



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 30 June 2023

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Home Dispatches

The summer 2023 edition of our internal quarterly, *Home Dispatches*, will be published after our late June tour event. That tour, originally scheduled for 28 June, has had to be moved to 5 July, so the summer edition of *Home Dispatches* will follow accordingly. If you have content for *Home Dispatches*, please email to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

5 July, Wednesday – Tour of Dr William D Finn Centre for Forensic Medicine, headquarters of the Nova Scotia Medical Examiner Service, rescheduled from 28 June. ‘Exigencies of the service’ (editor’s words). 1300-1500. Registration is required. To register, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com by close-of-business-hours 27 June. The limit to the number of people who will be able to take the tour has been reached. Further registrants will be put on a waiting list, and if there are enough, another tour will be scheduled.

New: 18 July, Tuesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker LCol Hope Carr, 5th Canadian Division HQ, speaking on "Op PRESENCE: Civil-Military Capacity Building for UN Peace Operations." 1300-1500. Cambridge Military Library, Royal Artillery Park. Registration is not required. Operation PRESENCE is the CAF contribution to the Government of Canada’s peace operations strategy, and includes commitment of high-value military capabilities to various United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. The CAF’s Training Support to Peace Operations (TSPO) is the provision of training support to the UN, including to

the UN's Engagement Platoon initiative. The Canadian contingent is responsible for developing and piloting the Engagement Platoon Pilot Course; the mission of the platoon is to enhance the situational awareness of a UN infantry battalion by mapping the human terrain of the area of operations in order to identify vulnerable areas and at-risk populations. LCol Carr will speak about the operation, TSPO and progress with the Engagement Platoon.

RUSI(NS) Events August

There is no event planned for RUSI(NS) for August. Our first event in September, a Distinguished Speaker presentation in-person at the Royal Artillery Park Mess (!), is planned for Wednesday, 20 September.

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

New: RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Paper "Canadian Corvettes in the Second World War – A General History" by Dr Richard Gimblett, 24 June 2023

<https://rusi-ns.ca/canadian-corvettes-in-the-second-world-war/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Sudan Evacuation Shows Way Forward for Humanitarian Intervention" by Jay Heisler, 4 June 2023, https://rusi-ns.ca/sudan_evacuation/

RUSI(NS) Comments "Reform Needed in Intelligence Recruiting Process" by Jay Heisler, 28 May 2023,

https://rusi-ns.ca/intelligence_recruiting/

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 21 June 2023

<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, June 2023

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 6, June 2023

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, June 2023

<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/202-rausi-dispatches-june-2023>

New: Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, July 2023

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies – Australia Journal *United Service* Volume 74, Number 2, June 2023

<https://www.rusi.com.au/Publications.php#Journal>



Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 2nd Quarter 2023.

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 19, Issue 2, 19 June 2023

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, June 2023, <https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute>

@RUSI NS on Twitter:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>Global Engagement Center @TheGEC 23 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Putin’s campaign of disinformation to justify his war against Ukraine is a blatant manipulation of history and a violation of the sacred memory of all who fought against tyranny in World War II. Learn more: Vladimir Putin’s Historical Disinformation - U.S. Department of State https://state.gov/disarming-disinformation/vladimir-putins-historical-disinformation/</p>									
<p>CAN🇨🇦 "2022 Exports of Military Goods" https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/controls-controles/military-goods-2022-marchandises-militaires.aspx?lang=eng Incl "Canada's policy on the export and brokering of military items" & "Developments in 2022"</p>	 <table border="1"><thead><tr><th>Category</th><th>Percentage</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>NATO Members</td><td>24.2%</td></tr><tr><td>UN Res. 1540</td><td>25.2%</td></tr><tr><td>Non-NATO APOC</td><td>50.6%</td></tr></tbody></table>	Category	Percentage	NATO Members	24.2%	UN Res. 1540	25.2%	Non-NATO APOC	50.6%
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<p>Federal Fleet @federalfleet 27 Jun tweeted: Asterix Shows Its Mettle in Another Successful Circumnavigation View Full Article Here: https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2023/06/27/2695537/0/en/Asterix-Shows-Its-Mettle-in-Another-Successful-Circumnavigation.html RUSI(NS) retweeted: #MVAsterix would not have to be shuffled between Atlantic & Pacific Oceans if @RoyalCanNavy had two+ replenishment oilers (Info Note "Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment" https://rusi-ns.ca/auxiliary-oiler-replenishment/) #AOR. CAN🇨🇦 needs keep ASTERIX, build 2 Joint Support Ship project oilers, acquire 4th AOR</p>									
<p>Aerospace Intelligence @space_osint 27 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The State Department (🇺🇸) has approved the possible sale of sixteen P-8A Poseidon aircraft and related equipment to Canada (🇨🇦) for an estimated cost of \$5.9 billion. https://dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/canada-p-8a-aircraft <i>See also:</i> How much for new Canadian military surveillance planes? U.S. offers price tag https://globalnews.ca/news/9796926/canada-us-military-aircraft-sale-price/</p>									

