



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 14 April 2023

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Dispatches Editor

Volunteers are sought to edit and publish *Dispatches* 12, 19 and 26 May editions in the absence of the current (temporary) editor. Further, volunteers are needed to curate content for *Dispatches* and to post to our Twitter and Facebook accounts, which posts are then included in *Dispatches*. If you can help out in any way, please email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Defence Policy Review

The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces have opened public consultations to all Canadians on the defence policy review. The review (a.k.a. Defence Policy Update – DPU) has been a topic of discussion in the RUSI(NS) Security Affairs Committee (SAC) for many months. It appears that comments from individuals rather than organizations is the approach being taken for the review, though there is an opportunity to list the organization of choice in a submission. Members of RUSI(NS) and other readers of *Dispatches* are encouraged to make a submission. See the text box at the beginning of the Other section to the 10 March edition of *Dispatches*. Note the **closing date of 30 April 2023**.

It is easier to write answers to the review's questions on a separate document rather than filling in the boxes on the review webpage (<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-defence-policy/we-want-to-hear-from-you.html>). The SAC has copied the questions onto a document and can provide that to anyone to assist with their submission. Email RUSI(NS) for a copy.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker May 2023

There have been some recent changes to availability of the planned speaker and Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess for May. What with those plus lack of availability of a planner, our May event has been cancelled.

18 April, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation by Colin Marston, UK Defence Wargaming Centre, and Graham Longley-Brown, lead author for the MOD Wargaming Handbook, titled "Influence Wargaming Handbook." 1200-1400 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/influence-wargaming-handbook-tickets-524664865737>

19 April, Wednesday - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (UK) webinar "Assessing the Chinese People's Liberation Army's Personnel" 1430-1530 BST. Online. To register: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/assessing-chinese-peoples-liberation-armys-personnel>

25 April, Tuesday - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (UK) webinar "Cyber Operations in Ukraine: A Conversation with Victor Zhora." 1400-1500 BST. To register: <https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/cyber-operations-ukraine-conversation-victor-zhora>

New: 26 April, Wednesday - Queen's University Centre for International and Defence Policy speaker series event featuring LTC Wendy Tokach, "Arctic Security In a Time of Geopolitical Insecurities." Noon-1 pm Eastern. Online. To register: <https://www.queensu.ca/cidp/events/idp-speaker-series/arctic-security-time-geopolitical-insecurities-ltc-wendy-tokach>

New: 5 May, Friday - presentation "The Battle of the Atlantic: Gauntlet to Victory." 1330-1530. Naval Museum of Halifax, Stadacona, CFB Halifax. RSVP to navalmuseumhalifax@forces.gc.ca. See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

New: 6 May, Saturday - presentation "The Battle of the Atlantic: Gauntlet to Victory." 1330-1530. Cambridge Military Library, Royal Artillery Park, CFB Halifax. RSVP to wgard@eastlink.ca. See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

New: 6 May, Saturday - Maritimes Division of the Master Mariners of Canada Battle of the Atlantic Ceremony. 1100. Small Craft Gallery, Maritime Museum of The Atlantic, 1675 Lower Water St, Halifax, NS.

9 May, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Scenario Design, or How I ruined my perfect wargame with a sloppy scenario." 1900-2100 ADT. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/scenario-design-or-how-i-ruined-my-perfect-wargame-with-a-sloppy-scenario-tickets-581291246767>

16 May, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "The Politics of Play: Wargaming with the US Military." Noon-1400 EST. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-politics-of-play-wargaming-with-the-us-military-tickets-415461174557>

13 June, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Influence Wargaming Handbook." 1200-1400 EDT. Online To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/influence-wargaming-handbook-tickets-524664865737>

Changed: 22 June (moved from 24 May), **Thursday** - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Brigadier-General Masson. Time TBC, noon or 1300-1500. Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess. MTF.

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Comments "Mental Health of Police, Military and Security" by Jay Heisler, 4 April 2023
https://rusi-ns.ca/mental_health/

RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Note "Naming Tanks in the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps" by John Boileau, 13 March February 2023,
https://rusi-ns.ca/naming_tanks/

RUSI(NS) Presentation "Canadian Armed Forces/Department of National Defence Space" by BGen Mike Adamson, 15 February 2023,
<https://rusi-ns.ca/caf-dnd-space/>

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 12 April 2023
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association Technical Information webpage
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/technical-information>

Company of Master Mariners of Canada Maritimes Division *Foghorn*, March 2023

Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, February 2023

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 4, April 2023

New: Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, April 2023
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/193-rausi-dispatches-april-2023>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, April 2023

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* Volume 5 Issue 7
<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies – Australia *Journal*, Volume 74, Number 1, March 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 2nd Quarter 2023.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 17, Issue 8, 10 April February 2023

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 1, March 2023

New: Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* April 2023
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2023-04>

@RUSI NS on Twitter:





RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.






CBC News @CBCNews 7 Apr tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: #Analysis: NATO leaders' summits tend to be polite affairs — but Sec. Gen. Jens Stoltenberg may have been needling Canada with his comments on NATO's two per cent defence spending target. (NATO is getting ready to twist Canada's arm on defence spending
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nato-canada-defence-spending-1.6804733>)



Canadian Armed Forces @CanadianForces 6 Apr tweeted: An @RCAF_ARC CP-140 Aurora Air Detachment will be deployed to Japan on #OpNEON. The Aurora will monitor for suspected maritime sanctions evasion activities.
<https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/04/canada-deploys-cp-140-aurora-aircraft-to-japan-to-support-implementation-of-sanctions-against-north-korea.html>
(Canada Deploys CP-140 Aurora Aircraft to Japan to Support Implementation of Sanctions Against North Korea)
RUSI(NS) retweeted: #OpNEON = CAN 🇨🇦 contribution to multinational effort to support @UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea 🇰🇵
<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html> Flexibility of #airPower



