



# Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

## Dispatches

### 21 Oct 2022

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.*

*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

#### Admirals' Medal

See poster at end of Dispatches for solicitation by the Naval Association of Canada for nominations for the Admirals' Medal.

#### **Events:**

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**25 October**, Tuesday - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies webinar "Euro-Atlantic and Global security priorities following Russia's war in Ukraine." 1200-1330 BST. Online. To register: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/euro-atlantic-and-global-security-priorities-following-russias-war-ukraine>

**27 October**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Back to the Future: The 1980s Global War Games as a Campaign of Learning." 1800-2000 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/back-to-the-future-the-1980s-global-war-games-as-a-campaign-of-learning-tickets-358240826957>

**Emended: 2 November**, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Special Speaker Adam MacDonald “The Maritime Domain of the Russian-Ukrainian War: Implications, Considerations and Lessons for Canada and the Royal Canadian Navy.” 1900 Atlantic. Via Zoom. To register, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com) by close-of-business Sunday, 30 October. As the subject line for your registration email, put: RUSI(NS)

Special Speaker 2 November 2022 Registration. In addition to your name, please provide whether you are RUSI(NS), otherwise indicate your organization (association, company or unit).

*Also, from our speaker: Overcoming American Hegemony: The Central Paradox of Chinese and Russian Revisionism*

<https://jmss.org/article/view/76237>

**Save the Date: 16 November**, Wednesday - Distinguished Speaker from Fisheries and Oceans Canada, on the National Fisheries Intelligence Service. 1300 Atlantic. Via Zoom. More to follow.

*For context to the event (read the thread):*

Greg Poling @GregPoling 19 Oct tweeted

(<https://twitter.com/GregPoling/status/1582851455593066499>): THREAD > US just released the 21-agency Natl 5-Yr Strategy for Combating IUU Fishing, mandated by the 2019 Maritime SAFE Act. Here's some of the obviously Asia-related stuff, esp. Vietnam and Taiwan.

*Strategy at: Federal Agencies Release Joint U.S. Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing*

<https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/agency-statement/federal-agencies-release-joint-us-strategy-combating-illegal-unreported-and>

### **Publications:**

Publications without links are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

RUSI(NS) Presentations by Lieutenant-Colonel Julien Letarte, RCAF, and Major Drew Larned, USAF, *Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles – Canadian and US Programs*, 14 September 2022

<https://rusi-ns.ca/rpas/>

RUSI(NS) Comments *Mental Health Reform in National Security in North America: Building on Recent Progress* by Jay Heisler, 14 September 2022

<https://rusi-ns.ca/mental-health-reform/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note *Naming and Dedication of Canadian Coast Guard Ships*, 23 August 2022

<https://rusi-ns.ca/naming-dedication-canadian-coast-guard-ships/>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 12 October 2022

<https://www.cmissa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute *President's Enews*, October 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 8, September 2022

Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada Newsletter *Seatimes*, August 2022

Naval Association of Canada *Starshell*, Summer 2022, Issue 95

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, October 2022

<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/155-rausi-october-2022-dispatches>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, October 2022

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* - Volume 5 Issue 7

<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 14, Issue 8, 17 October 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2022




Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* October 2022

<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-10>

See list contents in 'Other', below.


**Tweeted by @RUSI NS:**

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

<p>"The neglect of Canada's armed forces is leaving us all defenceless" <a href="https://thehub.ca/2022-10-13/richard-shimooka-the-neglect-of-our-armed-forces-is-leaving-us-all-defenceless/">https://thehub.ca/2022-10-13/richard-shimooka-the-neglect-of-our-armed-forces-is-leaving-us-all-defenceless/</a> "...the @CanadianForces, &amp; the government writ large, may require a more fundamental change to how foreign policy is guided, administered, &amp; funded."</p>	
<p>CDA Institute on Twitter: "There's a lot of urgency around climate change, but if ppl use the resources that are suddenly available to respond to that urgency, and they don't think through what they do with them, then we'll have a lot of mistakes to make up for later. @CntrClimSec <a href="https://twitter.com/CDAInstitute/status/1580586421705768960">https://twitter.com/CDAInstitute/status/1580586421705768960</a>" / (Can Military Installations Cope with Increasingly Extreme Weather? <a href="https://cdainstitute.ca/john-conger-can-military-installations-cope-with-increasingly-extreme-weather/">https://cdainstitute.ca/john-conger-can-military-installations-cope-with-increasingly-extreme-weather/</a>)</p>	
<p>CDN Defence Academy/L'Académie cdn de la défense tweeted and RUSI-NS retweeted: "Technology is advancing at a pace that is changing how we visualize war. Have autonomous and uncrewed systems changed war fundamentally? #LineOfSight   #UncrewedSystems <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2021/09/have-autonomous-and-unmanned-systems-changed-war-fundamentally.html">https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2021/09/have-autonomous-and-unmanned-systems-changed-war-fundamentally.html</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/CDACanadaACD/status/1580892991861846018">https://twitter.com/CDACanadaACD/status/1580892991861846018</a>" (Have Autonomous and Unmanned Systems Changed War Fundamentally? <i>and</i> Anyone Else Thinking About Drones?)</p>	