Tyler Rogoway @Aviation_Intel 27 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Canada Testing Big TOW Missile System On Little MRZR Buggies

(<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/canada-testing-big-tow-missile-system-on-little-mrzs-uggies>)



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 29 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "There were no nefarious purposes at play. There was no wrongdoing in the sense that the government willfully ignored or subverted intelligence for their own gain. Mistakes were made. They've been exposed by Mr. Johnston, the press, [and] to PROC."

(Revitalizing National Security: A Critical Examination of the Intelligence Community

(<https://cdainstitute.ca/revitalizing-national-security-a-critical-examination-of-the-intelligence-community/>)



GC Newsroom @NewsroomGC 23 Jun tweeted:

@Transport_gc: Minister Alghabra announces the first proposed #BVLOS #DroneSafety rules in Canada and among the first worldwide.

(Minister of Transport announces Canada's first proposed drone safety regulations for beyond visual line-of-sight operations

(<https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2023/06/minister-of-transport-announces-canadas-first-proposed-drone-safety-regulations-for-beyond-visual-line-of-sight-operations.html>)

Transport Canada @Transport_gc 26 Jun retweeted: #ICYMI: proposed changes to the #DroneSafety rules would support lower-risk operation of drones beyond visual line-of-sight

Hopefully news rules for beyond-visual-line-of-sight BLVOS use of #drones will improve their employment in security & safety emergency operations in CAN🇨🇦. Need more drones in police, fire, etc., organizations but safe conditions for their & public use



NAADSN_RDSNAA @NAADSN_RDSNAA 8 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Quick Impact is out from Fellow @_Hughes_Thomas on the April 2023 Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence: A Secure and Sovereign Arctic.

(A Comment on A Secure and Sovereign Arctic

(<https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/A-Comment-on-A-Secure-and-Sovereign-Arctic.pdf>)

Report: Arctic Security Under Threat: Urgent needs in a changing geopolitical and environmental landscape

(https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/SECD/report/s/2023-06-28_SECD_ArcticReport_e.pdf)



“Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia” on Facebook:

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Tank Camouflage

Buschleid @BuschModelar 21 Jun tweeted: The tragic situation aside (*editor: tank hit a mine, but in an area where it can be recovered and likely repaired*), this is one of the best looking camouflages applied to captured tanks from this war. It uses very similar colours to one batch of modernised Shilkas, with the exception of missing black, different shade of base green, but brown and gray was added.



Someone replied: Rookie error painting the wheels in a variety of colours. When rotating this will create a strobing effect which will attract attention.

So, with the ubiquity of aerial drones on battlefield, will vehicle visual camouflage get even more attention? What research is being done by military establishments these days? Is there a Canadian Army publication about vehicle camouflage? Bring out the historical studies!

Canada should follow Nordic way of being pro-oil, pro-defence

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/alexander-dalziel-canada-should-follow-nordic-way-of-being-pro-oil-pro-defence>

"Successive Canadian governments have acted as if foreign policy is something they only need to tell Canadians and the world about on an ad-hoc basis."



The Canadian Defence Policy Update should not come out in the absence of a definitive foreign policy statement.

Michel Maisonneuve: Canada skipping NATO's largest-ever training drill an embarrassment

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/michel-maisonneuve-canada-skipping-natos-largest-ever-training-drill-an-embarrassment>

"The new policy (Defence Policy Update) could provide the impetus for Canada to increase its share of defence expenditures to GDP closer to the agreed two per cent floor and explain how this would be accomplished."



