



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 3 February 2023

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

15 February, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Brigadier-General G Michael Adamson, Commander 3 Canadian Space Division, titled "3 Canadian Space Division." 1300-1500. Via Zoom. To register, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com - indicate whether you are RUSI(NS) or, if not, of what department/ agency, unit, association or company you are a member. Put "RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker 15 February 2023 Registration" as the subject line of your email.

Advance reading:

The Growing Complexity of Space: Implications for Security and Stability

https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/202210E

Government of Canada supports commercial space launches in Canada

<https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2023/01/government-of-canada-supports-commercial-space-launches-in-canada.html>

7 March, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Malign: Gaming Influence in the Information Age." 1800-200 EST. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/malign-gaming-influence-in-the-information-age-tickets-484966807777>

Changed: 16 May, Tuesday (was 21 February) - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "The Politics of Play: Wargaming with the US Military." Noon-1400 EST. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-politics-of-play-wargaming-with-the-us-military-tickets-415461174557>

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

New: RUSI(NS) Information Note “Types of Royal Canadian Navy Combatant Warships,” 30 January 2023

<https://rusi-ns.ca/types-of-rcn-combatant-warships/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Armoured Fighting Vehicles,” 17 January 2023

<https://rusi-ns.ca/armoured-fighting-vehicles/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note “RCN Ship Pennant Numbers,” 9 January 2023

<https://rusi-ns.ca/rcn-ship-pennant-numbers/>

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 1 February 2023

<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

New: Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, February 2023

New: Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 2, February 2023

Naval Association of Canada recording “Seaspan Shipyards” by Denis Stevens, VP of Government Relations for Seaspan, 9 January 2023

https://youtu.be/XHKH6MQa_eE

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, January 2023

<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/178-rausi-january-2023-dispatches>

New: Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, February 2023

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* Volume 5 Issue 7

<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 1st Quarter 2023.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 16, Issue 6, 30 January 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 4, December 2022

St. Francis Xavier University Mulroney Institute of Government *Canadian Naval Review* Volume 18, Number 2 (2022)

United Services Institute of Nanaimo and North Island *Newsletter*, Vol 31, No 1, January 2023

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* January 2023

<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-12>

Tweeted by @RUSI NS:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.


RAS-NSA @RAS_NSA 26 Jan tweeted: #HotTakes | In his latest publication, @srdjanvucetic argues that given the assorted risks and threats Canada could face, military procurement is only a small piece of the overall puzzle. RUSI(NS) retweeted: "Finally: Canada buys the F-35" <https://ras-nsa.ca/finally-canada-buys-the-f-35/> "A far-reaching and comprehensive review of the defence, security, diplomacy and development issues that Canada is facing is long overdue." #defencePolicy @NationalDefence



NATO ACT @NATO_ACT 29 Jan tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: #Highlights of the week: @NATO_ACT is setting the stage for #NATO to address security challenges in one of the most dangerous environments for future #NATO operations - the urban environment, where multi-domain forces will play a key role. https://jwc.nato.int/application/files/2816/7092/4803/MDO_URBANDEC2022.pdf #WeAreNATO (Multi-Domain Operations in an Urban Environment)



Black Cultural Centre for Nova Scotia @BCC_NS 30 Jan tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The Black Cultural Centre for Nova Scotia is pleased to share that the @CanadianMint launched a commemorative coin today featuring No. 2 Construction Battalion. Check out the launch video: <https://zcu.io/3fVy> Learn more at <http://mint.ca> #AHM2023 #BHM2023 #N2CB




Royal Canadian Navy @RoyalCanNavy 30 Jan tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Do you know where your closest Naval Reserve Division is? In anticipation of their Centennial anniversary tomorrow - take a peek at which of the 24 Divisions is closest to your neighbourhood! #NavRes100 #WeTheNavy




Canadian Army @CanadianArmy 30 Jan tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Read about @Army_Comd_Armeec thoughts on how the CA is modernizing to meet the challenges of today brought on by the war in Ukraine, and Canada's role in the deterrence of further Russian aggression in Europe: <https://canadianarmytoday.com/from-ukraine-with-urgency-how-the-lessons-of-conflict-are-shaping-the-army-agenda/>
 (From Ukraine with urgency: How the lessons of conflict are shaping the Army agenda)




RUSI(NS) Information Note "Types of Royal Canadian Navy Combatant Warships" <https://rusi-ns.ca/types-of-rcn-combatant-warships/> How will CAN 🇨🇦 Surface Combatant #CSC project ships be typed? @RoyalCanNavy
A coincidence: On This Day RN @OnthisdayRN 2 Feb tweeted: #OnThisDay 80 years ago in 1943 the term Frigate was revived by the @RoyalNavy to designate a new class of twin-screw escort vessels. After over 20 years the RN will shortly take delivery of 2 new Frigate classes with Type 31 (HMS VENTURER) & Type 26 (HMS GLASGOW)
 Daniel L Little @HalifaxAuthor replied: Learn more about frigates throughout history at: <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frigate> @RoyalCanNavy @RoyalNavy



