



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 16 June 2023

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Stress Resources

The Nova Scotia fires have been stressful to many, and those fire aren't over by a long shot. In the response and the recovery phases, there is a need to take care of the mental health of people, first responders and others. Information is circulating through various channels.

Operational Stress Resources for First Responders

Operational Stress Injury Clinic is available for RCMP, CAF and their families.

<https://mha.nshealth.ca/en/services/nova-scotia-operational-stress-injury-osi-clinic>

For other first responders with benefits seeking private supports:

<https://psychologytoday.com/ca>

For first responders without access to benefits or private supports:

<https://mha.nshealth.ca/en>

DND staff also advised of: <https://ns.211.ca/>, 'Help Starts Here.'

Home Dispatches

The summer 2023 edition of our internal quarterly, *Home Dispatches*, will be published after our late June tour event. If you have content for *Home Dispatches*, please email to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

22 June, Thursday - Royal Alberta United Service Institute presentation "War and Warfare in Ukraine." 1900 Mountain/2200 Atlantic. Via Zoom. To register: [https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZcudOyqqT4jG9J0-tCHOGRnfSbdFbpYitgv#/registration](https://us02web.zoom.us/join/joinMeeting?meetingRef=6023197167&meetingId=91813434636)

22 June, Thursday - Royal Alberta United Services Institute presentation "War and Warfare in Ukraine" with MGen Chip Chapman, CB (ret'd). 1900 Mountain. Via Zoom. To register: <https://www.rausi.ca/info-events/rmcsd/579-war-and-warfare-in-ukraine>

22 June, Thursday - CDA Institute webinar "The Future of Domestic Operations: Rethinking the Role of the CAF in Emergency Response." 1000 EST. To register: <https://cdainstitute.ca/events/the-future-of-domestic-operations-rethinking-the-role-of-the-caf-in-emergency-response/>

26-27 June, Monday – Tuesday – RUSI Land Warfare Conference 2023, “Mobilising Today to Secure Tomorrow.” 09:00 - 17:00 BST. Church House, London | Online. To register: <https://rusi.org/events/martial-power-conferences/rusi-land-warfare-conference-2023>

28 June, Wednesday – Tour of Dr William D Finn Centre for Forensic Medicine, headquarters of the Nova Scotia Medical Examiner Service. 1300-1500. Registration is required. To register, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com by close-of-business-hours 27 June. The limit to the number of people who will be able to take the tour has been reached. Further registrants will be put on a waiting list, and if there are enough, another tour will be scheduled.

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Comments " Sudan Evacuation Shows Way Forward for Humanitarian Intervention by Jay Heisler, 4 June 2023, https://rusi-ns.ca/sudan_evacuation/

RUSI(NS) Comments "Reform Needed in Intelligence Recruiting Process" by Jay Heisler, 28 May 2023, https://rusi-ns.ca/intelligence_recruiting/

RUSI(NS) Presentation "The Nova Scotia RCMP – Forward into 2023 and beyond" by ACmmr Dennis Daley, 1 May 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/nova-scotia-rcmp/>

RUSI(NS) Information Note “MV Asterix and HADR Missions”, 26 April 2023 https://rusi-ns.ca/asterix_and_hadr_missions/

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 7 June 2023 <https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association Technical Information webpage <https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/technical-information>

Note that listed is the RUSI(NS) Info Note "Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment."

Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, June 2023

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 6, June 2023

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, June 2023
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/202-rausi-dispatches-june-2023>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, June 2023



Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 2nd Quarter 2023.

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 19, Issue 1, 12 June 2023

New: Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, June 2023, <https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute>

@RUSI_NS on Twitter:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>NSIRACanada @nsiracanada 9 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: NSIRA has released its Terms of Reference for its review of the Government of Canada's production and dissemination of intelligence on foreign interference in the 43rd and 44th Canadian federal elections. Read it here (https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/nsira-review-of-the-government-of-canadas-production-and-dissemination-of-intelligence-on-foreign-interference-in-the-43rd-and-44th-canadian-federal-elections)</p>	
<p>"Canada's defence review draws many public comments" https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/canadas-defence-review-draws-many-public-comments 1,500 public comments to CAN🇨🇦 defence policy update #DPU. Hopefully there will be public report summarizing those comments. #StrongSecureEngaged</p>	

CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 9 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: We don't want to see failure of any kind yet we complain when the system is rigid and risk-averse. We want to spend more on defence, but we also want our taxes low. We demand accountability but are unwilling to hear the truth from our elected officials. <https://cdainstitute.ca/beyond-the-2-threshold-optimizing-canadian-defence-spending/> (Beyond the 2% Threshold: Optimizing Canadian Defence Spending)



