



## Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 28 July 2023

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.*

*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

### **Events:**

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**28 July**, Friday - North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network speaker Adam P MacDonald, "A Royal Canadian Navy that is a Blue-Water navy and Arctic-capable: How to be/come both." 1300 Eastern. Via Zoom. To register: [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScVF8cnCCgveShpGeey\\_vQAOVfWcjkSnz0diAXtFvdbh0AmBw/viewform](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScVF8cnCCgveShpGeey_vQAOVfWcjkSnz0diAXtFvdbh0AmBw/viewform)

**16 August**, Wednesday - Brookings Institution speaker Dr Michael O'Hanlon, "Military History for the Modern Strategist." 1830 EST. Livestream: <https://www.armywarcollege.edu/live/>. See poster at end of *Dispatches*.

**Save the date: 20 September**, Wednesday - RUSI(NS) Distinguished Speaker TBA. 1300-1500. Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess. MTF.

There is no RUSI(NS) event planned for August

## **Publications:**

Publications without links are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

**New:** RUSI(NS) Comments “Naval Doctrine and Strategy,” 25 July 2023, [https://rusi-ns.ca/naval\\_doctrine\\_strategy/](https://rusi-ns.ca/naval_doctrine_strategy/)

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Brigade and Brigade Group,” 15 July 2023, [https://rusi-ns.ca/brigade\\_brigade\\_group/](https://rusi-ns.ca/brigade_brigade_group/)

RUSI(NS) Comments "Canada’s Special Forces #Helicopters are Obsolete for the Role They are Tasked to Carry Out" by RUSI(NS) SAC, 10 Jul 23, [https://rusi-ns.ca/sof\\_griffon/](https://rusi-ns.ca/sof_griffon/)

RUSI(NS) Information Note “Armoured Fighting Vehicles,” 2 July 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/armoured-fighting-vehicles/>

RUSI(NS) History & Heritage Paper “Canadian Corvettes in the Second World War – A General History” by Dr Richard Gimblett, 24 June 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/canadian-corvettes-in-the-second-world-war/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Sudan Evacuation Shows Way Forward for Humanitarian Intervention” by Jay Heisler, 4 June 2023, [https://rusi-ns.ca/sudan\\_evacuation/](https://rusi-ns.ca/sudan_evacuation/)

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 19 July 2023  
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

**New:** Edmonton United Services Institute President’s *Enews*, August 2023

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 7, July-August 2023

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, July 2023  
<https://www.rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/202-rausi-dispatches-july-2023>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, July 2023

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies – Australia Journal *United Service*  
Volume 74, Number 2, June 2023  
<https://www.rusi.com.au/Publications.php#Journal>

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 2nd Quarter 2023




**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 19, Issue 7, 24 July 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*, Volume 22, Issue 2, June 2023

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, July 2023, <https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute>

**@RUSI\_NS on X:**

@RUSI\_NS posts may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something tweeted or retweeted, email RUSI(NS).

<p>CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 20 Jul tweeted: New Force Development report! Highlights submarines' critical role in CAF amid changing global security landscape. Urgent policy decisions are needed to ensure a modern and capable submarine fleet for Canada's defense. (Canada's Future Submarine Capability <a href="https://cdainstitute.ca/canadas-future-submarine-capability/">https://cdainstitute.ca/canadas-future-submarine-capability/</a>) RUSI(NS) retweeted: #Submarines are strategic assets to CAN🇨🇦 &amp; @RoyalCanNavy, much change calculus by potential adversaries. Even (especially) when unseen. CAN needs 12 boats to ensure capability in our 3 oceans. In view of geo-political situation, procurement needs start now #DefencePolicyUpdate</p>	
<p>Daniel Otis @dsotis 16 Jun tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: 🌐 From a 'red disc with a ring' near Montreal to an object 'flying sporadically' over northern Canada, my latest investigation for @CTVNews shows how the Royal Canadian Air Force, Transport Canada &amp; other federal entities handle #UFO/#UAP reports 📄 <a href="https://ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/how-does-the-canadian-government-and-military-handle-ufo-reports-1.6442873">https://ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/how-does-the-canadian-government-and-military-handle-ufo-reports-1.6442873</a> 🇨🇦 ? 📄 🔍 (Here's how the Canadian government and military handle UFO reports <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/how-does-the-canadian-government-and-military-handle-ufo-reports-1.6442873">https://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/how-does-the-canadian-government-and-military-handle-ufo-reports-1.6442873</a>)</p>	
<p>Halifax JRCC CCCOS @hfxjrcc 23 Jul tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: On 22 July, 413 #SAR Squadron conducted multiple rescues in conjunction with @RCMPNS and @HalifaxSAR. In one mission SAR Techs were lowered into the rushing flood water and air lifted a stranded camper to safety. #RESCUE</p>	

