



# Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

## Dispatches

### 5 May 2023

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.*

*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

#### **Events:**

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**6 May**, Saturday - presentation "The Battle of the Atlantic: Gauntlet to Victory." 1330-1530. Cambridge Military Library, Royal Artillery Park, CFB Halifax. RSVP to [wgard@eastlink.ca](mailto:wgard@eastlink.ca). See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

**6 May**, Saturday - Maritimes Division of the Master Mariners of Canada Battle of the Atlantic Ceremony. 1100. Small Craft Gallery, Maritime Museum of The Atlantic, 1675 Lower Water St, Halifax, NS.

**9 May**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Scenario Design, or How I ruined my perfect wargame with a sloppy scenario." 1900-2100 ADT. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/scenario-design-or-how-i-ruined-my-perfect-wargame-with-a-sloppy-scenario-tickets-581291246767>

**New: 10 May**, Wednesday - Forsvarsakademiet (Royal Danish Defence College) seminar "The Arctic and Outer Space: A common security dilemma?" Via Zoom. 1700-1900 CET. To register: <https://events.fak.dk/theartcticandtheouterspace10052023>

**16 May**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "The Politics of Play: Wargaming with the US Military." Noon-1400 EST. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-politics-of-play-wargaming-with-the-us-military-tickets-415461174557>

**New:** 17 May, Wednesday - Queen's University Centre for International and Defence Policy speaker Colonel Ryan Jurkowski "Communicating Strategically: The Need for the Canadian Armed Forces to Adapt to Today's Information Environment." Noon-1 pm EDT. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.queensu.ca/cidp/events/idp-speaker-series/communicating-strategically-need-canadian-armed-forces-adapt-todays>

**13 June**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Influence Wargaming Handbook." 1200-1400 EDT. Online To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/influence-wargaming-handbook-tickets-524664865737>

**22 June**, Thursday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker Brigadier-General Masson, Commander 5th Canadian Division. 1300-1500. Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess. **Note this is a Thursday and not our normal Wednesday.** MTF.

### **Publications:**

Publications without links are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

**New:** RUSI(NS) Paper "Chantier Davie Canada Inc – Post-2011 Activity – Construction, Conversion, Refit and Repair" by Captain Anthony Potts, 2 May 2023, [https://rusi-ns.ca/chantier\\_davie/](https://rusi-ns.ca/chantier_davie/)

**New:** RUSI(NS) Presentation "The Nova Scotia RCMP – Forward into 2023 and beyond" by ACmmr Dennis Daley, 1 May 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/nova-scotia-rcmp/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note "MV *Asterix* and HADR Missions", 26 April 2023  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/asterix\\_and\\_hadr\\_missions/](https://rusi-ns.ca/asterix_and_hadr_missions/)

RUSI(NS) Comments "Mental Health of Police, Military and Security" by Jay Heisler, 4 April 2023  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/mental\\_health/](https://rusi-ns.ca/mental_health/)

RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Note "Naming Tanks in the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps" by John Boileau, 13 March February 2023,  
[https://rusi-ns.ca/naming\\_tanks/](https://rusi-ns.ca/naming_tanks/)

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 26 April 2023  
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association Technical Information webpage  
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/technical-information>

Company of Master Mariners of Canada Maritimes Division *Foghorn*, March 2023

Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, April 2023

**New:** Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 5, May 2023

**New:** Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, May 2023  
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/197-rausi-dispatches-may-2023>

**New:** Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, May 2023

Royal Canadian Navy *Your Navy Today* Volume 5 Issue 7  
<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/your-navy-today/volume-5-issue-7.html>

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies – *Australia Journal*, Volume 74, Number 1, March 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 2nd Quarter 2023.



**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 18, Issue 3, 1 May 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 21, Issue 1, March 2023

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!* April 2023  
<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute/2023-04>

**@RUSI NS on Twitter:**

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

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|--|--|
| <p>Canadian Global Affairs Institute @CAGlobalAffairs 27 Apr tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "Innovative, operationally focused and intelligence-infused systems enabled through electronic sensor suites, data processing and information sharing on icebreaking platforms are essential inclusions for the @CoastGuardCAN..." writes @m_mcwhinney.<br/><a href="https://cgai.ca/connecting-icebreakers-to-c4isr-ensuring-the-canadian-coast-guard-doesnt-miss-the-boat">https://cgai.ca/connecting-icebreakers-to-c4isr-ensuring-the-canadian-coast-guard-doesnt-miss-the-boat</a><br/>(Connecting Icebreakers to C4ISR: Ensuring the Canadian Coast Guard Doesn't 'Miss the Boat')<br/><i>Comment:</i> So why does this article include only 6 CCG icebreakers thereby excluding the 1100s and 1050s but does include all Finnish icebreakers (only 3 of which are Polar certified) and the large number of non-Polar Russian icebreakers? Stop over stating Russian and understating others.</p> |  |
| <p>Canadian Army @CanadianArmy 28 Apr tweeted: Our soldiers are in Sudan as part of Op SAVANNE to help Canadians fleeing the violence and instability in the region. We are committed to helping Canadians at home, and abroad whenever we are called upon. #StrongProudReady<br/>RUSI(NS) retweeted: Operation #SAVANNE<br/>#OpSAVANNE = @CanadianForces response to deteriorating security situation in #Sudan<br/><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-savanne.html">https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-savanne.html</a> Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations #NEO<br/><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-">https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-</a></p>  |  |

[defence/services/operations/military-operations/types/neo.html](https://ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/441/NDDN/Reports/RP12342748/nddnrp03/nddnrp03-e.pdf)

The Naval Association of Canada @navalasn 29 Apr tweeted: The Standing Committee on National Defence recommends that the Government of Canada urgently undertake a procurement process to replace the Victoria-class submarines with submarines that are under-ice capable for operations in our Arctic waters.

