



## Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 10 February 2023

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.*

*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

### **Events:**

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**15 February**, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Brigadier-General G Michael Adamson, Commander 3 Canadian Space Division, titled "3 Canadian Space Division." 1300-1500. Via Zoom. To register, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com) - indicate whether you are RUSI(NS) or, if not, of what department/ agency, unit, association or company you are a member. Put "RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker 15 February 2023 Registration" as the subject line of your email.

*Advance reading: see #space below, and:*

Establishment of 3 Canadian Space Division

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/07/establishment-of-3-canadian-space-division.html>

*and*

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/06/north-american-aerospace-defense-command-norad.html>

**New: 24 February**, Friday - Network for Strategic Analysis presentation "The War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and the Future Political Settlement." 0800-1200 EST. Via Zoom. To register: <https://ras-nsa.ca/event/the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/>

**7 March**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Malign: Gaming Influence in the Information Age." 1800-200 EST. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/malign-gaming-influence-in-the-information-age-tickets-484966807777>

## **Publications:**

Publications without links are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

**New:** RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Note “Canadian Pacific Railway’s ‘Support Our Troops’ Locomotives,” by Adam Meeks, 7 February 2023

<https://rusi-ns.ca/locomotives/>

**New:** Royal Alberta United Services Institute presentation by Cmdre Pat Montgomery "Canada's Naval Reserve: Past, Present, and Future," 20 January 2023

<https://www.rausi.ca/info-events/lunch-and-learn/562-canada-a-naval-reserve-past-present-and-future>

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Types of Royal Canadian Navy Combatant Warships,” 30 January 2023

<https://rusi-ns.ca/types-of-rcn-combatant-warships/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Armoured Fighting Vehicles,” 17 January 2023

<https://rusi-ns.ca/armoured-fighting-vehicles/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note “RCN Ship Pennant Numbers,” 9 January 2023

<https://rusi-ns.ca/rcn-ship-pennant-numbers/>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 1 February 2023

<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, February 2023

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 2, February 2023

Naval Association of Canada recording “Seaspan Shipyards” by Denis Stevens, VP of Government Relations for Seaspan, 9 January 2023

[https://youtu.be/XHKH6MQa\\_eE](https://youtu.be/XHKH6MQa_eE)

**New:** Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, February 2023

<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/183-rausi-dispatches-february-2023>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, February 2023

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* Volume 5 Issue 7

<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 1st Quarter 2023.

**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 16, Issue 7, 6 February 2023




United Services Institute of Nanaimo and North Island *Newsletter*, Vol 31, No 1, January 2023

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* January 2023

<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2022-12>

**Tweeted by @RUSI NS:**

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

<p>ASPI @ASPI_org Jan 15 tweeted: How China's maritime militia takes advantage of the grey zone   Masaaki Yatsuzuka   <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-chinas-maritime-militia-takes-advantage-of-the-grey-zone/">https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-chinas-maritime-militia-takes-advantage-of-the-grey-zone/</a> (How China's maritime militia takes advantage of the grey zone) South-east Asia is region in which @RoyalCanNavy has &amp; will operate as part of CAN🇨🇦 Indo-Pacific Strategy. #RCNavy commanders &amp; ships need to ready to respond to Chinese maritime militia provocation. Share info &amp; lessons with Australia &amp; Japan?</p>	
<p>Innovative, CAN🇨🇦 to use parts from former US presidential helicopter fleet &amp; additional airframes from contractor to build up @RCAF_ARC #search&amp;rescue #SAR helicopter capability. "Canada moves to rebuild search and rescue helicopter fleet" <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/01/26/canada-moves-to-rebuild-search-and-rescue-helicopter-fleet/">https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/01/26/canada-moves-to-rebuild-search-and-rescue-helicopter-fleet/</a> RUSI(NS) retweeted: More at: "RCAF Cormorant airframe to be 'identical' to Norwegian AW101-612; some avionics will differ" <a href="https://skiesmag.com/news/rcaf-cormorant-airframe-identical-norwegian-aw101-612-avionics-differ/">https://skiesmag.com/news/rcaf-cormorant-airframe-identical-norwegian-aw101-612-avionics-differ/</a></p>	
<p>LGen J.J.M.J. Paul, CCA / CAC @Army_Comd_Armees 4 Feb tweeted: Very proud of the work done! @RCAF_ARC support was critical to get the first Leopard 2A4 Tank ready to fly to Europe. This shows that we have the ability with the wider CAF/DND to project significant combat power quickly around the globe. RUSI(NS) retweeted: Demonstrating necessity of strategic #airlift (&amp; #sealift) for @CanadianForces. #CC177 Globemaster III (<a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/air-force/services/aircraft/cc-177.html">https://www.canada.ca/en/air-force/services/aircraft/cc-177.html</a>) significant @RCAF_ARC asset. If CAN🇨🇦 wants make a difference in international affairs, need 'legs' to get there. Defence of Canada starts elsewhere Leopard 2 Tank B-Roll <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/canadianarmy/albums/72177720305781233">https://www.flickr.com/photos/canadianarmy/albums/72177720305781233</a> <i>Nice pictures, though general and not specific to ongoing events.</i></p>	

Anita Anand @AnitaAnandMP 5 Feb tweeted: We've deployed a @RCAF\_ARC CP-140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft to strengthen efforts to disrupt gang activity in Haiti. This aircraft will provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance – and bolster efforts to establish peace and security for the Haitian people.

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Though #CP140 Aurora main role is anti-submarine, aircraft flexibility (sensor updates) allow for overland surveillance <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/02/canada-deploys-cp-140-long-range-patrol-aircraft-to-support-haiti.html> Must be feeding ground op centre (Canada? elsewhere?) correlating info & providing to appropriate authorities. #Airpower security role



Canadian Army @CanadianArmy 4 Feb tweeted: Building on the success of the Digitally Aided Close Air Support system to support surface-to-surface fire missions is CA modernization in action: <https://canadianarmytoday.com/digital-fires-the-next-bound/>

(Digital fires: the next bound)

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Digitally Aided Close Air Support (DACAS) system allows Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) to send digital targeting info collected using laser range finder directly to pilot & aircraft mission computer with just few taps on tablet

*"CAS is air action by fixed-wing (FW) and rotary-wing (RW) aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces." (Joint Publication 3-09.3 Close Air Support)*



Murray Brewster @Murray\_Brewster 7 Feb tweeted: Building Brigades: A look at the challenges Canada, the UK and Germany face in bulking up NATO's eastern flank. #NATO #Ukraine #Latvia


(Building brigades: Canada, NATO allies struggle to shore up Baltic defences against Russian threat

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ukraine-russia-latvia-lithuania-estonia-nato-1.6738735>)

RUSI(NS) retweeted: There are limits to extent CAN🇨🇦 can engage militarily in world affairs based on our willingness to fund @CanadianForces. Our numbers of ships, aircraft, vehicles and especially people means we need be careful & selective. Need public discussion of foreign policy (is?) & strategies









