



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 21 July 2023

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

New: 25 July, Tuesday - Center for Strategic and International Studies panel discussion "The Dangers of Certain Peace Plans in the Russo-Ukrainian War." 9-10 am ET. Hybrid. To watch: <https://www.csis.org/events/dangers-premature-peace-plans-russo-ukrainian-war>

28 July, Friday - North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network speaker Adam P MacDonald, "A Royal Canadian Navy that is a Blue-Water navy and Arctic-capable: How to be/come both." 1300 Eastern. Via Zoom. To register: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScVF8cnCCgveShpGeey_vQAOVfWcjkSnz0diAXtFvdbh0AmBw/viewform

16 August, Wednesday - Brookings Institution speaker Dr Michael O'Hanlon, "Military History for the Modern Strategist." 1830 EST. Livestream: <https://www.armywarcollege.edu/live/>. See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

Save the date: 20 September, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker TBA. 1300-1500. Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess (!!). MTF.

There is no RUSI(NS) event planned for August

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

New: RUSI(NS) Information Note “Brigade and Brigade Group,” 15 July 2023, https://rusi-ns.ca/brigade_brigade_group/

An interesting article what with the announcement of Canada ‘scaling up’ its battlegroup in Latvia to brigade:

Army Shift from Brigades Back to Divisions Raises Concerns Among Retired Generals

<https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/07/17/army-shift-brigades-back-divisions-raises-concerns-among-retired-generals.html>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Canada’s Special Forces #Helicopters are Obsolete for the Role They are Tasked to Carry Out" by RUSI(NS) SAC, 10 Jul 23, https://rusi-ns.ca/sof_griffon/

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Armoured Fighting Vehicles,” 2 July 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/armoured-fighting-vehicles/>

RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Paper “Canadian Corvettes in the Second World War – A General History” by Dr Richard Gimblett, 24 June 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/canadian-corvettes-in-the-second-world-war/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Sudan Evacuation Shows Way Forward for Humanitarian Intervention” by Jay Heisler, 4 June 2023, https://rusi-ns.ca/sudan_evacuation/

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 19 July 2023
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, June 2023

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 7, July-August 2023

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, July 2023

<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/202-rausi-dispatches-july-2023>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, July 2023

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies – Australia Journal *United Service* Volume 74, Number 2, June 2023

<https://www.rusi.com.au/Publications.php#Journal>

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 2nd Quarter 2023





New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 19, Issue 6, 17 July 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 22, Issue 2, June 2023

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, July 2023, <https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute>

@RUSI NS on Twitter:

RUSI(NS) tweets may also be viewed by clicking on the Twitter icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

<p>CDN Defence Academy/L'Académie cdn de la défense @CDACanadaACD 13 Jul tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 🎮 Serious gaming may seem like an oxymoron, but war gaming continues to be a valuable exercise for modern militaries and governments to work through complex scenarios. #Wargaming https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2023/06/drdc-analysts-serious-war-games.html (Game on! DRDC analysts are serious about war games)</p>	
<p>RUSI(NS) Info Note "Brigade and Brigade Group" https://rusi-ns.ca/brigade_brigade_group/ Comparison of brigade to brigade group in @CanadianArmy doctrine, & their organizations, strengths & how they are employed. "Roadmap - Scaling the EFP Latvia Battle Group to Brigade" https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/07/roadmap---scaling-the-efp-latvia-battle-group-to-brigade.html <i>RUSI(NS) Info Note:</i> "What is a Battle Group in the Canadian Army?" https://rusi-ns.ca/battle-group/</p>	
<p>NATO ACT @NATO_ACT 15 Jul tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: Efficient military logistics are paramount in #NATO, guaranteeing the availability of personnel, infrastructure and stockpiles. Discover how @NATO_ACT is driving advancements in military mobility solutions to enhance operational preparedness: https://act.nato.int/article/logistics-and-moving-militaries/ #WeAreNATO (Logistics and the Practical Art of Moving Militaries)</p>	
<p>RUSI @RUSI_org Jul 11 tweeted: As waters continue to warm in the Arctic, fisheries management in the region is becoming increasingly entangled with security concerns. Read to find out more in the latest #RUSICommentary from Grace Evans and @AndreasOsthagen (In Hot Water: Arctic Fisheries as a Proxy for Geopolitical Tensions) https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/hot-water-arctic-fisheries-proxy-geopolitical-tensions RUSI(NS) retweeted: "traditional separation between fisheries management & high politics of security affairs, sanctions & military signaling is eroding." Fisheries security long been activity of navies. CAN 🇨🇦 must be ready for illegal, unregulated & unreported #IUU fishing, adversarial 'fishing' fleets</p>	

HMCS SACKVILLE @HMCSSACKVILLE1 17 Jul tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: HMCS Sackville's funnel denotes the 'barber pole brigade,' or escort group C-3, formed in April 1942 and sailing from St. John's to Londonderry. Sackville was one of 6 corvettes in the original group! Read more at: <https://rusi-ns.ca/barber-pole/> Photo: Doug Struthers CNMT Nice to see a RUSI(NS) Info Note get use like this.



