



## Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 22 September 2023

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.*

*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

### RUSI(NS) Remembrance Dinner 2023

**Save the date:** Thursday, 9 November. 1800 for 1830. More to follow.

#### **Events:**

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**29 September**, Friday - Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies webinar "The Royal Canadian Air Force's Future Role in NORAD and NATO." 1600–1700 BST. To register: <https://my.rusi.org/events/webinar-the-royal-canadian-air-force-s-future-role-in-norad-and-nato.html>.

**3 October**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Cardboard Meets Bits, Designing a WWII Tactical Leadership RPG." 7-9 pm ADT. Online. "The game strives to give players a tactically credible, emotionally authentic, and historically respectful experience of leading a US infantry company." For more info and to register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/cardboard-meets-bits-designing-a-wwii-tactical-leadership-crpg-tickets-631859688337>.

**17 October**, Tuesday - "Re-Fighting History The War in the East, Boardgames, and Histories of WWII." 7-9 pm ADT. Online. For more info and to register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/re-fighting-history-the-war-in-the-east-boardgames-and-histories-of-wwii-tickets-684218986407>.

**Amended: 18 October**, Wednesday - Distinguished Speaker Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander Royal Canadian Navy, titled "Why Canada Needs Submarines." 1400-1600. Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess. Registration required; see call-to-meeting/invitation.

Pre-event reading:

Canada's Future Submarine Capability

<https://cdainstitute.ca/canadas-future-submarine-capability/>

and:

Can a new operational profile fix Canada's submarine problem?

<https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/naval-warfare/canadas-submarines-have-had-limited-availability-in-recent-years-but-a-transition-to-a-new-operation/>

**12 December**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "The Tyranny of Binaries: how wargame rules build narratives." 7-9 pm AST. Online. For more info and to register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-tyranny-of-binaries-how-wargame-rules-build-narratives-tickets-633057882167>.

### **Publications:**

Publications without links are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

RUSI(NS) Paper "Kingston-class Ships – Less than meets the eye" by SWD Swan, 1 August 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/kingston-class/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Naval Doctrine and Strategy," 25 July 2023, [https://rusi-ns.ca/naval\\_doctrine\\_strategy/](https://rusi-ns.ca/naval_doctrine_strategy/)

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Brigade and Brigade Group," 15 July 2023, [https://rusi-ns.ca/brigade\\_brigade\\_group/](https://rusi-ns.ca/brigade_brigade_group/)

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 13 September 2023 <https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, September 2023

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 8, September 2023

Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada *Seatimes*, August 2023.

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, September 2023 <https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/212-rausi-dispatches-september-2023>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, September 2023

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies New South Wales *Newsletter*, Issue No.87 August 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 3rd Quarter 2023




**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 20, Issue 7, 18 September 2023






**New:** Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver *Members News* 19 Sept 2023


Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, August 2023, <https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute>

**@RUSI\_NS on X:**

@RUSI\_NS posts may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or reposted, email RUSI(NS).


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| <p>Canadian Coast Guard @CoastGuardCAN 15 Sep posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Today, we're #CCGProud to be in #Dartmouth, #NovaScotia to officially re-dedicate the CCGS Kopit Hopson 1752! Breaking a bottle upon the vessel's bow is long-held tradition that wishes fair winds and good fortune to those who sail on it.</p> <p><a href="https://canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2023/09/government-of-canada-officially-re-dedicates-vessel-in-spirit-of-reconciliation-with-indigenous-peoples.html">https://canada.ca/en/canadian-coast-guard/news/2023/09/government-of-canada-officially-re-dedicates-vessel-in-spirit-of-reconciliation-with-indigenous-peoples.html</a></p> <p>(Government of Canada officially re-dedicates vessel in spirit of reconciliation with Indigenous peoples)</p> <p><i>More:</i> Canadian Coast Guard Dedicates Third and Final Secondhand Medium Icebreaker</p> <p><a href="https://gcaptain.com/canadian-coast-guard-dedicates-third-and-final-secondhand-medium-icebreaker/">https://gcaptain.com/canadian-coast-guard-dedicates-third-and-final-secondhand-medium-icebreaker/</a></p> |    |
| <p>RCAF Operations @RCAFOperations 16 Sep posted: The @RCAF_ARC undertakes two major resupply missions each year—one in the spring and one in the fall—called #OpBOXTOP. Fuel, dry supplies and passengers are moved between 8 Wing Trenton and CFS Alert via the mighty CC-177 Globemaster. #RCAF (2/4)</p> <p>RUSI(NS) quoted: Operation BOXTOP = @CanadianForces @RCAF_ARC semi-annual airlift mission to supply Canadian Forces Station Alert, northeast tip of Ellesmere Island, Nunavut, 817 km from North Pole</p> <p><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-boxtop.html">https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-boxtop.html</a> #OpBOXTOP</p>   |  |
| <p>BGen / Bgén Stéphane Masson @5Div_Comd_5Div 20 Sep posted: Ongoing events in Canada and around the world are providing valuable insights on how our Forces are adapting for today and into the future. These insights and more were the topic of conversation at today's distinguished speakers event organized by the @RUSI_NS.</p> <p>RUSI(NS) reposted: A pleasure to host Brigadier-General Masson @5Div_Comd_5Div, presenting "Our troops are ready" &amp; his priorities of people, modernization &amp; readiness. Focused on providing unique @CanadianArmy support to</p>   |  |

