



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 11 November 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Remembrance Day

Inspector Don Moser, President RUSI(NS), is laying a wreath today on behalf of the members of RUSI(NS) at the Royal Artillery Park Remembrance Day Ceremony.

Members of the Institute are encouraged to attend a Remembrance Day ceremony in their neighbourhood.



Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

New: 14 November, Monday - Naval Association of Canada speaker Commodore Murray, Royal Canadian Navy Director General Naval Strategic Readiness, speaking on "The RCN Personnel Picture." 1900-2030 Eastern. Via GoToMeeting. To register: <https://nac-o.wildapricot.org/event-5009091>.

14 November, Monday - CIGI, "Enhancing Canada's Security Posture in an Uncertain Global Environment." Based on a Centre for International Governance Innovation essay series published earlier this year, "Situating Canada in a changing World: Constructing a Modern and Prosperous Future": <https://www.cigionline.org/situating-canada-in-a-changing-world-constructing-a-modern-and-prosperous-future/>. This event will host two authors from the series: Timothy Andrews Sayle Laurence Deschamps-Laporte. 1900 Eastern. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.cigionline.org/events/enhancing-canadas-security-posture-in-an-uncertain-global-environment/>.

17 November, Thursday - Center for Strategic and International Studies Seventh Annual China Power Conference, “China’s Power Up for Debate.” 0900-1215 Eastern. Livestream:
<https://www.csis.org/events/chinas-power-debate-3>

New: 17 November, Thursday - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies presentation "Far-Right Extremism in the Military and Police Forces." 1700-1800 GMT. Online. To register: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/far-right-extremism-military-and-police-forces>

emended: 30 November, Wednesday - **RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers** Jamie Foote, Marine Security Operations Centre (East), and Patricia DeMille, Fisheries and Oceans Canada International Programs, presenting “Fisheries and Oceans Canada: Intelligence Support in Combatting Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fisheries.” 1300 Atlantic. Via Zoom. To register, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com - indicate whether you are RUSI(NS) or, if not, of what department/agency, unit, association or company you are a member. For context to the event, check #marine security, below.

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Comments "Royal Canadian Navy Public Affairs Engagement Opportunities ...for Ships" by Steffan Watkins, 26 October 2022, https://rusi-ns.ca/pa_engagement/

RUSI(NS) Presentations by Lieutenant-Colonel Julien Letarte, RCAF, and Major Drew Larned, USAF, Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles – Canadian and US Programs, 14 September 2022
<https://rusi-ns.ca/rpas/>

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 9 November 2022
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, October 2022

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 10, November 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, October 2022
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/155-rausi-october-2022-dispatches>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, November 2022

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* - Volume 5 Issue 7
<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 4th Quarter 2022.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 15, Issue 3, 7 November 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2022




Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* November 2022

<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-11>

Tweeted by @RUSI NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Three Remembrance Day posters tweeted by RUSI(NS) are in the Other section of this *Dispatches*.

<p>Canadian Global Affairs Institute @CAGlobalAffairs 3 Nov tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "Responding to real or perceived adversarial threats with a greater allied combat capability in the Arctic itself would represent an overinvestment and misunderstanding of these emerging threats." writes @adam_lajeunesse https://cgai.ca/arctic_perils_emerging_threats_in_the_arctic_maritime_environment (Arctic Perils: Emerging Threats in the Arctic Maritime Environment)</p>	
<p>HMCS Yellowknife @HmcsYellowknife 1 Nov tweeted: #HMCSYellowknife supports Canadian Coast Guard #CCG with wreck survey off Vancouver Island. #Shipwrecks #WeTheNavy #ReadyToHelp https://lookoutnewspaper.com/hmcs-yellowknife-supports-canadian-coast-guard-in-wreck-survey/# (HMCS Yellowknife supports Canadian Coast Guard in wreck survey) Dave Mazur @WestCoastCmdre retweeted: A great initiative - safeguarding our local marine environment in support of a CCG mandate, while providing a challenging training opportunity for our MCDV / Dive team operating ROV's to inspect shipwrecks. BZ to all involved. RUSI(NS) retweeted: CAN Defence Policy Update & National Shipbuilding Strategy update need to address replacement of @RoyalCanNavy Kingston-class multi-role vessels. Can mine countermeasures, diving support, bottom/wreck survey, patrol/repair of underseas lines (energy, communications) be combined?</p>	
<p>RUSI @RUSI_org 7 Nov tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: @New RUSI report, 'The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence' by Justin Bronk, with Nick Reynolds and @Jack_Watling, is out now! https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence</p>	

"The CBSA's @CanBorder National Immigration Detention Framework"