<https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2021/10/anyone-else-thinking-about-drones.html>)

NAADSN\_RDSNAA @NAADSN\_RDSNAA 14 Oct tweeted and RUSI-NS retweeted: New in @Journal\_INDOPAC by P. Whitney Lackenbauer (@WhitneyLackenb1), Adam Lajeunesse (@adam\_lajeunesse) and Ryan Dean: "Why China Is Not a Peer Competitor in the Arctic" Available here: <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3172586/why-china-is-not-a-peer-competitor-in-the-arctic/>"



Rebuilding the Reserve Force [https://www.cgai.ca/rebuilding\\_the\\_reserve\\_force](https://www.cgai.ca/rebuilding_the_reserve_force) "(#NATO) Alliance members including Canada must belatedly develop a high degree of war-fighting deterrence capability & long-term sustainability." @CanadianForces is reconstituting - needs to build further



Wavell Room - British Military Thinking [@wavellroom](https://www.wavellroom.com/)  
Wavell Room tweeted and RUSI-NS retweeted: "With the Arctic quickly becoming a stage for new geopolitical competition, a new security dilemma is emerging as the states surrounding adopt competing Arctic strategies and developed new military capabilities in the region"



The Canadian Coast Guard [@CoastGuardCAN](#) tweeted and RUSI-NS retweeted: The trio is complete! Today, [@chantierdavie](#) delivered CCGS Vincent Massey! Thanks to the [#NationalShipbuildingStrategy](#), this 3rd medium icebreaker helps ensure we have what's needed to deliver critical services to Canadians. Learn more <http://ow.ly/ZSy050LcaPe>



CDN Defence Academy [@CDACanadaACD](#) Tweeted and RUSI-NS retweeted: [#ELP2022](#) | Dr. Albert Pierce addresses the participants on Strategic Leadership. He notes that in every org the leaders set the tone, incl. the ethical tone. Within military orgs, command climate starts at the top. <https://capstone.ndu.edu/Portals/83/Documents/Spouse%20Info/Resources/Strategic%20Leadership%20article-Pierce.pdf>

## On Strategic Leadership

By RICHARD B. MYERS and ALBERT C. PIERCE



1 Marine Expeditionary Force and Multi-National Division North commanders discuss election security plans with Iraq soldiers and Kurdish representatives in Mosul, January 2009

**S**trategic leadership has many characteristics in common with leadership at lower levels, but it also has some that are distinctive. There are six that we think will be particularly relevant to strategic leaders in the future: intellectual openness, nuance, intellectual agility, integration, teamwork, and ethics. Because the scope of opinion on strategic leadership is diverse, leaders must be open to different points of view.

**Intellectual openness.** Because the scope of strategic leadership is so wide and the range of opinions on strategic issues is so diverse, leaders must be open to different points of view. Indeed, they should encourage subordinates, peers, and others to express their views as directly as possible—from those in the corridors of power and the public at large to allies and friends abroad. No one has a monopoly on relevant

General Richard B. Myers, USAF (Ret.), is the National Defense University (NDU) Colin Powell Chair of Leadership, Ethics, and Character. Dr. Albert C. Pierce is Director of the Institute for National Security Ethics and Leadership at NDU.



STRATCOMCOE [@STRATCOMCOE](#) tweeted and RUSI-NS retweeted: Wondering how activities on [#socialmedia](#) has changed since February 24? A comparison of heavily amplified content about [#NATO](#) on [#Twitter](#) and [#VKontakte](#) exposes [#Kremlin](#)'s waning ability to control conversations on Western platforms. More <https://bit.ly/3D8nIUM>



VIRTUAL MANIPULATION BRIEF, ISSUE 1/2022  
RUSSIA'S STRUGGLE TO CIRCUMVENT SANCTIONS AND COMMUNICATE ITS WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

Debunk.org [@DebunkEu](#) tweeted and RUSI-NS retweeted: Ukrainian refugees fleeing the terror of war became a target not only for Russian missiles, but disinformation narratives as well. [🔗](#) to the full report: <https://bit.ly/3SeQU0q> [#WeStandWithUkraine](#) [#refugees](#) [#disinformation](#) [#propaganda](#) [#dezinformacija](#) [#melagienos](#) [#debunk](#)