<https://ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/441/NDDN/Reports/RP12342748/nddnrp03/nddnrp03-e.pdf>

(A Secure and Sovereign Arctic)

RUSI(NS) retweeted: #Submarines are "capital ships", sign of CAN 🇨🇦 as a maritime country, & great deterrent to aggression by adversarial states. @RoyalCanNavy sub force of crewed & uncrewed boats should be large enough to patrol our 3 ocean approaches, some subs able to op for extended periods in #Arctic

## A SECURE AND SOVEREIGN ARCTIC

Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence

Honourable John McKay, Chair



Alex Vicefield @avicefield 28 Apr tweeted: Combat Support Ship Asterix is offshore Sudan vitally supporting international evacuation operations alongside allied navies

RUSI(NS) retweeted: #MVAsterix, leased to

@RoyalCanNavy as oiler, can provide indirect to CAN 🇨🇦 & allied ships in region by replenishing ship/helo fuel & other services, or direct to #OpSAVANNE Non-combatant Evacuation Operation #NEO #Sudan "MV Asterix and HADR Missions" [https://rusi-ns.ca/asterix\\_and\\_hadr\\_missions/](https://rusi-ns.ca/asterix_and_hadr_missions/)



Irving Shipbuilding @IrvingShipbuild 28 Apr tweeted: Today at Halifax Shipyard, shipbuilders, members of the @RoyalCanNavy, the federal and provincial governments as well as the descendants of William Hall marked a shipbuilding milestone with the official naming of HMCS William Hall. <https://shipsforcanada.ca/our-stories/the-future-hmcs-william-hall-officially-named-today>

(The Future HMCS William Hall Officially Named Today)

RUSI(NS) retweeted: RUSI(NS) Information Note "Warship Naming Ceremonies" <https://rusi-ns.ca/warship-naming-ceremonies/> #HMCSWilliamHall @NationalDefence #Arctic&Offshore Patrol Ship project #AOPS #RCNavy Arctic&Offshore Patrol Vessel #AOPV



RCMP @rcmpgrcpolice 28 Apr tweeted and USI(NS) retweeted: We're making history today 🇨🇦 His Majesty King Charles III will be the 2nd #RCMP Commissioner-in-Chief in our 150-year history. Her Majesty QE II previously held the title and was the Honorary Commissioner of the RCMP since 1953. <https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/news/2023/rcmp-maintains-royal-traditions> 📍: Buckingham Palace (RCMP maintains Royal traditions)  
*Note info in the article about the sword.*



Assistant Commissioner Dennis Daley, Commanding Officer, RCMP 'H' Division, spoke to RUSI(NS) & guests 15Mar234 with presentation "The Nova Scotia RCMP – Forward into 2023 and beyond" <https://rusi-ns.ca/nova-scotia-rcmp/> @RCMPNS @rcmpgrcpolice #RCMP



Canadian Army @CanadianArmy 1 May tweeted: Soldiers from @4CdnDiv4DivCA are providing security and assistance to Canadian citizens evacuating from Sudan as part of Op SAVANNE. The Canadian Army is ready to help Canadians at home and abroad. Images have been digitally altered due to operational security. RUSI(NS) retweeted: Operation #SAVANNE #OpSAVANNE = @CanadianForces 🇨🇦 response to deteriorating security situation in #Sudan <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-savanne.html> Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations #NEO <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/types/neo.html>



National Post @nationalpost May 2 tweeted: Tank maker paid Ukrainian broker to secure \$92M, sole-sourced contract with Ottawa, lawsuit says <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/defence-firm-paid-ukrainian-broker-to-secure-92-million-sole-sourced-contract-with-ottawa-lawsuit-says> (Defence firm paid Ukrainian broker to secure \$92M, sole-sourced contract with Ottawa, lawsuit says) Not a #tank! Senator is an armoured car, though Roshel markets it as an armoured personnel carrier <https://roshel.ca/products/law-enforcement/senator-apc/> RUSI(NS) Info Note "Armoured Fighting Vehicles" <https://rusi-ns.ca/armoured-fighting-vehicles/>  
*The National Post article had been included in the 3 May edition of the Halifax Chronicle Herald. An email was sent to the Chronicle Herald with the observation.*



RCAF Operations @RCAFOperations 3 May tweeted: #DYK @RCAF\_ARC CC177✈️ from 429 (T) Sqn regularly transport supplies from us Pituffik Space Base in GL to Canadian Forces Station (CFS) Alert on Ellesmere Island, NU🇨🇦, - the most northerly, permanently inhabited location in the world - as part of #OpBOXTOP.

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Operation BOXTOP = @CanadianForces @RCAF\_ARC semi-annual airlift mission to supply Canadian Forces Station Alert🇨🇦, northeast tip of Ellesmere Island, Nunavut, 817 km from North Pole <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-boxtop.html> #OpBOXTOP



Naval Surface Forces @SurfaceWarriors 4 May tweeted: ⚓ Replenishment-At-Sea with our Neighbors from the North!

📷 From right to left, @USNavy guided-missile destroyer USS Truxtun (DDG 103), @RoyalCanNavy supply ship MV Asterix and frigate HMCS Montreal (FFH 336) conduct a replenishment-at-sea in the Red Sea, May 3, 2023.

