



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

Dispatches

28 Oct 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Admirals' Medal

See poster at end of Dispatches for solicitation by the Naval Association of Canada for nominations for the Admirals' Medal.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice – email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

2 November, Wednesday – RUSI(NS) Special Speaker Adam MacDonald “The Maritime Domain of the Russian-Ukrainian War: Implications, Considerations and Lessons for Canada and the Royal Canadian Navy.” 1900 Atlantic. Via Zoom. To register, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com by close-of-business Sunday, 30 October. As the subject line for your registration email, put: RUSI(NS) Special Speaker 2 November 2022 Registration. In addition to your name, please provide whether you are RUSI(NS), otherwise indicate your organization (association, company or unit).

Also, from our speaker: Overcoming American Hegemony: The Central Paradox of Chinese and Russian Revisionism
<https://jmss.org/article/view/76237>

New: 14 November, Monday – CIGI, “Enhancing Canada’s Security Posture in an Uncertain Global Environment.” Based on a Centre for International Governance Innovation essay series published earlier this year, “Situating Canada in a changing World: Constructing a Modern and Prosperous Future”:

<https://www.cigionline.org/situating-canada-in-a-changing-world-constructing-a-modern-and-prosperous-future/> This event will host two authors from the series: Timothy Andrews Sayle Laurence Deschamps-Laporte. 1900 Eastern. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.cigionline.org/events/enhancing-canadas-security-posture-in-an-uncertain-global-environment/>

14-16 November, Monday-Wednesday – Maritime Security Challenges Conference 2022, Pacific Seapower: Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific. The conference “...will spotlight the current challenges being addressed in this increasingly compelling region,” specifically: challenges to the strategic commons, great power competition and the spaces between, and innovation to meet maritime challenges. An in-person event at Victoria, BC, speakers and attendees include policy specialists, regional scholars, and naval officers from around the world. To learn more and register/buy tickets: <https://mscconference.com/>

16 November, Wednesday – Distinguished Speaker from Fisheries and Oceans Canada, on the National Fisheries Intelligence Service. 1300 Atlantic. Via Zoom. More to follow.

For context to the event (read the thread):

Greg Poling @GregPoling 19 Oct tweeted

(<https://twitter.com/GregPoling/status/1582851455593066499>): THREAD > US just released the 21-agency Natl 5-Yr Strategy for Combating IUU Fishing, mandated by the 2019 Maritime SAFE Act. Here's some of the obviously Asia-related stuff, esp. Vietnam and Taiwan.

Strategy at: Federal Agencies Release Joint U.S. Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing

<https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/agency-statement/federal-agencies-release-joint-us-strategy-combating-illegal-unreported-and>

New: 17 November, Thursday – CSIS, Seventh Annual ChinaPower Conference: China’s Power Up for Debate. 09-1215 Eastern. Livestream: <https://www.csis.org/events/chinas-power-debate-3>

New: 21-25 November, Monday-Friday – CASIS, 2022 West Coast Security Conference: Disruption. This Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies’ conference will discuss the new types of security challenges that disrupt the conventional understanding and approach to preserving security. Conference participants feature practitioners and academics discussing the evolving character of the emerging threats, their impact on the security landscape, and potential solutions to build resilience to them. Attendance is accredited for 20 hours towards University of Ottawa’s PDI Professional Development Certificate in Security. An in-person event. To learn more and register/buy tickets: <https://casisvancouver.ca/westcoastconference/>

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Presentations by Lieutenant-Colonel Julien Letarte, RCAF, and Major Drew Larned, USAF, *Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles – Canadian and US Programs*, 14 September 2022

<https://rusi-ns.ca/rpas/>

RUSI(NS) Comments *Mental Health Reform in National Security in North America: Building on Recent Progress* by Jay Heisler, 14 September 2022

<https://rusi-ns.ca/mental-health-reform/>

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 26 October 2022

<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute *President's Enews*, October 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 8, September 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, October 2022
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/155-rausi-october-2022-dispatches>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, October 2022