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| <p>@CanadianForces ops abroad &amp; domestically.<br/>@5CdnDiv_5DivCA is in good hands</p>  |    |
| <p>"Army set to scrap dozens of troop carriers — even as Ukraine pleads for more equipment"<br/><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/armoured-vehicles-armatec-ukraine-dnd-1.6973154">https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/armoured-vehicles-armatec-ukraine-dnd-1.6973154</a> Even if CAN🇨🇦 can make battle-operational only a few armoured personnel carriers it is disposing, that would be useful to UKR🇺🇦 in defence of their country</p>   |    |
| <p>NATO Maritime Command @NATO_MARCOM 14 Sep posted: 14 NATO Nations and 1 Partner Nation will be participating in #DynamicMessenger next week in Portugal. The exercise promotes the integration of #MaritimeUnmannedSystems into #NATO operations. #WeAreNATO #InnovationNATO<br/>Canadian Armed Forces in Europe @CAFinEurope reposted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Great opportunity to train with #Allies &amp; #Partners! Looking forward to work side-by-side! / Belle opportunité de s'entraîner avec nos #Alliés &amp; #Partenaires! Hâte de travailler tous ensemble! @USNATO @Poland_MOD @NLatNATO @DelPortugalNATO @CanadaNATO 🇨🇦🇩🇪🇫🇷🇮🇹🇯🇵🇺🇸🇷🇺🇬🇧🇸🇪</p>   |  |
| <p>Bill Blair @BillBlair 15 Sep posted: Yesterday, I visited @GD_LandSystems Canada to meet with the workers who build armoured vehicles for the @CanadianForces. With projects like the ACSV, we'll continue to provide our military with the tools it needs to protect Canada – while creating good jobs for Canadians.<br/>RUSI(NS) reposted: ACSV = Armoured Combat Support Vehicle <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/armoured-combat-support-vehicle.html">https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/armoured-combat-support-vehicle.html</a> @CanadianArmy ambulances, mobile repair &amp; vehicle recovery vehicles, engineer support vehicles &amp; command posts for domestic &amp; international ops</p> |  |
| <p>NEXTA @nexta_tv 16 Sep tweeted: Almost 900 hectares of agricultural land have been demined in Kharkiv region. In general, in Kharkiv region demined more than 6.8 thousand hectares of territory. More than 109 thousand explosive objects have been destroyed. In particular, now the settlement of Tsirkuny in Kharkiv region is completely demined within the framework of the experimental project on restoration of settlements. More than 2.9 thousand kilometers of power lines and more than 288 kilometers of gas pipelines have been demined in the region. This has already made it possible to restore gas supply to 78 per cent of consumers and electricity supply to about 90 per cent of customers in the de-occupied territories.</p>   |  |

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| <p>RUSI(NS) reposted: Might CAN contribute doctrine, training &amp; equipment to help demine UKR? Alternate to providing tanks, artillery, armoured carriers which we lack. Demining will be long-duration necessary mission</p>  |  |
| <p>CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 21 Sep posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Experts dive into Canada's defence policy update &amp; procurement challenges, emphasizing funding issues, NORAD/NATO priorities, and key lessons from SSE. Need for transparency &amp; balanced funding allocation emerges pivotal factors for success.<br/>(Assessing SSE and Anticipating the Defence Policy Update <a href="https://cdainstitute.ca/assessing-sse-and-anticipating-the-defence-policy-update/">https://cdainstitute.ca/assessing-sse-and-anticipating-the-defence-policy-update/</a>)</p> |  |

**“Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia” on Facebook:**

RUSI(NS) posts may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS).

