



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 4 November 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Canadian Crown 🇨🇦 @Canadian_Crown tweeted 29 Oct: His Majesty King Charles III has sent the following message to all members of the Canadian Armed Forces as he assumes the role of their Commander-in-Chief, as Canada's new King. #cdnpoli #cdncrown #CAF #RCN #RCAF



Her Excellency the Right Honourable Mary Simon, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, is pleased to share the following message from His Majesty The King Charles III to all Canadian Armed Forces members.




BUCKINGHAM PALACE

On the occasion of my Accession as Sovereign, I would like to send every one of you in the Canadian Armed Forces my heartfelt gratitude for the unstinting loyalty and professionalism you displayed throughout the reign of my beloved Mother.

I know that The Queen took the greatest possible pride in the way service members from Canada performed their duties in many parts of the world, and often in the most testing and difficult circumstances.

I share my Mother's high regard for your courage and commitment. I know, for my part, that you will continue to serve your country with the dedication and bravery which you have demonstrated with such success over the years.


Charles R

Remembrance Day

Inspector Don Moser, President RUSI(NS), will lay a wreath on behalf of the members of RUSI(NS) at the Royal Artillery Park Remembrance Day Ceremony.

Members of the Institute are encouraged to attend a Remembrance Day ceremony in their neighbourhood.



Dispatches Editors

Many thanks to Sanchez King and Meaghan Setter who served as temporary editors to *Dispatches* for the last two weeks.

Volunteers as editors are still being sought. Try it out for a week!

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

Peace Keepers Service at the Grace Lutheran Church

6 November, Sunday

The Grace Lutheran Church, at 40 Caldwell Road, Cole Harbour (Dartmouth) has, in the past at times, invited veterans to their church in appreciation for all the good they have done for world peace.

Unfortunately, there are very few First World War veterans left but we hope to also attract veterans who served on United Nations or NATO missions.

I hereby invite any veterans who could come to this service on Sunday, November 6th at 10:00am. This is a service for the Peace Keepers so please share.

Kind Regards
Steinar Engeset
Cell: 902-471-0172

14 November, Monday – CIGI, “Enhancing Canada’s Security Posture in an Uncertain Global Environment.” Based on a Centre for International Governance Innovation essay series published earlier this year, “Situating Canada in a changing World: Constructing a Modern and Prosperous Future”: <https://www.cigionline.org/situating-canada-in-a-changing-world-constructing-a-modern-and-prosperous-future/>. This event will host two authors from the series: Timothy Andrews Sayle Laurence Deschamps-Laporte. 1900 Eastern. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.cigionline.org/events/enhancing-canadas-security-posture-in-an-uncertain-global-environment/>.

14-16 November, Monday-Wednesday – Maritime Security Challenges Conference 2022, “Pacific Seapower: Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific.” The conference “...will spotlight the current challenges being addressed in this increasingly compelling region,” specifically: challenges to the strategic commons, great power competition and the spaces between, and innovation to meet maritime challenges. An in-person event at Victoria, BC, speakers and attendees include policy specialists, regional scholars, and naval officers from around the world. To learn more and register/buy tickets:

<https://msconference.com/>

16 November, Wednesday (**Note:** there may be a change of date) – Distinguished Speaker from Fisheries and Oceans Canada, on the National Fisheries Intelligence Service. 1300 Atlantic. Via Zoom. More to follow. For context to the event (read the thread):

Greg Poling @GregPoling 19 Oct tweeted <https://twitter.com/GregPoling/status/1582851455593066499>:
THREAD > US just released the 21-agency Natl 5-Yr Strategy for Combating IUU Fishing, mandated by the 2019 Maritime SAFE Act. Here's some of the obviously Asia-related stuff, esp. Vietnam and Taiwan.
Strategy at: Federal Agencies Release Joint U.S. Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing

<https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/agency-statement/federal-agencies-release-joint-us-strategy-combating-illegal-unreported-and>

17 November, Thursday – CSIS, Seventh Annual ChinaPower Conference: China’s Power Up for Debate. 09-1215 Eastern. Livestream: <https://www.csis.org/events/chinas-power-debate-3>

