



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 29 September 2023

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

RUSI(NS) Remembrance Dinner 2023

Save the date: Thursday, 9 November. 1800 for 1830. More to follow.

Events:

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

3 October, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Cardboard Meets Bits, Designing a WWII Tactical Leadership RPG." 7-9 pm ADT. Online. "The game strives to give players a tactically credible, emotionally authentic, and historically respectful experience of leading a US infantry company." For more info and to register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/cardboard-meets-bits-designing-a-wwii-tactical-leadership-crpg-tickets-631859688337>.

17 October, Tuesday - "Re-Fighting History - The War in the East, Boardgames, and Histories of WWII." 7-9 pm ADT. Online. For more info and to register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/re-fighting-history-the-war-in-the-east-boardgames-and-histories-of-wwii-tickets-684218986407>.

18 October, Wednesday - Distinguished Speaker Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander Royal Canadian Navy, titled "Why Canada Needs Submarines." 1400-1600. Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess. Registration required; see call-to-meeting/invitation.

Pre-event reading:

Canada's Future Submarine Capability

<https://cdainstitute.ca/canadas-future-submarine-capability/>

and:

Can a new operational profile fix Canada's submarine problem?

<https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/naval-warfare/canadas-submarines-have-had-limited-availability-in-recent-years-but-a-transition-to-a-new-operation/>

and

Canada's Future Submarine Capability

<https://cdainstitute.ca/canadas-future-submarine-capability/>

New: 14 November, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Read Threat Rising -- US Marine Corps Educational Wargames." 7-9 pm AST. Online. For more info and to register:

<https://www.eventbrite.com/e/read-threat-rising-us-marine-corps-educational-wargames-tickets-698764231627>

12 December, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "The Tyranny of Binaries: how wargame rules build narratives." 7-9 pm AST. Online. For more info and to register:

<https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-tyranny-of-binaries-how-wargame-rules-build-narratives-tickets-633057882167>.

Publications:

Publications without links are available on request to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

RUSI(NS) Paper "Kingston-class Ships – Less than meets the eye" by SWD Swan, 1 August 2023,

<https://rusi-ns.ca/kingston-class/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Naval Doctrine and Strategy," 25 July 2023, [https://rusi-](https://rusi-ns.ca/naval_doctrine_strategy/)

[ns.ca/naval_doctrine_strategy/](https://rusi-ns.ca/naval_doctrine_strategy/)

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Brigade and Brigade Group," 15 July 2023, [https://rusi-](https://rusi-ns.ca/brigade_brigade_group/)

[ns.ca/brigade_brigade_group/](https://rusi-ns.ca/brigade_brigade_group/)

New: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 27 September 2023

<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, September 2023

New: Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 9, October 2023

Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada *Seatimes*, August 2023.

New: Naval Association of Canada Ottawa Branch September 2023 Speaker's Evening recording "Canadian Sea Power in the Wake of Changing Geopolitics" with Dr Rob Huebert

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JfPImxlyZqg>

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, September 2023

<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/212-rausi-dispatches-september-2023>

New: Royal Canadian Logistics Service Newsletter *The Logistician* September 2023

<https://sway.office.com/pA4cFB1V3YMF4WNI>

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, September 2023

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies New South Wales *Newsletter*, Issue No.87 August 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 3rd Quarter 2023

New: Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 20, Issue 8, 25 September 2023

New: Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver *Members News* 26 Sept 2023

Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, August 2023, <https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute>

@RUSI_NS on X:

@RUSI_NS posts may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or reposted, email RUSI(NS).

The Cove @covetweet 21 Sep posted: Since the launch of our Take That Hill! giveaway, we have seen great feedback about the value of #wargaming to unit PME. This in-depth review from 1/15 RNSWL shows how they are incorporating it into simple training, with lessons from red and blue players (Wargaming Primer as a PME Tool

<https://cove.army.gov.au/article/take-hill-reviews>)

CDN Defence Academy/L'Académie cdn de la défense

@CDACanadaACD 22 Sep quoted and RUSI(NS) reposted:

🇺🇸 You would be hard pressed to find a leader in Army who disagrees with the statement “Professional Military Education (PME) is important”, yet there are so many opportunities for PME that exist in the ether that go unexploited. Wargaming is one of them. (@covetweet)



RUSI @RUSI_org 22 Sep posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: 'A polarised political environment has seen soldiers take to social media to air political views, which goes against most forces' codes of conduct' writes Major Patrick Hinton in the latest #RUSICommentary.

(Soldiers and Social Media in the Age of Connectivity Saturation

<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/soldiers-and-social-media-age-connectivity-saturation>)



Note from article: Social media is used by senior officers as a strategic communications tool to advance national objectives, whether by reassuring allies or deterring adversaries. It is also used by units and formations to attract people to enlist in a challenging recruiting environment. However, there is ongoing evidence of poor, improper and illegal behaviour which can impact team cohesion and play into the hands of adversaries.

AMTI @AsiaMTI Sep 22 posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:
The Philippine and Canadian navies conduct a joint sail in the South China Sea.

<https://globalnation.inquirer.net/219656/fwd-ph-canadian-navy-conducts-bilateral-sail-in-west-philippine-sea>

@inquirerdotnet

(PH, Canadian navy conduct bilateral sail in West Philippine Sea)

Ed: Interesting to read a Philippine perspective. And to note the difference in article titles.