NATO Association of Canada @NATOCanada 31 Jan tweetd and RUSI(NS) retweeted: All eyes are on #Arctic #security as #NATO allies pivot to address the regional geopolitical threats posed by #Russia and #China. Katherine E. Todd argues that #Canada can no longer afford to lag behind in planning for the Arctic's future. #cdnpoli
<https://natoassociation.ca/canadas-need-for-a-comprehensive-arctic-strategy-amid-russian-and-chinese-threats/>
 (Canada's Need For A Comprehensive Arctic Strategy Amid Russian And Chinese Threats)



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 31 Jan tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Latest with @CleoPaskal: "We are going back to the late 1930s, and no grand strategy for the Indo-Pacific will work without getting it right in the Pacific Islands. Otherwise, the region's people will suffer tremendously, like in WWII." (The New Front Line: China Setting Parameters of Engagement in the Pacific
<https://cdainstitute.ca/the-new-front-line-china-setting-parameters-of-engagement-in-the-pacific/>)



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 1 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: CDAI Fellows @ProfAnkersen, @CleoPaskal, @justinmassie1, & Chuck Davies reflect on significant challenges ahead. "Choosing priorities will increasingly become a problem for CAF and government. Clearly, the war in Ukraine will not be resolved anytime soon."
 (Looking Ahead: What are Canada's Most Pressing Security Challenges in 2023?)
<https://cdainstitute.ca/looking-ahead-what-are-canadas-most-pressing-security-challenges-in-2023/>)



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 6 Dec tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "The work starts now. It is great that the strategy is out, and I salute the people who worked hard on this, but nothing has been accomplished at this point. Action, at the end of the day, is what matters."
 (Competing Strategic Interests in the Indo-Pacific: Implications for Canada)
<https://cdainstitute.ca/executive-summary-competing-strategic-interests-in-the-indo-pacific-implications-for-canada/>)



RAS-NSA @RAS_NSA 26 Jan tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: #HotTakes | In his latest publication, @srdjanvucetic argues that given the assorted risks and threats Canada could face, military procurement is only a small piece of the overall puzzle.
 (Finally: Canada buys the F-35)
<https://ras-nsa.ca/finally-canada-buys-the-f-35/>)



RUSI @RUSI_org 2 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Ukraine's use of uncrewed surface vessels to attack Russian navy ships has attracted widespread attention. But does it really herald a new era of naval warfare? Sidharth Kaushal provides his analysis in the latest #RUSICommentary.
 (Ukraine's Uncrewed Raid on Sevastopol and the Future of War at Sea)
<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraines-uncrewed-raid-sevastopol-and-future-war-sea>)



Armour (!!)

Nicholas Drummond @nicholadrummond 26 Jan 23 tweeted (video):
<https://twitter.com/nicholadrummond/status/1618708455942135810>: T-34s made in 1944 and re-imported from Laos.
 Russia is really scraping the bottom of the barrel. What this tells me is that the thousands of additional tanks apparently held in storage are a fiction.



#Armour of a different sort

War Monitor @WarMonitors 12:50 PM · Jan 31, 2023 tweeted

(<https://twitter.com/WarMonitors/status/1620464463580381184>): The Russian Ministry of Defense announced the dispatch of an armored train to the “special operation zone”. It is designed for engineering reconnaissance, as well as the destruction of air and ground targets.



From a colleague: Interesting to see the equipment, although it would be preferable to see Russia leave the thing parked and unused. Amazing how technology and machinery considered long obsolete and unnecessary can suddenly be pressed into service when circumstances require!

Posted on Facebook “Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia”:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Is Canada’s military ready for the challenges ahead? ‘No,’ says defence chief

<https://globalnews.ca/news/9441183/canadian-military-readiness-wayne-eyre/>

"Canada's military is not ready for the challenges the future holds as the global security situation continues 'deteriorating!'..."



U.S. Naval Commander attributes piracy drop to Obangame exercises

<https://www.nannews.ng/2023/01/27/u-s-naval-commander-attributes-piracy-drop-to-obangame-exercises/>

"The reduced piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is one of the evident successes of the Obangame exercise series..."

Canada is participating in Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS 2023 with HMC Ships GLACE BAY and MONCTON, two Kingston-class patrol vessels. Though typed as mine operations vessels, they have greatly proved the value to Canada and the Royal Canadian Navy of operating such smaller vessels. Part of a 'balanced navy.' Good to read that deployments of Kingston-



class for the past handful of years to train local navies in maritime security is assisting in reducing piracy in the region. The 'constabulary' role of navies (the other roles are conflict and diplomatic). The Kingstons are aging, it is time for Canada to program their replacements with vessels capable of mine and other 'seabed operations' (e.g., patrol of communications cables) capabilities. National Shipbuilding Strategy version 2?