HybridCOE [@HybridCoE](#) tweeted and RUSI-NS Retweeted: The Russian invasion of [#Ukraine](#) saw new actors - non-state actors, hacker groups, commercial enterprises - exploiting [#cyberspace](#). This increases legal uncertainty and even asymmetry, writes [@lecanardfauve](#), and suggests solutions. Read more <https://hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-paper-15-exploiting-cyberspace-international-legal-challenges-and-the-new-tropes-techniques-and-tactics-in-the-russo-ukraine-war/>



Canadian Armed Forces [@CanadianForces](#) Tweeted and RUSI-NS retweeted: We've awarded a contract to provide operational clothing and footwear to Logistik Unicorp. This contract is a new approach to supplying operational gear and supports the [#CAF](#)'s goal of building a more modern, diverse, and inclusive armed forces. <https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/10/minister-anand-announces-investment-of-up-to-37-billion-to-supply-operational-clothing-and-footwear-to-the-canadian-armed-forces0.html>



**Air-to-Air Drone**

Roman Kyryliuk [@KyryliukRoma](#) 18 Oct tweeted: Hello Shahed-136! We attached a mini-machine gun to the drone. 1000 likes on this video and I'll post a video of this drone in action! <https://twitter.com/kyryliukroma/status/1582285711847219200>



**Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:**

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

**Russia To 'Modernize' 800 Vintage T-62 Tanks Due To Ukraine Losses: Report**

<https://www.thedrive.com/.../russia-to-modernize-800...>

"The Russian military is reportedly set to receive some 800 refurbished and possibly upgraded T-62 tanks in



the next three years to try to help make up for severe losses it has already sustained in its ongoing all-out invasion of Ukraine. Many of the nearly antique T-62s have already been pulled out of deep storage and sent to Ukraine, where they have shown to be of debatable utility."

The Russians have armour in reserve to modernize and use. Canada seems to have made a practice of scrapping or otherwise disposing of equipment taken out of service. Probably in the interests of saving money. It does mean, though, that we have nothing at hand to send to allies or to use ourselves. In the event of mobilization, we are dependent on industry to produce what's needed. That can take time. Canadian industry doesn't appear to be on a resilient, surge footing (the term 'war footing' is too limited and an incorrect message - term should be reserved for war).

**Downward trend in piracy continues in the Gulf of Guinea**

<https://www.defenceweb.co.za/.../downward-trend-in.../>

"Piracy appears to be on the decline with reported incidents in the Gulf of Guinea – long accepted as the world's piracy hotspot – substantially down in the latest quarterly International Maritime Bureau (IMB) report."



The Gulf of Guinea is a region of occasional deployment of Royal Canadian Navy ships, Kingston-class multi-role patrol vessels. Might their efforts in training with local forces have helped a bit in enhancing regional marine security? Would be nice to think that ships of the RCN are achieving such diplomatic and constabulary success (to list two of the Booth triangle functions of a navy).

**Navel-gazing Canada has neglected its military, new French ambassador says**

<https://nationalpost.com/.../french-ambassador-on-canadas...>

"Caught up in navel-gazing and living under the protective shield of the United States, Canada has allowed its military presence worldwide to wither over the last decade or so..."



**As the war shifts, Ukrainian soldiers in the U.K. learn offensive tactics from Canada**

<https://www.cbc.ca/.../canadian-ukraine-military-training...>

"We're now trying really hard to instill in the candidates what I call an offensive spirit because we are aware of the way the campaign is going in Ukraine."



**Defence chief calls on Canadians to rally behind military during personnel crisis**

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/.../defence-chief-calls-on...>

"So we need a whole-of-society effort to help us bring the Armed Forces back to where it needs to be for the dangerous world ahead."

Canada and other democratic states are facing cross-society attacks (cyber, public information, political, legal, etc.) from authoritarian states. There is conflict, more than just competition, going on. Canada needs a 'whole-of-society effort,' starting with a 'whole-of-society recognition' of the threats.



**UK Provides MROSS Program Update Following Nordstream Incidents**

<https://www.navalnews.com/.../uk-provides-mross-program.../>

"...the UK announced plans to develop MROSS (Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ship) to augment at-sea surveillance capacity in order to protect critical national infrastructure (CNI) on the seabed and detect wider threats in the North Atlantic."

Considering the recent attacks on subsea pipelines ("After Nord Stream Attack, Europe Scrambles to Secure Subsea Pipelines" <https://maritime-executive.com/.../after-nord-stream...>), Canada would be wise to develop a multi-role ocean surveillance ship to protect the many communications





cables, oil and gas pipelines, electrical lines and sensors on the sea bottom in the Canadian areas of responsibility.

