



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 31 March 2023

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Defence Policy Review

The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces have opened public consultations to all Canadians on the defence policy review. The review (a.k.a. Defence Policy Update – DPU) has been a topic of discussion in the RUSI(NS) Security Affairs Committee (SAC) for many months. It appears that comments from individuals rather than organizations is the approach being taken for the review, though there is an opportunity to list the organization of choice in a submission. Members of RUSI(NS) and other readers of *Dispatches* are encouraged to make a submission. See the text box at the beginning of the Other section to the 10 March edition of *Dispatches*. Note the **closing date of 30 April 2023**.

It is easier to write answers to the review's questions on a separate document rather than filling in the boxes on the review webpage (<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-defence-policy/we-want-to-hear-from-you.html>). The SAC has copied the questions onto a document and can provide that to anyone to assist with their submission. Email RUSI(NS) for a copy.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

New: 3 April, Monday - Naval Association of Canada April Speaker's Evening with Professor Sal Mercogliano, "Six Oilers: The Epic History of Founding the Supply Line Between America and Australia in 1942." 1900-2100 EDT. To register: <https://nac-o.wildapricot.org/event-5224956>

Emended: 12 April, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Rear-Admiral Santarpia, "Reflections of a Naval Commander." 1300-1500. Ballroom, Wardroom.

18 April, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation by Colin Marston, UK Defence Wargaming Centre, and Graham Longley-Brown, lead author for the MOD Wargaming Handbook, titled "Influence Wargaming Handbook." 1200-1400 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/influence-wargaming-handbook-tickets-524664865737>

New: 19 April, Wednesday - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (UK) webinar "Assessing the Chinese People's Liberation Army's Personnel" 1430-1530 BST. Online. To register: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/assessing-chinese-peoples-liberation-armys-personnel>

New: 25 April, Tuesday - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (UK) webinar "Cyber Operations in Ukraine: A Conversation with Victor Zhora." 1400-1500 BST. To register: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/cyber-operations-ukraine-conversation-victor-zhora>

New: 9 May, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Scenario Design, or How I ruined my perfect wargame with a sloppy scenario." 1900-2100 ADT. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/scenario-design-or-how-i-ruined-my-perfect-wargame-with-a-sloppy-scenario-tickets-581291246767>

16 May, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "The Politics of Play: Wargaming with the US Military." Noon-1400 EST. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-politics-of-play-wargaming-with-the-us-military-tickets-415461174557>

24 May, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Brigadier-General Masson. 1300-1500. Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess. MTF.

13 June, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Influence Wargaming Handbook." 1200-1400 EDT. Online To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/influence-wargaming-handbook-tickets-524664865737>

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Note "Naming Tanks in the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps" by John Boileau, 13 March February 2023, https://rusi-ns.ca/naming_tanks/

RUSI(NS) Presentation "Canadian Armed Forces/Department of National Defence Space" by BGen Mike Adamson, 15 February 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/caf-dnd-space/>

RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Note "Canadian Pacific Railway's 'Support Our Troops' Locomotives" by Adam Meeks, 7 February 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/locomotives/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Types of Royal Canadian Navy Combatant Warships," 30 January 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/types-of-rcn-combatant-warships/>

RUSI(NS) Presentation “Canadian Coast Guard Autonomous Systems and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Program” by Scott Hatcher, 18 January 2023,
https://rusi-ns.ca/ccg_autonomous_systems/

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Armoured Fighting Vehicles,” 17 January 2023,
<https://rusi-ns.ca/armoured-fighting-vehicles/>

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 29 March 2023
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association Technical Information webpage
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/technical-information>

Company of Master Mariners of Canada Maritimes Division *Foghorn*, March 2023

Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, February 2023

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 3, March 2023

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, March 2023
<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/187-rausi-dispatches-march-2023>

Royal Alberta United Services Institute presentation by Cmdre Pat Montgomery "Canada's Naval Reserve: Past, Present, and Future," 20 January 2023,
<https://www.rausi.ca/info-events/lunch-and-learn/562-canada-a-naval-reserve-past-present-and-future>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, March 2023

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* Volume 5 Issue 7
<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies – Australia *Journal*, Volume 74, Number 1, March 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 2nd Quarter 2023.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 17, Issue 6, 27 March February 2023

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* March 2023
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2023-03>

@RUSI NS on Twitter:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>CAN 🇨🇦 @NationalDefence newly updated Defence Capabilities Blueprint "provides info about defence procurement & contracting opportunities in online searchable format" http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/index.asp Eg. #Arctic Over the Horizon Radar for northward-aimed surveillance http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=1941</p>	
<p>Macdonald-Laurier Institute @MLInstitute 22 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "The #Arctic used to be a flyover region for ICBMs & long-range bombers," writes Christian Leuprecht. However, for security purposes in recent years, the polar regions are now in play: #Russia & #China have designs on the region, rivaling the West. (Making Canada's Arctic security paradigm fit for purpose: From exceptionalism to geostrategic competition https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/making-canadas-arctic-security-paradigm-fit-for-purpose-from-exceptionalism-to-geostrategic-competition/)</p>	
<p>Murray Brewster @Murray_Brewster 25 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Washington wanted accelerated NORAD spending. What it did and did not get in the push for Canada to do more faster. #cdnpoli #NORAD (PM details defence spending plans during Biden's visit — but the timelines are largely the same https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-biden-defence-spending-f35-norad-1.6790703)</p>	
<p>North American Aerospace Defense Command #NORAD modernization project timelines https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/allies-partners/norad/norad-modernization-project-timelines.html estab new Northern Approaches Surveillance System #NASS, procure short/med/long range air-to-air missiles, expand Air-to-Air Refueling/Strat Tanker Transport Capability #STTC</p>	


