



## Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 17 March 2023

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.*

*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

### Defence Policy Review

The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces have opened public consultations to all Canadians on the defence policy review. The review (a.k.a. Defence Policy Update – DPU) has been a topic of discussion in the RUSI(NS) Security Affairs Committee (SAC) for many months. It appears that comments from individuals rather than organizations is the approach being taken for the review, though there is an opportunity to list the organization of choice in a submission. Members of RUSI(NS) and other readers of *Dispatches* are encouraged to make a submission. See the text box at the beginning of the Other section to the 10 March edition of *Dispatches*. Note the **closing date of 30 April 2023**.

It is easier to write answers to the review's questions on a separate document rather than filling in the boxes on the review webpage (<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-defence-policy/we-want-to-hear-from-you.html>). The SAC has copied the questions onto a document and can provide that to anyone to assist with their submission. Email RUSI(NS) for a copy.

### RUSI(NS) Annual General Meeting

The RUSI(NS) AGM will be held via Zoom on Tuesday, **March 21st**, 2023 at **1930** to 2030 hrs. The agenda and annual reports will be sent out shortly. The email included the zoom coordinates, meeting ID and passcode. Please test your zoom account prior to the meeting to ensure that you have the latest version and are able to sign in. If you have a question, you can contact Blair at [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

## **Events:**

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**New: 21 March**, Tuesday - Maritime Forces Atlantic Defence Visible Minority Advisory Group and Department of National Defence Eastern Canada Stakeholder Engagement Office panel discussion and in-person networking "International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination." 1300-1500. Ballroom, Wardroom, CFB Halifax. See text box at end of *Dispatches*. [Note that the Stakeholder Engagement Office is a major partner of RUSI(NS) in arranging speakers and events.]

**New: 22 March**, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) and Royal Canadian Legion Calais Branch, Lower Sackville, will host Colonel (ret'd) Nishika Jardine, the Veterans Ombud, speaking primarily with her priorities for the office. 1130 coffee for noon start for 1330 finish. Royal Canadian Legion Calais Branch, 45 Sackville Cross Road. Pass the word.

**New: 22 March 2023**, Wednesday - École de Guerre Networking Group and Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies event "War in Ukraine: How Will Western Alliances Redefine Their Position." 1400 - 1800 CET. Hybrid (follow on YouTube). To register: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/war-ukraine-how-will-western-alliances-redefine-their-position>

**22 March**, Wednesday - Royal Alberta United Service Institute presentation by Commander Nicole Robichaud, Commanding Officer HMCS *Margaret Brooke*, speaking about her recent experiences onboard, including Operation NANOOK. 1900 Mountain time. Via Zoom. To register: [https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZMUceGurTgsEtz1NIUSgCy0yYbyn4\\_ocjUQ](https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZMUceGurTgsEtz1NIUSgCy0yYbyn4_ocjUQ)

**New: 25 March**, Saturday - Edmonton United Services Institute Annual Symposium and Mess Dinner ""Natural Disaster Management and Mitigation - Non-partisan Dialogue in Fact, Science, Policy, and Practice." Symposium 0900-1620. Mess/Semi-formal Dinner 1830. See text box and poster at end of *Dispatches*.

**12 April**, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Assistant Rear-Admiral Santarpia. 1300-1500. Nova Scotia Room, Wardroom. MTF.

**18 April**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation by Colin Marston, UK Defence Wargaming Centre, and Graham Longley-Brown, lead author for the MOD Wargaming Handbook, titled "Influence Wargaming Handbook." 1200-1400 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/influence-wargaming-handbook-tickets-524664865737>

**16 May**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "The Politics of Play: Wargaming with the US Military." Noon-1400 EST. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-politics-of-play-wargaming-with-the-us-military-tickets-415461174557>

**24 May**, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Brigadier-General Masson. 1300-1500. Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess. MTF.