Omar Alghabra @OmarAlghabra 10 Jun tweeted: Today we announced the seizure of the Russian Antonov cargo aircraft at Pearson Airport. This sends a clear message to Russia that their illegal invasion continues to have consequences. We will always be there for the Ukrainian people. <https://canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2023/06/government-of-canada-orders-seizure-of-russian-registered-cargo-aircraft-at-toronto-pearson-airport.html>

(Government of Canada orders seizure of Russian-registered cargo aircraft at Toronto Pearson Airport)

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Bravo @Transport_gc for seizing strategic airlifter of aggressive belligerent state.

#EconomicWarfare may be slow but can affect warfighting capability of target state. Turn over Antonov to UKR 🇺🇦 as reparation & replacement for UKR An-24 destroyed in war? *Further:*

The world watches as Canada moves to seize a Russian cargo jet for Ukraine

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/monday-volga-dnepr-cargo-plane-forfeiture-ukraine-1.6873277>



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 12 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Gen. Wayne Eyre, chief of the defence staff, has warned that the burden on the military is straining its ability to fulfil its core responsibilities.

(U.S., Canada open to a 'NORAD-like' model of joint disaster response: Blair

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-us-disaster-response-cooperation-1.6871059>)






RUSI @RUSI_org 14 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Ukrainian forces press forward in their offensive, but caution is needed before declaring success or failure. Read our latest #RUSICommentary and gain insights from

@Jack_Watling's analysis on the latest phase of the war in Ukraine.


(Ukraine's Counteroffensive Begins: Shall the Leopards Break Free?)



<p>https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraines-counteroffensive-begins-shall-leopards-break-free)</p>	
<p>Communications Security Establishment (CSE) @cse_cst 14 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Our foreign signals intelligence mandate helps support the safety and well-being of Canadians, Canadian infrastructure, and Canada's national interests. Learn more about our work in #SIGINT: (Foreign intelligence https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/mission/foreign-intelligence)</p>	
<p>"The Challenges and Opportunities of Taking the Canadian Army Digital" https://vanguardcanada.com/the-challenges-and-opportunities-of-taking-the-canadian-army-digital/</p>	
<p>RUSI(NS) Comments "RCMP Policing" https://rusi-ns.ca/rcmp_policing/ Info about federal & contract policing when municipalities, public, media consider alternative policing arrangements @RCMPGRCpolice @RCMPNS #RCMP</p>	

“Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia” on Facebook:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>Lack of domestic defence industry, bureaucracy hindering Canada's military procurement, says PBO https://www.thesudburystar.com/news/lack-of-domestic-defence-industry-bureaucracy-hindering-canadas-military-procurement-says-pbo</p> <p>"Numerous means exist to improve defence procurement in Canada ... both specialization and single-point accountability are key."</p>	
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When is a corvette not a corvette?

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/when-is-a-corvette-not-a-corvette/>

"...rather than focusing on a specific type or class of ship with dubious definitions such as a corvette, we should focus on the effects that need to be delivered. Flexibility, persistence, scale, self-defence, offensive-strike capabilities and constabulary operations must be weighed against the clear constraints, delivery timeframes and workforce constraints. Consideration of these elements will lead to some clear conclusions about what is in the art of the possible for the future fleet mix."



Whether the Canadian Surface Combatant project ships are typed as frigates, destroyers or something else is not important. What is important is the intended employment of the ships; how that employment fits into naval, maritime and national defence policies; and whether the ships' weapons and sensor fits, and other capabilities, allow those ships to carry out those policies. The type name is just a general, short-hand, description of roles.

For more on ship types, see RUSI(NS) Information Note: "Types of Royal Canadian Navy Combatant Warships" (<https://rusi-ns.ca/types-of-rcn-combatant-warships/>).

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Editor: The following is a definition of blue water navy that the Security Affairs Committee worked up: "A blue water navy is one that has ships (combatant and support/auxiliary, with seaworthiness and endurance); trained and experienced personnel; and logistics (including major engineering facilities ashore) to undertake sustained, long range, long endurance operations in the open oceans."

Cash-strapped Canadian Armed Forces 'tenuous,' veteran soldier says

<https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/cash-strapped-canadian-armed-forces-tenuous-veteran-soldier-says>

In these times of increased threats (China, Russian, etc.), Canada needs to focus on ensuring its military is combat capable to defend the country. That is the most basic function of a government. Any other 'priority' detracts from that, and weakens our defences.