VAdm/Vam Angus Topshee @Comd_RCN 26 Mar tweeted: Fair winds & following seas to #HMCSMontreal & #MVAsterix who departed Halifax today for #OpProjection. The 1st east coast frigate to deploy in #IndoPacific to bolster 🇨🇦's presence in the region. To all of our families & loved ones, we thank you for your continued support! RUSI(NS) retweeted: .@RoyalCanNavy deploys 1 frigate with only replenishment oiler in fleet. Combo ensures good support during long-endurance/far-distant mission, highlights that CAN🇨🇦 needs more oilers than 1 now to be replaced by 2 building. Pix @FederalFleet #OpPROJECTION <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-projection.html> (Operation PROJECTION)








NATO ACT @NATO_ACT 25 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: #NATO SecGen @jensstoltenberg launched his annual report, covering all aspects of the Alliance's work over the past year, including NATO's support to #Ukraine, reinforced deterrence & defence, and #Finland & #Sweden's membership. Full #SGreport: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_212795.htm #WeAreNATO (The Secretary General's Annual Report 2022)



NATO ACT @NATO_ACT 23 Mar tweeted: #NATO's Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic's network is expanding! #DIANA enhances trans-Atlantic links between public, private and academic sectors with the aim to innovate & maintain NATO's technological edge. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_213074.htm #WeAreNATO (NATO's DIANA expands transatlantic footprint, gears up for first challenges) RUSI(NS) retweeted: #Halifax CAN🇨🇦 to host North American Regional Office of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Defence Innovation Accelerator for North Atlantic #DIANA. Objective to facilitate cooperation tech researchers to solve critical Allied defence & security problems <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2022/11/government-of-canada-proposes-halifax-as-north-american-location-for-natos-defence-innovation-accelerator-for-the-north-atlantic.html>



<p>CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 27 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Our Fellow, Col (Ret'd) Charles Davies discusses what we can expect from budget 2023, the defence policy update, NATO spending, and emphasizes Canada's ability to shape the world for the better, and the increasing importance that we do so. (The World Needs Canada to Live up to its Potential https://cdainstitute.ca/the-world-needs-canada-to-live-up-to-its-potential/)</p>	
<p>CAN🇨🇦 submitted Letter of Request to US outlining requirements&requesting offer for 16 P-8A Poseidon & equipment/servicing as Cdn Multi-Mission Aircraft #CMMA for @RCAF_ARC https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/medias-media/actualites-news/2023-03-27-00-eng.html To replace retiring CP140 Aurora. Provide anti-submarine & surveillance capabilities (Statement on the Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft (CMMA) for the Royal Canadian Air Force)</p>	
<p>National Defence @NationalDefence 27 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: “Quantum 2030: The DND/CAF Quantum S&T Strategy Implementation Plan” is a roadmap to ensure the @CanadianForces is ready to take advantage of new operating capabilities enabled by quantum technologies. Read more: https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/overview-quantum-2030.html #DefenceScience</p>	
<p>.@RCAF_ARC CP140 Aurora crew conducts interception training with CF188 over Cold Lake, Dec2022 https://rcafoptionsarc.smugmug.com/Sharing/Aurora-Sharing/n-qqZkRk/i-xpzWGxR/A Such regular training is part of how #RCAF maintains professional norms while operating in int'l airspace monitoring #UN sanctions against North Korea #OpNEON <i>Timely training!</i></p>	
<p>CAN🇨🇦 @NationalDefence awards contract for ballistic helmet systems (https://www.joint-forces.com/defence-equipment-news/63018-galvion-batlskin-caiman-selected-by-canada), part of Canadian Dismounted Infantry Capability Enhancement, Soldier Systems program https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2023/02/soldier-system-deliveries.html <i>See Soldier Systems poster at end of Dispatches.</i></p>	

CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 20 Mar tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: “What we have seen in our review of the Canadian Rangers is that the policies that serve us well in downtown Ottawa may not serve us well in the northern and remote locations that are served by these members.”
(Canadian Rangers need more support from military, NDP MPs say
<https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-rangers-need-more-support-from-military-ndp-mps-say>)



A lesson of psyops'ers

Nate Mook @natemook 26 Mar tweeted: A rocket fired by Russia hit a farm in the front line Ukrainian town of Hulyaipole—but instead of explosives, it was filled with thousands of anti-US propaganda papers. It still destroyed the building, so I don't think the propaganda worked.

Check your delivery system!



“Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia” on Facebook:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

His Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) Montréal and Motor Vessel (MV) Asterix deploys to the Indo-Pacific

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/03/his-majestys-canadian-ship-hmcs-montreal-and-motor-vessel-mv-asterix-deploys-to-the-indo-pacific.html>



"...HMCS *Montréal* and Naval Replenishment Unit (NRU) MV *Asterix*..."

It is a regret that official releases refer to the NRU and ASTERIX as if they were one and the same. The NRU is a naval unit of people, with no major equipment like a ship, that deploys detachments onboard ASTERIX to undertake naval functions. ASTERIX is a leased civil vessel. To write it as above is to confusate the difference between the two. More clear would have been to write: "...HMCS *Montréal* and the Naval Replenishment Unit (NRU) onboard MV *Asterix*..."

