyUpdate



.@NationalDefence announces new CAN  military aid to #Ukraine <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/10/minister-anand-announces-new-canadian-military-aid-to-ukraine-at-ukraine-defense-contact-group-meeting.html> Artillery rounds, drone cameras, satellite communications, winter clothing. Does CAN have sufficient resilient/scalable industry to support @CanadianForces & allies when call upon?



Kill Count

Defense of Ukraine @DefenceU 8 Oct tweeted: 69 skulls - 69 significant confirmed hits. And this is only on one Ukrainian HIMARS. A great weapon in the right hands. Each HIMARS salvo brings us closer to peace in Europe. 📷 @WSJ

Skulls. Now that's a different way to count kills, rather than silhouettes of aircraft, ships, etc.



Doctrine Primer

Nikki Dean on Twitter: "Can I please reintroduce you to one of the bestest little gems you've probably forgotten we wrote? ADP 1-01, the Doctrine Primer. It's 44 pages of deliciousness that every student in @USACGSC and @ArmyUniversity needs to read cover-to-cover before class starts! Trust me! 2/ <https://t.co/I44W7eunSc>" / Twitter

Pub at:


https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18138_AD%201-01%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf

and: US Army adopts new multidomain operations doctrine

<https://www.defensenews.com/land/2022/10/10/us-army-adopts-new-multidomain-operations-doctrine/>

newly released: US Army FM 3-0 Operations, October 2022

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf



NATO ACT @NATO_ACT 9 Oct tweeted (https://twitter.com/NATO_ACT/status/1579089718733852672): #Highlights of the week @NATO_ACT: [1] #NATO's first commitment remains our Collective Defence, based on a 360-degree approach" – GEN Lavigne @NATO_SACT via hologram technology addressed participants of the dialogue "Future War and Deterrence". #WeAreNATO

Interesting not so much for the topic as for the use of hologram to address participants.



Wargaming

Introduce Wargaming to Wardrooms

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/july/introduce-wargaming-wardrooms>

Georgetown University Wargaming Society (GUWS) @GUWargaming 9 Oct tweeted" "...wardroom of the USS Ohio (SSGN-726) conducted a daylong #wargame in 2018 focused on a scenario in the western Pacific area of responsibility. The game was designed to stress critical thinking and innovation among the officers."



Wargaming very much was a unit-level activity in the 1800s. There is yet potential for that.

Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

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Pacific Clearance Divers take a plunge with the Irish navy

<https://www.lookoutnewspaper.com/pacific-clearance-divers-take-a-plunge-with-the-irish-navy/>

“The purpose of the exchange was to provide Fleet Diving Unit’s junior Clearance Divers with experience of integrating with a foreign dive team, learning their techniques and procedures in Surface Supplied Breathing Apparatus diving, and reinforce the professional diving relationship the RCN has with the Irish Naval Service...”



Diplomacy/international relations is one of the basic functions of a navy. It's not just warships, though, that carry out the function. Individual sailors and teams are all part of the naval diplomatic effort.

Who is supplying Russia with drones?

<https://www.dw.com/en/who-is-supplying-russia-with-drones/a-63373854>

'Suicide drones' or 'kamikaze drones' are misnomers, terms in media and popular/colloquial use. Almost imply that self-destruction is not the purpose of the weapons. They are loitering munitions. They are meant to be sent out and not return. Proper terminology should be used to ensure proper messaging.



Ukraine war: Bridge linking Russia to Crimea 'reopened' after powerful explosion

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/10/08/ukraine-russia-war-latest-putin-nuclear-threat-zaporizhzhia/>

Attacking a strategic line of communication (= supply) is an obvious action. Attribution will be interesting - good that the Russians do not appear to be publicly blaming Ukraine because, whilst the bridge connects Ukraine Crimea to the Russia to the east, the bridge itself is Russian and so an attack on it is an attack on Russia. What could be the consequences of that?



The bridge may be re-opened but to light traffic, possibly not enough for supplying Russian military forces occupying Crimea and beyond. The Russians need working rail. Will there now be further attacks on other lines of communication, maybe mining of ports in the Sea of Azov and Crimea?