Nigeria Celebrates Dedication of Deep Sea Port Built by China

<https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/nigeria-celebrates-dedication-of-deep-sea-port-built-by-china>

"The project was built by the China Harbor Engineering Company as part of China's Belt and Road strategy."



The Chinese 'global game of Go' continues. Such a port is easily dual-use, with facilities that can service naval vessels as easily as civil trade. A map of all Chinese controlled (in whole or significant part) port throughout the world would be eye opening.

This port is in a part of Africa and the Atlantic into which Canada and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) have been routinely (though not frequently) deploying ships. There is currently a major exercise in the region, OBANGAME EXPRESS 2023, in which two Kingston-class patrol ships are participating.

UK reveals capture of Russian equipment, instructs industry to develop new countermeasures

<https://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/uk-reveals-capture-of-russian-equipment-instructs-industry-to-develop-new-countermeasures>

"...industry has been instructed to interrogate the Russian equipment and design superior countermeasures. The UK is also ensuring Ukrainians benefit from the newfound knowledge."



One can hope that the Canadian Armed Forces and Canadian industry are benefiting from the intelligence garnered from the Russia-Ukraine war.

Rebuilding U.S. Inventories: Six Critical Systems

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebuilding-us-inventories-six-critical-systems>

"The bottom line is that military aid will continue, and Ukraine will still be able to resist, but inventory replenishment will become an increasingly pressing problem. DOD has many tools to mitigate the problem of "empty bins" and will need to use all of them to avoid a slackening of military support to Ukraine."



Too often, people (those outside a military and many within) count the number of ships, aircraft and tanks and they take those counts as measures of a military's strength. But really, true strength is in numbers not publicly available: the numbers of missiles, bombs and rounds. One can be confident our

senior people in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) know those numbers and have communicated them to our senior political leaders. But we, the general public, don't know what the numbers are, or more importantly what they mean. We don't need the numbers, but we should know whether our leadership is sufficiently funding our military to truly provide for our defence. The Chief of Defence Staff has stated that the CAF doesn't have enough people. Is this a time for Parliament to be told whether the CAF has enough munitions, parts, etc., to keep our forces going in a conflict?

Editor: *Last week Dispatches carried a graphic from this article. The source has now become apparent.*

Other Sources:

#Arctic

The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war>

A few key findings: <https://twitter.com/csiserep/status/1618663876467515393>

#Canadian Armed Forces

'History will tell' if Canada's military facing new decade of darkness: defence chief

<https://globalnews.ca/news/9442804/canadian-forces-decade-of-darkness/>

#armour

How Canada sabotaged its own fleet of tanks

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/adam-zivo-how-canada-sabotaged-its-own-fleet-of-tanks>

#charts #maps

New Canada Marine Planning Atlas launched

<https://maritimemag.com/en/new-canada-marine-planning-atlas-launched/>

#command

On command

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2022.2139243>

#cryptology

Is China About To Destroy Encryption As We Know It? Maybe

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2023/01/china-about-destroy-encryption-we-know-it-maybe/382041/>

#defence procurement

Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment: The Challenge to the U.S. Defense Industrial Base

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/empty-bins-wartime-environment-challenge-us-defense-industrial-base>

#economic security

Democracies embrace economic security to counter China and Russia

<https://www.axios.com/2023/01/31/democracies-embrace-economic-security-to-counter-china-and-russia>

"Democratic countries are increasingly using economic security as a crucial way to protect themselves from China and Russia."

#Indo-Pacific

The “Freeland Doctrine” and Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Between isolation and confusion

<https://ras-nsa.ca/the-freeland-doctrine-and-canadas-indo-pacific-strategy-between-isolation-and-confusion/>

Denial May Bring War - Punishment May Keep it at Bay

<https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/denial-may-bring-war-punishment-may?sd=pf>

When might China invade Taiwan? Depends who you ask

<https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/taiwan-invasion-timeline-01302023145650.html>

How Gray-Zone Ops in the Yellow Sea Could Trigger a Maritime Crisis

<https://fairbank.fas.harvard.edu/research/blog/how-gray-zone-ops-in-the-yellow-sea-could-trigger-a-maritime-crisis/>

We Don't Have the Missiles to Stop China. Time For Drone Swarms

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/02/we-dont-have-missiles-stop-china-time-drone-swarms/382423/>

Is the Canadian Armed Forces looking at employing (and countering) mass drones?

#warfare

The Ukrainian Tank Story and Taiwan

https://www.theepochtimes.com/the-ukrainian-tank-story-and-taiwan_5019228.html

#information operations

Chinese influence operations may lack critical element: influence

<https://cyberscoop.com/chinese-influence-operations-dragonbridge/>

#national security

Three steps toward a ‘whole of nation’ approach for national security

<https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3806237-three-steps-toward-a-whole-of-nation-approach-for-national-security/>

Points (Update and empower the defense industrial base, Empower allies and partners through collaboration, Defend the homeland against cyber threats) applicable to Canada, too.