For years, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) has had crews based both in NATO (Geilenkirchen) and in US (Tinker Air Force Base) operating the E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft. The E-3 have now reached the end of their lifespan and will not be upgraded but replaced by a new and better aircraft system, the E-7 Wedgetail.



Until recently, the RCAF had a large contingent based in Germany and at one time commanded the force of some 17 E-3. The Canadians at Tinker were part of an exchange program and flew missions worldwide as part of US Air Force crews. Training our aircrews who have experience on the E-3 and converting to the E-7 would be simple and take less time than for most aircraft conversions. Thinking ahead, the airframe of the Wedgetail is the same as that of the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) which the RCAF is considering as the replacement for its Aurora (MPA).

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) was the first air force to acquire Wedgetails and they are now a force multiplier in the vast areas of northern Australia. The RAAF can now surveil their entire airspace, especially protecting their airspace from the north.

No such airborne surveillance and aircraft control capability exists in Canada. Such a platform is ideal for reaching the vast areas of the far north and more importantly, more difficult for an adversary to target as compared to the fixed ground based radar system. A force of five Wedgetails would be sufficient to meet the needs of Canada and would dovetail nicely working in concert with the being-procured F-35 fighter force.

It is believed that our air force planners and indeed any defence review would be remiss if they did not consider acquiring such a force multiplier for Canada. Additionally, not only would they enhance our North American Aerospace Defense Command capability, but Wedgetails would be rapidly available for deployment anywhere F-35s would be operating in future. We still have time to get on board.

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Posted as comment: 'The ability to stare': Why the US Air Force is eager to get the E-7
<https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/03/23/the-ability-to-stare-why-the-us-air-force-is-eager-to-get-the-e-7/>

Underwater drones to seek and destroy mines

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/rcn/2023/03/underwater-drones-to-seek-and-destroy-mines.html>

The Royal Canadian Navy is acquiring a sea mine disposal capability with the Remote Mine-Hunting and Disposal System (RMDS). The system consists of two classes of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV or UUV, colloquially drones): one deep-water (100-200 metres depth) and the other shallow water (10-100 metres). Mines are disposed using a fibre-optic guided vehicle with onboard sonar and camera and a one-shot large calibre-shaped charge. The RMDS will be used primarily from Kingston-class ships (which are typed as general-purpose mine warfare - MM - though they are used for a variety of roles including training and offshore/regional patrol), however, this implies that the system may be able to be carried aboard other vessels such as 'vessels/craft-of-opportunity' (VOOP/COOP) taken up from civil



use or those to be acquired under the Naval Inshore Support Vessel project. Every vessel a mine hunter!

Look for possibly more use of the initialism UISS: Unmanned Influence Sweep System, maybe Canadianized as Uncrewed Influence Sweep System (see: "RIMPAC lessons will inform Navy's pursuit of a program-of-record unmanned ship in 2025"

<https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/08/01/rimpac-lessons-will-inform-navys-pursuit-of-a-program-of-record-unmanned-ship-in-2025/>).

Report to Congress on Constellation-class Frigate Program

<https://news.usni.org/2023/03/28/report-to-congress-on-constellation-class-frigate-program-ffg-62-13>

Interesting is the part about "the number of vertical launch system (VLS) missile tubes in the FFG-62 design." Missile cell count has amongst ship-fans and pundits become much a major measure of ship capability and whether a ship is a destroyer, frigate, etc. Certainly a visible measure, as growth margin, power for radars and the like are measures not seen.

It would be nice to see similar reporting, whether from a Parliamentary office or not, about the Canadian Surface Combatant project ship.



Davie wants to replace Russians in Finland

<https://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/2023-03-28/industrie-navale/la-davie-veut-remplacer-les-russes-en-finlande.php>

"Helsinki Shipyard Oy, a shipyard in the Finnish capital that has built 60 per cent of the world's icebreaker fleet, issued a statement on its website Sunday to announce that Chantier Davie Canada now has an 'exclusive option' to purchase its facilities and that negotiations are underway."

Chantier Davie seems to be positioning itself well, with this acquisition and its Arctic Centre of Excellence (<https://www.davie.ca/uploads/pdfs/2022-11-04-nic-en.pdf>), to be truly a world leader in icebreaker-related matters. That could be advantageous for Canada and for the NATO alliance. With procurement of the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels for the Royal Canadian Navy, and icebreakers of various type designations for the Canadian Coast Guard. the 'balance' of Canada's marine services are increasingly, welcome that, changing to a Northern orientation.



Canada Needs Wedgetails

Recently the media reported that the Canadian government has submitted a Letter of Request to the US for 16 P-8 Poseidon aircraft for surveillance, reconnaissance and anti-submarine operations. These reliable aircraft are in service with several air forces and navies, and the US is planning to procure sufficient of them to replace their aging P-3 Orions in these roles.



In terms of aerial surveillance, this move forms only one part of the equation: airborne surveillance, aircraft warning and control is the other vital role and is distinct from the aforementioned roles.

In my view, what is missing in the equation is that whilst the Minister of National Defence is looking to replace the aging Aurora aircraft based in Greenwood and Comox for the first requirement, this does not address in any way airborne warning and control for air defence of our airspace. The Royal Australian Air Force and the US Air Force have selected the E-7 Wedgetail aircraft to replace the E-3A in this role. Note that only the US, NATO and UK are flying such platforms but that Canadian aircrews have been flying and indeed commanding such operations for a number of years.

