



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 25 November 2022

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Home Dispatches

Submissions are now being received for the December 2022 edition of *Home Dispatches*. Email submissions and comments to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

How Military Children Interpret the Presentation of Moral Injury in Canadian Armed Forces members Post-Deployment: A Qualitative Study

See letter at end of *Dispatches*.

Veterans Affairs Canada Consultation on Supports for Veteran Families and Caregivers

Are you a family member or caregiver for a Veteran? If so, we need your feedback about the supports available to you, and what else we may be able to provide.

Visit Let's Talk Veterans before December 2nd, 2022, to provide your input:
<https://letstalkveterans.ca/>

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

30 November, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speakers Jamie Foote, Marine Security Operations Centre (East), and Patricia DeMille, Fisheries and Oceans Canada International Programs, presenting “Fisheries and Oceans Canada: Intelligence Support in Combatting Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fisheries.” 1300 Atlantic. Via Zoom. To register, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com - indicate whether you are RUSI(NS) or, if not, of what department/agency, unit, association or company you are a member. For context to the event, check tweet and #maritime security below.

New: 30 November, Wednesday - Dalhousie University Centre for the Study of Security and Development presents Sarah Minckler, speaking on “Layered Lessons: Political Science Research and Military Decision-Making.” Noon-1300. Zoom (<https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84466095253?pwd=SENSazM5WW1mZEdRWGFXY2d5RS9lZz09>) and at Lord Dalhousie Room, Henry Hicks Building, Dalhousie University. Free. See poster at end of *Dispatches* and: https://www.dal.ca/sites/cssd/news-events/events-calendar/2022/11/30/sarah_minckler_layered_lessons_political_science_research_and_military_decision_making_november_30.html

New: 6 December, Tuesday - Jamestown Foundation webinar "After Kherson: An Assessment of Ukraine's Successful Counter-Offensive." 1000-1130 am Eastern. To register: https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_kus39PJYTTeDa4ngtQBmhQ?mc_cid=5fe7ee6780&mc_eid=3f22ddb88

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Comments "Royal Canadian Navy Public Affairs Engagement Opportunities ...for Ships" by Steffan Watkins, 26 October 2022, https://rusi-ns.ca/pa_engagement/

RUSI(NS) Presentations by Lieutenant-Colonel Julien Letarte, RCAF, and Major Drew Larned, USAF, Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles – Canadian and US Programs, 14 September 2022
<https://rusi-ns.ca/rpas/>

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 23 November 2022
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, October 2022

New: Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XL, Number 11, December 2022

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, October 2022
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/155-rausi-october-2022-dispatches>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, November 2022

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* - Volume 5 Issue 7
<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 54, 4th Quarter 2022.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 15, Issue 5, 21 November 2022

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2022




St. Francis Xavier University Mulroney Institute of Government *Canadian Naval Review* Volume 18, Number 2 (2022)

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* November 2022

<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-11>

Tweeted by @RUSI_NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 17 Nov tweeted: By failing to clearly articulate how FMT advances Canada’s long-term national interests, political leaders are undermining public support for such missions and are leaving Canadian trainers to wonder how their efforts concretely matter. https://cdainstitute.ca/canadian-foreign-military-training/ (Canadian Foreign Military Training: What Good is it among other Allied Providers?) RUSI(NS) retweeted: FMT=foreign military training "Canadian Foreign Military Training: What Good is it among other Allied Providers?" a wide-ranging and thoughtful paper on Canada 🇨🇦, its leadership & strategy</p>	
<p>CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 15 Nov tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Latest from Rob Huebert for our Expert Series: "The only way we can truly ensure there is no threat to Canada is to improve our protective capabilities and assume the threat is real. Canada must get much more serious and do what it says it's going to do." (Canada Must Get Serious about the Russian Threat https://cdainstitute.ca/rob-huebert-canada-must-get-serious-about-the-russian-threat/)</p>	
<p>CAN 🇨🇦 fights illegal fishing with #OpNorthPacificGuard https://www.canada.ca/en/fisheries-oceans/news/2022/11/canada-fights-illegal-fishing-with-operation-north-pacific-guard.html Illegal, unreported & unregulated #IUU fishing is maritime threat. Besides economic & environmental costs, used by adversarial states for expansionist purposes & by criminals to finance activities <i>Note: Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing</i> https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/international/isu-iuu-eng.htm <i>and</i> Canada’s Dark Vessel Detection Program https://www.canada.ca/en/fisheries-oceans/news/2022/11/canada-fights-illegal-fishing-with-operation-north-pacific-guard.html</p>	

Good Question

James Rogers @DrJamesRogers 19 Nov tweeted: During the First Gulf War it was said that Saddam's troops tried to surrender to drones overhead, knowing their presence meant precise strikes were incoming. Today, surrendering to drones is an increasingly common part of war. But what are the legal obligations of the operator?



Posted on Facebook Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

U.S. Blames Iran for Drone Attack on Tanker Near Oman

<https://news.usni.org/2022/11/16/u-s-blames-iran-for-drone-attack-on-tanker-near-oman>

"...an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle conducted a one-way attack against the Pacific Zircon, a Liberian-flagged, commercial tanker..."