David Pugliese @davidpugliese 23 Sep posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: DND increasingly claims records requested by public don't exist, but critics have their doubts

<https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/dnd-increasingly-claims-records-requested-by-public-dont-exist-but-critics-have-their-doubts> via @ottawacitizen



5th Canadian Division @5CdnDiv_5DivCA 25 Sep posted:

Tracking targets in the sky! ✈️ 4th Artillery Regiment's Medium Range Radar was put to the test on Ex CUTLASS FURY 23. Capable of detecting hostile aerial targets, the MRR can predict the point of impact, point of origin, and survey airspace for anything from rockets to jets.



RUSI(NS) quoted: .@5CdnDiv_5DivCA 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support) provides: Medium Range Radars, Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Airspace Coordination Centres, & Fires, Air Defence & Surveillance & Target Acquisition Coordination Centres to @CanadianArmy
<https://www.canada.ca/en/army/corporate/5-canadian-division/4-artillery-regiment.html>



CDN Defence Academy/L'Académie cdn de la défense @CDACanadaACD 27 Sep posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:
🇺🇸🇨🇳 @WarOnTheRocks Where the Wargames Weren't: Assessing 10 Years of U.S.- Chinese Military Assessments #WargameWednesday


<https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/where-the-wargames-werent-assessing-10-years-of-u-s-chinese-military-assessments/>




<p>NAADSN_RDSNAA @NAADSN_RDSNAA 26 posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: 🇺🇸🇨🇦 Latest Policy Primer out by @adam_lajeunesse - #Chinese Media Reactions to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and @NATO Expansion in Sweden and Finland</p> <p>https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/23sep-Lajeunesse-China-Reactions-Ukraine-NATO_Policy-Primer.pdf</p>	 <p>The image shows the cover of a 'POLICY PRIMER' document. It features the NAADSN logo in the top right corner, which includes the text 'NAADSN' and 'naadsn.ca'. The title of the primer is 'Chinese Media Reactions to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and NATO Expansion in Sweden and Finland', dated 'September 25, 2023'. The author is listed as 'Adam Lajeunesse, PhD' and 'NAADSN Coordinator'.</p>
<p>Federal Fleet @federalfleet Sep 26 posted: Asterix is working alongside the Philippine Navy to enable long-range naval patrols enforcing the Philippines' maritime sovereignty and fisheries. Through Asterix, Canada plays a pivotal role, worldwide, in enabling operations to maintain the sovereign rights of Canada's allies.</p> <p>RUSI(NS) quoted: Providing logistics services from replenishment oiler ASTERIX, leased to @RoyalCanNavy, is example of how CAN🇨🇦 supports allies & partners. Maintaining security at sea means being there & being able to stay there. Logistics ships are mark of #BlueWaterNavy</p>	 <p>The image shows the Asterix replenishment oiler at sea, illuminated by searchlights, with other ships visible in the background.</p>

“Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia” on Facebook:

RUSI(NS) posts may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS).
 Meta is deleting some RUSI(NS) Facebook posts that are linked to news. Readers of *Dispatches* may have to search online for an article if they are interested in reading it further.

<p>Inside the West's Mammoth Effort to Turn Ordinary Ukrainians Into Soldiers</p> <p>https://time.com/6315601/west-mammoth-ukrainians-soldiers/</p> <p>"a former British army officer ... that he had over three years of training before he ever stepped foot onto a warzone."</p> <p>We won't have years to prepare our soldiers (historically, the 'ten years rule' for equipment procurement left countries woefully unprepared). The possibility of a short- or no-notice conflict ('gray rhino?') is too great at this time. Canada needs to have a system at the ready, call it or not 'mobilization', to train soldiers in a few months to expand our army to necessary levels or to replace casualties which will happen in great numbers.</p>	 <p>The image shows several Ukrainian soldiers in camouflage gear lying on the ground in a field, possibly in a trench or defensive position.</p>
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<p>Does Canada have a foreign policy?</p> <p>https://www.gzeromedia.com/gzero-north/does-canada-have-a-foreign-policy</p> <p>"Canada hasn't published a National Security Strategy, for example, since 2004. Nor has it undertaken a formal Foreign Policy Review. Without a conceptual anchor like that, Canada's foreign policy is unmoored."</p>	 <p>The image shows a map of North America with a large, stylized red maple leaf overlaid on the continent of Canada.</p>
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Aussie Hunter-class Frigate Program Facing Cuts?

<https://www.navalreview.ca/2023/09/aussie-hunter-class-frigate-program-facing-cuts/>

"Despite repeated questioning, Mr Hudson (BAE Systems Australia CEO) declined to publicly reveal the current projected 'top weight' of the Hunter-class frigate, or its parent design, Britain's new Type 26 warship."

Growth (displacement, size) of warships whilst in the design stage is a concern as such growth can lead to underperforming ships and increased cost. It is only right that governments should demand figures, even if estimates, and publicize them. Such figures are a mark of a shipbuilder's performance before a project has progressed too far to recover.

The Australian Hunter-class and Canadian Surface Combatant project ship are both based on the British Type 26 design.



Politicians or Lynch Law: Who Will Control Ukraine's Reconstruction?

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/politicians-or-lynch-law-who-will-control-ukraines-reconstruction>

Transport Canada "established (a) working group to support reconstruction of UKR transportation infrastructure & resiliency of Ukraine's rail infrastructure" ("The Government of Canada and the Canadian Railway Industry to provide rail assistance to Ukraine" <https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2022/09/the-government-of-canada-and-the-canadian-railway-industry-to-provide-rail-assistance-to-ukraine.html>). There doesn't appear to have been anything public about that since the September 2022 announcement.

Reconstruction of Ukraine (mine clearing, infrastructure rebuilding) will be a huge undertaking. Might be a good opportunity, whenever it arises, for Canadian contributions.