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* - Volume 5 Issue 7
<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>



New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 15, Issue 1, 24 October 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2022

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* October 2022
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-10>


Tweeted by @RUSI_NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>@CoastGuardCAN Tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Enhancing Offshore Patrol Capability in a More Contested Commons. “CAN 🇨🇦 maritime agencies need to be prepared for greater possibilities of contestation at sea between its enforcement assets & illegal, unregulated & unreported #IUU fishing.” https://www.cgai.ca/the_canadian_coast_guard_enhancing_offshore_patrol_capability_in_a_more_contested_commons</p>	
<p>@CDAInstitute Tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Getting the design correct upfront on the CSC program is important for Canada because the new vessel will represent the majority of the country's Navy's surface power, and the program already is being heavily scrutinized for cost and schedule domestically.</p>	

[@MLInstitute](#)

Tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: No longer can Ottawa simply ignore North American defence for long stretches to time, argues James Fergusson. "The world has changed, and with it the significance of North American defence. Funding is just the tip of the iceberg." [#cdnpoli](#)
<https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/north-american-defence-modernization-in-an-age-of-uncertainty/>



[@davidcommon](#)

Tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: How does Ukraine know what the Russian military is doing? Intel from NATO's fleet of surveillance aircraft is a big part.

[@CBCNews](#)

Comment: Advantage for CAN  of being in alliance like #NATO: shared resource Airborne Warning and Control System (#AWACS) aircraft.



[@CDAInstitute](#)

Tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "If we are to be fully engaged in keeping the Arctic secure, we need improvements in investments. We've seen too many gaps for too many decades."

Comment: Indigenous peoples & people who have lived in #Arctic for generations know the lands & know the Arctic. Keep them engaged, informed & part of decision-making process - best way to keep Arctic secure.



[@NATOCanada](#)

Tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "#NATO believes that #standardization between its member states helps make it more efficient and combat-effective. Are there limits to what can be achieved? Joseph De Sapio examines the reasons both for and against continued standardization."

<https://t.co/q0AsVnKVrX>



[@CFOperations](#)

Tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "Today, seven Canadian Armed Forces medical and dental personnel embarked aboard USNS COMFORT, a U.S. Navy hospital ship, to participate in CONTINUING PROMISE 2022, a mission with U.S. counterparts to provide humanitarian assistance to communities in Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras." [#OpGLOBE](#) [#ContinuingPromise](#) [#USNSComfort](#)

U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Julia Melzer



[@CBC News](#)

Tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Canada's North spared from national military staff shortages. "CAN 🇨🇦 needs multi-dept #Arctic/North defence&security development policy/plan that addresses infrastructure development (deep water port, airfields, navigation routes), regional people engagement"

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/north-defence-canadian-armed-forces-nunavut-1.6625251>



Maritime situational awareness approach

NATO Maritime Command @NATO_MARCOM 22 Oct tweeted: Croatian sailors from HRVS Dubrovnik conduct a maritime situational awareness approach as part of #NATO Operation Sea Guardian. OSG 's current focused patrol is led by flagship TR TCG Salihreis and deployed in the Central Mediterranean. #wearenato #DeterAndDefend



"Maritime situational awareness approach!" What happened to good ol' terms like boarding or visit or challenge? Expressions like maritime situational awareness approach indicate that people have been at this too long. Would to want to see (have to read) the doctrine that goes with this.

Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Flying just outside Ukraine, NATO's sentinel planes warn of Russia's battlefield moves

<https://www.cbc.ca/.../flying-with-nato-awacs-1.6619471>

"Intelligence from sophisticated system quietly provides near real-time picture of Russian forces"
"As Ukraine takes back territory in its fight with the invading Russians, it is clear western intelligence has been a key component to their success, including the big picture offered by the AWACS."



The intelligence that NATO is providing to Ukraine, directly or indirectly it doesn't matter, may be the best 'weapon' that the West is being provided to that country.

Sensible Talk Aboard a UK Aircraft Carrier. But Does It Come Too Late?