Canadian Coast Guard @CoastGuardCAN 2:35 PM · Jul 14, 2023 tweeted: News from #BritishColumbia: we're doing a pollution response exercise off the west coast of Vancouver Island this week near Ucluelet. In partnership with @MarineResponse, we'll be practicing responding to an oil spill from our Emergency Tow Vessel, the Atlantic Eagle! This exercise includes testing our Mobile Incident Command Platform, equipment, and decontamination of a large vessel. It allows us to test new methods and technologies so we are better prepared to protect the marine environment in the future!



RUSI(NS) retweeted: Mobile Incident Command platform = @CoastGuardCAN vehicle/trailer equipped with communications, display systems, briefing rooms to serve as command posts in field at incidents, eg, #NSwildfires

LGen J.J.M.J. Paul, CCA / CAC @Army_Comd_Arme 20 Jul tweeted: Another lesson from Ukraine: our combined arms tactics must be optimized. Tanks and infantry are vital, but effective air defence is also needed to counter airborne threats, including numerous drone types.



RUSI(NS) retweeted: RUSI(NS) Paper "We Have No Air Defence For Our Army – Why?" <https://rusi-ns.ca/air-defence/>

“Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia” on Facebook:

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

CBSA takes part in national operation to combat 3D printed guns

<https://www.canada.ca/en/border-services-agency/news/2023/06/cbsa-takes-part-in-national-operation-to-combat-3d-printed-guns.html>



"Guns produced by 3D printers are a growing threat to Canadians, and our law enforcement agencies are stepping up efforts to address them..."

A few years ago RUSI(NS) members had the pleasure of touring the Royal Canadian Navy's Fleet Maintenance Facility Cape Scott Laser Additive Manufacturing shop. Not the same as 3D printing guns, much more useful for printing parts, metal and other material, for old equipment. LAM appears to be at times an underappreciated technology, and one whose full potential is not yet realized. See: "FMFCS Laser Additive Manufacturing Update" (<https://www.cntha.ca/static/documents/mej/mej-78.pdf>).

RFA Tideforce Conducts Trials With MV Raleigh Fisher

<https://seawaves.com/2023/07/04/rfa-tideforce-conducts-trials-with-mv-raleigh-fisher/>

A Royal Fleet Auxiliary oiler of the United Kingdom, which normally would service Royal Navy ships, successfully provided and received fuel from a commercial tanker. Not necessarily a new development but not something often done.

This is the sort of capability that needs to be tried and confirmed in order to ensure adequate logistics support to naval forces. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) currently has one leased replenishment oiler (AOR), Motor Vessel ASTERIX. Two Protecteur-class AOR are building but are some years away. That is likely not enough, especially if one of the two becomes unavailable. It would be good for the RCN to work with Canadian, maybe other nationality, tankers and ensure a capability for them to support Canadian naval ships, both oilers and combatants.



Canada's secret service is fighting a hidden civil war

<https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/canadas-secret-service-is-fighting-a-hidden-civil-war-brian-lee-crowley-in-the-telegraph/>



The Arctic is more important than ever, why is Canada paring back its Arctic engagement?

<https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/the-arctic-is-more-important-than-ever-why-is-canada-paring-back-its-arctic-engagement-ken-coates-and-carin-holroyd-in-the-toronto-star/>



Navies don't agree on naval-warfare law. Here's how to keep legal fissures from sinking your coalition

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/07/fissures-naval-warfare-law-endanger-coalition-operations/388513/>

"...flag states may commission unmanned warships that are entitled to sovereign immunity, enjoy navigational rights, and have belligerent rights in the law of naval warfare, including strike operations."

The San Remo Manual (San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jmsu.htm>) has long been useful,



whether for planning or just for definitions (e.g., warship - see: "Warships, Combatants, Types and Classes" <https://rusi-ns.ca/warships-combatants-types-classes/>). The article supports use of the Newport Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare (<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol101/iss1/1/>). With content such as about commissioning unmanned (uncrewed) warships, it will make for interesting reading.

Russia Says All Ships in the Black Sea Heading to Ukraine are 'Potential Carriers of Military Cargo'

<https://news.usni.org/2023/07/19/russia-says-all-ships-in-the-black-sea-heading-to-ukraine-are-potential-carriers-of-military-cargo>



"...all vessels sailing in the waters of the Black Sea to Ukrainian ports will be regarded as potential carriers of military cargo," reads a message the (Russian) MoD issued..."

"Under international law, the declaration allows Russian forces to board and search ships suspected of transporting arms..."

Lawfare, Russia upping the ante. Might this increase the area of conflict (which, really, is global anyways if one considers the public information, financial and other domains)? Time to study carefully the Newport Manual of the Law of Naval Warfare (<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol101/iss1/1/>).