**New: 13 June**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Influence Wargaming Handbook." 1200-1400 EDT. Online To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/influence-wargaming-handbook-tickets-524664865737>

## **Publications:**

Publications without links are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

**New:** RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Note “Naming Tanks in the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps” by John Boileau, 13 March February 2023,  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/naming\\_tanks/](https://rusi-ns.ca/naming_tanks/)

RUSI(NS) Presentation “Canadian Armed Forces/Department of National Defence Space” by BGen Mike Adamson, 15 February 2023,  
<https://rusi-ns.ca/caf-dnd-space/>

RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Note “Canadian Pacific Railway’s ‘Support Our Troops’ Locomotives” by Adam Meeks, 7 February 2023,  
<https://rusi-ns.ca/locomotives/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Types of Royal Canadian Navy Combatant Warships,” 30 January 2023,  
<https://rusi-ns.ca/types-of-rcn-combatant-warships/>

RUSI(NS) Presentation “Canadian Coast Guard Autonomous Systems and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Program” by Scott Hatcher, 18 January 2023,  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/ccg\\_autonomous\\_systems/](https://rusi-ns.ca/ccg_autonomous_systems/)

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Armoured Fighting Vehicles,” 17 January 2023,  
<https://rusi-ns.ca/armoured-fighting-vehicles/>

**New:** Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 15 March 2023  
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

**New:** Company of Master Mariners of Canada Maritimes Division *Foghorn*, March 2023

Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, February 2023

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 3, March 2023

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, March 2023  
<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/187-rausi-dispatches-march-2023>

Royal Alberta United Services Institute presentation by Cmdre Pat Montgomery “Canada’s Naval Reserve: Past, Present, and Future,” 20 January 2023,  
<https://www.rausi.ca/info-events/lunch-and-learn/562-canada-a-naval-reserve-past-present-and-future>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, March 2023

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* Volume 5 Issue 7  
<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

**New:** Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies – *Australia Journal*, Volume 74, Number 1, March 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 2nd Quarter 2023.

**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 17, Issue 4, 13 March February 2023

**New:** Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* March 2023  
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2023-03>

**Tweeted by @RUSI NS:**

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

Hybrid CoE @HybridCoE 2 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Our new & updated @HybridCoE Handbook on #maritime #hybridthreats is now available - with 15 scenarios & legal scans. It provides context for decision-makers & operators from our participating states, #EU & #NATO about threats in, on & under the sea:

<https://www.hybridcoe.fi/news/in-on-and-under-the-sea-new-maritime-hybrid-threat-scenarios-presented-in-a-hybrid-coe-handbook/> 1/2

(In, on, and under the sea: New maritime hybrid threat scenarios presented in a Hybrid CoE handbook

The updated #Handbook explores scenarios with harm potentials or the risk of political & military escalation. New plausible scenarios include undersea cable cuts by malign #hybridthreat actors or freedom of navigation operations in contested waters:

<https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-paper-16-handbook-on-maritime-hybrid-threats-15-scenarios-and-legal-scans/> 2/2

(Hybrid CoE Paper 16: Handbook on maritime hybrid threats: 15 scenarios and legal scans)



H I Sutton @CovertShores Mar 9 tweeted: \*\*\*NEW\*\*\* List of countries which can design and build submarines here -> <http://hisutton.com/Submarine-Building-Countries-List.html> Thx everyone who discussed previously, yto help refine the list

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Sourcing which #submarine from which building country will be interesting choice for CAN🇨🇦 Patrol Submarine project to replace @RoyalCanNavy Victoria-class submarines

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/proactive-disclosure/secu-06-october-2022/procurement.html>

#NationalShipbuildingStrategy #NSS




Canadian Coast Guard @CoastGuardCAN Mar 8 tweeted: Our capacity building team was just in #Bahrain to use the @USCG's 'ship in a box.' The facility roughly mimics a ship and we used it to practice and demonstrate our maritime skills for the upcoming Cutlass Express exercise. Learn more: [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues\\_developpement-enjeux\\_developpement/peace\\_security-paix\\_securite/capacity\\_building-renforcement\\_capacites.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_developpement-enjeux_developpement/peace_security-paix_securite/capacity_building-renforcement_capacites.aspx?lang=eng) #CCGGoesGlobal RUSI(NS) retweeted: #CCG @CoastGuardCAN participating in Exercise #CutlassExpress 2023 <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3319284/exercise-cutlass-express-2023-kicks-off-in-djibouti/> as part of CANCAs security capacity-building programs: training, equipment, tech/legal assistance to prevent/respond to terrorism & transnational crime, & increase law enforcement cooperation



"Ottawa ready to supply Ukraine with Canadian high-tech drones, source says" <https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/canada-to-supply-ukraine-with-high-tech-drones> Donation of large number #drones #UAS by CAN🇨🇦 to #Ukraine would be good support, immediate effect. "Canadian donations and military support to Ukraine" <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/campaigns/canadian-military-support-to-ukraine.html>