STRATCOMCOE @STRATCOMCOE 23 Jan tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The worsening of relations between RU and the West has pushed RU towards CN putting information operations of both countries on the forefront of the threats assessment for #NATO. Might the #InfoOps of two countries be coordinated? Read more here   
(Dragon's Roar and Bear's Howl: Convergence in Sino-Russian Information Operations in NATO Countries? <https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/dragons-roar-and-bears-howl-convergence-in-sino-russian-information-operations-in-nato-countries/258>)





NATO Association of Canada @NATOCanada 7 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy is a welcome turn to the region, but does the IPS adequately secure Canadian interests? Joseph De Sapia argues the IPS is better understood as an opening dialogue on future policy. (Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy: An Overdue Conversation <https://natoassociation.ca/canadas-indo-pacific-strategy-an-overdue-conversation/>)



Defense AI Observatory @Defense\_AIO 6 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted:  NEW DAIO COUNTRY STUDY   
We are excited to release "When the Teeth Eat the Tail" by @RobertEngen on #defenseAI in #CAN . Get your copy at [https://defenseai.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/DAIO\\_Study2309.pdf](https://defenseai.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/DAIO_Study2309.pdf)  
(When the Teeth Eat the Tail - A Review of Canada's Defence Artificial Intelligence)



Seaspan @Seaspan 6 Feb tweted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "Shipbuilding is a unique art – like a mix of blacksmithery & brain surgery." As we prepare to build the @CoastGuardCAN's new Polar Icebreaker , find out what makes it the crown jewel of their fleet & what steps we're taking to deliver this ship.   
<https://seaspan.com/stories/polar-progress-find-out-whats-happening-behind-the-scenes-in-the-development-of-canadas-new-polar-icebreaker/>  
(Polar Progress: Find out what's happening behind the scenes in the development of Canada's new Polar Icebreaker)



David Pugliese @davidpugliese 7 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS): My latest article....Canadian Army fast-tracking purchase of air defence, anti-tank missiles and counter-drone gear <https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-army-fast-tracking-purchase-of-air-defence-anti-tank-missiles-and-counter-drone-gear> via @ottawacitizen



Royal Canadian Air Force @RCAF\_ARC 8 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The new RCAF strategy is now available! Find out how your Air Force is planning on generating relevant, responsive and effective air and space power at home and abroad for the years to come. → □ <https://www.canada.ca/en/air-force/corporate/reports-publications/royal-canadian-air-force-strategy.html> (Royal Canadian Air Force strategy)

*Full size poster near end of Dispatches.*



General / Général Wayne Eyre @CDS\_Canada\_CEMD 9 Feb tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Yesterday, I sent a message to #CAF leadership on my focus areas for 2023 – Reconstitution, Culture, Operations and Modernization. I encourage all members to read this message and consider how these focus areas apply to their daily work serving Canada.

(Chief of the Defence Staff 2023 Focus Areas <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2023/02/chief-of-the-defence-staff-2023-focus-areas.html>)

*See Message from the Chief the Defence Staff in the Other section of Dispatches.*



Anita Anand @AnitaAnandMP 8 Feb tweeted: 🇹🇷 Türkiye: We're deploying a Global Affairs Canada and @CanadianForces Canadian Disaster Assessment Team to the country to evaluate the situation and to determine the needs of those most affected. Our thoughts are with everyone touched by these major earthquakes. RUSI(NS) retweeted: Canadian Disaster Assessment Team CDAT= experts fm Global Affairs Canada @CanadaFP &





@CanadianForces. CDAT goes to disaster & assesses needs on ground. Recommends whether to send CAF & Disaster Assistance Response Team #DART. CAN🇨🇦 gov't makes final decision <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/types/dart/how-dart-responds.html>

**Camouflage (?)**

Alina Milić @AlinaMilic 3 Feb tweeted: Kuchkovo, building of the Ministry of Defense of Russia. It is good that they use a camouflage net, it hides the Pantsir air defense system well.

Other than the possibility that the troops rigged the netting simply because that is the routine anyways, one kinda wonders whether it is deliberate to send messages to the Russian people, Ukrainians and the West.




**Balloon Busting, 21st Century**

The incident of the Chinese high-altitude (meteorological? surveillance?) balloon over the US provided plenty of opportunities for comment in twitter verse. Some was waggish such as the ‘balloon kill’ marking on the side of F-22 Raptor fighter and some downright made-up (the ‘moral patch’). Some was educational: "The military jets using the call sign ‘FRANK’ is significant. Frank Luke Jr. was an American fighter ace in World War I better known as the ‘Arizona Balloon Buster.’ He is credited with shooting down 14 German surveillance balloons." A lot was simply wrong or speculative, such as whether the balloon could be shot down (that’s now been proven). There was lots of to and fro in the waggery (word?) – someone pointed out the round shape in the upper right corner of the F-22 picture and remarked “You missed one.”



**U.S. AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION CHART**



### Drone Carpet Bomber!

**KUNAL BISWAS** @Kunal\_Biswas707 5 Feb 23 tweeted ([https://twitter.com/Kunal\\_Biswas707/status/1622239057526001664](https://twitter.com/Kunal_Biswas707/status/1622239057526001664), *interesting video*): Impressive Large Improvised Ukrainian Quad Copter With Six Tube Containing Six 81mm Mortar Rounds Which Are Free Fall In Nature And Released In Quick Succession For Achieving Carpet Bomb Runs The 81mm Mortar Has More Or Less Same Shrapnel Dispersion Of 120mm Mortar RU🇷🇺🇺🇦



### Posted on Facebook “Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia”:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

### For Latin American Countries, Geopolitical Competition Begins at Sea

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/latin-american-countries-geopolitical-competition-begins-sea>



"...Latin American countries (could apply to other countries) need to adapt to 21st century geopolitics, be flexible in their approaches to sea power, and seek alliances to deal independently but not separately with global security issues."

Maritime strategy considerations. This is one of Canada's regions. Are there Canadian foreign policy/'strategies' for other than the Indo-Pacific and European regions, that is, South-East Asia and Africa?

### Platform publishes list of ships dismantled worldwide in 2022

<https://shipbreakingplatform.org/platform-publishes-list-2022/>

"In Canada, the illegal breaking of barges and asbestos-laden vessels is negatively affecting the local residents and the indigenous people of Baynes Sound."



Rare that Canada gets a mention in NGO Shipbreaking Platform news releases and reports.

The Canadian Coast Guard appears to be continuing its successful wreck and abandoned vessels program. There doesn't seem to have been much news of late of government ships being sent to the breakers, disposals of late which (good move) seem to have been on the whole through proper (from environmental and labour laws) means.



## US partners Nigeria, others to tackle piracy

<https://punchng.com/us-partners-nigeria-others-to-tackle-piracy/>

"The biggest success perhaps is that piracy statistics in recent years have been coming down and we attribute that to the improved cooperation that we have in West Africa."