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Replenishment-at-sea, providing fuel, food, spares & other svcs, is capability valued & shared amongst allies. #MVAsterix, replenishment oiler leased by @RoyalCanNavy & operated by @FederalFleet, is major asset for multi-national ops whether conflict or non-combatant evacuation



### Coronation Six-Gun Salvo


Capt Will Matthews RE on Twitter 27 Apr: "Soldiers from @KingsTroopRHA will carry out an unprecedented six-gun salvo for King Charles III's #coronation All 6 guns will fire simultaneously, to mark the point at which the King is crowned 🇬🇧 <https://www.forces.net/king-charles/how-historic-six-gun-salvo-will-be-carried-out-kings-coronation>" / Twitter [https://twitter.com/The\\_RE\\_LE/status/1651530729665306631](https://twitter.com/The_RE_LE/status/1651530729665306631)

*Unknown whether firing a salvo is Canadian practice. After some checking with Ottawa it doesn't appear to be a plan for the Coronation.*



### Understanding Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) Research and Capability Needs to Deter and Limit the Impacts of (Adversary) [Dis]information

Brett Boudreau @WHMTE tweeted 1 May: Communication practitioners may be interested in this new DRDC report, regarding R&D needs of Defence (and Govt writ large) to more effectively deter and counter adversary disinformation.



The 66-page report demonstrates that for a variety of reasons, National Defence is poorly placed and inadequately prepared to substantively defend its interests and equities against mis- and disinfo, particularly a domestic context. There is significant extant DND/CAF capability to do so, but this remains largely untapped due to an institutional mindset toward the informational space rooted firmly in the pre-Internet Cold War. This situation should be of particular concern to an organization in self-described "existential crisis."

Notably, on overseas operations as part of a NATO or coalition effort, the CAF is substantively better placed to defend itself and manoeuvre in the information space even it not able to decisively counter and obtain strategic success.

Report at: [https://www.cgai.ca/understanding\\_department\\_of\\_national\\_defence](https://www.cgai.ca/understanding_department_of_national_defence)

### Cotton = ?

*The word 'cotton' has been showing up in social media posts about attacks in the Russia-Ukraine War. So had to look it up:*

What is the meaning of "бабовна" (cotton) referring to explosions?

<https://ukrainian.stackexchange.com/questions/6983/what-is-the-meaning-of-бабовна-cotton-referring-to-explosions>



### **“Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia” on Facebook:**

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

### **Joint Collaborative Environments can help stop foreign disinformation**

<https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2023/04/27/joint-collaborative-environments-can-help-stop-foreign-disinformation/>

"All too often, analyses of cyberattacks focus strictly on the technical components of what is happening, while ignoring the broader context of why the attack is happening. By integrating foreign malign influence into existing cybersecurity infrastructure, the < > government can produce a comprehensive approach to the challenge."

Joint Collaborative Environment = “a common and interoperable environment for the sharing and fusing of threat information, insight, and other relevant data across the federal government and between the public and private sectors.”



### **Robot Rescue? Air Force Seeks New Way to Recover Downed Troops**

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2023/04/robot-rescue-air-force-seeks-new-way-recover-downed-troops/385696/>



"Declaring its current and planned fleets of combat search and rescue helicopters ill-suited to the vast Indo-Pacific theater, the U.S. Air Force is looking for better—and possibly uncrewed—ways to rescue troops should conflict break out with China."

Canada does not have a dedicated combat search and rescue (SAR) capability, one of the aspects of not being a major power. Nor, despite having an Indo-Pacific strategy, is Canada so focused on a particular part of the world that it has, can afford to have, military elements designed to operate there well. That said (written), Canada does have SAR challenges with its vast and at times forbidding landscape, challenges that may be well taken on by increased use of uncrewed (drone) aircraft (and maybe, too, ground and water) vehicles. National policies (do we have them for SAR and for uncrewed vehicle development and use?) should address the use of uncrewed vehicles in SAR, particularly to ensure coordination and collaboration between government departments and non-government organizations/companies.

### **Arrival of new aircraft, lack of trained staff will cause 'significant disruption' for RCAF, generals told**

<https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/arrival-of-new-aircraft-lack-of-trained-staff-will-cause-significant-disruption-for-rcaf-generals-told>



"The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is dealing with a high number of inexperienced personnel, as well as shortages of staff in key jobs, while at the same time trying to bring in new-generation stealth fighter jets and drones."

It is not good to push back (delay) major capital procurement projects with a result that too many come due at about the same time. Besides the capital budget envelope being only so big at any time, other factors are affected, one of which is recruiting and training people to be available when equipment is delivered. Difficulties now are the result of decisions, many by the most senior of leaders, over years in the past. It takes time to grow a military or part of it, a military cannot simply be expanded or contracted like a company or government department.

### **New Details on Ongoing Gulf of Guinea Pirate Attack**

<https://gcaptain.com/new-details-on-gulf-of-guinea-pirate-attack/>



"Either a mothership was used to deploy a skiff, or a secondary tanker is in the vicinity to illegally offload the boarded vessel's cargo..."

There's a level of sophistication of the pirate operation implied in the article. That means those who are in the business of countering (surveillance, detection, response) piracy have to be capable, well trained and well equipped, forces. The Gulf of Guinea is a region into which Royal Canadian Navy



ships deploy from time to time. One can take it they are trained to handle piracy, and are operating in conjunction with local forces ashore and afloat. And, really, piracy is a global problem, and responding to it a routine function of navies.

### **No 'unity of command' on Arctic security among Western allies: U.S. defence expert**

<https://thehub.ca/2023-04-28/no-unity-of-command-on-arctic-security-among-western-allies-u-s-defence-expert/>

"A lack of coordination is an ongoing problem among allies regarding the Arctic, and the U.S.-Canada bilateral relationship is no exception..."

"...there is no unity of command or even centralized alliance for Arctic security between Western and allied partners..."

There is, and it's called NATO. The Arctic is the alliance's northern front against Russia (it's not a 'flank', not when states there are directly facing with Russia - 'flank' is too much an outmoded Euro-centric thinking). And if a call for 'unity of command' means under US command, then there needs to be some further consideration. Canada is in the best position to command NATO forces on the north-west Arctic front.