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Further: Ukraine responds reciprocally to Russian blackmail, will consider "vessels heading to Russian ports as potential carriers of military cargo"

<https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/07/20/ukraine-responds-reciprocally-to-russian-blackmail-will-consider-vessels-heading-to-russian-ports-as-potential-carriers-of-military-cargo/>

and this was brought forward as relevant: Turkey, the Montreux Convention, and Russian Navy Transits of the Turkish Straits

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/march/turkey-montreux-convention-and-russian-navy-transits-turkish>

House of Commons Defence Committee Report on Defence Procurement System "It is broke - and it's time to fix it: The UK's defence procurement system"

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5803/cmselect/cmdfence/1099/summary.html>



It is an interesting report, with much made of governance and accountability, with one minister accountable for the government procurement enterprise and the reform needed to 'fix' what is broken, a need for more urgency in procurement (e.g., the UCR procurement system as essentially the default methodology as much as possible) with up-front trade-offs between capability (what they call "exquisite procurements" where weapon systems require all the possible bells and whistles), budget and schedule, and the need for more government focus on ensuring a responsive domestic defence industry by assuring skilled personnel are available commercially (as informed by a continuous dialogue with national defence industry). These are of course similar to our issues. As well, I note that the report also recommends that the military set up a procurement career stream.

Without a government that cares, none of that is going to happen - in fact, most external observers have given up on raising such issues.

Russia Lays Mines in Black Sea to Block Ukrainian Ports, NSC Says

<https://news.usni.org/2023/07/19/russia-says-all-ships-in-the-black-sea-heading-to-ukraine-are-potential-carriers-of-military-cargo>



"Russia has laid sea mines in the Black Sea that could interfere with Ukrainian grain exports..."

Doesn't matter whether Russia has actually laid any mines, nor how many. Just the declaration will have an impact on marine insurance and the movement of ships, with consequent effects on trade, in this case food.

Canada needs a robust mine countermeasures capability. Mines don't have to be laid at Canadian ports and waterways to have an adversarial effect on our safety and prosperity. Replacements of the Royal Canadian Navy Kingston-class ships, the Offshore Patrol Vessel project, need to be part of that, but there should be a lot more than includes divers, drones and vessels-of-opportunity.

Other Sources:

#airpower

Air and Space Power Bibliography

https://www.zotero.org/groups/5110475/air_and_space_power_bibliography

#China

Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (UK): China

https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/ISC-China_Press-Release.pdf

<https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/ISC-China.pdf>

#defence policy

Trudeau only the latest PM who couldn't care less about defence

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/carson-jerema-trudeau-only-the-latest-pm-who-couldnt-care-less-about-national-defenc>

Not for lack of trying!: Peter MacKay on why Conservatives couldn't meet NATO's defence-spending commitment

<https://nationalpost.com/news/not-for-lack-of-trying-peter-mackay-on-why-conservatives-couldnt-meet-natos-defence-spending-commitment>

Is Canada Really a NATO "Free-Rider"?

<https://cdainstitute.ca/is-canada-really-a-nato-free-rider/>

#drones

Drone Swarms and Amphibious Operations

<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drone-swarms-and-amphibious-operations>

#Indo-Pacific

Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2023

<https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2023/>

Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategic Engagement: Pivoting Towards Implementation

https://www.cgai.ca/canadas_indo_pacific_strategic_engagement_pivoting_towards_implementation

#intelligence

Speech by Sir Richard Moore, head of SIS (MI6), 19 July 2023

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-by-sir-richard-moore-head-of-sis-19-july-2023>

Several comment about #China.

#leadership

When Do Troublemakers Make For Great Leaders?

<https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/07/when-do-troublemakers-make-for-great-leaders/>

#legal

The Law of Naval Exclusion Zones

http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/842/1/Mundis_Law_Naval_Exclusion_Zones.pdf

#NATO

NATO's Vilnius summit made clear that the status quo is unacceptable

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-natos-vilnius-summit-made-clear-that-the-status-quo-is-unacceptable/>

#reading

War Books: A Summer Reading List

<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/war-books-a-summer-reading-list/>

#Russia-Ukraine War

Making Military Aid Work

<https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/making-military-aid-work>

Thinking Op UNIFIER.

Campaign update on the 2023 Ukrainian offensives

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1680346656762654720.html>

#artillery

Ukraine Situation Report: Kyiv's Growing Counter-Battery Advantage

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-kyivs-growing-counter-battery-advantage>

#drones

Sea drones, missile strikes and blockade: Ukraine's counteroffensive in Crimea

<https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/CRIMEA/gdvzwrmlpw/>

#warfare

Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combats-studies-institute/csi-books/weaving-the-tangled-web-lsco-volume-1.pdf>

A couple of years old, but resurfaced, maybe (and rightly so) in view of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

#wargaming

Writing War Gaming Rules Correctly

<https://robertdelwood.medium.com/writing-war-gaming-rules-correctly-43e0428fd966>

Other:

Crimean Bridge Unsafe: Russian Navy Amphibs for Kerch Strait

<https://seawaves.com/2023/07/12/crimean-bridge-unsafe-russian-navy-amphibs-for-kerch-strait/>

Interesting, the article implies that it is civilian vehicles ("peak of the holiday season") that are being transported by Russian amphibious ships.