Interesting videos linked below. Not apparent whether it was a truck bomb though it appears a truck was at the point of explosion/

The Telegraph @Telegraph 8 Oct tweeted

(<https://twitter.com/Telegraph/status/1578707148229734400>): 🇷🇺🇺🇦 The moment a blast struck the bridge connecting Crimea and mainland Russia, leaving a large section in ruin
<https://telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/10/08/ukraine-russia-war-latest-putin-nuclear-threat-zaporizhzhia/>

OSINTtechnical @Osinttechnical tweeted 8 Oct: "Footage reportedly of the explosion that hit the Crimean Bridge <https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1578632284173131776>"

More: Video: Kerch Strait Bridge Damaged in Massive Explosion
<https://maritime-executive.com/article/video-kerch-strait-bridge-damaged-in-massive-explosion>

(Thread by a division commander) Mark Hertling @MarkHertling 8 Oct tweeted (<https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1578745739416510466>): Wanna know what it's like to be a battlefield commander & have a bridge blow up in your area of operations? Having had that experience, under different circumstances, it is not a good day in Moscow. A "war story" that will provide some insight into the Kerch attack.

Sal Mercogliano (WGOW Shipping) on Twitter 8 Oct: "It is significant that they did not drop the center span that allows ships to transit between the #BlackSea and the #SeaOfAzov. That would have been a significant loss to #Russia's ability to export food, fuel & fertilizer. It could have also led to the end of the #grain deal."
<https://twitter.com/mercoglianos/status/15788660704040>



ChrisO on Twitter: "1/ Finland's national broadcaster Yle has published an interesting interview with an explosive ordnance disposal expert, retired Major Myka Tyry of the Finnish Defence Forces, on the Crimea Bridge blast. He makes a number of points I've not seen elsewhere
https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1579480666282287104"
Interesting thread - assessed it was a sizable truck bomb, probably suicide.

The symbolic significance of the Crimea bridge attack
<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-symbolic-significance-of-the-crimea-bridge-attack/>

Meme Wars

The attack on the Kerch Strait bridge led to many sardonic memes



From Russia, but not with love

<http://shipfax.blogspot.com/2022/10/from-russia-but-not-with-love.html>

"...suspect both the USCG and the CCG may be "kicking the tires" since both countries have icebreaker shortages due to the age and refit needs of their current fleets."

Polar Circle, a 12,236 bhp icebreaker, built in 2006 and with a bollard pull of 150 tonnes. It makes a lot of sense for the Canadian Coast Guard to buy or lease such vessels when there is a shortage in the CCG fleet. Whilst there is a good shipbuilding program ongoing for the CCG, it will take a while for the CCG fleet to get where it needs to be (admittedly that is a question as the government has not released any study of what Canada needs for an icebreaker fleet).



It's Time to Rethink Our Wargames

<https://inkstickmedia.com/its-time-to-rethink-our-wargames/>

Wargames are: "unrepeatable, chaotic, vague, and messy events. Collecting data from them is difficult — they produce 'dirty' data, you often miss the best parts, and they cannot be repeated. But if you think that means you can't learn anything from them, you might as well stop trying to understand real-world conflicts, because everything I have written about wargames in this paragraph is also true for wars."



Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing

Gina Fiore @marsecgina 5:12 PM · Oct 12, 2022 on Twitter (<https://twitter.com/marsecgina/status/1580290220611682305>)

): This is the first time IUU Fishing has been mentioned in a national security strategy and it was mentioned in three different sections. Thank you to the Biden Admin for recognizing just how important this issue is.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/12/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-national-security-strategy/> @ whitehouse

(Fact Sheet: The Biden-Harris Administration's National Security Strategy)



Four returns to a search of "fishing" in the US national strategy (available at:

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>):

"We will act in common purpose to address a range of issues – from untrusted digital infrastructure and forced labor in supply chains and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are involved in activities such as the trafficking of drugs and other illicit goods, money laundering, theft, human smuggling and trafficking, cybercrime, fraud, corruption, and illegal fishing and mining.

Threats to these systems — including excessive maritime and airspace claims, pollution and unregulated deforestation, and wildlife trafficking and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing — impact governments' abilities to meet basic human needs and contribute to political, economic, and social instability.

We will stand up for freedom of navigation and overflight, support environmental protection, and oppose destructive distant water fishing practices by upholding international laws and norms, including the customary international law rules in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea."

Hmm, how (official policy, whatever) might Canada highlight the threat of IUU fishing?