<https://www.canada.ca/en/border-services-agency/news/2022/10/the-national-immigration-detention-framework.html> "...transfer of current Laval Immigration Holding Centre ops to new facility...completion of last of major infrastructure projects announced as part of National Immigration Detention Framework"

See also: The CBSA's National Immigration Detention Framework

<https://www.canada.ca/en/border-services-agency/news/2022/10/the-national-immigration-detention-framework.html>



EUvsDisinfo @EUvsDisinfo 7 Nov tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Most of the world has seen Russia's mask of lies drop during 8+ months of unjustified invasion of #Ukraine. Yet, the Kremlin continues to use disinformation to fuel its war machine & hide its atrocities. Here's a recap of Russia's main #disinfo narratives:

(Still at War: Russia's Disinformation Targeting Ukraine


<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/still-at-war-russias-disinformation-targeting-ukraine/>)



STRATCOMCOE @STRATCOMCOE 8 Nov tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The pandemic has resulted in a bunch of counter-disinformation comms challenges. In one of our researches we looked at innovative solutions that might make #stratcom practitioners to think differently about their own communication challenges. More:

(Disinformation in Democracies: Improving Societal Resilience to Disinformation


<https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/disinformation-in-democracies-improving-societal-resilience-to-disinformation/241>)



RUSI @RUSI_org 1 Nov tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Russia's campaign to systematically degrade Ukraine's energy infrastructure creates an urgent humanitarian challenge, but it must not distract from the importance of ensuring the sustainability of support to Ukraine's armed forces, write @Jack_Watling and Nick Reynolds.

(Winter is Coming: Russia Turns to Countervalue Targeting

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/winter-coming-russia-turns-countervalue-targeting>)



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Europe's Seabed Is Its Soft Underbelly

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/01/europe-seas-undnerbelly-baltic-nord-stream-sabotage-russia-energy-communications-critical-infrastructure/>

Europe's critical energy and communications infrastructure in its northern seas are vulnerable. How are North America's and particularly Canada's? Are we prepared (plans, equipment, practice) to undertake underseas/seabed operations in defence of energy and communications lines?



Submarine could move to another fleet-repair facility, DND says

<https://www.timescolonist.com/local-news/submarine-could-move-to-another-fleet-repair-facility-dnd-says-6060536>

"The CHICOUTIMI is currently going through "transition docking," also called deep maintenance, at the federally owned graving dock in Esquimalt."



It wasn't that long ago that there was media criticism of the Esquimalt Graving Dock for which ships it serviced and that it was federally funded. The criticism was too focused. The utility of the dock for servicing Canada's submarines, allied frigates and, in the future, Canadian frigates of the Canadian Surface Combatant project, demonstrates the importance of docks (graving, dry, wet - see: "Jetties, Piers and Wharfs" <https://rusi-ns.ca/jetties-piers-wharfs/>) as part of this country's strategic seapower. Retaining sufficient, capable docks is and should remain inherent in the National Shipbuilding Strategy (which needs a refresh, with more emphasis on ship maintenance and repair).

UK Defence Secretary: British Army 15 years behind peers

<https://www.army-technology.com/analysis/uk-defence-secretary-british-army-15-years-behind-peers/>

"A confused strategic direction and failed procurement has left the British Army with severe capability gaps."



Lessons for Canada? Especially with the Defence Policy Update impending?

'Up your game,' Global Affairs told as report blasts weak governance in areas of national security, intelligence

<https://nationalpost.com/news/up-your-game-global-affairs-told-as-report-blasts-weak-governance-in-areas-of-national-security-intelligence>



"The committee is also of the view that the Minister of Foreign Affairs work with the Minister of National Defence to put in place 'proactive, regular and comprehensive consultation mechanisms' to ensure that Canada's defence policies and military operations are aligned with its foreign policy objectives."

Should the impending Canada Defence Policy Update be made public before a comprehensive foreign policy statement? With as much as has changed and is changing lately, the threats and actions of Russia and China being the greatest, Canadians should have a foreign policy statement around which discussion and action can solidify. (Our allies would probably like to see something, too) It is not a time for political waving back and forth.

Experts Reflect on the Arbour Report

<https://cdainstitute.ca/experts-reflect-on-the-arbour-report/>



Navy Plans to Stop Chinese Spy Ship from Entering India's Exclusive Economic Zone

<https://www.indiandefensenews.in/2022/11/navy-plans-to-stop-chinese-spy-ship.html>

"While foreign vessels, including warships, can freely sail through the EEZ, Indian law forbids any survey, research or exploration there by a foreign nation without permission."



Interesting legal way to deny access to adversarial intelligence collections hips purporting to be survey, research or exploration vessels. Does Canada have any such laws? Should Canada have such laws?