Hmm, might a USN amphib be a solution for our PEI ferry woes?

Canadian Coast Guard Mobile Incident Command Platform

Here is the longer description of MICP provided by the CCG and used for the RUSI(NS) retweet above:

A Mobile Incident Command platform is a trailer. The CCG has multiple size MICP, equipped with briefing rooms, monitors, white boards, communications, etc. Basically, they are a mobile command post and used primarily at incidents as such in the field. For example, the CCG had them set up in Shelburne during the response to the NS wildfires and on the dock at Wood Islands PEI during the ferry incident last summer.



British Library EThOS - Search and order theses online

<https://ethos.bl.uk/Home.do?new=1>

"EThOS is the UK's national thesis service which aims to maximise the visibility and availability of the UK's doctoral research theses."

Interesting search site, well worth exploring. The #legal entry above in Dispatches OSZ was an early find.

Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

Australia

These articles are provided in order of their arrival from our Australian "correspondent" with his comments. Once again our thanks for our correspondent's efforts.

The first article raises an issue that is a bit odd. While Australia should not ignore Africa's use of the western Indian Ocean, there are more important issues in the nations bordering the northern Indian Ocean. I think focus on the activities of India, Pakistan the US and China in the entire Indian Ocean is more important. The article is at: <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-australia-can-work-with-france-in-the-western-indian-ocean/>

The RAN appears to be going back into the sea mine business. I note that Canada is deploying two Kingston-class ships to conduct mine warfare operations and training in European waters using remote vehicles. I doubt that minelaying is within our capabilities except for exercise purposes (*editor: RCN has confirmed that mine laying is not part of its doctrine or capabilities*). Article is at: <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/adf-will-need-fast-minelayers-for-its-new-smart-mines/>

The third article expresses some emerging fears in Australia. I don't believe that these have been publicly expressed too often but living in relative isolation is a challenge, just as living amongst powerful friends can be. The article is at: https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jul/17/supporting-us-military-against-china-could-draw-australia-into-nuclear-war-expert-warns?CMP=morningmailau_email

The Australians are testing HIMARS in western Australia. The article is at: <https://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/adf-and-us-army-to-test-himars-in-wa>

O Canada

Canada has again been embarrassed at the last NATO Conference in Vilnius, Lithuania, last week, where the PM asked that other things be considered for inclusion in a country's contribution to NATO goal of 2%. The request was turned down by NATO as being merely a way of avoiding responsibility. Canada has not been contributing adequately since the 1960s, choosing instead to allow the US to do our job and allowing politicians to continue to bribe Canadians with their own money on badly designed and resourced programs of limited value. There are those who believe that "hard power" is no longer necessary, in fact to be avoided; there is a price to pay for that thinking. Canada relies on the relationship it has with other like-minded countries for trade and our overall economy. The appearance of being a freeloader according to the Wall Street Journal has repercussions as we are about to find out. Canada is not held in high regard either in NATO or the UN as we do not contribute in a manner befitting a major economy. We will pay for our inaction as an earlier government found out in the mid-1970s when the Germans called us out for our lack of effort - shortly afterwards Canada purchased 114 Leopard 1 tanks, used by the CAF until the Afghanistan war. The tanks were replaced in the field by the Leopard 2 tank in the 2000s. 20 were rented from the Germans and a further 80 were purchased from Dutch stocks. They were left to languish after the end of the war, training on tanks and with tanks barely occurred on a regular basis. Canada needs another German to explain the ground truth apparently.

The Canadian government seems insufficiently aware to the changing situation and requirements to ensure the safety of our country. There is no such thing as a post-national state, and nationalism is alive and well as are military alliances; there is a strong need for those in the modern world affected by

authoritarian regimes in Russia and China. Canadians have to understand that our north is closer to Moscow than to Ottawa and that Russia has re-armed and re-established major military bases and facilities in the north and that their ships, submarines and aircraft are armed and not built for "constabulary work." Even Russian icebreakers are armed. A rethink of our preparations is required.

Canada did state that it will double its Latvian contribution from roughly 750 to around 1500 soldiers as well as getting newer, more appropriate equipment. This is good news but a drop in the bucket. It requires rebuilding the army and preparing for a "heavy metal" conflict. Canada has not fielded a true mechanized brigade group with all its parts in decades. Learning the practical lessons requires actual exercises that teach the practical lessons such as logistically supporting such an organization in the field. Tactical exercises without troops are too easily manipulated. Having your logistics group head down a one-way road and meeting an engineer regiment with heavy equipment on said road in the middle of the night can embarrass commanders and staffs and ensures they learn the lessons and implications of failure in a peace time exercise. This occurred in the FMC division exercise during the early part of RV 85. It did not happen again. MGen De Chastelain, the division commander "sensitized" the staff against further failures of that kind. There is nothing like a clear failure to get the point across. The implication of such a failure was appreciated by all. Doubling of our contingent means properly preparing all our regular brigades to be capable of commanding a whole brigade group of up to 6k soldiers plus attachments. Just understanding the logistics requirements alone is a true feat especially of an organization of multiple national contingents. It is clear the government made a commitment that the army will be hard pressed to fill adequately.