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/10/sensible-talk-aboard-uk-aircraft-carrier-does-it-come-too-late/378763/>



"National security leaders have a credibility problem, and the British brought recent polls to prove it. Organizers handed out hard copies of an August survey of the American and British public which indicates that voters will follow partisan fearmongers if sensible national security professionals don't try harder to reach them."

A call for better national security messaging. Repetition (apparently, especially of a lie) may work for disinformation, but true warnings need to be carefully couched and timed

HMS Enterprise completes Arctic research mission

<https://www.forces.net/services/navy/hms-enterprise-completes-arctic-research-mission>

"After passing 66.56° North, the crew carried out a 'blue nose' ceremony (<https://www.forces.net/navy/news/what-royal-navys-blue-nose-ceremony>) – a traditional seafaring ceremony to signify a ship has sailed inside the Arctic."

The blue nose has been a frequent achievement of Royal Canadian Navy sailors and ships, and with progress of the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship project vessels, there will be many more.

"In the strait, personnel held a service of remembrance over the wreck of the battle-cruiser HMS Hood, lost in May 1941 at the hands of Hitler's flagship Bismarck – it saw 1,400 lives lost and sent shockwaves through the contemporary Royal Navy."



HMS HOOD is also a Canadian war grave, as Canadian sailors lost their lives when the battlecruiser was sunk by BISMARCK.

Command Authority - A Guide for Senior Enlisted Leaders

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/.../Command-Authority/>

Interesting read, but when reading it, Canadians and other non-Americans have to bear in mind that the US concepts of command are not the same as Canada's, and not even NATO's despite the US being part of NATO.

Of course, in the recent past, not even the Canadian Army and Royal Canadian Navy agreed in their doctrines on command. The Army's sequence of command authority was different from the Navy's command, operational command, operational control, tactical command and tactical control (putting aside technical control and administrative control).



Supplies from cancelled barge to be flown to Sachs Harbour, N.W.T., though details are scarce

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/sachs-harbour-resupply-barge-contingency-plan-1.6622772>

Flying in fuel, food and other goods to a Northern community because a scheduled delivery by barge was cancelled is an expensive and time-consuming process. Response to a situation like this is something that the civil government(s) should be prepared to undertake as a contingency, and hopefully not immediately turn to the Canadian Armed Forces because the military has the heavy airlift and expertise. The incident speaks, too, to the frailty of northern communications, that the unavailability of a single barge can have this effect. What does this mean if there was a need for a military operation or other surge activity in the North? Would there be enough barges? Do the Forces and other government departments need to plan to source North-qualified barges from elsewhere? Hmm, maybe it would be useful to establish one or more logistics transport companies in the Canadian Rangers.



Military recruiting issues may be 'more serious' than senior ranks letting on

<https://globalnews.ca/news/9217070/military-recruitment-canada-armed-forces-hillier/>

What are the establishment and actual strengths of the operational commands (navy, army, air force, special operations)? The numbers likely are telling.



3 lessons Taiwan should take from Ukraine's air war

<https://breakingdefense.com/.../3-lessons-taiwan-should.../>

"... Taiwan ought to invest in what's popularly known as a porcupine defense (<https://tnsr.org/.../a-large-number-of-small-things-a.../>), with an air force built around large numbers of cheap and mobile systems, trained on air denial concepts and tactics, and intertwined in robust international and public-private partnerships to meet potential wartime demands."

For 'large numbers of cheap and mobile systems,' Taiwan and supporting states need capable defence and security industries ('war footing' is a misnomer).



China failed its Arctic ambitions in Greenland

<https://www.politico.eu/.../china-arctic-greenland.../>

Appears Greenlanders have been taking a balanced approach in their international relations. They recognize China for the ambitious state that it is and they don't let the Chinese approach to inter-state affairs cow them. Things to be learned by other states in their relations with China.


Canada could do well to strengthen relations in trade, infrastructure development and other areas with Greenland.