Canada urgently requires the E-7 to augment future F-35 fighter aircraft operations in the air defence role and also to expand our NORAD capability for surveillance of the Canadian Arctic. Of note, the P-8 and E-7 operate the same airframe, which would enhance pilot training, maintenance training and logistics. The Department of National Defence should comprehensively look at all aspects of surveillance, not just the surveillance and maritime roles of the P-8 but also vital air defence and NORAD whilst the Defence Policy Review is underway and whilst E-7 production lines are open.

Other Sources:

#A2R

Canadian Armed Forces' Latest Appeal Tries a New Direction

<https://musebycl.io/advertising/canadian-armed-forces-latest-appeal-tries-new-direction>

#Arctic

What Multilateral Strategy for Canada in the Arctic?

<https://ras-nsa.ca/what-multilateral-strategy-for-canada-in-the-arctic/>

Top US Northern Command official calls Arctic military resources insufficient at Senate hearing

<https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/military/2023/03/23/top-us-northern-command-official-calls-arctic-military-resources-insufficient-at-senate-hearing/>

#artificial intelligence

The Future of Defense: The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Modern Warfare

<https://wavellroom.com/2023/01/27/artificial-intelligence/>

How science-fiction tropes shape military AI

<https://thebulletin.org/2023/03/how-science-fiction-tropes-shape-military-ai/>

#naval operations

Securing the maritime commons: The role of artificial intelligence in naval operations

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/42497-a-i-in-naval-operations-exploring-possibilities-debating-ethics/>

#balloon

Up in the Air: The Spy Balloon and What It Means for Canada

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/air-spy-balloon-and-what-it-means-canada>

#China

Why is China strengthening its military? It's not all about war.

<https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2023/03/24/why-is-china-strengthening-its-military-its-not-all-about-war/>

#information operations

The colourless, odourless gas of Chinese ideology

<https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4838671>

#warfare

Chinese communist way of war: Different than the West

<https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4846571>

#cyber operations

CAF Digital Campaign Plan: First Thoughts

<https://canadiancyber.substack.com/p/caf-digital-campaign-plan-first-thoughts>

Secret trove offers rare look into Russian cyberwar ambitions

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/03/30/russian-cyberwarfare-documents-vulkan-files/>

#drones #naval warfare

Uncrewed boats are changing the way wars are fought at sea

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uncrewed-boats-are-changing-the-way-wars-are-fought-at-sea/>

#Indo-Pacific

The United States and stability in the Taiwan Strait

<https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-03/the-United-States-and-stability-in-the-Taiwan-Strait/>

#intelligence

How Open-Source Intelligence Is Changing Warfare

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/march/how-open-source-intelligence-changing-warfare>

#international relations

Backgrounder: Canada and the United States advance work to grow our clean economies and create good, middle-class jobs on both sides of our border

<https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2023/03/24/backgrounder-canada-and-united-states-advance-work-grow-our-clean>

Note sections on: Ukraine Support, Haiti, Foreign Interference, Indo-Pacific Strategy, Renewal of Operation NEON, NORAD Modernization Investments and Cyber. Other sections are of interest, especially from the perspective of other services with which RUSI(NS) is related.

#NATO

Western alliances in times of power politics

<https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2023/03/28/western-alliances-in-times-of-power-politics-a-review/index.html>

#maritime security

Seafloor Cables and Pipelines: Are They Secure?

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/march/seafloor-cables-and-pipelines-are-they-secure>

#naval warfare

Every Ship a SAG and the LUSV Imperative

<https://cimsec.org/every-ship-a-sag-and-the-lusv-imperative/>

Rise of Hybrid Warfare Drives New Approach for Naval Services

<https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/rise-of-hybrid-warfare-drives-new-approach-for-naval-services>

#Russia-Ukraine War

Russia's Evolution Toward a Unified Strategic Operation: The Influence of Geography and Conventional Capacity

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1233-8.html

The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military's Decision making Role in a "Besieged Fortress"

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1233-7.html

Assessment: a strategic turning point of the war?

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1639580618362167298.html>

Russia's 'Low-Tech' War on Ukraine Discredited Its Military Modernization Narrative

<https://ras-nsa.ca/russias-low-tech-war-on-ukraine/>

Russian factory tank production

https://twitter.com/pati_marins64/status/1638913309217898500

Vladimir Putin unleashed the monster of war. It must now devour his regime

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-vladimir-putin-unleashed-the-monster-of-war-it-must-now-devour-his/>

This is the Cost of Appeasement

<https://cdainstitute.ca/this-is-the-cost-of-appeasement/>

Anyone thinking appeasement need to read the book "Peace For Our Time" by Roger Parkinson. Appeasement is the resort of those who failed to prepare.

If China Arms Russia, the U.S. Should Kill China's Aircraft Industry

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/20/china-russia-aircraft-comac-xi-putin/>

Reaper madness: What really happened between Russian fighter jets and a US drone over the Black Sea

<https://taskandpurpose.com/news/air-force-mq-9-reaper-drone-russian-fighter-jet-intercept-black-sea-explainer/>

Britain will learn lessons from Ukraine conflict

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britain-will-learn-lessons-from-ukraine-conflict/>

Resumption of offensive operations by the Ukrainians

<https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1640426102043623451>

Mobilisation in Russia: How to Convince Men to Fight in Ukraine?