From "Pipeline Safety Regimes in Canada" (<https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/.../pipeline-safety-regimes.../16440>): "The Canada Energy Regulator is an independent federal agency that regulates cross-border pipelines in Canada. The role of the CER is to make sure pipeline companies meet strict requirements to keep Canadians and the environment safe." Implicit in that statement is defence of pipelines (not the other sea bottom infrastructure). Also implicit is that CER is dependent on companies' resources to carry out that defence. It leaves questions: What resources does Canada have to defend its sea bottom infrastructure? Which department is lead in planning, practicing and conducting defensive efforts and responses to attacks? How are all the stakeholders coordinated? Which vessels are available to do what, and presuming one or more MROSS is necessary, which department should build and operate it (them)?

### **From Freeze to Seize: How the UK Can Break the Deadlock on Asset Recovery**

<https://rusi.org/.../freeze-seize-how-uk-can-break...>



"Canada has taken a different approach,

where new legislation will allow the government to directly issue an Order seeking permanent asset forfeiture based on individuals who risk a 'grave breach of international security'. This type of administrative, government-issued forfeiture order, however, is unlikely to stand up to challenges in the courts and may risk diluting the meaning and impact of the wider sanctions regime."

Which federal department is lead? Such 'economic warfare' (use of term at risk of diluting its meaning) is important, and legal action should be drafted to be able to stand up to court action.

### **Among the Sea Powers: Australia's Maritime Strategy in the Indo-Pacific**

<https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/.../among-the.../>



"Protection of natural resources and maritime trade, transnational blue crimes, environmental threats, marine safety, and scientific research in the maritime domain also deserve attention when formulating maritime security strategy."

Applicable considerations (long have been) for Canada as the government undertakes a Defence Policy Update, and for government maritime departments and agencies as maritime and naval strategies are subsequently reviewed.

**Canada's 'tenuous hold' in Arctic could be challenged by Russia, China, says top soldier**

<https://www.cbc.ca/.../wayne-eyre-arctic-russia-china...>

"Canada's hold on the outer reaches of its Arctic territory is "tenuous" and will face significant challenges from both Russia and China in the future, the country's top military commander warned a parliamentary committee on Tuesday."



**The Navy's DDG(X) Destroyer: We Have A Price Problem**

<https://www.19fortyfive.com/.../the-navys-ddgx-destroyer.../>

"Bottom line, past hype is no guarantee of future results. As a rule defense folk are upstanding people with no intent to mislead. But incentives and disincentives intrinsic to the profession of arms encourage a bubbly, relentlessly upbeat, and thus deceptive culture when it comes to weapons procurement. That culture muffles doubt."

A caution to keep in mind in Canada.



**Senate committee studying Arctic security in response to Chinese, Russian interest in region**

<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/1/...>

"We know that China too is showing some interest lately in minerals and the fishery and is indeed as part of that declaring itself to be a near-Arctic state, and so add to that a new generation of stealth missile capacity and that gives us a lot to be concerned about."



**Other Sources:**

**#armour**

AbramsX Next Generation Main Battle Tank Breaks Cover

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/abramsx-next-generation-main-battle-tank-breaks-cover>

*Lessons for Canada's next tank?*

**#command**

A New Combat Analysis Framework

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2022-OLE/Razma/>

The End of the Fighting General

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/the-end-of-the-fighting-general/>

### **#defence policy**

Refreshing Canada's Defence Policy & Lessons from SSE

<https://cdainstitute.ca/expert-series-defence-policy-update/>

In a changing world, Canada cannot continue to ignore its defence spending commitments

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-in-a-changing-world-canada-cannot-continue-to-ignore-its-defence/>

### **#economic warfare**

Economic Sanctions

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2022/Duckenfield/>

### **#information operations**

Information Warfare and Wikipedia

*A "...case study, the English-language Wikipedia page for the Russo-Ukrainian war..." Available on request to RUSI(NS).*

### **#intelligence**

The Ukraine War Is Teaching the US How to Move Intelligence Faster

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/10/ukraine-war-teaching-us-how-move-intelligence-faster/378361/>

RUSI Annual Security Lecture 2022 with Sir Jeremy Fleming, Director of GCHQ

<https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/rusi-annual-security-lecture-2022-sir-jeremy-fleming-director-gchq>  
*'If China is the Question, What is the Answer?'*

What's in Biden's Executive Order on Signals Intelligence?