Canada Frigate to Test AEGIS Combat System at US Facility

<https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/09/22/canada-test-aegis-us-facility/>

The Aegis combat system test site for the Canadian Surface Combatant project ships will be built at a US facility. Whilst that arrangement probably makes sense for a number of reasons, it is a regret that the site will not be built in Canada as will be the Canadian Surface Combatant Land-Based Testing Facility (<http://tridentnewspaper.com/LBTF/>). Developing Canadian capabilities is what the National Shipbuilding Strategy generally intended.

Aegis is a naval combat system built to defend against advanced air and surface threats, and is fully integrated with missile launching element, computer programs, radar and displays working together.



Operation NANOOK 2023 successfully concluded in Canada's Arctic

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/09/operation-nanook-2023-successfully-concluded-in-canadas-arctic.html>

US Navy participation in Canada's Operation NANOOK in the Arctic included a nuclear-powered submarine and uncrewed undersea vehicles (UUV) from UUV Flotilla 1 (UUVFLOT 1). Two thoughts: there needs to be planning and exercise of responding to an emergency in a nuclear-powered submarine in the Arctic. And it may be a good idea for the Royal Canadian Navy to establish an organization to operate UUV (drones) in the Arctic. In both cases, the challenges of distance and environment mean that navies cannot simply depend on resources deploying from the south.



HII & GDEB integrate 3D printing into shipbuilding process for Virginia class subs

<https://navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/september/13598-hii-gdeb-integrate-3d-printing-into-shipbuilding-process-for-virginia-class-subs.html>



"This move to use certified 3D-printed parts could potentially hasten the construction and subsequent delivery of submarines to the U.S. Navy by minimizing waiting periods for essential components."

Could/will such action be undertaken to progress production of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project boats? Considering increasing concern over conflict situation(s) in the world and a 'closing strategic window' (decreasing time to ready for a conflict), Canada has to be capable for expediting building of defence resources. Is Canadian industry keeping up with additive manufacturing developments?

With delay of fleet review, RAN must be prepared to fight with what it has now

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/with-delay-of-fleet-review-ran-must-be-prepared-to-fight-with-what-it-has-now/>



"As time creeps on in an era of no strategic warning time, and as capability reviews continue, the sobering thought is that the ADF (Australian Defence Force) and RAN (Royal Australian Navy) must be prepared to fight tonight with the fleet they have now."

Australia is undergoing a surface combatant fleet review. There is a debate there over the number and capability of their major and minor combatants (what the Australians call 'tiers' - 'major' and 'minor' are relative and somewhat undefined terms depending on a state's navy). Canada has not had such a debate, at least publicly; there seems generally to be a comfort level (acceptance?) with the frigates, submarines, large patrol vessels and small patrol vessels of the Royal Canadian Navy, though not with their age and speed and cost of replacement. This is called fleet balance. Re-balancing is a continual process as the world's geo-political conditions change. For instance, the current decreasing 'strategic warning time' of a major conflict with, say, China, means that the Canadian government should be considering more closely an expedited procurement of more submarines than the four in the fleet at

present. Or considering arming naval and civil ships that don't normally carry much or any armament.

An aspect alluded to in the article but not developed is that maybe it isn't the number of major combatants that should be a concern, but the number of missiles at sea, no matter how they are there. That count may be a more useful, though simplistic, measure of a state's fighting capability.

At the end of the town hall in Halifax prior to the Government of Canada issuing the defence policy Strong, Secure Engaged, I overheard one of the politicians mutter to a colleague he wished someone would tell him how many ships Canada needed. He was asking the wrong question, at least for the occasion. Politicians should be asking, with maybe a little bit of telling (leadership), the general public what they want their country to be able to do, and what they want their military to be able to do in support of that answer. Then it is the admirals and generals to state what is needed (after which rages the affordability debate) - preferably with as much of this as possible being public so the citizenry knows how and why their dollars are being spent.

Meanwhile, what's being discussed in Australia is worth attention.

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Comments from a RUSI(NS) member: A good article out of Australia. As is common of late, they are asking good, first-principles questions of their defence capability - what is needed and why? The issue of cost, and thus affordability, comes after that, and accordingly demands adjustments and compromise on capability. The result is that even when making choices to reduce or defer on procurement they establish a sound understanding of the shortfall. And, critically, they achieve broad, political consensus in the process.

By comparison, in Canada we constrain right from the start. As a first step, a first principles analysis is hard to generate. There is a natural tendency to assume that we should propagate what capability we have into the future - replacing like for like and in similar number. That tendency can be overcome at the service level (for the Navy, "Leadmark" and its various updates were intended to do that) but the effort generally stands alone and is not supported across DND/CAF. Within the Department it strays too close to the policy dimension, which is jealously guarded, and across the Armed Forces is seen as competitive, which indeed it can be. The result is that the whole issue is never forced for consideration at the appropriate level - that of the government of the day and of Parliament more generally.

No national consensus on need is ever generated and thus we persevere on cost alone and defence remains a matter of divisive political debate, and poorly understood by the public at large. Of course, being accustomed to living under the protection of the USA, we seem to think we have the luxury to prevaricate. Australia, being much further removed, knows it must work of it.

Legitimate Questions About the U.S. Navy's Struggle to Change

<https://defenseopinion.com/legitimate-questions-about-the-u-s-navys-struggle-to-change/447/>

Despite great differences in scale of the navies of Canada and the US, there are enough similarities in challenges and potential solutions that Canada should pay attention to US thinking and actions; some take aways:

- there is difficulty deploying new weapons systems;
- the fleet needs funding to uncrewed and crewed systems;
- wargaming results suggest that aircraft carriers, destroyers and even submarines are vulnerable to adversary defenses, but don't tell the whole story;



- shipyards are part of the problem, especially when they build controversial ships; they need a steady building program to stay viable over time;
- the Navy needs a maritime strategy to inform its operations and force design (the wording is very US where strategy is put before force design); and
- everyone one needs to band together to support change.