National Defence @NationalDefence 25 Jul tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: The CC-330 Husky will provide strategic airlift, transport, and medical evacuations, as well as refuel fighters. It will play a crucial role in achieving operational and strategic objectives with our Allies at home and abroad. Learn more: <https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/07/government-of-canada-awards-contract-for-the-strategic-tanker-transport-capability-project.html>

(Government of Canada awards contract for the Strategic Tanker Transport Capability project)  
 See also: The Strategic Tanker Transport Capability Project and NORAD Modernization  
<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/07/the-strategic-tanker-transport-capability-project-and-norad-modernization0.html>  
 and Strategic Tanker Transport Capability project  
<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/strategic-tanker-transport-capability-project.html>

Large version of graphic at end of Dispatches.

It seems the RCAF has ceased the practice of numbering aircraft in the 100-series. Makes sense, as the Husky is derived from the A330.

From DND: The first two used aircraft are expected to enter into RCAF service in fall 2023 following aircrew conversion training. Deliveries of the modified new and used CC-330 aircraft are set to start in 2027.

From a reporter colleague: They ordered more because they are framing this as a part of NORAD renewal and contribution to defence of North America...some of the money was obtained from the NORAD modernization pot and, in my view, it is a quick way to signal the U.S. that Canada wants to increase its capability that can help NORAD and also NATO...refueling tankers are in demand.

Context for the Canadian procurement: "Air Force gas stations in the sky are aging, with replacements hamstrung and a capacity crunch looming"

[https://www.stripes.com/branches/air\\_force/2023-07-26/air-force-gas-stations-aging-10861556.html](https://www.stripes.com/branches/air_force/2023-07-26/air-force-gas-stations-aging-10861556.html)






RCAF Operations @RCAFOperations 26 Jul tweeted: Members of 440 Sqn, supporting #OPLENTUS, transport Australian firefighters by CC138 Twin Otter between Kamloops and Prince George, BC. The @RCAF\_ARC is supporting wildfire fighting efforts by transporting firefighters and other specialists throughout the province.

@BCGovFireInfo

RUSI(NS) retweeted: Flexibility of #airpower. @RCAF\_ARC aircraft need not be water bombers to help with fighting wildfires. Tactical & operational airlift can contribute significantly. #OpLENTUS = @CanadianForces assistance to province(s) in response to natural disaster(s)


<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-lentus.html>



<p>CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 26 Jul tweeted and RUSI(NS) retweeted: "The much-touted defence review should identify what capabilities Canada needs. But the damage done by decades of complacency and neglect by governments of both parties will take many years to rectify."        (Canada's miserly defence spending is increasingly embarrassing  <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/07/24/canadas-miserly-defence-spending-is-increasingly-embarrassing">https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/07/24/canadas-miserly-defence-spending-is-increasingly-embarrassing</a>)</p>	
<p>Canadian Armed Forces Operations @CFOperations 26 Jul tweeted: CAF participation in #TRADEWINDS23 is our #EnduringPromise to cooperative regional security. It reinforces CA objectives to support the Caribbean region. A secure Caribbean region means a secure North America. 🌐 #PARTNERSHIPS 📷: S1 Alexandra Proulx        RUSI(NS) retweeted: Exercise TRADEWINDS #ExTW = annual US Southern Command exercise focused on countering threats, building partnerships &amp; improving Humanitarian Assistance &amp; Disaster Relief #HADR# capabilities <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/list.html">https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/list.html</a> #ExTRADEWINDS promotes &amp; strengthens safety &amp; security in Caribbean</p>	
<p>"EU plans to buy new firefighting planes as climate crises worsen" <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-plans-buy-new-firefighting-planes-climate-crises-worsen-2023-07-26/">https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-plans-buy-new-firefighting-planes-climate-crises-worsen-2023-07-26/</a>        If @deHavillandAIR is chosen as prime contractor, this would be the ideal time for CAN🇨🇦 government to hop on board</p>	

**“Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia” on Facebook:**

RUSI(NS) posts may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS).