Are civil ships now going to need some level of drone counter-measure capability? Civil ships have always been part of what's now called gray zone or hybrid warfare (modern terms for adversarial action in the state between peace and conflict), is now more protection required?

Manitoba open to shipping LNG through Churchill

<https://www.winnipegfreepress.com/breakingnews/2022/11/15/manitoba-open-to-shipping-lng-through-churchill>

"Manitoba isn't shying away from the Hudson Bay Railway and Port of Churchill being used to ship energy from Alberta and Saskatchewan."



In addition to the evident economic benefits (another route for inland energy, support to local peoples) there are strategic advantages to developing Churchill, Manitoba, as a deep water northern port, advantages for Canada and its Arctic where infrastructure development may be the best way for this country to ensure its sovereignty there, and for our allies and friends in other parts of the world who need our energy to counter bellicose states like Russia,

It will take effort; see: Rail line to the Port of Churchill still needs extensive repairs

<https://panow.com/2022/10/18/rail-line-to-the-port-of-churchill-still-needs-extensive-repairs/>

Ottawa touts larger military presence in Asia, Europe amid troop, equipment challenge

<https://www.timescolonist.com/national-news/ottawa-touts-larger-military-presence-in-asia-europe-amid-troop-equipment-challenge-6123612>

"...there is only so much the Armed Forces, which is also struggling to replace much of its old equipment, can do in its present state."



Maybe senior leaders of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) operational commands, including the navy, Army and Air Force, should be allowed to testify before Parliamentary committees as to the states of their commands and employability/deployability, testimony unfettered by government political considerations and direction. Is too much being asked of the CAF, after so many years of underfunding, in the interest of diplomatic posturing? These are discussions that should be undertaken in public.

The Bias For Capability Over Capacity Has Created a Brittle Force

<https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/the-bias-for-capability-over-capacity-has-created-a-brittle-force/>

US but something to bear in mind as Canada, with a Defence Policy Update impending, considers the nature and structure of its Canadian Armed Forces in light of the world's geo-strategic situation whilst meanwhile there are other great demands on the finances of the country.



UK refuses to make defense spending commitments amid strategy review

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/11/17/uk-refuses-to-make-defense-spending-commitments-amid-strategy-review/>

"The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown that conventional warfare in the European theater is not dead, that peer-on-peer, high-intensity conflict is not fading away, and that firepower and a strong logistics tail remain paramount to achieving victory on the battlefield..."



Consideration for Canada. Canada, with its impending Defence Policy Update, needs to ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces have the capabilities (force nature and structure) and capacities (numbers) for a full range of scaled-up, enduring activities across the spectrum of operations.

Swimming in Dirty Money: It's Time to Dive Below the Surface

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/swimming-dirty-money-its-time-dive-below-surface>

"...no coordinated global effort on a similar scale has been



made to identify and disrupt the finance linked with illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing."

"IUU fishing is a form of criminality that relies heavily on the formal financial system, thus rendering it vulnerable to the interventions available to the anti-financial crime community."

IUU fishing is a threat that is maritime, general, economic and environmental. It is a defence, security and environmental issue, and should be addressed by the multi-government department collaborative effort. (One of the problems with multiple department matters is the reluctance of any one to stand up and take charge - that needs to be an early first problem to resolve. Fisheries and Oceans Canada?)

Canada investing \$1.2b in next phase of Oceans Protection Plan

<https://maritimemag.com/en/canada-investing-1-2b-in-next-phase-of-oceans-protection-plan/>

"Investments announced today will continue to advance this work and expand it to more areas, including:

...
- growing the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary."

Is there an 'objective state' ('force development goal' to use defence terminology) for the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary? Opportunity for public discussion?



Launch Plan

<http://shipfax.blogspot.com/2022/11/launch-plan.html>

"The Royal Canadian Navy's own ship repair unit in Halifax, has a synchrolift that will need to be upgraded to accommodate larger ships."

How will the large frigates to be built under the Canadian Surface Combatant (#CSC) project be docked?

Dry docks (dry or wet, graving or floating; see: Jetties, Piers and Wharfs <https://rusi-ns.ca/jetties-piers-wharfs/>) are strategic resources for Canada. Is there a national inventory of them? Shouldn't they be considered as part of the National Shipbuilding Strategy?



Ukraine war: The men who bring back the dead

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63627345>

"...the war in Ukraine is not just a physical battle. There's a moral component too, reflected in the way an army treats both the living and the dead. "

Mortuary affairs as an element of the strength of a military and of society.

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*Then there's the Russian version of mortuary affairs:
Russians accused of burning bodies at Kherson landfill*



<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/21/russians-accused-of-burning-bodies-at-kherson-landfill>

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From an earlier article: These Ukrainian volunteers recover soldiers' remains to return them to their families

<https://www.npr.org/2022/08/07/1113999223/these-ukrainian-volunteers-recover-soldiers-remains-to-return-them-to-their-fami>

"The term (Evacuation 200) made its way into public consciousness in the 1980s, when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union and Soviet soldiers' bodies were brought home from the war in Afghanistan. Each body in its zinc coffin was said to weigh around 200 kilograms — about 440 pounds."