Other Sources:

#A2R

Strengthening the Ranks: Strategies for Improving Retention

US but lessons: <https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2023/09/22/strengthening-the-ranks-strategies-for-improving-retention/>

#artificial intelligence

AI Strategies in the PLA's Coastal and Air Defense

<https://jamestown.org/program/ai-strategies-in-the-plas-coastal-and-air-defense/>

How revisiting naval aviation's lessons can (and cannot) inform military AI innovation

<https://breakingdefense.com/2023/08/how-revisiting-naval-aviations-lessons-can-and-cannot-inform-military-ai-innovation/>

#Australia

Resetting the Australian Army

<https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/occasional-papers/resetting-australian-army>

#cyber operations

Pro-India hackers claim responsibility for disruption of Canadian Forces website

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-india-hackers-canadian-army/>

#defence policy

Playing 'Dodgeball' with the NATO Commitment

<https://frontline.online/defence/2023/1/12913-playing-dodgeball-with-the-nato-commitment>

The 2% 'Solution'

<https://frontline.online/defence/2023/1/13066-the-2%-solution>

#drones

How small drones changed modern warfare

<https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/small-drones-military-warfare/>

Cheap Drones Help Ukraine Evade Russian Air Defenses

<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/22/world/europe/ukraine-budget-drones-russia.html>

Iran Claims Development of 'Water-Landing' Military Drone

Interesting: <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/09/25/iran-water-landing-drone/>

British drone releases torpedo at sea for first time

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-drone-releases-torpedo-at-sea-for-first-time/>

#Indo-Pacific

Urgency in the Indo-Pacific: Canada at a distance as China becomes increasingly mbedded

<https://cdainstitute.ca/urgency-in-the-indo-pacific-canada-at-a-distance-as-china-becomes-increasingly-embedded/>

#information operations

17th of September in Lukashenko's Belarus: militarist, USSR-style rhetoric and the demonisation of Poland

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/17th-of-september-in-lukashenkos-belarus-militarist-ussr-style-rhetoric-and-the-demonisation-of-poland/>

How to identify misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation

<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/how-identify-misinformation-disinformation-and-malinformation-itsap00300>

#Russia

Shaping and manipulating the information space

<https://euvsdisinfo.eu/shaping-and-manipulating-the-information-space/>

#land warfare Indo-Pacific

Landmines in Ukraine: Lessons for China and Taiwan

<https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/landmines-in-ukraine-lessons-for-china-and-taiwan/>

#maritime strategy #China #legal

Anatomy of China's Maritime Strategy: Threatening the Maritime Order Through Its National Legislation and Self-Centered Interpretation of UNCLOS

<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol100/iss1/10/>

#planning

Planning for the Next War Must Be a Mixture of Art & Science

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/september/planning-next-war-must-be-mixture-art-science>

#Royal Canadian Navy #submarines

Canada's Future Submarine Capability

<https://cdainstitute.ca/canadas-future-submarine-capability/>

#Russia-Ukraine War

Dubious Russian Claims of 'Doubling' Arms Production

<https://jamestown.org/program/dubious-russian-claims-of-doubling-arms-production/>

Russia Uses All Means to Recruit Central Asians for War in Ukraine

<https://jamestown.org/program/russia-uses-all-means-to-recruit-central-asians-for-war-in-ukraine/>

Why Were Predictions About Russia's War on Ukraine So Wrong?

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/russia-war-ukraine/>

It's Time for the West to Embrace Ukraine's Way of War, Not Doubt It

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/it%E2%80%99s-time-west-embrace-ukraine%E2%80%99s-way-war-not-doubt-it>

How Greek shipping oligarchs are reaping billions from Putin's war

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2023/09/25/greek-shipping-oligarchs-billions-russia/>
Economic warfare doesn't work if there are those who put their personal interest first.

Ukraine darkens Russia's naval prospects in the Black Sea

<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/09/ukraine-darkens-russias-naval-prospects-in-the-black-sea/>

Biting Off What It Can Chew: Ukraine Understands Its Attritional Context

<https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/biting-off-what-it-can-chew-ukraine-understands-its-attritional-context/>

#information operations

France exposes mega Russian disinformation campaign

<https://www.politico.eu/article/france-accuses-russia-of-wide-ranging-disinformation-campaign/>

Germany Sees More Aggressive Russian Disinformation Campaigns Since Invasion Of Ukraine

<https://www.rferl.org/a/germany-aggressive-russian-disinformation/32579614.html>

#strategy

The Case Against the Concept of Great Power Competition

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/6/30/the-case-against-the-concept-of-great-power-competition>

Antecedents to Strategy: The Use of Force

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/antecedents-to-strategy-the-use-of-force/>

Choosing Strategy: Meaning, Significance, Context

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/choosing-strategy-meaning-significance-context/>

Beyond Strategy as a Means to an End

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/beyond-strategy-as-a-means-to-an-end/>

Why Strategy Is Easy but Difficult (at the Same Time): A Short Study on the Complexities of Escalation

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/why-strategy-is-easy-but-difficult-at-the-same-time-a-short-study-on-the-complexities-of-escalation/>

#United States

Citizen Soldiers and American State Defense Forces

<https://domesticpreparedness.com/articles/citizen-soldiers-and-american-state-defense-forces>

A US perspective as Canada considers its Armed Forces and domestic operations.