Shipyards pitched to build new marine-based nuclear power plant

<https://splash247.com/shipyards-pitched-to-build-new-marine-based-nuclear-power-plant/>

"...a transportable and marine-based small modular reactor (SMR) power generating facility, which they are now pitching to shipyards to build."



Would any Canadian shipyard have the capability and capacity to build a SMR? Would any want to?

Still, a marine transportable SMR (dare on write vessel?) could have its advantages in getting power to areas that otherwise could not obtain the power they want and need.

Other Sources:

#Canadian Armed Forces

The Success of the Indigenous Service Member and the Combining of Two Cultures

https://cfc-ca.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=36546096

Estimated cost of warship fleet rises to \$84B thanks to delays, inflation: PBO

<https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/estimated-cost-of-warship-fleet-rises-to-84b-thanks-to-delays-inflation-pbo/ar-AA13rdBc?ocid=windirect&evd=3b443c39adc24b6d96b1b20f6598e4f4>

#China

PLA Rocket Force Organization

<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/3193056/pla-rocket-force-organization/>

Russia's Ukraine Disaster Exposes China's Military Weakness

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/24/russias-ukraine-disaster-exposes-chinas-military-weakness/>

#disinformation

Countering disinformation

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1583380015550726144.html>

#drones

Report on Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles

<https://news.usni.org/2022/10/21/report-on-navy-large-unmanned-surface-and-undersea-vehicles-11>

#economic warfare

The Haves and Have Nots of Sanctions Implementation

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/haves-and-have-nots-sanctions-implementation>

#Indo-Pacific

Russia's Ukraine Disaster Exposes China's Military Weakness

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/24/russias-ukraine-disaster-exposes-chinas-military-weakness/>

Will China Invade Taiwan? What the Experts Told Us

<https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/10/will-china-invade-taiwan-what-the-experts-told-us/>

#information operations

The Edge of Chaos: Emergent Factors in the Information Environment

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/5/9/the-edge-of-chaos-emergent-factors-in-the-information-environment>

Learning to Defend Yourself against Disinformation: An Essential Skill in the 21st Century

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/learning-to-defend-yourself-against-disinformation/>

The Joy of Bombing

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-joy-of-bombing/>

#land #warfare

Army 2030: Disperse or die, network and live

<https://breakingdefense.com/2022/10/army-2030-disperse-or-die-network-and-live/>

#NORAD

North American defence modernization in an age of uncertainty

<https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/north-american-defence-modernization-in-an-age-of-uncertainty/>

#Planning

Planning in 5 Quotes

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/09/28/planning-in-5-quotes/>

The 16 People Who Make Up Every Operational Planning Team

<https://taskandpurpose.com/news/16-people-make-every-operational-planning-team/>

#Russia-Ukraine War

A river too far: Bridges in Kherson Oblast

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/10/12/a-river-too-far-control-of-bridges-in-kherson-oblast/>

Bridge wars. Interesting brown intelligence perspective.

Abandoned Russian base holds secrets of retreat in Ukraine

<https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-base/>

Russian Total War in Ukraine: Challenges and Opportunities

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-total-war-ukraine-challenges-and-opportunities>

The war for control of the net in Ukraine

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/10/21/the-war-for-control-of-the-net-in-ukraine-digital-infrastructure/>

Ukraine war: 'General Winter' is about to arrive – this time it's not good news for the Russian army

<https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-general-winter-is-about-to-arrive-this-time-its-not-good-news-for-the-russian-army-193247>

Understanding Ukraine

<https://legionmagazine.com/en/understanding-ukraine/>

Winter in Europe

<https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/winter-in-europe/>

#cyber operations

Exploiting cyberspace: International legal challenges and the new tropes, techniques and tactics in the Russo-Ukraine War

<https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-paper-15-exploiting-cyberspace-international-legal-challenges-and-the-new-tropes-techniques-and-tactics-in-the-russo-ukraine-war/>

#information operations

'It's Time To Ignore' The Traps: Disinformation Expert Says Kremlin's 'Empty Threats' Have Paralyzed The West

<https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-dinformation-trap-kalensky/32088525.html>