<p>Lee Berthiaume @leeberthiaume 7 Apr tweeted: Thirty per cent of Defence Department procurement positions vacant: Internal report https://timescolonist.com/national-news/thirty-per-cent-of-defence-department-procurement-positions-vacant-internal-report-6820508 #cdnpoli</p> <p>RUSI(NS) retweeted: How should a corps of defence material procurement specialists be recruited, trained & retained? Should there be a dedicated CAN🇨🇦 federal defence/security procurement department (yes)? The strength of an organization is its people. @NationalDefence #cdnpoli #defencePolicyUpdate</p>	
<p>Dr Elizabeth Buchanan @BuchananLiz 7 Apr tweeted: Canada ups Arctic surveillance capabilities to protect North America https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2023/04/06/canada-ups-arctic-surveillance-capabilities-to-protect-north-america/</p> <p>RUSI(NS) retweeted: #NORAD modernization project timelines https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/allies-partners/norad/norad-modernization-project-timelines.html #Arctic Over the Horizon Radar project http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=1941</p>	
<p>NAADSN_RDSNAA @NAADSN_RDSNAA 7 Apr tweeted: Good morning and Happy Friday! Start off the last day of the week reading about #sanctions. “It’s fire and forget ... We don’t measure effectiveness.” says Co-Lead @AndreaCharron (Ottawa struggles to keep up with fallout from explosion of international sanctions https://calgaryherald.com/news/canada/ottawa-sanctions-fallout)</p> <p>RUSI(NS) retweeted: Appears CAN🇨🇦 would benefit from a whole-of-government approach, Global Affairs Canada @CanadaFP with other departments/agencies such as @NationalDefence & @CanadianForces, to 'economic warfare' to analyze opportunities & potential effects of sanctions on targets & domestically.</p>	
<p>Philippe Le Billon @plebillon Apr 8 tweeted: New paper on Chinese fleets and the geopolitics of high seas fishing https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23001112?dgcid=author</p> <p>(Ocean predators: Squids, Chinese fleets and the geopolitics of high seas fishing)</p> <p>RUSI(NS) retweeted: Illegal, unreported & unregulated fishing is a security threat, especially when Distant Water Fishing fleets are operated for expansionist purposes, as does China🇨🇳. Then #IUU fishing also defence concern. CAN🇨🇦 federal depts incl @NationalDefence need to collaborate to counter</p>	

<p>Georgetown Security Studies Review @GSSReview Apr 10 tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: NATO Needs a Unified Arctic Command (https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2023/04/10/nato-needs-a-unified-arctic-command/)</p>	
<p>"CAN🇨🇦 Patrol #Submarine Discussion Ramps Up" https://www.navalreview.ca/2023/04/canadian-patrol-submarine-discussion-ramps-up/ Yes, #subs are strategic importance, ultimate defenders/deterrence. @RoyalCanNavy should have sufficient considering our three oceans and distance from contested areas, capable of long range/endurance patrols</p>	
<p>The Naval Association of Canada @navalassn 11 Apr tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Our Naval Affairs group has just completed an analysis of the history of, and legal framework for, Chinese scientific research in the Arctic. Their report is available at https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/China-MSR.pdf (Chinese Marine Scientific Research in the Arctic - The History and Legal Framework)</p>	
<p>"Canada🇨🇦 spending \$59M on assault rifles, machine guns for Ukraine" https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ukraine-russia-trudeau-shmyhal-1.6806853 Rifles, machine guns, ammo, financial assistance to running UKR incl repair of damaged energy infrastructure. Prosaic/necessary contributions to common defence</p>	
<p>Robert Allan Ltd. @RobertAllanLtd 12 Apr tweeted: On April 5th a celebration was held to launch “Workboats for the World: The Robert Allan Story”, a history of Robert Allan Ltd., written on the cusp of the company’s 95th year of successful business, by Robert Allan with Peter A. Robson. https://ral.ca/2023/04/11/launching-workboats-for-the-world/ RUSI(NS) retweeted: .@RobertAllanLtd designer https://ral.ca/2019/06/25/robert-allan-ltd-to-design-new-tugs-for-the-canadian-navy/ of new Haro-class tugs being procured for @RoyalCanNavy Naval Large Tug project https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/naval-largegros-eng.html, currently building by</p>	

Groupe Océan @Groupe_Ocean, to be crewed by @NationalDefence

Thule

United States Space Force @SpaceForceDoD 7 Apr: Thule Air Base has officially been renamed Pituffik Space Base, The new name recognizes Greenlandic heritage and better reflects its role in U.S. Space Force. It is the DOD's northernmost installation, and plays a key role in the Space Form.

'Thule' has been part of our Arctic-think for a long time. Goin' havta reset the thinking - and a lot of maps!



“Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia” on Facebook:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Navy Carrier-Based Drones Will Be Able To Be Controlled By The Air Force

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/navy-carrier-based-drones-will-be-able-to-be-controlled-by-the-air-force>

"In a future fight, control of advanced drones belonging to the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force could be passed back and forth between assets from either service as the situation demands."



You would think that would be an obvious capability to build into drones of different services. Will Canada ensure that the drones (remotely piloted aircraft systems) being developed by different services and departments (e.g., Royal Canadian Air Forces, Canadian Coast Guard) can have their control transferred between departments, agencies and services?

Largest US Shipbuilder Expects More Profits From Drones, AI Than Surface Ships, Soon

<https://www.defenseone.com/business/2023/04/hii-hopes-key-acquisitions-put-it-center-pacific-pivot/384720/>

If "artificial intelligence, machine learning, cyber, live virtual constructive training, autonomy, big data, and electronic warfare and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance" are truly at the centre of a shift to the Pacific, and presuming that the Pacific is important to Canada as it is to the US, are Canadian shipbuilders ensuring they have the 'diversified portfolios' to design and deliver what is needed by the Royal Canadian Navy and other federal marine departments? What relationships (partnerships) are there between Canadian shipbuilders and the technology companies? To what extent are they talking, envisioning, experimenting, even forming an association (or taking advantage of a current marine industries association)?