#wargaming

Kriegspiel 2030: A Free-Play Tactical System for the Infantry

<https://www.themaneuverist.org/post/kriegspiel-2030-a-free-play-tactical-system-for-the-infantry-by-capt-william-allred-usmc>

Wargaming at the Company Level: Assessments and Recommendations to Avoid a Wargaming Bust

<https://www.themaneuverist.org/post/wargaming-at-the-company-level-assessments-and-recommendations-to-avoid-a-wargaming-bust>

Other:

Canadian Defence Academy *The Torch*: What's New This Week? 26 September - 2 October

<https://cfc-ca.libguides.com/c.php?g=709488&p=5224119>

Mine Warfare

Royal Canadian Navy @RoyalCanNavy 21 Sep posted: Today in 1996 – 1st of its class, #HMCSKingston was commissioned and the first ship to be built in #Halifax in 32 years. Kingston can conduct coastal patrols, minesweeping, law enforcement, pollution surveillance and response, as well as search and rescue duties.



Actually, the Kingston-class no longer have the ability to conduct mechanical minesweeping as they did originally. However, they currently embark both AUV (underwater drones) and clearance diving teams for mine countermeasures (MCM)-related missions.

Russia-Ukraine War

SW @TheStudyofWar offers unparalleled and comprehensive coverage of #Russia's invasion of #Ukraine with our daily campaign assessments. Sign up to receive these in your inbox here: <https://isw.pub/ISWEmailSignUp>

Editor: Their assessments are good.



Decoys

AFV Recognition @AFVRec_ 25 Sep posted: Russian inflatable T-72B's, likely from the 45th Separate Camouflage Engineer Regiment, the unit specialises in inflatable vehicles, check below for a full run down of the 45th Separate Camouflage Engineer Regiment.

A thread on inflatable vehicles:

https://twitter.com/AFVRec_/status/1611655057682092033



Force Development?

Nicholas Drummond @nicholadrummond 27 Sep posted: Within the first 6 months of the war in Ukraine starting, every NATO army decided to acquire some kind of loitering munition and an attritable UAV. 18 months later, there's a realisation that they actually need to reconfigure the entire army around a range of UAS and counter-UAS capabilities.

There's a point there.



Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

O Canada

Canadian foreign relations has taken a rather severe setback due to a series of gaffs that show the need for better vetting by all concerned. The Speaker works independently of the PM and the Government and therefore is responsible for the work to ensure visitors who will be presented to Parliament. This was an unfortunate oversight. The fallout from this event has had international consequences. Quite simply, our country appears to be more of a "hazard to navigation" than a serious international partner. The topic is obviously very political at present but it does indicate a very definite need for a rebuild of Global Affairs and a complete review of our foreign policy. Although much could be said, because of the nature of these events, the topic will end here.

Australia

These have been provided by our "Australian correspondent" who has given us a view of an area of the world that we are not familiar with on a regular basis. Australia has many of the issues that Canada has at present. The main difference is that Australia has taken a different approach that has made them a true international player. Australia has also passed Canada in per capita income for the first time. Its policies and economy are the product of sound governance and understanding of the world situation.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/where-will-australia-store-its-nuclear-waste/>

Comment: The article covers an Australian point of view on the subject of the future storage of nuclear waste created by Australia's use of nuclear fuels. This may include the future nuclear submarine fleet and possible civilian usage. It is a problem that Canada has addressed as well and it continues to review its own system of storage.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/budget-doesnt-reflect-urgency-of-demands-on-defence/>

Comment: Canada also needs the same discussion.

<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-09-14/departement-of-defence-natural-disaster-emergency-response/102857208>

Comment: The Australian Army has similar challenges to the Canadian Army with respect to civilian emergencies.

<https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/defence-and-foreign-affairs/former-defence-force-personnel-set-to-face-20-years-jail-for-providing-military-assistance-to-foreign-agencies-without-authorisation/news-story/4df19cf1b60cec062b783ae4b7af030a>

Comment: Australia has now developed legislation to prevent former military pilots from training foreign air forces. The penalties can rise be up to 20 years imprisonment. Canada has identified at least three former pilots of the RCAF who are engaged in similar situations. Canada does not currently have similar legislation yet.

<https://www.naval-technology.com/news/aucus-two-years-on-australias-submarine-dream/?cf-view>

Comment: This is an update on development of the Australian submarine program.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/with-delay-of-fleet-review-ran-must-be-prepared-to-fight-with-what-it-has-now/>

Comment: The RAN is pondering its future. The outcome is unclear but the Australian neighborhood is certainly full of challengers and challenges.

United States

The US has granted the Ukrainians a further allocation of military support which may include the ATACM missile with a 300 km range. This would put all of Russian-occupied Ukraine under the range of these missiles.

The first Abrams tanks have now entered Ukraine and should be involved in operations shortly. A total of 31 M1 have been allotted to Ukraine at this point. Modern Western tanks have been used both as small groups and as "sniper" tanks with their superior optics and night fighting capabilities with considerable success.

The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a long-in-the-tooth fighter aircraft. The US has not purchased new ones for over a decade, but it is the desired choice of many countries even now as it is constantly updated and modernized. Taiwan is receiving the newest version of the aircraft and has accepted several already. More importantly and interestingly, this fighter has been offered to Vietnam as a replacement for Soviet-era aircraft. Ukraine is expected to receive training and eventually used aircraft from US and NATO allies within the year. It will become their main combat aircraft. The Fighting Falcon continues to be an effective combat aircraft due to its flexibility and adaptability.