Defence Intelligence

UPDATE ON UKRAINE
22 October 2022

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russian forces continue to reinforce crossing points over the Dnipro River, and have completed a barge bridge alongside the damaged Antonovskiy bridge in Kherson.
- Although the use of heavy barge bridges was almost certainly included in Soviet-era planning for operations in Europe, it is likely this is the first time the Russian military have needed to utilise this type of bridge for decades. Using civilian barges likely provides Russia additional material and logistics benefits, having lost significant quantities of military bridging equipment and engineering personnel during its invasion.
- If the barge bridge sustains damage, it is almost certain Russia will seek to repair or replace damaged sections quickly, as their forces and crossing points over the Dnipro river come under increasing pressure in Kherson.



CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
COMMANDEMENT DU RENSEIGNEMENT DES FORCES CANADIENNES

RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

Russia claims that Ukraine intends to construct and detonate a "dirty bomb" – a device that uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material – and then blame Russia for using a low-yield nuclear weapon.

BASED ON CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND ANALYSIS:

- Russia has routinely made false claims about Ukraine's capabilities and intent, including the development and use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
- The detonation of a nuclear weapon would be clearly distinguishable from a "dirty bomb." Russia is accusing Ukraine of an implausible plot in order to escalate the war.
- Russia's recent messaging on nuclear threats is likely reflective of its diminishing capacity to alter the overall trajectory of the war by using conventional military means.

UKRAINE / RUSSIA UPDATE // 2022-10-26

 National Defence / Défense nationale

#urban warfare

Developing Basics for Future Urban Operations

<https://wavellroom.com/2021/08/25/future-urban-operations-close-quarter-battle/>

#wargaming

Wargaming Lessons from Exercise Sea Dragon

<https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/wargaming-lessons-from-exercise-sea-dragon/>

Other:

Her Excellency the Right Honourable Mary Simon, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, is pleased to share the following message from His Majesty The King Charles III to all Canadian Armed Forces members.



BUCKINGHAM PALACE

On the occasion of my Accession as Sovereign, I would like to send every one of you in the Canadian Armed Forces my heartfelt gratitude for the unstinting loyalty and professionalism you displayed throughout the reign of my beloved Mother.

I know that The Queen took the greatest possible pride in the way service members from Canada performed their duties in many parts of the world, and often in the most testing and difficult circumstances.

I share my Mother's high regard for your courage and commitment. I know, for my part, that you will continue to serve your country with the dedication and bravery which you have demonstrated with such success over the years.

Charles R

Canadian Forces College

The Torch What's New This Week? 25-31 October

<https://cfc-ca.libguides.com/c.php?g=709488&p=5224119>

CDN Defence Academy

The Canadian Military Journal, Fall 2022 edition. Vol. 22, No. 4

<https://twitter.com/CDACanadaACD/status/1585289643318300679>

Media Literacy

Library and Archives Canada @LibraryArchives 24 Oct tweeted: Do you know how to recognize misinformation when you see it? 🤖 Here's a little help from our friends at @IFLA! #FakeNews #MediaLiteracyWeek https://www.ifla.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/assets/hq/topics/info-society/images/how_to_spot_fake_news.pdf

HOW TO SPOT FAKE NEWS

CONSIDER THE SOURCE
Click away from the story to investigate the site, its mission and its contact info.

READ BEYOND
Headlines can be outrageous in an effort to get clicks. What's the whole story?

CHECK THE AUTHOR
Do a quick search on the author. Are they credible? Are they real?

SUPPORTING SOURCES?
Click on those links. Determine if the info given actually supports the story.

CHECK THE DATE
Reposting old news stories doesn't mean they're relevant to current events.

IS IT A JOKE?
If it is too outlandish, it might be satire. Research the site and author to be sure.

CHECK YOUR BIASES
Consider if your own beliefs could affect your judgement.

ASK THE EXPERTS
Ask a librarian, or consult a fact-checking site.