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/mobilisation-russia-how-convince-men-fight-ukraine>

Analytic Framework for Emulating Russian Decisionmaking

<https://www.cna.org/reports/2017/analytic-framework-for-emulating-russian-decision-making>

A 2017 CNA report, recently tweeted, that purports to have "accurately laid out what a potential Russian conventional action against Ukraine might look like."

Ukraine's new offensives against Russia will aim to retake territory, inspire hope and reignite Western attention on the war

<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-28/ukraine-2023-offensives-russia-retake-territory-west-war/102148638>

#cyber operations

Russia-Ukraine: War in Cyberspace Puts Civilians and Combatants on the Same Network

<https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news-features/new-norms-cyber-war/>

#drones

Inside Ukraine's scramble for "game-changer" drone fleet

<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/inside-ukraines-scramble-game-changer-drone-fleet-2023-03-24/>

Ukraine naval drones limit Russian warship activity - UK

<https://www.jpost.com/international/article-735551>

#economic warfare

If China Arms Russia, the U.S. Should Kill China's Aircraft Industry

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/20/china-russia-aircraft-comac-xi-putin/>

#United States #land operations #domestic operations

Adapt to Defend the Homeland

<https://www.ausa.org/articles/adapt-defend-homeland>

#war

Revising, or Rejecting, 'Reasonable Prospect of Success' in Just Wars? Lessons From Ukraine

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/revising-or-rejecting-reasonable-prospect-success-just-wars-lessons-ukraine>

#warfare

High Risk, High Reward: Reflections on Joint Forcible Entry

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/joint-forcible-entry/>

Rethink Use-of-Force Theory

<https://www.ausa.org/articles/rethink-use-force-theory>

Other:

CNA PLA Update Issue 8 | March 23, 2023

<https://www.cna.org/our-media/newsletters/pla-update/>

Reviews:

- A newly enacted law designed to increase the attractiveness of careers as reservists
- An expanded PLA recruitment campaign for carrier fighter pilots
- Recent accounts of PLA Army and China Coast Guard (CCG) organizations using simulation technologies to improve officer decision-making.
- Initial impressions of the latest session of China's National People's Congress (NPC), including implications of the announced defense budget and a look at how the demographics of the PLA's NPC delegation reflect (or don't) the PLA's total active duty force.

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

A days-after-the-budget comment. Missing are defence and security issues. Given the attacks by China under the "Three Wars Concept" and infiltration of the Canadian political system by the Communist Chinese Party not to mention the ever increasing possibility of being involved in a heavy metal conflict, this seems more than unwise. 50b CAD in deficit financing with little real measurable goals is problematic at best.

The media made mention that Canada is looking at the possibility that the Boeing-produced P-8 Poseidon may be used as a replacement for the long in the tooth CP140 Aurora which has done so well for Canada. Supposedly up to 16 aircraft will be acquired. While this news is to be welcome, keep in mind that Canada once had nearly two hundred anti-submarine aircraft including the Argus,

Neptune and Tracker, as well as various helicopters. Now we may have up to 16 aircraft for the longest coastline in the world covering three oceans and one of the second largest land mass. One wonders how they figure that 16 will do. Satellites are great for surveillance but eventually one needs something that potentially poke holes in an intruder. Satellites cannot do that, only an armed and capable platform can do that job. We may consider other means such as long-range drones but again will they be capable of defending themselves and reaching out and incapacitating an intruder? Canada is famous for buying unarmed equipment but now the world has changed and an intruder may very well do harm.

The Department of National Defence has taken great credit for the purchase of the F-35 for our new fighter aircraft and of course most recently the upgrade to the North Warning System, both replacing systems that are long overdue. Unfortunately, these systems will not be available until later in the decade or early in the next. Keep in mind that there are often delays. DND has returned billions back to the treasury as programs fail to meet targets. The government constantly talks about how large the defence budget is, yet at the same time they do not mention the return of funds, which means we spend even less than advertised.

Canada also tends not to think outside the box. The North Warning Systems gap could be filled by the purchase of a small number of E-7 Wedgetails recently announced as a replacement for the Boeing 707-based Air Early Warning and Communications System aircraft (AWACS). Canada's radar systems are incapable of dealing with hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, etc., partly because of the view that did not allow the Canadian Armed Forces from participating in the ballistic missile defence program. It made no sense then when it first came up, and non-participation is now a disaster waiting to happen. The E-7 is based on the ubiquitous Boeing 737 aircraft. It has already been purchased by Australia to cover their gaps. It makes sense. Canadian air force personnel have been involved with the NATO AWACS program and have also been involved with US Air Force AWACS as well, so training requirements are reduced. This would allow Canada to cover the gaps earlier especially if we take aircraft out of an existing production line.

The Defence Update Review is ongoing but it is interesting that the government is interested in the views of individuals as opposed to groups that actually can discuss programs in more detail and with considerable knowledge. One may think that the government already has built its answers and is looking for ways to justify their policies on defence, security and foreign affairs. Canada needs an armed forces to deter a hostile power or, if necessary, conduct lethal operations to defend our sovereignty either alone or with allies. Everything else is secondary to these requirements. One cannot have an impact on the world without hard power to back up soft power, otherwise one is just all talk and no ability to take action. We will not even start discussion on the massive deficit with little to show for it.