Boeing announced there is no end date for production of the P-8/E-7 aircraft based on the 737 airframe, which allows Canada some extra time. Unfortunately Bombardier wants to put in an application to have a militarized Global 6500 as a possible candidate for the CP-140 Aurora replacement. The real difference is that the P-8 is a tried and true platform where all the development is complete and is used by multiple NATO and allied partners. The Global 6500 would have to be developed from scratch and delays are inevitable as are developing issues. Whilst having a Canadian-built aircraft would be a feather in our cap, we would likely be the only users of such a fleet. It would be difficult to surge internationally as a result as parts and maintenance would be more difficult. If Bombardier had a fully developed anti-submarine aircraft the story might be different.

On another issue, this week the Indian press has suggested that Canada will be asked to leave the G7 due to our economic difficulties and small actual economy in comparison to other developing nations such as India, China and Brazil. India is not happy with Canada's apparent support of an independent Sikh Khalistan. India views such tolerance of these separatists as an unfriendly act by Canada. Canada hosted one of the largest pro-Khalistan demonstrations in the world. Could there be sour grapes as well? Probably, our own actions, however, are not what one has come to accept as behavior and actions of a country.

United States

The US has reinforced its forces in the Persian Gulf area the past two weeks in answer to Iranian efforts to seize ships in the Persian Gulf illegally. Forces include F-16 and A-10 fighter aircraft and suitable naval forces to stop this Iranian effort. A confrontation is possible that could lead to an actual conflict. It is possible that Iran is using these provocations to gain leverage against US efforts to restrict and restrain Iranian nuclear efforts and the revised treaty. It is not likely to succeed in the near term.

Israel

Demonstrations against proposed changes to the judicial system continue after the legislation was introduced once again in the Knesset. This has been tearing Israel apart as many view this as an

attempt to thwart legal action against Prime Minister Netanyahu and his right wing colleagues. Even some reservists have chosen not to show up for training.

Iran

Iran has re-introduced the morality police after several months now that demonstrations have subsided. It was the actions of the morality police that led to the near toppling of the theocracy last fall. Iran initially pulled back but used surveillance videos to quietly arrest key demonstration leaders. This apparently has been successful enough for them to feel confident to repeat their mistake.

Iran has started a campaign against shipping in the Persian Gulf. They state that vessels are being arrested on various charges. Recently US forces, specifically 5th Fleet, have taken active measures to prevent Iranian seizures and have ramped up forces to deal with the situation.

Moldova

Transnistria opposition leader Oleg Horgan was found dead at his home as a result of a blow from a heavy object. The exact time of death has not been confirmed. The local police and security service have stated that safe in the home was found open and emptied, therefore a robbery gone wrong. Horgan was willing to discuss reunification with Moldova and was a staunch critic of the separatist Government of Transnistria President Vadim Krasnoselsky. The president stated that he will take personal charge of the investigation. Moldovan Government Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Serebrian has requested that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe investigate the incident independently. Apparently there is little confidence that the Transnistria President will be "successful" in his task.

Moldova has been subject to Russia's attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine on which Moldova is dependent. Moldova is now looking towards a Romanian nuclear power plant expansion to offset Russia's efforts. The people of Moldova and Romania are from the same group of ancestors and have many family connections. There is a movement within Moldova to become part of Romania. This is rather tricky as Romania is a NATO and EU member which is about to become part of the Schengen Treaty allowing free movement within the EU. It would mean that Moldova as part of Romania would be secured by the NATO agreements. It is an interesting solution but one liable to cause difficulties across the continent at least in the short term.

Belarus

The remaining Wagner forces, around 5k troops, are now in a camp about 120 kms from the Belarus capital of Minsk. Some of these troops are providing training to Belarus members of the armed forces who have been recently mobilized for the security services. Belarus is maintaining that it will not attack Ukraine unless they are threatened or attacked. One Russian commentator, Andrey Kartapolov, a retired Colonel-General and a member of the Duma, also suggested that Wagner forces could be used to capture the Suwalki Gap between Poland and Lithuania. This "gap" is used for rail and road connections between Belarus and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea. The capital of the region was called Konigsberg when part of Germany. It was taken by Soviet forces at the end of the Second World War. It is the main base for the Russian Baltic Fleet.

US intelligence services have stated there is no firm confirmation that nuclear weapons have been transferred to Belarus at this time. The original plan was to have at least some in place by mid-July 2023. Training for Belarus airman and missile crews has apparently been completed as have upgrades to weapons storage facilities, so everything is in place. Most Russian troops have been withdrawn

from Belarus but somewhere around 5k Wagner troops are now stationed there - information is still somewhat unclear.