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/whats-bidens-executive-order-signals-intelligence>

Redefining Irregular Warfare: Legitimacy, Coercion, and Power

<https://mwi.usma.edu/redefining-irregular-warfare-legitimacy-coercion-and-power/>

### **#legal**

Wrangling Warships: Russia's Proposed Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/wrangling-warships-russias-proposed-law-northern-sea-route-navigation>

### **#policing**

Developing Policing Practices that Build Legitimacy

<https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26678/developing-policing-practices-that-build-legitimacy>

### **#security**

A National Security Strategy for the 2020s

[https://www2.uottawa.ca/faculty-social-sciences/sites/g/files/bhrsdk371/files/2022-09/natsec\\_report\\_gspia\\_may2022.pdf](https://www2.uottawa.ca/faculty-social-sciences/sites/g/files/bhrsdk371/files/2022-09/natsec_report_gspia_may2022.pdf)

## #RCAF

Fighter squadron commander removed from post after probe into sexually explicit pilot call sign

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/corey-mask-call-sign-1.6623411>

## #Russia-Ukraine War

Pakistan, Ukraine, And The Race For Third-Party Ammunition

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/pakistan-ukraine-and-the-race-for-third-party-ammunition>

*Would Canada be dependent on foreign industry to supply our requirements in a major conflict?*

## #drones

This Drone-Versus-Drone Kill In Ukraine Could Be An Air Combat First

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/this-drone-versus-drone-kill-in-ukraine-could-be-an-air-combat-first>

Analysis of Russian logistics in the south, including the Crimea bridge, of the Russia-Ukraine War area

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1581023172346118144.html>

A tale of three generals — how the Ukrainian military turned the tide

<https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/a-tale-of-two-generals-how-the-ukrainian-military-turned-the-tide/>

*Thread on how Ukrainians executed*

*command:* <https://twitter.com/ColeFPetersen/status/1581294583866331136>

*with:* [https://twitter.com/BA\\_Friedman/status/1581272825012576257](https://twitter.com/BA_Friedman/status/1581272825012576257)

("The End of the Fighting General" is available from [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).)

Analysis of Russian deployment to Belarus

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1582044513274822656.html>

How Western Experts Got the Ukraine War So Wrong

<https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/how-western-experts-got-the-ukraine-war-so-wrong/>

Russian railway sustainment

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1582395443211776001.html>

The West's sanctions may be having an effect on Russian logistics.

'It's Time To Ignore' The Traps: Disinformation Expert Says Kremlin's 'Empty Threats' Have Paralyzed The West

<https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-dinformation-trap-kalensky/32088525.html>

## #information operations

The joy of bombing

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-joy-of-bombing/>

The Kherson Ruse: Ukraine and the Art of Military Deception

<https://mwi.usma.edu/the-kherson-ruse-ukraine-and-the-art-of-military-deception/>

Picture for Russia-Ukraine War

<https://mobile.twitter.com/defencehq/status/1582966422723928065/photo/1>



CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND  
COMMANDEMENT DU RENSEIGNEMENT DES FORCES CANADIENNES

#### RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

Following the major long-range strike salvo launched by Russia beginning on October 10, Moscow claimed that there was no need for more "massive strikes" against Ukraine, and it denied using Iranian-sourced UAVs in its attacks.

#### BASED ON CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND ANALYSIS:

- Russia continues to launch regular strikes against Ukraine in an attempt to degrade Ukraine's critical electricity infrastructure. Strikes have caused civilian casualties and collateral damage to populated areas.
- There is clear evidence from both video and recovered debris that Russia is employing one-way-attack UAVs purchased from Iran.
- Russia's growing dependence on hastily-purchased Iranian weapons indicates that the pressure on its munitions stockpiles is increasingly severe.

UKRAINE / RUSSIA UPDATE // 2022-10-19



National  
Defence  
Défense  
nationale

### #space

(UK) Defence Space: through adversity to the stars?

<https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/30320/documents/175331/default/>

### #strategy

US Coast Guard Strategy

<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/12/2003094294/-1/-1/0/USCG-STRATEGY-2022.PDF>

Summary at: <https://news.usni.org/2022/10/14/2022-u-s-coast-guard-strategy>

A CCG contact advised that the CCG comparable document is: Canadian Coast Guard Integrated Business and Human Resource Plan 2021-2022 to 2023-2024

<https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/publications/corporation-information-organisation/ibhrp-piarh/2021-2024/index-eng.html>

Defining Defeat

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/4/13/defining-defeat>

### #United States

2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength

<https://www.heritage.org/military>

### #urban warfare

Urban Warfare Project

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1581289398422818818.html>

**#warfare**

Off the shelf, above the fight: How cheap drones are completely changing warfare

<https://taskandpurpose.com/opinion/drones-uas-warfare-ukraine-russia/>

The U.S. Marine Corps Has a Choice: Transform or Die

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/10/us-marine-corps-transform-or-die/378464/>

Other:

Humour as a Weapon


Development of Soviet tanks during WW2



Development of tanks during the war in Ukraine





NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP)