Chinese Interference

The article "Canadian Intelligence Warned PM Trudeau that China Covertly Funded the 2019 Election Candidates" (<https://globalnews.ca/news/9253386/canadian-intelligence-warned-pm-trudeau-that-china-covertly-funded-2019-election-candidates-sources/>) by Sam Cooper of Global News on 7

November 2022 is an important view into foreign influence into the Canadian election process. Depending on what stories one has available the original number of seats that may have been affected is up to 20. The implication is that we may not have the government that we should have had if this undue influence was not there. It is a major security issue, in this case by a country that continues to use the "Three Wars Concept" against us. The Three Wars covers non-kinetic attacks against a specific country target. It includes lawfare (using the country's own laws against it), information warfare (controlling aspects of the information flow, in this case use of the Chinese language press in Canada to pass misinformation to the Chinese community in Canada) and financial warfare (such as creating new rules as we saw with their attack on our canola farmers, and pork and beef producers).



This is a growing and most serious problem. Action or lack thereof may allow continued foreign influence on our future elections. Misinformation is part of that package as we have seen to our

south. People will believe almost anything. Joseph Goebbels must be smiling, but no Canadian should be.

New documents raise questions about Canada's lengthy naval shipbuilding delays

<https://www.hilltimes.com/2022/10/19/new-documents-raise-questions-about-canadas-lengthy-naval-shipbuilding-delays/385263>

"The documents suggest Canadian governments of both political persuasions have failed since the 1990s to create a new post-Cold War fleet, continually kicking the can down the road while announcing and re-announcing plans with unrealistic timelines and little or no expectation of actually delivering on promises made. Political and policy decisions, rather than budget pressures, or even supposed national security priorities, dramatically realigned Canadian military options with friends and foes alike and effectively doomed the Royal Canadian Navy to two decades of obsolescence. This is not a procurement process problem."



Ukraine's drone raid on Russian naval base was tactically innovative but not revolutionary

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ukraines-drone-raid-on-russian-naval-base-was-tactically-innovative-but-not-revolutionary/>

"Crucially, though, months from now, the raid on Sevastopol might very well be remembered for what it told us about where Ukraine was aiming to go operationally, rather than where technology leads naval warfare."

There needs yet to be a lot of discussion about what uncrewed vehicles can and cannot do, and their effects on operations and tactics. Proceed with development, but proceed (as has proven best in the past) in a deliberate evolutionary manner. Claims of 'game-changing' revolutionary technology have to be taken with care.



Other Sources:

#armour

Why the TAPV is not the M117 and why Canada ended up with the TAPV

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1589115049318445056.html>

#China

A Period of Consequences

<https://hendrixandassociates.com/f/a-period-of-consequences>

"We are once again entering a period of consequences. It does not matter who is responsible for where we are, history is written, what matters is the actions we take this day, and the actions taken in every day that follows to address the gathering storm."

#command

Blind Intent and Vision-Impaired Guidance

<https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2022/11/07/blind-intent-and-vision-impaired-guidance/>

#culture

Success Tomorrow Depends on Disruption Today

<https://wavellroom.com/2019/04/17/success-tomorrow-depends-on-disruption-today/>

A cultural matter. And not just confined to the British or army.

#drones

Drone Guard: The Complete C-sUAV Solution

An industry piece but informative: <https://defence.frontline.online/article/2022/1/20050-Drone-Guard-The-Complete-C-sUAV-Solution>

Counter-Drone Legislation Needs a Major Overhaul

<https://defenseopinion.com/counter-drone-legislation-needs-a-major-overhaul/286/>
US, but could there be lessons for Canada?

#environment

Climate Change & National Security - Implications for the Military

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Command/ClimateChg-Palazzo%20interactive%20w%20cover%2010Aug2022.pdf>

#information operations

Influencing the mind of an adversary

<https://wavellroom.com/2020/05/21/influencing-the-mind-of-an-adversary/>

#land warfare

Yes, Manoeuvre is Alive. Ukraine Proves it.

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/11/04/yes-manoeuvre-is-alive-ukraine-proves-it/>

#marine security #IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing)

More Than 100,000 Fishing-Related Deaths Occur Each Year, Study Finds

<https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2022/11/more-than-100000-fishing-related-deaths-occur-each-year-study-finds>

IUU fishing among the drivers of alarming death rate and extensive injuries among fishers.

Hot spots of unseen fishing vessels

<https://www.science.org/doi/epdf/10.1126/sciadv.abq2109>

Collin Koh @CollinSLKoh tweeted 9 Nov 22: Immensely useful new analysis that spotlights incidences of intentional disabling of AIS within the commercial fisheries industry. This study would be helpful for maritime law enforcement agencies worldwide not least in the Indo-Pacific.