President Putin visited Minsk this week for ongoing discussions on the union of Belarus and Russia. Two thoughts here: first, Putin feels confident enough to leave Russia despite ongoing unease over the attempted coup, and second, he made a very clear statement that he did not seek the absorption of Belarus nor occupation by Russian forces. Now, he said something similar prior to the 2014 start to the Russia-Ukraine war. Lukashenko was at pains to state that they were co-aggressors as Putin looked on skeptically. If one takes the past behavior of Putin as an indicator and if one were Lukashenko, one may ensure one's insurance is paid up, that family was somewhere safe and that one would have a carefully developed escape plan to a very neutral country.

The Director General of the Belarus Red Cross testified at the Hague on Lukashenko's actions as part of an effort to determine if there is sufficient evidence for criminal charges. Not a good week for Lukashenko.

Russia-Ukraine War

The war continues well into the second year with more than 510 days from 24 February 2022, but the war has actually been fought since 2014 and that tends to be forgotten within the West. Countries in the West tried initially to minimize the possibility of a wider conflict through negotiations, hence the Minsk Accords versions 1 and 2, honoured by both sides more in the breach. Russia is the aggressor and negotiations left then President Petro Poroshenko with little room to maneuver and hence the conflict became somewhat frozen despite Western leadership knowing that Putin continued to reinforce "separatists" in Luhansk and Donetsk with Russian regular troops up to and including battalion-sized groupings. Putin also was quite clear early on that his goal was the elimination of Ukraine and the re-establishment of the former Russian empire area. So the war continues until Putin is most thoroughly defeated or killed; a wounded regime will not stop. Russia has had some success in the north near Lyman but limited success anywhere else. It is thought this is an attempt to syphon off Ukrainian forces from the east and south where Russian forces are having difficulties. Ukraine on the other hand has tactically surrounded Russian forces in Bakhmut, limiting the ability of Russian forces from further resupply of their troops, and has maintained their footholds across the Dniper River. Although Ukrainian troops are seeing slow progress in their offensive, the fact is they are still moving and having considerable success against Russian rear area targets

Russia's economy continues to falter with the ruble at nearly its lowest point in years. So called friendly countries are taking advantage of Russia's predicament to extract favourable prices for oil, gas, petroleum products and military equipment. Many large firms have left Russia and social media within Russia continue to show large empty malls. Sanction are affecting the local economy and Russian citizens who still remain largely quiet about the ongoing conflict. It is unlikely that opposition will come from the general public, at least until something or rather someone takes action. This will have to occur within the inner circle of the government and the solution could be worse than the current regime, but always time will tell.

The apparent coup was a puzzle. Wagner took over the headquarters of the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don with little effort. Crowds appeared to be supportive, at least publicly. Somehow out of 20k troops 5k were able to move nearly 700 kms to a position around 150 kms from Moscow with little opposition from the Russian military, National Guard or FSB. Eight aircraft were destroyed and about 20 Russian aircrew were killed in the move. Yet despite early success and absolutely incompetent actions by security forces, the coup stopped. Allegedly Putin flew to St Petersburg to avoid the issue but flew back almost immediately once things quieted down, even having discussions

with Prigozhin and up to 35 senior staff of Wagner. An agreement of sorts was reached with most Wagner troops being offered positions within the military or demobilization or exile of sorts in Belarus where at least 5k are currently stationed training Belarus troops and continuing to be a force-in-being and a potential threat to several people including Putin, Lukashenko, Northern Ukraine or NATO at the Suwalki Gap amongst others. It is almost a perfect situation for their survival or for further action on behalf of the Putin regime. Wagner like all mercenary forces was always a two-edged sword and loyalty tends to favour the highest bidder.

The other fallout is what has happened to other private security companies? Our earlier note stated that there were many others of varying size and complexity although Wagner was the most established. One suspects most were subsumed into the military as directed, but many of these troops were security forces of existing large corporations actually requiring trained security personnel, such as the rail and oil sectors, especially in view of the number of sabotage events happening within Russia. The other point is that these troops are also a measure of security for key oligarchs to prevent "falls" from balconies, windows, off boats or after a fine meal when unfortunate effects of the meal occur. They have reason to maintain their security forces. These are also the type of organizations that might be prone to have a grudge against the regime and see the leadership as vulnerable but not quite time as yet. Prigozhin himself has been a bit of a "will-o-the-wisp" disappearing and reappearing at random places in Belarus and Russia, yet supposedly he is in exile in Belarus on "pain of death," but one wonders how he is able to move with almost impunity despite the vaunted FSB. Was there another part of the deal? This is especially interesting in view of the arrest of somewhere around 15 general officers arrested and possibly more for their actions or inaction during the coup. There is more to this incident that is not clear and requires considerably more study and surveillance. It is not over.

