



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 24 March 2023

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Defence Policy Review

The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces have opened public consultations to all Canadians on the defence policy review. The review (a.k.a. Defence Policy Update – DPU) has been a topic of discussion in the RUSI(NS) Security Affairs Committee (SAC) for many months. It appears that comments from individuals rather than organizations is the approach being taken for the review, though there is an opportunity to list the organization of choice in a submission. Members of RUSI(NS) and other readers of *Dispatches* are encouraged to make a submission. See the text box at the beginning of the Other section to the 10 March edition of *Dispatches*. Note the **closing date of 30 April 2023**.

It is easier to write answers to the review's questions on a separate document rather than filling in the boxes on the review webpage (<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-defence-policy/we-want-to-hear-from-you.html>). The SAC has copied the questions onto a document and can provide that to anyone to assist with their submission. Email RUSI(NS) for a copy.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

25 March, Saturday - Edmonton United Services Institute Annual Symposium and Mess Dinner
""Natural Disaster Management and Mitigation - Non-partisan Dialogue in Fact, Science, Policy, and Practice." Symposium 0900-1620. Mess/Semi-formal Dinner 1830. See text box and poster at end of *Dispatches*.

12 April, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Assistant Rear-Admiral Santarpia. 1300-1500. Nova Scotia Room, Wardroom. MTF.

18 April, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation by Colin Marston, UK Defence Wargaming Centre, and Graham Longley-Brown, lead author for the MOD Wargaming Handbook, titled "Influence Wargaming Handbook." 1200-1400 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/influence-wargaming-handbook-tickets-524664865737>

16 May, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "The Politics of Play: Wargaming with the US Military." Noon-1400 EST. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-politics-of-play-wargaming-with-the-us-military-tickets-415461174557>

24 May, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Brigadier-General Masson. 1300-1500. Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess. MTF.

13 June, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Influence Wargaming Handbook." 1200-1400 EDT. Online To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/influence-wargaming-handbook-tickets-524664865737>

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Note "Naming Tanks in the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps" by John Boileau, 13 March February 2023, https://rusi-ns.ca/naming_tanks/

RUSI(NS) Presentation "Canadian Armed Forces/Department of National Defence Space" by BGen Mike Adamson, 15 February 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/caf-dnd-space/>

RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Note "Canadian Pacific Railway's 'Support Our Troops' Locomotives" by Adam Meeks, 7 February 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/locomotives/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Types of Royal Canadian Navy Combatant Warships," 30 January 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/types-of-rcn-combatant-warships/>

RUSI(NS) Presentation "Canadian Coast Guard Autonomous Systems and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Program" by Scott Hatcher, 18 January 2023, https://rusi-ns.ca/ccg_autonomous_systems/

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Armoured Fighting Vehicles," 17 January 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/armoured-fighting-vehicles/>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 15 March 2023 <https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Company of Master Mariners of Canada Maritimes Division *Foghorn*, March 2023

Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, February 2023

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 3, March 2023

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, March 2023
<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/187-rausi-dispatches-march-2023>

Royal Alberta United Services Institute presentation by Cmdre Pat Montgomery "Canada's Naval Reserve: Past, Present, and Future," 20 January 2023,
<https://www.rausi.ca/info-events/lunch-and-learn/562-canada-a-naval-reserve-past-present-and-future>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, March 2023

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* Volume 5 Issue 7
<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies – Australia *Journal*, Volume 74, Number 1, March 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 2nd Quarter 2023.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 17, Issue 5, 20 March February 2023

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* March 2023
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2023-03>

@RUSI NS on Twitter:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

NAADSN_RDSNAA @NAADSN_RDSNAA 17 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: With Canadians having missed the boats on #AUKUS, what future is there for CANSUBFOR? Will it forever be a stranger in its own backyard? Fellow @TimDocChoi along with David Perry explores this in the latest @CAGlobalAffairs #DefenceDeconstructed (Report: Canadian Submarine Recapitalization in the Context of Climate Change
<https://basicint.org/report-canadian-submarine-recapitalization-in-the-context-of-climate-change/>)



Transport Canada @Transport_gc 16 Mar tweeted: The Government of Canada is now accepting proposals for the construction of an aircraft hangar facility in #Iqaluit to support #NASPCrew capacity in the Arctic. 📄 □ The deadline to submit a proposal is April 18, 2023: <https://canadabuys.canada.ca/en/tender-opportunities/tender-notice/ws3825000203-doc3831508152> (Aircraft Hangar Construction, Iqaluit, Nunavut) RUSI(NS) retweeted: Hopefully whatever #Arctic/Northern infrastructure one CAN 🇨🇦 government air department builds is in collaboration (at least, comparing requirements) & usable by other depts (#NASP=National Aerial Surveillance Program https://rusi-ns.ca/national_aerial_surveillance_program/)



CDN Defence Academy/L'Académie cdn de la défense @CDACanadaACD 17 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 📄 The “Tactical Cloud”, A Key Element of the Future Combat Air System | At the crossroads between operational requirement and technological opportunity, the #tacticalcloud, or #combatcloud, is the latest manifestation of Network Centric Warfare. <https://frstrategie.org/en/publications/notes/tactical-cloud-key-element-future-combat-air-system-2019>



.@CanadianArmy Taurus armoured recovery vehicle being loaded 18Mar23 into Antonov 124 heavy-lift aircraft for transport as donation to #Ukraine. ARV= <https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/equipment/vehicles/armoured-recovery-vehicle.html> Part of CAN 🇨🇦 support to UKR 🇺🇦 <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/campaigns/canadian-military-support-to-ukraine.html> #StandWithUkraine



Note, as there has been some confusion in reporting: Mid-Career Army Officer on Twitter 18 Mar: "The Leo 2 ARV CAN: -Equipped w/ a crane to pull engines & turrets for field maintenance, a winch to recover stuck vehs + welding gear. -The dozer blade is for grip & stability but can help dig fighting positions. -Diffent from the AEV (pic right) which has a digging arm instead of crane."