United States

The US continues to support Ukraine massively. This week both Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Stryker armoured vehicles of various types are now in the hands of the Ukrainians along with fourteen Challenger II tanks from Britain and eighteen Leopard 2 from Germany with more coming from Canada, Spain, Poland and Finland. The US has put nearly 50b USD in loans and grants in support of Ukraine. The US also opened the first permanent base in Poland and Eastern Europe as well in this reporting period, also infuriating the Russians. US support for Ukraine and Europe in general is bound to continue under the Biden administration.

The US government is also providing support to Taiwan and will be "hosting" the Taiwanese president as she travels to countries in South America. The Speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy, is expected

to meet with the Taiwanese president as she passes through the US. The US also continues to press the Chinese on the South China Sea, sending a US destroyer close to a Chinese-manned artificial island in the Paracel Island chain. The Chinese made much of the situation, stating they had warned the US ship off, however it is very clear the US vessel took its time sailing apparently within three miles of the manned island on innocent passage. Chinese and American relations are at an all-time low and are not expected to get better in the near term.

Moldova

Moldova will be hosting American, Romanian and British troops for an exercise between 27 March and 7 April 2023. The exercise is a combined joint exchange exercise which practices advanced shooting, parachute training and inter-operability. Moldovan Special Forces will be involved. Moldova has participated in this exercise since 2009.

Moldova passed new legislation on 16 March 2023 that makes Romanian or rather Moldovan as the official language of the country as per the Declaration of Independence despite opposition from Russian speakers. When Moldova broke from the Soviet Union there was an attempt to have the Moldovan (Romanian) language written in Cyrillic instead of the Roman alphabet used in Western Europe. It clarifies the language issue and is clearly identified in the original declaration. Courts decided that the Declaration of Independence takes precedence over the Constitution.

A potential coup by pro-Russian groups as well as Russian infiltrators was foiled in mid-March 2023. Russia was accused of plotting to gain control over Moldova not later than 2030, however, the plot by Ilan Shor and the Shor Party resulted in arrests and prevention of individuals from entering the country. Transnistria still remains under pro-Russian control with an 1800 man Russian "peacekeeping force" remaining in the breakaway region.

Belarus

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that he will deploy Iskander nuclear missiles in Belarus not later than July 2023. Different versions of the Iskander have different ranges but they are largely considered to be an effective missile. Some will be stationed along the Ukrainian border. Russia will maintain control over the weapons and will be the only ones authorised to use them despite being on Belarus territory. Russia has also modified ten Belarus aircraft to load and fire nuclear weapons. Again these weapons will be under strict Russian control. One wonders how large Russia's security force will be to maintain security. It may not be the agreement that Lukashenko thought he might get from the Russian government. In the book *The Third World War*, Minsk was destroyed by nuclear attack. Can reality be catching up?

Russia-Ukraine War

The war continues with little movement by either side. Russian achievements are few and far between and measured in a few square kilometers but at a horrendous cost in lives and equipment. Successful armies are trained and people know their equipment and also know they have the necessary logistics and administrative support. Ukraine has this as well as a motivated armed forces that uses its initiative and keeps its "powder dry" in preparation for their next steps. The fighting continues to be around three areas: the Kremmena-Svatova line in the north, Bakhmut in the east and most recently Adviiivka further south. Unfortunately for the Russians, each offensive operation has proven to be less than successful. Less is heard of Vuhledar of late as Russian losses have proven prohibitive even for them.

In Russia, major defence industries seem to be having a spate of unexplained fires that occur far from Ukraine. While excuses are found, it is increasingly apparent that Russian citizens may be taking matters into their own hands. There is nothing to verify this but the fires cannot be strictly otherwise explained. This week we also heard from at least two oligarchs that there is a level of concern and one might say conspiracy within the business community. While these two items are not a sign that the Russian leadership is in great trouble, it does indicate that all is not well within the Russian Federation. Russian history is filled with stories of despots meeting an untimely end unexpectedly and from unexpected directions. Putin is aware of this and has tended to use armoured trains to move around. This is not the sign of a confident leader.

China has not thrown a lifeline to Russia although one can imagine that there is increasing consternation that Russia will be significantly weakened by this war. Although some Chinese-made equipment is being found on the battlefield it seems that is in small amounts likely because of one-on-one arrangements with Chinese firms rather than a nationally organized effort. In China even small efforts are usually well known by authorities so they may attempt to round up support in small increments in just enough amounts to keep the Putin regime intact.

China

If there was any doubt who was the senior partner in the partnership it is no longer remotely even a point of discussion. Putin has finally turned Russia into a vassal state of China. In the Chinese nationalist movement within the Communist Chinese Party they are calling for the return of territory seized by Czarist Russia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Russia and China have been strategic rivals with few exceptions. They have fought as late as 1969 along the Amur River at the cost of tens of thousands of lives. They fought proxy wars against each other in Viet Nam in 1979 as well. Now Russia is on the ropes in many respects. What will China do to take advantage of the situation? It is likely to be a steep price for the Russian Federation. Putin will make it in the history of Russia as the one who sealed the fate of the Russian Federation and likely Xi will laugh as Russia will give things up willingly as China throws a few crumbs...and Putin's Russia will be grateful.