The potential for Chinese action to seize Taiwan

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1595655034116911106.html>

An Australian perspective but the points about strategy and Defence Policy Review (Defence Policy Update in Canada's case) can apply to Canada.

An Australian perspective but the points about strategy and Defence Policy Review (Defence Policy Update in Canada's case) can apply to Canada.



"...what is required is a 'theory of deterrence for a conventionally-armed middle power' that thinks beyond the US extended nuclear deterrence umbrella."

"We need a high-tech, lethal and balanced military that can adapt to the one thing inevitable in our strategic future: surprise."

The following was posted to the 11 Nov 22 *Dispatches*:

Navy Plans to Stop Chinese Spy Ship from Entering India's Exclusive Economic Zone

<https://www.indiandefensenews.in/2022/11/navy-plans-to-stop-chinese-spy-ship.html>

"While foreign vessels, including warships, can freely sail through the EEZ, Indian law forbids any survey, research or exploration there by a foreign nation without permission."

Interesting legal way to deny access to adversarial intelligence collections hips purporting to be survey, research or exploration vessels. Does Canada have any such laws? Should Canada have such laws?

One of our knowledgeable colleagues has now advised: There were similar precautions at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic like the cruise ship bans, but I don't think Canada has anything like India's Exclusive Economic Zone and I haven't heard of any plans to have something similar in Canada.



Other Sources:

#armour

Ukraine war: Is the tank doomed?

<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-61967180>

Survive: The Case for Armour

<https://wavellroom.com/2020/10/08/survive-the-case-for-armour/>

#counterterrorism

The CONTEST Review: What Next for Prevent?

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/contest-review-what-next-prevent>

#cyber operations

Beyond the Bottom Line: The Societal Impact of Ransomware

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/beyond-bottom-line-societal-impact-ransomware>

#defence cooperation

EU report finds appetite stagnating for defense cooperation

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/11/17/eu-report-finds-appetite-stagnating-for-defense-cooperation/>

EU. One would hold this assessment doesn't hold for NATO and for Canada...

#drones

Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems

<https://news.usni.org/2022/11/17/defense-primer-u-s-policy-on-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems>

The Tiny and Nightmarishly Efficient Future of Drone Warfare

<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2022/11/russia-ukraine-war-drones-future-of-warfare/672241/>

#electronic warfare

Defense Primer: Electronic Warfare

<https://news.usni.org/2022/11/16/defense-primer-electronic-warfare>

#information operations

Throwing Mud at Everyone and Hoping Some of it Sticks

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/throwing-mud-at-everyone-and-hoping-some-of-it-sticks/>

The Bear's Side of the Story: Russian Political and Information Warfare

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/6/27/the-bears-side-of-the-story-russian-political-and-information-warfare>

#logistics

Army Preps for 'Contested Logistics,' Works to Boost Arms Production

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/11/army-preps-contested-logistics-works-boost-arms-production/379877/>

#maritime security #IUU fishing

Give Teeth to Fishery Enforcement

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/november/give-teeth-fishery-enforcement>

The Ocean Foundation and FAO launch groundbreaking knowledge hub for fisheries management

<https://www.fao.org/in-action/commonoceans/newsroom/detail-events/en/c/1613389/>

The global fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing reaches a new milestone

<https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/the-global-fight-against-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-reaches-a-new-milestone/en>

Canada not mentioned.

China fishing fleet defied U.S. in standoff on the high seas

<https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/ap-china-fishing-fleet-defied-us-standoff-high-92472812>

The Outlaw Ocean

<https://www.theoutlawocean.com/the-outlaw-ocean-podcast/>

Guarding the Pacific: How Washington can Counter China in the Solomons and Beyond

<https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/guarding-the-pacific-how-washington-can-counter-china-in-the-solomons-and-beyond/>

EEZ-adjacent distant-water fishing as a global security challenge: An international law perspective

https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/20220912_Hybrid_CoE_Working_Paper_19_DWF_WEB.pdf

B-1B Bombers Are Hunting Illegal Fishing Boats Off South America

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/b-1b-bombers-are-hunting-illegal-fishing-boats-off-south-america>

Turning the Tide? Learning from Responses to Large-Scale Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in Five Countries

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/whitehall-reports/turning-tide-learning-responses-large-scale-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-five>

Strings Attached - Exploring the Onshore Networks Behind Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing

<https://c4ads.org/reports/strings-attached/>

Argentina Deploys New Patrol Vessels to Combat IUU Fishing

<https://cimsec.org/argentina-deploys-new-patrol-vessels-to-combat-iuu-fishing/>

Feds Seek Authority to Combat IUU Fishing With Other Nations

<https://fishermensnews.com/feds-seek-authority-to-combat-iuu-fishing-with-other-nations/>

#China

China's Maritime Militia and Fishing Fleets: A Primer for Operational Staffs and Tactical Leaders
<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/China-Reader-Special-Edition-September-2021/Luo-Panter-Maritime-Militia/>

*Interesting to read such an article in an army journal, says something about the perceived threa.
The entire issue is at:*

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/China-Reader-Special-Edition-September-2021/>

The Strategic Significance of the Chinese Fishing Fleet

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/China-Reader-Special-Edition-September-2021/Landreth-Fishing-Fleet/>