HD HHI on Collision Course with Hanwha Ocean for Canadian Submarine Order

<http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html>

"The Canadian Submarine Replacement Project will purchase up to 12 submarines..."

Korean industry seems to be pretty certain about Canada acquiring twelve conventional-powered submarines.



Canada is missing crucial NATO exercise because our Air Force is up on bricks

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canada-missing-crucial-nato-exercise>



Ukraine War Could Last a Decade, Top Ukrainian Official Says

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/06/ukraine-war-could-last-decade-top-ukrainian-official-says/387523/>



"Russia's war on Ukraine may last another ten years, according to a Ukrainian official who described his ministry's effort to attract investment in defense start-ups working on everything from drones to AI."

All too often, wars are predicted to be short and 'the troops will be home by Christmas.' But all too often, they don't work out that way. Even if a short war is the plan (usually the aggressor's plan), it is wise to plan for the long run. Better yet, prepare for a long war, an intense war, in peacetime, with industry, a personnel system, plans and processes sufficiently detail to support a rapid build-up, a surge, that is, scalability to ensure the strength to fight and keep on fighting. Battles may be won by the big battalions, wars are won by the big wallets. Especially when some, a lot, of the expenditures have been made beforehand, to deter potential opponents and to win out for however long it takes, hopefully short, against confirmed aggressors.

Other Sources:

#Access To Information

Defence Department Harming Credibility Of Canada's Transparency System: Commissioner
<https://www.readthemaple.com/defence-ministry-harming-credibility-of-canadas-transparency-system-commissioner/>

#artificial intelligence

Artificial intelligence: challenges and controversies for US national security
<https://thebulletin.org/2023/06/artificial-intelligence-challenges-and-controversies-for-us-national-security/>

#China

China Maritime Report No. 27: PLA Navy Submarine Leadership - Factors
<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/27/>

China's Technology Strategy: Leverage Before Growth
<https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/chinas-technology-strategy-leverage-before-growth/>

#culture

British Army discussing if masculine naming conventions should be gender-neutral, CGS says
<https://www.forces.net/services/army/masculine-coded-ranks-need-be-thought-through-british-army-chief-says>

#defence policy #land warfare #Australia

Holding the Door Open - Securing a Point of Entry to Facilitate Littoral Manoeuvre in the Near Region

<https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/holding-door-open>

This article is listed here not so much for the subject, but because it is the result of direction in the Australian Defence Strategic Review. Considering the impending Canadian Defence Policy Update (DPU, sometimes referred to as a review), it'll be interesting to see what if any comparable clear direction is included in that (not in the sense of "Army, get involved in littoral manoeuvre" but clear as to how the government wants a service to be able to operate).

#drones

To integrate uncrewed surface vehicles into the navy, start with a concept of operations

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/to-integrate-uncrewed-surface-vehicles-into-the-navy-start-with-a-concept-of-operations/>

#economic warfare

Threat potential in the economy: from vulnerabilities to China's increased coercion

<https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/hybrid-coe-trend-report-10-threat-potential-in-the-economy-from-vulnerabilities-to-chinas-increased-coercion/>

#Indo-Pacific

Taiwan Contingencies and Southeast Asia: Scenarios in the Gray Zone

<https://fulcrum.sg/taiwan-contingencies-and-southeast-asia-scenarios-in-the-gray-zone/>

Salami operations.

Washington is Recalibrating its Asia Strategy

<https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/washington-is-recalibrating-its-asia-strategy/>

#legal #naval operations

Could Indonesia legally stop transit by nuclear-powered AUKUS subs?

Broader than the article topic implies: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/could-indonesia-legally-stop-transit-nuclear-powered-aukus-subs>

U.S., China Should Revive Cold War Rules for Encounters at Sea

<https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/op-ed-u-s-china-should-revive-cold-war-rules-for-encounters-at-sea>

#naval strategy

#Indo-Pacific

RADM J. C. Wylie: Considerations for a U.S. Indo-Pacific Naval Strategy

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/wylie/>

#strategic vision #Royal Navy

Is The Royal Navy Still a 'Blue Water Navy'? No, it is not.

<https://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com/2023/06/is-royal-navy-still-blue-water-navy.html>

#planning

Furthering the Discussion on METT-TC

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2023/Furthering-the-Discussion/>

#Royal Canadian Air Force

Future Fighter Capability Project Industry Engagement Information Session 5 June 2023

Presentation deck available on request to RUSI(NS).