Other Sources:

#Arctic

US Department of Defense Establishes Arctic Strategy Unit

<https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/us-department-defense-establishes-arctic-strategy-unit>

US Department of Defense Establishes Arctic Strategy Unit

<https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/us-department-defense-establishes-arctic-strategy-unit>

Note the "Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, the Pentagon's new regional center for Arctic security studies in Alaska."

More: Early 2022 Greetings from the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies

<https://arcticportal.org/ap-library/announcements/2768-early-2022-greetings-from-the-ted-stevens-center-for-arctic-security-studies>

(US) National Strategy For The Arctic Region, October 2022

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf>

Apparently the US strategy lines up better with the Canadian position of the North West Passage.

More: The White House Fact Sheet: The United States' National Strategy for the Arctic Region

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/07/fact-sheet-the-united-states-national-strategy-for-the-arctic-region/>

and:

White House Arctic strategy calls for enhanced military presence

<https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/10/07/white-house-arctic-strategy-calls-for-enhanced-military-presence/>

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine Freezes Moscow's Arctic Ambitions

<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3172713/the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-freezes-moscows-arctic-ambitions/>

China, Russia Quietly Expanding Arctic Partnership, Says Panel

<https://news.usni.org/2022/10/11/china-russia-quietly-expanding-arctic-partnership-says-panel>

#armour

First video of AbramsX main battle tank released

<https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/abramsx-main-battle-tank-video/>

The future of armour? Points for Canada to consider when it comes time to replace its Leopard tanks?

See also: Next Generation AbramsX Tank Will Have Hybrid Power Plant

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/next-generation-abramsx-tank-will-have-hybrid-powerplant>

#border security

U.S. Border Policy Must Adapt to the Region's New Migration Pattern

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/darien-gap-us-asylum-seekers-border-crisis/>

Context for our Distinguished Speakers event next week.

#civil-military relations

Principals with Agency: Assessing Civilian Deference to the Military

<https://tnsr.org/2022/09/principals-with-agency-assessing-civilian-deference-to-the-military/>

#command

Mission Command at the Battle of 73 Easting

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2022/October/Mission-Command-at-the-Battle-of-73-Easting/>

The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force

<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1949&context=monographs>

#drones

The Drone Age - How Drone Technology Will Change War and Peace

book review: <https://cfc.overdrive.com/media/5437992>

#environmental security

Climate Change & National Security: Implications for the Military

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/CSI-Press-Publications/Command/#ClimateChange>

book at:

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combats-studies-institute/csi-books/Command/ClimateChg-Palazzo%20interactive%20w%20cover%2010Aug2022.pdf>

#force structure

Confronting the Changing Sustainment Battlefield Calculus

https://www.army.mil/article/259612/confronting_the_changing_sustainment_battlefield_calculus

#Indo-Pacific

Navigating Canada-Taiwan relations: Why Canada needs a renewed strategy to help safeguard peace in the Taiwan Strait

<https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/navigating-canada-taiwan-relations-why-canada-needs-a-renewed-strategy-to-help-safeguard-peace-in-the-taiwan-strait/>

#information operations

U.S. Influence Operations: The Military's Resurrected Digital Campaign for Hearts and Minds

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-influence-operations-militarys-resurrected-digital-campaign-hearts-and-minds>

EU East StratCom Task Force Trends of the Week 13 October 2022

<https://mailchi.mp/euvdisinfo/dr306?e=826e7edc60>

#intelligence

‘More Open to Stay Secret’: UK Intelligence Agency Openness and the Public

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/more-open-stay-secret-uk-intelligence-agency-openness-and-public>

#repurposing (*couldn't think of another hashtag for this*)

Equipment should be looked at for imaginative re-use, e.g., training, rather than just disposed.

Navy Turning British Surplus E-3 Sentry Into E-6B Doomsday Plane Trainer

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/navy-turning-british-surplus-e-3-sentry-into-e-6b-doomsday-plane-trainer>

How Repurposed Global Hawks Will Hugely Accelerate Hypersonic Testing

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/how-repurposed-global-hawks-will-hugely-accelerate-hypersonic-testing>

#Russia-Ukraine War

Lessons from Russian Missile Performance in Ukraine

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/october/lessons-russian-missile-performance-ukraine>

As Ukrainian Troops Advance, Russia Appears Intent on Fighting Long War

<https://www.newsweek.com/ukrainian-troops-advance-russia-appears-intent-fighting-long-war-1749689>

Is Canada ready for a long war?