#political warfare

MLI welcomes the prime minister's recognition of China's election interference

<https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/mli-welcomes-the-prime-ministers-recognition-of-chinas-election-interference/>

#Russia-Ukraine War

Canadian and UK Intelligence Updates have been posted to the end of Dispatches.

A Security Update on the Current Status in the Black Sea

<https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/dryad-global-a-security-update-on-the-current-status-in-the-black-sea/>

Contested Skies: Air Defense after Ukraine

<https://mwi.usma.edu/contested-skies-air-defense-after-ukraine/>

Russia is fighting by the book. The problem is, it's the wrong book.

<https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/russia-is-fighting-by-the-book-the-problem-is-its-the-wrong-book/>

Russian Mobilization & Force Generation Update

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5>

How Is Russia Faring Against NATO Equipment In Ukraine? A Tally

<https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/10/how-is-russia-faring-against-nato.html>

Report to Congress on Ukrainian Military Performance

<https://news.usni.org/2022/11/06/report-to-congress-on-ukrainian-military-performance-2>

Considering the implications of the attack on the Russian fleet in Sevastopol

<https://www.navylookout.com/considering-the-implications-of-the-attack-on-the-russian-fleet-in-sevastopol/>

Impact of the Russian withdrawal from Kherson on the war

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1590524003994972160.html>

The political and military utility of obstacle belts

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1589899313077170176.html>

#information operations

Ukraine's internet army of 'fellas' are using dog memes to fight Russian propaganda - and they've raised \$1m for the army too

<https://news.sky.com/story/ukraines-internet-army-of-fellas-are-using-dog-memes-to-fight-russian-propaganda-and-theyve-raised-1m-for-the-army-too-12729625>

“All quiet on the Western Front”...

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/all-quiet-on-the-western-front/>

Smoke, mirrors and gas: the Kremlin deflects blame for the energy crisis

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/smoke-mirrors-and-gas-the-kremlin-deflects-blame-for-the-energy-crisis/>

#training

Discussion of what a modern military training system should look like

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1589102039510188034.html>

#wargaming

The 'Agile' Wargames that Can Test Force Design

Part 1: <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/agile-wargames-can-test-force-design-part-1>

Part 2: <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/agile-wargames-can-test-force-design-part-2>

Part 3: <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/agile-wargames-can-test-force-design-part-3>

Forging Wargamers - A Framework for Professional Military Education


https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Forging%20Wargamers_web.pdf

Other:

Tracking the Leopards

Interesting to see the Canadian Leopards track.


Kein Mensch Kein Tier @KampfmitKette tweeted 2 Nov 22: Where all those Leopard 2A4s ended up and who bought newly built.



Graphics

Sometimes the simple graphics are the most effective.


USTRANSCOM @US_TRANSCOM 5 Nov tweeted: Our vital contribution to national security is evident in our ongoing Ukraine support and the @US_EUCOM effort in support of our @NATO allies. To date, we have moved more than 185 million pounds of security assistance to the people of #Ukraine. #TogetherWeDeliver



NORAD - In Perpetuity and Beyond

<https://www.mqup.ca/norad-products-9780228013990.php>


"...this book uses a functional lens to evaluate NORAD's options and the technological and organizational solutions needed to defend North America. The authors investigate the ways in which the NORAD command might adapt in the future as it struggles to modernize and keep ahead of new threats."



Russian Logistics

A ground level up study on supply requirements for Russian units and an effort to understand potential issues in Russian force design

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1590322324250980358.html>



Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

The SAC Synopses have routinely commented on the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) non-kinetic attacks against our country as part of the "Three Wars Concept" including legal, information and financial coercion in various forms, usually using the host country's own systems against itself. The CCP hopes to destabilize democratic governments and to emplace unfriendly governments with ones more compliant to Beijing's thinking. Canada is a prime target. It has badly needed resources, it has a number of areas that could be exploited for political gain and influence, it has a large Chinese diaspora, and they have been allowed to grow their embassy and consulates. As a resource-based nation, China appears to be an almost ideal customer with great needs and deep pockets. Some in Canada think there are huge profits to be made, and the CCP is eager to exploit these folks. Influence operations persist in most of Canada, such as the introduction of Chinese language instruction, which while not bad in itself, curtails discussions on major issues involving China through the Confucius Institutes funded by the CCP's United Front. The CCP also funds approximately 80% of the Chinese language press in Canada which is OK until they introduce CCP propaganda into the mix as seen in the recent elections resulting

in defeat of some politicians viewed as anti-CCP. This is a serious problem as is the “employment” of former politicians and civil servants and then use these folks to lobby for or advise the CCP. The CCP itself call these folks “useful idiots” amongst other terms.