#Russia-Ukraine War

Ports shelled, ships blocked as Russia-Ukraine war escalates

<https://insurancemarineneews.com/insurance-marine-news/ports-shelled-ships-blocked-as-russia-ukraine-war-escalates/>

What is Russia's Strategy in Ukraine?

<https://mwi.usma.edu/what-is-russias-strategy-in-ukraine/>

"Russia's strategy in Ukraine has thus become one of attrition, using military, economic, and diplomatic activities to exhaust Ukraine and its Western backers until they accept the current situation as a new reality."

2Q23 Ukraine 1 Year On: The State of Our Assumptions

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2023/5/29/2q23-ukraine-1-year-on-the-state-of-our-assumptions>

A New Strategy for the Black Sea

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-strategy-black-sea>

US/NATO-Russian Strategic Stability and the War in Ukraine

<https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/06/US-NATO-Russian-Strategic-Stability-in-Ukraine.pdf>

Armor Expert Breaks Down Ukraine's Loss Of Bradleys During Breaching Operation

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/armor-expert-breaks-down-ukraines-loss-of-bradleys-during-breaching-operation>

Too early for strategic judgements of the Ukrainian offensive, timely to review the Russian response

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1668446913333727235.html>

and, longer version:

What Now Gerasimov?

<https://mickryan.substack.com/p/what-now-gerasimov>

On observing the Ukrainian 2023 offensives from afar

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1668872349360492544.html>

Russian use of armour has evolved

thread: <https://twitter.com/nicholadrummond/status/1668943037475561472>

What is Russia's Strategy in Ukraine?

Economic warfare/strategy: <https://mwi.usma.edu/what-is-russias-strategy-in-ukraine/>

#artillery #defence procurement

Russia-Ukraine war: Can the West keep supplying Ukraine with enough artillery?

<https://www.vox.com/2023/6/6/23744349/ukraine-artillery-counteroffensive-united-states-europe>

NATO pushes for common standards to tackle shortfalls in artillery munitions

<https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nato-pushes-common-standards-tackle-shortfalls-artillery-munitions-2023-06-13/>

#drones

'No Comparison In World History': Ukraine's Comms Security Chief Shares Takes On Drone War

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2023/06/12/no-comparison-in-world-history-ukraines-comms-security-chief-shares-takes-on-drone-war/>

Captured US Stealth Drone, Reversed-Engineered By Iran, Could Help Russia In Gaining Air Superiority Over Ukraine

<https://eurasianimes.com/us-stealth-drone-reversed-engineered-by-iran-to-help/>

#security #strategy

German National Security Strategy "Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. - Integrated Security for Germany"

<https://www.nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de/National-Security-Strategy-EN.pdf>

A comparison, what with Canada's Defence Policy Update impending

#space

Not a Rose by Any Other Name: Dual-Use and Dual-Purpose Space Systems

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/not-rose-any-other-name-dual-use-and-dual-purpose-space-systems>

GAO Report on Military Space Command and Control

<https://news.usni.org/2023/06/14/gao-report-on-military-space-command-and-control>

#strategy

Putin's Wars: Testing Boyd's Strategy of Applied Friction

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2023/6/12/putins-wars-testing-boyds-strategy-of-applied-friction>

#wargaming

Wargaming 101 – Sayers vs. The U.S. Navy

<http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2023/06/12/wargaming-101-sayers-vs-the-u-s-navy/>

Other:

Canadian Naval Review Volume 19, Number 1, 2023

<https://www.navalreview.ca/current-issue/>

Note article "The RCN and RAN: Navigating Different Paths" by Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander RCN.

Drone Warfare

CJ @CasualArtyFan 9 Jun tweeted (video: <https://twitter.com/CasualArtyFan/status/1667264406164590611>): Here's something you don't see every day. A Ukrainian drone capturing and then towing 2 Russian drones underneath. Looks like tractors have taken to the sky in the effort to capture as much Russian equipment as possible.



Battle Damage Assessment and Repair

Rob Lee @RALee85 Jun 9 tweeted: Photo showing damaged/abandoned Ukrainian Leopard 2A6 tank and Bradley IFVs reportedly in the Orikhiv part of the front. Possible mine strikes. ...