U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Report No. 1: China's Third Sea Force, The People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA

<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1/>

Exposing the Gap Between PRC Rhetoric and Illicit Maritime Activity

<https://www.cna.org/centers-and-divisions/cna/cip/china-studies/illicit-maritime-activity>

#migration #extremism

Migration, Firebombings and the Risks of Mainstreamed Far-Right Extremism

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/migration-firebombings-and-risks-mainstreamed-far-right-extremism>

#planning

Performance-to-Plan

Interesting site: <https://p2p.navy.mil/>

#policing

Police Strategies to Control High-Level Corruption

<https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26781/police-strategies-to-control-high-level-corruption-a-global-perspective>

#reading

War Books: A Reading List Inspired by Veterans Day

<https://mwi.usma.edu/war-books-a-reading-list-inspired-by-veterans-day/>

#Russia-Ukraine War

Could Ukraine Retake Crimea? Not Easily

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/11/could-ukraine-retake-crimea-not-easily/379919/>

Impact of winter on the war in Ukraine

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1593835793629745153.html>

On the Dnipro River at Night, Ukrainian Fighters Ambush Russian Forces
<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/21/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-river.html>

After action review during and of the Russia-Ukraine War
<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1595630801026428928.html>

#drones

The Drones Of The Ukraine War
<https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-invasion-drones-war-types-list/32132833.html>

#information operations

Information Warfare in Russia's War in Ukraine
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/22/information-warfare-in-russias-war-in-ukraine/>

What would it mean for the war in Ukraine if Twitter dies?
<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1594809226592919589.html>

#strategy

The Meaning of Strategy, Part I: The Origins
<https://tnsr.org/2017/11/meaning-strategy-part-origin-story/>

The Meaning of Strategy, Part II: The Objectives
<https://tnsr.org/2018/02/meaning-strategy-part-ii-objectives/>

#United States #strategy

Summarizing the 2022 National Defense Strategy
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/summarizing-2022-national-defense-strategy>
US but interesting to compare.

Other:

Maritime Engineering Journal Fall 2022

<https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/mej/42-071-maritime-engineering-journal-102.pdf>

contents include:

AOPS Concept of Operations

Contract Design Specifications: Quality Assurance for AOPS

The Balancing Act between Ice Breaking and Open Ocean Seakeeping in the Design of the Harry DeWolf- class

Marine Systems Overview: How the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels differ from the Canadian Patrol Frigates

Combat Suite Overview for the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels

Remotely Piloted Aircraft System

The Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) project was discussed at a recent RUSI(NS) Security Affairs Committee meeting, as it was believed that a RPAS squadron had been established. RCAF sources advised that a squadron has not been stood up, and that per the procurement public website



(<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/remotely-piloted-aircraft-system.html>), contract award is still expected in 2023/2024. Note also the project website (<http://dgpapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=977>).

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

The Emergency Act Inquiry started its last week of witnesses this week. Justice Rouleau has been a fine example of how inquiries should be run. He kept everyone in line with their testimony, preventing politicization of the inquiry despite efforts by virtually all participants. This was accentuated by the removal Tuesday of the Freedom Convoy's lawyer, Mr Miller, after arguing with Commissioner Rouleau. This week the commission will have cabinet ministers and staff as witnesses, no chance of politics entering here...NOT.

The one items that every Canadian should be concerned with no matter what their political stripe is the lack of communications between various levels of government, police agencies, the various intelligence organizations, and the actions or inactions of various senior civil servants. No one was in charge, no one seemed to take responsibility, no one seemed to be coordinating, and so on. It is the most important job of any government to provide for the safety and security of the nation and its citizens within the confines of the law and constitution. This seems to be an ongoing failure of successive governments. The safety, defence and security of the nation must be all party and at least the very basics agreed to by all parties of all stripes within Parliament. Basic ideas such as what are our national interests, red lines to foreign actors, at what point does a disruption caused by demonstrations and illegal acts become a national emergency, development of clarity on what even constitutes an emergency. This week's list of senior civil servants clearly showed that they would make it up as needed as opposed to actually understanding the current existing legal definitions. It makes me appreciate that in Nova Scotia everyone talks and there is coordination for major events. Ottawa is different, it is the national capital and there of all places there is a strong need for a single coordinating body that cuts across jurisdictions supported by a formal trained staff which would incorporate logistics, liaison, a known hierarchy of command, key individuals who are and can be held responsible for their actions, communications systems, finances, etc., such that the national capital can be protected under virtually any circumstances or at least an initial coordinated effort can be sorted out.

The roles of the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office must be more open and transparent. Questions must be asked whether they are the right organizations to deal with complex issues and are they too political to achieve the necessary requirements for governing. This will be interesting to watch.