<p><b>Time to Increase Arctic Maritime Domain Awareness</b>  <a href="https://vanguardcanada.com/time-to-increase-arctic-maritime/">https://vanguardcanada.com/time-to-increase-arctic-maritime/</a></p>	
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### Canadian Divers Find WWII Bombs on US Shipwrecks Off Newfoundland Coast

<https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/canadian-divers-find-wwii-bombs-on-us-shipwrecks-off-newfoundland-coast>

Underseas operations include a variety of activities including by Maritime Explosive Ordnance Disposal Divers of the Fleet Diving Units Atlantic and Pacific.



The site (<https://www.historicplaces.ca/en/rep-reg/place-lieu.aspx?id=3436>) would be an ocean war grave. Even though the lost are foreigners, the site is located in Canadian waters. Parks Canada was to develop new regulations for such sites.

### Australia prioritises modernisation and indigenous capabilities in defence

<https://www.army-technology.com/news/australia-prioritises-modernisation-and-indigenous-capabilities-in-defence/>

The article marks the difference between Canada and Australia on the issue of defence spending and commitment to an effective military capability.



### D - All of The Above: Connecting 21st Century Naval Doctrine to Strategy

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/d-all-of-the-above-connecting-21st-century-naval-doctrine-to-strategy/>

"Viewing today's debates on naval strategy through the lens of traditional maritime strategic thought offers officers, policy makers, and thinkers a framework and a clarifying structure."



Yes, strategic understanding is too readily lost in a sea of jargon and buzzterms, too often created by (headquarters, academic) people trying to break out of the mass of information these days and to distinguish themselves. Staffs need to focus on staff functions.

### Deploying An Aerial Drone (UAV) From A Submarine

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/07/video-deploying-drone-uav-from-submarine/>

"The objective of this project is to deploy a drone from a submerged submarine in order to recover video data and to pilot it from the submarine."



The submarine aircraft carrier has returned!

This will likely be a capability that any large enough submarine, nuclear or conventionally powered, will be able to deploy. Hopefully (likely) Canada is considering this capability for its boats, the current Victoria-class and future boats from the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project.

### **Canada orders more Airbus A330 tankers, hires firm to convert planes**

<https://www.defensenews.com/air/2023/07/25/canada-orders-more-airbus-a330-tankers-hires-firm-to-convert-planes/>

Nine A330, to be typed as CC330 Husky, multi-role tanker transports (a certain amount of redundancy in that name) to replace five CC150 Polaris. One wonders what is the assessment that led to nine replacing five. Are there calculations for preferred ratios of tankers to customer aircraft? Logistics thinking of strategic lift requirements to move what are ultimately expeditionary forces overseas?



### **Trudeau overhauls his cabinet, drops 7 ministers and shuffles most portfolios**

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cabinet-shuffle-trudeau-1.6916367>

This Council will be interesting to follow.

"Along with the new names heading up security and intelligence-related portfolios, the Prime Minister's Office announced Wednesday it will follow the example of its Five Eye allies and set up a cabinet committee on national security and intelligence. The lack of one has been cited by the national security community as an oversight in light of recent controversies.

A PMO spokesperson called the new National Security Council a 'forum for ministers to deliberate on and address issues of pressing concern to Canada's domestic and international security.'"

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*Related, see:* Prime Minister announces changes to the Ministry

<https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2023/07/26/prime-minister-announces-changes-ministry>

and

Michel Maisonneuve: Trudeau shows disregard for military by replacing capable minister in time of crisis

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/trudeau-shows-disregard-for-military-by-replacing-capable-minister-in-time-of-crisis>



### **Other Sources:**

#### **#artificial intelligence**

AI and Gray-Zone Aggression: Risks and Opportunities

<https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/ai-and-gray-zone-aggression-risks-and-opportunities/>

#### **#cyber operations**

If you want peace, prepare for... cyberwar

<https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/critical-thinking-if-you-want-peace-prepare-for-cyberwar/>

### **#defence policy**

Canada's miserly defence spending is increasingly embarrassing

<https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/07/24/canadas-miserly-defence-spending-is-increasingly-embarrassing>

*Copy available on request to RUSI(NS) for those unable to access the subscription wall.*

'I hope the Canadians are watching': U.S. senator tees off on Canada's military spending

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/norad-confirmation-hearing-spending-1.6918975>