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From a merchant mariner and RUSI(NS) colleague: Good comment and questions. Is the fitted instrumentation and warfare a matter for the shipbuilder? The shipbuilder should build a ship that is a structural platform to be fitted out with military software and hardware by agencies with that expertise. Should the shipbuilder be the weapons expert? I think not. They should stick to welding and fitting. However, the fact they are building old fashioned diesel-powered ships is a strong indication they are less than future thinking and perhaps need a good dose of sustainability.

From another merchant mariner and colleague: Would expect that all Canadian ship builders have some sort of technology package that is in use, but may be mainly for IT security. It would have to be very enticing for any of the three ship builders to venture into these fields if the CAF have not specifically asked for something to be developed. We are decades behind in maintaining a modern RCN and CCG, hard to see the federal government jumping ahead now and being in step with USA.

The Map is Never Neutral

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/8/31/the-map-is-never-neutral>



"Military leaders, especially strategists, need a strong understanding of both the maps that they use and their limitations. This understanding can help strategists formulate a better strategy to combat the strategies of adversaries ... Every map is an argument about what is important, promoting a specific point of view that the cartographer embeds in the map intentionally or unintentionally. Maps will continue to be a political medium for promoting specific views as well as tools for understanding ... "

Map literacy is not a matter just for military leaders, and the strategists amongst them, but for people at all levels of military and civil organizations, in government and out. Think of map literacy as an older form of digital or media literacies, the latter two of course still not broadly enough understood.

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And, yes, maps lie.

Russia's new foreign-policy concept: the impact of war

<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/04/russia-new-foreign-policy-concept-the-impact-of-war/>



Lovely sentence: "It is a committee product in a personalistic autocracy."

What is the difference between a foreign policy concept and a foreign policy? Extent of detail? Considering that a policy does not have to be greatly detailed to be a policy, why should there a concept? Or is this a reflection of 'translation from Russian'?

Whatever - Canada needs a refresh of its foreign policy, such as it is, with close consideration of the policies of China and Russia and of our allies.

Royal Canadian Navy Contract Highlights the Capabilities of Drones for Maritime Operations

<https://www.commercialuavnews.com/international/qii-ai/royal-canadian-navy-contract-highlights-the-capabilities-of-drones-for-maritime-operations>

“Ship inspections from drone imagery can be completed in a fraction of the time taken for traditional methods. Artificial Intelligence then accelerates the process even more by automating the detection and measurement of issues in need of remediation, like corrosion or other problems...”



Cool tech. It appears that the drones conducting the operations ('maritime operations' is a bit deceptive, as that term usually refers to non-engineering activities) are aerial, provided by Skydio (<https://www.skydio.com/>). Whether 'hull crawlers' can be integrated into the inspections is not apparent.

<Sigh> So, the 'Executive Officer's critical eyes' are being supplanted...

Canada at crossroads on submarines as cost, need butt heads and allies press ahead

<https://www.nationalnewswatch.com/2023/03/14/canada-weighs-need-for-new-submarines-as-u-s-britain-push-forward-on-nuclear-fleets/#.ZDKxIHvMKUk>

Submarines are "one of Canada's most strategic assets for conducting surveillance of Canadian and international waters, including the near Arctic."



It takes a long time to build a submarine force, not so much to procure the boats but to train up capable commanders and crews. Replacement of Canada's Victoria-class submarines by whatever mix of crewed and uncrewed vessels to ensure that Royal Canadian Navy Submarine Force remains capable to contributing to the defence requirements of the state is an effort that needs to be started now and progressed expeditiously.

A submarine does not have to use its weapons to have a great effect on an adversary's thinking, it just has to be out there at sea, unseen, a potent threat.

Haiti's outgunned police will have to wait even longer for Canadian armoured cars

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/haiti-police-canada-armoured-cars-1.6804384>

The article identifies the vehicles to be delivered to Haiti as Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles. At first



it appeared that this might have been a mis-identification, as MRAP "is a term for United States military light tactical vehicles produced (by Oshkosh) as part of the MRAP program that are designed specifically to withstand improvised explosive device attacks and ambushes"

(<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MRAP>). However, Evan Dyer, the reporter who wrote the article, confirmed that INKAS, the manufacturer of the vehicles being built for Haiti, described them as MRAP. INKAS has a MRAP, the Geebor, on their website (<https://inkasdefense.com/defense/>) which may be the vehicle in question. A variety of interesting other vehicles on the INKAS site, too. Good to see a Canadian company appearing to do well, the sort of company that the impending Canadian defence policy update needs to support. Good, too, what with the great amount of mis-identification by various media of military vehicles, ships and aircraft, that the reporter had done what we expect of the media, and ensured the facts (#QualityJournalism).



Get a 1st look at the new Marine Atlantic ferry — at a shipyard in China

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/new-ferry-marine-atlantic-dual-fuel-silent-class-1.6803614>

Considering how 'dual-purpose' Chinese-built ferries are, with so many of them capable of embarking and landing military forces as part of an invasion of Taiwan, has Canada inadvertently procured the beginnings of an amphibious force?

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article: China is Preparing Merchant Ro-Ro Ferries for Amphibious Warfare

<https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/china-is-preparing-merchant-ro-ro-ferries-for-amphibious-warfare>



Canada Faces Questions Over Alleged Chinese Interference

The article "Canada Faces Questions Over Alleged Chinese Interference" written by Frederik Kelter for Al Jazeera (<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/13/canada-faces-questions-over-alleged-chinese-interference>) is a fine piece that somewhat embarrassingly defines the issue better than Canadian media.



Chinese interference, or anyone else's interference, in our political processes is reason to be concern. There were allegations that some of the so called "green" movements were in part funded by US oil interests, not proven but used as another example. This is not as simple as just a foreign agent registry. Canada must develop resources that have the capability to investigate issues of this nature on a routine basis.

It speaks to also providing either the RCMP and CSIS the necessary direction, the legal capability and the capacity to ensure action can be taken. Our own citizens who also happen to be of Chinese descent are harassed and threatened and subject to disinformation. This is not fiction for them nor for candidates running for office at any level of government, as apparently happened in the two last

elections. The current government has been inactive on conducting an inquiry, open to the Canadian people. It is the right thing to do now.