The Defence Policy Update, due out later this year, is an opportunity for the Government to prove that it truly has as a priority the defence of Canada in trying times. Failure to demonstrate to Canadian citizens and the rest of the world that the current geo-political situation is understood and that something is being done about it, with greater defence commitments and other actions such as those

suggested by Major-General (retired) Maisonneuve, will condemn many of Canada's aspirations, whether defence related or not, and values to be ignored by other states.

'All it takes is one click': Chief cyberspy warns Canadians to protect themselves from online crime

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-cse-cybersecurity-caroline-xavier-1.6886253>



RNLN Looks At Low-Manned Platform To Augment Frigate Fire Power

<https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/cne-2023/2023/06/rnlN-trific-low-manned-platform-to-augment-frigate/>



"...based on a commercial fast crew supply vessel hull outfitted with a series of containerised payloads. Potential options include a containerised vertical launch system for surface-to-air missiles; box launchers for loitering munitions; and a containerised electronic support measures/electronic countermeasures fit. Further extensions could include strike or anti-ship missiles, underwater modules, or extra sensors."

Considering the state of world affairs, navies including the Royal Canadian Navy need to be looking at ways to produce large quantities of capabilities at sea, meaning, how to build many ships that can easily be fitted with weapons and sensors. Containerized systems embarked in a civil design-based ship that can be constructed by more shipyards reads like an idea worth exploring. 'Ships as trucks.'

Canada developed corvettes as an emergency build at the beginning of the Second World War. RUSI(NS) History Paper "Canadian Corvettes in the Second World War – A General History" (<https://rusi-ns.ca/canadian-corvettes-in-the-second-world-war/>). Time to resurrect the ship type?

Of Submersibles and Submarines

A Facebook comment from a RUSI(NS) member, further to the posting in Dispatches 23 June 2023:

The submersible industry is regulated like other maritime categories, but it seems that OceanGate sought opportunities to avoid jurisdictional regulations.

Of OceanGate's three submersibles, reportedly only one of them is inspected by a Class Society: the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS).

Company CEO Stockton Rush said "these outside classification agencies slow us down; they're time consuming, and basically OceanGate knows better."



Many specialized vessels struggle to fit within Class Society rules, so it is not uncommon to "shop around" for the best fit or to "cherrypick" from multiple rule sets.

Under International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) agreements, one society may accept another's rules where their own rules are inadequate for certain elements.

When justified they might also grant certain exemptions, but typically that is only done where another set of rules still is met.

In the case of the OceanGate *Titan*, that craft does not navigate directly in or out of any Port State's waters but rather is transported by a support vessel.

On this occasion the *Titan* was not even carried aboard its support ship but instead was towed - quite inelegantly - astern of the MV *Polar Prince*.

Notably the *Polar Prince* is not a purpose-built support vessel for deepwater submersible operations, but rather it is a 64 year old former CCG buoytender / light icebreaker, the former CCGS *Sir Humphrey Gilbert*.

It would be interesting to discover whether the act of towing, rather than carriage aboard the Canadian-flagged support vessel, was yet another step in avoiding jurisdictional oversight.

There have been questions about the structural integrity of this submersible craft and about the company's operating procedures.

The lack of risk-mitigation measures seems highly questionable. The operation lacked any tether or recovery cable, any backup submersible or ROV, any reserve oxygen or even freshwater supplies beyond a couple of days, and seemingly any sort of distress beacon (internal or float-free).

The only provisional plan for emergency situations seems to have been to jettison ballast and float to the surface.

Ultimately it seems like the catastrophic failure of the pressure hull negated any emergency procedures anyway.

- - -

Further, from: The ABS Underwater Rules

<https://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/articles/Article%20-%20MT%20JAN%202017.pdf>

"Classification society rules normally cover only the minimum requirements for classification and are not intended to be build/design specifications. When fabricating a newbuild underwater unit, the detailed build/design specification has to be developed separately by the designers/builders. Items in these specifications that are over and above the class requirements need to be agreed upon with unit owners/operators. Classification society rules do not address flag or coastal administration requirements. The Underwater Rules also do not address qualification requirements for personnel operating underwater units. Such requirements typically are covered by the flag administration requirements, with compliance being the responsibility of the owner/operator. The Underwater Rules typically do not address military specific features and attributes, which would be addressed by supplementary requirements that would be developed jointly by the naval/military technical authorities and ABS. Such supplementary requirements have been developed and used successfully to class applications, such as the handling system for the navy's Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System. As the industry strives for innovation, efficiency, and competitive advantage, ABS remains

prepared to consider alternative arrangements or novel designs that can be shown—either through satisfactory service experience or systematic analysis based on sound engineering principles and risk assessment—to meet the overall safety standards of the Underwater Rules.”