### **Revolutionary autonomous tractor tackles Ukraine's landmine problem**

<https://innovationorigins.com/en/revolutionary-autonomous-tractor-tackles-ukraines-landmine-problem/>

"...an innovative unmanned system to clear agricultural fields of landmines, a critical issue for the country. The system includes a drone, a robot deminer, an autopilot, and a tractor-trailer system that can withstand explosions."

Innovative. Give the Ukrainians, and necessity, credit.

Now, can it autonomously tow captured Russian tanks?



### **US Drug War and Rise of the Pacific Route**

<https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/interview-us-drug-war-and-rise-of-the-pacific-route/>

Canada does not need/want to be 'collateral damage' in the movement of drugs north by maritime routes. Canadian government resources, especially those of the marine departments (Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Coast Guard, etc.), are better employed elsewhere than in maritime counter-drug patrols. If nothing else, it means that the marine fleets have to be warped in their structure, with bigger patrol ships built to operate for longer periods in the seas further south, and with a large number of patrol vessels included in fleet balances.



## **Other Sources:**

### **#Arctic**

US Navy to deploy Arctic navigation, communication, and environmental sensing

<https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-navy-to-deploy-arctic-navigation-communication-and-environmental-sensing>

### **#artificial intelligence**

Challenges of Implementing AI With “Democratic Values”: Lessons From Algorithmic Transparency

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/challenges-implementing-ai-democratic-values-lessons-algorithmic-transparency>

### **#China**

China’s Updated Espionage Legislation: A Massive Risk to Western Companies

<https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/chinas-updated-espionage-legislation-a-massive-risk-to-western-companies/>

Chinese Navy Submarine and Major Surface Ship Order of Battle

Cool depictions: <https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2023/04/24/chinese-navy-submarine-and-major-surface-ship-order-of-battle/>

Xi Jinping’s Worst Nightmare: A Potemkin People’s Liberation Army

<https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/xi-jinpings-worst-nightmare-a-potemkin-peoples-liberation-army/>

### **#cyber operations**

911? We Have an Emergency: Cyberattacks On Emergency Response Systems

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/911-we-have-emergency-cyberattacks-emergency-response-systems>

### **#defence policy #submarines**

Chart a clear course for defence dollars

*Globe and Mail* editorial available on request to RUSI(NS).

### **#drones**

US Orders MQ-9B SkyGuardian Drones for Taiwan

*The MQ-9B user group gets bigger:* <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/05/02/us-skyguardian-drones-taiwan/>

Beyond Reapers and DJI Mavics: Are Scholars and Policymakers Ready for One-Way Attack Drones?

<https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/beyond-reapers-and-dji-mavics-are-scholars-and-policymakers-ready-for-one-way-attack-drones/>

### **#legal**

How should the law treat Underwater Maritime Autonomous Vehicles?

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-should-the-law-treat-underwater-maritime-autonomous-vehicles/>

## **#Indo-Pacific**

Shandong Carrier Group returns to port: What does its deployment mean?

*Good analysis:* <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4874696>

Thoughts on Canada's "Old" Horizon of Opportunity in the Indo-Pacific Region

<https://cdainstitute.ca/thoughts-on-canadas-old-horizon-of-opportunity-in-the-indo-pacific-region/>

## **#information operations**

Custer's Last Tweet: Avoiding a Digital Little Bighorn in the Fight for Hearts and Minds

<https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/custers-last-tweet-avoiding-a-digital-little-bighorn-in-the-fight-for-hearts-and-minds/>

## **#intelligence**

Review of the CSE ministerial authorizations and ministerial orders under the CSE Act

<https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/review-of-the-cse-ministerial-authorizations-and-ministerial-orders-under-the-cse-act>

## **#land warfare**

War in 2050: The Army's Operating Concept After Next

<https://mwi.usma.edu/war-in-2050-the-armys-operating-concept-after-next/>

"...bear in mind the admonition of Michael Howard that while any concept we are working on now is most likely wrong, the challenge is to not be too badly wrong."

## **#logistics**

Limping to war

<https://logisticsinwar.com/2019/01/24/limping-to-war/>

## **#maritime strategy**

Look to maritime domain to revive failed U.S. statecraft

<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/may/3/look-maritime-domain-revive-failed-us-statecraft/>

*'Naval statecraft.' How fits into current naval thinking?*

## **#NATO**

A New Black Sea Strategy for a New Black Sea Reality

<https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/new-black-sea-strategy-new-black-sea-reality>

## **#naval weapons**

Report to Congress on Navy Shipboard Lasers

<https://news.usni.org/2023/04/27/report-to-congress-on-navy-shipboard-lasers-4>

## **#Russia-Ukraine War**

Russian Army Numbers Growing Inside Ukraine, Says Top NATO Commander

<https://news.usni.org/2023/04/27/russian-army-ranks-growing-inside-ukraine-says-top-nato-commander>

Discussion about the strategic and political importance of the Ukrainian offensives - what does victory look like?

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1651728308940447745.html>

How China Could Save Putin's War in Ukraine

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/how-china-could-save-putins-war-ukraine>

How many brigades did Ukraine start with war with?

<http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2023/05/01/how-many-brigades-did-ukraine-start-with-war-with/>

What Brigades has Ukraine added since the war started?