Canada is participating with two Kingston-class patrol vessels in Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS 2023, the aim of which is "to improve combined maritime law enforcement capacity, promote national and regional security in Western Africa, and increase interoperability between the U.S., African, and multinational partners." Not getting coverage, but assuredly there are Canadians ashore, as there have been in previous

years exercises, assisting in the operations centres, with training and at other collaborative efforts. It is nice to think that this all may be contributing to reducing piracy in the region. The 'diplomatic' role (along with 'conflict' and 'constabulary') of navies.



## French Navy is erasing pennant numbers on its LHDs

<https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/10279-naval-news-naval-news-february-2023-navy-forces-maritime-defense-industry/12783-french-navy-is-erasing-pennant-numbers-on-its-lhds.html>



The French are removing pennant (a.k.a. hull) numbers from warships. The article doesn't say why. At close range, there are often distinguishing features (the placement of an antenna, the cover of some equipment) that differentiate even between very otherwise very similar ships of the same class. At long range, the numbers aren't visible anyways. So it is difficult to understand the rationale for the French Navy decision not to paint the numbers on its ships. Pennant numbers are useful to sailors, naval and merchant marine, when their vessels are maneuvering in proximity.

For more about pennant numbers, see RUSI(NS) Information Note "RCN Ship Pennant Numbers" (<https://rusi-ns.ca/rcn-ship-pennant-numbers/>).

### Colombian military spots balloon-like object in its airspace

<https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/refile-colombian-military-confirmed-possible-balloon-flying-over-its-airspace-2023-02-05/>

"Colombia's air force said in a brief statement on Saturday that a possible balloon had been detected in its air defense system on Friday morning."

Okay, are modern Western militaries now going to need balloon defence corps?!

*From a member (image is not related to the Columbian story):*  
The two characters, reading from right to left (the traditional Chinese way), is the acronym of CCP (中国共产党).



It is uncertain the image is authentic. It looks like a photoshop to me. At this stage, it is still early to draw any conclusions on the purpose of the balloon.

### Australia and Canada are ideal Indo-Pacific partners

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australia-and-canada-are-ideal-indo-pacific-partners/>

"(Australia and Canada)...would benefit by implementing detailed strategies to guide their relations with other nations and regional multilateral forums."



Canada is a Pacific Ocean state. We need the military and other (diplomatic, coast guard, fisheries, etc.) forces accordingly. Attention needs to be paid, and progress announced, on our Indo-Pacific Strategy.

### Type 26 Frigate Promises Naval Interchangeability

<https://www.armadainternational.com/2023/01/type-26-frigate-promises-naval-interchangeability/>

"Being a 'reference navy'...means 'having an adaptable tactical mentality, at the operational level having convening power, and offering credible sea power to play a part in statecraft at the strategic level.'"



Okay, we've heard the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister declare Canada as a 'convening power' (that seemed to be quickly dropped). Does the Royal Canadian Navy have the aspects of being a 'reference navy'? Maybe, rather than declarations of being a middleweight navy or other (academically relevant only?) classifications, it just gets on what it is doing, and doing well these days, with its job as a globally-engaged navy.

## USA Plan for Potential Arctic Confrontations with “Northern Strike” Exercise

<https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/usa-plan-potential-arctic-confrontations-northern-strike-exercise>

"Both the language and intent of these new (US services') strategies provide a very significant shift where tones of cooperation and support for a cooperative Arctic were replaced with language calling for the redevelopment of hard security capabilities..."

Canada should refresh its Arctic strategy.



## China's military interest in high-altitude balloons is growing, documents reveal

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/china-balloon-documents-1.6738210>

One can be assured that Royal Canadian Air Force planners and operations staff (and historians!) are increasingly considering, wargaming and preparing to handle balloon incursions. Now that would make for an interesting exercise.

*Also:* Why stratospheric balloons are used in era of space-based intelligence

<https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/02/06/how-stratospheric-balloons-could-complement-space-based-intelligence/>

*with links:*

Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade

[http://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/032922\\_Regaining\\_the\\_High\\_Ground\\_Report\\_Final\\_Web.pdf](http://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/032922_Regaining_the_High_Ground_Report_Final_Web.pdf)

US Army floats the option of fielding high-altitude balloons

<https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2020/11/09/us-army-floats-the-option-of-fielding-high-altitude-balloons/>

U.S. military's newest weapon against China and Russia: Hot air

<https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/05/u-s-militarys-newest-weapon-against-china-and-russia-hot-air-00043860>

Balloon Warfare: What is the CCP up to?

<https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2023/02/07/balloon-warfare-what-is-the-ccp-up-to/>

Deflating China's trial spy balloon

<https://www.politico.eu/article/spy-us-nato-deflating-china-trial-spy-surveillance-balloon-us/>

The Soviets Built Bespoke Balloon-Killer Planes During The Cold War

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/the-soviets-built-bespoke-balloon-killer-planes-during-the-cold-war>






### Danish And Finish Companies Ink MoU For Modular Mine-Laying System

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/02/danish-and-finish-companies-ink-mou-for-modular-mine-laying-system/>

Containerized sea mine-laying capability. Considering that the Royal Canadian Navy's Kingston-class and Harry DeWolf-class patrol vessels are built to carry containers, might this be a means to convert them into minelayers? Not something one can envision needed for Canadian ports and coasts, but maybe for an expeditionary capability. Or as an aid to train our ships and sailors in mine countermeasures, a capability much more likely they would need anywhere in the world.

Could the containers be adapted to 'ships (and smaller vessels) taken up from trade' - vessels and craft of opportunity (VOOP and COOP)? And what developments are there for containerizing operation of underwater drones.



### Close Engagement: Land Power in the Age of Uncertainty

[http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/assets/ARMY\\_Internet/docs/en/close-engagement.pdf](http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/assets/ARMY_Internet/docs/en/close-engagement.pdf)

"Sustainment, in the operational support context, usually includes materiel management and distribution, health services, equipment maintenance and recovery, construction services, and personnel support services."

One can be assured that the lessons coming out of Ukraine will very much inform the Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre publication (and following editions) of a concept for operational support.



### How to help Kyiv go on a drone offensive

<https://www.defensenews.com/thought-leadership/2023/02/07/how-to-help-kyiv-go-on-a-drone-offensive/>

There is utility in armaments that are relatively easy and inexpensive to produce in mass (as long as they are effective, too). Could Canada contribute more to the defence of Ukraine by designing such drones, building drone factories, or at least sending parts that would allow Ukrainian factories to make them?

Such actions might also strengthen Canada's military production capability.



### Canadian military plane heads home after two surveillance flights over Haiti

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canadian-military-plane-heads-home-after-two-surveillance-flights-over-haiti-1.6264276>

Two flights, even with the endurance of the CP140 Aurora



patrol aircraft, aren't much time overhead. Probably, at best, strategic and operational level intelligence could be collected - tactical would go 'stale' quickly.

One kinda wonders whether a long-endurance aerial drone would have been a better aircraft for this mission. Bring on the Royal Canadian Air Force's Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (<https://rusi-ns.ca/rpas/>)!