MarkHertling @MarkHertling retweeted: This photo tweeted by @RALee85 shows Bradley's and Leo II's damaged (obvious thrown tracks, apparent mine damage). This is part of combat. It also speaks to the need for trained maintenance teams to conduct rapid BDAR (battle damage assessment and repair) on high-tech kit 1/


This is the kind of thing I've been tweeting about for months. The training of the logisticians, mechanics, repair teams who have established supply chains & available parts. There's even a manual for BDAR (attached). 2/ https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34177-ATP_4-31-001-WEB-2.pdf (Editor: the tweet thread is word reading. Battle damage assessment and repair BDAR can be a new term, even if old concept, to some of us)

[TP 4-31/MCRP 3-40E.1 Recovery and Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (BDAR)]

Wargaming

CDN Defence Academy/L'Académie cdn de la défense @CDACanadaACD 14 Jun tweeted: Canadian Army Journal – Tactical Decision Game – Commitment Issues. CAJ readers are invited to try this TDG, submit answers for critique, and suggest future ideas/scenarios for the series.


<https://canada.ca/en/army/services/canadian-army-journal/tactical-decision-games.html>



The CAF and Disasters

CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 14 Jun tweeted: In our latest Expert Series @ProfAnkersen, Gordon McBean, and @_Jean_Slick discuss the potential for a civilian-led response mechanism to address increasing instances of climate-related crises and disasters in Canada and the role of the CAF. (<https://open.spotify.com/episode/6Wu1soolNewslnqITj644L>)

RUSI(NS) doesn't normally focus on/distribute podcasts, what with our lack of editors/people to listen to and validate episodes, but because of the topic this one is included in Dispatches.



Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

Australia

The Australian government will make "an important decision" by the end of September about the RAN shipbuilding program. It seems it is not the nuclear submarine component. It may be change to the surface combat ship acquisition program.

Australia will reform 9 Squadron RAAF to maintain and fly the Triton MQ-4C stationed as part of 92 Wing based at RAAF Base, Edinburgh. It will work in conjunction with Austrian P-8 Poseidon aircraft as part of that country's overall surveillance effort. The main story can be found at: <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2023-06-11/squadron-reforms-after-decades>

O Canada

Foreign influence will finally get its public inquiry and will even get grudging Government support. The poison pill part is that the Government has asked the Opposition to select the head of the inquiry. It has, as expected, turned into a mess with the three main parties arguing. It was a brilliant political move but disastrous for the country as a whole. The problem has to stop soon and action taken to ensure China's ability to conduct influence operations inside Canada is highly restricted. One start would be to reduce China's diplomatic corps to 50 personnel from 178, the same as Canada's in China, and to restrict their movement, the same as Canadian diplomats in China. One might also consider even closer ties with Taiwan especially as they have more experience with Chinese cyber and influence activity attacks. Sitting back and allowing to happen is no longer an option.

In regard to other supporting actions, greater scrutiny must be taken on Canadian firms and organizations advocating for China. Companies such as the Power Corporation have wielded much more influence than they should ever have been allowed to do. Use of Kinsey for government work should be investigated more thoroughly and actions taken to curtail and restrict their involvement in Canadian government policy. It was announced Wednesday that the Canada government will cease dealing with the China-led Asia Infrastructure Development Bank after a Canadian executive who was the Director of Communications resigned from the bank because the actions of members of the Chinese Communist Party were found to influence all the bank's activities

This week also saw a White House spokesman state that there will be no reopening of the AUKUS agreement to permit Canadian participation in those areas of interest. This is another blow to our status in the world and our ability to influence world affairs. Canada is seen as a country of much talk but very little real action.

Prime Minister Trudeau visited Kyiv last week and pledged more money and ammunition and equipment for Ukraine including 10k rounds of 105mm artillery. His visit was well received by the Ukrainian Rada members.

General Eyre, the Chief of Defence Staff, has suggested strongly that Canada needs to consider purchase of up to 12 submarines. It is not a bad idea and that number was actually considered in the late 1980s when nuclear submarines were being considered by the Mulroney government. It would allow for approximately four submarines per ocean. This would allow for at least one boat being at sea all the time and allow for a surge if required. Canada has to contend with ice cover in the Arctic so an Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarine is the only option other than prohibitively expensive nuclear one. These are the nations that are currently building submarines:

United States - nuclear submarines only;

United Kingdom - nuclear submarines only;

Peoples' Republic of China - nuclear and conventional submarines;

India - nuclear and conventional submarines;

Russian Federation - nuclear and conventional submarines;

France - nuclear and conventional submarines;

Japan - conventional submarines (AIP);

South Korea - conventional (AIP);

Germany - conventional (AIP);

Sweden - conventional (AIP); and

Spain - conventional (AIP).

Moldova

Moldova is the canary in the coal mine in Europe. Europe's action and support to this small poor country will most likely determine how a new Europe will be formed. For this reason, Moldova will continue to be watched and commented upon in future notes.