Why isn't Poilievre making a bigger deal of Trudeau's defence spending failures?

<https://thehub.ca/2023-06-26/j-1-granatstein-why-isnt-poilievre-making-a-bigger-deal-of-trudeaus-defence-spending-failures/>

Why aren't Canadians making a bigger deal of our governments' (yes, plural) defence spending failures?



OceanGate operated in 'lawless' high seas. Others do, too.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/06/24/oceangate-lawless-high-seas/>

"Pirate ships, illegal fishing and human trafficking all operate in a legal gray zone on the open ocean. Regulation has proven difficult."

Looks like there needs to be a whole-of-government approach to counter these issues. And not just by the marine departments. What national body (government committee?) is there that brings all aspects of national capability to bear? Hmm, shouldn't Canada have a national marine policy and supporting strategy?



Canada should 'revisit' question of joining U.S. ballistic missile program: Senate committee

<https://www.ipolitics.ca/news/canada-should-revisit-question-of-joining-u-s-ballistic-missile-program-senate-committee#>

See report: Arctic Security Under Threat: Urgent needs in a changing geopolitical and environmental landscape

https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/SECD/reports/2023-06-28_SECD_ArcticReport_e.pdf



Canada urged to buy new submarines capable of operating in the Arctic

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-urged-to-buy-new-submarines-capable-of-operating-in-the-arctic/>

See report: Arctic Security Under Threat: Urgent needs in a changing geopolitical and environmental landscape

https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/SECD/reports/2023-06-28_SECD_ArcticReport_e.pdf



Senators call on feds to bring Indigenous communities into Arctic security planning

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/indigenous-arctic-security-norad-1.6891602>

See report: Arctic Security Under Threat: Urgent needs in a changing geopolitical and environmental landscape

https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/SECD/reports/2023-06-28_SECD_ArcticReport_e.pdf



Northern leaders are deeply worried by threats to Canada's sovereignty

<https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/braid-northern-leaders-are-deeply-worried-by-threats-to-canadas-sovereignty>

"Bercuson doesn't see any prospect of troops pouring off transports to invade Canada from the north. The threat is that competitors will assume sovereignty with regular sea exercises and even development in areas claimed by Canada."



Canadians need to appreciate the nature of the threat, and it isn't foreign military on Canadian territory. The threat is more insidious (almost 'gray rhino') than that.

Other Sources:

#artificial intelligence

AI Has Entered the Situation Room

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/19/ai-artificial-intelligence-national-security-foreign-policy-threats-prediction/>

#Canadian Armed Forces

Canada has a weak excuse for missing NATO's largest-ever training exercise

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-has-a-weak-excuse-for-missing-natos-largest-ever-training/>

Renewing the social contract between Canadians and Armed Forces

<https://www.saltwire.com/atlantic-canada/opinion/commentary-renewing-the-social-contract-between-canadians-and-armed-forces-100867665/>

Canada's absence from major NATO exercise shows what defence laggards we've become

<https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/smol-canadas-absence-from-major-nato-exercise-shows-what-defence-laggards-weve-become>

#defence policy

Analysis-'Show us the money': Canada pressured by allies to up military spending

<https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2023-06-29/analysis-show-us-the-money-canada-pressured-by-allies-to-up-military-spending>

Canada urged to buy Arctic-capable submarines
Globe and Mail article available on request to RUSI(NS).
RCN needs 12 boats, at least four of which air independent propulsion (AIP).

#Indo-Pacific

The Indian Ocean Strategic Map

<https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/147937cf124843fcb86126b028e8d97c/>

"The Indian Ocean Strategic Map... is designed to convey the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean's geographic features and trading routes."

May be useful to those looking at Canada's Indo-Strategic Strategy.