Ukrainian air defence

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1579416337809829888.html>

Ukraine's New Offensive Is Fueled by Captured Russian Weapons

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-new-offensive-is-fueled-by-captured-russian-weapons-11664965264>

and

Half of Ukraine's tank fleet now consists of captured Russian armor

<https://taskandpurpose.com/news/ukraine-captures-russian-tanks-fleet-size/>

#drones

Suspected Ukrainian Explosive Sea Drone Made From Recreational Watercraft Parts

<https://news.usni.org/2022/10/11/suspected-ukrainian-explosive-sea-drone-made-from-jet-ski-parts>

Innovation!

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Re-purposed captured Russian equipment now makes up a large proportion of Ukraine's military hardware. Ukraine has likely captured at least 440 Russian Main Battle Tanks, and around 650 other armoured vehicles since the invasion. Over half of Ukraine's currently fielded tank fleet potentially consists of captured vehicles.
- The failure of Russian crews to destroy intact equipment before withdrawing or surrendering highlights their poor state of training and low levels of battle discipline. With Russian formations under severe strain in several sectors and increasingly demoralised troops, Russia will likely continue to lose heavy weaponry.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Early on 08 October 2022, an explosion damaged the Kerch Strait Bridge, the road and rail crossing which links Russian-occupied Crimea and the Krasnodar region of Russia.
- Two of the four carriageways of the roadway have collapsed in several places over a length of approximately 250m. It is almost certain that some vehicle transits via the other two carriageways have resumed, but capacity will be seriously degraded.
- The extent of damage to the rail crossing is uncertain, but any serious disruption to its capacity will highly likely have a significant impact on Russia's already strained ability to sustain its forces in southern Ukraine. The rail crossing was only opened to freight in June 2020, but the line has played a key role in moving heavy military vehicles to the southern front during the invasion.
- This incident will likely touch President Putin closely; it came hours after his 70th birthday, he personally sponsored and opened the bridge, and its construction contractor was his childhood friend Arkady Rotenberg. In recent months, Putin's former bodyguard, now commander of the Russian National Guard, Viktor Zolotov, has provided public assurances about the security of the bridge.



CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
COMMANDEMENT DU RENSEIGNEMENT DES FORCES CANADIENNES

RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

Russian officials claim that the recent wave of long-range missile strikes against Ukraine (80+ on Monday, 20+ on Tuesday) did not target civilian infrastructure or public spaces.

BASED ON CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND ANALYSIS:

- The Russian strikes targeted at least 15 locations, including Kyiv and Lviv, and were primarily meant to disable Ukrainian critical infrastructure, including essential utilities like electricity and water.
- Russia's targeting process has consistently demonstrated no concern for avoiding civilian casualties and other collateral damage.
- Russia has shown a diminishing ability to hold territory in Ukraine. Its attacks on critical infrastructure are likely intended to degrade Ukrainian public resolve, though they have often had the opposite effect.

UKRAINE / RUSSIA UPDATE // 2022-10-12



National
Defence
Défense
nationale

#security strategy

(US) National Security Strategy, October 2022

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>

"From the report" at: <https://news.usni.org/2022/10/12/2022-u-s-national-security-strategy>
and

New National Security Strategy Returns Focus to Rules, Partnerships, and American Leadership

<https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/10/new-national-security-strategy-returns-focus-rules-partnerships-and-american-leadership/378329/>

#strategy

Educating Maritime Geostrategists for the Naval Services

<https://cimsec.org/educating-maritime-geostrategists-for-the-naval-services/>

But first, let's educate strategists for all services.

#wargaming

History of Wargaming Project

<http://www.wargaming.co/index.htm>

Other:

Veterans Affairs Canada Salute! October 2022

In this edition:

Queen Elizabeth II

Save the date: Career webinar

Marking Disability Employment Awareness Month

Women's History Month: Sgt (Ret'd) Marjorie (Worby) Stetson

Sgt (Ret'd) Julianno Scaglione: Charting his own path

Women's History Month and the anniversary of the Michelle Douglas case

Canada and France protect Juno Beach
 Trail of the Caribou leads to Gallipoli
 Remembrance materials for the classroom
 Commemoration calendar
 Learn about Mental Health First Aid
 Contribute to research on PTSD
 Understanding and improving mental health campaign, October 10-November 20
 Your input wanted: National Veterans Employment Strategy
 2022 Canadian Veterans Health Survey
 Veteran and Family Well-Being Fund open for applications

The Prospect Foundation

<https://www.pf.org.tw/en/pfen/>

A Taiwan-based think tank.