Statement from the Minister of National Defence – Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure

<https://www.canada.ca/en/communications-security/news/2023/04/statement-from-the-minister-of-national-defence--cyber-threats-to-critical-infrastructure.html>

"CSE (Communications Security Establishment) works every day to defend government systems from threats. On any given day, CSE's defensive systems can block anywhere from 3 to 5 billion malicious actions targeting government networks. These defensive actions are a result of CSE's dynamic cyber defence capabilities which remain ready to defend government systems and protect against future attacks."



So WHY did CSE NOT protect the PM's web site?

Other Sources:

#Arctic

US Department of Defense Working on Updated Arctic Strategy

<https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/us-department-defense-working-updated-arctic-strategy>

Why the US is Losing The Race for the Arctic and What to Do About It

<https://cimsec.org/why-the-us-is-losing-the-race-for-the-arctic-and-what-to-do-about-it/>

#balloons #innovation

99 Spy Balloons: An Exploration of Disruptive Innovation on a Budget

<https://mwi.usma.edu/99-spy-balloons-an-exploration-of-disruptive-innovation-on-a-budget/>

#China

#airpower

China's Massive Fleet of Radar Planes and the Strategy Behind It

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/chinas-massive-fleet-of-radar-planes-and-the-strategy-behind-it>

We need to pay attention to more than just their fighters and bombers.

United Front Work and Beyond: How the Chinese Communist Party Penetrates the United States and Western Societies

Timely: <https://jamestown.org/program/united-front-work-and-beyond-how-the-chinese-communist-party-penetrates-the-united-states-and-western-societies/>

#seapower

Growth of the Chinese PLA Navy

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1638293098760486912.html>

#future casting #warfare

Struggling to see the Future: Unless Peace Comes

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/unless-peace-comes/>

#information operations

The Organizational Determinants of Military Doctrine: A History of Army Information Operations

<https://tnsr.org/2023/01/the-organizational-determinants-of-military-doctrine-a-history-of-army-information-operations/>

Can journalism resist a chatbot-fueled race to the bottom?

<https://thebulletin.org/2023/04/can-journalism-resist-a-chatbot-fueled-race-to-the-bottom/>

It will be interesting to see how journalism (media adapts. It will also be interesting to see how information operations adapts. That adaptation will need to be rapid.

#intelligence

BloodAxe and the Further Democratization of Intelligence Analysis

<https://wavellroom.com/2023/04/07/bloodaxe-and-the-democratization-of-intelligence/>

#land operations

Lessons from Large Scale Combat Operations, Part I

<https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2023/04/11/lessons-from-large-scale-combat-operations-part-i/>

Lessons from Large Scale Combat Operations, Part II

<https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2023/04/12/lessons-from-large-scale-combat-operations-part-ii/>

Lessons from Large Scale Combat Operations, Part III

<https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2023/04/13/lessons-from-large-scale-combat-operations-part-iii/>

#legal

US warship sails near manmade Chinese-controlled isle

<https://www.reuters.com/world/us-navy-says-destroyer-conducts-navigational-rights-mission-s-china-sea-2023-04-10/>

'Lawfare' term to watch: 'excessive claim area.'

#maritime security #strategy

New EU maritime security strategy: adjusting the compass?

<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/04/new-eu-maritime-security-strategy-adjusting-the-compass/>

#NATO #Arctic

'NATOization' Of The Arctic Theater: Implications Of Changing Nordic Strategy

<https://www.eurasiareview.com/10042023-natoization-of-the-arctic-theater-implications-of-changing-nordic-strategy-analysis/>

#Russia

Has the Russian submarine threat been diminished by the Ukraine war?

<https://www.navylookout.com/has-the-russian-submarine-threat-been-diminished-by-the-ukraine-war/>

#Russia-Ukraine War

Russia will soon be on the defense, but then what?

<https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/russia-will-soon-be-on-the-defense-but-then-what/>

Russia's war in Ukraine – Year one

<https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/inside-policy-russias-war-in-ukraine-year-one/>

How Russia's Offensive Ran Aground

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/04/06/world/europe/russia-offensive-maps.html>

Interesting approach to depicting 'progress' by using city/town graphics.

Naval Considerations in the Russo-Ukrainian War

<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss4/4/>

#airpower

Air mobility and the war in Ukraine

<https://wavellroom.com/2023/03/20/air-mobility-and-the-war-in-ukraine/>

#artillery

Artillery usage could show the future course of the Ukraine war

<https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3934532-artillery-usage-could-show-the-future-course-of-the-ukraine-war/>

#information operations

Waiting For Another Offensive

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/waiting-for-another-offensive/>

#seapower

The Age of American Naval Dominance Is Over

<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/04/us-navy-oceanic-trade-impact-russia-china/673090/>

"Our economy and security rely on the sea—a fact so fundamental that it should be at the center of our approach to the world." Same for Canada!

#space

Where Outer Space Meets Cyberspace: A Human-Centric Look at Space Security

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/where-outer-space-meets-cyberspace-a-human-centric-look-at-space-security/>

#strategy

The Map is Never Neutral

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/8/31/the-map-is-never-neutral>

"What a study of the military uses of maps can tell us about the formulation of strategy."

America Needs a "Cold War" Strategy for China

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-needs-%E2%80%9Ccold-war%E2%80%9D-strategy-china-206388>

#grand strategy

Defining Grand Strategy

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/8/17/defining-grand-strategy>

"Grand strategy is the art of developing and applying diverse forms of power in an effective and efficient way to try to purposefully change the relationship existing between two or more intelligent and adaptive entities."

#United Kingdom #reserves #airpower

Depth and New Capabilities: Delivering on the RAF's Ambition for the Air Reserves

<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/depth-and-new-capabilities-delivering-rafs-ambition-air-reserves>

Other:

Naval Association of Canada *Starshell* Winter 2023 Issue 97

<https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Starshell-March-2023-LR.pdf>

contents:

An Interview with VAdm Angus Topshee

The Bridge Layout for the CSC

Canadian Submarine Operations

A Canadian Arctic Underwater Capability

Ops Update

RCN Mentorship Program

RCN Fleet by the Numbers

Chinese Marine Scientific Research in the Arctic

Future-casting (and product marketing)

These four articles, which are really product marketing, are interesting though for their use of a fictional story as the basis of their messaging. Not an uncommon approach for defence affairs (consider the 1871 book *The Battle of Dorking*), a bit entertaining, and not an unuseful way to think about future operations and conflict.