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| <p><b>Ukraine Isn’t the Reason the U.S. Is Unprepared for War</b><br/><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/09/russia-ukraine-war-us-aid-weapons-spending/675343/">https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/09/russia-ukraine-war-us-aid-weapons-spending/675343/</a><br/><i>Editor: It’s been noted that Facebook is deleting this post, probably because of the URL, after it has been posted.</i></p> <p>"A lack of defense production has created an alarming gap between America’s strategy and its capabilities."</p> <p>A lack of defence production capability limits the contributions Canada can make to allies and coalition partners in conflict operations, and options for government in less-than-conflict situations. There needs to be a study of what Canada needs in a major conflict, what we have, and what we need to do to get where we need to be. Such information (at least, as much as it can be turned into unclassified information) should be publicly available. People need to understand that all the ships, tanks and aircraft are useless after too short a time if they do not have the ammunition and spare parts to keep them operating.</p> |  |
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| <p><b>Canada to contribute \$33 million to British-led partnership delivering high priority air defence equipment to Ukraine</b><br/><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/09/canada-to-contribute-33-million-to-british-led-partnership-delivering-high-priority-air-defence-equipment-to-ukraine.html">https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/09/canada-to-contribute-33-million-to-british-led-partnership-delivering-high-priority-air-defence-equipment-to-ukraine.html</a></p> |  |
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"Canada will contribute \$33 million (CAD) to the partnership, which is providing Ukraine with hundreds of short- and medium-range air defence missiles and associated systems required to protect Ukraine's critical national infrastructure."

Providing funding to buy munitions is a reasonable alternative to having a national defence industry that can produce them, but it leaves Canada still to some degree not self-sufficient in producing armaments that increasingly it appears we need now, or at least in the short term, given situations internationally. The Canadian Armed Forces lacks air defence missiles and associated systems (see: We Have No Air Defence For Our Army – Why? <https://rusi-ns.ca/air-defence/>).

### **A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force**

<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3240&context=parameters>

"...the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict brings the changing character of warfare into sharp relief—a future of warfare marked by advanced autonomous weapons systems, artificial intelligence, and a casualty rate the United States has not experienced since World War II."



These are lessons for Canada, too.

From X: "The US Army War College just published a new paper on key lessons from the Ukraine War which suggests that the US could expect up to 3,600 casualties per day in a high intensity war, and that an adequate force could only be sustained with conscription." Does the Canadian Armed Forces and particularly the Canadian Army have the people, equipment and sustainment, all the way back to munitions stockpiles and production capabilities, to last more than a very short period of time?

### **Ukraine War: why the Black Sea is key to Kyiv's counteroffensive**

<https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-the-black-sea-is-key-to-kyivs-counteroffensive-213776>

"Nato could be more vocal about freedom of navigation and set up a red line that would forbid Russia from targeting grain ships."



'Red line' is not something one hears related to naval warfare. And 'freedom of navigation' is a US term. Still, if actioned, this could lead to some interesting 'lawfare' at sea aspects for the Russia-Ukraine war.

A significant comment was made to this RUSI(NS) Facebook post which was in Dispatches 15 September 2023. The comment is included here with the post.

### **Navy Expanding 'Cold Spray' Welding Alternative in Fleet Repair**

<https://news.usni.org/2023/09/12/navy-expanding-cold-spray-welding-alternative-in-fleet-repair>



"Cold spray uses a highly-pressurized gas that fires heated metal powder at supersonic speed to lay metal onto a surface."

"The technology uses a process called high deposition rate additive manufacturing."

Cool - cold-spray welding in mobile workshops or portable welders. Considering the growing necessity to get broken or battle damaged ships back into operation, what with the unfavourable balance of forces Canada and its allies are increasingly facing, such a capability would be worth the Royal Canadian Navy looking into. The RCN already has a laser additive manufacturing capability in at least one of its fleet maintenance facilities, it may not be much to add a deployable cold-spray welding capability.

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*Comment:* Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) is exploring cold spray welding and its potential for structural repairs of naval alloys. Cold spray has been used fairly extensively in the US for geometric repairs, typically to parts made of lower strength alloys. However, there is general interest among the Five Eyes countries in its suitability for structural repairs of higher strength alloys. To explore this, DRDC has been working with National Research Council Canada and developing cold spray procedures for nickel aluminum bronze. Comprehensive mechanical testing has been done and results will be published. Recommendations to senior authorities on the use of cold spray for repair and next steps for research should be ready in a year or so. DRDC is aware of the work Canada's allies are doing and is looking at possible areas of collaboration.

### **Other Sources:**

#### **#artificial intelligence**

Beyond ChatGPT: Experts say generative AI should write — but not execute — battle plans  
<https://breakingdefense.com/2023/09/beyond-chatgpt-experts-say-generative-ai-should-write-but-not-execute-battle-plans/>

Alexa, Write my OPOD: Promise and Pitfalls of Machine Learning for Commanders in Combat  
<https://cimsec.org/alex-write-my-opord-promise-and-pitfalls-of-machine-learning-for-commanders-in-combat/>

#### **#cyber operations**

Remind Me Again...What Were We Deterring? Cyber Strategy and Why the United States Needed a Paradigm Shift

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2023/9/4/remind-me-againwhat-were-we-deterring-cyber-strategy-and-why-the-united-states-needed-a-paradigm-shift>

#### **#land warfare**

Notes on Military Elite Units

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/bounds2.pdf>

Useful read, with how some units in the Russian-Ukraine War are called elite.