### **#NORAD**

NORAD's likely new commander commits to 'tough conversations' with Canada on defence spending

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/norad-confirmation-hearing-spending-1.6918975>

### **#defence procurement**

Royal Australian Air Force to replace and expand C-130J Hercules fleet

<https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/australia-raaf-c130j-hercules-order>

*From a member (wag): Australia to purchase new "J" models to replace old "J" Hercules. Maybe Canada could buy the old aircraft!*

### **#doctrine**

History Is Better Than Doctrine

<https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/history-is-better-than-doctrine>

### **#drones**

Minister of Transport announces Canada's first proposed drone safety regulations for beyond visual line-of-sight operations

<https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2023/06/minister-of-transport-announces-canadas-first-proposed-drone-safety-regulations-for-beyond-visual-line-of-sight-operations.html>

*Are defence, security and safety activities going to experience more drone intrusions operated by BVLOS operators?*

### **#warfare**

Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Between Myths and Confusion

<https://ras-nsa.ca/lethal-autonomous-weapons-between-myths-and-confusion/>

### **#exercises**

Creating a New Standard for Evaluating Tabletop Exercises

<https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/articles/creating-a-new-standard-for-evaluating-tabletop-exercises>

### **#Indo-Pacific**

Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2023

<https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2023/>

*note: Asia-Pacific Naval and Maritime Capabilities: The New Operational Dynamics*



<https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-pacific-regional-security-assessment-2023/aprsa-chapter-3/>

### **#drones**

Inspired by Ukraine war, Taiwan launches drone blitz to counter China

<https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/us-china-tech-taiwan/>

### **#land warfare**

Supporting Command and Control for Land Forces on a Data-Rich Battlefield

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/supporting-command-and-control-land-forces-data-rich-battlefield>

### **#law enforcement #artificial intelligence**

AI Partners – Filling Law Enforcement Experience Gaps

<https://domesticpreparedness.com/articles/ai-partners-filling-law-enforcement-experience-gaps>

### **#logistics**

The military's next mission? Reinvent logistics

<https://www.wired.co.uk/bc/article/military-logistics-are-more-difficult-and-dangerous-than-ever-can-tech-help-microsoft>

Buying Time: Logistics for a New American Way of War

<https://www.cnas.org/press/press-release/buying-time-logistics-for-a-new-american-way-of-war>

### **#medical**

Medicine, Morale and Mustering the Force

podcast: <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/medicine/>

*"There is a correlation between better medicine and war outcomes. But a lot of times the side that has better medicine isn't the side that wins."*

*Comment:* This is all very true. Tropical medicine studies and treatments arose out of the British and French colonial armies' experience.

### **#NATO**

NATO Policy on the Protection of Children in Armed Conflict

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_217655.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_217655.htm)

After the NATO Summit: Are We Already at War with Russia?

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/after-nato-summit-are-we-already-war-russia>

NATO Review - The 2023 NATO Summit in retrospect

<https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2023/07/27/the-2023-nato-summit-in-retrospect/index.html>

## **#Russia-Ukraine War**

Russian War Abuses in Ukraine: A Lesson in Legitimacy  
<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/legitimacy/>

Russian offensives  
<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1683617679582822406.html>

## **#drones**

Robotic Warfare Is the Future of Conflict, as Ukraine Shows  
<https://themessenger.com/opinion/robotic-warfare-is-the-future-of-conflict-as-ukraine-shows>

What lessons can be drawn from the “Second Russo-Ukrainian war”?  
<https://ras-nsa.ca/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-the-second-russo-ukrainian-war/>

## **#information operations**

What He Said and What it Really Means – Vol. 4: “Importance of Uninterrupted Food Supply”  
<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/what-he-said-and-what-it-really-means-vol-4-importance-of-uninterrupted-food-supply/>

History as an Information Weapon in Russia’s Full-Scale War in Ukraine  
<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/history-as-an-information-weapon-in-russias-full-scale-war-in-ukraine/>

## **#strategy**

Supporting Ukraine Provides a Lesson in Grand Strategy  
<https://defenseopinion.com/supporting-ukraine-provides-a-lesson-in-grand-strategy/421/>  
*Note the succinct definition of grand strategy.*

## **#warfare**

Russian fortifications present an old problem for Ukraine  
<https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/russian-fortifications-present-an-old-problem-for-ukraine/>

Trench Warfare In Ukraine Casts Old School Army Training In Different Light  
<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/trench-warfare-in-ukraine-casts-old-school-army-training-in-different-light>

## **#shipbuilding**

The politics of military megaprojects: discursive struggles in Canadian and Australian naval shipbuilding strategies  
*Available on request to RUSI(NS).*

## **#strategy**

D - All of The Above: Connecting 21st Century Naval Doctrine to Strategy  
<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/d-all-of-the-above-connecting-21st-century-naval-doctrine-to-strategy/>

"Viewing today's debates on naval strategy through the lens of traditional maritime strategic thought offers officers, policy makers, and thinkers a framework and a clarifying structure."