“The Watched Pot Still Boils” – Expeditionary & Survivable C4I

<https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/the-watched-pot-still-boils-expeditionary-survivable-c4i/>

“Fool Around & Find Out” – Holistic Situational Awareness & Decision-Making

<https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/fool-around-find-out-holistic-situational-awareness-decision-making/>

“The Influence of Sea Power” – Distributed Maritime Operations: Sensors, Networks & Effects

<https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/the-influence-of-sea-power-distributed-maritime-operations-sensors-networks-effects/>

“Under Armor” – Ground Combat Vehicle Systems

<https://breakingdefense.com/2023/04/under-armor-ground-combat-vehicle-systems/>

Cyber Ops in the Russia-Ukraine War

Russia's War in Ukraine: Examining the Success of Ukrainian Cyber Defences

<https://www.iiss.org/research-paper//2023/03/russias-war-in-ukraine-examining-the-success-of-ukrainian-cyber-defences>

It was intended to amplify this article but first a check was done with our cyber expert in the Security Affairs Committee. Dave Swan came back with:

Really?

"It is therefore important that specific drivers for Ukraine's defensive success are identified, analysed and where appropriate, reinforced."

A key factor in Ukraine's cyber defense has been tight OPSEC. Contributing corporations such as Microsoft have touted their successes, however, Ukraine's own cyber forces as well as anything coordinated by Ukraine, including its allies, has operated under tight OPSEC. The result has been Russia has not been able to identify any players - except the amateurs. US Cyber Command has operated 'Hunt Forward' in obscurity. Likewise NATO and EU Security teams have operated in silence. Consider, Russia's troll farms have attacked every aspect of allied support to Ukraine - except cyber. Why not cyber? It's hard to attack ghosts, and that is all Russia appears to have. No substantial information on WHY new cyber attacks, methodologies and systems don't accomplish much, just the experience of them not working.

"Governments and private firms assisting Ukraine have been thrust into the war with limited planning and forethought about Ukraine's specific needs or how to respond as part of a collective-defence architecture."

Allied governments have contributed specific resources (cyber security teams) with both defensive and offensive capabilities. Limited planning and forethought? Perhaps some deployments were rapid but the deployed teams appear to be doing quite well. The full report notes that Kiev's "adaptive capacity was engineered well in advance of the February 2022 invasion. As this paper details, underlying Ukraine's ability to make agile decisions and out-manoeuvre Russia's cyber forces is the culmination of years of experience, investment and high-level policymaker attention dedicated to improving the country's cyber defences."

Some of the skills to prepare cyber defences came from allied governments ... limited planning ... I don't think so. Culmination of years of experience, investment and ... you can't have both.

I submit that the author needs to stop reading so much academic analysis and look at more source data. There are holes in his description of cyber events, holes covered by other organizations and reporting. The scope of his examination of cyber impacts is incomplete. He even has the Russian cyber ORBAT wrong.

This paper does a disservice to the excellent work that Mandiant usually produces.

The article has not been amplified.

Petition Launched to Preserve Historic Battery

The Halifax Military Heritage Preservation Society (HMHPS) has launched an online petition seeking citizen support to request the Halifax Regional Municipality Council to preserve the historic Point Pleasant Battery site in Point Pleasant Park along with federal financial support from the Halifax MP as the park is Crown property.

The petition follows HRM issuing a request for proposal, closing April 19, regarding Point Pleasant Park shoreline improvement (due to climate change, coastal erosion) that could result in removal or entombment of the battery. It has deteriorated due to years of neglect and climate change and is part of the park's system of fortifications dating to 1762.

“There has been little or no public consultation regarding preserving/repairing the Point Pleasant Battery. Given the battery has protected Halifax and its naval port during numerous conflicts through to the Second World War it is a significant part of Halifax's heritage and Nova Scotia and Canada's history,” William Breckenridge, chair of the HMHPS said.

“We encourage concerned residents to send a clear message to the mayor, councillors, and members of the Point Pleasant Park Advisory Committee to recognize the battery's significance and review the terms of reference of the proposal before awarding the contract. There is a need for open and meaningful consultation with the community at large and to desist from considering removal of the battery as the primary course of action,” he explained.

Additional background regarding the petition can be found on the Change.org website:

<https://www.change.org/SavePointPleasantParkForts>

Contact: William Breckenridge, Chair HMHPS

Email: wbreck@netscape.net; Tel: (902) 402-2462

April 9, 2023

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

Canada has taken insufficient effort to rebuild the Canadian Armed Forces as many programs are back loaded well beyond the life span of this government. Canadian troops on the front line against Russia remain ill-equipped and lacking the necessary weapons to properly defending themselves against a modern adversary. Successive Canadian governments have over time reduced capabilities. Canada was at one point a key contributor to NATO and UN Peacekeeping missions. Now ill-equipped troops do their best with very limited resources. It is heartening though that we are now seeing increasing numbers of media reports calling out the lack of effort especially in light of Russian aggression and Chinese interference. Yet as one government supporter stated, defence and security will not garner votes and so the downward spiral of the CAF continues to the point we are no longer considered reliable. It isn't our troops that are not reliable, they will do their best. There is a saying about loyalty - it has to be up and down the chain of command. That starts from the top. Food to the Canadian contingent in Poland, anyone?

There have been several articles about Global Affairs Canada lamenting the state of that department. Many governments have added to the neglect. Many left when the department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International Development Agency were amalgamated. Again,

key capabilities were let go and experienced people left; very few remaining understand development programs. New members are technically very capable and highly educated yet have limited practical experience. The idea of developing long-term relations with countries is a lost art according to a former diplomat. Senior management is a problem. The civil service is quite capable of sending a senior civil servant to a new department with limited knowledge of the subject. The main result has been pointed out in the media: bureaucracy and poor management. But what does one expect when the real diplomats and development folks leave? Canada needs a foreign affairs policy that actually is a policy and it needs to rebuild the diplomatic corps in a meaningful way. Canada is a trading nation; we need to have long term effective relations bilaterally with other countries. It is not a "nice to have" but absolutely important to the economic health of the country.