## **#reading**

War Books: Resistance

<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/war-books-resistance>

Commandant's Professional Reading List

<https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Commandant's-Professional-Reading-List.pdf>

## **#Russia-Ukraine War**

Navies face 'dreadnought moment' as Ukraine destroys more Russian warships, British admiral says

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/09/navies-face-dreadnought-moment-ukraine-destroys-more-russian-warships-british-admiral-says/390271/>

*'Dreadnought' may have not been the most accurate analogy but as something that resonates in people's historical memory, it resonates.*

Ukraine Situation Report: Rumors Swirl Of New Attacks On Black Sea Fleet

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-rumors-swirl-of-new-attacks-on-black-sea-fleet>

War in Ukraine: Is the counter-offensive making progress?

Great maps and pictures: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66796358>

The Tactical Mistake Russia Is Making in Its Defensive Lines

<https://www.businessinsider.com/tactical-mistake-russia-ukraine-war-defensive-lines-2023-9>

Ukraine seeks upper hand in cat-and-mouse game of naval drones

<https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2023/09/14/ukraine-seeks-upper-hand-in-cat-and-mouse-game-of-naval-drones/>

New Lessons U.S. Is Learning From The Air War Over Ukraine

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/new-lessons-u-s-is-learning-from-the-air-war-over-ukraine>

## **#artillery**

Ukraine learns to fight with a hodge-podge of foreign artillery

<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/09/ukraine-using-special-program-manage-foreign-donated-artillery/390322/>

Ukraine Situation Report: M109 Paladins Are Proving Too Wily For Russian Gunners

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-m109-paladins-are-proving-too-wily-for-russian-gunners>

## **#intelligence**

Report to Congress on Military, Intelligence Issues on Russian Invasion of Ukraine

<https://news.usni.org/2023/09/19/report-to-congress-on-military-intelligence-issues-on-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-3>



## #staffwork

America Needs a War on Bad Writing

satire: <https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/america-needs-a-war-on-bad-writing>

## #wargaming

New Research into the History, Theory and Practice of Naval Wargaming

[https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/143109168/New\\_Research\\_into\\_the\\_History\\_Theory\\_and\\_Practice\\_of\\_Naval\\_Wargaming\\_mariners\\_mirror.pdf](https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/143109168/New_Research_into_the_History_Theory_and_Practice_of_Naval_Wargaming_mariners_mirror.pdf)

### Wargaming

Dr. James W.E. Smith @James\_WE\_Smith 16 Sep posted: I was very grateful to @NauticalHistory in partnership with @kclwargaming for supporting the research that led to smashing the myth that professional British Wargaming starts with Britain's army. Research resulted in the attached journal article & I presented the final findings during King's Wargaming Week 2023 with the Keynote: 'The Art and Philosophy of Wargaming.'

#Wargaming was a tool central to the Admiralty era Royal Navy for education & training—Corbett used it too—before the British Army imported Prussian Kriegspiel. The latter the central myth that GB Wargaming starts with the Army.



## Other:

### Canadian Surface Combatant Land-Based Testing Facility

From CFB Halifax Public Affairs.

Please be advised that new information on the LBTF project is now available at [www.tridentnewspaper.com/lbtf](http://www.tridentnewspaper.com/lbtf). This information includes:

An update on the status of current site preparation work;

1. A construction timeline update, noting that construction will now take place between March 2024 and late summer 2027 (timeline subject to change);
2. A traffic management update;
3. An environmental update; and
4. An update on operational considerations during and post-construction.

You can view the full Community Information Bulletin by visiting [www.tridentnewspaper.com/lbtf](http://www.tridentnewspaper.com/lbtf).

During a public information session in January 2023, the LBTF project team committed to an additional information session ahead of construction. At this time, there is minimal information to be delivered beyond the construction updates provided in this latest website update. With that said, the project team recognizes that members of the public have questions regarding various aspects of this project including the Radio Frequency emissions and licensing processes and the future operation of the facility. When further information becomes available on these topics, updates will be provided.



## Project inquiries

If you have any questions as this project progresses, please don't hesitate to contact [CFBHalifaxPublicAffairs@forces.gc.ca](mailto:CFBHalifaxPublicAffairs@forces.gc.ca) and we will do our very best to provide responses in a timely manner in coordination with the LBTF project team. Should the information you're seeking be unavailable at this stage in the project, we will keep your questions on file to be answered as details become available.

While we continue our efforts to provide project information to the community, members of the public are also welcome and encouraged to promote the Trident website and these emails through their formal or informal networks. Links are as follows.

English: [www.tridentnewspaper.com/LBTF](http://www.tridentnewspaper.com/LBTF)  
French: [www.tridentnewspaper.com/fr/LBTF](http://www.tridentnewspaper.com/fr/LBTF)

Thank you for your continued interest in this project.