#intelligence

Statement from the National Security Intelligence Review Agency on its Review of the Government of Canada's Production and Dissemination of Intelligence on Foreign Interference in the 43rd and 44th Canadian Federal Elections

<https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/statement-from-the-national-security-intelligence-review-agency-on-its-review-of-the-government-of-canadas-production-and-dissemination-of-intelligence-on-foreign-interference-in-the-43rd-and-44th-canadian-federal-elections/>

#reading

War Books: Finding Treasures on Dusty Shelves, Part 2

<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/war-books-finding-treasures-on-dusty-shelves-part-2/>

#Russia #naval warfare

Bear underwater: Russia's undersea capabilities

<https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/britains-world/bear-underwater-russias-undersea-capabilities/>

#Russia-Ukraine War

State of the Ukrainian 2023 offensive campaign

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1672055675248340992.html>

Assessment of the impact on Russia's 'fighting power' of the Wagner mutiny

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1674162791199174657.html>

#drones

The History and Effectiveness of the Bayraktar TB2 Drone in Ukraine

<https://www.suasnews.com/2023/06/the-history-and-effectiveness-of-the-bayraktar-tb2-drone-in-ukraine/>

#space

How the 'Stormbringers' are Preparing for War in Space

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/06/how-stormbringers-are-preparing-war-space/387998/>

#strategy

Teaching Your Enemy to Win

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/teaching-your-enemy-to-win/>

So What! The Meaning of Strategy

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/so-what-the-meaning-of-strategy/>

#warfare

Understanding Sun Tzu through the Mongols

<https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2023/06/26/understanding-sun-tzu-through-the-mongols/>

#wargaming

Wargame shows attacks on reactors would cause meltdowns and military paralysis

<https://thebulletin.org/2023/06/wargame-shows-attacks-on-reactors-would-cause-meltdowns-and-military-paralysis/>

Other:

Australian Army Journal Volume 19 Number 1

<https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/australian-army-journal-aaaj/volume-19-number-1>

contents:

Enabling Army's Team Learning

The Design and Implementation of a Youth Learning Framework within an Ab Initio Officer Training Academy

Australian Army Physical Training Continuum – Reducing Injury and Medical Discharge Rates

Army's Gap Year: In Search of a Purpose?

Soft Power 'Sky Net' – The Importance of Artificial Intelligence for Information Operations

The Case for Cluster Munitions: Amend or Withdraw from the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Primus inter pares vel primos? The Development of the Military Staff in the Australian Army

Ship Camouflage

Navy Lookout @NavyLookout 26 Jun tweeted:

.@HMS_Forth - 3rd of the Batch II OPVs to receive the dazzle paint scheme during refit in #Gibraltar

And in drone times, will we see more attention now to ship camouflage?

Though there needs to be better understanding as to what constitutes dazzle and disruptive paint schemes.



More Ship Camouflage

H I Sutton @CovertShores 28 Jun tweeted: ***UPDATE***

Here-> <http://hisutton.com/Russian-Navy-Deceptive-Camouflage.html> In past few days #Russia Navy has painted more ships in deceptive camouflage in Black Sea. All are Kalibr cruise missile carrying ships. Article explains...

#OSINT

(Russian Navy's New Deceptive Camouflage To Protect Kalibr-Armed Warships)



Cope Cages

Rob Lee @RALee85 26 Jun tweeted: Russian MT-LB with a counter-UAV screen. <https://t.me/voenacher/47453>

There's history to cope cages and similar rigs (see UK pictures below). Does there need to be a rethink on how vehicles are designed to counter/withstand drones?

Pictures:

Troops are rigging 'Tarian Quickshield' used ed for RPG protection, as an anti-drone and loitering munition product.


A wag wrote "just a scaled back version of this."

Someone posted "FV432 with anti-bomblet net."



Mud Brown Environment

You have to know environment in which you plan to operate, or just have an interest. Below, a picture of part of the general environment ('brown data'?) for subsea/sea bottom operations. From <https://www.submarinecablemap.com/>.



INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since summer 2022, the Russian Navy has invested in major enhancements to the security of the Black Sea Fleet's main base at Sevastopol.
- This includes at least four layers of nets and booms across the harbour entrance. In recent weeks, these defences have highly likely also been augmented by an increased number of trained marine mammals.
- Imagery shows a near doubling of floating mammal pens in the harbour which highly likely contain bottle-nosed dolphins. In Arctic waters, the navy also uses Beluga whales and seals. Russia has trained animals for a range of missions, but the ones housed in Sevastopol harbour are highly likely intended to counter enemy divers.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In the early hours of 24 June 2023, the feud between Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner Group and the Russian MoD escalated into outright military confrontation.
- In an operation characterised by Prigozhin as a 'march for freedom', Wagner Group forces crossed from occupied Ukraine into Russia in at least two locations. In Rostov-on-Don, Wagner has almost certainly occupied key security sites, including the HQ which runs Russia's military operations in Ukraine.
- Further Wagner units are moving north through Vorenezh Oblast, almost certainly aiming to get to Moscow. With very limited evidence of fighting between Wagner and Russian security forces, some have likely remained passive, acquiescing to Wagner.
- Over the coming hours, the loyalty of Russia's security forces, and especially the Russian National Guard, will be key to how the crisis plays out. This represents the most significant challenge to the Russian state in recent times.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent days, Ukrainian forces have re-set and have again been undertaking major offensive operations on three main axes in southern and eastern Ukraine.
- Ukrainian forces are using the experiences from the first two weeks of the counter-offensive to refine tactics for assaulting the deep, well prepared Russian defences. Ukrainian units are making gradual but steady tactical progress in key areas.
- In Luhansk Oblast, Russian forces have made their own significant effort to launch an attack in the Serebryanka Forest near Kremina. This probably reflects continued Russian senior leadership orders to go on the offensive whenever possible. Russia has made some small gains, but Ukrainian forces have prevented a breakthrough.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- As part of its broader counter-offensive, Ukraine has gained impetus in its assaults around Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast.
- In a multi-brigade operation, Ukrainian forces have made progress on both the northern and southern flanks of the town.
- There has been little evidence that Russia maintains any significant ground forces operational level reserves which could be used to reinforce against the multiple threats it is now facing in widely separated sectors, from Bakhmut to the eastern bank of the Dnipro River, over 200km away.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Ukrainian Airborne forces have made small advances east from the village of Krasnohorivka, near Donetsk city, which sits on the old Line of Control.
- This is one of the first instances since Russia's February 2022 invasion that Ukrainian forces have highly likely recaptured an area of territory occupied by Russia since 2014.
- Recent multiple concurrent Ukrainian assaults throughout the Donbas have likely overstretched Donetsk People's Republic and Chechen forces operating in this area.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Early on the morning of 22 June 2023, Ukrainian Armed Forces struck the Chonhar road bridges between the Crimean Peninsula and Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast.
- These bridges service one of two main road supply routes between Crimea and Kherson. The route over the Chonhar bridges are the most direct route from Russia's Crimean logistics hub at Dzhankoi and the Zaporizhzhia sector, where Russia is currently defending against a major Ukrainian offensive. The temporary closure of the route caused vital Russian logistics convoys to take at least 50% longer to reach the front via alternative routes.
- Reports indicate that Russian authorities almost certainly constructed a pontoon bridge replacement crossing within 24 hours of the attack; it is highly likely that crossings are limited to military traffic only. The speed with which an alternate crossing was constructed indicates how vital this route is to the Russian military efforts in occupied Ukraine.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 24 June, air defence forces of the Wagner private military company reportedly shot down Russian military helicopters and an Ilyushin Il-22M airborne command post aircraft.
- The Il-22M is part of a relatively small fleet of up to 12 aircraft, heavily utilised for both airborne command and control, and radio relay tasks. These special mission aircraft have played a key role in orchestrating Russian forces in their war against Ukraine. As high value assets they have operated within the safety of Russian airspace, far beyond the range of Ukrainian air defence systems.
- The loss of this aircraft is likely to have a negative impact on Russian air and land operations. In the short term the psychological shock of losing a large number of aircrew in this manner will almost certainly damage morale within the Russian Aerospace Force. In the longer term, there is a realistic possibility that current tasking levels may have to be reduced to safely manage the remaining fleet. This will likely undermine Russia's ability to command and coordinate its forces, particularly during periods of high tempo operations.

Rob Lee @RALee85 29 Jun tweeted: Russian T-72B tank with a roof screen.



Looks like mosquito netting...