VAdm / vam Bob Auchterlonie @Comd_CJOC_COIC Mar 8 tweeted: Recently our Joint Warfare Centre team helped deliver the first bi-national Space table top exercise (TTX) with members of 3 Canadian Space Division and Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force Space Operations Group. Working together for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. RUSI(NS) retweeted: CANcaJoint Warfare Centre wargaming/table-top exercising excellent means to explore/learn aspects of #space operations <https://rusi-ns.ca/wargaming/> Useful for @RCAF_ARC 3 Cdn Space



Division, & way to strengthen relationships, to exercise operations with ally <https://rusi-ns.ca/caf-dnd-space/>



NAADSN_RDSNAA @NAADSN_RDSNAA 20 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Co Lead @AndreaCharron and Dr. James Ferguson write on the necessity of continued bilateral focus on and investments into #NORAD modernization with @CanadaInstitute (Discovering NORAD) <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/discovering-norad>
Note the tail art on the aircraft.



Royal Canadian Navy @RoyalCanNavy Mar 21 tweeted: We're currently undergoing a Point Defence Missile System Upgrade, which involves developing, acquiring and integrating a minimum of 174 missiles with the 16-launcher system currently aboard frigates. <https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/rcn/2023/03/upgraded-missiles-to-better-defend-ships-against-air-attacks.html> #WeTheNavy (Upgraded missiles to better defend ships against air attacks) RUSI(NS) retweeted: Ammunition supply has been highlighted recently as highly important for readiness of forces to defend countries. Is 174 point defence missiles sufficient for extended action by 12 @RoyalCanNavy frigates? What are CAN🇨🇦 munition stockpiles&what should they be? Can industry provide?



"Why Canada is pushing back at U.S. pressure to put boots on the ground in #Haiti" <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/haiti-canada-biden-trudeau-1.6788656> Lack of @CanadianForces people, difficult environment, questionable objectives. Truly a mission for CAN🇨🇦 to undertake? Comments contributed by RUSI(NS) members



Jointery

Desperate for equipment Russia mounts vehicles with decades-old naval guns

<https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/desperate-for-equipment-russia-mounts-vehicles-with-decades-old-naval-guns/ss-AA18BbgP#image=2>

This is taking jointness to whole new levels.

Of course, landing naval guns for use ashore is old practice.



OWA UGV

(one-way attack uncrewed ground vehicle)

Rob Lee on Twitter 6:47 PM · Mar 18, 2023: "Ukraine's 3rd Assault Brigade is using kamikaze UGVs packed with explosives on Russian positions. <https://t.co/twxwOUKqKZ>" / <https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1637209200127254529>

Shades of Nazi German Goliath 'tracked mine.'

The NATO symbol for UGV uses the wing-like chevron, as do the symbols for uncrewed systems in other environments.



T-80 Losses

Suyi控 @partizan_oleg 17 Mar tweeted (https://twitter.com/partizan_oleg/status/1636615775099437059): A T-80U thread. Russia inherited 600~700 T-80Us from the Soviet Army in 1991. According to SIPRI some 125 were exported to Cyprus and South Korea (among which 74 were exported before 2000). No recorded battle losses before Feb 2022.



Good threat read. And, no, this is not an Australian T-80. It is a Russian tank in one of its two natural positions, the other position being after a turret toss (that is, in pieces).

“Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia” on Facebook:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

China to Build ‘Super Dredger’ Vessel to Boost Island-Building Capability

<https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/03/16/china-super-dredger-vessel/>

"...a Reuters report in February 2021 suggested that all China's sand-dredging operations are part of psychological warfare



against Taiwan..."

This is either a bit of a reach for information operations (IO), or a very sophisticated and hugely integrated approach to IO.

Either way, it says something about a navy's state (or, to rephrase, a state's maritime forces) when a specialized auxiliary ship such as a 'supersized sand dredging vessel' is considered useful to build.

Integrating the Art and Science of Wargaming

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/integrating-art-and-science-wargaming>

"There remains a rampant debate as to whether wargaming represents an art or a science.

Our answer to this question is that it is—and should be—both. Game design requires artistry (recognizing that engaged play is intrinsic to the value of the medium), but if a game is going to be applied to a problem of national security or foreign policy, then science has to play a role. And taking on this task has never been more important. The <enter your country name of choice> faces a changing, complex, and challenging security environment made more complicated by emerging technologies ... all of which we have limited to no data on regarding their impact for the warfighter and the national security environment. Wargaming done well has a crucial role to play in filling this gap and strengthening < > national security now and in the long run."



AUKUS Nuclear Sub Deal Opens Door to Advanced Undersea Operations

<https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/aukus-nuclear-sub-deal-opens-door-to-advanced-undersea-operations>

Whether Canada becomes a member of AUKUS or not (and AUKUS is much more than about nuclear-powered submarines, so it would be advantageous to join), Canada and the Royal Canadian Navy (really, all government marine departments) should acquire and operate large and extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV) in addition to crewed boats for its submarine force. The UUV would provide capabilities for long-endurance (e.g., western Pacific) and dangerous (e.g., under-ice) missions that Canada needs conduct to ensure its sovereignty and defence.