Moldova and Ukraine signed an agreement on 12 June 2023 for a new bridge from Yampil in Ukraine to Cosauti in Moldova, eliminating the need to go through Transnistria. It will further prevent pro-Russian influence from hampering cross-border movements, and create better economic conditions for Moldova overall. The main argument for a pro-Russian stance is the improved economy with a relationship with the Russian Federation, which is somewhat in doubt as the war continues to fumble along.

In her recent visit to Ottawa, President of Moldova Maia Sandu discussed Canada's ongoing support. Canada responded by sanctioning pro-Russian Moldovan oligarchs. Europe and Canada have made every effort to quell pro-Russian voices. The best way to continue to do this is to improve Moldova's economy and so lessen Russia's influence now and in the future. Eventually, if successful, Transnistria will likely fall of its own lack of a viable economy especially with a growing and confident economy in Moldova.

Belarus

Just when one thought that the Belarus leader couldn't get more bizarre, this week he stated he would have no hesitation in using tactical nuclear weapons if Belarus was attacked. Keep in mind, although

there is some suggestion that the move of nuclear weapons has been sped up, the actual date of arrival is supposed to be in July 2023. Belarus is expected to receive between 10 and 25 weapons in total. The other big point is that Lukashenko has absolutely no control over these weapons. The authorization for their use is firmly in Russia's hands. Belarus is providing storage sites and the personnel to deploy these weapons.

Lukashenko has allowed Russian forces to use Belarus for attacks including the main initial attack against Kyiv. He has not allowed Belarus soldiers to take part in any attack on Ukraine. Last year, he lost the Deputy Defence Minister over this issue. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has asked for all Belarus citizens to be prepared for action if Lukashenko decides to use Belarus troops against Ukraine. Putin said last week that Russia will secure Lukashenko in case of civil unrest. This is seen as a warning perhaps to forces in Ukraine, however, Russia continues to have its own problems and it is somewhat doubtful that they will be able to conduct such operations.

Russia-Ukraine War

The war continues to be one of attrition and capability to sustain manpower, morale and resources to the bitter end. Casualties have been heavy as Ukraine shifts to the offence along the front in the east. Even Russian sources are suggesting that Ukraine is not suffering the same casualty rate as Russia in its offensive actions. One suggested that even on the offence, Ukraine is "only" suffering a one-to-one ratio between its forces and Russia. Russia also lost a general officer this past week: MGen Vladimir Rogev was killed in Zaporizhzhia. He was serving as Chief of Staff to the 35th Army at the time. Early Wednesday, 14 June 2023, Adam Delimkhanov, a member of the lower house of the Duma representing Chechnya, was seriously wounded while visiting Chechen units near the front. He was one of several hundred killed or wounded in a large scale strike against a large convoy. He is commander of the Chechen division of the Russian National Guard as well. He was evacuated back to Chechnya. Russian sources state that Ramzan Kadyrov is a personal friend and that Mr Dilimkhanov is alive and well and not wounded, however, his immediate removal from the battlefield is noteworthy.

Ukraine has conducted a massive campaign of eliminating command and control headquarters, logistics sites, supply locations, maintenance facilities, airports, seaports, chokepoints such as bridges or fords, major warehouses and large troops concentrations, with precision weapons and drones. Russia has committed vast resources to building and maintaining defensive positions in several layers allegedly supported by mobile armour formations. Ukraine has used its technological edge to conduct these operations with HIMAR and Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Ukraine's navy has also produced a series of new weapons including air-launched weapons, long range drones, unmanned surface vessels and a newly-produced unmanned undersurface weapons system, all of which essentially has removed the much more powerful Russian Black Sea fleet as a major capability. Allegedly, most Black Sea fleet units are now stationed in Russian ports due to the serious risk while in Crimean ports, despite upgrades to port facilities there.

Ukraine is making slow but steady progress on the battlefield, choosing to take small but incremental steps around Bakhmut, Vuhedar and Orikhiv as well as many smaller villages and towns. Ukraine's tactics are more sophisticated, taking an all-arms approach that is well supported by artillery and air resources, choosing to attack better terrain rather than taking over lowland settlements as an example. Although Ukraine has taken casualties of all types, Western equipment has proven its ability to take hits and most importantly keep the soldiers inside the equipment alive and able to fight another day. Russian equipment has often been determined to be "death traps" for their crews. Western nations are pledging replacement equipment as rapidly as possible.