<http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2023/05/02/what-brigades-has-ukraine-added-since-the-war-started/>

The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – tanks

<http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2023/05/03/the-nine-new-brigades-for-the-spring-offensive-tanks/>

The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – APCs and IFVs

<http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2023/05/04/the-nine-new-brigades-for-the-spring-offensive-apcs-and-ifvs/>

The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – artillery

<http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2023/05/04/the-nine-new-brigades-for-the-spring-offensive-artillery/>

The Ukrainian Navy and the Fight for Democracy

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/may/ukrainian-navy-and-fight-democracy>

Putin claims he's cancelling public celebrations over safety fears. The truth is more humiliating

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/may/02/putin-cancelling-public-celebrations-safety-fears-ukraine-war>

### **#armour**

An Unerring Sense of Locality: Ukraine and the Future of Armored Warfare

<https://mwi.usma.edu/an-unerring-sense-of-locality-ukraine-and-the-future-of-armored-warfare/>

1,500 new and modernised tanks - really?

<https://wavellroom.com/2023/05/01/1500-new-and-modernised-tanks-really/>

### **#cyber operations**

Cyber lessons from Ukraine: Prepare for prolonged conflict, not a knockout blow

<https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/cyber-lessons-from-ukraine-prepare-for-prolonged-conflict-not-a-knockout-blow/>

### **#information operations**

How the US government can combat Russian disinformation on Ukraine

<https://www.federaltimes.com/opinions/2023/05/02/how-the-us-government-can-combat-russian-disinformation-on-ukraine/>

“Right on Target” – But Which Target?

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/right-on-target-but-which-target/>

A Lesson from Russia's Information Manipulation Textbook: Setting the Scene for a Large-Scale Missile Attack

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/a-lesson-from-russias-information-manipulation-textbook-setting-the-scene-for-a-large-scale-missile-attack/>

**#logistics #economic warfare**

RuAF logistics and the cumulative effect of 14 months of tactical truck attrition

<https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1654168118292250655>

**Other:**

**Coronation Emblem**

The Canadian Coronation Emblem (see below) was featured in the 7 April 2023 edition of *Dispatches*. Information about the British Coronation Emblem is at:

<https://www.royal.uk/coronation-emblem>.



**US Army University Military Review May-June 2023**

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2023/>

contents:

The Graveyard of Command Posts: What Chornobaiivka Should Teach Us about Command and Control in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Decided among the Cities: The Past, Present, and Future of War in Urban Environments

Analysis of Land Army Maintenance Techniques in the War in Ukraine

Fighting with Agility: The 162nd Armored Division in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

A Sad and Bloody Business: Land Force Lessons from the Falklands, Forty Years On

Culture Change and People First: Creating a Culture that Acts as the Antibody to the Corrosive Elements

Toward a Vernacular of Risk: Unmiring Mission Command through Risk Education

Furthering the Discussion on METT-TC

Nanoenergetic Materials for Microscale Tactical Applications

China's Belt and Road Initiative in East Africa: Finding Success in Failure?

Peace Games: Preparing U.S. Officials for Challenges and Opportunities Abroad

Upon the Fields of Friendly Strife: An "Athletic Charter" to Reform the Army's Sports Culture and Build Better Leaders

On Killing Remotely: The Psychology of Killing with Drones

## Cool training aids

The Odd Case Of 'Russian Air Defense Vehicles' Showing Up On A Train In Ohio

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/the-odd-case-of-russian-air-defense-vehicles-showing-up-on-a-train-in-ohio>



## Maritime Espionage

*Contributed by a RUSI(NS) member:* This podcast, "Cold Front," is about ongoing Russian maritime espionage activities around Nordic countries. It is available at <https://www.dr.dk/lyd/p1/cold-front> or through most podcast services, Apple, etc. Perhaps the material well known by some, but it is nonetheless an interesting series.

## Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

### O Canada

The issue of Chinese interference is an ongoing challenge for governance. More troubling this week was the apparent direct threat by the Chinese against a specific member of Parliament (MP) and that the Chinese diplomat responsible actually apparently bragged about this in public. Worse, the Prime Minister's Office was aware for up to two years of this incident and did not inform the MP of the threat. Even more troubling is that the Chinese diplomat was not declared persona non grata and deported. Time will eventually sort this out, but even if remotely true this is a major cause for all Canadians to be concerned.

China has proven time after time that it has intent to disrupt Canadian politics by way of threats to Chinese Canadians, disinformation, and economic threats as we saw with canola, beef and pork products. Thoughtful planning and action is needed in a coordinated way with allied nations. Consideration should be given to increasing cooperation with Taiwan. Taiwan is well aware of the Communist Chinese Party's methods of operation and can help us with advice and remedies. It appears that we need to take action against this growing threat.

The Sudan non-combatant extraction operation (NEO) is ongoing although the main effort is now at Port Sudan along the coast. Two Canadian ships, HMCS *Montréal* and MV *Asterix* happened to be nearby enroute to duties off North Korea to enforce UN sanctions. The air evacuation became untenable due to the actions of the two belligerent parties making the airfields unsafe. Approximately 200 Canadians are still in Sudan who have requested assistance.

There was a CBC interview with the Canadian Ambassador to Sudan, Phil Lupul. He was quite clear that the threat was very real, even worse than Afghanistan, and necessitated evacuation of his team. I was quite prepared to castigate the diplomatic staff for leaving, but I was greatly relieved to hear Phil's response and it was encouraging. I have personally worked with Phil in Afghanistan and know that he would not abandon the embassy without cause. He was there on 30 December 2009 when we lost five folks in a Provincial Reconstruction Team patrol. He didn't stop his work then or stop diplomatic staff from going out. He knows all too well what the penalties are for a decision made too late or not at all. It is always easy to armchair quarterback from a distance, it is something else to be there and have to make decisions on the fly. It is not easy.