Logistical Lessons From Ukraine—and What It Means for Taiwan

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/logistical-lessons-ukraine%E2%80%94and-what-it-means-taiwan>

"As demonstrated by the conflict in Ukraine, having access to large ammunition stockpiles is crucial for successful territorial defense and the ability to launch counterattacks."

Canada needs to take in this lesson and ensure that our stocks of ammunition are adequate. Actual numbers may not be something for public consumption but at least the Minister and Chief of Defence Staff should be making statements to Parliament about the state of holdings. Maybe this should be



something submitted to the Department of National Defence as part of the defence policy review (<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-defence-policy/we-want-to-hear-from-you.html>).

In Show of Unity, NATO and EU Heads Mark Historic Visit to North Sea Platform

<https://gcaptain.com/in-show-of-unity-nato-and-eu-heads-mark-historic-visit-to-north-sea-platform/>

It would be well worth while, if they haven't done so already (and they probably have) for Canadian government authorities to start including sea supply and infrastructure companies in defence and security planning, wargaming and exercising. The sea, including subsea/sea bottom, environment (platforms, energy and communications lines/cables) needs to be a regular part of the shared government maritime 'plot' (picture).



“NATO has also recently created an undersea infrastructure coordination cell to map vulnerabilities, and coordinate efforts between NATO Allies, partners, and the private sector.”

Two Dead in Cocaine-Smuggling Mishap off Colombia

<https://maritime-executive.com/article/two-dead-in-cocaine-smuggling-mishap-off-colombia>


The Colombian Navy... "recently intercepted a 50-foot semisubmersible smuggling boat with a cargo of 2.6 tonnes of cocaine..."



The term too often and incorrectly used in the media and colloquially is 'narco-sub.' Good to read this article's use of "semisubmersible" which is what such boats truly are (and sometimes, 'low profile' or 'low observable vessel'). They are not submarines nor a target for anti-submarine forces. It is evident from this case with two dead smugglers, however, that they are targets for correctly trained and equipped forces, capable of treating these boats as hazardous material. It is important that involved Canadian forces (navy, coast guard, police, border services) as so trained and equipped.

More on the vessels at (ignore the country boundaries in the map):

Transatlantic-Narco-submarine-Galicia
<http://www.hisutton.com/Transatlantic-Narco-submarine-Galicia.html>



Replacing Canada's Howitzers

Nicholas Drummond @nicholadrummond tweeted 17 Mar 23 (<https://twitter.com/nicholadrummond/status/1636869863258873856>): The UK's purchase of Archer may seem illogical to some, but is actually a clever solution with multiple benefits.

The tweet thread about the value of wheeled versus tracked



artillery (in this case UK) is worth reading as Canada looks to replace the four towed M777 155 millimetre howitzers (<https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/equipment/weapons/m777-howitzer.html>) it donated to Ukraine. Might Canada be wise to buy wheeled artillery such as the Archer, in order to get a non-developmental product quicker?

Some earlier reporting: Canadian military to replace weapons sent to Ukraine, but could face problems buying new howitzers

<https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-military-to-replace-weapons-sent-to-ukraine-but-could-face-problems-buying-new-howitzers>

Japanese Navy to acquire MQ-9B SeaGuardian from General Atomics

<https://navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/march/12927-japanese-navy-to-acquire-mq-9b-seaguardian-from-general-atomics.html>



"SeaGuardian features a multi-mode maritime surface-search radar with an Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) imaging mode, an Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver, and a High-Definition – Full-Motion Video sensor equipped with optical and infrared cameras."

Might there be an opportunity for Canada and Japan to collaborate (share lessons) whilst operating their remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS)? The Japanese MQ-9B looks like it has a sensor suite optimized for maritime surveillance; the sensors are not much different from those listed for the Royal Canadian Air Force RPAS project (see: "Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles – Canadian and US Programs" https://rusi-ns.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/LCol_Letarte_RCAF_presentation_220914.pdf).

Maritime Sabotage: Protecting Europe's Soft Underbelly

<https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/maritime-sabotage-protecting-europes-soft-underbelly/>



"The (NATO) Alliance should ensure that it has the resources to respond to attacks on submarine infrastructure by quickly repairing or replacing damaged infrastructure and responding to aggression in kind."

Whether called seabed warfare, underwater warfare or whatever, there needs to be concerted action by states, Canada included, to study, plan for and build capability to undertake actions and counter-actions, in peace and war, with sea bottom cables and pipelines.

PLA expels US destroyer trespassing Chinese territorial waters off Xisha Islands

<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202303/1287822.shtml>



"Without authorization from the Chinese government, guided missile destroyer the USS Milius on Thursday made an illegal intrusion into Chinese territorial waters off the Xisha Islands, sabotaging the peace and stability in the South China Sea..."

The Chinese are trying to re-define the meaning of freedom of the sea and international maritime law to suit their purposes. People need to be aware of this disinformation campaign, and people, especially naval staff, need to educate themselves by the study of, or at least the reading of some, maritime law to counter the campaign.

Other Sources:

#Arctic

View of Perceptions of decision-makers about a potential forum of cooperation in the eastern part of the North American Arctic

<https://polarresearch.net/index.php/polar/article/view/9026/15434>

#artificial intelligence #future casting

How to Describe the Future? Large-Language Models and the Future of Military Decision Making

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2023/3/23/how-to-describe-the-future-large-language-models-and-the-future-of-military-decision-making>

New term! Large-language models. "...large-language models incorporate massive amounts of data from books and articles into training sets that allow them to recognize patterns between words and images."