### **Other Sources:**

#### **#A2R**

Recruitment Reality: New Toys Attract

<https://frontline.online/defence/featured/11991-Recruitment-Reality-New-Toys-Attract>

#### **#defence policy**

SIPRI explores global defence spending

<https://frontline.online/defence/featured/12153-SIPRI-explores-global-defence-spending>

#### **#drones #legal**

Wargame of Drones: Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Crisis Escalation

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00220027221106960>

#### **#Indo-Pacific**

Water Wars: Japan's Defense Buildup Signals a Shift Away from Post-WWII

*good roundup:* <https://www.lawfareblog.com/water-wars-japans-defense-buildup-signals-shift-away-post-wwii>

#### **#wargaming**

A few thoughts on @CSIS's recent Taiwan wargaming report

<https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1623115742341128195>

#### **#information operations**

Ways the Russian Machinery Tries to Manipulate Us

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ways-the-russian-machinery-tries-to-manipulate-us/>

#### **#information technology**

Disinformation In the Age of ChatGPT

<https://mwi.usma.edu/disinformation-in-the-age-of-chatgpt/>

#### **#land warfare**

Armies in Retreat Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequences

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Research%20and%20Books/2023/ArmiesRetrt-HeckMills-2023.pdf>

#### **#naval operations #legal**

Rules of Engagement and Undersea Incursions: Reacting to Foreign Submarines in Territorial Waters

<https://cimsec.org/rules-of-engagement-and-undersea-incursions-reacting-to-foreign-submarines-in-territorial-waters/#respond>

## **#naval warfare**

From Eyes Above: Information Architectures for Striking Maritime Targets

<https://cimsec.org/from-eyes-above-information-architectures-for-striking-maritime-targets/>

## **#Russia-Ukraine War**

Is the U.S. Military Capable of Learning From the War in Ukraine?

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/02/us-military-lessons-war-ukraine-russia-weapons-tactics/>

Reflecting on One Year of War: The Decisive Element of Black Sea Strategy

<https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/reflecting-on-one-year-of-war-the-decisive-element-of-black-sea-strategy/>

RAND experts fear stalemate, ‘frozen conflict’ in Ukraine

<https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/rand-experts-fear-stalemate-frozen-conflict-in-ukraine/>

What Russia Got Wrong: Can Moscow Learn From Its Failures in Ukraine?

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/what-russia-got-wrong-moscow-failures-in-ukraine-dara-massicot>

## **#armour**

The Importance of Tanks

<https://frontline.online/defence/featured/12170-The-Importance-of-Tanks>

Tanking Up: Understanding the Materiel—and Moral—Implications of the New Armor Heading to Ukraine

<https://mwi.usma.edu/tanking-up-understanding-the-materiel-and-moral-implications-of-the-new-armor-heading-to-ukraine/>

## **#drones**

Ukraine Is Now Strapping RPGs to Racing Drones to Bomb Invading Russians

*innovation:* <https://www.vice.com/en/article/n7zxp8/ukraine-is-now-strapping-rpgs-to-racing-drones-to-bomb-invading-russians>

## **#FIBUA**

Urban Combat Is Changing. The Ukraine War Shows How

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/02/ukraine-war-shows-how-urban-combat-changing/382561/>

## **#space**

The Growing Complexity of Space: Implications for Security and Stability

[https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en\\_CA/ResearchPublications/202210E](https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/202210E)

Government of Canada supports commercial space launches in Canada

<https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2023/01/government-of-canada-supports-commercial-space-launches-in-canada.html>



Space power and national strategy

<https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world/space-power-and-national-strategy/>

Securing the New Space Domain: An Introduction

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/securing-the-new-space-domain-an-introduction/>

One More Step for NATO's Space Centre of Excellence

<https://www.act.nato.int/articles/nato-space-coe-mou>

## **#strategy**

What is Strategy

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/briefs/what-is-strategy/>

Bringing the Fundamentals of Strategy to IR

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/briefs/bringing-the-fundamentals-of-strategy-to-ir/>

## **#United Kingdom**

Can the British Army still march to the sound of the guns?

<https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2023/02/can-the-british-army-still-march-to-the-sound-of-the-guns>

*Interesting to compare the British Army and its situation to the Canadian Army.*

## **#war**

Examining War's Economic Incentives and Sanctions

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/30/examining-wars-economic-incentives-and-sanctions>

War at the Margins - Indigenous Experiences in World War II

<https://manifold.uhpress.hawaii.edu/projects/war-at-the-margins>

Reconsidering Clausewitz on Friction

<https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/reconsidering-clausewitz-on-friction/>

## **#warfare #FIBUA**

Urban Warfare is Not Exceptional

<https://wavellroom.com/2023/02/03/urban-warfare-is-not-exceptional/>

## **#wargaming**

Wargaming Lessons from Exercise Sea Dragon

<https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/wargaming-lessons-from-exercise-sea-dragon/>

Getting the Story Right about Wargaming

<https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/getting-the-story-right-about-wargaming/>

Other:

## MESSAGE FROM THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF



### Chief of the Defence Staff 2023 Focus Areas

February 8, 2023

Now that we've kicked off 2023, I want to provide an update on the state of the Canadian Armed Forces, my updated focus areas, and the way forward. I still view our primary role as continuing to provide a force that delivers operational excellence in a manner that reflects Canadian identity and values and of which Canadians remain proud. This role is becoming increasingly more difficult as our geopolitical environment shifts at a rapid pace, and we must remain dedicated to propelling this institution forward to achieve our aims. All of us have a part to play in doing so.

We live in an era of a deteriorating global security situation, where the norms, behaviours, and relationships that have underpinned the rules-based international order are at risk from highly capable hostile actors. Simply put, Canada and its allies confront a multidimensional threat environment that undermines democracy and its institutions, which are under attack by adversaries who seek to establish an order based on authoritarianism.

Our armed forces, as the institution charged with defending our country, has an ever more important role to play as global security declines around us, and in the years and decades ahead, we will be called upon more and more to act. This stark reality gives us focus, purpose, and meaning.

What does that mean for us? First, we must remember that the role of the military in a democracy, the hallmark of military professionalism, is to serve the will of the people represented by their duly elected officials. It means that even though we are a reflection of the culture norms/values of Canadian society, the added trust and responsibilities we have necessitates a higher level of conduct that is beyond reproach.

Next, it means doing what we can, within our own sphere of influence and control, to be the best that we can be at our profession, to be solid leaders and teammates, while all the time looking after our subordinates, each other, and ourselves. It means being individually ready for whatever may come and resilient in the face of challenge. Indeed, I am under no illusion as to our challenges as an institution. In fact, I am reminded that the CAF has always had challenges throughout its history and, as we face the challenges of today, we would all do well to remember the good things and the tremendous strengths that define us as members of the profession of arms. Our honourable purpose, unwavering commitment, teamwork and camaraderie, and enduring selfless service have never been more important to bring to bear than now.