21-25 November, Monday-Friday – CASIS, 2022 West Coast Security Conference: Disruption. This Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies’ conference will discuss the new types of security challenges that disrupt the conventional understanding and approach to preserving security. Conference participants feature practitioners and academics discussing the evolving character of the emerging threats, their impact on the security landscape, and potential solutions to build resilience to them. Attendance is accredited for 20 hours towards University of Ottawa’s PDI Professional Development Certificate in Security. An in-person event. To learn more and register/buy tickets:

<https://casisvancouver.ca/westcoastconference/>

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

New: RUSI(NS) Comments "Royal Canadian Navy Public Affairs Engagement Opportunities ...for Ships" by Steffan Watkins, 26 October 2022, https://rusi-ns.ca/pa_engagement/

RUSI(NS) Presentations by Lieutenant-Colonel Julien Letarte, RCAF, and Major Drew Larned, USAF, Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles – Canadian and US Programs, 14 September 2022

<https://rusi-ns.ca/rpas/>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association On Watch, 26 October 2022

<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, October 2022

New: Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 10, November 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, October 2022

<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/155-rausi-october-2022-dispatches>

New: Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, November 2022

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* - Volume 5 Issue 7

<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

New: Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 4nd Quarter 2022.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 15, Issue 2, 31 October 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2022

New: St. Francis Xavier University Mulroney Institute of Government *Canadian Naval Review* Volume 18, Number 2 (2022)

New: Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* November 2022

<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-11>

Tweeted by @RUSI_NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

CSE 🍁 @cse_cst 28 Oct tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted:
The @cybercentre_ca has released its National Cyber Threat Assessment for 2023-2024 🍁:
<https://cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/national-cyber-threat-assessment-2023-2024> It provides key judgments about the current cyber threat environment and how Canadians could be affected.



Global Engagement Center @TheGEC 28 Oct tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Serious weekend reading. How do purveyors of foreign propaganda and disinformation exploit primal fears to achieve their malign goals? Discover their tactics in the link: <http://ow.ly/gaPG50Loyyn> (Global Engagement Center Counter-Disinformation Dispatches #13 January 13, 2022 Exploiting Primal Fears)



RCAF Operations @RCAFOperations 27 Oct tweeted: .@RCAF_ARC members deployed with @CFOperations #OPPRESENCE have been busy providing airlift capacity to the #UN in the 🇷🇺 in support of @Monusco. The CC130J Hercules crew is operating throughout the region, including in the shadow of Mount Nyiragongo, an active volcano! RUSI(NS) retweeted: #OpPRESENCE = @CanadianForces contribution to Govt of CAN 🇨🇦 peace operations strategy <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/op-presence.html> Includes commitment of high-value military capabilities (eg airlift) to various United Nations @UN peacekeeping missions



"New barges bring exciting capability to @RoaylCanNavy" <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/rcn/2022/11/new-barges-bring-exciting-capability-to-the-rcn.html> 4 modular self-propelled barges, to deploy from Joint Support Ships #JSS, move material/people ship-shore, transform into bridge, floating dock or diving platform for salvage. More roles to be learned



Groupe Océan | Ocean Group @Groupe_Ocean 1 Nov tweeted: La construction des quatre grands remorqueurs pour la Marine Royale Canadienne se poursuit. Le 26 Octobre dernier, les blocs du 3e grand remorqueur sortaient de nos ateliers de Québec pour être transportés au chantier de l'Isle-aux-Coudres pour y être assemblés. @MarineRoyaleCan



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 3 Nov tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Parenteau and Maisonneuve offer 5 proposals to reconnect CMCs with their raison d'être. Restructuring organizational culture within CAF is only possible if officers are given the tools to undertake their roles as agents of cultural change. <https://cdainstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Vimy-52.pdf> (Time to Reset the Canadian Military Colleges as Military Academies)

Tank Defence

Oryx @oryxspioenkop 7:13 PM · Oct 27, 2022 tweeted:
Belarus just invented the cope bucket to 'protect' MBTs
against munitions fitted with IR seekers

This is real.

I'm not joking.

*It's beginning to be difficult to differentiate between 'humour
as a weapon' and the real and ridiculous ...*



Wooden Drones

Samuel Bendett @SamBendett 28 Oct tweeted: A DIY copter made in Yemen from sticks and a simple motor. Talk about drone proliferation - this is about as simple as it gets. <https://t.me/droneswar/4521>
(<https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1586011832136785920>)



May seem nothing more than internet amusing but it speaks of how easy it can be (including 3D printing the plastic parts?) to build drones. And paired with makeshift HEAT charges, effective munitions can be made by non-state actors. That can change the calculus in many (all?) operations. Continuous counter-drone measures will be important and routine.