## Attack Schemes

Volodymyr Dacenko @Volodymyr\_D\_ 15 Oct tweeted: Comparison of Russian and Ukrainian attack schemes: I decided to compare the offensive of Russia in the spring and the counteroffensive of Ukraine in September in order to understand the reasons for such different results 1/17  
#RussiaUkraineWar #kharkivcounteroffensive

### COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN ATTACK SCHEMES



Created by Volodymyr Dacenko  
@Volodymyr\_D\_



## Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

### O CANADA

As mentioned in the notes, we have taken the initial cut at a submission to the Minister of Defence on the Defence Policy Update (DPU). While this process is ongoing, it is clear major changes have occurred in the world that are troubling to most countries in the free world...except for Canada, which appears to be doing everything to avoid reality. While a defence review is in order as it is five years into a 20-year program that is the "Strong Secure, Engaged" program, it is clear that with the back loading of programs until later, many of the proposed programs will be in appropriate or actually too late for the current situation. It also appears that it is being done in relative isolation away from the public at a time when the public should be well-informed on defence and security issues. It will be interesting to see what this internal process will ultimately produce and if it will meet the issues of a very changed world situation.

It should be noted that Minister of Foreign Affairs Melanie Joly is planning to release an Indo-Pacific strategy shortly after the outcome of the 20th CCP Congress. There is concern from former Ambassador Guy Saint Jacques that Ottawa and in particular this Government are still reluctant to call out China as "a strategic rival competitor" despite the actions of China against Canadian citizens such as the "Two Michaels", economic warfare against agricultural products such as canola as leverage and of course the very great danger of their illegal actions such as the illegal police stations in Toronto and likely Vancouver as well as the alleged kidnapping of Chinese Canadians off our own streets, who annoy Beijing. The Ambassador's position was left vacant for over a year. Minister Joly has appointed a highly experienced professional diplomat as the new Ambassador as opposed to the two very weak political appointees John McCallum and Dominic Barton.

This past five days as of the time of writing has had an interesting view of the implementation of the Emergencies Act during the "Freedom" Convoy last January 2022. What is impressive is the indication of multiple failures at all levels, a lack of trust between agencies that should be talking almost daily, a lack of meaningful communications and liaison between various levels of Government and agencies coupled with a lack of overall command and control with the necessary information and intelligence needed to do the barest minimum. One has to wonder what sort of blunders and displays of incompetence will be identified next. Mind you, the Nova Scotia Mass Casualty Commission has also been a wondrous tale of woe as well, so it isn't just an Ontario or Central Canada problem.

In contrast, we have the very real successful efforts of the Emergency Management Organizations in the four Atlantic Provinces. It wasn't Government, fire, health services or policing or coordination with the Federal Government that was the problem. It was a failure of local power companies and the complete collapse of the cell phone system within the provinces including the backup system for the emergency responders. The private companies that control these services have a lot to answer for and their explanations to date are not credible. Nova Scotia Power had only 800 personnel on standby, yet the real problem is in part their lack of maintenance of the trees along the power lines. As an example, a private company contracted by NS Power surveyed our local area. The private contractor was appalled not only

by the trees encroaching on the area but also the condition of poles. They wrote their report stating that the conditions were bad and needed maintenance in the near future. They were told it was too low a priority. It explains a lot, power was out for days. It isn't that the power goes out, it happens, it is NS Powers determination of priorities. They have had a reputation for lax maintenance and failure to spend before a storm occurs as prevention. The cell phone providers are even worse and need to be dealt with in a meaningful way with very real penalties that will make them pay attention. The CRTC is not doing its job, it needs to get out of the office and actually do something about this ongoing and pervasive failure by cell phone companies. Failures should be the exception not a normal part of business. Private companies providing essential services need to be brought into emergency management teams before a failure not after the failure. Natural disasters require a comprehensive approach by all levels of Government, private industry, non-government agencies like the Red Cross to achieve a rapid and successful recovery.

## **NATO**

Only two countries are left to ratify the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, Hungary and Turkiye. Hungary under Orban is looking to cause issues and try to get Hungary exempted from certain aspects of sanctions. Victor Orban is considered an ally of Putin; they have remained in contact throughout the conflict. Turkiye is hoping to gain concessions from both new countries over alleged support for Kurdish separatists. Both countries have their own peculiar agendas, and this could take time without some form of solution that both might accept. This could take time given the mercurial tempers of both the Hungarian and Turkish leaders.