Moldova

The EU has granted 105m Euros to Moldova for energy security this week. The EU continues to support the Western-leaning Moldovan government of Maia Sandu in security and economic areas.

Belarus

Belarus Foreign Minister Sergei Aleinik stated at the UN during an interview with Associated Press reporter Edith Lederer on 26 September 2023 that he could not envision a situation where his country would enter the war in Ukraine alongside Russian forces. He also stated that he did not see a situation where Russia would order his country to use tactical nuclear weapons it recently deployed in his country. The article went on to provide more information on the Belarus relationship with Russia which is continuing to develop in most areas as part of the Union Agreement between the two countries. Belarus has been almost totally dependent on Russian largesse for the past thirty years. Belarus has been forced to become closer to Russia since the start of the war due to its own internal issues with the 2020 elections largely debunked as fraudulent. The self-appointed leader of the country has tried to walk a very fine line between the West and Russia for decades but has been forced to take a more pro-Russian point of view to keep the country afloat. This will not change.

Russia-Ukraine War

The war continues to extract heavy casualties on both sides of the war. Russia continues to lose credibility in the longer term and has been given little support so far by their allies although many countries are lining up to receive Russian petroleum products. Russia's economy also continues its slow decline even as military expenditures continue to rise. Production remains laggardly in Russia with many key weapons systems hamstrung by a lack of suitable computer chips, key Western-made aircraft parts, ammunition components, etc., to keep the Russian military in action. Kiyv's economy has also suffered especially with ongoing Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure. The total cost of damages is yet to be thoroughly estimated but certainly well over a trillion USD and this is likely to climb substantially. Russia still controls about 18% of Ukraine.

The war along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremmina line in the north remains relatively static with neither side gaining or losing any large amounts of ground. In the east near Bakhmut Ukraine continues to take small amounts of territory just south of Bakhmut, but the ground gives control over a higher elevation allowing for Ukrainian forces to dominate all the major supply roads into the devastated city. This puts Russian forces in a difficult position as Ukraine is able to develop the situation to their advantage. It is likely that Russian leadership will not give permission to withdraw to more defensible lines as Surovkin did in Kherson. There seems to be an inertia created by the desire of the Putin regime to "win" despite the outrageous costs to manpower and equipment. Ukraine's biggest effort is in the area of Robotyne where Ukrainian troops have holed Russian first and second lines and are now starting to be in position for a much larger effort with heavier forces. They are not there yet and Russian forces are now shoring up the third line in anticipation of this attack. The Dnipro situation continues to be mainly static with clashes between small groups or boats. Russian forces are thinly scattered across southern Kherson with most fortifications defending the Crimean peninsula.

The biggest story is not found in the tactical picture but rather the operational and strategic levels where Ukraine has some advantages. At the international level Ukraine seems to have the world's sympathy as they have basically won the information battle space. Russia still controls its own information space due to heavy restrictions on what Russian citizens can legally consume in the media. VPN have helped immensely in ensuring some in Russia do get other views but most are still dependent on government television and radio. Ukraine gets the sympathy vote and it is this point of view found in the West and therefore keeping its allies happy. Operationally, Ukraine is looking at the destruction of those headquarters, units and facilities that will shape the battlefield in the longer term. Elimination of these facilities and even individuals will have a cumulative effect on Russian forces ability to conduct command, control, communications and intelligence gathering while also degrading the ability of those forces to provide logistics and medical support to fighting units in targeted areas.

Ukraine is now in better shape in some respects than Russia as their artillery and missile systems now have the advantage of greater range and accuracy. Essentially their systems can hit while remaining out of range of similar Russian forces. The best example, but not the only one was the Storm Shadow attack on the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet that may have killed the fleet commander and injured several other general officers as well as staff. As many as 34 may have been killed by one account. This is not confirmed.

One other factor has been Ukraine's ability to adapt to the changing situation while innovating new tactics based on a more realistic understanding of the situation. New Ukrainian weapon systems seem to come online almost weekly; an example is the new autonomous large UUAV displayed for the press this week. It is Ukraine's ability to meet the challenge, examine it, plan, prepare and execute new options that has allowed the fight to continue for so long. Russia has not shown this capacity at this point. While this is said, Russia has shown a great ability to take casualties, make adjustments and build extensive defensive works quickly and effectively. They are not defeated by a long shot.

The last point for thought is the rise in Russian partisans within Russia crippling facilities, equipment etc. Free Russian forces which have been largely quiet have vowed to enter the fray once again in larger numbers in the coming weeks. There are also rumours to the effect that Russian officers in Sevastopol may have provided considerable targeting information to Ukraine. Time will tell if these are just the start of potential regime-changing forces.

Nagorno-Karabakh

The Azerbaijanis attacked the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave of Armenians on 19 September 2023 in violation of the ceasefire agreement which also placed Russian "peacekeepers" in place to prevent violence. Azerbaijan prior to this had closed off the only road from which the enclave was receiving food and medical supplies from Armenia thus creating a de facto blockade of the enclave nine months before the attack. The attack lasted less than 24 hrs and saw the enclave surrender to Azerbaijani forces. Five Russian peacekeepers were killed by accident by Azeri forces, but essentially Russian forces did little to prevent the violation of the ceasefire agreement. Azerbaijan apologized for the Russian losses but were essentially allowed to retain control of the enclave. To be fair, the enclave although mainly settled by Armenians was actually Azeri territory seized by Armenia in a short war in the early 1990s shortly after the demise of the Soviet Union. Approximately 120k Armenians lived in the enclave. As of mid week, more than 28k Armenians have fled the area to Armenia with a large number still on the road. The Armenians in the enclave stated that there is ethnic cleansing by the Azeris despite assurances that their rights would be respected. It is thought that Armenia is the casualty of more powerful nations vying for control over the area. Turkiye appears to be the biggest winner in this respect as the main backer of Azerbaijan. Russia appears to be the loser as they are preoccupied with the war in Ukraine. The US has just recently shown interest in the area and has recently held exercises with Armenian forces. This situation is likely to continue deteriorating especially in view of antigovernment demonstrations in Armenia.