Ukraine Weapons Tracker @UAWeapons 28 Oct tweeted: #Ukraine: Many regularly ask if a small drone-dropped munition can really deal damage to armoured vehicles. Well, here is a perfect example: makeshift HEAT munitions were dropped on a Russian BMD-4M, one penetrated the turret, damaging the breech and disabling the cannon.



Graphic Fail

Chris Cavas @CavasShips 18 Sep 22: Wall Street Journal's otherwise laudable effort to display the ships of the PLAN #Chinese #Navy is marred by blatantly lazy graphics using a US Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyer to illustrate every ship type (subs, frigates, mine ships, etc). Major #Fail <https://wdmmw.org/peoples-liberation-army-navy-china.php>

Silhouettes of ships, aircraft, vehicles, etc. can be useful for defence messaging stories. Reading the tweet above, it is apparent that in addition to an imagery bank (being worked on by DND) available to CAF/DND staff, media and the public, a silhouette bank would be useful too.



Force Protection?

Rob Lee @RALee85 1 ov tweeted (video <https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1587426043484323847>): Russian forces delivering concrete pillboxes in Kherson Oblast. <https://t.me/sashakots/36925>



Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | @ChuckPfarrer 1 Nov tweeted: MEN IN BOXES: In Kherson, RU is importing pre-fab cement structures to reinforce defensive positions. These 'pill boxes' are a throwback to war in a previous century. UKR's Anti-Tank Guided Missiles and precision strike artillery will turn these cubes into tombs for RU soldiers.

Yes, the boxes do not look like something that would hold up against fire of any strength (maybe blast and shrapnel?).

Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Reagan Strike Group Operating with Japanese, Canadian Warships in Western Pacific

<https://news.usni.org/2022/10/28/reagan-strike-group-operating-with-japanese-canadian-warships-in-western-pacific>



HMC Ships VANCOUVER and WINNIPEG of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) are operating as part (reads to be exercising) of the US Navy's Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in the Pacific. Not greatly significant news in itself, but with HMCS FREDERICTON recently part of the Gerald R. Ford in the Atlantic, it appears that Canada had three frigates working with US carrier groups at the same time (albeit it appears the collaboration was short duration, not like the full integration of a RCN frigate into a CSG as has been done in years past). For three to be operating like that is a rare if not a first time occasion, and speaks well of the RCN's capability to have three of its twelve frigates so deployed and employed. Stef Watkins, in his RUSI(NS) Comments "Royal Canadian Navy Public Affairs Engagement Opportunities – for Ships" (https://rusi-ns.ca/pa_engagement/) writes of how the RCN can

push navy messaging by making better use of ships' automatic identification system (AIS). Better that Canadians read about their navy from RCN sources than foreign.

"The joint U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Task Force 76/3 ..." That's a different task force numbering, and one that was not supported by communications publications at least a few years ago. Some sort of messaging there, with the US combining staffs: "The Navy created Task Force 76/3 after combining the staffs of Task Force 76, 7th Fleet and III Marine Expeditionary Force's 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade ..." Working command and control arrangements is good practice.

Analysis: Ukraine Strikes With Kamikaze USVs – Russian Bases Are Not Safe Anymore

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/10/analysis-ukraine-strikes-with-kamikaze-usvs-russian-bases-are-not-safe-anymore/>

The threat of drone attack, air, surface and sub-surface, to Canadian naval and commercial ports has been a consideration for some time, but now with a precedent it may be a time to review security plans and to conduct some more exercises on drone counter-measures.



Defence review must consider force posture in the context of Australia's strategic geography

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/defence-review-must-consider-force-posture-in-the-context-of-australias-strategic-geography/>

Force posture = what military forces are where. Force posture is an inherent consideration of a state's defence policy, whether the term force posture is explicitly used or not. Canada's strategic geography has long driven force posture; examples are forces in Germany and in the Arctic. Global strategic geography is changing, as adversary states occupy territory by military or commercial force. Canada's upcoming Defence Policy Update should address current and objective force posture of the Canadian Armed Forces, particularly with regard to the Arctic and Europe.