More recently we have heard of Chinese Police Service Stations being set up in Canada illegally. The CCP Embassy has suggested that these are to help Chinese citizens living in Canada with things such as driver’s licences and other administrative issues. Other countries have discovered that they also function as fronts for Chinese police seeking to “apprehend” enemies of the state such as anti-CCP activists from Hong Kong or Canadian Chinese journalists who are less than complimentary about the CCP using new extra-territorial laws passed by Beijing. Ireland and the Netherlands have ordered these removed as an invasion of their sovereignty. Canada is investigating three such stations in Toronto, but one wonders about whether there is penetration into other cities and provinces such as Vancouver, British Columbia or Montreal, Quebec. This again is a serious issue needing immediate action.

One has to wonder why this has occurred at all if our intelligence agencies really had the resources, tools including legal regulations, and personnel with the necessary language skills to actually keep track of the actions of the CCP. The other piece that has been mentioned this week to remind us all: our intelligence services have been briefing on this subject for years at least since 2010. This is not new but it is concerning that Canada still has no real foreign influence laws of consequence or even a formal list of registered lobbyists working for foreign countries, so the country could have some sort of idea who is functioning in this manner. This would also include foreign funding as we have seen with the CCP’s United Front to the Chinese language press in Canada. China is not alone in this type of operation, but foreign influence may also be foreign businesses and various non-government organizations - the Canadian Government must have some idea who is trying to do what to influence our government. Most are benign, but some are not, and we need to know. We could examine Australia’s foreign influence laws as an example to get us started. It is not a “nice to have,” it is now essential for the safety and security of our country.

The United States

The US mid-terms are over, but the voting is so close it is difficult to actually say who won. It appears the Democrats have done better than historically normal. At this point (Wednesday), it appears the House will flip to the Republicans and the Senate is still very much in the air, but at least one seat has flipped to the Democrats. Still, it is early, and the fall out will not really be known for months. Depending on the outcome, it could affect the entire free world for years to come.

Iran

The demonstrations in Iran are continuing after eight weeks and a severe crack down by authorities. Threats are ramping up from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij militia. The regime has stated that they will investigate the situation of police actions against Masah Amini, or Zhina Amini by her Kurdish name. Iran has resorted to bombing Kurdish areas in Iraq. The regime’s relationship with its Kurdish population in the north-east is not good to begin with and this is not helping. More to the point, the Iraqi Kurds are armed to the teeth and threatening them is likely to draw a response from people that are if anything more fanatic than the IRGC. Most interestingly, the demonstrations are country wide and led by young women. One of their key words of this movement is “freedom.” They appear to be very passionate about their cause and although they have no specific leadership as yet, there does seem to be a greater level of understanding of what they want. This appears to be a situation that could conceivably get out of control very quickly. It is a dangerous situation for the regime, probably more dangerous than any other attempts to date.

The other problem is the attack by Sunni radicals against regime supporters. The Sunnis are a minority in Iran but they are able to gain support from other Sunni populations in the region. The regime is again trying to stop the problems by using a large hammer rather than understanding the issue. This too will cause ongoing ripples within the regime.

Iran has given drones and are allegedly in discussions to sell ballistic missiles to Russia which they say were provided prior to the start of the Russia-Ukraine War on 24 February 2022. This has been largely debunked particularly as they initially said they did not supply any drones or missiles to Russia. The US added sanctions and stopped the nuclear agreement talks. More importantly, Iran seems to be making more excuses than normal including saying that the IRGC made the deal without telling the Foreign Affairs department. Again, it appears that the regime is “tap dancing” through the issue rather than having a plan. The thought that a part of the regime can arbitrarily act internationally without approval from the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, shows a weak leadership, also not a good image internally or externally. Given Khamenei’s poor health and decline, his death without an heir apparent may cause a major fight amongst regime loyalists for power even with the ongoing and increasing pressure from other movements and force from the outside. Russia’s use of Iranian ballistic missiles will likely cause unintended reaction by Western powers. The long-term health of the regime is not looking promising.