## **BELARUS**

As one might tell, the situation of Belarus is fascinating. It is a story of tight-rope walking of the deadliest kind. The self-appointed leader of this country is widely hated by all his citizens, and he is kept in power by his security services and his friend Vladimir Putin. He fully knows that the minute Belorussian troops cross into Ukraine with Russian troops his lifespan will likely be numbered in mere days. Belarus is obligated by the Union Treaty to defend the Union (meaning Belorussia and Russia). Russian troops are unlikely to be available this time. Belarus has a small Army of 60 k with 300 k in reserve, which is equipped with older equipment; its more modern equipment was sent to Russia along with a considerable supply of their personal protective gear and war stock ammunition. Apparently, depending on who one listens to, up to six Belorussian battalion tactical groups are linking up with a similar sized Russian force. The theory for the use of these troops is to attack towards Kyiv, Ukraine is ready this time, it is likely to not go well. Imagine Belorussian troops running into a much better trained and equipped Belorussian force fighting in defence of Ukraine. It should make for interesting dynamics especially since Belarus citizens already dislike Russians and want their own freedom. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is just across the border with her shadow Government just waiting for Lukashenko to "decide" as if he will have a choice this time.

## **THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR**

It is day 238 of Putin's "Three Day War," tens of thousands have been killed and millions have been displaced within Ukraine. Russia has essentially kidnapped millions of Ukrainians and taken them to Russia as a further war crime. They are about to do it again for residents of Kherson who now reside in a city about to be retaken by Ukrainian forces. Most of the identified war crimes have been conducted by ill-disciplined Russian forces although there are some Ukrainian infractions as well. The difference is the Ukrainian culprits will face a trial., Russians have been rewarded for their actions. A war crimes tribunal needs to be set up for Russia as it is unlikely that Russia will ever have a judicial system capable of doing the right thing. Russia will need help to bring the accused to justice and justice does matter for everyone involved. Rule of Law must be the way ahead and not an afterthought.

Russia has started a campaign using Iranian built Shaheed 136 loitering munition. It is slow and uses very old technology to hit the target, simply a coord is input to the systems "brain" and it flies to the coordinates and crashes. Its main advantage is that it has an incredibly long range of nearly 2500 kms. It isn't terribly useful on the battlefield with many moving units and vehicles as a result. It does make a very fine terror weapon not unlike its Nazi predecessor, the V1 Buzz bomb. It has been almost exclusively used on fixed targets such as apartments and in particular power infrastructure. President Zielenski stated that nearly 30% of power plants have been damaged or destroyed. Targeting of civilian infrastructure on purpose is also a noted war crime. Although Ukraine has managed to acquire air defence systems most are forward protecting troops and equipment as it is not yet present in sufficient numbers to provide overall air defence coverage. Kyiv and Kharkiv have taken the brunt although most cities in Ukraine have been hit.

The current situation in the war is somewhat fluid and is currently subject to a Ukrainian "blackout" during two large scale offensives; one in the East and one in the Kherson region. The blackouts are normal security precaution to prevent accidental release of operational information that could be of value to enemy forces. Russia continues to mount an offensive towards the city of Bakhmut in the centre of the overall front, their efforts have seen some movement forward but at a very slow pace and severe losses, still Russia persists in this area. The troops involved seem to be belonging to the private military company Wagner, or forces from Chechnya. This has caused a more obvious rift in the Russian effort with both Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner group and Ramzan Kadyrov, head of Chechnya. Both men complained about the actions or lack thereof of military leadership. These two men seem to be the public face of opposition to the way the war is being conducted. They have been careful to not to specifically blame Vladimir Putin, making it clear they blame Army leadership specifically Minister of Defence Shoigu. Shoigu was once thought to be a possible successor to Putin. This is likely no longer the case. There are five men thought to be more likely as follows;

- a. Sergey Kiriyenko - Chief of Staff presidential Administration, age 61;
- b. Nikolai Patrushev Chair of the National security Council, age 77;
- c. Dmitry Patrushev, Minister of Agriculture, son of Nikolai age 34;
- d. Yevgeny Prigozhin, Head of the Wagner Group also known as Putin's Chef, age 62;
- e. Alexander Bortnikov, Head of the FSB, age 72.

Two others are mentioned but many consider them long shots or has been:

- a. Dmitry Medvedev, former president and Prime Minister for Putin, age 57'
- b. Sergei Shoigu, Minister of Defence, age 67.

The problem for all of these men is that they all have been until recently firm supporters of the war, in fact most of these men have pushed for greater action such as the use of a tactical nuclear weapon. One can and should argue that the first use of a nuclear weapon is always strategic no matter how big or small. NATO has threatened severe consequences if any nuclear weapon is used.

Russia's industry and overall economic condition continues to fall, perhaps not as fast as anticipated but falling, nevertheless. More than six million have lost their employment. Large scale industries dependent on foreign technology for parts and operation are now closing and more than 1200 foreign businesses have left Russia. Ultimately, Putin has destroyed the covenant with the citizens of Russia, he would keep things growing if the people stayed out of politics. Russia has fallen into a hole from which there will be no escape while Putin and his supporters remain in power. Given his demonstrated capability to operate and adapt, he could remain in power for some time and thus the Russian people could remain as the latest version of North Korea. One hopes better for them in future.