"Large-language models will likely have a larger impact on the battlefield than autonomous drones due to their ability to automate the many aspects of staff work that prevent military leaders from focusing on tactics and strategy."

#Canadian Armed Forces

Ontario proposes new rules to protect jobs of military reservists

<https://www.cp24.com/news/ontario-proposes-new-rules-to-protect-jobs-of-military-reservists-1.6317236>

Might NS consider the same?

A tweet about the article noted:

Compensation options for ill and injured Reservists

<https://www.canada.ca/en/ombudsman-national-defence-forces/education-information/caf-members/reservist-information/compensation-options-ill-injured.html>

#communications

Challenging the Next Generation to Communicate Preparedness

<https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/resilience/challenging-the-next-generation-to-communicate-preparedness/>

#defence policy

Lt.-Gen. Michel Maisonneuve (ret'd): Canadians deserve an operational Navy

opinion: <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canadians-deserve-an-operational-navy>

Unnecessary Delay: The Integrated Review Refresh 2023

A comparison with UK: <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/unnecessary-delay-integrated-review-refresh-2023>

Time to take the politics out of strategic planning

Yes! (AUS but valid):

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/time-to-take-the-politics-out-of-strategic-planning/>

Britain's Military Cannot Sustain a Global Role

<https://thealphengroup.com/2023/03/14/britains-military-cannot-sustain-a-global-role/>

"...the three things that matter in defence are reach, clout and technology..."

#defence procurement

Ignoring defence spending is not an option, but we'll probably do it anyway

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/john-ivison-ignoring-defence-spending-is-not-an-option-but-well-probably-do-it-anyway>

Budget 2023: Canada's indefensible military spending

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-budget-2023-canadas-indefensible-military-spending/>

#defence production

Reviving the Arsenal of Democracy: Steps for Surging Defense Industrial Capacity

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/reviving-arsenal-democracy-steps-surging-defense-industrial-capacity>

#drones

Decoding the Defense Department's Updated Directive on Autonomous Weapons

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/decoding-defense-departments-updated-directive-autonomous-weapons>

Thinking Big with Small Drones: An Allied Approach to Swarming

<https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/thinking-big-with-small-drones-an-allied-approach-to-swarming/>

#Indo-Pacific

China's Three Roads to Controlling Taiwan

<https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/chinas-three-roads-to-controlling-taiwan/>

"The US must urgently rethink its defense of Taiwan so that it blocks all three roads to Chinese victory."

#information operations

China Is Tweaking Its Propaganda for African Audiences

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/16/china-propaganda-africa-soft-power/>

The Canadian definition of propaganda is: "Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view." (AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, and TERMIUM Plus® The Government of Canada's terminology and linguistic data bank). So propaganda is not intrinsically good or bad, it is who uses it, how it is used and who are the audience.

TikTok, ByteDance, and their ties to the Chinese Communist Party

Submission to the (Australian) Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media, 14 March <https://aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=a7e2a076-1112-4414-ba0f-f129e0cd39fe&subId=735418>

"State capture refers to sophisticated influence operations in which a more powerful and expansive state secretly captures the decision making of weaker state via capture of key officials through corruption, gaining significant and hidden control of supposedly sovereign states."

Paul Maddison @PaulMaddison7 Mar 19 tweeted (<https://twitter.com/PaulMaddison7/status/1637368917961347072>): This thread is cut & paste from the preamble to the 14 March 2023 Submission to Australia's "Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference Through Social Media". For my Canadian friends, the best is saved for last. 1/7 In Ottawa, intelligence agencies reportedly found in 2017 that the CCP was interfering at "all levels of government". In contrast with Australia, however, Canada's political leaders did not act, and the problem of CCP interference continued to grow." 7/7

#information technology

Report on National Security Implications of 5G Networks

<https://news.usni.org/2023/03/17/report-on-national-security-implications-of-5g-networks-2>

#logistics

Marines update logistics doctrine from 1997 — here's what's inside

<https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2023/03/21/marines-update-logistics-doctrine-from-1997-heres-whats-inside/>

see: Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 4: Logistics

<https://news.usni.org/2023/03/22/marine-corps-doctrinal-publication-4-logistics>

and

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 4, Logistics

<https://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/MCPEL/Electronic-Library-Display/Article/899840/mcdp-4/>

#maritime #legal

Could Indonesia Block Foreign Nuclear Subs at Maritime Choke Points?

<https://maritime-executive.com/article/could-indonesia-block-foreign-nuclear-subs-at-maritime-choke-points>

Considerations when thinking of #Arctic choke points.

#maritime #strategy

Maritime Security: EU updates Strategy to safeguard maritime domain against new threats

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_1483

"The European Union has released an update (https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/publications/joint-communication-update-eu-maritime-security-strategy-and-its-action-plan-enhanced-eu-maritime_en) to its EU Maritime Security Strategy (https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/ocean/blue-economy/other-sectors/maritime-security-strategy_en) and Action Plan, the most recent update since 2014, which included 14 references to cyber threats and the importance of cybersecurity. The joint communication to the European parliament and council highlighted the threats of "hybrid and cyber-attacks targeting maritime infrastructure" and noted the increasing likelihood that EU member states will experience such attacks on undersea pipelines and cables." (Thea Dunlevie, American Enterprise Institute)

The Maritime Security Framework (<https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/publications/maritime-security-surete-maritime/framework-cadre/index-eng.html>) "presents a series of considerations related to the contribution of the Canadian Coast Guard to Canada's national security. It is intended to offer context regarding the Coast Guard contribution within the collective federal effort to enhance Canada's national and maritime security."