This week saw the Ukrainian attack on the Kerch bridge destroying part of one span and damaging the other road span and part of the rail connection. It is part of Ukraine's overall effort to destroy Russia's ability to supply its forces in the south logistically. This was part in an overall effort to eliminate or damage key logistics sites thus preventing resupply of Russian forces. Ukraine used the same methods last year in their overall offensive actions in the north. Within the last days, Russia has retaliated using long range missile and drones against civilian targets all over Ukraine. While this hurts Ukraine in many ways, it does not change the military dynamic of Ukraine's more targeted approach. Ukrainian air defences have been largely successful but not perfect.

The bottom line is that the war must continue if some form of peace is to be possible eventually. The Putin regime must be at least crippled or eliminated or the conflict will be frozen. There is a possibility of a nuclear event of some sort especially if Russia gets desperate. One also has to wonder whether Russian nuclear weapons are safe and do Ukraine's intelligence and long range special forces have other ideas that could change the equation. Nothing is out of the realm of the possible and Russian forces have proven highly inept on many occasions - is it possible their nuclear security troops are any better?

China

China is an authoritarian and genocidal regime. It has territorial ambitions against virtually all its neighbours. Its actions have spoken louder than words, especially as we have seen in the South China Sea, the Himalayas, in Xinjiang province (also known originally as East Turkistan), its dishonest efforts in Hong Kong, its threats to Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and the US territories in the Pacific. It is an imperialist entity and a major threat to its neighbours.

Canada is a target of China's non-kinetic attack. China takes a comprehensive approach to their attacks. China conducts financial, influence activities and lawfare against Canada and has done so for

decades. They have relied on carefully cultivated influential persons such as politicians, business leaders and academics who have been effectively turned to view China through rose-coloured lens usually through various types of "rewards" to adopt a pro-China point of view. Some politicians including two Canadian senators and one member of Parliament have publicly provided direct support to a pro-Chinese position regarding Chinese Communist Party (CCP) influence operation actions including interference in our elections in 2019 and 2021, establishment of police stations and using disinformation provided by the Chinese diplomatic corps. The current Canadian government has been less than open about its approach to the political influence issue to the extent that although the Prime Minister has all the power necessary to call for a public inquiry, they have failed to do so and have used every opportunity to delay an open look at the issue by the Canadian public. Although it has declared one Chinese diplomat persona non grata it still allows for a bloated Chinese diplomatic corps of 178 personnel (only two less than the US) versus only 50 Canadian diplomats in China. The actions of the CCP diplomats have proven that their numbers are there to influence Canadian politics further and to attack Canadian-based democracy advocates, Uyghers, and Tibetan opposition groups as well as groups affected by CCP actions. One solution is to downsize or rather right-size the Chinese presence in Canada by reducing their diplomatic corps to the same size as the Canadian diplomatic corps. Action against all Canadian diplomats would result in removal of their diplomatic corps as well. There is zero need for Canada to have such a large CCP contingent.

The Chinese economy continues to deteriorate with large scale unemployment now officially over 21% for youth - some estimates have placed the figure of unemployed and under employed at over 35 % especially in rural areas, unseen by Western observers and unbiased observers. Large-scale property management has now moved into bankruptcy which is having a domino effect on the Chinese economy. Most of China's economic issues can be laid at the door of the CCP and especially Xi Jinping as the "Core Leader." His one-man view is an excellent example of unbridled power left in the hands of one man of limited experience. The authoritarian's ability to change positions and direction quickly is only matched by the absolute ability to get things wrong quickly as well. China is undergoing a deconstruction of sorts where half-built projects are being demolished. More importantly, other infrastructure projects such as dam maintenance or renewal have been neglected which have now caused major environmental issues once they collapse. China in the 1950s and 60s developed and built more than 37k dams alone; most are aging out or are in poor repair yet the CCP has done little to correct the problem, choosing instead to build new infrastructure of limited use or value, usually in the wrong locations.

Xi's crackdown during Covid has also antagonized the population by forcing great hardship when lockdowns occurred. Combined with attacks on private enterprise including technology, education, and private enterprise in general and foreign industries, conditions have been created that will continue to haunt China for years to come. Although China says it is open for business, in practical terms it is not and foreign investment has virtually disappeared, at least in the short-to-medium period. Again, the ability of the CCP to understand and contribute to economic success is virtually non-existent. The CCP has created conditions that will compromise its place as the rulers of China. The only problem is there is no organized resistance and thus China is likely to continue to deteriorate because of the specific actions of the CCP. The CCP is a failure of ideas, its failures are numerous and serious in nature and its demise is possible through their own stupidity.