## **Moldova**

Moldova is a Russian target country. Russia has written a new foreign policy document that is...well, delusional. There is an article on it from the International Institute of Strategic Studies called Russia's New Foreign Policy-Concept "The Airing of Grievances and a New Vision of World Order" (<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/04/russia-new-foreign-policy-concept-the-airing-of-grievances-and-a-new-vision-of-world-order/>), published on 13 April 2023. Russia's changing priorities are certainly worth noting. One aspect is Russia's intention to gain control over Moldova post a successful war against Ukraine. Moldova is Europe's second poorest country with a large proportion of pro-Russian sympathizers. Russia expected to control Moldova by 2030.

The key pro-Russian Party leader Ilon Shor has been tried in absentia. He was convicted and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. His deputy leader Marina Tauber was just arrested this past week for financial issues and potential fraud. She was considered a flight risk and remains in custody. Ilon Shor is currently in Israel as a dual citizen of Moldova and Israel. The Shor Party is likely to win the state election in Gagauzia which is being fought between the Shor Party and the Socialists. The current national ruling party is not running candidates there as the region is seen as pro-Russia.

The EU renewed their suspensions of duties and tariffs on Moldovan goods in order to support the Moldovan economy. The EU is continuing its support despite pro-Russian sentiments in parts of the country. Transnistria remains in pro-Russian hands. Leaders there have stated that Russian peacekeepers can stay even if the Moldovan authorities remove the 1992 agreement. Approximately 1800 Russian soldiers remain there along with 6k pro-Russian militia. They are guarding a large stockpile of Russian ammunition located there. They will likely not change voluntarily.

## **Belarus**

According to US sources, only about 2800 Russian soldiers remain in Belarus. This number increases from time to time for exercises and training but it is not sufficient for regime change in Belarus.

The Belarus government is ramping up its counter-intelligence organization to counter internal dissidents and partisans. Belarus has been continually hampered by actions of anti-Russian pro-democracy groups. Belarus citizens are not in favour of the war and any move to join the war on the Russian side would result in violent opposition including from security forces.

Belarus has added a second mobile group to its border security force along the Ukraine-Belarus border this past seven days. These groups are approximately 300 strong each. They supplement static positions and are not considered by Ukraine to be a major threat.

## **Russia-Ukraine War**

The war continues to be one of attrition with both sides taking severe casualties. In the north along the Svatova-Kremmina line Russia was unable to make any significant headway. The front has been generally static. Russia has until now been able to make slow but steady progress in Bakhmut at a horrendous cost. Ukraine still holds 15% of Bakhmut after ten months of siege. This week saw a slightly different story with Ukrainian local counter-attacks sweeping Russian forces back using precision strikes by artillery and localized combined arms attacks by small groups mainly in the north of the Bakhmut sector. Russian forces have been generally unable to resist local Ukrainian counter-attacks but there has been no breakthrough at this point.

Ukraine has crossed the Dnipro River near Kherson making headway using light forces delivered by small boats. Ukrainian operational security is still good and the exact situation is unknown. The Antonovski bridge and the dam at Nova Kakhovka are apparently both in the sight of Ukrainian troops. Ukrainian artillery is busy targeting ammunition depots and other key installations in southern Ukraine. Most of this effort appears to be setting conditions for the long awaited counter-attack. Ukrainian officials commented on Wednesday that the counter-attack had actually begun but they also stated that most of these current operations are the building blocks for larger actions.

Russia and Ukraine have been trading missile and drone attacks. Russia launched 18 missiles apparently fired from Tu-95 and Tu-160 heavy bombers. 15 out of 18 missiles were destroyed but three hit causing civilian casualties including to a storage site for decommissioned ICBM near Pavlohrad. The final estimate of missiles in the attack was 23 KH-101 and KH-55 cruise missiles of which 21 were shot down plus two drones also shot down. Russia fired a second batch of missiles on 2 May injuring 34 civilians when the missiles hit an apartment complex.

Ukraine had launched an attack on Sevastopol, destroying an oil storage depot, and continues to target ammunition sites and other facilities including temporary barracks. Early morning on Wednesday at approximately 3 am two drones were alleged to have attacked the Kremlin. There are videos of at least one of the drones apparently hitting a flag on top of a large dome. Russia has stated that this was an assassination attempt on President Putin and they will retaliate at a time of their choosing. There was considerable speculation that this was not a Ukrainian effort but rather a false flag attack to provide an excuse for further Russian action. Time will tell which version is the truth. A Ukrainian oligarch has a contest for prize money for the first organization which can land a drone or similar craft into Red Square on 9 May, however, it is unlikely that competitors would waste the effort at this point.

Russia continues its war efforts by building extensive fortifications and trenches across southern Kherson and Zaporizhia. Unfortunately, one unit found itself digging into an area used to bury anthrax contaminated cattle. Two members became ill and had to be hospitalized and the unit and area had to be quarantined.

Two trains were derailed by explosives near the port of Berdyans`k on separate occasions indicating operations of partisans or deep sabotage teams in the Russian rear. This appears to be continuing inside Russia with fires `breaking out` in key industries including factories building missile components as well as transport facilities. The rise of these types of incidents are problematic for Russian forces. It means security has to be everywhere at the same time thus forcing Russian security forces to be spread thin across the country. Even bases in the far East have not been immune to these acts.

New Russian private military companies (PMC) are making their way to the front in Ukraine and in fact around the world. In one recent battle around Bakhmut, PMC Wagner forces were replaced by mercenaries from a smaller PMC, but Ukrainian troops counter-attacked the positions of the new troops who apparently abandoned their positions won by costly Wagner efforts. Needless to say, this did not sit well. More recently, a new form of PMC showed up, providing security to Russia's main oil firm. The oil company like other large industrial conglomerates maintains private security forces for its own facilities. Most of these folks are former soldiers and are reasonably well trained unlike the newly conscripted or mobilized troops. In research from various sources it became very clear that the changing nature of private military companies is more than a little difficult to understand. Suffice to say, PMC are being used for military operations whether they like it or not. Their loyalty is questionable if they are not paid and as one saw with inter-PMC rivalry not all can be depended upon to "fight to the death."