Belarus

Currently, there are about 20k Russian soldiers in Belarus, including up to six battalion tactical groups (BTG), who are providing the Russian portion of a joint force with Belarus which has also provided a similar number of BTG. Most Russian troops are air defence missile system and surface to surface missile units, drone operations, some aviation assets along with logistics. It is increasingly apparent that Belarussian forces are not willing to fight Ukrainian troops. Belarus has also given away major pieces of armour to Russia, leaving Belarussian forces without as many tanks or reserves of tanks and other armour vehicles to meet potential losses. The question is what will happen if Russia attacks Ukraine from Belarus again as a spoiling attack. Ukraine is now estimated to have 1.2+m troops in various forms. An increasing portion of troops are Western trained and equipped. The Belarussian military knows this and has always been more than reluctant to attack their neighbour particularly for the Putin regime. The Lukashenko regime is not popular and it remains in power with the agreement of the security forces. Some 90% of those Belarussian forces would refuse to invade and would not support the regime’s orders to do so under the present circumstances. A question might be what would the armed forces of Belarus do if Russian forces in Belarus cause a Ukrainian action into Belarus? The Ukrainian forces today are a vastly different type of force from February 2022. Is it possible that they might take action against Russian troops to save their country? Given Russia’s apparent weakness, is it entirely possible for the armed forces to make a deal with the opposition leadership for amnesty and through the opposition find support in the West for Belarussian independence? There are many pots boiling at the moment; a major success by one side or the other may tip the balance of any decision by the security forces leadership.

North Korea

North Korea is denying that it is providing weapons and ammunition to Russia despite appearances otherwise. South Korea and the United States just finished a major series of exercises, and eighteen nations participated in Japan’s Fleet Review including Canada represented by the frigates HMC Ships *Vancouver* and *Winnipeg*. Overall, the show of Western power plus Asian allies must be more than a little daunting for a nation equipped with aircraft, armour and ships generally older than even Canada’s and less well maintained. North Korea’s announcements coupled with fewer missile launches probably

had more to do with the show of force than anything else. North Korea always attempts to gain attention by “bad acting” but one might consider they didn’t like this year’s answer.

Still, North Korea needs food and if they can get Russian grain and oil at cut rate prices for ammunition, one suspects they will continue to do it. The real problem will occur if Russia is seen to be firing North Korean built ballistic missiles into Ukraine. It will likely not go well.

The Russia-Ukraine War

North Korea and Iran have been mentioned before in discussion of the current situation in the Russia-Ukraine War. Why? It shows the increasing spread of the conflict in Europe and Asia. Turkiye was not mentioned but has been instrumental in some respects in keeping Ukraine going. One is the ongoing flow of Ukrainian grain products and secondly, the enforcement of the Montreux Convention regarding entry into the Black Sea through the Bosphorus. This week they denied entry to a cruiser and destroyer of the Pacific Fleet sent to reinforce the Black Sea Fleet. It also doesn’t take into account Europe and the NATO allies which potentially brings over a billion people involved in some way with the conflict. This is a mess that could go sideways quickly, probably because of an unintended result from a relatively minor action such as blowing up a power dam or damaging a nuclear power plant.

Russia’s main form of offensive action appears to be missile attacks on civilian infrastructure, especially elements of the power grid. Ukraine at present has between 40 and 50 % of its power grid destroyed or damaged as a result of Russian action. The water system in some cities have also been damaged. The main intent seems to create unlivable conditions for Ukrainians. This operation is expensive in missiles with a relatively large number being shot down by Ukrainian forces using Western systems thus much of this effort is wasted at great expense utilizing resources that will be difficult or nearly impossible to replace. With this in mind, it is no wonder Russia is intent on acquiring North Korean and Iranian ballistic missiles, as Ukraine currently has no defence against at this time. Use of ballistic missiles would be an escalation which may cause unintended outcomes which would be of no benefit to anyone.

Russia is continuing offensive attacks in the north around Kremmina and the Bakhmut areas. These offensive actions are ineffective, gaining only a few hundred meters if evenly remotely successful. No major gains are expected as Russia continues to replace trained troops with mobilized troops of limited capability and training. Today, Wednesday, Sergey Shoigu, the Minister of Defence, ordered the withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnipro River. Earlier today, Ukrainian troops broke through the first line of defence in several places just north and west of Kherson itself. Ukraine is well aware that Russia may use the city of Kherson as a major trap to inflict major casualties on Ukraine. This may include major incidents such as the blowing up of the Korhovka Dam or something similar. The dam is most likely as it has been suggested by Russia that the Ukrainians were going to blow it despite the Ukrainians having zero reason to do so - if the dam were breached the main area flooded would be on the east bank but the loss of the power station would set Ukraine back as it would take years to rebuild the structure. Why would Russia do this as the ones mainly affected would be Russians?