The American people deserve to know how the war in Ukraine will end

<https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3703322-the-american-people-deserve-to-know-how-the-war-in-ukraine-will-end/>

Knowing an 'end state' (the objective condition at termination of a mission or conflict) is desired by the military - the knowledge facilitates planning, resource allocation, etc. The political leadership often prefers a less defined condition, allowing flexibility to change policy and direction as circumstances progress. Whatever the detailed end state is (and that could remain classified for various reasons), it is important for and the responsibility of the leadership to communicate to the public why a country is involved (directly or indirectly) in a conflict and what can be expected out of the effort. For a liberal democracy, public support is a 'centre of gravity' ("source of strength or leverage whose degradation or destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy's or one's own ability to accomplish a given political/military mission").



Is the Canadian general public satisfied that they are being told enough of why Canadian is supporting Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine War? Enough that they understand why at times they are going to have to make short-term sacrifices for their long-term security? How is that 'enough' measured? Are our leaders being measured?

Tug attack darkens prospects for Black Sea grain shipments

<https://splash247.com/tug-attack-darkens-prospects-for-black-sea-grain-shipments/>

"...Lloyd's insurer Ascot said it had paused writing cover for new shipments using the Ukrainian grain corridor until it could better understand the situation. Other insurers are also reassessing the situation in light of Russia's withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative."



Marine insurers have much more impact on maritime operations during conflicts than many people realize. And without the movement of 'stuff' by sea, it can be exceedingly difficult to continue most conflicts.

The Life Cycle Cost of the Canadian Surface Combatants

<https://distribution-a617274656661637473.pbo-dpb.ca/747dfff97de30adc19e38143f28b6e8334a0f7510c5c3a94c465a41c66cf504>

From a colleague: No surprises in the report, and the Parliamentary Budget Officer did try hard by using three different approaches - though a scan of the on-line report did not show any of the details. \$7.3B per operational year for a fleet of 15 frigate (so \$500M annually per ship) is not an outlandish cost of a navy's 'tip of the spear' for surface protection as a contribution to coalitions and to delivering on national & continental defence, plus global values projection, all of which is about safeguarding and growing Canadians' future prosperity. It is a pittance in comparison to GDP projections and other government programs.



Lifecycle costing predictions can be problematic. There are too many assumptions buried in all model predictions when we really have no idea what anything will cost out 5 years (people? fuel? spares?). The best that can be done is to compare competing acquisition platform options to assess which is likely going to cost less over its life in service. As with acquiring complex weapon systems, we generate numbers that are not confidence-based (from what can be seen, not even in the PBO report based on the three different point estimates) and which create a questionable number that is usually very large and creates sticker-shock for the politicians and general public.

Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates (OGGO) Meeting No. 37 Monday, Oct 31, 2022, hearing from the Parliamentary Budget Officer about the PBO Canadian Surface Combatant report

<https://parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20221031/-1/37948>

Other Sources:

#adaptation

The Cost of Delaying Wartime Tactical Adaptation

<https://cimsec.org/the-cost-of-delaying-wartime-tactical-adaptation/>

#armour

The graveyard of Russian Tanks

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/09/22/russian-tank-graveyard/>

Survive: The Case for Armour

<https://wavellroom.com/2020/10/08/survive-the-case-for-armour/>

#information operations

New Army social media policy pushes stricter rules

<https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2022/10/31/new-army-social-media-policy-pushes-stricter-rules/>

US, but lessons for Canada?

5 media literacy tips to avoid election misinformation

<https://www.poynter.org/fact-checking/media-literacy/2022/5-media-literacy-tips-to-avoid-election-misinformation-from-carl-azuz-and-hasley-pitman/>

There needs to be similar literacy education within the CAF/DND, really, the general public.

#land warfare

Deleting Warrior saves lives: APCs vs IFVs

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/08/05/deleting-warrior-saves-lives-apc-vs-ifvs/>

#naval weapons

The Kingfisher gun-launched anti-submarine munition

cool tech: <https://www.navylookout.com/the-kingfisher-gun-launched-anti-submarine-munition/>

Might this be something the Canadian Surface Combatant project frigates' 127mm be able to handle?

#Russia-Ukraine War

The UK Defence Intelligence Updates have been placed at the end of Dispatches.