### **#warfare**

The Post Operational Level Age: How to Properly Maintain the Interface between Policy, Strategy, and Tactics in Current Military Challenges

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/the-post-operational-level-age-how-to-properly-maintain-the-interface-between-policy-strategy-and-tactics-in-current-military-challenges/>

The Post-Operational Level Age: The Operational Focus Approach, Part 2

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/the-post-operational-level-age-the-operational-focus-approach-part-2/>

The Post-Operational Level Age: The Operational Focus Approach, Part 3

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/the-post-operational-level-age-the-operational-focus-approach-part-3/>

### **#legal**

Cluster Munitions and Operational Considerations

<https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/cluster-munitions-and-operational-considerations>

### **Other:**

#### **Defence Policy**

Globe and Mail editorial 20 July 2023: In defence of higher defence spending

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-in-defence-of-higher-defence-spending/>

*(Reproduced below as not everyone can access the Globe and Mail. The editorial led to a number of comments amongst Institute members which are included after the editorial.)*

Lots of important milestones are arbitrary. A 10th wedding anniversary, a four-minute mile, or losing 20 pounds are all artificial, to an extent (a 4:01 mile is nothing to sneeze at, after all). But that doesn't mean they do not signify something important: Devotion to one's partner, athletic excellence, improving one's health – or, say, the strength of Canada's commitment to contributing to the security of the West.

There's no question that the NATO goal of member countries spending at least 2 per cent of gross domestic product on defence is an arbitrary target. Those who make that point to oppose an expansion of Canadian military expenditures are right about that.

But at the same time, there's no question that what that goal signifies is crucial, a point overlooked by those who attempt to wave away Canada's failure to meet the 2-per-cent threshold.

The NATO communiqué from last week's summit in Lithuania spelled out a number of things, including the shift from language in 2014 that called the 2-per-cent target "aspirational" to an "enduring commitment to invest at least" that amount annually. Just as importantly, the communiqué – endorsed by Canada – spelled out why: There is a "radically changed security environment" because of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, but also because of China's "coercive policies." As a result, "we are strengthening NATO's collective defence, against all threats, from all directions."

That is the strategic imperative; the goal of 2 per cent of GDP is merely the signifier. Still, why should this particular benchmark be used? Why not, for instance, focus on total military expenditures?

On that front, Canada comes off relatively well, with the sixth-highest expenditure in NATO as measured by dollars. In seventh place is Poland, whose military outlays are just over two-thirds of Canada's. But the Polish economy is barely one-third the size of our country's. (That means Poland is well above the 2-per-cent threshold.)

In public finance in Canada, there's a consensus that those with greater means should contribute more. That belief is at the core of the income tax system, where higher-income people pay not just more tax, but higher rates of tax. That same basic principle – from each according to their ability, as someone once wrote – is at work with NATO's goal.

That's not to say there aren't issues with using GDP. A sharp recession, for instance, would push up military expenditures as a proportion of GDP, all other things being equal. Still, using national income as a proxy for fiscal ability is a fair measure, and one that allows for the great disparity in the size of NATO members' economies.

But there is still the question of an arbitrary goal of 2 per cent. To an extent, that criticism has some weight: there's no magical transformation that takes place if a nation's expenditures tick up from 1.99 per cent of GDP to 2 per cent.

However, the critique of that specific goal ignores two big facts. First, Canada is losing ground, not only compared with its own recent expenditures but within NATO. In 2017, Canada spent 1.44 per cent of GDP on defence, close to the NATO average (excluding the United States) of 1.48 per cent. But five years later, in 2022, that gap had widened considerably, with Canada spending 1.29 per cent of GDP while the NATO average excluding the U.S. had risen to 1.65 per cent.