According to the latest available statistics, China has spent 838b USD equivalent on the Belt and Road Initiative also known as the Global Development Program after the BRI started to get a reputation for debt diplomacy. Many projects were ill-conceived and the loans much larger than the host country could ever repay. China as a result has had to forgive or re-schedule more than 240b USD out of that total amount from just 22 countries. Nearly 60% of the loans are in some distress. Even the CCP has acknowledged that conditions for loans was far too loose. Returns on the investments have been limited. Even social dividends have proven to be fleeting especially as China attempts to create conditions for success through management by China or outright takeover of the asset such as Sri Lanka's Hambantota port. This has caused considerable anger amongst the locals and opposition parties. The fault is mainly local governments, but often China displays an arrogant posture towards the local people. Contrary to popular belief, China's reputation is not universally loved - corruption and graft amongst local politicians is rampant as seen by the local folks.

China has continued to place more money into infrastructure. While this might be a way for most countries to set up for success, it is not the same for China. China has continued to use the building of infrastructure as a way to increase the value of their Gross National Product. China on the other hand has developed too much infrastructure including whole cities that are essentially uninhabited and therefore are a waste of resources. This past year the Chinese economic growth slowed so the central government used its tried and true method to keep people employed and increase the GDP artificially. China has also done this with its armed forces, building far more equipment than is necessary or capable of being maintained by a large armed forces of suspect training at the individual and collective

level. The CCP has tried to get Chinese citizens to become consumers, thus mitigating against the loss of foreign exports which have fallen by as much as 60%. Foreign investment now according to *China Update* is now aimed at the Chinese domestic market vice creation of new China-based supply chains. Yet the CCP's handling of private enterprises, the pandemic, bank failures and property management failures have all caused the Chinese public to tighten their belts and save rather than bolster the economy. China quite simply is not a good place to invest.

The US continues to conduct freedom of navigation operations, this time near the Paracel Islands. China has built a relatively large base on an artificial island claiming it as its own territory along with claims on the whole South China Sea. Chinese spokesmen claimed a US destroyer was forced away by Chinese forces, but this view is mainly for home consumption. China has stated that these waters are historically Chinese the same way they claim parts of India, Russia, Nepal, Bhutan and virtually everyone of its neighbours. This is not a country that is a "peacemaker," it is a revisionist power. It is not a friendly nation and should not be treated as though it is. Quite simply, China is a threat to peace in general, it is not a friend.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- As of mid-March 2023, Russia had likely redeployed at least 1,000 troops who had been training at the Obuz-Lesnovsky training ground in south-western Belarus.
- Although no new rotation of troops has been noted, Russia has highly likely left the tented camp in place, suggesting it is considering continuing the training programme.
- The fact Russia has resorted to training its personnel under the much less-experienced Belarusian army highlights how Russia's 'special military operation' has severely dislocated the Russian military's training system – instructors have largely been deployed in Ukraine. Russia likely also views Belarus's continued indirect support to the operation as important political messaging.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russia's assault on the Donbas town of Bakhmut has largely stalled. This is likely primarily a result of extreme attrition of the Russian force. Ukraine has also suffered heavy casualties during its defence.
- The Russian situation has also likely been made worse by tensions between the Russian Ministry of Defence and Wagner Group, both of whom contribute troops in the sector.
- Russia has likely shifted its operational focus towards Avdiivka, south of Bakhmut, and to the Kremina-Svatove sector in the north, areas where Russia likely only aspires to stabilise its front line. This suggests an overall return to a more defensive operational design after inconclusive results from its attempts to conduct a general offensive since January 2023.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since the start of March 2023, Russia has likely launched at least 71 Iranian-designed Shahed series one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle (OWA-UAVS) against targets across Ukraine.
- These attacks followed a two-week pause in OWA-UAV attacks in late February 2023. Russia has likely started receiving regular resupplies of small numbers of Shahed OWA-UAVs.
- Russia is likely launching Shaheds from two axes: from Russia's Krasnodar Krai in the east and from Bryansk Oblast in the north-east. This allows Russia flexibility to target a broad sector of Ukraine and decreases flying time to targets in the north of Ukraine. It is also likely to be a further attempt to stretch Ukrainian air defences.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 22 March 2023, at least three uncrewed surface vessels (USV) and one uncrewed aerial vehicle reportedly attempted to strike the Russian naval base of Sevastopol, in occupied Crimea. Open source reports suggest that one USV was stopped by defensive booms, while two were destroyed in the harbour. Russian officials said that no Russian vessels had been damaged.
- A previous USV attack on Sevastopol on 29 October 2022 reportedly damaged the minesweeper Ivan Golubets and the frigate Admiral Makarov.
- Even though the new attacks likely failed to damage any military assets, the USV threat likely continues to constrain operations of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent days, Russia has continued to prioritise an operation attempting to encircle the Donetsk Oblast town of Avdiivka. However, Russian forces have made only marginal progress at the cost of heavy losses in armoured vehicles.
- Russia's 10th Tank Regiment has likely lost a large proportion of its tanks while attempting to surround Avdiivka from the south. The regiment is part of 3rd Army Corps, the first major new formation Russia stood up to support the invasion of Ukraine since August 2022.
- Numerous open-source accounts suggested that 3rd Army Corps has been particularly dogged by problems with ill-discipline and poor morale. Despite a likely period of training in Belarus, the formation still appears to display limited combat effectiveness. 10th Tank Regiment's losses have likely largely been due to tactically flawed frontal assaults similar to those in other recent failed Russian armoured attacks, such as around the town of Vuhledar.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Fighting continues in the Donbas town of Bakhmut, though Russian assaults are still at a reduced level compared to recent weeks.
- One of the key achievements of recent Ukrainian operations has likely been to push Russian Wagner Group fighters back from the 0506 route. This minor country road has become a critical supply line for Ukrainian defenders. Wagner had previously been within a few hundred metres of the route.
- On 26 March 2023, Russian media claimed Wagner had taken full control of the Azom factory complex to the north of Bakhmut town centre. However, the area likely remains contested, as it has been for the past fortnight. With Wagner having now confirmed the release of at least 5000 prisoner fighters, personnel shortages are likely hampering Russian offensive efforts in the sector.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russian media reporting suggests that the authorities are preparing to start a major military recruitment campaign with the aim of signing up an additional 400,000 troops.
- Russia is presenting the campaign as a drive for volunteer, professional personnel, rather than a new, mandatory mobilisation. There is a realistic possibility that in practice this distinction will be blurred, and that regional authorities will try to meet their allocated recruitment targets by coercing men to join up.
- Russian authorities have likely selected a supposedly 'volunteer model' to meet their personnel shortfall in order to minimise domestic dissent. It is highly unlikely that the campaign will attract 400,000 genuine volunteers. However, rebuilding Russia's combat power in Ukraine will require more than just personnel; Russia needs more munitions and military equipment supplies than it currently has available.