The other issue at play is the Azerbaijan enclave of Nakhchivan, a mainly Azeri population of some 460k people. As part of the 2020 ceasefire agreement, the road to allow Azerbaijan a road to this enclave through Armenian territory was agreed to but never enacted. Azerbaijan is likely to force this issue as well. Armenia is really in no shape to defend itself against overwhelming Azeri military forces with strong backing from Turkiye. It seems that the Armenia is still stuck with its former Ottoman overlords that caused the Armenian genocide on 1915. This too is likely to be a major flash point in the near future. Armenia's government would probably like to negotiate rather than enter another disastrous war with little hope of success or even break even.

China

The decline and possible collapse of the Chinese economy has been of considerable interest to not only China watchers but also to much of the financial world both regionally and internationally as it comes under greater oversight. Part of the reason for this is China continues to be less than open. As time has gone on, it is increasingly clear that most economic figures regarding China's general situation have proven to be virtual fiction including things such as population as one example which may be quite a bit smaller than the 1.4b as well as the consequences of the very real prospect of demographic decline. Bear this in mind as you read the note below.

The Chinese Communist Party is not representative of the Chinese people. It serves itself and its own survival. As an entity, it has killed tens of millions of Chinese people by force and by sheer incompetence mainly under the leadership of Chairman Mao. In the 1990s, China opened up under Deng Xiaoping and his "capitalist experiment" which led to the rise of the Chinese economy within the world. This opening up continued under his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao which continued this growth until 2012. Before one gets too fuzzy and warm about these leaders, remember that Deng was responsible for the Tiananmen Square massacre on 4 June 1989. He was no saint nor were any of his successors.

Xi Jinping took over as party chairman in 2013. Since that time he has consolidated power in himself taking all the key leadership jobs as only Mao had done before. He reinstated a cult of personality and has become by his own words the "Core Leader." In doing so he has become a single point of failure within the system and the single point of blame for failures. Despite the fact he has been given an unprecedented third term as chairman, his actions are increasingly under the scrutiny of party members outside his own faction. This is a major problem for China as it now has to focus inwardly once again. This internal struggle can remain within the country or boil over into the region. Xi may or may not be in serious trouble.


Xi has chosen a different path, one that leads China back to the past. China's path under the CCP has been bloody and brutal. Mao had created the cult of personality. Decisions could be made quickly with little thought of the consequences of the long suffering Chinese people. He has tried to dismantle the "capitalist experiment" of Deng and re-emphasized state owned enterprises (SOE) noted mainly for their inefficiency. Under Xi, there SOE became the largest recipients of grants and loans at the expense of the more efficient private enterprises. Xi has been wary of private enterprise being too successful thus calling into account the actions of the CCP. This was seen over the past two years in attacks on tech firms, educational firms and major retailers such as Alibaba.

Deng had ended the cult of personality in favour of a more decentralized approach to leadership within the party; Xi has reversed this in favour of his own newly developed cult of personality based on himself as Core Leader. It emphasized centralized planning and the rise of party influence within private enterprise such as party branches within not only Chinese firms but also foreign firms. When combined with changes to the national security legislation, foreign firms have consequently chosen to invest their money in other countries such as Vietnam, India, and Thailand. This has caused the flight of capital not only foreign but also Chinese money seeking to avoid issues especially in view of US sanctions imposed initially by the Trump administration and continued under the Biden administration.

China has also caused concerns because of its actions and declarations such as declaring the competition between systems, the Western versus the Chinese system. Xi has touted the Chinese system as better, being more efficient in its decision making. It has proven over time that the real problem with this is that good decisions can be made but it makes bad decisions much easier to make as well. China's various infrastructure programs in recent years have been the main reason for

heightened GDP increases without actually achieving real value as much of this development is unsustainable and quite frankly unneeded. The property development sector is now a major drain on the overall country, with thousands perhaps millions of excess apartments having been built with little hope of their need. The collapse of the property development sector has now come under closer scrutiny as the leadership of Evergrande has been detained for more extensive questioning. Other companies and their employees under now under investigation by security forces. Failures in business are likely to also receive increased investigations as the economy continues to decline. This is not over.

Another issue is the state of the Peoples' Liberation Army. This is a party organ but one that has been given considerable latitude to function. The PLA is unlike any Western military. It has control over businesses and many of its enterprises are run by PLA cadres. The head of Huawei got his start in a similar situation. This system has also led to graft and corruption, something that Xi has railed against in the past. The problem for Xi is that the people suspected of corruption in the military are his own appointments, something brought to his attention by opposition from other factions. The bottom line is that Xi's control has been limited. It will be of interest to see how this plays out, we truly live in interesting times.



The graphic is a dark blue rectangular panel with a yellow horizontal bar at the top. On the left side of the top bar is the Defence Intelligence logo, which includes a crown and a shield. On the right side of the top bar, the text 'UPDATE ON UKRAINE' and '22 September 2023' is displayed. The yellow bar contains the text 'INTELLIGENCE UPDATE' in bold, black, uppercase letters. Below the bar, there are three bullet points in white text, each preceded by a small white circle. The background of the panel features a faint, light-colored map of Ukraine.