#mobilization

Building an Army: Some Lessons from History

https://issuu.com/chacr_camberley/docs/bar_spr23/s/21232068

Timely, good read. Could also have been titled "How to avoid destroying a military."

#naval warfare

Fighting DMO, Pt. 4: Weapons Depletion and the Last-Ditch Salvo Dynamic

<https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-4-weapons-depletion-and-the-last-ditch-salvo-dynamic/>

Fighting DMO, Pt. 5: Missile Salvo Patterns and Maximizing Volume of Fire

<https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-5-missile-salvo-patterns-and-maximizing-volume-of-fire/>

#policing

Countering Misogyny and Building Trust in UK Policing

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/countering-misogyny-and-building-trust-uk-policing>

#political warfare

Micronesia's President Writes Bombshell Letter on China's 'Political Warfare'

<https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/micronesias-president-writes-bombshell-letter-on-chinas-political-warfare/>

This article does not have an overt Canadian nexus but because of growing concerns here about foreign interference, it has been included in Dispatches.

#Russia-Ukraine War

An Idea So Crazy It Just Might Work

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/crazy/>

The Bloody Toll of Russia's War in Ukraine

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/bloody-toll-russias-war-ukraine>

Ukrainians are riding tanks captured from an elite Russian unit into battle in Bakhmut, but their new gear may not last long

<https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-is-using-captured-russian-tanks-but-faces-logistic-issues-2023-3>

From Hibernation to Humiliation? Russia Brings T-54 Tanks Out of Retirement

<https://notes.citeam.org/t-54>

*This says so much about defence industry, mobilization and war reserves.
and*

Russia is dusting off ancient tanks as losses mount in Ukraine

<https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/russia-tanks-t-54-t-55-ukraine/>

and

Signs Point To Russia Sending Ancient T-54 Series Of Tanks To Ukraine

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/signs-point-to-russia-sending-ancient-t-54-series-of-tanks-to-ukraine>

Using Starlink Paints a Target on Ukrainian Troops

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/03/using-starlink-paints-target-ukrainian-troops/384361/>

#airpower

Air mobility and the war in Ukraine

<https://wavelroom.com/2023/03/20/air-mobility-and-the-war-in-ukraine/>

Report to Congress on Transferring Fighter Aircraft to Ukraine

<https://news.usni.org/2023/03/21/report-to-congress-on-transferring-fighter-aircraft-to-ukraine>

#cyber operations

Ukraine Cyber Lessons Learned 2022

<https://dd80b675424c132b90b3-e48385e382d2e5d17821a5e1d8e4c86b.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/external/russias-cyber-tactics-lessons-learned-2022-1.pdf>

#drones

Ukrainian Drone Pilot's Frontline Account Of Fighting Via Eyes In The Sky

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukrainian-drone-pilots-frontline-account-of-fighting-via-eyes-in-the-sky>

#United States

DOD Communication Playbook 2023

[available on request to RUSI(NS)]

Not sure how 'playbook' fits against policy, strategy and plans, but looks to be direction/guidance about affairs. Probably best makes sense to those with big-team experience.

#warfare

The Operational Level of War Does Not Exist

<https://www.tjomo.com/article/the-operational-level-of-war-does-not-exist/>

Operationalizing Multi-Domain Operations at the Tactical Level: SOSRA and Seven Steps of Engagement Area Development

<https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2023/03/20/operationalizing-multi-domain-operations-at-the-tactical-level-sosra-and-seven-steps-of-engagement-area-development/>

#wargaming

Can war games really help us predict who will win a conflict?

<https://www.ft.com/content/0e403251-a999-4af9-b869-a143ea25c019>

This is the value of war games. They can help us understand human behaviours in unpredictable and rare scenarios but not necessarily to predict the future.

Other:

**North America Aerospace Defense Command
North Warning System and Joint Surveillance
System**

<https://www.cigeography.com/2023/02/NORAD.html>



H I Sutton @CovertShores 22 Mar tweeted: *****UPDATE***** Here -> <http://hisutton.com/New-Ukraine-Maritime-Drone.html> #Ukraine's new maritime drone (USV) with which to strike #Russian Navy in Sevastopol, Crimea and beyond. Funded largely by donations? #OSINT

 Ukrainian Maritime Drone, October 2022



COVERT SHORES
www.hisutton.com

 Ukrainian Maritime Drone, March 2023
Provisional, approximate scale



Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

One has to leave the country to see really how poorly served we are at times by Canadian journalism. If one were to examine Canadian news outlets, one would see navel gazing, climate and infotainment. Most Canadians have little or no clue as to the issues that affect the rest of the world. Essentially, Canadians are blind - some issues will end the world much sooner than climate change yet, our media keeps people blissfully unaware. It shows in the types of stories that are the pabulum that is Canadian news. Even poor African countries are better served.

The biggest and most concerning issue in Canada is in fact a "burning issue," and that is interference in our politics at all levels of government by foreign players. Most point to China, however that may be true they are by far not the only one. They are the most dangerous at present. For reasons that are as yet unknown, our government has chosen not to take concrete action. It is concerning that the indications are that the government was the main beneficiary of these alleged cases of interference. This being said, a public inquiry would clear the issue up at least to a great degree. It does not stop other forms of more detailed inquiry, but the public needs to be reassured that our institutions are safe

and secure. It should be noted that the opposition has forced the government this week, which will cause key personnel including the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff to testify before Parliament under oath. In particular, Parliament will examine the Prime Minister's actions when informed of foreign political interference. It is likely not going to be pretty. It is clear Parliament will be more "interesting" than normal.