#NATO

NATO's Maritime Vigilance: Optimizing the Standing Naval Force for the Future

<https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/natos-maritime-vigilance-optimizing-the-standing-naval-force-for-the-future/>

#naval warfare #Russia-Ukraine War #Indo-Pacific

Applying Lessons of the Naval War in Ukraine for a Potential War with China

<https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/applying-lessons-the-naval-war-ukraine-potential-war-china>

#Russia-Ukraine War

Assessing Russian Casualties

<https://henryschlottman.substack.com/p/assessing-russian-casualties>

Russian strategy for its continuing Ukraine invasion in 2023
<https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1618377888113516545> and
<https://en.rattibha.com/thread/1618377888113516545>

Thinking About Putin and Russian Strategy
<https://mickryan.substack.com/p/thinking-about-putin-and-russian>

Amid the smoke of war, power in Europe is shifting decisively to the east
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jan/29/amid-the-smoke-of-war-power-in-europe-is-shifting-decisively-to-the-east>
Would not usually be in Dispatches but this is from RUSI UK.

Russia's War in Ukraine: What are the emerging military lessons?
<https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2023/01/strategic-survey-2022-russias-war-in-ukraine>
Note 'The battle of the narrative.'

Could Russia's Reliance on Belarus be its Soft Underbelly?
<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/emerging-insights/could-russias-reliance-belarus-be-its-soft-underbelly>

Expanding Equipment Options for Ukraine: The Case of Artillery
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/expanding-equipment-options-ukraine-case-artillery>

Battlefield adaptation
<https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1620924055267475456>

#drones

Turkey's And Iran's Drone Supply In The War In Ukraine
<https://ras-nsa.ca/turkeys-and-irans-drone-supply-in-the-war-in-ukraine/>

#naval warfare

War In Ukraine: Western Navies See Lessons From Strategic To Tactical Levels
<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/01/war-in-ukraine-western-navies-see-lessons-from-strategic-to-tactical-levels/>
Recall presentation to RUSI(NS): The Maritime Domain of the Russian-Ukrainian War: Implications, Considerations and Lessons for Canada and the Royal Canadian Navy (https://rusi-nsa.ca/maritime_domain_russia-ukraine_war/)

#war

Ten Things I Learned by Skimming Thucydides
<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/skimming-thucydides/>

#military history

What War Leaders Most Underestimate: Duration and Deaths
<https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/what-war-leaders-most-underestimate-duration-and-deaths-11674830698>

Other:

Canadian Defence Academy *The Torch* has added the RUSI(NS) website to its What's New This Week page (<https://cfc-ca.libguides.com/The-Torch/Whats-New?preview=8d01d4c58cd1fa4b02bc759f34e935be>) and three of our products (*Dispatches, Dimensions, Cyber Intelligence Report*) to its Current Awareness page (<https://cfc-ca.libguides.com/c.php?g=709488&p=5055078&preview=8d01d4c58cd1fa4b02bc759f34e935be>).

The Canadian Military Journal Vol. 21, No. 2

<http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/index-eng.asp>

contents:

Canada, the Freeloader, Rather Than Vested Defence Partner in NORAD and the Defence of North America

Russia's Private Military Contractors: Cause for Worry?

The Lockheed CP-140M Aurora, Canada's Current Long Range Patrol Fleet

Making Moral Decisions Under Stress: A Revised Model for Defence

Counterinsurgency and Hybrid Warfare in Vietnam

Mentoring and Motivating Millennials and Post-Millennials at the Unit and Sub-Unit Levels

Canadian Aircraft Serials Personnel Information Resource (CASPIR)

<https://caspir.warplane.com/>

"CASPIR contains documents, images and history of Canada's military aviation. The personnel and aircraft data has been compiled using data provided by trusted Canadian military aviation historians and original source documents. Where possible source documents are linked."

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

Parliament is back in session with serious world issues requiring more attention. Canada and historically Canadian governments have always had difficulties determining when international issues should come to the front and how domestic policies might be directed to support these issues. McKenzie-King understood before the start of the Second World War that the status quo was no longer an option and he started the re-armament of the nation and thinking how one might mobilize the country for a major conflict. There is an increasing number of folks trying to come to grips how this may once again be the case and that Western governments should now take action. The Russia-Ukraine War has been an eye opener. The cost in people, equipment and resources has been horrific and the need for industrial level production is unfortunately necessary. Military production lines are re-opening or are being considered for new production. As we have donated equipment it also became clear we didn't have enough, but we sent what we could. New production to replace that equipment is not readily available at present.