An assessment of the Russian campaign options

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1583256094142476288.html>

Ukraine's Military Medicine Is a Critical Advantage

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/31/ukraine-military-medicine-russia-war/>

Water as weapon, and casualty, in Russia's war on Ukraine

<https://thebulletin.org/2022/10/water-as-weapon-and-casualty-in-russias-war-on-ukraine/>

Russian mobilization

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1587130213497978881.html>

Lessons?

The 'naval drone' attack conducted against the Black Sea Fleet

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1587380677951082496.html>

Russia's options be for 2023 and the vulnerabilities Ukraine can attack

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1587601438053920768.html>

Interactive Map and Assessment: Verified Ukrainian Partisan Attacks against Russian Occupation Forces

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/interactive-map-and-assessment-verified-ukrainian-partisan-attacks-against-russian>

How To Help Ukraine Rebuild: Give Kyiv More Arms Now To Fight Russia

<https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/ukraine-reconstruction-starts-now/>

Thoughts on the current course of the war

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1588160941665189888.html>

The likely impact of winter on the war

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1585018258729897984.html>

#cyber operations

Inside a US military cyber team's defence of Ukraine

<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-63328398>

Note the 'Hunt Forward missions.'

#drones

Ukraine's New Weapon To Strike Russian Navy In Sevastopol

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/09/ukraines-new-weapon-to-strike-russian-navy-in-sevastopol/>

Ukraine's Unprecedented Mass Drone Boat Attack Was A Wakeup Call

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-unprecedented-mass-drone-boat-attack-was-a-wakeup-call>

#training

The (US) Navy Must Redefine Risk in Combat Training

<https://cimsec.org/the-navy-must-redefine-risk-in-combat-training/>

Starting with a Step: Creating Professional Incentives for Continuous Tactical Learning

<https://cimsec.org/starting-with-a-step-creating-professional-incentives-for-continuous-tactical-learning/>

#wargaming

Wargaming at MCU

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/wargaming-mcu>

Other:

Chinese Navy Surface Vessels 2022

Cool graphic.



Canadian Surface Combatant Land-Based Testing Facility

28 October 2022

New information on the Land-Based Testing Facility (LBTF) project at Hartlen Point, Halifax, is now available at www.tridentnewspaper.com/lbtf.

Updates include:

- (1) Notification of the next community engagement session, to occur on January 31, 2023. This session, much like the first in March 2022, is open to all interested members of the public;
- (2) Notification of some preliminary geotechnical drilling work to occur next month (November 2022) at Hartlen Point. Please note that this work does not mark the beginning of construction or contractors mobilizing to the site, rather is part of a standard study undertaken during the preliminary phases of infrastructure projects to better understand soil conditions on site;
- (3) A question and answer page; and
- (4) The latest project schedule, outlining future activities and timelines.

Members of the public living in the Eastern Passage area can also expect a Canada Post mail out in the coming weeks that will echo much of this information.

If you have any questions as this project progresses, please don't hesitate to contact CFBHalifaxPublicAffairs@forces.gc.ca and we will do our very best to provide responses in a timely manner in coordination with the LBTF project team. Should the information you're seeking be unavailable at this stage in the project, we will keep your questions on file to be answered as details become available.

Further, please feel free to share this information with your contacts who might be seeking information on the LBTF.

Public Affairs
Canadian Forces Base Halifax | Royal Canadian Navy
Department of National Defence | Government of Canada

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

The Act of Remembrance

They shall not grow old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.

O Canada

The inquiry into the use of the Emergency Act is ongoing. This week the alleged “leaders” of the Freedom Convoy were being interviewed for their understanding of the situation, which will be an interesting view especially after the comments and views expressed by law enforcement officials the previous two weeks. The inquiry is not a trial, it is simply to understand how and why the Emergency Act was used as required by the Act governing its use. The inquiry is supposed to try to provide understanding not only to Parliament but to government officials at all levels and law enforcement why this occurred. It is not meant to provide blame but rather to review what went right and what went wrong and why. It is actually a very smart move. Removal of citizens’ rights at any time should be reviewed and so we have the inquiry chaired by a well-known and respected jurist. It is a good way to ensure the longer-term integrity of our system of government.