Russian losses are becoming apparent even to the general public especially after the open letter sent by the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade stating they had lost 300 killed near the village of Pavilivka due to poor planning and leadership of the higher formation. It forced the administration to counter the claim by the Russian appointed governor, but the damage was done. The Russian public is aware now and is actively checking on casualties. It cannot be hidden anymore. Russian troop morale is at an all-time low as the troops themselves see themselves as meat for the grinder. Ukraine estimates that Russian troop losses exceed 1000 a day with more captured. Ukraine has set up a hotline for Russian troops to surrender which has been used over 3k times in recent days. Manpower is plentiful but

trained manpower is in short supply. Russian sources say that 130k are now near the area of operations with approximately 50k being already in frontline units. These troops have had little refresher training and very little time to become familiar with their new unit before they are thrust into operations. This is not ideal. One soldier reached the front and became a prisoner of Ukraine within an hour and half; many were not so lucky and achieved an early grave.

As mentioned last week, Yevgeny Progozhin and Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Wagner Group and the Chechens respectively have pushed hard against the leadership of the armed forces as a way of gaining further influence with Putin and try to usurp the power of the Defence Minister for their own purposes. The bottom line is that it shows the increasing fractures within the Putin regime and the increasing pressure on Putin to contain both ambitions of his most trusted commanders and the increased stress of ongoing military defeats. Something will have to give; there are others within the regime who quietly work within the regime and who think they know better. At some point they will push this point of view more forcefully and likely within the next couple weeks especially if the Kherson withdrawal goes badly.

China

In relation to the Canadian government's statements on Chinese interference, China has chosen to attack the messenger. The attack from the Embassy was predictable as they made much of Canada's actions against our indigenous population including residential schools. What the Embassy doesn't say is Canada has taken action by way of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and have made significant efforts to correct the situation based on current understanding. The real issue here is not that we didn't commit what can only be described as cultural genocide, but we are undertaking action to mitigate the damage as we proceed down a new path with all the missteps that entails. China continues to commit cultural genocide and worse without any thought of correcting their actions. Nor do they address the real problem, China's overreach into democratic countries illegally and setting up extrajudicial police agencies essentially kidnapping Canadian citizens. China has and is continuing to act in a belligerent manner with Canada. It is time to change that by taking action against the untruths of the embassy staff and the actions of the CCP's United Front.

In recent report made public in Britain, it was stated that China has produced more pollution in eight years than Britain has managed to produce since the dawn of the industrial revolution. China under the CCP has time and again made announcements that suggest that they will adopt a greener solution yet at the same time are now trying to get its own coal producers to increase the supply. The CCP is famous for providing answers that people want to hear versus what they actually do. China's pollution problems are of its own making through rapid and poorly planned construction and development projects. This is not likely to change. China will always provide figures that show it in its best light but with limited ability of unbiased observers to confirm in real terms. China under the CCP continues this type of action and will continue to do so until someone forces the issue.

China held the 14th Zhuhai Airshow displaying the newest and best products of China and Russia. They even let the BBC get "close" to these aircraft including jet fighters, bombers, transports, air liners and various types of unmanned aerial vehicles and missile technology. It was impressive until one thinks about how most Chinese aircraft are developed from their Soviet and Russian predecessors. The Russia-Ukraine War has also made an impression mainly on the ground from aircraft that were shot down by Ukraine. It would certainly inspire confidence in any purchase of these products knowing that they are likely to face Western developed air defence equipment which has been so successful in the destruction of the Russian version of the products. One expects a downward trend in the purchase of Chinese or Russian built equipment in the near term.

The last comment on China is this: what is going on now in China is complex. Few if any in Canada have really paid attention to China. There are those who have shown a true interest yet the CCP have and continue to conduct a misinformation campaign to gain influence in certain circles within Canada. With this in mind, over the next few weeks, we hope to provide a more specific outlook from both English language and Chinese language sources. Quite often what is said in English is quite different than provided in Chinese. The CCP itself is based on what could be considered a Ponzi scheme or even liars' dice. Each level of authority tells a tale that makes them look in the very best light. These actions are repeated at each level thus even minor mistakes or exaggerations can compound to make the final official figures almost meaningless. Now multiply this over decades and is anything actually true especially given the level of corruption in China.

The bottom line for Canada is this: China is an authoritarian state that conducts cultural genocide against minorities within China. It continues to this day and is likely to continue in the future. It cannot be trusted to be open or honest, it simply is not in its nature. The paper is going to help explain some of the issues and portrayals about China. The Chinese people are deserving of much better than the corruption and malfeasance of the CCP. Contrary to CCP spokespersons, the CCP and Chinese citizens are not one but two very different entities.



The
**Canadian
Military Memorials
Database**

Is there a military memorial
in your community?

Is it in the
Canadian Military Memorials Database?

Check the database at
<http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/national-inventory-canadian-memorials>
and send an update!



The
**Canadian
Military Memorials
Database**

Is there a military memorial
in your place of worship?

Is it in the
Canadian Military Memorials Database?

Check the database at
<http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/national-inventory-canadian-memorials>
and send an update!