IFLA
International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions
With thanks to www.factcheck.org

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O CANADA

It has been interesting to watch the ongoing inquiry into the use of the Emergencies Act during the "Freedom Convoy" demonstration in Ottawa. It is becoming increasingly clear that security issues are not a forte of the folks that supply security in Ottawa. One point is very clear, there is a need for a centralized security headquarters that is manned in some fashion by all security services for the Ottawa region. Ottawa is the nation's capital, yet we seem to have a series of fiefdoms that do not communicate with each other in a meaningful way. Ottawa is always likely to be a focal point for anyone wanting to get the Government of the day's immediate attention is to cause an incident(s) in Ottawa. It is clear that discussion between the Ottawa Police, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Parliamentary Security Service and the RCMP was less than adequate. Ottawa's Federal infrastructure is too important to be left to just the local force. Discussions, training, detailed planning, planning for contingencies and exercises should be conducted regularly. This may include a mass casualty event, a major hazmat incident caused by accident, use of explosives or exotic materials to cause disruption. This might also include a mass evacuation from affected areas and the setup of an improvised hospital to be at least thought of as examples of what may be required. Figuring it out in the middle of a incident is less than ideal.

There is concern that there is a lack of transparency in regard to both the new Defence Policy Review at DND and the Indo-Pacific review at GAC. Both these areas are more important for Canada's long-term growth than is being given credit for and certainly of more concern to the public. It seems both activities are being done more in private than they should, they affect all Canadians and they need to be discussed publicly.

Canada's military is in sad shape with recruiting and retention both being in poor shape. One can hardly recruit if one does little or no attraction, has an opaque system to bring people into the military, does nothing to mitigate against allegations that may or may not have validation, not to mention recruiting centres are in locations that are often ill-advised at best and in too small a number. The service does great work around the world, but one would never know it from the constant gloom that comes from Ottawa. As a short-term fix, use the Supplementary Holding list for short in supply trades. Use the tools you have as well. A goal for recruiting should be one to two weeks, all choke points should be identified and eliminated starting with medical which has to be decentralized. Recruiting is not difficult; the military is still a fine profession but there are barriers that seem to impede the process. Some thought must be given to sorting this out quickly.

BELARUS

Although there is constant talk of Belarus joining the Russian effort, it seems to be more hot air than action...fortunately for a whole lot of folks. Russia has apparently added 9 k troops to Belarus on top of artillery troops firing various rockets and missiles across the border. There are some media reports that Belarus has created six battalion tactical groups to join with a similar sized Russian contingent near the border. This looks ominous except Belarus is sending T 72 tanks to Russia from its own stocks. This is hardly the move of a nation about to join the war especially at the rate tanks are being destroyed. Still, Lukashenko, the self-declared leader of Belarus has to walk a tight rope between Russia and his own people who are less than happy about the thought of attacking their neighbours. Still, the group of forces created by Russia and Belarus cannot be ignored completely, they are a force in being.

This week saw the use of explosives to disable trains in Belarus, to prevent further movement of Russian equipment. This type of sabotage has been ongoing since the start of the war. Sviatlana

Tsikhanouskaya, the opposition leader has asked Belarussians not to support any action against Ukraine. This included the security forces who are less than happy about participation in a badly run war. Lukashenko knows that he will not survive authorizing an attack on Ukraine despite his ongoing pronouncements. Still, it will be interesting to see if Russian troops are there to attack or to potentially occupy Belarus, given the heavy losses to "professional" Russian troops it is doubtful they could pull the action off either way. It is unlikely the current Belarus regime will survive if they bow to Russia's pressure to attack Ukraine.

THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR

It has been a rough week for Russia as Ukraine has made a series of attacks in virtually all fronts. Russia has tried to take action by way of local counterattacks, in the North around Kermina, around the city of Bakhmut and in Kherson oblast. Russia has not been successful for the most part. In just Bakhmut, Ukrainian troops retook approximately two kilometres of territory back in less than 48 hrs; Russia had spent two months to achieve this mainly using the troops from the Wagner Group. Most Russian assaults have been failures. Why is that happening?