Here is a partial list of PMC from various sources, there may be duplication and at this point, not all the abbreviations are known.

- a. ENOT Gp;
- b. PMC Shchit;
- c. Moran Security Group;
- d. Redut-Antiterror;
- e. Antiterror Orel;
- f. PMC Wagner;
- g. Cossacks, maybe the tribe vice a PMC;
- h. RSB Group;
- i. Antiterror, could be the holding company for the other earlier two groups;
- j. MAP group;
- k. MS Group;
- l. Centre R;
- m. ATK Group/Corporation?;
- n. Slavonic Group; and
- o. Private industrial security forces such as from oil companies or military manufacturing firms.

The other issue about PMC is why the increasing numbers? Are we increasingly likely to see extreme rivalry played out in a deteriorating Russia? This needs more research. One question in my mind is should Putin be more worried about internal threats from 'friends'? Time will tell.

Speaking of fighting to the death, Alexei Navalny has been charged with another series of based on his 'actions' in prison. It is also suspected that he was poisoned again and is in increasingly poor health. His colleague Vladimir Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years in prison as well. Mr Kara-Murza has also been poisoned twice before. The two men did not try to hide but rather faced their accusers directly - these could be deadly foes, although one hopes that Russians themselves will see the light. The law on treason has also been amended to allow for life in prison and the requirements to prove the case also loosened. Can Russia save itself?

## **China**

China under the Communist Chinese party (CCP) is an authoritarian state. Its actions against minorities, religious groups, human rights workers and pro-democratic followers have been brutal. The sole purpose of the CCP is the survival of the regime. There is no rule of law as we know it and recent changes to Chinese "law" have further caused concern to Chinese citizens and foreigners alike. Most recently is the change to the regulations creating exit bans which affect tens of thousands every year. Other changes have been made to 'laws' regarding espionage and subversion which allows for state and local government to create and enforce these bans. Most recently, exit bans have been used for hostage diplomacy. Most are politically motivated and are often subject to arbitrary decisions of the local court, however, China has made this into an administrative civil matter, not criminal. It is difficult to get any ban reviewed by competent authority. Foreigners are often detained as a way to gain leverage against their company or a loved one living abroad who has somehow incurred the wrath of the CCP.

China is facing a major economic crisis. Slightly over half the population has achieved some measure of prosperity but over 400m are still in what the rest of the world might call abject poverty. The CCP has worked hard in providing serious education opportunities for a small number of students. This year more than 11m graduated but with unemployment reaching 19.9% of the youth, many are without meaningful work. Students tend to be the most radical and less likely to take 'no' for an answer. The economy has not been well mainly caused by the pandemic and the CCP's dogmatic efforts to quell the

disease including by severe lockdowns. This, coupled with the withdrawal of many foreign companies, failure of the property development industry, bank failures, crop failures and sanctions have made developing new jobs difficult. The job market will not get better in the near term. The solution being proposed is to use the new grads as village cadres similar to Mao's Cultural Revolution. While not expecting millions to die as per the original cultural revolution, it is a waste of human resources. The unemployment problem is a direct result of the CCP downgrading and impeding the true growth makers, the private sector, in favour of State Owned Enterprises (SOE). The CCP now faces a potentially large disaffected population throughout the country. China therefore has a potential internal security problem which may affect the health and survival of the CCP.

With a deteriorating economy and an increasingly restive population China also faces a Taiwan that is increasingly independent and which views itself now as Taiwanese and not Chinese. China has threatened to take Taiwan by force if necessary but would prefer a 'peaceful' agreement and fold Taiwan into the Peoples' Republic of China. Still, potentially Taiwan offers a potential out for the CCP. Authoritarian regimes have a long history of focusing their citizens' minds away from their actual concerns in favour of an external enemy thus retaining their control of the country..

This year, China has made 112 incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone. Taiwan has made great strides to increase the capability of its air force and navy. Most recently, Taiwan has authorized the commanders of its Coast Guard vessels to use their own discretion to open fire if there is cause. Taiwan's belligerence would give Beijing latitude to take action and at present with increasing difficulties would Xi take a chance?

As pointed out in a recent podcast by "Lei's Real Talk" China is faced with two basic options, although there are sub-options as well. Plan A is non-kinetic relying on cyber-warfare, economic warfare, disinformation, intimidation, isolation, legal efforts, diplomatic efforts, etc., at the same time to offer a 'gentle way' for Taiwan to peacefully reunite with the mainland. It is unlikely that Taiwan will fall for this type of operation given their liberty and independence, as well as the negative example of Hong Kong and the value of the CCP's agreements. Plan B is an actual invasion and direct military confrontation with the US, Japan and their many allies as well as a well-equipped and motivated Taiwan. Still might Xi take the chance? He might if he is increasingly affected by internal unrest. There are some indications this might be considered. Conscription rules have just changed to allow for a more complete call up of appropriate individuals especially those with cyber or space related skill sets to gain the high ground. Time will tell.



Recall RUSI(NS) Information Note "A System to Judge Information Reliability" (<https://rusi-ns.ca/a-system-to-judge-information-reliability/>).



**RUSSIA SAYS:**

Russia recently released its report on the State of Human Rights in Ukraine, which reiterated its usual accusations against the Ukrainian government.