Prospect Foundation Prospects & Perspectives 2022:

- No. 50 - The Impact of China's Military Drills around Taiwan on Indo-Pacific Security
- No. 51 - China's Assault on the 'Median Line' in the Taiwan Strait: A New Challenge for Taipei
- No. 52 - Challenging Beijing's Divide and Conquer Strategy: The Baltic States' Exit from 16+1
- No. 53 - Resolving the Bottleneck in U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan
- No. 55 - Prepare for War to Confront China's 'New Normal' over Taiwan

The Brit @TheBrit96 8 Oct tweeted (<https://twitter.com/TheBrit96/status/1578892374293389318>):
 British Army combat brigades.

Anyone have a Canadian version?

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5	Column 6
X 12th Armoured Brigade Combat Team (BULFORD)	X 20th Armoured Brigade Combat Team (BULFORD)	X 1st Deep Recce Strike Bde. Combat Team (TIDWORTH)	X 7th Light Mech. Bde. Co. Team (COTTESMORE)	X 4th Light Brigade Combat Team (CATTERICK)	X 16 Air Assault Bde. Combat Team (COLCHESTER)
King's Royal Hussars TIDWORTH	Royal Dragoon Guards WARMINSTER	Household Cavalry Rgt. BULFORD	Royal Scots Dragoon Guards (LEUCHARS)	Light Dragoons CATTERICK	2 Parachute Regiment COLCHESTER
Royal Tank Regiment TIDWORTH	Queen's Royal Hussars TIDWORTH	Royal Lancers TIDWORTH	1 Scots Guards CATTERICK	1 Coldstream Guards WINDSOR	3 Parachute Regiment COLCHESTER
Royal Wessex Yeomanry (Res.) BOVINGTON	1 Royal Rgt. of Fusiliers TIDWORTH	1st Queen's Dragoon Guards (CAERWENT)	1 Yorkshire Regiment CATTERICK	1 Grenadier Guards ALDERSHOT	4 Parachute Regiment (Reserve) LEEDS
1 Royal Welsh TIDWORTH	1 Princess of Wales's Royal Rgt. (TIDWORTH)	Royal Yeomanry (Res.) LEICESTER	1 The Rifles CHEPSTOW	1 Duke of Lancaster's R BLACKPOOL	2 Royal Gurkha Rifles FOLKESTONE
1 Mercian Regiment BULFORD	5 The Rifles BULFORD	1 Royal Horse Artillery LARKHILL	2 Royal Anglian Rgt. COTTESMORE	1 Royal Gurkha Rifles FOLKESTONE	1 Royal Irish Regiment EDINBURGH
3 Royal Welsh (Reserve) CARDIFF	3 Princess of Wales's R. Rgt (Res) CANTERBURY	3 Royal Horse Artillery NEWCASTLE	4 Royal Rgt. of Scotland CATTERICK	2 Royal Rgt. of Scotland EDINBURGH	7 Parachute Rgt. RHA COLCHESTER
4 Mercian Rgt. (Reserve) WOLVERHAMPTON	5 Royal Rgt. of Fusiliers (Reserve) ALNWICK	5 Rgt. Royal Artillery CATTERICK	4 Rgt. Royal Artillery TOPCLIFFEE	2 The Rifles LISBURN	23 Parachute Eng. Rgt. WOODBIDGE
4 Regiment, RLC ABINGDON	7 The Rifles (Reserve) KENSINGTON	19 Rgt. Royal Artillery LARKHILL	105 Rgt. Royal Artillery (Res.) EDINBURGH	103 Rgt. Royal Artillery (Res.) ST HELENS	13 Air Assault Rgt. RLC COLCHESTER
4 Battalion, REME TIDWORTH	1 Regiment, RLC BICESTER	26 Rgt. Royal Artillery LARKHILL	32 Engineer Regiment CATTERICK	75 Engineer Rgt. (Res.) WARRINGTON	16 Medical Regiment COLCHESTER
2 Medical Regiment TIDWORTH	3 Battalion, REME TIDWORTH	101 Rgt. Royal Artillery (Reserve) GATESHEAD	6 Regiment, RLC DISHFORTH	154 (Scottish) Rgt. RLC (Res.) DUNFERMLINE	216 Signal Squadron COLCHESTER
	1 Medical Regiment TIDWORTH	104 Rgt. Royal Artillery (Reserve) NEWPORT	1 Battalion, REME CATTERICK	102 Bn, REME (Res.) NEWTON AYCLIFFE	Pathfinders COLCHESTER
		6 Battalion, REME TIDWORTH	3 Medical Regiment CATTERICK		