The air force is having difficulties with the Airbus CC295 with new configuration requirements plus the creation of technical documents in both languages. The tech documents are being held up until most or all of the Canadian changes are completed. The renewal of the Cormorant fleet will also be an issue as the Canadian aircraft are the only ones with that specific configuration. Plus there is the purchase of further air frames; one media article suggested up to seven extra air frames may be purchased as well as upgrading and refitting the existing fleet. It makes sense as the Griffons used in the Great lakes are not as well suited to this type of operation. This essentially allows the CC115 Buffalo fleet, the older CC130H and the Griffons used for SAR to be taken out of service for two modern airframes. One hopes this will get sorted out sooner rather than later.

On 5 April 2023, Canada was called out by Jens Stoltenberg, civilian head of NATO yet again on its ongoing failure to meet the 2% of GDP for defence funding. Canada currently is assessed to spend 1.33% this year. Canada is near the bottom of NATO spending. Consider that DND also returns usually one to two billion CAD because of program delays, so actually we spend by far less. It was also noted in the media this week that one third of procurement positions are vacant...this may explain the disaster that is procurement.

We will end this section on a more positive note. Canada will provide Ukraine with 21k assault rifles, and 38 machine guns along with 2.4m rounds of appropriate ammunition. The Canadian government will further contribute to ongoing cleanup efforts in Ukraine, now and in the future. Canada also announced further sanctions against Russia including 14 individuals and 38 entities supporting the war effort. Further sanctions were also taken against Belarus where a further nine entities were sanctioned. This is good news. Now if we could only do this to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

On another note, the entire Board of Directors and the CEO resigned from the Trudeau Foundation due to the "politicization" of the money allegedly received from China. This week it was discovered that the money had not been returned as the original contributor could not be identified. Good story requiring a forensic audit especially since 125m CAD plus interest has been supplied by the Canadian tax payer. The Trudeau Foundation should be placed in a trusteeship while the audit is completed.

United States

The biggest issue in security is the alleged leaked documents that cover a number of US foreign intelligence issues including "spying" on allies including Ukraine, South Korea and Canada. Somewhere around 100 documents are involved, a good number seemed to be "well doctored" and includes misinformation as well as factual info. The full extent of damage from the release is now subject to a criminal investigation. There is already one media report that states that the documents were released on a gaming site called Discord and was a result of arguments between several players which escalated apparently into delivery of actual documentation (*Editor: this synopsis was written before the news of an arrest related to this case*). Some of the material was specifically on the new

offensive that Ukraine is still expected to launch in the near future. This is not over and the US will have to do considerable damage control with friends and allies.

The US continues to put more forces into the Western Pacific with US assets sailing alongside the Chinese vessels surrounding Taiwan. Although China has home ground advantage in many ways they are not invincible and the US and others are reminding them of that fact. It is increasingly clear that it will not be just the US but many others if China decides to take Taiwan forcibly. Chinese success is not guaranteed but neither is a successful defence of Taiwan.

France

The article “Macron says Europe Should Not Follow the US or Chinese policy over Taiwan (<https://www.reuters.com/world/macron-says-europe-should-not-follow-us-or-chinese-policy-over-taiwan-2023-04-09/>) published on 9 April 2023 is self-explanatory. There have been further comments about Macron's speech that are less than charitable, especially those by the Polish Prime Minister and German European Parliament members who criticized the French president's comments. Macron is a big believer in Europe as one of the new poles in a new multi-polar world. Eastern Europeans do not view Europe but rather the US as a guarantor of their safety. In their view, the US is absolutely essential for European freedom. Did Macron overstep his boundaries? Probably yes.

Russia-Ukraine War

The war or special military operation in Russian speak is at a near standstill. The main areas of operation in the north are along the Svatove-Kremmina line, in the east at Bakhmut and a little further south at Avdiivka. Although there has been some movement forward by Russian forces, the areas captured are small and generally of limited value. Russia commanders have inexplicably decided to send essentially ill-equipped and unsupported troops in nearly human wave attacks, especially around Avdiivka and Bakhmut and earlier the town of Vuhledar. Most of the attacks were poorly conducted and lacked coordination between the various arms such as supporting armour, artillery and air support. As a result Russian casualties can only be described as serious as in serious enough to stop offensive operations by Russian forces. There seems little to back up current dispositions, a bad sign if the Ukrainians decide to counter-attack.

The latest atrocity apparently by the Russians is a beheading of a Ukrainian prisoner of war. I have not seen the video but it is available on some types of media platforms (*Editor: many professional media are advising against watching the video, too traumatic*). The prisoner is held down and a Russian soldier with a relatively small bladed knife does a slow removal of the head. The prisoner was alive for most of the deed. Russia has conducted a large number of alleged war crimes during this war including the kidnapping of Ukrainian children from occupied areas. President Putin and his Commissioner for Human Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, have both been charged by the International Criminal Court for this activity.

Russia is also expected to announce a further mobilization of up to 400k new soldiers. This is not confirmed as yet but it would make sense. Russian casualties have been significant. More importantly, is there sufficient equipment to equip this new army? The answer appears to be no. Tanks are being built at a rate that would allow for twenty per year, aircraft production has a similar problem as Western made parts are now unavailable. This is not expected to change. Some countries are likely to try to provide some parts if the price is right. Iran as one example is apparently providing repairs and parts for Western commercial aircraft.

One of the other growing problems is suspicious fires throughout Russia that would be impossible for Ukrainian special forces to do. These attacks are more likely to be conducted by Russian saboteurs. There are several videos of alleged Russian partisans destroying infrastructure. How serious is this problem? It seems that fires are breaking out daily so it cannot be ignored.