Canada does have some production lines open, the most notable is the Roshel production line of Senator vehicles. More than 500 have been ordered for Ukraine already at Ukraine's request. Ukraine will take adequate over perfect anytime so long as it is available. Canada might learn from that as well. During the buildup of the first Canadian Division in 1939, trucks were taken off civilian production lines and quickly modified. One old signals sergeant stated that when they were sent to France in spring 1940, they were immediately told to get the heck out as fast as they could and to destroy the vehicles of the division signals regiment. They had nothing to do it with so hammers and running engines without oil, etc., were the methods used. He also mentioned that the clocks in the vehicles were actually silver pocket watches. They were easy to take out, apparently, and he got around 30+

silver pocket watches. He gave them out as presents later in his life. The point of the story is, you take what you can get as fast as you can - it may not be perfect, one may have to take silver instead of the gold. The gentlemen in question is long passed but he laughed about it until the day he died. I will say he was a character and a half.

It was sad to hear General Eyre's interview with Mercedes Stephenson this past Sunday, 29 January 2023 on the West Block. His comment about a second "decade of darkness" were telling. General Eyre has had more than his fair share of challenges this year, with little prospect of these issues resolving themselves. One event that highlights the current situation is the flooding of HMCS *Summerside* at her berth recently. The event was well handled by her crew. It apparently was caused by a valve that suffered from corrosion damage allowing the ingress of water. Damage was limited. More importantly, there was an interview with Commander Ken Hansen, RCN retired, for his views on the issue of aging ships. The Kingston-class vessels are now twenty-five years old. This was their intended lifespan but Canada has consistently gone well past the "best before date." Keep in mind the frigates and submarines are older than the Kingstons. This is only one area of concern, the list is almost endless.

United States

The US is once again beset with issues with the new Republican majority in the House...mainly amongst the Republican members themselves. One point that is positive is that generally there is agreement on both the issues in Ukraine and on the situation with Taiwan. Although some of the more vocal members are having their say, there is bipartisan support on these issues.

One issue that the Republicans want to cover is the withdrawal from Afghanistan. There is considerable fear that the arms provided to the Afghan National Security Forces can and will end up in the hands of various groups and conflicts. Certain countries may have received some weapons or are expected to receive weapons, those countries including Yemen, Syria, Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar and several African countries such as South Sudan. The withdrawal has had a numbing impact on the world at its abruptness and its potential fallout, mainly caused by the negotiating tactics of the Trump government which agreed to unreasonable times for a US and NATO withdrawal. Canada as well needs to look at the overall performance in the Afghan withdrawal; it was not pretty and seemed to lack a sense of urgency despite the warnings of former Canadian commanders.

On the plus side, the US has promised at this point 31 Abrams tanks for Ukraine along with a larger package of equipment and ammunition but at present are not willing to allow US designed fighters such as the F-16 to be given to Ukraine.

Iran

Demonstrations have started again in Iran. They are smaller and ruthlessly put down by the regime's forces. This time demonstrators are also facing post demonstration arrests with information that young teenagers of both sexes are prone to attacks which include rape and beatings. Most interestingly, a young man and woman were sentenced to ten years in prison each for the crime of slow dancing; they were filmed having a wonderful time and therefore were arrested for an immoral act. Still, one has to wonder as time goes on whether the regime will continue to survive even with a greater crackdown. Most Iranians were not even born during the Revolution; it is not considered a positive event by the younger generation which is increasingly unwilling to accept the harsh reality that is Iran.

An Iranian naval task force reached Brazil en route to the Panama Canal. It consists of two ships, the multi-purpose ship *Marwan* based on a former oil tanker and the frigate *Dena*. They visited Rio de Janeiro before proceeding along the coast towards their ultimate destination, the Panama Canal.

Last, on 30 January 2023, unidentified drones hit targets in Iran. Targets were identified as involved with weapons production and storage. Iran stated that the attacks were unsuccessful, however, local citizens state something somewhat different. Video shows the Isfahan target being hit followed by multiple explosions. Iran has assisted the Russians by providing several types of drones and are supposedly now considering the provision of various ballistic missiles. The weapons provided will likely end up hitting Ukrainian targets sometime in the near future. The country suspected of this drone attack is the state of Israel.

Belarus

Russian troops continue to increase, however, tanks and self-propelled (SP) guns seem to be missing as yet. Troop levels are estimated to be around 30k but many are air defence, infantry, logistics support and air force units. It does not seem to be an army that would be used in an invasion. Tanks and SP guns are able to be moved quickly by rail but that is readily observable by satellite. What this type of force could be used for is occupation to keep Belarus in the fold. Lukashenko is well aware of this and he also knows he does not have the support of his security forces if Belarus joins the attack on Ukraine nor will his people support him. Lukashenko's ability to make any move in any direction is limited by his own people but also by Putin's forces. An attack from Belarus territory is unlikely to succeed at this point based on forces available.