Russia is generally thought to be responsible for the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam which did so much damage down river. What was unexpected is that the dam collapsed more than thought possible, thus a greater quantity of water was released much faster than thought possible. Russian positions in the first line of defence were badly damaged. The destruction of the dam is apparently going to be investigated by the International Criminal Court as a war crime. What is more serious is that the IAEA have stated that Russians had wired the six reactors at Enerhodar with explosives. There is concern that Russia will turn the plant into a large dirty bomb. What is concerning is Russians have not concerned themselves with the possible consequences of such an act. This is not something that the world would forgive and that there would be long term effects long after the event and severe consequence for Russia, in particular for Russian leadership.

The Russian portion of this note will end with our 'dear friend' Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner group. The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation has mandated that all private armed groups should have their members sign a contract and become contractees. Most groups apparently complied including Chechens of Kadyrov's Army and National Guard. One notable group did not and has become more and more vocal in their opposition to the handling of the war by the current minister, Shoigu. The minister had his own private military company as well which has been rolled into the army. One might have suspicions that the Russian leadership was increasingly concerned about the rapid growth in the "industry," including industrial security groups of Russia's vast oil industry. Too many people with arms and no distinct loyalty except for money. Wagner is different, it has generally carried the "can" for Russia internationally, all the while giving some degree of plausible deniability including in Ukraine in 2014, Syria, Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali and elsewhere. Essentially, the Wagner group has been Putin's "jack knife." As with all private armies in history they are potentially two-edged swords, and the Wagner group now seems to be the other edge with increasing criticism of the ministry's actions. The Russian army and Wagner have been in active combat with one another resulting in a Russian army unit commander being captured and tortured after his troops ambushed Wagner forces moving out of Bakhmut. The question is, what next? Will the Russian army fight Wagner? Is Wagner about to launch their own campaign against the ministry and as a consequence Putin himself? This issue is not over, but Wagner is dependent on resupply from the army, so time for opposition is limited. Will Putin's chef be looking for a new bird to cook shortly?

China

Nuclear weapons are once again increasing in numbers, estimated this year to be around 90 new weapons. Most of these are Chinese. Pakistan also continues to produce nuclear weapons to balance India's stockpile and to level the playing field. China has suggested that its target will be about 1000 warheads in various forms. China also continues its overall increase in its military capability and has increasingly shown some sophistication in their organization to include force generation and force employment. Its combat organizations are built on multi-role multi-capability forces in an all-arms system, impressively supported at least of paper by a large logistical effort and system. China's forces continue to grow in capability but something seems amiss as well. The parades are truly impressive and the display of weapons systems continues to grow, all with increasingly capable targeting capabilities including carrier killing missiles such as the D-17. Yet something seems amiss. Large armed forces of totalitarian regimes seem to be able to conduct a vast array of missions, but a more nuanced look shows most of their exercises to be delivered by rote and often do not display a clear understanding of the operation they are conducting. The Ukrainians showed themselves to be capable of adaption on short notice and quickly learn from their mistakes. Given the political nature of China's armed forces' command and control structure, one is not certain this is the case. China has not fought a real war, and most of its boasts are of untried weapons on a non-existing enemy that is also not shooting back. It is easy to win if the enemy doesn't shoot.

China's military is also noted for its corruption and politics where it is better to be loyal than competent in many cases, but loyal to the right faction which at the moment is the faction of Xi Jinping. The other factions are still there under the surface with opportunity to embarrass Xi-appointed leadership. The other issue is that many members of the military are also involved in actual business with many officers assigned to deal with industry essentially owned by the military. The head of Huawei was involved in such a manner as one example. A military also concentrating on its own enrichment is not a good practice as a general rule and often leads to less than honest and forthright leadership when one badly needs it.

The infamous Wuhan lab is back in the news as there are accusations that they are continuing to develop biological weapons using new technology that allows for the use of artificially developed viruses in new weapons programs. This has not been confirmed and most large nations, Canada included, have some capability to test antidotes to serious diseases. The lab works very closely with China's military which provides it with financial resources and trained manpower.

The picture we are left with is troubling. Essentially a corrupt semi-competent military with newly developed nuclear weapons and new biological agents, potentially with an increasingly paranoid single point of failure known as Xi Jinping. What could go wrong?