Canada Poland @CanadaPoland 8 mar tweeted: CAN has deployed Canadian Armed Forces Medical Technicians to PL 🇵🇱 to train members of the UA 🇺🇦 military & provide the skills needed to save lives in combat situations. CAN is extending its ongoing training of UA 🇺🇦 sappers in PL 🇵🇱 under Op.UNIFIER until Oct.2023 <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/03/canada-deploys-medical-trainers-to-operation-unifier-and-extends-engineer-training-in-poland.html>




(Canada deploys medical trainers to Operation UNIFIER and extends engineer training in Poland RUS(NS) retweeted: .@CanadianForces provides medical & engineer training to UKR 🇺🇦 forces #OpUNIFIER #UNIFIER. Good to train personnel for all activity not just tank & infantry. CAN🇨🇦 specialty role as trainer of other forces?

NATO Association of Canada @NATOCanada 13 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: @NationalDefence Minister Anita Anand announced @NATO's North American HQ for innovation may be in Halifax. What is DIANA? Scott Burns analyses this in the following <https://natoassociation.ca/diana-defence-innovation-accelerator-for-the-north-atlantic/> #defenseindustry #defenselab #aerospace #navy #innovation #diana #halifax #nato  
(DIANA: Defence Innovation Accelerator For The North Atlantic)



Report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security "Up to the Task: Strengthening Canada's Security Posture in Relation to Russia"  
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/441/SECUR/Reports/RP12018647/securp07/securp07-e.pdf>  
#NationalSecurity




*This report was circulated to the RUSI(NS) Security Affairs Committee and resulted in the following comments:*

*member 1:* Interestingly, in the report, there is only one mention of Arctic patrol ships and no mention of submarines (except for Russian) or Canadian Coast Guard vessels which are key to the surveillance aspect. Canada lacks any organic capability to surveil undersea cables. Note recent suspicious activities off Svalbard and the Norwegian coast, and severing of the Nordstream II pipeline. With respect to the recent Royal Navy announcement for an undersea surveillance and intervention vessel acquisition, the Norwegian Coast Guard already has the capability in two chartered vessels. Both the Royal Australian Navy and Royal New Zealand Navy have already acquired very similar capabilities.

*member 2:* Actually, Canada does have capacity to survey cables under water (albeit not permanently under ice at this time). A former Royal Canadian Navy officer is president of Kraken Robotics, based in St Johns and Dartmouth, which offers high fidelity surveillance capacity. See: <https://krakenrobotics.com/>.

*member 1:* Kraken has the survey equipment and expertise but you still need a capable, dynamic positioning platform to deliver it plus the intervention capability built-in in terms of medium to heavy work class remotely operated vehicles and/or diving support.

Steffan Watkins @steffanwatkins 15 Mar tweeted: "502nd Logistic Readiness Squadron members and Defense Department contractors work together to load a medical module onto a Royal Canadian Air Force C-130J at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas, March 8, 2023." -DVIDS <https://dvidshub.net/image/7680686/502nd-logistics-readiness-squadron-supports-royal-canadian-air-force-lifesaving-mission> #RCAF #CFC2514 #C2B58F  
RUSI(NS) retweeted: .@RCAF\_ARC Aeromedical Bio-Containment Evacuation System (ABES)  
<https://knightaerospace.com/general/rcaf-abes2/> & <https://www.facebook.com/RCAF.ARC/videos/the-rcaf->



[recently-declared-its-aeromedical-bio-containment-evacuation-system-abe/747478182471683/](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/rcaf/2021/02/rcaf-implements-new-bio-containment-capability-to-transport-infectious-patients.html) #RCAF #airpower "capability in a #container" @KnightAero\_SATX  
 Also, article about Aeromedical Single Isolation Bio-containment Unit (ASIBU) at:  
 RCAF implements new bio-containment capability to transport infectious patients  
<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/rcaf/2021/02/rcaf-implements-new-bio-containment-capability-to-transport-infectious-patients.html>



## Maps and Charts

cdrsalamander @cdrsalamander 5 Mar 23 tweeted:  
 This does not get enough discussion.

Yes, good point. We've seen plenty of maps depicting Crimea and other areas in or not in Russia. But how do the land borders, recognized or not, affect territorial seas and exclusive economic zones?

And there are so many other layers that can/should be added to understand the geo-strategic importance/ aspects of the region. Pipelines, rail lines, power lines, communication lines, sea routes, major river routes, distances...