One last issue on Canada, the Defence Policy Update (DPU) is apparently delayed until the new year. At the same time, in last week's in-person discussion, one member discussed several procurements that were done with little fanfare and commented on the announcement of projects and acquisitions that simply disappear from view. Examples are the sole-source purchase recently of two more CC130J

Hercules, the current state of the Buffalo replacement program apparently beset with issues, the current status of the two tanker replacement aircraft based on the Airbus 330 as well as the stand up of a new squadron of remotely piloted unmanned vehicle to be headquartered in Ottawa and two other locations and the ongoing effort to stand up 3 Space Division of the Royal Canadian Air Force and the move to put all Airfield engineer flights under 3 Wing Bagotville for a proposed expeditionary force capability. It seems that the Department of National Defence has been more than a little quiet about these initiatives. These stories coupled with the DPU should be more open to the public in general. Most are actually good news stories, and the public should know. Still no contract for new fighters, no contracts for the ancient North Warning System, no speeding up of the warship replacement programs including the Canadian Surface Combatant, the Joint Support Ship, the replacement programs for the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel ships, the submarine replacement program and the necessary support and training facilities and the Army is virtually unable to conduct anything like combat operations or situations near to war, no artillery, insufficient numbers of tanks, inadequate helicopters for Army operations, insufficient communications gear, insufficient numbers of armoured vehicles such as infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, no new logistics vehicles in sufficient numbers, lack of commonality between Regular and Reserve forces and it goes on, yet no one can figure out how to get to 2% of GDP for defence as agreed to by NATO including Canada. As always, Canadian troops will and are in harm's way without even the barest amount for them to do their job. These soldiers are some Canadian citizen's son or daughter, husband, uncle, mother, aunt and partners, these are not some abstract number and we as a country must remember that point most of all.

The United States

The final outcome of the mid-term elections is still outstanding. Currently the House will become Republican with a minimum of 220 seats versus 212 seats for the Democrats with three seats left to be decided. The Senate will be Democrat with a minimum of 50 seats to the Republicans' 49 seats with a runoff election being held in Georgia on 6 December 2022 for the last seat in the Senate. It appears that in the House the Republicans seem to be aiming for revenge as opposed to running the country. This has implications that are truly global, and parochial issues based on revenge seem petty when the free world really needs the United States. The United States keeps alliances together and focused, the House needs to rise to the occasion and understand that their decisions matter to all of us.

This week saw allegations that several Supreme Court Justices have been less than impartial including Justice Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito in different aspects. It also drew attention to the Federalist Society's actions in gaining the appearance of undue influence. One of the latest dinners had several Justices attend a formal dinner where more partisan comments were made including jokes about demonstrators exercising their rights as US citizens. It is not a good look especially in light that the Supreme Court of the US (SCOTUS) is not obligated to follow any specific ethical code. All courts US and Canadian must not only be impartial but they must always appear to be impartial and actions that are allowed for the general public are no longer theirs to make as the perception they are less than impartial also matters. Ethical guidelines are there for a reason.

Iran

Iran is difficult to assess as to the longer-term health of its current system of governance. The regime of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is not liked by the general population. Khamenei himself is 83 and in poor health and his life expectancy is low. His regime is kept in power by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij militia, police and most recently reported several thousand volunteers from Lebanon's Hezbollah. The latest demonstrations have been daily since the death of Zhina Amini on 22 September at the hands of the morality police. The demonstrations also are spreading undeterred by violent threats by the regime. According to Iranian language press, more than 362 people are known to have been

killed during these demonstrations including 59 security force members and 56 children. These numbers are several days old and are out of date. There are also the unreported deaths as well which could be quite large. The regime has threatened an even more heavy-handed approach to quelling the disturbances. One Iranian ex patriot has suggested that a line had been crossed by the regime and that people are no longer afraid and thus the demonstrations grow.

The Iranian regime is promising to help Russia set up a drone factory in Russia itself in the near future. Israel has suggested that if Iran were to provide drones and missiles as proposed that Israel would provide Ukraine with Israeli built and designed ballistic missiles. The Jericho series of missiles are considered modern and effective and much more capable than Iranian systems. Who would have predicted that Russia would be getting Iran's assistance to build drones and missiles? Ukraine has examined Iranian-built systems and has found commercial level equipment from many countries including Ukraine itself. Ukraine has released this information so that countries can examine how they may be able to cut off this supply of material to prevent the use of commercial products for weapons systems. The bottom line is that this war is more complex than anticipated and certainly lasting longer.

Belarus

Russia has basically taken all of Belarus war stocks of equipment and vehicles for their own use. It is further evidence that Belarus is unlikely to invade Ukraine intentionally. There are suspicions that Russia intends to create a false flag operation within Belarus to gain public favour of an attack on Ukraine. The Belarussian Army is only small, about 60k members. Its equipment is judged to be old, and they have little in reserve because of Russian demands. Less than 3% of the population think that Belarus should attack with another 30% supporting Russia attack on Ukraine. More than 500 Belarussians have joined the Ukrainian forces to date although this number may be considerably higher as many do not wish to be identified because of the Lukashenko regime's actions against family members if known. There are reports that suggest that more than 90% of Belarussian service members would not fight if ordered to attack Ukraine. Any attack would be widely condemned with Belarus and potentially remove the regime.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the main opposition leader, was in Ottawa this week to ask for support for increased sanctions on the regime. Ottawa has placed more sanctions on Belarus as a result including 16 companies. These sanctions are likely to increase as the war continues. The regime is not popular and is dependent on Russia to remain in power. It should be noted that Belarus held a referendum that allows Russia to place nuclear weapons in Belarus this past summer. Allegedly 65% of the population approved although there is considerable doubt that this is the actual level of support for such an initiative.