China

China under the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) is an authoritarian and genocidal regime uses various means to attack perceived opposition. It continues to occupy Tibet and West Turkistan, also known as Xinjiang province, which they invaded in 1950 and have held on to ever since. Tibet and East Turkistan are not the only victims of CCP aggression; this includes India, Nepal, Bhutan and six countries surrounding China's illegal attempt to claim the South China Sea. It also continues to clamp down on pro-democracy advocates, even those whose efforts have been non-violent. China does not have what anyone might consider rule of law. Even its own constitution is routinely ignored for the benefit of the Party. This week two human rights lawyers were tried behind closed doors and found "guilty." The two men, Mr Xu Zhigong and Mr Ding Jiayi, were given sentences of 12 and 14 years. Other actions include "black prisons," forced confessions, torture, executions and other criminal acts. China does what it wants; its new vision of the world is straight out of the dark ages with a single would-be emperor in the form of the very thinned skinned Chairman of the Communist Chinese Party, Xi Jinping. The current method of governance is found mainly in organized crime.

It is therefore somewhat fantastical that Xi and his senior appointments have attempted to show China as the "rational" person in the room when it comes to world affairs. China's visit to Russia and its so-called "peace proposal" is an excellent example. The main goal is to support and save Russia's current leader from a major reckoning in its war with Ukraine. China is also instrumental as part of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), a partnership that if successful would return the world to a much grimmer way of life. Most of these countries have had serious civil strife and tendencies that have not been conducive to working democracies and their view of the world which if one is able to read some of their government's positions would such as on the recent Russia-Ukraine war. It would consolidate the view that might is right.

China just completed a three-day combat drill around Taiwan. China sent 71 aircraft across the Straits of Taiwan past the median line. Taiwan did send aircraft and ships to make the point that they will be opposed. Taiwan will be receiving more defensive weapons from the US and others.

One of China's latest efforts is to try to establish the yuan as a world reserve currency to displace the US dollar. The principle idea is that by displacing the US dollar as the currency of choice they remove the use of the dollar as a weapon. In the case of Russia it would allow it to escape the effects of economic sanctions, allowing the regime to continue hostile actions that affect Europe. Even some of the BRICS may have reservations about that idea. Elements in the US may actually like the idea as well as the US turns inwards away from the world. Certainly, the Trump era showed the dangers of a disengaged America. Success of their venture is still unknown, but the idea and effort to achieve it is there. China seems to be in a leadership role here as well as it fits nicely into their thinking of a more global China with vassal states. It should be noted that Russia is for all intents and purposes a vassal state of China. More than 30 countries have adopted the yuan as their preferred trade currency.

China is not without major difficulties. This year the economy was supposed to shift towards a consumer driven one vice one depending on export markets. This has not occurred as Chinese citizens have lost confidence in the Chinese economy. Last year, the Covid 19 lockdowns, bank failures, property development failures and disruption of the supply chain and high unemployment have all acted a negative way on the overall Chinese economy. China has stated that provinces will have to

meet new infrastructure projects even though their level of debt often more than exceeds the provincial GDP. Overall, it is expected that China will not meet its projected growth rate of 5%. Although not widely reported, demonstrations about the economy and employment are continuing despite CCP efforts. The problem is that there is no central opposition leadership to help remove the CCP. This is a long overdue effort. China views some of these problems as US attempts to stifle China's economy. There was an interesting piece in the Economist 1 April 2023 suggesting that the "open societies in the West focus on three guiding principles: stop or limit decoupling, second, eliminate flash points yet keep suitable forces available to meet the potential threat and stick to Western values of openness, equal treatment of all and the rule of law." Sounds great and requires one to forget China is an authoritarian regime that has and is continuing genocide against its minorities, attacks virtually all religions and is generally lacking any morals of consequence. Decoupling and containment are the only answers for such a regime.

Indo-Pacific News - Geo-Politics & Military News @IndoPac_Info 9 Apr tweeted (https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1645038562579222531): A good map showing the range of #Taiwan's surface-to-surface missiles, and the locations of important targets in the #Chinese mainland. Air launched missiles and anti ship missiles are not included. A good reference amid increased tension in the #TaiwanStrait #Taiwancrisis



INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- As claimed on Russian social media, the Russian MoD has highly likely dismissed Colonel-General Rustam Muradov as commander of the Eastern Group of Forces (EGF) in Ukraine.
- The EGF under Muradov has suffered exceptionally heavy casualties in recent months as its poorly conceived assaults repeatedly failed to capture the Donetsk Oblast town of Vuhledar. The operations attracted intense public criticism from across the spectrum of Russian commentators - including Muradov's own troops.
- Muradov took over the EGF after its disastrous attempt to assault Kyiv from the north-west during the initial full-scale invasion. He is the most senior Russian military dismissal of 2023 so far, but more are likely as Russia continues to fail to achieve its objectives in the Donbas.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent days, Russian forces have regained some momentum in the battle for Bakhmut. Since late March 2023 their advance had largely stalled.
- Russia has made further gains and has now highly likely advanced into the town centre, and has seized the west bank of the Bakhmutka River. Ukraine's key O506 supply route to the west of the town is likely severely threatened. Russian regular forces, likely including airborne troops, have probably reinforced the area, and Russia is again using artillery more effectively in the sector.
- There is realistic possibility that, locally, Wagner and Russian MoD commanders have paused their ongoing feud and improved co-operation.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russia's campaign to severely degrade Ukraine's unified energy system (UES) within the 2022-23 winter has highly likely failed. Russia has conducted long range strikes since October 2022, but large-scale attacks have become rare since early March 2023. Smaller scale strikes (with fewer than 25 munitions) continue, but are highly likely having much less impact on the UES.
- Ukraine's network operating companies continue to source replacement transformers and other critical components. Transporting and installing these components is a major logistical challenge, especially high voltage transformers which weigh at least 100 tonnes.
- Ukraine's energy situation will likely improve with the arrival of warmer weather. Planning and preparations for next winter have likely already begun.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 5 April 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin chaired a full session of Russia's Security Council, the first such event since October 2022.
- The main report was presented by Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, and discussed reconstruction, law enforcement and public order in the illegally-annexed areas of Ukraine.
- The choice of Kolokoltsev as the main speaker is likely an attempt by the Kremlin to portray the situation in those territories as being normalised. In reality, much of the area remains an active combat zone, subject to partisan attacks, and with extremely limited access to basic services for many citizens.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over the last seven days, Russia has likely increased its armoured assaults around the Donetsk Oblast town of Marinka, 20km south-west of Donetsk city.
- Marinka has been fought over since 2014 and has been largely destroyed by artillery exchanges. It commands the approaches to Donetsk and the key H15 road.
- Russia continues to give a high priority to resourcing operations in the broader Donetsk sector, including the Marinka and Avdiivka areas, expending significant resources for minimal gains.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- As of 03 April 2023, Russian media reported the transfer of TOS-1A thermobaric multiple launch rocket systems to Russian airborne forces (VDV).
- The highly destructive TOS-1A, which Russia designates as a 'heavy flamethrower', is typically operated by Russia's specialist Chemical, Biological and Radiological Protection Troops in Ukraine, and has not previously been formally associated with the VDV.
- The transfer likely indicates a future role for the VDV in offensive operations in Ukraine. It is likely part of efforts to reconstitute the VDV after it suffered heavy casualties in the first nine months of the war.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over recent weeks, Russia has continued to develop extensive linear defences in Zaporizhzhia Oblast in southern Ukraine. The area is highly likely the responsibility of Russia's Southern Grouping of Forces (SGF).
- Russia has now completed three layers of defensive zones across approximately 120km of this sector. These consist of a front line of forward combat positions, and then two zones of nearly continuous, more elaborate defences. Each zone is approximately 10-20km behind the one in front.
- Russia has probably put significant effort into these defensive works because it is convinced Ukraine is considering an assault towards the city of Melitopol. The defences have the potential to be formidable obstacles, but their utility almost entirely depends on them being supported by sufficient artillery and personnel. It remains unclear if the SGF can currently muster these resources.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Leaders of several Russian regions bordering Ukraine, as well as occupied Crimea, have announced that their usually high-profile 9 May Victory Day military parades will be cancelled.
- Some Russian cities further away from Ukraine have confirmed they plan to go ahead with Victory Day. The cancelled events have likely primarily been called off because of security concerns near the border, as officials have claimed.
- However, the different approaches highlight a sensitive communications challenge for the Kremlin. Putin couches the 'special military operation' in the spirit of the Soviet experience in World War Two. The message risks sitting increasingly uneasily with the many Russians who have immediate insights into the mismanaged and failing campaign in Ukraine. Honouring the fallen of previous generations could easily blur into exposing the scope of the recent losses, which the Kremlin attempts to cover up.

Info-graphic Maps

UK Defence and Security Relationships Across Europe

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/projects/european-security-transformation-programme/uk-defence-and-security-relationships-across-europe>

From RUSI UK: "As Europe's security environment changes, so will its security architecture. These structural developments have created an overlapping mosaic of multilateral, minilateral, trilateral and bilateral groupings which all exhibit different political, diplomatic, defence and security responsibilities and commitments. This map helps to understand this complexity and facilitate further analysis."

An interesting depiction that includes UK military locations, deployments and exercises. Canada does not seem to have done anything like this for some while. Useful for public messaging, but probably resource (people time) consuming. (New word – minilateral.)

The screenshot shows the RUSI website interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with 'RUSI' logo and links for 'Explore our Research', 'Events', 'News & Comment', 'Membership', 'NextGen', 'About', and 'Contact'. A search bar and 'Log in' button are on the right. The main content area features a dark-themed map titled 'UK defence and security relationships across Europe'. On the left, there is a list of international organizations with checkboxes, including the European Political Community (EPC), G7, NATO, and others. Below this is a section for 'UK locations, deployments and exercises' with checkboxes for 'Permanent Bases', 'Forward Bases', 'Deployments', 'Standing Exercises', and 'Standing missions'. The map itself shows Europe with several blue location markers. A pop-up window for 'Operation Cabrit NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP)' is open, displaying the location 'Tapa Army Base (Tapa sõjaväelinnak)' and a section titled 'About this deployment' which states: 'UK-led NATO multinational battlegroup under the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), alongside Danish and France forces. Know for UK forces as Operation Cabrit'. Below this, there are two sources listed: '1. Deployments Baltica' and '2. NATO's Eastern Flank: Stronger Defence and Deterrence'.

Tank Reserve?

Oryx @oryxspioenkop 22 Mar tweeted

<https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1638549873891876869>: The trolling is real.

‘Tankies’ would get this. For the rest of you, go to your history books, the ones about the early months of the Great Patriotic War.





The Battle of the Atlantic Gauntlet to Victory

Join us at the Naval Museum of Halifax (S20) to meet Ted Barris, a renowned Canadian author who will be presenting his most recent book "The Battle of the Atlantic: Gauntlet to Victory".

Date:
5 May 2023
Time:
1:30 to 3:30 pm

Location:
2729 Gottingen Street- Naval Museum of Halifax
If you wish to attend, please RSVP by April 28th to:
navalmuseumofhalifax@forces.gc.ca

Ted Barris is an award-winning journalist, broadcaster and historian. He's the author of 20 bestselling, non-fiction books including works on wartime Canada - Juno, Victory at Vimy, The Great Escape, Dam Busters, Rush to Danger and many others. His 20th book, Battle of the Atlantic: Gauntlet to Victory, was published in 2022 and became an instant national bestseller. Also last year, Ted was appointed Member of the Order of Canada. His appearance at the Naval Museum features his dynamic in-person talk and multi-media presentation on Battle of the Atlantic, with books available for purchase and autographing.




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Date:
6 May 2023
Time:
1:30 to 3:30 pm

Location:
Cambridge Military Library, RA Park
If you wish to attend, please RSVP by April 28th to:
wgard@eastlink.ca

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Nicolai Eberholst (Pike Grey 1914-1918) @PikeGrey1418 8 Apr tweeted: #Easter - "Thundering Easter Greetings From the East Ukraine" German postcard from the First World War. #HappyEaster #Easter2023