## If at first you don't have a landing beach...

Mike Forsythe @mlkeforsythe 12 Mar replying to @type36512: This means that the PLA can land at any location on the west coast of Taiwan without being limited by geographical conditions. I learned that they spent only 20 minutes on completing the entire process of building a bridge. This is huge.



## New Submarines

George Allison on Twitter Mar 13, 2023: "🚨 BREAKING - The design chosen for the new Australian nuclear submarine has been leaked. The new Etutsa class will be able to ascend to depths of over 1,000ft. Here's a quick photo I was able to take of a design model. <https://t.co/tPGivRxyRV>" / Twitter <https://twitter.com/geoallison/status/1635266917715054594>



What will the model for Canadian Patrol Submarine look like?...

## Submarine 'Legs'

A representative depiction of nuclear-powered versus diesel-powered submarine deployability (in this case from the Royal Australian Navy submarine base at Perth, Australia). It would be interesting to see a depiction for Canadian submarines from Esquimalt. Canada is a Pacific nation. What sort of endurance and on-station time do we get out of one of our more significant assets, submarines, when they are diesel-powered? We know they can deploy to the Western Pacific but how much do we have to depend on allied basing and logistics to make that happen and to contribute to action in that region?



## Posted on Facebook "Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia":

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

## USAF Special Ops Buys MQ-9B SkyGuardians To Test Air-Launched Drone Concepts

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/usaf-special-ops-buys-mq-9b-skyguardians-to-test-air-launched-drone-concepts>

"U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) will be procuring MQ-9B SkyGuardian remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) to prove a concept that would see them used as launch platforms for smaller, more expendable drones. The SkyGuardians would employ the smaller drones at a safe distance from enemy air defenses, sending them into riskier, less permissible environments."



The Royal Canadian Air Force will procure the MQ-9 for its Remotely Piloted Aircraft System project (see: "Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles – Canadian and US Programs" <https://rusi-ns.ca/rpas/>). Might the



aircraft at some point be capable of being able to launch other, smaller drones? The capability wouldn't necessarily be for penetrating air defence environments but could allow for great surveillance sensor coverage.

### **Pentagon's Joint Concept for Competing**

<https://news.usni.org/2023/03/09/pentagons-joint-concept-for-competing>

"Strategic competition is a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other."



US concept that fits with gray zone and hybrid warfare?

### **Antsy about its aging tanks, Italy is mulling a rush purchase**

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/03/10/antsy-about-its-aging-tanks-italy-is-mulling-a-rush-purchase/>

If so many states are attempting to rebuild or build up their battle tank inventories, especially with Leopards, what position does that put Canada as we attempt to replace the eight donated to Ukraine (see: "Canadian military will get new tanks to replace Leopards going to Ukraine: minister"

<https://globalnews.ca/news/9510170/canada-military-anand-leopards-ukraine-tanks/>)?



### **Why Ukraine is using World War I-era Maxim machine guns**

<https://taskandpurpose.com/news/ukraine-maxim-machine-gun-russia/>

Yes, it costs to warehouse and maintain old arms and munitions, but maybe that should be looked upon as an investment in defence rather than a cost.



### **Ukraine sea drones show the way**

<https://navalinstitute.com.au/ukraine-sea-drones-show-the-way/>

"While other countries have started using naval drones for military (sic) purposes, so far only Ukraine has explored the application of explosive-charged unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) during the ongoing international military conflict.

These USVs with pre-installed warheads essentially function as kamikadze (sic) drones or loitering munition which can wait (loiter) until the target is identified and confirmed..."



Loitering munition, or better yet 'one way attack', is a better term than kamikaze or suicide drone. The latter evoke emotion (okay, maybe that's what some writers want to do), the former rationale consideration.