Soldier Systems

https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/army/lineofsight/articleimages/2023/02/Soldier_System_Graphic_Black_Background_EN_Feb%202023.pdf

Soldier System Deliveries – Short, Medium and Long Term



Operational Clothing	Personal Weapons	Personal Equipment
<p>Short Term (in 2023)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Temperate boots – Delivery in progress General Purpose Boots – Delivery in progress Modernized Combat Uniform (MCU) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delivery TW ongoing Delivery MT to start late Spring 2023 Flyers' Gloves: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Touchscreen – Delivery in progress Insert – Delivery in progress Non-touchscreen – Delivery Spring 23 Polar Fleece – Delivering Converged Rain Suits – Delivery summer 23 Sunhats – Delivery in progress Hybrid Combat Shirts – Delivery in progress <p>Medium Term (2023 to 2025)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CBRN Boots Operational Clothing and Footwear Consolidated Contract (OCFC2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Major change to supply chain management CAF Anthropometric Program for Soldier System Acquisition (CAPSSA) <p>Long Term (2025 to 2028)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OCFC2: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Combats Online" ordering system Tactical Field Over Boots Cold Wet Weather Over Boots Cold Wet Weather Boots Desert Boots Soldier Operational Clothing and Equipment Modernization (SOCEM): Major re-design of ops clothing ensemble 	<p>Short Term (in 2023)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> C22 Pistol for Canadian Army Deliveries May – June 2023 C6A1 Flex and Coax General Purpose Machine Gun – Delivery now through 2024 C21 Multi-Calibre Sniper Weapon – Delivery Feb to May 2023 C16 AGLS FCS Battery Upgrade – deliveries in progress until 2024 <p>Medium Term (2023 to 2025)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> C8A4 Assault Rifle and Optical Sight Upgrade C19 General Purpose Rifle Conversion C16 AGLS Magnetic Compass conversion to GPS C22 Pistol for RCAF, RCN and MPs <p>Long Term (2025 to 2028)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Canadian Modular Assault Rifle 	<p>Short Term (in 2023)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sleeping Bags – Delivery underway Next Gen full ballistic helmets - delivering Dismounted Infantry Capability Enhancement (DICE) Helmet – Delivery Summer 23 Gas Mask Carriers – Delivering Thermal Blankets – Delivering Sniper Concealment Kit – Delivery completed, More options pending <p>Medium Term (2023 to 2025)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Laser Range Finder w/ Thermal Imaging Army Patrol Pack (Day Pack) DICE Load Carriage Army General Purpose Flotation Device Modernized Show Shoes and Poles New Binoculars Integrated Soldier System Project (ISSPP) Cycle 3 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ergonomic Upgrades, New Hub/Cables, New End User Device, New Radios Severe Cold Sleep System Renewal of CBRN Coveralls CBRN Hydration System CAF Anthropometric Program for Soldier System Acquisition (CAPSSA) <p>Long Term (2025 to 2028)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Skis Toboggans, 100 and 200 lbs. Capacity Night Vision System Modernisation (NVSM) Soldier Operational Clothing and Equipment Modernisation (SOCEM): Major redesign of ops personal equipment system

Delivery status updated as of February 2023

Future Fighter Capability Project

One wonders when the type designation for the RCAF version of the F-35, a US designation, will be announced. CF135? (Yes, there was a CH135.)

F-35A CANADA'S FUTURE FIGHTER

Range	>2,200 km - Ability to fly non-stop from Cold Lake, AB to Inuvik, NWT	Maximum speed	Mach 1.6	Service ceiling	15,240 m	G-limit	9	Fleet size	88
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- Infrastructure construction will start in 2023
- First aircraft in 2026

- Multi-role capabilities
- Conventional takeoff and landing variant

- Interoperable with Canada's allies
- Able to meet NATO and NORAD mission requirements simultaneously

Canada.ca/Defence



Cool picture

Defense of Ukraine @DefenceU 23 Mar tweeted: Ukrainian artillery near Bakhmut.