For me, all of this means channeling my own energy and bandwidth toward four focus areas, or lines of effort, that I believe are necessary for us to rebuild our readiness and the armed forces. They are Reconstitution, Culture, Operations, and Modernization. I do not label them 'priorities', as they are all closely linked, indeed, mutually supporting, and must advance in parallel, with individual activities within them moving up and down the list as circumstances demand.

## **Reconstitution**

Reconstitution is a term many of us in the military are already quite familiar with, and we apply reconstitution measures often at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, as needed to restore units to an acceptable level of readiness. The intent of CAF Reconstitution is to rebuild our personnel strength by concentrating on recruiting, retention, and modernizing our personnel system. The limiting factor, a strategic resource, is mid-level leadership, which must be well-targeted on high value activities. There is no silver bullet for Reconstitution, no one activity that we can stop doing to redirect capacity. Rather, every activity we undertake, every new task that is offered to us, every new policy, must be viewed through the lens of reconstitution. What does it cost us if we do it? What relative value does it add? What are the risks and impacts if we delay or stop doing it? How does it serve the institution as a whole? I ask you all, especially those of you in command positions, to take a critical eye on our activities.

There are many initiatives underway that will support Reconstitution, too numerous to list here. Recruiting modernization is proceeding apace, concentrating on streamlining the process, including medicals and the on-line experience, and increasing advertising and attractions activities. We have recently opened all occupations to permanent residents, and in the weeks that followed we received thousands of applicants from those who wish to offer meaningful service to their new country. As well, beyond recruiting, work is underway to increase efficiencies in the training pipeline, to reduce wait times and look at creative ways of achieving individual qualifications while addressing what I like to call our “quality of service” through a range of retention initiatives. In all respects, everything is on the table.

## **Culture**

The culture of our institution is another area on which I continue, like you, to put much focus. Our culture is a tangible manifestation of who we are as a military. We need to be a military that reflects and lives up to the values and professional expectations articulated in the Canadian Armed Forces Ethos: Trusted to Serve, published last year. I ask all of you to weave it into the fabric of your lives.

Our culture, rightly in my view, has come under much scrutiny in recent years. Having an inclusive, respectful, and safe workplace where all feel they belong and can contribute to our larger mission of defending the country is essential. Likewise, we need to inculcate more of a culture of innovation, calculated risk tolerance, continuous learning, security awareness, and reframing our situational understanding. At the same time, our culture must continue to promote selfless service, the willingness to go into harm’s way to get the job done, and the protection of others.

There is concrete action underway at the strategic level as well as grassroots activities at the unit level, and we are being held accountable for our progress. This includes the ongoing implementation of the recommendations from the Independent External Comprehensive Review, and the recent update to Parliament on our efforts. It is most certainly too early to declare success, and I know that there will be failures and missteps along the way - we are, at the end of the day, a human organization - but we must continue to learn and progress, take the higher road and stay above the fray.

We must continue to go forward focusing on this existential aspect of our profession, always remembering that we need to adapt and accept risks to achieve meaningful change, and in everything that we do we must serve Canada in line with the expectations of Canadians, however they may evolve, and ultimately always do the right thing.

## **Operations**

While we reconstitute and evolve our culture, the operational demand has not and will not subside. That said, I am viewing every ongoing operation and new demand through the lens of reconstitution. In



doing so, we must consider several questions: What can we realistically generate and achieve the necessary strategic effect? What is the opportunity cost? How can we maximize deployment opportunities for our junior members while continuing to grow the CAF? What activities or other operations are we willing to cease so we can undertake new ones?

The situation in Ukraine is a case in point. This is, literally, the front line for defending the rules-based international order (or truly the front line of freedom) and we must maintain our resolve to do our part, without widening the war, to see Russian aggression defeated. To do this we must continue to evolve our training, equipment, and other supports as the war progresses. This will not be a short-term commitment.

Rebalancing our footprint in the world based on national priorities is a constant challenge. The recently released Indo-Pacific Strategy is another example, where we will be very targeted in what, when, and who we deploy, especially balancing the capabilities of the Royal Canadian Navy between this region and the rest of the world. Adding to this requirement for balance, we will continue to be heavily engaged in Europe with Operations UNIFIER and REASSURANCE, and increasingly so with our presence and expertise in the Arctic and other areas of continental defence. It will not be easy, and we'll not be able to satisfy all as everyone wants more CAF.

### **Modernization**

We cannot be so consumed with the challenges of today that we mortgage our future, and thus modernizing the CAF continues to be an area of focus. We must continue to implement the plans set out in Canada's defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged as well as those that are part of NORAD Modernization. We must continue with our efforts to bring about a digital force, built on standards and technologies that empower CAF joint operations and operations with our partners and allies. We must continue to develop our future operating concepts and force structure and fortify operational sustainment as a function that underpins all operations at home and abroad.

Russia's war in Ukraine has shown us many lessons about both the changing character and the enduring nature of war. We must incorporate these lessons, from the tactical to the strategic, with a sense of urgency.

This speaks to the absolute criticality of the forthcoming Defence Policy Update that was directed last spring. I strongly believe it must address a host of critical concerns that underpin our readiness to defend Canada, Canadian interests, and national prosperity in the dangerous years ahead.

### **Conclusion**

We are on the cusp of tremendous change, in each of these four focus areas and beyond, and that change will only be possible with you, and those with the dedication like you, serving our country. Military service is not easy, but it does provide a transcendent purpose – to be part of something bigger than one's own self and truly focused on the greater good.

We face difficult times, times that require resilience and commitment. I am committed to doing everything I can, with the time I have left to serve, to constantly improve our armed forces, your conditions of service, and ultimately our ability to succeed in operations and in war.

Your country will need your service more and more into the future, even though all may not fully appreciate the magnitude of the growing threats. I ask all of you to look after your subordinates and colleagues, your families and friends, and yourselves—you are all part of a force for good in a dangerous world. At the end of the day, we will continue to be called upon to do many things, but we must not forget that the ultimate manifestation of a military's role is to fight and win. If we truly keep

ourselves focused on this objective, we will succeed while continuing the sacred legacy of service of those who came before us.

W.D. Eyre  
General  
Chief of the Defence Staff

### **Reconstitution**

Reconstitution is an operation that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. Reorganization is all measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat effectiveness or return it to a specified level of combat capability.

(*US Army pub, not NATO: ATP 3-94.4 Reconstitution Operations* May 2021

[https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR\\_pubs/DR\\_a/ARN32296-ATP\\_3-94.4-000-WEB-1.pdf](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN32296-ATP_3-94.4-000-WEB-1.pdf))

### ***The Watch***

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Professional Military Journal on Homeland Defense

Dear Sir or Madam,

*The Watch* is a professional military journal on Homeland Defense published by U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The goal of *The Watch* is to strengthen U.S. security partnerships and provide an international forum to address global Homeland Defense issues and challenges. The publication is geared to our Allies and partners including senior military leaders, high ranking government officials, and academic professionals.