Defence Intelligence

UPDATE ON UKRAINE
22 September 2023

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over the last four days, both Russia and Ukraine have experienced unusually intense attacks deep behind their lines. There have been reports of explosions at Russian logistics sites, air bases and command posts in Crimea, the Krasnodar region, and near Moscow.
- It is highly likely that Russia's Black Sea Fleet has again been heavily targeted. However, the explosions at Chkalovsky Air Base, near Moscow, are likely to be of most strategic concern to Russian leaders. This is a sensitive location because it hosts specialist military aircraft as well as VIP transport for Russian leaders. Reported damage to a COOT special mission aircraft is particularly relevant: the exact variant involved is unclear, but these valuable assets undertake missions which include electronic intelligence collection.
- Russia has launched long-range strikes at targets across Ukraine repeatedly over the last week. This unusual intensity is likely partially in response to the incidents in Russia and Crimea. With the ground battle relatively static, each side is seeking advantage by striking through their adversary's strategic depth.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since February 2022, three successive commanders of one of Russia's most prestigious airborne regiments have either resigned or been killed.
- The 247th Guards Air Assault Landing Regiment commander Colonel Vasily Popov was likely killed in the heavily contested Orikhiv sector in early September 2023. Only weeks before, in August 2023, his predecessor, Colonel Pytor Popov, likely resigned his command. Independent Russian media sources claim he acted in protest over the military's failure to recover the bodies of Russian casualties.
- In the early weeks of the invasion, then 247th commander Colonel Konstantin Zizevsky was killed near Mykolaiv. The experience of the 247th highlights the extreme attrition and high turnover in Russia's deployed military, even amongst relatively senior ranks.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent weeks, Russian customers have highly likely been experiencing localised petrol and diesel shortages. The shortages are unlikely to be a direct result of the war. They are probably being caused by a range of factors including short term demand increases from the agricultural sector, annual summer maintenance of refineries, and attractive prices for export.
- On 21 September 2023, Russia suspended nearly all diesel and petrol exports in order to stabilise its internal markets.
- The move will almost certainly further constrain supplies in a tight global market, likely having the greatest impact on countries currently dependent on Russian fuel supplies.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Over the last week, Russian forces have made a concerted effort to conduct local counter attacks against advancing Ukrainian forces in both the Orikhiv and Bakhmut sectors. In both areas, Ukrainian forces have defeated the Russian attacks and maintained their hold on recently liberated territory.
- Comments posted by the Russian military community suggest extreme disillusionment amongst those involved in these counter attacks, especially near Bakhmut, with reports of ‘ill-conceived’ advances, lack of artillery support, and heavy casualties.
- During the last nine months, the Russian force in Ukraine has proved itself capable of conducting stalwart defensive operations. However, it continues to display only minimal capability on the offensive. Commanders struggle to orchestrate complex joint effects, to concentrate sufficient artillery ammunition, and to maintain high morale and offensive spirit.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) has suffered a series of major attacks in recent weeks, culminating in strikes on its headquarters on 20 and 22 September 2023. These attacks have been more damaging and more coordinated than thus far in the war.
- The physical damage to the BSF is almost certainly severe but localised. The fleet almost certainly remains capable of fulfilling its core wartime missions of cruise missile strikes and local security patrols. It is, however, likely that its ability to continue wider regional security patrols and enforce its de facto blockade of Ukrainian ports will be diminished. It also likely has a degraded ability to defend its assets in port and to conduct routine maintenance.
- A dynamic, deep strike battle is underway in the Black Sea. This is likely forcing Russia into a reactive posture whilst demonstrating that Ukraine’s military can undermine the Kremlin’s symbolic and strategic power projection from its warm water port in occupied Sevastopol.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Since mid-September 2023, Russia has highly likely committed elements of its new 25th Combined Arms Army (25 CAA) to action for the first time. The formation started moving into Ukraine from late August 2023.
- Units from two of 25 CAA's manoeuvre components, 67th Motor Rifle Division and 164th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, are reported to be fighting on the front in a sector west of Severodonetsk and Kreminna, along the border between Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
- Since the start of the invasion, Russia has only rarely maintained an uncommitted army-size grouping which could potentially form the basis of a major new offensive thrust. With 25 CAA apparently being deployed piecemeal to reinforce the over-stretched line, a concerted new Russian offensive is less likely over the coming weeks.

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) have lost approximately 90 fixed-wing aircraft in combat since February 2022. It has also been flying some of its combat aircraft types far more intensively than in peace time.
- All aircraft have a projected lifespan, in flying hours. It is highly likely that with this extra wartime use, Russia is eating into many of its airframes' lifespans far more quickly than the VKS planned for. The need for extra maintenance is complicated by a shortage of spare parts because of increasing demand and international sanctions.
- The VKS maintains the ability to surge sortie rates over occupied Ukraine. However, as the war continues much longer than the Russian Ministry of Defence originally planned for, wear and tear of airframes is likely to have reduced the viability of the VKS's long-term tactical air power.

Art as Information Operations

Anton Gerashchenko @Gerashchenko_en 23 Sep posted: Soldiers of the 112th Territorial Defense Brigade and French photographer Émeric Lhuisset recreated the painting "Reply of the Zaporozhian Cossacks" by Ukrainian artist Illia Repin. 📷📷 - emericlhuisset / Instagram
Gotta admire the Ukrainian mastery of upping it to the Russians.



Destruction Count

Phillips P. OBrien @PhillipsPOBrien 25 Sep posted: If these figures are accurate, this really is something of note. UAVs on their own are destroyed the equivalent of more than a pre-Feb 24, 2022 Russian BTG every week. The 27 tanks and 73 different pieces of artillery/SPG really stand out.