### **Other Sources:**

#### **#Arctic**

NATO, Russia Are Flexing Their Military Power in the Arctic

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-03-13/nato-russia-are-flexing-their-military-power-in-the-arctic>

Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin

book: <https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780815738886/Red-Arctic-Russian-Strategy-Under-Putin>

#### **#cyber security**

Canada's allies buy more Canadian cybersecurity products than Ottawa does, parliament told

<https://www.itworldcanada.com/article/canadas-allies-buy-more-cybersecurity-products-than-ottawa-does-parliament-told/532412>

#### **#defence policy review**

A framework for assessing Australia's defence strategic review

*Australia but worth a comparison:* <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-framework-for-assessing-australias-defence-strategic-review/>

#### **#drones**

Leveraging Loitering Munitions

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/07/20/loitering-munitions-tactical-operational-strategic/>

Uncrewed naval vessels and the span of maritime tasks

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23000088>

China Gears Up To Shoot Down US Drones

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/02/china-gears-shoot-down-us-drones/382731/>

How Ukraine uses high-tech anti-drone guns to down Russian drones and recover intelligence from them

*Cool looking 'guns':* <https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraines-anti-drone-guns-down-russian-drones-recover-intelligence-2023-2>

General Atomics Air-Launched Armed Drone Program Nears Critical Design Review

<https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/03/09/general-atomics-drone-program/>

*"The LongShot intends to expand the range and potency of manned aircraft by pairing them with an unmanned aerial vehicle armed with air-to-air missiles."*

## **#Indo-Pacific**

Deterring a Chinese military attack on Taiwan

<https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-03/deterring-a-chinese-military-attack-on-taiwan/>

## **#intelligence**

Defence Intelligence – communicating probability

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-intelligence-communicating-probability>

## **#planning**

Foresight-Driven Warfare: Bringing Futures Thinking Into The Next Fight

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2023/3/9/foresight-driven-warfare-bringing-futures-thinking-into-the-next-fight>

## **#national security**

VAdm (Ret'd) Mark Norman Speaks at the 2023 Ottawa Conference

<https://cdainstitute.ca/vadm-ret-d-mark-norman-speaks-at-the-2023-ottawa-conference/>

## **#policing**

Global Illicit Flow Programme of the European Union News Brief – Week of 6 March 2023

*Interesting range of incidents, including at Winnipeg:* <https://illicitflows.eu/news-brief-week-of-6-march-2023/>

## **#reconstitution #casualties**

Return-to-Duty (RTDs)

<http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2023/03/13/returns-to-duty-rtds/>

*The Canadian Army trains on unit reconstitution, etc. Not something I recall the Navy or Air Force considers in detail. Maybe in the medical staff? Anyways, interesting ratios.*

## **#Russia-Ukraine War**

Ukraine as Russian Imperial Action: Challenges and Policy Options

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraine-russian-imperial-action-challenges-and-policy-options>

Tackling the Underwater Threat: How Ukraine Can Combat Russian Submarines

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/tackling-underwater-threat-how-ukraine-can-combat-russian-submarines>

For Opposition to Putin's War, Look to the Fringes of His Empire

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/20/russia-ukraine-war-casualties-deaths-putin-ethnic-minorities-racism/>

Lessons From Ukraine Many Don't Want to Hear

[https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/11/lessons\\_from\\_ukraine\\_many\\_dont\\_want\\_to\\_hear\\_886750.html](https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/11/lessons_from_ukraine_many_dont_want_to_hear_886750.html)

1. Mass matters.
2. Maritime operations are vulnerable.
3. Deep attacks by themselves are ineffective.
4. Airborne and amphibious warfare has been minimized.
5. Artificial intelligence has arrived.

Tackling the Underwater Threat: How Ukraine Can Combat Russian Submarines

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/tackling-underwater-threat-how-ukraine-can-combat-russian-submarines>

Tackling the Underwater Threat: How Ukraine Can Combat Russian Submarines

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/tackling-underwater-threat-how-ukraine-can-combat-russian-submarines>

What the Fall of Empires Tells Us About the Ukraine War

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/20/russia-ukraine-war-putin-empire-imperialism-colonialism-conquest-collapse/>

An examination of whether Russia is generating momentum in Ukraine

<https://twitter.com/WarInTheFuture/status/1635523475992633345>

### **#airpower**

Ukraine - lessons for Western air power

<https://wavellroom.com/2022/07/13/ukraine-lessons-for-western-airpower/>

### **#armour**

T-90Ms are appearing on the Eastern front – what is the threat?