Lessons Learned for Navy Shipbuilding

Some recent tweets, including from a Canadian defence academic, highlighted shipbuilding lessons from an October 2022 US government report (<https://news.usni.org/2022/10/10/report-to-congress-on-navy-force-structure-and-shipbuilding-2>). Any applicable lessons for Canada? Certainly one got **highlighted** (below) in a tweet.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix D. A Summary of Some Acquisition Lessons Learned for Navy Shipbuilding

This appendix presents a general summary of lessons learned in Navy shipbuilding, reflecting comments made repeatedly by various sources over the years. These lessons learned include the following:

- **At the outset, get the operational requirements for the program right.** Properly identify the program’s operational requirements at the outset. Manage risk by not trying to do too much in terms of the program’s operational requirements, and perhaps seek a so-called 70%-to-80% solution (i.e., a design that is intended to provide 70%-80% of desired or ideal capabilities). Achieve a realistic balance up front between operational requirements, risks, and estimated costs.
- **Use mature technologies.** Use land-based prototyping and testing to bring new technologies to a high state of maturity before incorporating them into ship designs, and limit the number of major new technologies to be incorporated into a new ship design.
- **Impose cost discipline up front.** Use realistic price estimates, and consider not only development and procurement costs, but life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs.
- **Employ competition** where possible in the awarding of design and construction contracts.
- **Use a contract type that is appropriate for the amount of risk involved,** and structure its terms to align incentives with desired outcomes.
- **Minimize design/construction concurrency** by developing the design to a high level of completion before starting construction and by resisting changes in requirements (and consequent design changes) during construction.
- **Properly supervise construction work.** Maintain an adequate number of properly trained Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) personnel.
- **Provide stability for industry,** in part by using, where possible, multiyear procurement (MYP) or block buy contracting.
- **Maintain a capable government acquisition workforce that understands what it is buying, as well as the above points.**

Identifying these lessons is arguably not the hard part—most if not all these points have been cited for years. The hard part, arguably, is living up to them without letting circumstances lead program-execution efforts away from these guidelines.

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

Canada is a rich country with abundant resources and capabilities and a population that is diverse as the land itself. During most of the last century, it hit well above its weight on the international stage. The reason is that it had citizens who understood the issues and understood the consequences of not dealing with bullies in a timely manner. There were over a million men and women who had fought for Canada in the two world wars at considerable cost in lives and material. There was also an understanding that this required a functioning foreign service made up of professionals, a military to be able to back up promises when made as well as a reasonably reliable security service in the RCMP. It was not perfect and it was expensive but for the most part it worked.

Canada has been hamstrung in developing the modern equivalent. The country has not had an open conversation and study of our foreign policy and what Canada hopes to achieve such as what are our vital interests even. Any foreign policy must also include a review of the security situation as it deals with Canada. Our security requirements are our problem. There is a strong need for a comprehensive review of potential threats and what we think we can do to mitigate or stop the threat outright. The Chinese police stations in Toronto and Vancouver are an excellent example of a specific threat to Canadian citizens, especially in view of Chinese extraterritorial laws regarding dissidents foreign or domestic. Our policies need to be backed up by a strong capable military and robust intelligence and security services that are well-trained and resourced to deal with domestic security and foreign operations. This all must be covered by oversight from Parliament with members who are properly security cleared and vetted. This oversight committee (s) must have available advice from properly trained and equipped and security cleared personnel with the ability to get a properly vetted judicial commentary and ruling in regard to legal status of particular issues or situations.