Minister Anand made comments on the AUKUS pact that were somewhat less than complete. The AUKUS pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States covers nuclear submarines and seven other areas. She kind of skipped over the other areas such as increased intelligence sharing, research on AI and quantum computer research as well as increased integration between the key allies. Canada does need new submarines and it is not too early to start negotiations. Japan has a new type of boat that meets that criteria. The Minister is correct, we do not need to be nuclear necessarily, but they do have to be air independent for use in all three oceans. Canada has missed the boat.

Canada has now provided eight Leopard 2 A4 tanks and an armoured recovery vehicle to Ukraine. Canada is also providing more 155 mm ammunition as well. Canada has spent or sent well over 5B CAD to support Ukraine, not counting efforts to settle Ukrainians in Canada.

United States

The US continues to support Ukraine with major programs for weapons and equipment to further Ukraine's defence against Russia's unprovoked attack on that country, its people and culture. The most recent program allows for more ammunition for artillery systems. The US is continuing to be the major provider of this support. The EU is moving steadily forward in their support as well approving 2B Euros for the purchase of one million 155 mm shells this past week. It is interesting that US Republican representatives, especially those of the pro-Trump team, are now pushing to limit support to Ukraine. It shows a lack of understanding of the world situation, that investment now in Ukraine will ultimately save US and allied lives.

Moldova

Moldova, with a population of just three million, is the fourth poorest country in Europe. It is generally accepted that it is the next target of Russia if they are successful in their attack on Ukraine. It has been hit by errant missiles from Russia and by defending air defence missiles from Ukraine. It has recently had the government of Prime Minister Gavrilita resign on short notice. The President, Maia Sandu, accepted the resignation of the previous government and asked a former Interior Minister, Dorin Recean, to be the next Prime Minister and form a new government.

The new Prime Minister has a lot to deal with starting with an economy in desperate shape with 30% inflation and an active anti-government movement formed by opposition leader Ilan Shor of the Shor Party. Mr Shor and Vladimir Plahotniuc are Moldovan oligarchs who are known to be pro-Russian. It is alleged that they orchestrated recent mass demonstrations against the government and may have assisted in a major hybrid Russian attack. Moldovan police and security forces using Ukrainian and NATO assistance were able to apprehend several alleged agents provocateurs as well as denying entry to 182 other men who were suspected of being employed to cause disruptions in the past two weeks.

The European Union is making every attempt to help Moldova gain stability for its economy. Nearly a billion Euros have been allocated to assist. Strangely, as of 13 March 2023 Moldova once again purchased gas from Gazprom.

Moldova is still dealing with the Russian self-declared enclave of Transnistria which has a Russian garrison of between 1500-1800 troops plus its own militia of 6000 troops. Moldova's armed forces consists of only 6000. Eventually the Transnistria problem will have to be faced; it too will not be pretty. Moldova will need extensive help

Belarus

Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko is still attempting to balance Putin's pressure for a Belarus attack on Ukraine and maintaining the loyalty and survival of his security forces. Lukashenko is faced with an almost impossible dilemma. While an attack by Belarus forces would appease Putin, it would ultimately lead to Lukashenko's own downfall. Lukashenko needs his security forces intact. What is being suggested by Vitaly Tsygankov, a correspondent for "Russian Freedom in Belarus," on 21 March 2023 is that the security services are now competing against each other for resources and their own power. The lack of unity amongst Belarus security forces could be a major flaw in the long term. Lukashenko lacks actual legitimacy and absolutely needs the security forces to survive and to a degree keep freedom of maneuver to the country as a whole and not under Russian authority. Ukraine's successful fight prevents the Russians from further occupation of Belarus territory and Belarus security forces lack the resources to effectively deal with either Russia or Ukraine. Belarus' fate will likely be decided later on this spring. Cracks are there.

Russia-Ukraine War

The war is one of attrition, the gradual slow unending grind of active combat in a small area loaded with fortifications, ruins and destroyed vehicles and equipment along with the stench of rotting bodies torn apart by incessant shelling. It is closer to the actions in the First World War vice a modern version of maneuver warfare as per neat staff college solutions. No one expected the 21st century to have a 19th century brawl in Europe. Industrial level troop requirements along with vast quantities of equipment, vehicles, ammunition, food, potable water, fortifications shouldn't be back in vogue, but here we are. Russia is apparently willing to sacrifice its entire future on the misguided whims of one man who generally keeps himself in an echo chamber of likeminded individuals. This is not a recipe for happiness anywhere. Unfortunately for president Putin, the losses are now being felt throughout the country. Use of VPN is growing and other narratives are now in the open.

Ukraine is receiving a weapons and equipment package totaling 350M USD from the US including large quantities of ammunition for HIMARS, M-270, and 155 mm artillery of various types as well as other ammunition and equipment. This raises the US total contribution to 30B USD since the start of the war.

The biggest news was the visit of President Xi Jinping to Moscow over a three day period. Putin looked and acted as the junior partner and Xi looked content. The Russian czars are probably rolling over in their graves as Putin has let Russia become a junior vassal state to China; so much for Russian empire and glory in the 21st century. China has every right to act in a triumphant manner with a long term enemy essentially coming hat in hand for support. It will also become clear to the "stans" that China is the new overlord and that adjustments will have to be made in their relationships. Without firing a shot, China has achieved a great victory and thus access to the largest resource fields in the world. It will be hailed as a new Chinese empire with a new emperor. The world is not ready for a modern Chinese empire run by the CCP.