The article by Scott Taylor in the Chronicle -Herald published on Tuesday, 1 November 2022, called “Look to Ukraine for Defence Planning” was very appropriate. The Canadian Armed Forces do not have the wherewithal to provide for basic defence of the country, whether manpower, equipment or resources. This is especially relevant given the world current situation. To quote the most relevant comment: “ With the current lead times, delays and cost over runs of virtually all of our recently major procurements, maybe we need to completely overhaul our sense of urgency when it comes to equipping our military with what they actually need.” Mind you, this only applies if the government and the parties can come together for a general understanding of national requirements not only for defence but in keeping with the overall security of the nation as well. This should be apolitical and not conducted by a single party. Our own policy regarding China as espoused by the Foreign Minister is a case in point. Here it is advocated for an ongoing relationship with the Communist Chinese Party despite Beijing’s hostile acts against Canada including economic warfare, information warfare and now the setup of police stations in Canada in direct action against Canadian sovereignty and which also involved essentially the kidnapping of Canadian citizens from Canada. China under the CCP is not a friend but an adversary.

Perhaps one of the most disturbing challenges in dealing with the CCP’s China is the number of Canadian organizations and people who have developed a warped sense of the benefits of dealing with an authoritarian and genocidal regime. An article by Terry Glavin of the National Post published 2 November 2022 (<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/terry-glavin-dominic-bartons-disturbing-mckinsey-legacy-propping-up-china>) discusses one such individual, the former ambassador to China, Dominic

Barton. I could make comments but it has been suggested that I occasionally become too political - this isn't political it is a travesty.

The United States

The US midterms are going to be held on 8 November 2022. Polls show the potential for the Republicans to take control of both the House and Senate if the polls are right. The economy appears to be a deciding factor in this election. This being said, the controversial Roe versus Wade decision by the conservative members of the Supreme Court maybe quietly percolating in the background, especially with women voters. Polls are so difficult to judge as many people no longer participate which tends to throw off the results. The run up to the election has been horrific to watch and the outcome of this election may change the fate of the world, whether we like it or not.

Iran

Demonstrations in Iran continue despite the severe reaction of the regime. The regime continues to blame the United States and Israel for the ongoing protests which have gone on for nearly fifty days. While one has to admire the demonstrators who have shown an amazing level of courage and daring given the extreme measures of the regime, one can also see that the regime's willingness to do the unthinkable to its daughters and young people will likely succeed again...this time. The demonstrations lack a focal point, a leadership cadre, resources and organization to topple the regime or at least to make it listen. The future is different. Ali Khomeini is 83 and in poor health. There is no obvious successor and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is likely to try to gain more power and wealth when Khomeini sheds his mortal coil. The regime is not popular with the young as most were born long after the revolution. The excesses of the Shah are long forgotten, but the actions of the current regime are not. Time is not on their side and the harder they clamp down the greater the anger.

Iran is about to become absolutely vital to Russia as it sells drones, cruise missiles and soon ballistic missiles to the Putin regime. Iran and Russia have changed place. Russia was instrumental in the negotiations for the nuclear deal as well as providing weapons and resources. Now it is Iran that is providing the capability. The ballistic missiles in particular are a problem as Kyiv does not have the capability to defend against such weapons. By providing this capability to Russia, Iran may essentially change the course of the war. The axis of Russia, Iran and North Korea is a major problem not only for Ukraine but to the community in the Gulf. Iran has threatened to attack Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf nations. It has become Russia's major partner. One can only see a greater relationship between the two countries, which will do no one any good.

The Russia-Ukraine War

Ukraine is still able to withstand the attacks of the Wagner Group, a private military company, near Bakhmut despite major efforts on the part of the Russians. Gains have been minor and taken at great cost in lives and equipment. Yet Ukraine pushed the Russians back in less than 24 hrs and allowed them to start again, recapturing the very same ground that took three months to take. It was Russia's only source of success on the ground. Ukrainian forces continue their effort in the Kherson oblast and are making slow but steady progress. Russian forces are being withdrawn across the Dnipro River and newly mobilized troops are taking their place and are digging in near Kherson city itself. Russia has increased the area of civilian evacuations, forcibly removing people who wish to remain. Once again Russia is choosing to commit war crimes rather than truly understand the situation and negotiate the removal of Russian troops. It appears that the new troops are being left to their fate. Most don't wish to be there and Russia is not going out of its way to provide even the most basic needs including food, water and even ammunition. The latest estimates by media and Ukraine state that Kherson is likely to