It is expected that Russia will attempt to push Belarus into the war by a false flag operation and that it is likely to be unsuccessful in gaining the support of the citizens of Belarus. It is likely the regime will fall within days of such an action.

Russia-Ukraine War

Russia has been forced into its third major withdrawal at Kherson. The Ukrainian armed forces have managed to secure the entire western bank of the Dnipro River. The newly freed city saw celebrations by city citizens lasting several days. It was a stark contrast to the demonstrations against Russian forces when they initially occupied the city in early March. Russia has started shelling the city so Ukraine has offered a voluntary evacuation to those citizens fearing Russian artillery and rocket attacks. Service has been building up rapidly although Russia is maintaining artillery fire from the east bank. Ukraine has not stopped and announced officially that Ukrainian troops are on the Kinburn

peninsula thus eliminating positions for Russian artillery to attack further into Ukraine. Partisans have also been active throughout the east bank as well, providing reconnaissance for Ukrainian forces. HIMARS has been a game changer for Ukraine. It has forced withdrawal of headquarters and logistics centres away from their supported troops with a number of organizations moving into the Crimean peninsula and developing defence positions there. It appears Russia may be willing to give up at least a portion of the east bank as well. This situation is likely to very active in the near term.

Russia has used the troops evacuated from Kherson and moved them into the Donbass and further north into Luhansk oblast. There are also suggestions that some of these troops will move into Belarus as well. By doing this activity, Russia hopes to produce the effect of diminishing Ukrainian troops numbers and forcing them provide defence over a much larger front. This seems to make sense to a degree, but Ukrainian troops are in greater numbers and often outnumber Russian troops on the front. Ukraine is supported by Western satellite information and has a large number of reconnaissance drones of various types. Russia would be very hard-pressed to avoid being spotted no matter where they go at any time of day or night. There have been some Russian movement forward in villages near Bakhmut but of limited value. Ukraine has apparently responded by putting MLRS rockets systems into the area around Bakhmut, thus Russian forces and facilities take a fearsome beating every time they attack. In the north Ukraine has apparently reached the Russian border and have replaced their flag there. It is expected that Ukraine is going to move forward more deliberately against Russian forces in the north. The area has a limited population and few villages, once the frost enters the ground heavier equipment will become more viable. Russian losses have been significant.

Ukraine allegedly conducted an attack using their unmanned surface systems. This attack was successful in that damage was done to an oil loading and storage area. It missed the naval dockyard, but the psychological effect was devastating. The attack was conducted over a 650 kms from Ukrainian facilities at Novorossiysk. It means that no Russian naval base on the Black Sea is totally safe for the Russian fleet. Many have stated that this changes naval warfare - yes, but good procedures, training, patrolling by sea and air and a proper boom emplacement would have sorted this out fairly quickly. The Japanese and Italians both had similar ideas before, this is not new, but it does require leadership and thought.

The last on this section is the artillery fire on the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant (ZNPP) which Russia stated was done by the Ukrainians. The UN IAEA completed its examination of Ukrainian nuclear facilities and found no preparations of producing a “dirty bomb.” In a Russian source, a Russian military blogger actually stated that the rounds seemed to come from Russian positions. Ukraine gains no benefit from destruction of the ZNPP or any other facility on their own soil. The only country that gains any benefit of a dubious sort is Russia. The fallout of any damaged nuclear facilities would enter into Russia, thus more damage to Russian soil. The head of IAEA has asked for Russia to vacate the ZNPP to Ukrainian technicians. There are some reports that Russia is considering handing the plant to IAEA representatives at ZNPP. Ukraine is also moving from north Zaporozhye towards Melitiopol with some success as of Wednesday as part of a new offensive. This effort is still at the early stages.

Winter is coming and the ground is currently not frozen as yet. The first snows have turned the dirt roads into a muddy morass. This will change as the ground freezes and heavier vehicles will be able to move around. Ukraine seems to be using lighter vehicles and still seem to be able to move effectively. Ukraine has also been well equipped with winter warfare equipment by its NATO partners and thus is better able to keep troops moving in the field. Russian troops have been left with little survival gear and seem ill-prepared for any type of long-term operations in the winter. Winter has always been historically Russia’s best time for operations, such as in the Napoleonic War and the Great patriotic War... we won’t discuss the First World War as the winter proved less than beneficial. Winter will not

be Russia's friend this time around. Russian industry is nearly dead and the ability of Russia to produce the necessary equipment is long gone. Russia will pay with heavy losses not caused by Ukraine but by weather-related injuries which will compose most of their losses. Russia has also failed to provide basic logistics of food, potable water, medical support and even sufficient ammunition for their troops nor the means to bring it forward safely. Winter will have an effect, but Russia will not like it.

China

President Xi was thought to be overall successful in his most recent foray into the world. He attended two major events and had significant meetings with world leaders including President Biden of the US and Prime Minister Albanese of Australia. He even met our Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on two separate occasions including a video shot in close proximity showing Xi dressing down the PM in public with a comment caught after Trudeau left, saying "very naïve." It was a good day for Xi, not so much for our Prime Minister. The APEC conference was great but the Cambodian Prime Minister tested positive for Covid. Xi is apparently somewhat paranoid about this disease and is likely going into quarantine for a period of time. A good series of conferences but a poor ending. Chinese press was very pleased and virtually fell over themselves with praise. One other comment on this issue is that China was very supportive of the COP 27 initiative as they always have been in public. It was also announced that Chinese coal production was up over 7% - so much for the climate change conference. The reality is that China is a major polluter; that is unlikely to change in the near term.