The war itself is mainly taking place in three main areas, the first being the small city of Bakhmut in central Eastern Ukraine, the second just to the south at Avdiivka and the last around Kremmina in the north-east. What all three locations have in common is huge Russian losses for minor gains. Russian

losses are estimated to be over 30K killed in the nearly seven month battle for Bakhmut. Ukraine has made minor counter-attacks when possible but seems to be hoarding its resources for the much anticipated major offensive. The general feeling is that the Ukrainian Army is waiting for Western tanks and equipment arrive at the front before making any moves. The offensive is likely to occur in late April or May 2023.

The Russian airfield at Dzhankoi in Crimea was attacked by Ukraine using long range unmanned aerial vehicles. The attack shows Ukraine's increasing capacity to inflict damage on Russian targets several hundred kilometres away. Ukraine's target appears to have been a supply of naval Kalibre missiles being stored at the base. Dzhankoi is a major transport hub and thus a target rich area. Russia continues to find out the hard way that Ukraine has the capacity to hit at longer ranges than at the start of the war, mostly by locally-built capabilities. It is now believed that Ukraine could if so desired attack the Kremlin itself.

The President of Ukraine also received a visit from the Prime Minister of Japan in Kiev at the same time Xi Jinping was visiting president Putin in Moscow. Coincidence, probably not.

China

Every so often it is good to remind ourselves what China is under the Communist Chinese Party (CCP). China is now acting as if they are peacemakers able to stride the world along with other authoritarian regimes as an alternate type of democracy. Nothing could be further from the truth. China is an authoritarian and genocidal regime that crushes any potential opposition within the country with invasive surveillance, threats, violence and disappearances. It has no rule of law as anyone would recognize it. Minorities are crushed and culturally destroyed. China under the CCP has killed tens of millions of its own people since the revolution and continues to do so, although in smaller numbers. China still occupies Tibet and East Turkistan, as also known as Xinjiang Province, invaded and occupied in 1950. China also has territorial claims against all its neighbours including India in three areas, Galwan Valley, Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh along the Line of Actual Control between the two countries. Even their unlimited partner Russia is subject to certain elements suggesting that historical Chinese territory should be returned. Keep in mind the brutal conflict that occurred in 1969 resulting in tens of thousands being killed along the Amur River. One cannot forget the South China Sea and conflict with six neighbours. Its ongoing and increasing threat to take Taiwan by force. Its ongoing territorial disputes with Japan and Korea where China has used increasing threats and force. Russia under Putin has become a low level vassal state of China. China will extract a major price for China's "loyalty" towards Russia. I am not sure Russians will appreciate Putin's decisions. China is not a peacekeeper or maker unless one considers the dead as now peaceful. China has essentially put lipstick on a pig, but it is still a pig.

China is triumphant this week. They have received plaudits for their successful negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It was a true achievement to have two strong enemies agree to open renewed ties. One has to wonder how this deal was created as both the participating countries are somewhat less than honest in their foreign policy. It will be interesting to see how long this will last. They also have been able to suggest to the world that they are actively seeking peace in the Russia-Ukraine conflict with publication of their twelve point plan for a peace deal. The "plan" will result in 15% of Ukraine continuing to be occupied by Russia. It is not a serious offer but may be used to justify further Chinese participation. President Xi visited Moscow looking very much the statesman and Putin his subordinate in practical terms.

In a recent visit to two countries within Africa, it was evident to me that Chinese influence was very prominent as large infrastructure projects flourished over both countries. It was clear that the Chinese

were the country of choice for the primary lead in various projects. So it seemed, but reality is somewhat different. China seems to have large quantities of money to spread around, not only to help finance projects in client countries but also as a way to "buy" influence. Are they really well received? The answer may be somewhat different. One member of the government suggested that they will accept money from anyone, they as a third world nation have nothing to lose by using other peoples' money whether US, Chinese, French, Russian or anyone else. This does not necessarily buy the loyalty of that particular country. As the member of government stated, we know what they are like, but it is we who will decide our position and we will be careful about this.

The Chinese debt has reached massive levels. One South east Asian financial commentator stated that it is already 300% of GDP. China has put copious amounts of money towards new infrastructure projects that are not needed. One piece is increasingly clear, official financial figures are almost pure fiction and subject to increasing scrutiny by investors. Some, including Canadian firms and investment funds, are continuing to risk money in China. It is not a safe place to invest.

One wonders how far China will be able to go in its new guise. What is clear is that it is a false front based on China's past under the CCP. Time will tell.

General Comment

Canada is woefully unprepared for the growing world security situation. Our security forces in general are inadequate and are unable to take action against foreign agents whether criminal or state sponsored. We persist in our ignorance on purpose as defence and security information and expenditures as it is easier to continue to bribe Canadian citizens with their own tax dollars for dubious programs of limited duration and use. At present, most of the CAF, the RCMP, CSIS, CSE and others have been hamstrung by allegations most of which are unproven yet destroyed careers of good people. We have lost combat leaders which we may need shortly. Canadian soldiers and security personnel may pay a horrific price for a lack of action.