Russia-Ukraine War

The US and allies have finally agreed to provide tanks to the Ukrainians. The British are providing 14 Challenger 2 tanks, the US will provide 31 Abrams in the first batch, Germany and Poland will provide 14 tanks each, Spain will provide 6, Canada 4 and there are several other offers of more Leopard 2 tanks apparently coming from Norway and Finland. Poland will also provide some 60 modified former Warsaw Pact T-72. More offers are apparently coming from Japan for the T-90 (apparently up to 20) and South Korea as well but no details as yet. This is on top of a very impressive but varied slate of armoured vehicles such as the French AMX-10 RC, the Senator armoured truck, Marder infantry fighting vehicles, M2 Bradley IFV and many more.

The US is preparing to provide a further 2b USD support package to Ukraine. One of the new type of ammunition will be the provision of Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) missiles with a 150 kms range. The US did not provide the much longer ranged Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), approximately 300 kms range. The 150 kms ranged GLSDB missile will cover nearly half of Crimea.

While Ukraine has stated that it is grateful for all the support, one has to wonder whether this vast variety may also cause a massive logistical challenge in practice. It does have the advantage that the Russians may always wonder what they will run into, the suspense alone will kill them. All joking aside, logistics is and will always be a show stopper. All of Ukraine's backers might consider how they might enhance Ukraine's ability to provide key logistics vehicles and capabilities. This is vital.

The war itself has been brutal with both sides taking heavy losses. Russia has continued to make small, mainly insignificant, advances in the area around Bakhmut. There has been greater success in trying to surround Bakhmut and there is some fear that Ukrainian forces may end up at least partially surrounded at least by fire as most supply roads will be cut in some form. Russia continues to plow thousands of

men and considerable material into their attacks with limited support from tanks and artillery. The cost has been estimated in the thousands with recent fatalities estimated to be nearly a thousand in a single day. While Russia's population is still larger than Ukraine's, its demographics will not allow this type of wastage to continue for a prolonged period. Ukraine continues to hold its own in general terms. There are suspicions that Russia will launch a renewed major attack on or about 24 February 2023, the anniversary of the first of the latest attack. Time will tell and so will both military and civilian satellites. Can Russia move sufficient resources to a key sector to provide sufficient punch to impact and possibly break Ukrainian lines? The answer is likely no, but strange things happen in a war.

Russia's war production continues to deteriorate to the extent Russian prisoners are being offered jobs at war production industries especially ones with a need for strong backs and limited education. Tank repair factories in particular but also aircraft repair and production are the key locations. Still, labour is increasingly hard to get. Sanctions also have cut into their ability to build replacements. Most industries have slowed production due to a lack or slowdown in the arrival of parts; the more high tech the less that type of part is available.

Mobilization (unofficial) is also not achieving the desired numbers. A conscript call up is also due to start which is part of a normal conscript intake which occurs twice a year. It is questionable whether this cycle will get its normal number of around 140k. Russia is still unsure of how many people have actually fled the country as well, and numbers could be much higher than thought. There are large concentrations of Russians in many of the neighbouring countries but again, these numbers are suspect. The mobilization base is suggested by Russian figures to be around 8m - how many of these folks are actually still available?

In an interview with CNN's Erin Burnett on 30 January 2023, Mr Abbass Gallyamov, who is a former speech writer for Vladimir Putin and now a political analyst on Russian politics today, stated that President Putin's behavior appeared erratic. He also admitted that Putin appeared better physically than in the recent past. He stated his actions during the war seemed increasingly desperate as shown by his removal of senior officers from command, most recently by his demotion of General Surovikin to a deputy commander under Valery Gerasimov. He suggested that Putin may also suspect a possible coup.

Igor Girkin is no fan of Mr Putin, either. In his interview he pointed out the body doubles that Putin uses and suggests that the real Putin was the one standing all by himself in the church for mass. A small man waiting. Girkin was less than complementary. Certain YouTube channels now show Russian citizens actively criticizing the war openly, something not seen recently. Although Putin's official standing and popularity remain high, it shows considerable weakness. None of these by themselves or together stand for anything more than anecdotal evidence that his popularity may be waning.

The other point is that more than 12 oligarchs have died under suspicious circumstances including one by electrocution in the past week and a half. If the money support goes, where does this leave the regime? The economy is failing, although not as fast as one hoped for with the increased sanctions. With the help of China, North Korea and Iran, it does seem to be more buoyant than expected. Unemployment is high but skilled labour is in short supply. The Moscow Times reported earlier that more than 100k IT experts have left the country. Mobilization has not been particular about who they take, so people with skills have ended up as "cannon fodder."

Well, so what? At the moment, despite all the ill-will most people in the West can muster, it is unlikely that President Putin is in anyway set to lose his job at the moment. Still, it is interesting that negative comments are coming out at all given the security forces' large and all-encompassing mandate

to quash dissidents of all types. One has to wonder. The question has to be asked, what happens if Putin does fall in some fashion whether by disease as suggested, he steps down, or there is a coup. What will the West do then?