fall before the end of November. The real question is whether the Russian forces will blow up the dam at Kakhovka, which also had a river crossing over the top of the bridge. Ukraine has also operated successfully in the north and has placed the main road for resupply of Sieverdonetsk area in Luhansk oblast. It is likely that movement will be slower as Ukraine repairs roads, rail, bridges and other infrastructure to provide the necessary logistics chains to keep forces in operation especially as colder weather of winter approaches. It is expected that Ukraine will be starting further offensive operations in the Luhansk oblast once the logistics chain is more robust. Russia on the other hand seems to be losing access to their logistics chains in the north and is unable to resupply their forces effectively.

Ukraine has proven to be a master of asymmetrical combat over the past week. The first example was the attack on Sevastopol by unmanned surface vessels (USV) during the early morning of 29 October 2022. The Putin regime admitted to only one vessel being damaged, however, video of the attack was released by Ukraine showed a number of probable hits with at least one on an Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate, either the *Admiral Essen* or *Admiral Markarov*, and one on a large minesweeper plus one other vessel that was hard to determine as to its class or function. Sources state that up to seven of these USV were used during the attack. How they got there is unknown. Russia was highly incensed and withdrew from the agreement to allow for the safe passage of Ukrainian wheat in the Black Sea. They were universally condemned for their action of cancelling their participation in the program, with countries arguing that they were once again using food as a weapon. The second example was a raid on a Russian air base less than 20 kms from the Russian-Estonian border at Veretye Air Base. Two KA-52 helicopters were destroyed and confirmed by satellite imagery, and two more were damaged. According to Ukraine and other sources, the losses of this particular model maybe as high as 30% of the Russian fleet of this model. The event was available on various platforms as the entire act was filmed by the special forces troops involved. The real point was that there was virtually no security and the troops were able to walk up to the aircraft without being challenged.

The last item on Russia is the growing sense that there is now active opposition to the conduct of the war. This is not to say a western friendly opposition exists and is that capable. The opposition comes from at least two sources, Yevgeny Progozhin and Ramzan Kadarov, head of the Wagner Group and head of the Chechen Republic respectively. Both these men have been openly critical of the way the war is being conducted although at this point mainly directed towards the failed efforts of the Russian Armed Forces. This week saw reports of alleged disagreements between Progozhin and Putin himself about the way ahead for the ongoing campaign. Ramzan Kadarov has simply kept quiet and out of sight. It is suspected that both men have far greater ambitions. Kadarov himself may have other problems which may take him away from active participation. Casualties amongst his troops have been heavy and there are nearly 2k Chechens fighting for Ukraine against a common enemy, Russia. Kadarov has to deal with this internal issue. Not every Chechen is happy about being part of the Russian Federation. It would be ironic if Putin is overthrown by some form of Chechen block especially is it was the second Chechen war that gained Putin the recognition and power he was seeking. It is Kadarov who made Putin appear the wise man of Russia.

The other opposition is on public television where some vocal critics are now making comments about the war and Putin's actions. Professor Andrey Siderov of Moscow State University discussed the basic failures of the current operations. He asked a very basic question and it is one that as an intelligence officer I have asked my own commanders: "What are we trying to accomplish? And what does the end state look like in your view?" It sounds basic but in Russia there is no actual defined answer. But he asked this type of question in front of millions of people. No victory for Russia has been defined at all by Putin and his partners. It is increasingly clear to the general public that things are not well. Families have been separated perhaps never to be put back together. Most of the educated youth of the country have left the country. The FSB estimated in February 2022 that more than 4m Russians had left the country and more left once the war broke out.

Russia's economy is deteriorating with millions unemployed. More than 1200 foreign companies have left the country along with their investments. There are many stories about how well Russia is doing because of oil and gas but this doesn't match the greater issue of unemployment or under-employment. It does not take into account the vast brain drain of the young as well. Russia is terminally ill, China and the CCP can't save it as their own economy deteriorates. The war is costing tens of millions a day if not more. It is not a matter if the Russian economy and consequently Putin falls, it is when.