The other point is that all the G20 leaders were quiet on the subject of Chinese human rights abuses in Tibet, East Turkistan (Xinjiang Province), Hong Kong and of religious minorities. nor did they discuss China's ongoing territorial aggression virtually everywhere. Xi is not the only problem, it is the fact that good people chose to do little or nothing against an authoritarian and genocidal regime.

The Russia-Ukraine war has shown that most Russian equipment is poorly designed and built. It should give even Xi some pause to think of their own equipment reverse engineered from Russian equipment. This would include most of its air force, navy and several types of armoured vehicles, especially as it appears that China intends to attack Taiwan within the next decade or so. It should also encourage China maybe to cut down on huge parades and get their troops in the field, check their logistics perhaps and actually develop low level leadership and initiative. The Chinese leadership system is even worse than Russia's with the political officer actually outranking the operational commander. Nothing like a political animal to remove initiative. This is a benefit of their persistence in following a truly despicable leader, Chairman Mao, responsible for untold millions of deaths. China has tried to improve its pilot training by hiring Western military pilots for huge salaries but one has to wonder, why would one sell out their own country?

Lastly, apparently, Chinese authorities blame the leadership in the US for the current state of relations between the first and second largest economies. One has to admire the sheer audacity of these folks. China's economy is in poor shape and it continues to deteriorate with little possibility of a near term fix. What is amazing is that several large international investment firms have recently turned relatively "bullish" on the Chinese economy, in fact suggesting that their economy will grow between 3 and 4 % this year. Strangely, it is Western investment firms that are taking this position but not Asian or near Asian firms. The Xi regime has attacked the tech sector, education sector, propped up the unsound property development sector, dictated to the financial sector how they want the situation corrected; all of these sectors look like flaming pyres and one cannot discuss the reduction in export orders, the closure of many small and medium factories in the last couple years, the collapse of the private business sector. Yes, that certainly sounds like an economy that is likely to exceed expectations. I have been told that investment banks and firms have to believe official figures if they wish to partake in

China's growth, thus a bad comment or telling the truth may not be in their near-term best interest. The bottom line is that China is unlikely to be successful, its basic structure is now increasingly based on central planning and state-owned businesses which worked "so well" prior to Deng. China badly needs good leadership, and they will not succeed with the dead hand of the Communist Chinese Party controlling the economy. China will not overtake the US or have the success of liberal democracies.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over the last seven days, intense artillery exchanges have continued around the Svatove sector in Luhansk Oblast in north-eastern Ukraine. As on other parts of the front, Russian forces continue to prioritise constructing defensive positions, almost certainly partially manned by poorly trained mobilised reservists.
- With Russia's south-western front line now more readily defensible along the east bank of the Dnipro River, the Svatove sector is likely now a more vulnerable operational flank of the Russian force.
- As a significant population centre within Luhansk Oblast, Russian leaders will highly likely see retaining control of Svatove as a political priority. However, commanders are likely struggling with the military realities of maintaining a credible defence, while also attempting to resource offensive operations further south in Donetsk. Both Russian defensive and offensive capability continues to be hampered by severe shortages of munitions and skilled personnel.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 18 November 2022, multiple Russian and Ukrainian media outlets reported that an attack took place at an oil terminal in Novorossiysk port on Russia's Black Sea coast. A major base of Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) is close to the oil terminal.
- The BSF relocated many of its submarine operations to Novorossiysk after its Sevastopol base in occupied Crimea was struck by Ukraine over the summer. Russian commanders will likely be concerned about threats to the Novorossiysk-based amphibious landing ship flotilla. These vessels are relatively vulnerable without escorts and have assumed a more important role in supplying Russian forces in Ukraine since the Kerch Bridge was damaged in October.
- Full details of this incident are yet to emerge. However, any demonstration of a Ukrainian capability to threaten Novorossiysk would highly likely represent a further strategic challenge for the BSF. It would also further undermine Russia's already reduced maritime influence in the Black Sea.



RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

Russia claims that it is prepared to enter negotiations to end the war in Ukraine and asserts that Kyiv is the party which insists on continuing the conflict.

BASED ON CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND ANALYSIS:

- Russian forces continue to try to seize more Ukrainian territory, in particular in the eastern Donbas region. Russia is concurrently waging a missile strike campaign against Ukraine's critical infrastructure.
- While recent ground attacks have largely failed and resulted in no significant territorial gains, Russia continues to reposition its ground assets in an effort to take additional territory.
- Despite major setbacks recently, Russia is still trying to maximize the amount of Ukrainian territory it occupies, and it is not working to set conditions for productive diplomatic engagement.



INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since September, Russia has likely launched hundreds of Iranian-manufactured uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) against Ukraine. These have been a mixture of one way attack (OWA) UAVs and more traditional reusable armed systems.
- Russia has largely used these weapons against tactical military targets and the Ukrainian electricity grid. However, recently Russian commanders likely also wanted Iranian-sourced UAVs to prioritise medical facilities as targets of opportunity, and strike them with guided munitions if identified.
- Russia likely conceived of the UAV campaign to make up for its severe shortage of cruise missiles, but the approach has had limited success. Most UAVs launched have been neutralised.
- No OWA UAVs strikes have been publicly reported since around 17 November 2022. Russia has likely very nearly exhausted its current stock, but will probably seek resupply. Russia can probably procure UAVs from overseas more rapidly than it can manufacture new cruise missiles domestically.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In the last two weeks, Russia has likely redeployed major elements of the VDV (airborne forces) to the Donetsk and Luhansk fronts in the Donbas. From September to October, most of the severely weakened VDV units were dedicated to the defence of Russian-held territory west of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
- Some VDV units have likely been reinforced with mobilised reservists. Although these poorly trained personnel will dilute VDV's supposedly elite capability, Russia will likely still allocate these units to sectors deemed especially important.
- Potential operational tasks for the VDV include supporting the defence of the Kremina-Svatove area in Luhansk Oblast or reinforcing offensive operations against the Donetsk Oblast town of Bakhmut.

LAYERED LESSONS: POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND MILITARY DECISION-MAKING

SARAH MINCKLER

LORD DALHOUSIE ROOM, HENRY HICKS BLDG
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 12:00-1:00PM AST

FREE AND OPEN TO THE PUBLIC

LIVESTREAM ON ZOOM:

<https://us02web.zoom.us/j/84466095253?pwd=SENSazM5WW1mZEdrWGFXY2d5RS9lZz09>

Sarah Minckler is a fourth-year political science major, with a particular interest in the study of military strategy. She is currently training to be an Intelligence Officer with the Canadian Armed Forces. This presentation overviews some of the findings from a report she prepared in connection with a directed-reading course in Political Science.

Canadian Rangers

Canadian Army @CanadianArmy 19 Nov tweeted: Five CRPGs ensure a CAF presence within Canada's remote areas. Having been established more than 75 years ago, 5,000 CRs provide light-equipped, self-sufficient mobile forces to support CAF national security and public safety operations within Canada. #CR75

Location and Territories of the Canadian Rangers Patrol Groups (CRPG)

CANADIAN
ARMED FORCES



FORCES ARMÉES
CANADIENNES



2 CRPG

Headquarters: Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, QC
Covers Northern Quebec, James Bay, and the Lower North Shore
of Patrols: 28
of Rangers: 691

1 CRPG

Headquarters: Yellowknife, NT
Covers Nunavut Territory, Yukon Territory, Northwest Territories, and Atlin, British Columbia
of Patrols: 61
of Rangers: 1,724

5 CRPG


Headquarters: Gander, NL
Covers Newfoundland and Labrador
of Patrols: 34
of Rangers: 1,137

4 CRPG

Headquarters: Victoria, BC
Covers British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba
of Patrols: 47
of Rangers: 1,005

3 CRPG

Headquarters: Borden, ON
Covers Northern Ontario
of Patrols: 26
of Rangers: 692



 National
Defence

Défense
nationale



Title of Study: How Military Children Interpret the Presentation of Moral Injury in Canadian Armed Forces Members Post-deployment: A Qualitative Study
Thank you for your interest in my research study.

The purpose of this study is to explore how family members of those in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) perceive moral injury (MI) post deployment. In particular, I am interested in how military children view the presentation of MI. I have a secondary goal of better understanding how family members are supported when MI is present. The results of this research may be published in academic journals, shared at academic conferences, and/or shared with interest professionals working within the military community.

You should meet the following eligibility criteria in order to participate:

- You speak fluent English
- You are at least 19 years of age
- You have access to a stable internet connection
- You self-define as a child to a current or previous CAF member who has served on deployment involving the presence of potentially morally injurious events
- You will consent to having the interview audio recorded

If you are eligible and you choose to participate in this study the interview will last about one hour to one hour and thirty minutes in length. During this interview I will be asking questions about how you experienced the process of deployment, how the Canadian military supported you during and after deployment, and perceived impacts of deployment on your parent.

If you meet the above eligibility criteria, and you are interested in taking part in the study, please contact me directly by email or telephone (see below). At that time, I will provide you with further details about my study by way of an informed consent letter. You should make sure that you know the details of this project prior to giving your consent to participate. You will have the opportunity to ask questions or seek clarification about my study prior to your involvement. You may contact me, or my thesis supervisor Dr. Catherine Baillie Abidi (Catherine.BaillieAbidi@msvu.ca), with any questions in regards to this study. Whether or not you decide to take part in this study is completely up to you, and you may withdraw at any time.

This research study's ethical components have been reviewed by the Psychology Departmental Research Ethics Board (DREB) and University Research Ethics Board (UREB) and comply with Mount Saint Vincent University's Research Ethics Policy. Any questions or concerns about how this study is being conducted can be directed to the MSVU Research Office at 457-6350, or via email at ethics@msvu.ca. These contacts do not have any personal affiliation with the research study.

Sincerely,
Kathryn Reeves
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