China

President Xi has been successful this past year, he achieved in gathering power not seen since Mao as the Party's Core Leader. He also achieved the inclusion of Xi Jinping Thought into the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Constitution. They were and are great achievements worthy of any autocrat. The world has not been kind to Xi this fall, the Belt and Road Initiative is widely seen by many countries as a method of debt diplomacy. Many countries in Africa are calling into question the entire process. In part because of the pandemic, China's own Zero Covid policies, the attack on the tech sector, education sector and private sector, the economy has been set back and exports to the world slowed. Many parts of the economy have failed such as property development and local banks. This was coupled with China's "near" support of Russia, often taking the rhetorical point of view of Russia yet at the same time generally complying with US sanctions. This support of Russia by China was not well received by the European Union and has damaged China's efforts to gain more access to the European market. Many of Xi's policies were seen as methods to keep control and supporting other authoritarian regimes rather than to further the opening of China. This has longer term effects that were not anticipated. The people and the CCP have at least for a short time have become two different entities. This separation between people and party is contrary to the stability and may pose a threat to the survival of the Party. Xi's reign has not gone well, factions are bound to rise. The question is whether Xi is as strong as he was immediately after the 20th Party Congress.

One possible indication of the future is the appointment of a new Vice Premier due the middle of March 2023. He replaces Wang Qishan who is retiring from active politics. This new Vice Premier would be the eighth member of the Central Standing Committee of the CCP. This position is non-voting. It is expected to be Han Zheng, a member of the Jiang Zemin faction of the Party. While non-voting he will be the ears and eyes of the Jiang faction, now led by Zeng Quiahong, a long term Jiang loyalist. According to at least one media outlet, infighting amongst factions is expected to grow especially after the failures of many of Xi's policies.

The trouble with looking at China from the position of the West is we simply do not know how this may play out. Is this a real or manufactured problem which Xi will either ignore or crush. Still, what has been interesting this past six months is how at least the people seem to have separated themselves from the Party - is this serious or can the Party remake its image? Time will tell.

Deception

david D. @secretssql123 26 Jan tweeted: russians saying they hit a 777... umm, my turn. something fishy is going on here, no crew, no vehicle, no ammo, no spent rounds (shell casings).. no deep tire tracks... something is verry not right with this.. replica 777? looks like a dummy to get russia to hit it



(See picture next page) Often in deception it is the supporting details that matter. So when trying to deceive in a very public domain, social media with all its OSINTers just ready to analyze and jump on mistakes, one better be sure that the entire story comes together.



Maps

Tony Stark @Iron_Man_Actual 22 Jan tweeted: The aspect of Taiwan that often gets ignored when people talk about its rugged geography: the human element. All of the most defensible terrain is largely unoccupied and harsh for both invader and defender. That's why your only options are to deter or kill 'em on the beaches. (https://twitter.com/Iron_Man_Actual/status/1617237088637800456)


Interesting approach on using maps and the resulting perspective. Useful for operational planning?




More Maps

For a general perspective of geography and ranges:

https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1619331910081318912



and




Map Symbolology

Good to see APP-6 symbology being used on a map depicting operations.

Jomini of the West @JominiW 31 Jan tweeted

(<https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1620626767366209537>): 1/ Ukraine TVD, 1-31 JAN 23. The first month of 2023 saw a determined effort by the VSRF to finally seize control of Bakhmut in central Donetsk, blunt ZSU advances in Luhansk, and expand territorial control in Zaporizhzhia.

#UkraineRussiaWar #RussianArmy #UkraineFrontLines




Conflict Observatory

<https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/apps/sites/#/home>

Interesting site (interactive maps): "A central hub to capture, analyze, and make widely available evidence of Russia-perpetrated war crimes and other atrocities in Ukraine."


Department of State @StateDept 31 Jan tweeted: The State Department-supported @observeconflict's latest report makes clear the magnitude of Russia's unjustified and horrific destruction of Bakhmut, Ukraine. At least 5,400 buildings have been damaged or destroyed. View the full report:

<https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/apps/sites/#/home/pages/bakhmut-1>



Russian Tank Losses

Dominic Gravina @GravinaDominic 27 Jan tweeted: This is something I've been looking for a while. I'll explain in this thread <https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1618685448901238784>



INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over the last six days, Russian online commentators have claimed Russian forces have made significant advances, breaking through Ukrainian defences in two areas: in Zaporizhzhia Oblast near Oriktiv, and 100km to the east in Donetsk Oblast, near Vuhledar.
- Russian units have probably conducted local, probing attacks near Oriktiv and Vuhledar, but it is highly unlikely that Russia has actually achieved any substantive advances.
- There is a realistic possibility that Russian military sources are deliberately spreading misinformation in an effort to imply that the Russian operation is sustaining momentum.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russia highly likely suffered more than 300 casualties in a strike on troop accommodation at Makiivka near Donetsk City on 01 January 2023. We assess that the majority were likely killed or missing, rather than wounded.
- Following the strike, the Russian Ministry of Defence took the rare step of publicly acknowledging it had suffered casualties, claiming 89 killed. Russian officials likely assessed that it was not viable to avoid comment in the face of widespread criticism of Russian commanders over the incident.
- The difference between the number of casualties Russia acknowledged and the likely true total highlights the pervasive presence of disinformation in Russian public announcements. This typically comes about through a combination of deliberate lying authorised by senior leaders, and the communication of inaccurate reports by more junior officials, keen to downplay their failings in Russia's 'blame and sack' culture.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent weeks, the Russian Ministry of Education has provided more detail on the rollout of the previously announced plan to include basic military training in Russia's secondary school curriculum.
- The module within the 'Basics of Life Safety' course will include training with AK series assault rifles and hand grenades, military drill and salutes, and the use of personal protective equipment. The lessons will become mandatory from 01 September 2023. In addition, in December 2022, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education announced a 'military training basics' programme for university students.
- The initiatives highlight the increasingly militarised atmosphere in wartime Russia, as well as being a (likely deliberate) evocation of the Soviet Union: similar training was mandatory in schools up to 1993.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russian authorities are likely keeping open the option of another round of call-ups under the 'partial mobilisation'. On 22 January 2023, media reported that Russian border guards were preventing dual passport holding Kyrgyz migrant workers from leaving Russia, telling the men that their names were on mobilisation lists.
- Separately, on 23 January 2023, Russian presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that the decree on 'partial mobilisation' continues to remain in force, claiming the decree remained necessary for supporting the work of the Armed Forces. Observers had questioned why the measure had not been formally rescinded.
- The Russian leadership highly likely continues to search for ways to meet the high number of personnel required to resource any future major offensive in Ukraine, while minimising domestic dissent.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In the last three days, Russia has likely developed its probing attacks around the towns of Pavlivka and Vuhledar into a more concerted assault.
- The settlements lie 50km south-west of Donetsk city, and Russia previously used the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade in an unsuccessful assault on the same area in November 2022. Elements of the 155th are again involved as part of an at least brigade sized force which has likely advanced several hundred metres beyond the small Kashlahach River which marked the front line for several months.
- Russian commanders are likely aiming to develop a new axis of advance into Ukrainian-held Donetsk Oblast, and to divert Ukrainian forces from the heavily contested Bakhmut sector. There is a realistic possibility that Russia will continue to make local gains in the sector. However, it is unlikely that Russia has sufficient uncommitted troops in the area to achieve an operationally significant breakthrough.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent days, some of the most intense shelling in the conflict has likely taken place along the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine. This has included continued Russian shelling of Kherson city with artillery firing from the east of the river.
- On 29 January 2023, local authorities reported another three civilians killed in Kherson, while two foreign-owned ships moored on the river were damaged, causing an oil spill.
- Kherson remains the most consistently shelled large Ukrainian city outside of the Donbas. Russia's precise rationale for expending its strained ammunition stocks here is unclear. However, commanders are likely partially aiming to degrade civilian morale and to deter any Ukrainian counter-attacks across the Dnipro River.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russia's role as a reliable arms exporter is highly likely being undermined by its invasion of Ukraine and international sanctions.
- Even before the invasion, Russia's share of the international arms market was declining. Now, when faced with conflicting demands, Russia will almost certainly prioritise deploying newly produced weapons with its own forces in Ukraine over supplying export partners.
- A shortage of components is likely affecting the production of equipment for export, such as armoured vehicles, attack helicopters, and air defence systems. In addition, Russia's ability to sustain support services for existing export contracts, such as providing spare parts and maintenance, is likely to be seriously disrupted for at least the next three to five years.



CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
COMMANDEMENT DU RENSEIGNEMENT DES FORCES CANADIENNES

RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

Russian media claims that the mobilization carried out since late last year has positioned Russian forces to "crush" Ukraine within the next six months.

BASED ON CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND ANALYSIS:

- Russian units are facing serious staffing and equipment shortages. Available forces are mostly being committed piecemeal to ongoing fighting, persistently degrading Russia's reserve of combat power.
- Russia's incremental gains over the winter have come at enormous cost. Their forces are resorting to repeated frontal "wave" attacks against Ukrainian positions, a tactic unlikely to produce a breakthrough.
- Russia's extensive defensive preparations in occupied areas indicate their degree of concern about future Ukrainian counter-offensives. Ukraine retains the overall strategic initiative in the war.

War Art

Defense of Ukraine @DefenceU 26 Jan
tweeted:
Coming. Soon.
Be. Fearful. Enemy.

*Ukraine continues to show its mastery of
information operations across many media.*