China

The 20th Congress is over and Xi has his third term as General-Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It appears that Xi will continue his disastrous economic policies as well as Zero-Covid policy. His new team is not expected to be of much use when it comes to the economy. This will be short as I want to discuss the matter further with people who have more information than I on the potential outcomes of this event. The bottom line is that China under the CCP is an authoritarian and genocidal regime. It is not a friend, it is an adversary.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 27 October 2022, the Russian-appointed governor of Ukraine's occupied Kherson region, Vladimir Saldo, said that more than 70,000 people had now left Kherson city.
- On 26 October 2022, Saldo also claimed that Russia had removed the remains of the well-known 18th century Russian statesman, Prince Grigory Potemkin, from his tomb in Kherson's cathedral to east of the Dnipro.
- In the Russian national identity, Potemkin is heavily associated with the Russian conquest of Ukrainian lands in the 18th century and highlights the weight Putin almost certainly places on perceived historical justification for the invasion. This symbolic removal of Potemkin and the civilian exodus likely pre-empted Russian intent to expedite withdrawal from the area.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russia has deployed several thousand newly mobilised reservists to the front line in Ukraine since mid-October. In many cases they are poorly equipped. In September, Russian officers were concerned that some recently mobilised reservists were arriving in Ukraine without weapons.
- Open source images suggest that those rifles which have been issued to mobilised reservists are typically AKMs, a weapon first introduced in 1959. Many are likely in barely usable condition following poor storage. AKM fires 7.62mm ammunition while Russia's regular combat units are mostly armed with 5.45mm AK-74M or AK-12 rifles.
- The integration of reservists with contract soldiers and combat veterans in Ukraine will mean Russian logisticians will have to push two types of small arms ammunition to front line positions, rather than one. This will likely further complicate Russia's already strained logistics systems.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Imagery showed two MiG-31K FOXHOUND interceptor jets were almost certainly parked at Belarus's Machulishchi Airfield on 17 October, with a large canister stored nearby within a protective earth berm. It is likely that the canister is associated with the AS-24 KILLJOY air launched ballistic missile, a large munition which the MiG-31K variant is adapted to carry.
- Russia has fielded KILLJOY since 2018, but it has not previously been deployed in Belarus. Russia has occasionally launched these weapons during the Ukraine war, but stocks are likely very limited. It continues to expend its advanced long-range munitions against targets of limited operational importance.
- With a range of over 2000km, basing KILLJOY in Belarus gives Russia little added advantage in terms of striking additional targets within Ukraine. It has likely carried out the deployment mainly to message to the West and to portray Belarus as increasingly complicit in the war.



RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

Russia claims that its strikes on infrastructure targets across Ukraine on October 31 were in retaliation for the October 29 attack on Russia's navy in Sevastopol.

BASED ON CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND ANALYSIS:

- Russia's latest strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure are part of an ongoing campaign that has been underway for weeks, and they are not primarily a response to the attack on Russia's navy.
- The Russian strike campaign has been targeting civilian critical infrastructure across Ukraine, causing widespread disruption to basic utilities such as electricity and water.
- Russia will likely continue to target Ukraine's critical infrastructure heading into winter, and the impact will be most acutely felt by the civilian population.



INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- The owner of the Russian Wagner Group private military company, Yevgeny Prigozhin, stated on 23 October that Wagner forces were making advances of 100-200m per day, which he claimed was 'normal in modern warfare'.
- According to their military doctrine, Russian forces plan to advance 30km or more per day in most conditions. In February, Russian forces planned to make a 1000km advance through Ukraine within a month. In September, Ukrainian forces achieved advances of over 20km per day.
- In the last two months, Prigozhin has abandoned any pretence that he is not associated with Wagner and has been more explicit in his public statements. He is likely trying to burnish his credibility within the stressed Russian national security system.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russian soldiers serving in Ukraine are likely frustrated that they are forced to serve in old infantry combat vehicles which they describe as aluminium cans. In mid-October, in the face of Ukrainian offensives, Russian armoured vehicles losses increased to over 40 a day: roughly equivalent to a battalion's worth of equipment.
- In recent weeks Russia has likely resorted to acquiring at least 100 additional tanks and infantry fighting vehicles from Belarussian stocks. Armoured units and artillery are central to Russia's way of war; the force in Ukraine is now struggling partially due to difficulties in sourcing both artillery ammunition and sufficient serviceable replacement armoured vehicles.