An issue is how the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is deployed. At the moment, there are a large number of CAF missions around the world. This is a link to the latest, although outdated list of operations and major exercises: <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/list.html>. The latest is the deployment of up to forty combat engineers to Poland to teach Ukrainian soldiers anti-mining techniques. This is on top of a current operation in the United Kingdom training Ukrainians in modern combat techniques, paying particular attention to junior leaders and use of initiative in combat situations as well as anti-armour skills, etc. Canada does a lot of missions, but they are scattered and the country seldom gets best "bang for the buck." Is it time to recreate Canadian Forces Europe and perhaps keep sufficient resources, support, administration in Europe to support the increasing number of these increasingly longer term missions?

Belarus

There are increasing signs that Russia is putting more pressure on Belarus to "join the fight" against the Ukrainian "Nazis." The self-appointed leadership is saying one statement one day while the next a military leader says "not yet." Belarus is on a tight rope and there is no safety net. The entire Belorussian forces are about 100k with another 300k reserves available but in very similar shape as Russia's reserves: out of shape, poorly trained and unorganized. This is not a recipe for the long term health of an increasingly unpopular regime with little legitimacy that has a very active opposition in the country and in neighbouring countries.

Belarus has seen the arrival of up to 15k Russian troops, apparently mainly recent reserve call ups. It has also had the presence of air and missile troops with associated security forces. Belarus has let its territory be used by Russia for missile strikes and more recently loitering munition. Ukraine has responded to the increasing threat by placing large numbers of well-equipped and trained national guard elements along the border which Belorussian President Lukashenko has stated will be used to attack Belarus - except no one believes him. President Zielenski has asked for an international force of observers to be placed along the border of Belarus and Ukraine to ensure no unintentional actions can occur without suitable scrutiny as a way to give Lukashenko an out. It is widely expected that any attack by even some elements of Belorussian forces will likely result in regime change, likely by the armed forces and security forces of Belarus. The opposition leader, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, has called upon her fellow citizens not to cooperate with any attack on Ukraine. Lukashenko appears to be well aware that the regime's future hangs by a thread. Time will tell.

Russia-Ukraine War

The war continues, although at a slower pace as Ukraine takes time to adjust its logistics chain to allow for a longer-term advance across the entire front. They are still achieving minor advances in the north-east and in the south and somewhat surprisingly along the Bakmut front where there are Russian private military units and Chechen units, continuing their attacks with small but ongoing advances of little importance at present.

The biggest event of the past week was the attack of the Kerch bridge causing heavy damage to one of two roadways and damage to the rail bridge when fuel cars caught fire after the explosion. The exact cause is still a question. The most popular theory was a suicide truck bomb on a truck that was fully inspected by Russian security prior to going on the bridge. The second is a sub-surface attack from under the bridge. Both ideas have problems. Russia has accused Ukraine for the attack and has threatened a nuclear strike if the situation continues to deteriorate. The next day saw more than 80 missiles fired from various platforms and at least 14 loitering munitions allegedly from the area of Belarus. Over half the missiles and most of the drones were destroyed by Ukrainian air defence units. The targets appeared to be civilian in nature, including power production and transmission facilities, a university, a footbridge and a playground. They missed the bridge and the playground but came close. The Russians continued the attacks later in the week but not to the same extent.

New start up survey companies have started to take informal surveys of the Russian public. As we have mentioned before, the lines are generational with older folks having a tendency to support the regime and the war, with the numbers dropping the younger the demographic. This is not surprising in that it is the young who are affected by the regime's decisions. There is growing discontent, however, the surveys show that opposition of consequence will not come from the public. The real opposition is right-wing, former supporters of the Putin regime. People like Ramzan Kadyrov and Progozhin, also known as Putin's chef and head of the Wagner private military company. If I were President Putin, I might consider a new chef at present. Many formerly supportive television hosts also now criticize Putin, something unheard of in past. Putin has a very limited ability to change the situation on the ground. His constant meddling of the battle has caused major damage, such as failing to allow troops to withdraw from Lyman. The losses of manpower and equipment were unnecessary. Putin is now essentially a lame duck and is vulnerable. His support now relies upon the FSB and the National Guard. Time will tell if this is sufficient.

On 26 September 2022, both the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines suffered multiple detonations, causing a major escape of natural gas. There have been investigations as to the cause but most accepted answer was sabotage. The actual identity of the guilty party is unknown but suspicions are on the actions of the security service of the Russian Federation, although Russia actually owns the pipelines. NATO

members with pipelines and infrastructure in the North Sea have warships now protecting their equipment. NATO has further stated that an attack on this infrastructure will constitute action under article five of the NATO agreement/charter. This potentially could be the first act in a widened war. NATO and more specifically the US has stated that use of nuclear weapons would require a NATO response. This is probably the worst situation since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1960. This could get messy.