## US Army War College Quarterly *Parameters* Volume 53, Number 3 (2023) Autumn Issue

<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/>

contents:

A Historical Perspective on Today's Recruiting Crisis

A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force

The Strategic Importance of Taiwan to the United States and Its Allies: Part Two – Policy since the Start of the Russia-Ukraine War

The Impact of Antarctic Treaty Challenges on the US Military

US-Russia Foreign Policy: Confronting Russia's Geographic Anxieties

Urban Resistance to Occupation: An Underestimated Element of Land Warfare

The Chechen Kadyrovtsy's Coercive Violence in Ukraine

## US Army University Press *Military Review* September-October 2023

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2023/>

contents:

Pen and Sword: The Symbiosis between Ernest Hemingway and Maj. Gen. Buck Lanham

Low Crawling toward Obscurity: The Army's Professional Journals

Reimagining America's Professional All-Volunteer Army

Lack of Will: How the All-Volunteer Force Conditioned the American Public

Four Minutes to Make a Leader

The 11th Airborne Division Reborn: Arctic Angels

Russians Are Busy Hammering Out Their "Ideology of the Future"

Xi Jinping's PLA Reforms and Redefining "Active Defense"

Army University Press Products of Relevance to INDOPACOM and Korea

Data Centricity and the 1st Cavalry Division's "Speed of Relevance" during Warfighter 23-04

Pistol-Packing Padres: Rethinking Regulations Prohibiting Armed Military Chaplains

Medal of Honor: Nine Chaplains

Comedy in Combat Culture: Understanding the Use of Humor in Crisis and Conflict

Rear Detachment Operations through a Project Management Framework

## **Security Affairs Committee Synopsis**

### **Canada**

The Government of Canada has asked all departments to find fifteen billion CAD for possible cuts. The Department of National Defence is no exception. It will be interesting to see what cuts can be made to an already highly inadequate budget. One suspects the government will once again use DND as a piggy bank to cushion their previous planning.

The presentation with BGen Masson, the 5 Division commander this week, was great. It was good to hear a commander talk positively about his command, new equipment and his troops. It was also interesting that all the problems that were so when so many of us were in service are still stifling the soul of the service. The biggest problem is not that this generation is not interested, they are. They also are as good as any other generation, but we have a recruiting system built for a time when numbers were not needed as much so and inadequate and overly bureaucratic system has been allowed to remain uselessly in place doing no one any particular good. Security clearances required for so many military occupations are another chokepoint. It literally takes years in some cases to get a security clearance. The staffing is inadequate and has been for some time but again little to no action. The training system that we currently have is inadequate for the numbers of soldiers to be trained. There is a strong need to think outside the box such as civilian community colleges for key positions such as cooks, mechanics, aircraft maintenance personnel, photographers and geotechs. Reserve units can be used to train basic level training and even early occupation training so long as they are supported, as another way ahead. Our current system is not built or designed to train large numbers. The old system had its own problems but it was able to adjust as necessary to meet requirements as the CAF used to train between 14 and 20k personnel per year. The system needs to rethink, reboot and to become vastly more flexible. Authorities to enroll someone should be no higher than the regional level.

It was good to hear that new equipment is coming even if it is in many cases, new equipment is already obsolete or inadequate or as one has seen over time, each new iteration is bought in smaller and smaller numbers. This is true of all the services not just the army. Our procurement system is beyond hope and should be put out of its misery. Every time there is new equipment there is less of it and of lesser quality. It seems no one understands the need for redundancies, war stocks, adequate numbers of pieces within units, as well as filling second and third line supply and maintenance units. This does not even take into account the very real need to ramp up Canada's own ability to create sufficient necessary items such as ammunition.

### **Belarus**

The remaining Wagner forces are slowly leaving Belarus. It is expected that the most experienced will go to Wagner missions in Africa including Libya, Mali, Niger, Central African Republic and 13 other countries as well as Syria.

Latvia is closing its border crossing to Belarus shortly to prevent hybrid warfare using refugees fleeing their situation. On a similar matter, Belarus continues to accept Ukrainian children from Russia for re-education. Ukraine has called for their return.

### **Moldova**

NATO Deputy Secretary Mircea Joane stated that he sees no military threat to Moldova. He did state that hybrid warfare was likely to continue including non-kinetic attacks such as cyber, disinformation

and legal issues such as energy pressures according to RBC Ukraine reporter, Maria Kohlina, on 15 September during a visit to Chisinau.

Transnistria, the pro-Russian break away territory, remains relatively quiet, though pro-Russian sentiments are widely found throughout Moldova. A successful, non-corrupt government based on democratic values will be the true defence of Moldova in the future.