As influential leaders, we encourage you to reserve your copy of our next issue “The Arctic and Homeland Defense” (Volume 4) at [Contact Us – The Watch \(thewatch-magazine.com\)](https://thewatch-magazine.com). In addition, follow *The Watch* website for top stories on Homeland Defense issues and challenges as well as participate in our Arctic eTalks and Arctic Academic eTalks distinguished speaker series.

*The Watch* community is an important platform for us to share information on emerging threats, innovative ideas, cutting-edge technologies, and engage with other influential leaders in the field of Homeland Defense. We invite you to contribute original articles highlighting your country's successes in Homeland Defense and Security.

We thank you for your continued support and look forward to your participation in USNORTHCOM's *The Watch* community.

Very respectfully,

Dr. Ben  
Dr. Benjamin P. Gochman  
Program Manager - The Watch  
U.S. Northern Command  
Professional Military Journal

## NOSI – Naval Open Source Intelligence

<https://nosi.org/>

"Operational naval news, curated from open source intelligence, intended to serve as a source of continuing naval education."

### Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

#### O Canada

As noted in an earlier note, Bill C-21 has been postponed as more work is to be done to ensure the list of weapons affected do not include weapons normally used for hunting and professional sports shooting. Still, the push made to help ensure the bill's passage caused considerable angst and a distinct lack of trust between rural ridings and major urban areas. Withdrawal of the bill for further work was appropriate. Time will tell whether this bill will actually be passed in a modified form. What was clear was the bill did little to actually prevent gun crime which apparently comes from cross border smuggling of illegal weapons.

There are other bills which also cause concern, not so much from the content or current intent of the bills but rather the possibility that in their current form they could be used in an anti-democratic way. This includes bill C-11, the On-line Streaming Act, and Bill C-18, the On-Line News Act, which place power in the hands of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. There are major concerns even amongst government about the efficacy of these bills and the possibility of misuse or issues caused by the appointment of an ill-prepared, ill-equipped agency to conduct the level of scrutiny required. What was really troubling was the final comment in a story by Mobile Syrup called "Ministers Rodriguez and Champagne outline new CRTC chair's expectations in letter." It was the comment by the new head of the CRTC, Vicky Eatrises, stating: "It's a top priority for the organization because what we've done is not working." It indicates that there is already a definite point of view without examining the evidence first. It might explain Canada's fall from the top ten of free countries to number thirteen. Placing portions of free speech in the hands of a bureaucrat is not a matter that raises confidence, particularly one with apparently fixed ideas.

Canada's first of four tanks made world headlines as video showed the Leopard 2 being loaded aboard a Globemaster III at Halifax for the move to Europe. It showed that Canada was doing something to support Ukraine - that was very clear. Canada has done what it can with its limited abilities and crippled military. It also shows that Canada chose to send the tank by the most expensive way possible, 68 tons of tank by aircraft. As General Hillier stated early in his tenure as the Chief of Defence Staff: "We need a honkin' big ship." Once again we chose image over capability.

The last item of note is Canada's non-response to our air space being broached by a Chinese balloon that may or may not been on a reconnaissance mission. The US media made the announcement of the incursion and not the Canadian Government. The questions are: did our current North Warning System (NWS) fail to detect the incursion? Was the RCAF called to investigate? What was done? More in the US part of this note.

#### United States

The issue of the balloon has taken over the agenda of the US and its relationship with China. The Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, was supposed to visit China in the hopes that some of the goodwill created during the last G20 between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. This visit was postponed. Chinese Defence Minister, Wei Fenghe, also turned down a telephone call by Lloyd Austin after the balloon was shot down. Generally, except for the last comment, China has not made a huge scene over

the balloon's demise, however, they did state that they would take action if a similar incident occurred within Chinese territory. The trouble with this response is that China considers the whole of the South China Sea and the Straits of Taiwan and Taiwan itself to be Chinese territory. The possibilities of an unfortunate mishap are greatly increased. In the recent past, a US unmanned surface drone was seized for a short time by the Chinese Coast Guard. The drone was released back to the US – China may not be do next time.

Joe Biden gave his State of the Union address this week. MAGA Republicans made themselves known, despite efforts by both parties to keep the event more civil. At times it was not a pretty sight. The divided House does impose certain limitations on the Biden Presidency, but there seems to be some attempt to cooperate despite divisive issues. Support to Ukraine is one that both parties are in agreement as is a stronger position on China. Time will tell if there will be gridlock or whether more cooperation is possible in key areas such as the debt ceiling. Time will tell but a default would have massive and wide ranging effects on the US and world economy.

### **Iran**

Iran pardoned "tens of thousands" of prisoners including many who had been arrested in recent demonstrations. The amnesty will not cover dual nationals or those accused of "capital crimes" such as displaying "corruption on Earth," a sort of catch all law. Only four protesters have been officially executed from actions surrounding the demonstrations to date although this may be higher due to the opacity of the regime.

Demonstrations have largely downsized across the nation although the Baluchistan area and the Kurdish area are still restive. Information is still getting out to the world and information still continues to flow into the country courtesy of VPNs and satellite uplinks which the government appears to have had minimal success in containing. Iranians from outside the country maintain that although demonstrations are smaller and less conspicuous, there is a greater level of coordination throughout the country including a nascent leadership group. They also stated in an interview that the demonstrations will restart once a more concrete plan is available. Whether this is wishful thinking or a fact is another question.

Iran announced and demonstrated the new underground base called "Eagle 44" at an unspecified location. The base has a complement of drones and manned aircraft including older F-4 Phantoms and Su-24 bombers in its television article. It will later host the new Su-35 fighters to be acquired from the Russian Federation. The news article and announcement were in response to a joint US-Israeli exercise being held in Israel. Russia and Iran are negotiating increased cooperation which includes the provision of drones and missiles to Russia and the provision of modern aircraft to Iran. Further coordination is expected while the Russia- Ukraine War continues.

### **Belarus**

The Ukrainian news outlet Ukrainska Pravda stated that neither Belarus nor Russian troops are near the Belarus-Ukraine border at present. Belarus and Russia ended air exercises recently and Russian aircraft have remained at Belarus air bases as of 7 February 2023. It was the end of the second period of exercises conducted between the two nations. Ukrainian articles this week indicated that Ukraine is well prepared for an attack from the Belarus border, and that there were about 27 Ukrainian brigades located in the area of concern. The border area is mainly swamp so there are limited axes of advance for any attacking force to exploit. Belarus itself seems content to appear to be doing something vice actually supporting the Russian effort. There is some belief that Russia has withdrawn troops from Belarus and redeployed them to the Donbass. This is not verified but this comment came from DW



News about one week ago in an interview with Katia Glod, a fellow at the European Leadership Network.