<https://wavellroom.com/2023/03/10/t90m-are-appearing-on-the-eastern-front/>

The Russian Army Is Running Out Of T-72 Tanks—And Quickly

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/03/12/the-russian-army-is-running-out-of-t-72-tanks-and-quickly/>

### **#information operations**

Execution of a POW in Kremlin disinformation crosshairs

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/execution-of-a-pow-in-kremlin-disinformation-crosshairs/>

Digitizing the Battlefield: Using Social Media to Track U.S. Weapons in Ukraine

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/digitizing-battlefield-using-social-media-track-us-weapons-ukraine>

### **#security #Canada**

Up to the Task: Strengthening Canada’s Security Posture in Relation to Russia

Report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security:

<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/441/SECU/Reports/RP12018647/securp07/securp07-e.pdf>

### **#strategy**

The Book of War is Written By Chance: Napoleon’s 1812 March and the Challenge of Using History as a Guide for Strategy

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2023/3/13/the-book-of-war-is-written-by-chance>

**Other:**

**Downed Reaper**

US releases footage of Russian jet crashing into drone

<https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-64974825>

*Now this is the way to conduct public messaging – pro-actively!*



(From Defense One 16 March 2023) On Thursday the U.S. released footage of the Thursday morning Russian jet intercept of a U.S. military drone over the Black Sea on Tuesday: <https://www.dvidshub.net/video/876667/us-air-force-mq-9-camera-footage-russian-su-27-black-sea-intercept>. The video feed dropped in two places — after the Russians dumped fuel on the drone and after the other jet clipped the drone's propeller, effectively destroying its ability to stay aloft safely. The video was edited for duration, but the events are presented in sequential order, the U.S. military said. Here's the timeline of events portrayed in the video, as relayed by the U.S. military's Germany-based European Command:

00:00: [Start of video] A Russian Su-27 approaches to the rear of the U.S. Air Force MQ-9.

00:05: A Russian Su-27 begins to release fuel as it passes.

00:09 A Russian Su-27 passes over the U.S. Air Force MQ-9 while releasing fuel. As the Su-27 passes over the top of the MQ-9, it also disrupts the video transmission.

00:11: The propeller of the U.S. Air Force MQ-9 can be seen and remains undamaged.

00:22: A Russian Su-27 begins a second approach toward the MQ-9.

00:26: A Russian Su-27 begins to release fuel on the approach toward the MQ-9. An Su-27 proceeds to pass even closer.

00:29: A Russian Su-27 collides into the MQ-9 and the MQ-9's camera feed is lost for about 60 seconds.

00:39: The MQ-9's camera feed has returned to working order. At this time the propeller can be seen again and one of the props can be seen damaged.

00:42: [End of video]

Some thoughts about the incident:

1. Would a Canadian RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aircraft System – MQ-9) have a capability to 'bleat its black box info' (i.e., signal its last flight data via [satellite?]) as it went down?
2. What Canadian capabilities are there to recover a downed RPAS? Are they really any different than recovering a downed crewed aircraft (other than not having to address mortuary affairs matters)?
3. What can be done (in the design?) by one state (Canada) to limit the amount of intelligence obtained by another state, having recovered a downed RPAS of the first?
4. What are the legal implications of a state downing, deliberately or accidentally, another state's RPAS?
5. Striking a drone's propeller with one's own aircraft is an odd way to down a RPAS (or any other aircraft). Dumping fuel on it, too, seems a bit extemporaneous.

## **International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (IDERD)**

*“Impacts of Racial Discrimination: How Canada Can Lead The Way Forward”.*

The Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT) – Defence Visible Minority Advisory Group (DVMAG) in partnership with the Department of National Defence (DND) Eastern Canada Stakeholder Engagement Office (SEO) will be hosting a panel discussion and in-person networking event to acknowledge the importance of combating racial discrimination at home in Canada and globally around the world.

We'd like to invite you to join us as a valued member of the community and stakeholder your perspective is important and we'd like the opportunity to connect with you on this very important subject. Will be looking at how the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is leading the way forward and implementing recommendations provided within the [Minister of National Defence Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination](#).

### **What is IDERD?**

[The International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination](#) is observed annually on the day the police in Sharpeville, South Africa, opened fire and killed 69 people at a peaceful demonstration against apartheid "pass laws" in 1960.

### **Details**

**Location:** [Wardoom Ballroom, 2648 Lorne Terrace, Halifax, NS](#)

**Date:** Tuesday, 21<sup>st</sup> March 2023

**Time:** 1:00 – 3pm

**RSVP:** <https://forms.office.com/r/CcWe38Fz9C>

### **Event Objective**

Discuss anti-racism, equity, diversity, and inclusion approaches currently being promoted and developed within DND/CAF.

Reflect on lessons learned and being implemented in response to the Minister of National Defence Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination.

Discussion on how DND/CAF can advance system change and build stronger community connections to be an employer of choice for diversity candidates.