One other looming problem is Xi's desire to have Taiwan unify with the Chinese mainland by 2027. This week 14 Chinese vessels entered into Taiwanese maritime space along with an air intrusion. It is increasingly clear that at this point in time the annexation of Taiwan is unacceptable to most of the West. This would put China and the West potentially on a collision course. Interestingly enough, during the original negotiations on the "One China Policy" neither side ever stated that the other was the real or agreed to "One China". The Republic of China's position was that it was and is the only

China; the Peoples' Republic viewed it as they were the One China. Interesting but the One China was never an agreement that both agreed to. The CCP has only accepted their version and so has the Republic of China.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 12 July 2023, Russian state media reported that nuclear-powered submarines of Russia's Northern Fleet will not be taking part in the main Navy Day fleet review in St Petersburg on 30 July 2023.
- Since the current Navy Day format was established in 2017, this would be the first year that no nuclear-powered submarines have been involved. The change is likely primarily due to allow for maintenance and to retain availability for operations and training.
- There is also a realistic possibility that internal security concerns since Wagner Group's attempted mutiny have contributed to the decision.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russia has routinely sacked commanders since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, but the removal of the 58th Combined Arms Army's General-Major Ivan Popov is notable, he was apparently dismissed for voicing concerns rather than for any alleged poor performance.
- In a leaked video intended for his troops, Popov delivered a scathing attack on the Russian MoD leadership, whom he accused of, "hitting us from the rear, viciously beheading the Army at the most difficult and intense moment".
- Popov's comments draw attention to serious disaffection many officers likely harbour towards the senior military leadership. The complaints largely echo those made by Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin prior to his June 2023 mutiny. Direct criticism from subordinates is likely to become an increasing problem for Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff General Gerasimov.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- The Russian security apparatus entered a period of confusion and negotiations after Wagner Group's 24 June 2023 mutiny. In recent days, an interim arrangement for the future of the group has started to take shape.
- On 12 July 2023, the Russian MoD announced that Wagner had handed over 2000 pieces of military equipment, including tanks. As of 15 July 2023, at least a small contingent of Wagner fighters have arrived at a camp in Belarus.
- Concurrently, some Wagner-associated social media groups have resumed activity, with a focus on highlighting the group's activities in Africa. Based on recent announcements by Russian officials, the state is likely prepared to accept Wagner's aspirations to maintain its extensive presence on the continent.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- After being sacked as commander of Russia's 58th Combined Arms Army (58 CAA) in Ukraine, General-Major Ivan Popov claimed that one of his key complaints had been about the lack of counter-battery provision.
- Russian ground forces survivability relies on effectively detecting Ukrainian artillery and striking against it, often with its force's own artillery. A key component of this approach is counter-battery radars, which allow commanders to rapidly locate enemy gun lines.
- Russia is suffering from a worsening shortage of counter-battery radars, especially its modern ZOOPARK-1M. Only a handful of the originally deployed ZOOPARK fleet are likely to remain operational in Ukraine. Open-source footage showed another ZOOPARK being destroyed near the 58 CAA's area in early July 2023. The priority Popov apparently gave to this problem highlights the continued centrality of artillery in the war.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over the last week, fighting has continued in multiple sectors of the front, with both sides achieving marginal advances in different areas.
- In the north-east, Russian forces have attempted to push west through forests west of Kremina. Ukraine continues to resource significant effort around Russian-held Bakhmut. Here Russian forces are likely fragile but holding for now. Further south in Donetsk Oblast, especially around Avdiivka, Russian forces continue to attempt local assaults, with little success.
- In the south, Ukraine continues to attack on at least two axes, but is unlikely to have yet broken into Russia's primary defensive lines. In this area, Russia has likely implemented a shell-rationing regime for artillery in an attempt to preserve its critical indirect fire capability. In Kherson Oblast, Ukraine maintains a small bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnipro River near the ruined Antonivsky Bridge which is an added challenge for Russian commanders who are likely concerned about the vulnerability of their south-western flank.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since the start of July 2023, there has highly likely been an increase in fighting around the lower reaches of the Dnipro River.
- As well as intense combat on the eastern bank around the small Ukrainian bridgehead near the ruined Antonivsky Bridge, small units of Russian and Ukrainian troops have also been contesting islands in the Dnipro delta.
- Both sides are using small, fast motorboats, and Ukraine has successfully used tactical one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles to destroy some Russian boats.
- Russia faces a dilemma in deciding whether to respond to these threats by strengthening its Dnipro Group of Forces at the expense of the stretched units facing the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 17 July 2023, Russia failed to renew its involvement in the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). This effectively nullified the security agreement which, despite the war, had ensured the safe passage of vessels exporting grain from Ukraine. Russia is aiming to deter all merchant shipping from Ukrainian ports.
- Russia likely made the decision to leave some time ago because it decided that the deal was no longer serving its interests. Russia has masked this with disinformation, claiming its withdrawal is instead due to concerns that civilian ships are at risk from Ukrainian mines and that Ukraine was making military use of the grain corridor without providing evidence for these claims.
- On 19 July 2023, the Russian MoD said it would assume all vessels approaching Ukraine were carrying weapons.
- The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) will likely now take a more active role in disrupting any trade which continues. However, BSF blockade operations will be at risk from Ukrainian uncrewed surface vehicles and coastal defence cruise missiles.