Intelligence Updates

For those who would prefer to read the updates as they come out rather than weekly, they are posted on Twitter by the UK Ministry of Defence @DefenceHQ.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent days, Russian and Wagner Group forces have obtained footholds west of the Bakhmutka River in the centre of the contested Donbas town of Bakhmut. Over the preceding week, the river had marked the front line. Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to defend the west of the town.
- However, more broadly across the front line, Russia is conducting some of the lowest rates of local offensive action that has been seen since at least January 2023. This is most likely because Russian forces have temporarily depleted the deployed formations' combat power to such an extent that even local offensive actions are not currently sustainable.
- Russian leaders will likely seek to regenerate the offensive potential of the force once personnel and munition stocks are replenished. In the meantime, commanders will likely be forced to choose between carrying out offensive operations and conducting a credible defence of the full line.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- The Russian authorities are likely preparing to facilitate wider military conscription to resource its military requirements. On 13 March 2023, Russian Duma deputies introduced a bill to change the age bracket for conscription to men aged 21-30 years, from the current 18-27. The law is likely to be passed, and would come into force in January 2024.
- Russia has continued to run conscription call-up cycles twice a year since Soviet times. They are distinct from the exceptional 'partial mobilisation' of veterans carried out since September 2022. Russia continues to officially bar conscripts from operations in Ukraine, though at least hundreds have probably served through administrative mix ups or after being coerced to sign contracts.
- Many 18-21 year old men currently claim exemption from the draft due to being in higher education. The authorities are highly likely changing the age bracket to bolster troop numbers by ensuring that students are eventually forced to serve. Even if Russia continues to refrain from deploying conscripts in the war, extra conscripts will free up a greater proportion of professional soldiers to fight.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 3 March 2023, authorities in the Russian-controlled part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast published a decree that declared occupied Melitopol as the oblast capital. The Russian-installed head of the oblast, Evgeniy Balitskiy, said that this was a temporary measure until the city of Zaporizhzhia was controlled by Russia.
- Zaporizhzhia is one of the four oblasts President Putin claimed to have annexed as part of the Russian Federation on 30 September 2022. Russia has never occupied Zaporizhzhia city, a major industrial centre of 700,000 people, which is approximately 35km from the current front line.
- The quiet declaration of an alternative capital is likely tacit acknowledgement within the Russian system that its forces are highly unlikely to seize previously planned major objectives in the near future.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over the past three weeks, Russian forces have made creeping gains around the Ukrainian-held Donbas town of Avdiivka, immediately north of Donetsk city.
- The Russian operation has largely been carried out by the 1st Army Corps of the Donetsk People's Republic; local personnel who will know the terrain well. Avdiivka has been on the front line of the Donbas conflict since 2014; the city is now largely destroyed. The sprawling Avdiivka Coke Plant complex is likely to be seen as particularly defensible key terrain as the battle progresses.
- Tactically, the situation is similar to that in the larger town of Bakhmut, further north. Ukrainian forces continue organised defence, but their supply lines to the west are increasingly threatened by the Russian envelopment operation.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In the coming weeks, thousands of Russian convicts who have fought for Wagner Group are likely to be pardoned and released. Wagner prisoner recruitment peaked in autumn 2022, with inmates being offered commutation of their sentences after six months of service.
- Although approximately half of the prisoners recruited have likely been killed or wounded, evidence from Russia suggests the group is following through on its promise to free survivors. The certificates issued to freed Wagner veterans claim to have been endorsed by the decree of President Putin.
- With Wagner now likely banned from recruiting more prisoners, this exodus will worsen its personnel problems. In addition, the sudden influx of often violent offenders with recent and often traumatic combat experience will likely present a significant challenge for Russia's war-time society.



CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
COMMANDEMENT DU RENSEIGNEMENT DES FORCES CANADIENNES

RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

Russia claims that it intends to return children who were removed from Ukraine when it is safe to do so.

BASED ON CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND ANALYSIS:

- Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Russia has deported thousands of children from Russian-occupied areas without their legal guardians' consent. Such actions form the basis of the International Criminal Court's arrest warrant for President Putin.
- Russia demands that parents or legal guardians travel from Ukraine to retrieve their children in person. Russian authorities are aware that doing so is extremely difficult without their assistance, which they do not provide.
- Russia has established simplified legal procedures for granting citizenship to children deported from Ukraine. This allows them to be put up for adoption and suggests that Russia does not intend to return them to Ukraine, regardless of conditions on the ground.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over recent days Ukrainian forces initiated a local counterattack to the west of the Donetsk Oblast town of Bakhmut, which is likely to relieve pressure on the threatened H-32 supply route. Fighting continues around the town centre and the Ukrainian defence remains at risk from envelopment from the north and south.
- However, there is a realistic possibility that the Russian assault on the town is losing the limited momentum it had obtained, partially because some Russian MoD units have been reallocated to other sectors.

Lorem ipsum

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since the start of March 2023, heavy fighting has continued in parts of the Svatove-Kremina sector of the front line in northern Luhansk Oblast. Russia has partially regained control over the immediate approaches to Kremina town, which was under immediate Ukrainian threat earlier in the year.
- In places, Russia has made gains of up to several kilometres. Russian commanders are likely trying to expand a security zone west from the defence lines they have prepared along higher ground, and integrate the natural obstacle of the Oskil River. They likely seek to recapture Kupiansk, a logistics node.
- Operationally, Russia's intent in the north-east likely remains defensive. Commanders probably fear this is one of the sectors where Ukraine could attempt major offensive operations.

U.S. Embassy Kyiv @USEmbassyKyiv 18 Mar tweeted: As we celebrate Global Recycling Day, let's take a moment to reflect on what we can do to reduce waste, reuse items, and restore the health of our planet. 🌱



Illia Ponomarenko @IAPonomarenko 22 Mar tweeted: Holy cow, I've lived to see Russians de-mothball my favorite early Cold War legacy T-54/55s. Again: T-54s. Remember — the special military operation is running in full compliance with the plan as scheduled.



Венгерские Т-55 с башнями, развёрнутыми назад для перевозки по ж/д, 1985



Российские Т-54/55 с башнями, развёрнутыми назад для перевозки по ж/д, 2023