Second, NATO now describes the 2-per-cent threshold as a floor, not a ceiling, with the communiqué stating that “in many cases” higher expenditures will be needed “to remedy existing shortfalls.”

Without a doubt, Canada is one of those cases. Our land forces lack modern equipment, even basic supplies. The navy lacks sailors, not to mention modern submarines. The air force has yet to receive modern jets. More broadly, the federal Liberals have not even managed to deliver their updated vision for defence spending, never mind actually committing dollars.

There is one last reason the 2-per-cent goal cannot be ignored: The government of Canada has given its word. Until Vilnius, the Liberals might shrug at the (somewhat fuzzy) commitment that the Harper government made in 2014.

But it was Prime Minister Justin Trudeau who signed on to last week's communiqué. Canada has made a pledge to its allies. The goal may be arbitrary, but Canada's commitment to it cannot be.

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*Comment:* I strongly doubt that our current government will actually meet the 2 per cent requirement soon. There will be words said but the cash will not quickly follow because I doubt we have the ability to actually spend the additional money. The acquisition processes need to be "upgunned" to develop, produce and commission the items needed to make the CAF a fully effective military force in all of its elements. Short of a war footing being adopted, the ramping up will be drawn out by bureaucratic processes and financial issues.

*Comment:* Lots of good thoughts here very well presented. I still favour using percentage of whole of government spending on defence, as I have voiced before. Also, in concert with comments about the changing nature of ‘defence’, I support including more federal spending on security and safety activities, along with sovereignty actions into the whole of the ‘Defence’ portfolio.

*Comment:* Canada must awaken to the realities in which the nation faces on the world stage. China is aware of its opportunities to expand its political, economic and scientific influences throughout the world. It is aware that the western countries are not as unified as they were in the post Second World War period. Meanwhile, Russia has not lost its abilities to create mayhem in Europe. Canada and its allies have much to do to strengthen their individual and collective security in the face of the Chinese and Russian adventurism. It is time for strong political leadership in and from the western nations.