## **CHINA**

Before one looks at this week's China notes, one should remind oneself that it is not about China as such, it always has to do with the CCP. The main goal of CCP governance has nothing to do with the progress of the country unless it benefits the CCP and its direction. Although, many Chinese media outlets talk about Chinese democracy there is no such thing and there is no rule of law unless one counts the decisions of the CCP as rule of law; it is more the whim of the CCP and what benefits the CCP. The CCP is an authoritarian party that has ruled China since 1949, it has killed tens of millions of Chinese in the achievement of CCP goals during the aftermath of the Chinese revolution, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The current leadership continues this type of leadership and remembers the outcome for their own families. When the CCP and their mouthpieces discuss stability, they are actually talking about the survival of the CCP, nothing more counts. It is reptilian in nature and the factions within the party are all the same unfortunate ilk. There is no win-win with the CCP, only its survival counts.

The 20th Party Congress is ongoing. It started on Sunday, 16 October with a short, two-hour speech from Xi Jinping. Normally this speech would be the reading of the entire report on Chinese progress in the past five years, which has lasted for several hours including some over five hours, therefore the selected members of the Congress would be positively giddy with only a two- hour speech. What is interesting is that China also seems to be going through another change by becoming less dependent on the outside world in favour of a consumer led economy that is virtually impervious to outside actions. There is recognition that it is the party that is the key to success yet, it will benefit some aspects of the outside world such as increased effort to turn to a greener economy, that technological innovation will come to the fore and that everyone should support the party and its direction. Sounds great, except when you look at the party's direction in regard to Covid and the severe outcomes caused by the

party's direction and how they took technology to lockdown whole neighbourhoods electronically, essentially mass punishment and incarceration.

China will also expend considerable energy on its military including vastly increasing the Chinese nuclear arsenal and improve the overall capacity of the PLA. Xi did of course praise the stabilizing of Hong Kong and of course stated that reunification with Taiwan should happen peacefully but he also stated that they would not renounce reunification by force if necessary. China is now the senior partner to Russia with Russian forces now playing second fiddle to Beijing's operations. This is something that the Czars would be horrified about if they were present.

Chinese economy continues to suffer from a major downturn at virtually every level. Most of this is caused by a series of missteps by the CCP including a crackdown on tech companies, zero Covid policy lockdowns, Chinese industrial espionage, unfair trade practices, corruption, a reputation for debt diplomacy forcing the change of name from the Belt and Road Initiative to the Global Development Initiative, so as to give their predatory actions a fig leaf to stand under and of course US sanctions based on Chinese business and unethical practices and debt loads at all levels. The business intelligence firm Blackrock now estimates that the era of high Chinese growth rates may be over, they suggest that China's own actions are likely to cut growth to a maximum of 3% per year and even that might be difficult to achieve. China is already undergoing a drop in its available workforce at the same time they have a huge unemployment rate amongst the young. Keep in mind that just half the Chinese population have seen growth, half have not especially in the West and some areas of the south. China's overall future is unclear, its increasing reversal of opening up are receding under Xi. Its future may be dimmer than previously thought.

### **Call for Interest**

One of our members has founded a small but active Somalia-focused OSINT group on Signal. So far it includes US SOF deployed to the region, a former senior US military who does OSINT for all the evacuation groups, the DoD lead on Task Force Pineapple and a former State Department member for Somalia who now teaches a course in the US on the Ethiopian civil war. Plus some students our member gathered over the years and some people from the Ukraine evacuation.

Our member is enquiring whether anyone would want to join. If so, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

## The Admirals' Medal



Established in 1985, in conjunction with the 75th anniversary of the Naval Service of Canada, the Admirals' Medal award was founded by the sons of Canadian Rear-Admirals George Stephens and Victor Brodeur and Vice-Admiral Rollo Mainguy to honour their illustrious fathers. It is awarded annually to a member of the maritime/ naval community in Canada for outstanding achievements in the advancement of maritime affairs related to Canada.

Generally, the medal is awarded for outstanding achievement and impact in Canada's marine sector in areas including vision, executive action, science, technology and academic studies or for the application of practical skills. Alternately, the medal is awarded for an outstanding contribution or body of work in a maritime/naval field of endeavour warranting special recognition.

Responsibility for the Admirals' Medal was transferred from the Royal Canadian Navy to the Naval Association of Canada (NAC) in 2021. The Selection Criteria, the Annual Award Cycle and Nomination Instructions for this prestigious award are found at <https://www.navalassoc.ca/the-admirals-medal/> . Nominations for 2023 will be accepted until 1 November 2022.