The
**Canadian
Military Memorials
Database**

Is there a military memorial
in your place of work or recreation?

Is it in the
Canadian Military Memorials Database?

Check the inventory at
<http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/national-inventory-canadian-memorials>
and send an update!



Indigenous Pre-Cadet Training Program

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, our paramount concern has been for the health and safety of our IPTP Candidates and those attending the academy as we continue to implement best practices in collaboration with provincial and federal health authorities.

The Indigenous Pre-Cadet Training Program (IPTP) offers Canadian Indigenous people, between the ages of 19 and 29, an opportunity to experience a modified three-week Depot training experience within the RCMP at the RCMP Training Academy in Regina, Saskatchewan.

"It gives Indigenous youth the opportunity to experience a training session and a first-hand view of what a possible career in police work could entail," says Cpl. Maureen Greyeyes-Brant, who was a graduate of the program and is now the National Coordinator.

You'll learn:

- › An introduction to the Criminal Code and RCMP policy
- › Physical fitness and drill
- › Skills to help prepare you to apply to be a police officer

Basic Requirements

- › Be between 19 - 29 years of age
- › Be of First Nation, Inuit or Métis descent
- › Be a Canadian citizen
- › Be able to pass an enhanced reliability security check
- › Be in good physical condition
- › Possess a Canadian high school diploma or equivalent

Now accepting applications for the 2023 spring session!

Deadline: December 9, 2022

For more information contact

"H" Division RCMP Recruiting
HdivRecruiting@rcmp-grc.gc.ca

"I'm excited to be able to one day become an RCMP officer and inspire more to join to show that we can make a difference in society."

Phoebe Niviaqsiaq, Nunavut



INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Due to low morale and reluctance to fight, Russian forces have probably started deploying “barrier troops” or “blocking units”. These units threaten to shoot their own retreating soldiers in order to compel offensives and have been used in previous conflicts by Russian forces.
- Recently, Russian generals likely wanted their commanders to use weapons against deserters, including possibly authorising shooting to kill such defaulters after a warning had been given. Generals also likely wanted to maintain defensive positions to the death.
- The tactic of shooting deserters likely attests to the low quality, low morale and indiscipline of Russian forces.

Label the blocking units as NKVD units if you want to be historical...

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russia is probably struggling to provide military training for its current mobilisation drive and its annual autumn conscription intake. The Russian Armed Forces were already stretched providing training for the approximate 300,000 troops required for its ‘partial mobilisation’, announced on 21 September 2022. These issues will be compounded by the additional regular autumn annual conscription cycle, announced on 30 September 2022 and starting 01 November 2022, which is usually expected to bring in an additional 120,000 personnel.
- Newly mobilised conscripts likely have minimal training or no training at all. Experienced officers and trainers have been deployed to fight in Ukraine and some have likely been killed in the conflict.
- Russian forces are conducting training in Belarus due to a shortage of training staff, munitions and facilities in Russia. Deploying forces with little or no training provides little additional offensive combat capability.



CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
COMMANDEMENT DU RENSEIGNEMENT DES FORCES CANADIENNES

RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

Russia claims that its forces are achieving battlefield "successes" near Pavlivka in southeastern Ukraine.

Russian officials posted video statements purportedly from troops engaged in the fighting near Pavlivka, claiming that they are continuing to "crush the enemy."

BASED ON CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND ANALYSIS:

- Russian forces have made no significant gains in the area for months. Soldiers were almost certainly coerced into making positive statements in order to dispel further criticism of Russian leadership.
- Despite the lack of recent success, Russia continues to attempt attacks with uncoordinated and poorly equipped ground elements, leading to disarray and significant attrition.

UKRAINE / RUSSIA UPDATE // 2022-11-09



National
Defence
Défense
nationale

Defence
Intelligence

UPDATE ON UKRAINE
10 November

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 9 November 2022, Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu ordered the withdrawal of Russian forces from the west bank of the Dnipro river in Kherson, southern Ukraine. General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine, confirmed they will withdraw to defensive positions along the Dnipro River, citing re-supply issues as the primary reason for the decision.
- Russia's ability to sustain its forces on the west bank of the Dnipro river had been placed under pressure by Ukrainian strikes on Russia's resupply routes. In retreating, Russian forces have destroyed multiple bridges and likely laid mines to slow and delay advancing Ukrainian forces. The loss of Kherson's west bank will likely prevent Russia from achieving its strategic aspiration of a land bridge reaching Odesa.
- With limited crossing points, Russian forces will be vulnerable in crossing the Dnipro River. It is likely that the withdrawal will take place over several days with defensive positions and artillery fires covering withdrawing forces.