**BASED ON CFINTCOM ANALYSIS:**

- Russia's invasion of Ukraine has resulted in extensive human rights abuses and an acute humanitarian crisis.
- Russian forces have indiscriminately and disproportionately bombed Ukrainian population centres, hitting civilian homes, hospitals, and schools, and have committed widespread acts of violence and intimidation against the Ukrainian population, including torture, summary executions, sexual violence, and the looting of cultural property.
- Russia has also carried out the forced deportation and re-education of Ukrainian children, which is the basis of the International Criminal Court's arrest warrant for President Putin.



**INTELLIGENCE UPDATE**

- Last week, Russian media reported that the annual Russian International Army Games will not take place in 2023. Pitched as the 'War Olympics', the games have symbolised Russia's attempt to re-establish the military at the heart of popular culture. The festival-like event is particularly known for the Tank Biathlon.
- Russia has likely cancelled the games mainly because it is concerned the event would be seen as frivolous in wartime. Russian nationalist commentators, including former intelligence officer Igor Girkin, fiercely criticised the Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD) for going ahead with the 2022 iteration.
- There is also a realistic possibility that due to losses in Ukraine, the Russian MOD is concerned a shortage of tanks, tank crews and other skilled personnel will risk the Russian team's usual domination of the medals table.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In the early hours of 28 April 2023, Russia launched the first major wave of cruise missile strikes against Ukraine since early March 2023. Although Ukraine shot down most of the missiles, at least 25 civilians were killed.
- The attacks suggest a departure in Russia's use of long-range strikes. The wave involved fewer missiles than those over the winter and was unlikely to have been targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure. There is a realistic possibility that Russia was attempting to intercept Ukrainian reserve units and military supplies recently provided to Ukraine.
- Russia operates an inefficient targeting process and prioritises perceived military necessity over preventing collateral damage, including civilian deaths.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent months, Russian commanders have likely started punishing breaches in discipline by detaining the offending troops in 'Zindans' which are improvised cells consisting of holes in the ground covered with a metal grille.
- Multiple recent reports from Russian personnel give similar accounts of being placed in Zindans for misdemeanours including drunkenness and attempting to terminate their contracts.
- In the early months of the war, many Russian commanders took a relatively light touch in enforcing discipline, allowing those who refused to soldier to quietly return home. Since Autumn 2022, there have been multiple increasingly draconian initiatives to improve discipline in the force, especially since Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov assumed command of the operation in January 2023.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since summer 2022, Russia has constructed some of the most extensive systems of military defensive works seen anywhere in the world for many decades. These defences are not just near the current front lines but have also been dug deep inside areas Russia currently controls.
- Imagery shows that Russia has made a particular effort to fortify the northern border of occupied Crimea, including with a multi-layered defensive zone near the village of Medvedevka. Russia has also dug hundreds of miles of trenches well inside internationally recognised Russian territory including in the Belgorod and Kursk regions.
- The defences highlight Russian leaders' deep concern that Ukraine could achieve a major breakthrough. However, some works have likely been ordered by local commanders and civil leaders in attempts to promote the official narrative that Russia is 'threatened' by Ukraine and NATO.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 27 April 2023, Russian military-linked social media claimed that Russia's Deputy Defence Minister Colonel-General Mikhail Mizintsev had been dismissed. Mizintsev held the military logistics portfolio, and had only been in post for eight months.
- Mizintsev's sacking was not immediately confirmed, but speculation about his future highlights how logistics problems remain at the heart of Russia's struggling campaign in Ukraine. Russia does not have enough munitions to achieve success on the offensive. Paucity of ammunition drives internal divisions, most notably between Russia's Ministry of Defence and Wagner Group.
- Russia continues to give the highest priority to mobilising its defence industry, but it is still failing to meet war time demands. While Russia's political leaders persist in demanding success on the battlefield, Russia's logistics professionals are stuck in the middle.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 28 April and 01 May 2023, Russia mounted air launched cruise missile (ALCM) strikes against Ukraine. These were the first such strikes for 50 days, with the last prior strikes occurring on 09 March 2023.
- The latest strikes were conducted by Russian Long Range Aviation strategic bombers, both Tu-95 and Tu-160 aircraft, likely using Kh-101 and Kh-555 ALCMs.
- Both strikes used smaller numbers of missiles than seen in previous attacks, which is likely due to Russian attempts to rebuild its ALCM stockpiles. The observed types of facilities damaged by the Russian strikes indicates a possible shift away from targeting Ukraine's electrical power network. Both recent strikes were likely focused on Ukraine's military, industrial and logistical infrastructure.



CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND  
COMMANDEMENT DU RENSEIGNEMENT DES FORCES CANADIENNES

### RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

On May 1, Russia claimed that its long-range strikes hit crucial ammunition and fuel stores in the city of Pavlohrad that were important to Ukraine's expected, upcoming counter-offensive.

### BASED ON CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND ANALYSIS:

- Russia actually struck a storage facility for decommissioned inter-continental ballistic missile motors, which are of no use to Ukraine's war effort.
- Russian officials pointed to the widely-reported explosions from the strikes to support their claim that Russia had targeted materiel critical to the Ukrainian counter-offensive.
- Russia is concerned that media coverage of a possible Ukrainian counter-offensive is degrading the morale of its troops and public, and wants to create a narrative that it is taking sufficient measures to prepare.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 3 May 2023 a fire broke out at a Russian fuel depot in Volna on the Russian mainland side of the Kerch Strait, close to the Crimean bridge. It was initiated by a suspected drone strike.
- This follows a pattern of Russian fuel storage sites being damaged since the start of the year, with fuel depots in occupied Ukraine and the Russia-Ukraine border regions remaining particularly vulnerable to attack.
- The disruption to the fuel storage and distribution network will likely force adjustments to Russia's military refuelling operations to mitigate targeting.
- Russian adjustments could include deploying additional protection measures at fuel storage sites, as seen in Tuaspe in Russia, or relying on infrastructure in less threatened regions.