### **Russia-Ukraine War**

The war continues. Ukraine has become the superior power as Western equipment provided Ukraine with superior weapon systems especially in artillery and missiles. Ukraine has also developed and is continuing to develop an indigenous arms industry based on its own research and with the support of NATO allies. One of the most important events of the past week has been Ukraine's success against the Russian Black Sea fleet. Two vessels, one the landing ship *Minsk* and the improved Kilo-class submarine *Rostov-on-Don* were both effectively destroyed in dry docks. While the loss of the two vessels is important, the bigger loss is the potential damage and the loss of use of the two dry docks. It means that a significant part of Russia's ability to repair damage and maintain ships is not available in the foreseeable future. If the vessels are beyond economical repair, it will take time to remove the remains. The attack also means that these facilities are very definitely within the range of increasingly devastating Ukrainian attacks, thus Sevastopol is less and less likely to be useable for a fleet base. Ukraine's missile arsenal is expected to become more potent as the German Taurus and the US ATACM are expected to become available in the future. These missiles combined with modern fighter aircraft such as the Swedish Gripen and the US Fighting Falcon will be a marked improvement in Ukraine's already formidable capability. Longer range targets will be well within the range of attack as a result; the Kerch Bridge will be a sure target

Ukraine has continued to remove Russia's ability to resupply its forces by destroying critical infrastructure such as bridges, depots, supply points, headquarters, transportation hubs and air defences. At the same time they have increased attacks on longer range targets such as Moscow's defence industries. The Russian air defenses have had some success but it only takes one or two drones to hit a target within Moscow to cause increasing concern within the population. If one pays attention to Russian vloggers asking questions of Moscow citizens, recently the answers are continuing to become bolder in their criticism of the Russian government. There are not riots in the streets but resentment is growing. Russia's security forces front including National Guard and police units are finding themselves also heading for the front. Putin's ability to create conditions for a successful operation in Ukraine are becoming increasingly more difficult and thus Russia's ability to grab the initiative continues to weaken, at least in the near term.

By far the largest grouping of forces is in the north between the border and Kremmina is approximately 120k troops. Although they have the necessary numbers the level of their available equipment including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, logistics, bridging equipment and even mines continues to drop. Despite having the advantage and apparently the initiative in most areas, Ukraine has been able to stop most Russian offensive actions. Russia has been unable to effectively gain any significant ground.

Ukraine has however captured Klishchiivka and Adrivka just south of Bakhmut and made considerable headway against Russian forces. Russia has been forced to withdraw forces to stop the other Ukrainian attacks in the south near Robotny and Verbove. Ukrainian forces are expanding their bridgehead in this area after having breeched both the first and second line. Russians are seem to be working on their third line of defences near Tokmak.

The Ukrainians have apparently created conditions to expand their crossing points across the Dnipro near Kherson. This is possible because of Russian withdrawal of forces to reinforce their forces near Robotny including at least two divisions of the VDV or parachute forces identified as the 7th and 76th air assault divisions. These constitute some of the last effective experienced forces available in the theatre.

The overall effect is that the Ukrainians might be capable of much larger gains against tired and depleted Russian forces. This being said, the war is not over and Russia still has larger available manpower resources. The problem is whether a further call up of reserves and conscripts will be acceptable to an increasingly disgruntled population

## **China**

One point that needs to be repeated on a regular basis is that the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) does not represent the people of China. The CCP is approximately 8% of the total population and their main aim is their survival in power since taking over the governing of the country in 1949. It is responsible for the deaths of tens of millions of their own people through gross incompetence usually and an almost reptilian reaction to any opposition, peaceful or not.

China has in recent years conducted activities that have laid claims to significant areas of all 14 of their land-connected neighbours as well as significant claims in the East China and South China Seas. China has recently issued what is now called the ten-dash line map which has caused protests from its neighbours as this Chinese developed and issued map is considered China's official position in regard to its land and seas boundaries. It has not gone over well. It is evidence of China's imperial ambitions. It is very concerning if China acts on its new positions in a more forceful way. India has responded both forcefully and with their own map. General Minoj Nirvanna, the Indian Chief of Army Staff, commented that historically India and China did not have a common border at all. The map of modern China includes occupied East Turkistan (Xinjiang province), occupied Tibet, occupied South Mongolia and occupied Manchuria. It was coupled with new military exercises near to the Line of Actual Control. There is no "love lost" between these two nuclear powers. China is the second largest economy and India is now the fifth largest economy and both are major military powers.