China's economy is an ongoing train wreck with global ramifications if not sorted out. But does China have anyone to actually sort it out? The answer is no, nor is Xi likely to allow anyone with that capability anywhere near the levers of power. This is not going to end well.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- The Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) was extended by 60 days on 17 May 2023. However, Russia almost certainly continues to hinder grain exports by deliberately slowing inspections and actively blocking some vessels. Currently, only one or two ships are being inspected per day, compared with six to eight in Autumn 2022.
- Russia is likely attempting to force concessions on the re-opening of the Togliatti-Odesa pipeline, which exports ammonia from Russia through Ukraine, via Odesa. To complicate the situation, in recent days, the pipeline was damaged and is not currently operational.
- There is likely to be further Russian rhetoric and obstruction of the BSGI in the weeks prior to the next extension deadline of 16 July 2023.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In the last 48 hours significant Ukrainian operations have been taking place in several sectors of eastern and southern Ukraine.
- In some areas, Ukrainian forces have likely made good progress and penetrated the first line of Russian defences. In others, Ukrainian progress has been slower. Russian performance has been mixed: some units are likely conducting credible manoeuvre defence operations while others have pulled back in some disorder, amid increased reports of Russian casualties as they withdraw through their own minefields.
- The Russian Airforce has been unusually active over southern Ukraine, where the airspace is more permissive for Russia than in other parts of the country. However, it remains unclear whether tactical airstrikes have been effective.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- The collapse of the Kakhovka Dam on 06 June 2023 has almost certainly severely disrupted the occupied Crimean Peninsula's primary source of fresh water, the North Crimean Canal (NCC).
- The NCC draws water from the Kakhovka Reservoir, from an inlet higher than the bed of the reservoir. The water level in the reservoir had likely dropped below the level of the inlet by 09 June 2023 and water will soon stop flowing to Crimea.
- This will reduce the availability of fresh water in southern Kherson Oblast and northern Crimea. However, the Russian authorities will likely meet the immediate water requirements of the population using reservoirs, water rationing, drilling new wells, and delivering bottled water from Russia. Concurrently, communities on both the Russian and Ukrainian-controlled sides of the flooded Dnipro are facing a sanitation crisis with limited access to safe water, and an increased risk of water-borne diseases.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- During the last week, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has maintained a high public profile, likely with the aim of presenting himself as in control of strategic issues while Ukraine accelerates offensive operations.
- Shoigu has provided at least two comments on Russia's defensive operations, including making almost certainly seriously exaggerated claims about Ukrainian losses. This contrasts with other key periods in the war when he had disappeared from public appearances.
- Shoigu has also urged Russia's defence industry to redouble its efforts, and castigated Western Military District officers for not dispatching reserve armoured vehicles to the front quickly enough. Shoigu is likely acutely aware of the need to maintain a positive image in the face of increasingly unmasked criticism from some fellow Russians.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent months, Russia has highly likely worked to ensure its long-term, high-volume supply of one-way-attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs). By supplying these weapons, Iran continues to breach UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
- Russia has likely moved from receiving small deliveries of Iranian OWA-UAVs by air transport, to larger consignments by ship from Iran via the Caspian Sea. This 'International North-South Transit Corridor' has assumed much more importance since the invasion. It allows Russia to access Asian markets - including arms transfers - in ways it hopes are less vulnerable to international sanctions.
- Russia is also working to start domestic production of OWA-UAVs, almost certainly with Iranian assistance. Russia is highly likely investing in OWA-UAVs because it provides Russia with a relatively cheap long-range strike capability at a time when it has expended a large proportion of its cruise missile stocks in Ukraine.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In the last two weeks, there has been an uptick in Russian tactical combat air sorties, especially over southern Ukraine. This has almost certainly been in response to reports of increased Ukrainian offensive operations, as the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) attempt to support ground troops with air strikes.
- Despite the uptick, VKS' daily sortie rate remains much lower than the peak of up to 300 daily missions early in the war.
- Since the start of the invasion, the south of Ukraine has often been more permissible for Russian air operations compared to other sectors of the front. Over the last year, VKS has increased its use of air-to-surface weapons, such as glide bombs, which allow attack aircraft to remain well away from their targets.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 10 June 2023, the Russian MoD demanded that members of 'volunteers formations' such as Wagner Group sign contracts directly with the MoD, a move explicitly endorsed by President Putin on TV on 13 June 2023.
- For several months, Wagner owner Yevgeny Prigozhin has been aiming vitriolic criticism at the MoD hierarchy but deferred to Putin's authority.
- However, despite Putin's comments, on 14 June 2023 Prigozhin said that, 'none of Wagner's fighters are ready to go down the path of shame again. That's why they will not sign the contracts.' Prigozhin's rhetoric is evolving into defiance of broader sections of the Russian establishment. 01 July 2023, the deadline for the volunteers to sign contracts, is likely to be a key way-point in the feud.

Constantine @Teoyaomiquu 12 Jun tweeted: Russians brag about destroying a Ukrainian Howitzer with a Lancet drone. They struck a decoy



Quite the decoy! In drone-heavy times, deception is becoming a high, and necessary, art.