The professional Russian armed forces were either not used or were misused as was seen at the Hostomel Airport near Kyiv. Well trained and professional airborne forces were fed into a situation that should have been avoided. The intelligence for this operation was to say the least was poor and troops were not anticipating the strong reaction of Ukrainian forces. The losses were caused by wishful thinking on the part of Russian leadership. The result was similar throughout the theatre, heavy casualties in personnel, vehicles, and equipment. Losses were compounded by a lack of a multi-level logistics and support system, so many pieces of equipment were lost simply because they ran out of fuel or for minor maintenance problems. The result was they didn't have the equipment and ammunition when they needed it coupled with the loss of morale of some of the best and brightest available to the Russian forces.

The other point is that Russia's fire support whether from the land, sea or air seemed uncoordinated and almost primitive in nature. It seemed that fire support was not available to troops when needed. There are many stories of troops being forced into the attack with little or no support in a frontal attack. It does not seem to be improving and Russia is stuck with older artillery systems of limited capability.

Command and control were virtually absent. It has only been within the last month and a bit that a single commander was designated to control the overall attack. One was originally appointed before this time, but he seemed ineffective. One reason given was his love of drink, but this is unconfirmed. The new commander General, Sergey Surovkin who took over from the ineffectual Colonel General Alexander Dvornikov. Both have extensive experience in Syria and should have been able to sort the problems and issues. Surovkin is an air force commander, not an Army General although his earlier career was with the Army. He was noted for his extensive use of carpet bombing of Aleppo during the Syrian war. Since his arrival, things do seem to have become more organized. Surovkin has used his missile forces better using mass waves of missiles and drones to achieve the aims especially hitting power production plants effectively. Currently 40%+ of Ukraine's power generation capacity has been damaged or destroyed. He seems to be willing to use machines over men, something Russia needs to continue doing for success. In order to achieve this aim, he needs more trained troops, unfortunately, these troops that would have been most use are already gone.

Mobilization will help with numbers, but it will not solve the issue of the loss of middle and senior leadership, it is likely that recently mobilized troops and conscripts will be flung into "holes" where and when necessary. In the Kherson area up to 45 battalion tactical groups are deployed but most seem to be digging in around the city according to Al Jazeera. The city still remains with limited capacity to

move heavy vehicles and equipment. This will be expensive in lives and Russia is not the Soviet Union. There are only about 8 M young males available in the Russian population and approximately a third are unusable due to medical, criminal, or other reasons. Add the large numbers who left before the war and since mobilization and there is not a huge pool to draw from for reinforcements. It seems Russia is trying to act like the Soviet Union but without the manpower pools of that previous past. These losses will be permanent, it is unlikely that many who fled Russia will return if the current regime remains in place. Demographics will kill Russia.

Russia only has one card left, and that is its stockpile of nuclear weapons estimated to be around 5900+ weapons of various kinds. Many have been in long term storage and are an unknown quantity and quality. Many are estimated to be non-functional, but there is no way to verify how much of this stockpile continues to be useable. Russia has threatened to use nuclear weapons and even sent the Poseidon nuclear weapon capable of creating a massive Tsunami towards coastal targets on board the special carrier the submarine, Belgorod, the largest submarine in the world currently. It is a weapon of terror and the move towards the open sea is an information operation of the highest order. It is completely ineffective however if one is bluffing and someone calls you out. Nuclear weapons of any sort are strategic in nature, once used there is no putting the stopper back in the bottle. The US and NATO have stated that they will act if Russia uses any nuclear weapon anywhere. It is not something that Russia seeks.

The real answer is for Russia to return its troops to Russia. Peace will be possible then and only then. It will also likely that Putin and his cronies will have to leave power permanently. How this occurs is another issue?