Although China still looks impressive because of its actions and activities on the international scene, it is not the same internally. The CCP's deal with the people of China is based on the basis of a sound economy and increasing well-being and living conditions of the Chinese people overall. Since the start of Xi's third term as Party Chairman or the "Core leader" this relationship has deteriorated. Not all of this, such as the arrival of the pandemic, is Xi's specific fault but actions during the and after the easing of pandemic restrictions are just one example. The failure of some of the largest property developers such as Evergrande and Country Garden have devastated the property development industry so vital for infrastructure development, and consequently banking failures in some provinces has led to the decimation of the middle class. A secondary result is increased defaults on mortgages and people walking away from home ownership. At present there is growing concern within the Party that the people are increasingly looking at the Party as the problem.

The Party has cracked down on dissidents including many citizens who were scammed out of their savings by acts of fraud. The party's reaction to bank account holders trying to get their money out of their bank in some cases such as in Hebei province was to send in tanks. During Xi's time there have been increasing attempts to stifle religion, including crack downs on pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong (HK), Tibetans and the Uyghur community. Human rights lawyers have also been targeted as well. The Party also failed to eliminate poverty for about 40% of the population - between 500m and 600m people, mainly in poorer provinces, still live in abject poverty. Most importantly, the actions of

the local Party have not helped as they have conducted themselves in corrupt and petty ways that can exacerbate the overall situation of the local citizens. What continues to be in the Party's favour is the total lack of an organized opposition within the population. The opposition therefore remains inside the Party in the form of various factions, the most important is the Xi faction but its rival for power is the faction formed by followers of Jiang Zemin.

Apparently, Xi was brought to task by the Party elders at the Biedaihe annual summer (August 2023) gathering of all those Party members of the vice-minister level and including former members of that rank level. This effort was led by Zeng Quinhong, the current leader of what is left of the Jiang faction. The Party elders criticized Xi's current handling of the economy, which include the deteriorating relations with the US, US sanctions, fleeing foreign investment, and the withdrawal of many foreign companies from China in favour of other countries such as Vietnam. There is also the failure of sections of the economy such as property development, lack of control over the shadow banking system, the drop in exports and the lack of a consumer driven boost to the economy. Comment: The shadow banking system is the unofficial system in China of businesses making loans, etc., to other businesses. It is unregulated and thus the exact picture of China's finances can only be a fictional piece of information.

A further series of high profile ministers are disappearing including the Foreign Minister, Qin Gang, in July and more recently the Minister of Defence, Li Shengfu, last month. The excuse used is corruption. In the case of Qin Gang, it was the revelation of an affair that was widely publicized on social media, and Li apparently as a result of an investigation into his previous job as essentially head of logistics for the armed forces. Both men have not been seen recently and are thought to be in detention of some sort. The problem for Xi is that both men were appointed by Xi. Xi's main effort so to speak has been his crusade against corruption, but now the man who now has all the critical and powerful positions is now the target of factional foes. Xi has recently purged the Navy and most recently the Strategic Rocket Forces, both critical for any successful operations. Purges of the military from time to time have been a characteristic of authoritarian regimes and Xi has proceeded in a similar form, appointing "loyal" followers vice those with actual skill. Xi has a problem and it will not get better in the near term. There have been at least two known assassination attempts on Xi and possibly more recently. The CCP is not united and it is unlikely to do so in the near term. China is not doing well as a result.

On another interesting side note, a Chinese nuclear attack submarine may have been lost with all hands in the Yellow Sea. It is believed to be a Type 93 attack sub. This is not confirmed but the story continues to have "life" in the press throughout the region.


### **'Word Salad' Defence Paper Shows Real Lessons of Ukraine War Ignored in London**

<https://warshipsifr.com/features/word-salad-defence-paper-shows-real-lessons-of-ukraine-war-ignored-in-london/>

A criticism of UK defence policy and its writing. What parallels are there with Canadian policy? Might such criticisms be levelled at the Canadian Defence Policy Review when it is released (appreciating that ongoing budget cuts are likely to postpone release further) or will it be written with communications principles (clarity, brevity, accuracy) in mind?

The graphic in the article is good, especially the comments in its caption.

British commentators seem to like to use 'word salad' - descriptive.



## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In the early hours of 13 September 2023, multiple missiles struck the Sevmorzavod shipyard within Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Sevastopol naval base. The landing ship Minsk and Kilo 636.3 class submarine Rostov-na-Donu were hit while undergoing maintenance in dry docks.
- Despite the Russian Ministry of Defence downplaying the damage to the vessels, open-source evidence indicates the Minsk has almost certainly been functionally destroyed, while the Rostov has likely suffered catastrophic damage. Any effort to return the submarine to service is likely to take many years and cost hundreds of millions of dollars.
- There is a realistic possibility that the complex task of removing the wreckage from the dry docks will place them out of use for many months. This would present the BSF with a significant challenge in sustaining fleet maintenance. The loss of the Rostov removes one of the BSF's four cruise-missile capable submarines which have played a major role in striking Ukraine and projecting Russian power across the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Between October 2022 and March 2023, Russia focused long-range strikes against Ukraine's national energy infrastructure. Air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), especially the modern AS-23a KODIAK, were at the heart of most of these strike missions. Russia uses strategic bomber aircraft to release these munitions from deep within Russian territory.
- Open source reports suggest that since April 2023, ALCM expenditure rates have reduced, while Russian leaders have highlighted efforts to increase the rate of cruise missile production.
- Russia is therefore likely able to generate a significant stockpile of ALCMs. There is a realistic possibility that Russia will again focus these weapons against Ukrainian infrastructure targets over the winter.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent days, Russian forces have likely reinforced their defences around the occupied town of Tokmak in southern Ukraine, which is approximately 16 km behind the current front line.
- Russia is likely deploying additional checkpoints, 'hedgehog' anti-tank defences and digging new trenches in the area, which is held by its 58th Combined Arms Army.
- Tokmak is preparing to become a lynchpin of Russia's second main line of defences. Improvements to the town's defences likely indicates Russia's growing concern about Ukrainian tactical penetrations of the first main defensive line to the north.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over the last two weeks, Russia has likely further reinforced the hard-pressed 58th Combined Arms Army with additional VDV airborne units on the Orikhiv axis in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
- A total of at least five VDV regiments drawn from the 7th and 76th divisions are likely now concentrated within several kilometres of the frontline village of Robotyne. At full strength, such a force should constitute around 10,000 elite paratroopers. However, almost all units are highly likely dramatically under strength.
- The current situation is likely to be seen as highly unsatisfactory by the VDV hierarchy. Throughout the war Russian commanders have attempted to regenerate the airborne forces as a highly mobile, striking force for offensive operations. Once again, they are being used as line infantry to augment over-stretched ground forces.



## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Through the first half of September 2023, heavy fighting has continued around the islands in the lower Dnipro in Kherson Oblast, which currently marks the front line.
- Both sides have launched raids with teams in small boats against the islands and against the opposite riverbanks. There is a realistic possibility that Russian operations in the area have been energised since the sector came under the responsibility of the newly created 40th Army Corps.
- The number of forces involved are relatively small compared to other fronts; however, both sides see the area as strategically important. It also provides the opportunity to draw their adversary's units away from the intense combat in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since 15 September 2023, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have secured the villages of Klishchiivka and Andriivka, approximately 8km to the south of the Donetsk Oblast town of Bakhmut.
- This tactical success brings Ukrainian forces closer to the T 05-13 road, one of the main supply routes into Bakhmut from the south. However, Russia continues to hold the railway line which runs along an embankment between Klishchiivka and the T 05-13, creating a readily defensible obstacle.
- Recent redeployments of Russian airborne forces from Bakhmut to Zaporizhzhia in southern Ukraine have likely weakened Russia's defences around Bakhmut.



CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND  
COMMANDEMENT DU RENSEIGNEMENT DES FORCES CANADIENNES

#### RUSSIA'S CLAIM:

On September 13, the Russian Defence Ministry stated that two Russian vessels damaged in Sevastopol dry docks that day, a Ropucha landing ship and a Kilo-class submarine, would be fully restored and continue to serve in combat.

#### BASED ON CANADIAN FORCES INTELLIGENCE COMMAND ANALYSIS:

- The damage caused to the submarine's hull and internal components render it functionally inoperable.
- The landing ship also has a compromised hull and extensive damage throughout multiple critical systems.
- Due to the extensive damage to these two vessels, it is likely the repair timelines will follow that of the Russian aircraft carrier *Admiral Kuznetsov*, which has been under repair since 2017.

UKRAINE / RUSSIA UPDATE // 2023-09-21



National  
Defence  
Défense  
nationale



UPDATE ON UKRAINE  
21 September 2023

### INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Today, 21 September 2023, is the anniversary of Russian President Vladimir Putin's announcement of the 2022 'partial mobilisation' which saw around 300,000 Russian reservists called up to serve in Ukraine.
- On 15 September 2023, Russian State Duma Defence Committee Chair and former general Andrei Kartapolov reiterated that mobilised personnel were obliged to serve for the duration of the 'special military operation'. In a new admission of the stark situation at the front, he also said that it was not possible for personnel to be rotated out of the operational zone during their service.
- The absence of regular unit rotations out of combat duty is highly likely one of the most important factors contributing to low Russian morale, and the Russian Army's failure to conduct higher-level training since the invasion. The lack of such training is highly likely contributing to Russia's difficulties in conducting successful complex offensive operations.

#Indo-Pacific

Good graphic usage.

Ian Ellis @ianellisjones 17 Sep posted: China carried out major naval exercises + encircled Taiwan last week:

- Largest-ever drills simulating a blockade
- 20+ warships deployed, a new single-day record
- Massive ADIZ violation, 160+ planes detected
- 3x Surface Action Groups participate

Everything you need to know