The Polish journalist Andrzej Poczobut was sentenced to eight years in prison by Belarussian courts finding him guilty of two charges: "fomenting hate" and "acting to the detriment of Belarus." The arrest was conducted in 2021 and he has been imprisoned since that time. He had first drawn attention to himself in Belarus in 2011 when he was arrested for a first time. He has been an ongoing thorn in the side of the Lukashenko regime. The article was published this week by Polish Radio. Poland considers him to be a prisoner of conscience.

### **Russia-Ukraine War**

The war continues with heavy attrition on both sides, however, one estimate suggests that the ratio is seven Russian casualties to a single Ukrainian one. Despite this ratio, Russia continues to attack especially in the east around Soledar and Bakhmut. In most other areas there are clashes of limited size. Russia is continuing to attack this particular area and has achieved some marginal success. The biggest rumour is that Russia will open a major offensive within the next two weeks with the view in mind of achieving a noticeable effect not later than the anniversary date of the start of the war on 24 February 2023. Despite this theory, it does not appear that Russia has the necessary combat capability to conduct this size operation, with several commentators stating that the offensive has already started and Russia's ability is simply too little too late. Time will tell.

Ukraine has received assurances of more Western weapons in the near future with best estimates of the earliest arrival being the end of March. This will allow for training of crews for the various types of tanks being acquired. The newest type of tank promised is the venerable Leopard 1 which will be provided by several nations. There is an estimate that nearly 200 Leopard 1 will be made available along with Soviet-era, Challenger 2, Leopard 2 and Abrams tanks as well. Ukraine will also receive more air defence equipment and ammunition for NATO-provided artillery. Ukraine will also receive many types of armoured personnel carriers including the M113, Marder, Bradley M2, Senator, the US version of LAV used in Stryker brigades and the newest Canadian version of the Armoured Support Vehicle. While plentiful, the variety of vehicles will pose and training and logistical challenge to Ukraine.

The actual success of either side is in the balance. Will Russian manpower result in a victory or will Ukraine's ability to adapt to new equipment and training make the difference? While a battlefield victory either by Ukraine or Russia might not provide the necessary impetus for peace talks there are very relevant other factors. Russia has through its own propaganda developed a picture for the general public that they are, in fact, fighting NATO and not just Ukraine. Such a message provides cover for any defeats on the battlefield although ones suspects that some of the messages from outside Russia may get through, so time is a limitation. Russia also has to consider the outcome of a deteriorating economy. While Russia has made an excellent effort to circumvent sanctions and kept the appearance of economic success there is a downward economic trajectory. Failure cannot be hidden forever.

If Ukraine were to be defeated a number of issues might ensue. Creation of a one-sided peace deal which would effectively cut Ukraine from the West and potentially include whatever is left of unoccupied Ukraine under a sanctions regime similar to Russia and likely a further economic and population decline. The population would be restive at best and Russians universally hated within Ukraine proper. Low level insurgent activity would likely continue for at least a short period.

What would create conditions for a Russian victory? First, support from other nations. Most countries have not condemned Russia including virtually all of Africa, South East Asia, South West Asia and

South America. Russia and its allies have already developed a system to get Russian oil and gas to market using a large number of ghost tankers. These ships are provided by a number of countries, but all are willing to conduct these operations for a price. Poor nations are more than happy to receive cheap oil and gas. At the same time, Russia gets a flow of money into its coffers. The real battle is to get some sort of control over these situations without causing alarm or forcing the non-aligned countries to make a decision against Ukraine and the West. It is a difficult process. One point is clear, the West may not be the favourite in this situation as far as the non-aligned community is concerned. It should be major concern for the West as a whole.

The last point on the war is that Russia still maintains the largest nuclear arsenal in the world. The number is estimated to be just under 6k warheads of which 1.5k are active and are capable of launching within a short period. While the number is daunting, there is no indication at present that there has been any increase in readiness. The current status of the Russian arsenal is unknown but Russia is not noted for its maintenance and training, so its nuclear arsenal remains a wild card. A severe loss may cause some consideration of a nuclear response as we have seen and heard from time-to-time during this conflict. Consideration of this factor must remain at top of mind, it is the only real card Russia has to play. This could be played many ways such as providing a weapon or weapons to Iran. Clear understanding and knowledge of this challenge is essential.

The war will likely come to a head this year, likely during the summer. This does not mean the end of fighting, but rather a situation when neither side has the resources to continue the fight. Western apathy is likely to appear as the war extends into the fall. Time is the key element, can either side deliver a sufficient blow? The other point is that fate is fickle - what if a key figure is suddenly gone from the picture from either natural or unnatural causes? What happens if China and the US have an accident that causes a major disruption in world affairs? The bottom line is that the situation could change radically in a short period of time with little warning and even with malice aforethought. The one thing absolutely certain is uncertainty.

President Zelensky visited the UK to thank the UK Parliament for their support and to ask for fighter aircraft. He also thanked King Charles the Third for his ongoing support for Ukrainian refugees. The UK has consistently supported Ukrainian efforts to free their occupied lands. It has often been the leader in new initiatives and often leads the way such as the recent provision of tanks.

## **China**

In looking at the Chinese English language press, one might be surprised to see virtually nothing on the massive outbreak of Covid 19 that has affected most of China. Yet satellite imagery shows huge line ups of hearses to enter crematoria and a large number of videos sent from various parts of China showing hospitals filled to capacity and waiting areas filled with those suffering with the disease. Yet little in the media that shows anything to help the Chinese people understand the magnitude of the problem as China goes from Zero Covid policy to a policy free movement. China continues to be opaque with its information and leaves one little trust in official figures on the pandemic.

While on the subject of China's official numbers, Reuters produced an article called "China Reopening is a Wild Card for Canada Sticking Economic Soft Landing" by Steve Scherer and Fergal Smith on 6 February 2023. The article was over the top with enthusiasm for Canada to take advantage of China's reopening as Canada was such a major commodity supplier. While one can admire their enthusiasm, one might also take a look at China's ongoing economic fiasco which continues to destroy vast amounts of wealth, drive businesses to bankruptcy while being creative with their own laws to gain control over private business. China's massive debt makes any investment a true gamble. It might be true but countries nearer China do not share the author of the article's view, one that is overly optimistic.

The balloon incident this past week has caused considerable angst across the globe. The balloon program has been in existence for several years and there may have been as many as three previous overflights during the Trump administration and this one. There are some indications that perhaps they had over flown portions of the US before this time as well. Until the US is able to determine from the wreckage the exact nature of the program, we will not know for sure whether it was an innocent balloon or something very different.

China has blamed the US for the entire matter and essentially argued that the US overreacted. They took no responsibility in the media for their own actions which set in motion the actions that took place off the South Carolina coast. China further stated that the US actions against the balloon would be considered if a similar situation were to occur over Chinese territory. While understandable, one has to wonder how far Chinese authorities are willing to push the issue. This incident may be just the start of an ongoing struggle. In recent past, China tried to acquire one of the US unmanned surface vehicles, but gave it back when asked. A Chinese official stated today that the US should just get over it. An interesting comment given what China would have done under similar circumstances. What happens now?