China

On 16 October 2022, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will start the 20th Party Congress; approximately 2300 people will attend. The Congress consists of the General membership selected to represent their portion of the CCP, also a Central Committee of 400 members selected from the general membership, the Politburo of 25 members and the Standing Committee of between seven and nine folks including the General Secretary of the CCP, currently held by Xi Jinping. CNN has produced a very good overview of the Congress found at link: <https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/11/china/china-party-congress-explainer-intl-hnk-mic/index.html>.

What is expected from this Congress? First, it is a "rubber stamp" of decisions made at the Beihai meeting of the senior leadership of the CCP held this year in August 2022. It is expected that there will be new members within all levels of the hierarchy including the Standing Committee, the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CCP. There will be changes due to the natural retirement of older members. It is also expected that they will confirm that Xi will have a third term as General-Secretary of the Party, President of China and Chair of the Military Commission, the three most powerful positions in the Party. It will also likely endorse new military commanders of the services of the Peoples' Liberation Army and new commanders of key commands. These people will likely be Xi loyalists. This would mean that the rival faction led by Zhang Chemin would finally be removed from these key positions. Essentially it is suggested that Xi will complete the takeover of the Party once and for all. There is the possibility of a surprise as the economy is very delicate and national debt is huge and getting bigger with key industries failing. More recently, the US also ramped up restrictions on the provision of computer chips and equipment to produce them on the CCP and China in general. It is expected this will hamper Chinese growth in this area which would include artificial intelligence and more sophisticated weapon systems. This is something to really watch, the fallout from this effort could have global implications.

Other surprises could mean a change from the Zero Covid lockdowns, rehabilitation of the tech sector and further information on the concept of "common prosperity" as it affects Chinese citizens. More importantly, will Xi continue down the road of being self-sufficient by developing a consumer market within China but with certain characteristics that will be Chinese? The decision on this issue may have longer term effects on China's position in the global economy. Lastly (at least for me) is the issue of the One China Agreement. How China and the CCP deal with this issue is critical not only for China but for the world. Authoritarian regimes just a year ago were seeing a renaissance and seemed to be unstoppable. Time has changed this view.

Iran

Iran's Morality Police have succeeded to once again create massive chaos within the country, as if Iran needed further problems. A young woman was arrested and held in a police station where she apparently collapsed and died. Authorities tried to quell unrest by suggesting she died of a heart attack caused by an undetected heart defect. It didn't work and the demonstrations started. The authorities tried initially to calm the situation but to no avail and the demonstrations spread across Iran. Authorities ramped up security efforts including the use of bullets to calm the situation. The result was

the death of several other young women including one Wednesday. Demonstrations have ramped up yet again despite the more serious crackdown by police, the Basij Militia and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The demonstrations also now call for the removal of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which is a step too far for the authorities. At this point more than 185 people have died in the past four weeks of demonstrations. Some have suggested that the people have now lost their fear of the authorities and this could have a major effect on the continued health of the regime. As always time will tell, but with the recent death, it appears further demonstrations of increasing violence are in the new future. It will not go well for anyone.

The Admirals' Medal



Established in 1985, in conjunction with the 75th anniversary of the Naval Service of Canada, the Admirals' Medal award was founded by the sons of Canadian Rear-Admirals George Stephens and Victor Brodeur and Vice-Admiral Rollo Mainguy to honour their illustrious fathers. It is awarded annually to a member of the maritime/ naval community in Canada for outstanding achievements in the advancement of maritime affairs related to Canada.

Generally, the medal is awarded for outstanding achievement and impact in Canada's marine sector in areas including vision, executive action, science, technology and academic studies or for the application of practical skills. Alternately, the medal is awarded for an outstanding contribution or body of work in a maritime/naval field of endeavour warranting special recognition.

Responsibility for the Admirals' Medal was transferred from the Royal Canadian Navy to the Naval Association of Canada (NAC) in 2021. The Selection Criteria, the Annual Award Cycle and Nomination Instructions for this prestigious award are found at <https://www.navalassoc.ca/the-admirals-medal/> . Nominations for 2023 will be accepted until 1 November 2022.