### **Format**

Virtual – Microsoft Teams Platform. [Accessibility Information for MS Teams](#)

Audience: DND/CAF staff, personnel and invited external community stakeholders

### **Accessibility**

If you require accommodation, please email [jerome.downey@forces.gc.ca](mailto:jerome.downey@forces.gc.ca) or call 782-640-4753 and we will work with you to make appropriate arrangements.

### **Cost**

Free

## **Edmonton United Services Institute Annual Symposium and Mess Dinner**

The Edmonton United Services Institute (EUSI) is holding its annual symposium and dinner Saturday, 25 March 2023, at the Edmonton Inn & Conference Centre. This year's Symposium examines natural disaster management and mitigation, offering presentations and Q&A sessions from experts in science, crisis communications, provincial and federal government policy, insurance industry's use of artificial intelligence, and the Canadian Humanitarian Workforce program. Cost is free. Continental breakfast, coffee and buffet lunch are provided. Breakfast at 0820. A detailed program for the day is included on our website (<https://rausi.ca/info-events/special-events/574-natural-disaster-management-and-mitigation>).

The Mess/Semi-formal Dinner features keynote speaker Dr. Steven Ellis, Conservative MP, Cumberland-Colchester, Nova Scotia, and former Director of Health Services, Nova Scotia. Dinner music is provided by the band of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment. Civilian guests will be introduced to interesting aspects of etiquette as found at a military-styled Mess Dinner. Cost is \$100.00 per person. Reception at 1830 / Dinner at 1900.

More information - <https://rausi.ca/info-events/special-events/574-natural-disaster-management-and-mitigation>

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# **Natural Disaster Management and Mitigation**

**Non-partisan Dialogue in Fact,  
Science, Policy and Practice**

**25 March 2023  
FREE Symposium**

Mess Dinner follows. Full details at [www.rausi.ca/special-events](http://www.rausi.ca/special-events)

Ahead of the presentation, RAUSI asked Cdr Nicole Robichaud some questions, to which she replied:

Q. Is Canada's reenergized presence in the Arctic to enforce sovereignty?

A. Yes, one of the primary goals of operating up North is to see and be seen. This applies to shipping (both commercial and pleasure), Northern Communities, Allies, and non-Allies. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is operating in the Arctic Archipelago exuding and enforcing our Canadian Sovereignty.

Q. Are they significantly increasing the deployment of Canada's assets in the Arctic?

A. As more assets become available, we will be deploying and exercising more to continue to learn how to best operate in the Arctic. We will be liaising with our Northern Communities to help determine how best to operate up North so as to not endanger the environment, but also listening to the communities as they are our eyes and ears when we are not operating up North.

Q. As the commander of a Canadian Navy ship, are you seeing an increase in Canadian Naval activity in the Arctic?

A. Increase in Canadian Naval activity now – not necessarily. The navigable season in the Arctic is still somewhat limited, however with the building of the new Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels (AOPVs), in the future, more ships will sail to the North at the same time and as the sea ice melts, the navigable season will become longer which it is just a matter of time before we are patrolling Northern waters more frequently.

**(US) Joint Electronic Library**  
<https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/>

**Intelligence Updates**

For those who would prefer to read the updates as they come out rather than weekly, they are posted on Twitter by the UK Ministry of Defence @DefenceHQ.



UPDATE ON UKRAINE  
10 March 2023

**INTELLIGENCE UPDATE**

- On 9 March 2023, Russia conducted a wave of at least 80 long-range strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. Russia deployed cruise missiles, air defence missiles in a surface-surface role, Iranian one way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles, and an unusually large number of hypersonic air-launched ballistic missiles during the attack.
- This was the first major wave of long-range strikes since 16 February 2023 and likely one of the largest since December 2022. Ukrainian officials reported at least 11 civilians killed.
- The interval between waves of strikes is probably growing because Russia now needs to stockpile a critical mass of newly produced missiles directly from industry before it can resource a strike big enough to credibly overwhelm Ukrainian air defences.



## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over the last four days, Wagner Group forces have taken control of most of eastern part of the Donbas town of Bakhmut. In the town centre, the Bakhmutka River now marks the front line.
- Ukrainian forces hold the west of the town and have demolished key bridges over the river, which runs through north-south through a strip of open ground 200m-800m wide, between built up areas. With Ukrainian units able to fire from fortified buildings to the west, this area has become a killing zone, likely making it highly challenging for Wagner forces attempting to continue their frontal assault westwards.
- However, the Ukrainian force and their supply lines to the west remain vulnerable to the continued Russian attempts to outflank the defenders from the north and south.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- As Russia continues to suffer extremely heavy casualties, the impact varies dramatically across Russia's regions. In proportion to the size of their population, the richest cities of Moscow and St Petersburg have been left relatively unscathed. This is especially true for the families of the country's elite.
- On 21 February 2023, Russian senior officials were photographed making up the front two rows of the audience of President Putin's state of the nation speech. None of these are known to have children serving in the military.
- In many of the Eastern regions, deaths are likely running, as a percentage of population, at a rate of 30-40 times higher than in Moscow. In many places, ethnic minorities take the biggest hit; in Astrakhan some 75% of casualties come from the minority Kazakh and Tartar populations. As the Russian MoD seeks to address its continued deficit of combat personnel, insulating the better-off and more influential elements of Russian society will highly likely remain a major consideration.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent weeks, Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin has likely lost access to recruiting in Russian prisons due to his ongoing disputes with the Russian MoD leadership. Prigozhin is highly likely pivoting recruitment efforts towards free Russian citizens.
- Since the start of March 2023, Wagner has set up outreach teams based in sports centres in at least 40 locations across Russia. In recent days, masked Wagner recruiters also gave career talks in Moscow high schools, distributing questionnaires entitled 'application of a young warrior' to collect the contact details of interested pupils.
- About half of the prisoners Wagner has already deployed in Ukraine have likely become casualties and the new initiatives are unlikely to make up for the loss of the convict recruit pipeline. If the ban endures, Prigozhin will likely be forced to reduce the scale or intensity of Wagner operations in Ukraine.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent weeks, Russian artillery ammunition shortages have likely worsened to the extent that extremely punitive shell-rationing is in force on many parts of the front. This has almost certainly been a key reason why no Russian formation has recently been able to generate operationally significant offensive action.
- Russia has almost certainly already resorted to issuing old munitions stock which were previously categorised as unfit for use.
- A presidential decree of 03 March 2023 laid down measures for the Ministry of Trade and Industry to bypass the authority of the managers of defence industries who fail to meet their production goals. Russia is increasingly applying the principles of a command economy to its military industrial complex because it recognises that its defence manufacturing capacity is a key vulnerability in the increasingly attritional 'special military operation.'



#### RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

Russia claims that it has achieved its lowest ever unemployment rate, saying that this is the result of a strong economy.

#### BASED ON CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND ANALYSIS:

- Russia's low unemployment rate is not due to a strong economy, but to the large-scale changes and losses to its working-age population.
- Russia mobilized more than 300,000 citizens to fight in Ukraine, inflating its employment figures. It also lowered joining requirements to accept those with criminal records – a group that would have had a larger percentage of unemployed members.
- At least 140,000 of Russia's deployed troops have been killed or wounded since the beginning of the war. Almost one million working-age Russians have also fled the country during this time, and are unlikely to return in the next several years.



## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Russian public officials and workers have been subject to increasingly severe foreign travel restrictions. Some officials have likely had to forfeit their passports to the Federal Security Service. Employees closer to the centre of power face more severe restrictions; Kremlin officials are banned from all international leisure travel.
- This is a widening of existing measures which date from the Soviet era. Travel restrictions were tightened after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
- The measures are likely designed to prevent the flight or defection of increasingly disaffected officials. There is a realistic possibility that as the securitisation of the Russian state continues, travel restrictions will be tightened for an increasing number of public sector employees.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over the last week, Russian attempts to assault the Donetsk Oblast town of Vuhledar have almost certainly slowed. This follows repeated, extremely costly failed attacks over the previous three months.
- One factor in Russia's heavy losses in this sector has been Ukraine's successful adoption of Remote Anti-Armour Mine systems (RAAM). RAAM is a specialist artillery shell which scatters anti-armour mines up to 17km away from the firing unit. In some instances, Ukraine has launched the mines over and behind advancing Russian units, causing disarray when Russian vehicles attempt to withdraw.
- Russia's only notable recent tactical success has been in the Bakhmut sector, which is dominated by Wagner Group mercenary forces, currently engaged in a public feud with the Russian Ministry of Defence. There is a realistic possibility that Russia's MoD has been insistent in its drive for success in Vuhledar, partially because it wants its own success to compete with Wagner's achievements.