CHINA

The 20th Party Congress is over and no surprise the Party General Secretary is Xi Jinping who has become the first since Mao to do more than two terms as general secretary. He also retains the Presidency of the country and the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission. These are the three most powerful jobs in the country. Importantly, Xi has also managed to replace former supporters of other factions out to pasture and has brought in a new team to the Standing Committee of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) that are specifically loyal to Xi. During the final day of the Congress an unusual event occurred when the former General Secretary Hu Jintao was removed from the Congress allegedly for health reasons. The general feeling was that Xi was making a formal demonstration of his personal power by formally removing his immediate predecessor. One can only hope someone will return the favour in the not-too-distant future.

The markets reacted quickly to the new team and dropped. There is little enthusiasm for the new team which is seen as folks who will do Xi's bidding as opposed to trying to move things forward whether in relations to foreign affairs, internal security, trade, the economy and the role of state-owned enterprises in the leadership role. Most of China's modernization has been through private companies and entrepreneurial spirit vice the dead hand of central planning by the CCP itself. Foreign investment has steadily left the country and new lockdowns and changes to sanctions have caused a major exodus of foreign expertise.

China's actions in Xinjiang Province also known as the country of East Turkistan, Tibet, and most lately Hong Kong have shown the true face of CCP brutality. Recent revelations of Chinese Police station overseas have also shown China's overreach. The CCP brags how nearly a quarter million people have been brought to "justice" as a result of CCP police actions in foreign countries. Canada itself has three specific locations in Toronto identified and it is likely that Vancouver has something similar as well although this has not been verified. It is likely given Xi's speech that some form of

action will be taken against Taiwan. One estimate is that it will occur within the next calendar year. Such a move would be viewed the same way the Russian attack on Ukraine has gone, it will likely be met with force. If this did occur, it would be another world disaster with China losing most of its gains in the world. Its actions make no sense but neither did Russia's attack on Ukraine. Preventative actions are the answer. Any decision on Taiwan's fate must be made by the Taiwanese.

IRAN

Iran is now actively participating in the Russian Ukraine War. They are providing helmets, body armour, drones of various types and are allegedly going to provide ballistic missiles. Iranian training teams have been located in Crimea and Belarus and at least one team of ten personnel were eliminated by Ukrainian attacks. Iran and Russia initially denied the provision of Iranian weaponry to Russia but captured and recovered pieces are clearly Iranian in manufacture. This was also verified by Israel which had the parts examined. Israel has only provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine and has refused to provide weapons. Israel however, destroyed a drone manufacturing plant in Syria in the past two days. It seems likely now that Russia is accepting Iranian weapons that Israel will continue to honour any agreement formal or informal with Russia. Iran may also expect to see some form of retaliation in the not-too-distant future.

Iran continues to see massive demonstrations led by young women who are now calling for the overthrow of the Regime. Ali Khamenei is 83 and in notably poor health. He is not expected to live more than five years and likely less. A major move to rid Iran of the theocracy is possible especially now. People of Iran seem to have lost their fear of authorities and at least one Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) has been killed along with members of the Basij militia. This is not likely to go away anytime soon. This is likely the most dangerous period for the regime to date. The ramifications of a successful removal of an authoritarian regime would be felt worldwide. Time will tell.

The Admirals' Medal



Established in 1985, in conjunction with the 75th anniversary of the Naval Service of Canada, the Admirals' Medal award was founded by the sons of Canadian Rear-Admirals George Stephens and Victor Brodeur and Vice-Admiral Rollo Mainguy to honour their illustrious fathers. It is awarded annually to a member of the maritime/ naval community in Canada for outstanding achievements in the advancement of maritime affairs related to Canada.

Generally, the medal is awarded for outstanding achievement and impact in Canada's marine sector in areas including vision, executive action, science, technology and academic studies or for the application of practical skills. Alternately, the medal is awarded for an outstanding contribution or body of work in a maritime/naval field of endeavour warranting special recognition.

Responsibility for the Admirals' Medal was transferred from the Royal Canadian Navy to the Naval Association of Canada (NAC) in 2021. The Selection Criteria, the Annual Award Cycle and Nomination Instructions for this prestigious award are found at <https://www.navalassoc.ca/the-admirals-medal/> . Nominations for 2023 will be accepted until 1 November 2022.