The last note on China. Taiwan is an independent liberal democracy that was the refuge of the remnants of the Army of Chang Kai-Shek after the Communist Revolution. It became the Republic of China and remained on the UN Security Council until the Peoples' Republic gained control of the agenda in the 1970s. It has never been part of China as it exists now. It maintains the right to defend itself from a forceful takeover of the island. Although there is a series of memoranda on the "one China Policy," the Nationalist Chinese did not agree that it would be the Peoples' Republic, hence a bit of a problem.

Taiwan has watched the Russia-Ukraine War with interest. It has concluded that mines will be an essential part of any defence of the island, at the same time capable of inflicting massive casualties and damage on any attacking force. To this end, Taiwan has acquired or is acquiring suitable systems to provide a meaningful series of defence measures using mines. The first is the land system called Volcano. It is system that is loaded on a ten-ton truck and is capable of producing a large minefield with a mix of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Each load contains 960 mines.

The Navy has formed two Mine Warfare Squadrons along with acquiring a series of sea mines from tethered contact mines to bottom mines able to differentiate between types of ships. It is thought that rapid deployment of minefields opposite suitable landing beaches would inflict fairly major casualties. Interestingly enough, an article stated that 14 out of 18 sinkings of major vessels were caused in part by mines. Mines are cheap and easily produced at a mere fraction of the cost in comparison to effort required to clear them. This was an article by Prakash Nanda on 6 February 2023 in the Eurasian Times. Both Ukraine and Taiwan have to think outside the box in dealing with allegedly more capable enemy. Asymmetrical answers to a thorny problem may provide the answer for success.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- The scale of Russian paramilitary Wagner Group's convict recruitment programme has probably significantly reduced from its peak between summer and autumn 2022.
- The Russian Federal Penal Service (FSIN) figures released on 31 January 2023 reported a national penal population of 433,000, suggesting a decrease of 6000 inmates since November 2022. In contrast, FSIN data had indicated a decrease of 23,000 from September to November 2022. Wagner recruitment was likely a major contributing factor to this drop.
- Separately, anecdotal evidence from Ukrainian combatants over the last ten days suggests a reduced Russian reliance on human wave style assaults by Wagner convict fighters in key sectors. Significant tensions between Wagner and the Russian Ministry of Defence are playing out in public; competition between factions in the Russian elite is likely to be partially responsible for the reduced supply of convicts.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- The Russian military has formally integrated occupied areas of Ukraine into its Southern Military District. On 03 February 2023, Russia state news agency TASS reported that the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics and the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions are being placed under the three-star command which is headquartered in Rostov-on-Don.
- This follows Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu's January announcement that military expansion would include the establishment of 'self-sufficient force groupings' in Ukraine.
- The move highlights that the Russian military likely aspires to integrate newly occupied territory into a long-term strategic posture. However, it is unlikely to have an immediate impact on the campaign - Russia currently deploys forces from across all of Russia's military districts, commanded by an ad hoc deployed headquarters.



## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 01 February 2023, Russian Federation Council chair Valentina Matvienko said that regional elections will take place in the newly annexed areas of Ukraine on 10 September 2023.
- Incorporating the elections into same day of voting which is scheduled across Russia highlights the leadership's ambition to present the areas as integral parts of the Federation.
- This follows continued efforts to 'Russify' the occupied areas, which include revision of the education, communication, and transport systems. While meaningful democratic choices are no longer available to voters at even regional level elections in Russia, leaders will likely make the self-vindicating argument that new elections further justify the occupation.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- It is highly likely that Russia has been attempting to re-start major offensive operations in Ukraine since early January 2023. Its operational goal is almost certainly to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held parts of Donetsk Oblast.
- Russian forces have only managed to gain several hundred metres of territory per week. This is almost certainly because Russia now lacks the munitions and manoeuvre units required for successful offensives. Senior commanders likely make plans requiring undermanned, inexperienced units to achieve unrealistic objectives due to political and professional pressure.
- Russian leaders will likely continue to demand sweeping advances. It remains unlikely that Russia can build up the forces needed to substantially affect the outcome of the war within the coming weeks.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since Russia withdrew its forces from the west bank of the Dnipro in November 2022, skirmishing and reconnaissance has continued on the complex network of islands and waterways which make up the Dnipro delta.
- Russian forces have almost certainly used small boats to try to main a presence on key islands; Ukraine has successfully deployed long-range artillery to neutralise Russian outposts a number of times. Both sides have likely also deployed small groups on the Kinburn Spit, which commands the Dnipro Gulf.
- Both sides are likely aiming to maintain a presence in these areas to control maritime access to the strategically important river and to provide warning of any attempt by their adversaries to launch a major assault across the river. It is highly unlikely that Russia will attempt an assault crossing of the Dnipro: it would likely be extremely complex and costly.

### Royal Canadian Air Force Strategy

Dear friends,

It is with great pleasure I provide to you today the Royal Canadian Air Force Strategy. This document has been in development for the past 18 months and represents a vision and path for the future of the RCAF over the next decade.


The RCAF is on the cusp of unprecedented modernization. We are the beneficiaries of significant investments in equipment, infrastructure and capabilities that, once fully realized, will place the RCAF on par with the most advanced air forces in the world. The recent announcement of the acquisition of the F-35 as our new fighter, with associated infrastructure and equipment upgrades is testament to that investment. Meanwhile, we recognize that our capacity and capabilities are below where we want them to be. For the sake of our collective security and defence, we need a clear and achievable path forward.

The RCAF Strategy provides the overarching guidance for our collective efforts over the coming years. The Strategy contains four strategic objectives and a series of actions required to achieve those objectives. It is an ambitious and achievable undertaking that will set the RCAF on a solid footing to ensure we are prepared to act decisively when needed – either here at home or in support of our allies and partners around the globe.

As steadfast supporters of the RCAF your organizations are key partners in communicating with Canadians about your air and space force, the value a robust air and space force brings to Canada and Canadians, and the impact these forces have in a modern network-enabled battle space. It is no understatement to say your continued support is essential and valued for our collective successes in the exciting times ahead. To that end, I would be grateful if you would share the RCAF Strategy with your association.

LGen / Lgén Eric J. Kenny, CMM, MSC, MSM, CD





# RCAF STRATEGY


PEOPLE • READINESS • MODERNIZATION • PARTNERSHIPS

## VISION

Achieve operational advantage as an agile, integrated and inclusive air and space force.

## MISSION

Generate relevant, responsive and effective air and space power at home and abroad.



## STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

**VALUE OUR PEOPLE AND INVEST IN THEIR FUTURE**  
An agile, diverse and relevant workforce through professional development and personal growth.

**READY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS**  
Mission-ready, combat-capable forces achieving operational excellence at home and abroad.

**MODERNIZE FOR TOMORROW**  
Innovating at the speed of relevance to achieve and maintain operational advantage.

**ENGAGE AND PARTNER FOR SUCCESS**  
A respected force possessing the relevant capabilities to integrate effectively with allies and partners.