*Comment:* Before we spend vast amounts of money, we have to have a grip on our finances. The PBO/ Auditor General's Office now suggests that more than 100b CAD has been wasted so far by the current government and the amount continues to climb. Canadian governments have never sorted out our national interests on which all policies are developed. Our foreign policy is a mess; security defence policies are either written too simply or are a list of cultural aspirations that bear to relationship to reality. These have to be sorted out quickly before any decision can be made regarding increasing funding for defence issues. The country is in serious trouble as even our participation in the G7 is now being questioned. I do not question the 2% of GDP for defence or more to bring us back to a capable force but without the above, it will be a wasted effort. This does not include issue such as procurement, military law and basic capabilities. Bold leadership is required.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In the coming days, Russia's Wagner Group is likely to release the last of its convict-recruits from their mandated service. Its Project K prison recruitment scheme peaked in early 2023 and at least 40,000 men served under it.
- A significant number of the now pardoned convicts are likely to take up the offer to continue with Wagner as professional contractors. Meanwhile, the Russian MOD has taken over Wagner's prison recruitment pipeline.
- The end of the scheme marks a waypoint in the history of Wagner and of Russia's war in Ukraine. The soldiers provided by Project K enabled Russia to seize Bakhmut: one of its few recent claims to success. The project grew Wagner into the organisation which, last month, directly challenged the authority of President Putin. It also marks one of the bloodiest episodes in modern military history: up to 20,000 convict-recruits were killed within a few months.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russian former intelligence officer and leading nationalist mil-blogger Igor Girkin was almost certainly arrested for 'extremism' on 21 July 2023. Girkin has long been a critic of the Russian Ministry of Defence's conduct of the war. However, in recent days his comments have turned to direct criticism of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his time in power.
- The move is likely to infuriate fellow members of the mil-blogger community - and elements within the serving military - who largely see Girkin as an astute military analyst and patriot. He played a major role in Russia's war in the Donbas from 2014 and spent months on the front line in 2022.
- While Girkin is no ally of the Wagner Group, he was likely only prepared to push the limits of public criticism in the context of Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin's June 2023 abortive mutiny. The taboo against unmasked criticism of the Putin regime has been significantly weakened.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent days, there has been an increase in artillery fire along the north of the front line, in Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts. This has likely been accompanied by some increase in Russian small-unit assaults, but the situation has been obfuscated by Russian disinformation.
- Russia has likely only achieved marginal gains, but its renewed activity in the north highlights its importance to the Kremlin, when it is concurrently facing significant pressure in the southern Zaporizhzhia sector.
- Russia's Western Group of Forces is likely trying to advance back to the Oskil River in order to create a buffer zone around Luhansk Oblast, the possession of which Russia almost certainly considers one of its fundamental objectives of the war.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- All Russian school children are to be taught the basics of operating combat drones. Russian Senator Artem Sheikin announced that the lessons will include how to conduct terrain reconnaissance and ways to counter enemy uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs).
- The UAV lessons join assault rifle training, hand grenade skills and combat first aid in the revised 'Basics of Life Safety' syllabus for year 10 and 11 students, due to be mandated from 1 September 2023.
- Russia's renewed emphasis on military induction for children is largely an effort to cultivate a culture of militarised patriotism rather than develop genuine capability. However, the addition of UAV skills does highlight how Russia has identified the use of tactical UAVs in Ukraine as an enduring component of contemporary war.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since 18 July 2023, Russia has conducted greater numbers of long-range strikes against Odesa and other areas of southern Ukraine. These attacks have featured an unusual number of AS-4 KITCHEN missiles, a 5.5 tonne weapon originally designed to destroy aircraft carriers.
- Damage has included several grain silos at Chornomorsk Port, south of Odesa, as well as the historic city centre. On 24 July 2023, Russia extended one way attack drone strikes to the docks on the Danube River, approximately 200 metres from the Romanian border.
- Between August 2022 and June 2023, when the Black Sea Grain Initiative was still in force, Russia generally refrained from striking civil infrastructure in the southern ports. Since Russia failed to renew the deal, the Kremlin likely feels less politically constrained, and is attempting to strike targets in Odesa because it believes Ukraine is storing military assets in these areas. Since the start of the war, Russia's strike campaign has been characterised by poor intelligence and a dysfunctional targeting process.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Russia's Black Sea Fleet has altered its posture since Russia pulled out of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), in preparedness to enforce a blockade on Ukraine.
- The modern corvette SERGEY KOTOV, has deployed to the southern Black Sea, patrolling the shipping lane between the Bosphorus and Odesa. There is a realistic possibility that it will form part of a task group to intercept commercial vessels Russia believes are heading to Ukraine.
- The BSGI has moderated the involvement of the Black Sea in the war: there is now the potential for the intensity and scope of violence in the area to increase.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- As Ukrainian forces continue major offensive operations in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, one of the single most influential Russian weapon systems in the sector is the Ka-52 HOKUM attack helicopter. Russia has highly likely lost around forty Ka-52s since the invasion, but the type has also imposed a heavy cost on Ukraine.
- In recent months, Russia has highly likely augmented the force in the south with at least a small number of brand new, Ka-52M variants: a heavily modified aircraft, informed by lessons from Russia's experience in Syria. Evidence supporting the M variant's use in Ukraine includes photos posted on social media of aircrew posing next to the new aircraft and thanking well-wishers for sending them morale items.
- Another key improvement to the Ka-52 fleet is the integration of a new anti-tank missile, the LMUR, which has a range of approximately 15km. Ka-52 crews have been quick to exploit opportunities to launch these weapons beyond the range of Ukrainian air defences.








# CC-330 HUSKY


<b>Range</b> 13,900 km (10 ton payload)	<b>Service ceiling</b> 13,000 m	<b>Passengers</b> 250+	<b>Fleet size</b> 9
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 <b>2 Flight crew</b>	<b>First deliveries</b> Commercial configuration <b>2023</b> Multi-roles configuration <b>2027</b>
 <b>1 Air Refuelling Operator</b>	
 <b>8 Cabin crew</b>	

 **STRATEGIC TRANSPORT**

- Maximum payload of up to 45 tons, combining passengers and 37 metric tons of cargo.

 **AIR-TO-AIR REFUELLING**

- 111,000 kg of fuel;
- Capable of refuelling a minimum of 6 RCAF fighter aircraft over the Atlantic in a single leg.

 **AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION**

- Minimum of 6 ambulatory patients, 2 critical care patients, 8 non-critical care patients, 24 Aeromedical Evacuation crew members and 144 passengers.

 **STRATEGIC GOVERNMENT OF CANADA TRANSPORT**

- One aircraft configured for VIP transport.



**ADDITIONAL ACQUISITIONS: simulators and infrastructure**