



## Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches 6 October 2023

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.*

*Dispatches* is a weekly collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

### RUSI(NS) Remembrance Dinner 2023

Invitations were emailed on 4 October for the dinner Thursday, 9 November. RSVP by 12 October to Dan Tanner [tannerdan824@gmail.com](mailto:tannerdan824@gmail.com). E-transfer dinner payment to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

In response to queries, the dinner is open to RUSI(NS) members, spouses, friends, etc., on a per-person fee basis. Dress: mess kit / black tie and equivalent for ladies.

### **Events:**

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**17 October**, Tuesday - "Re-Fighting History - The War in the East, Boardgames, and Histories of WWII." 7-9 pm ADT. Online. For more info and to register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/re-fighting-history-the-war-in-the-east-boardgames-and-histories-of-wwii-tickets-684218986407>.

**18 October**, Wednesday - Distinguished Speaker Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander Royal Canadian Navy, titled "Why Canada Needs Submarines." 1400-1600. Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess. Registration required; see call-to-meeting/invitation.

Pre-event reading:

Canada's Future Submarine Capability

<https://cdainstitute.ca/canadas-future-submarine-capability/>

and:

Can a new operational profile fix Canada's submarine problem?

<https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/naval-warfare/canadas-submarines-have-had-limited-availability-in-recent-years-but-a-transition-to-a-new-operation/>

and:

Canada's Future Submarine Capability

<https://cdainstitute.ca/canadas-future-submarine-capability/>

**New:** and because some articles can just be fun:

<https://www.forces.net/services/navy/why-are-submarines-black-answer-isnt-straightforward-you-might-think>

**New: 18 October**, Wednesday - Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers Canadian Atlantic Section presentation "Frigate Boats and Cranes." 6:30-7:45 pm AT. Online. To register:

<https://communities.sname.org/events/event-description?CalendarEventKey=cf8b4df9-67c1-4344-bd9e-018af5a5a533>

**14 November**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Read Threat Rising - US Marine Corps Educational Wargames." 7-9 pm AST. Online. For more info and to register:

<https://www.eventbrite.com/e/read-threat-rising-us-marine-corps-educational-wargames-tickets-698764231627>

**12 December**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "The Tyranny of Binaries: how wargame rules build narratives." 7-9 pm AST. Online. For more info and to register:

<https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-tyranny-of-binaries-how-wargame-rules-build-narratives-tickets-633057882167>.

### **Publications:**

Publications without links are available on request to [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com).

RUSI(NS) Paper "Kingston-class Ships – Less than meets the eye" by SWD Swan, 1 August 2023,

<https://rusi-ns.ca/kingston-class/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Naval Doctrine and Strategy," 25 July 2023, [https://rusi-](https://rusi-ns.ca/naval_doctrine_strategy/)

[ns.ca/naval\\_doctrine\\_strategy/](https://rusi-ns.ca/naval_doctrine_strategy/)

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*, 27 September 2023

<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

**New:** Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*, October 2023

Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*, Volume XLI, Number 9, October 2023

Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada *Seatimes*, August 2023.

Naval Association of Canada Ottawa Branch September 2023 Speaker's Evening recording "Canadian Sea Power in the Wake of Changing Geopolitics" with Dr Rob Huebert

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JfPImxlyZqg>

Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*, September 2023

<https://rausi.ca/component/acym/archive/212-rausi-dispatches-september-2023>

**New:** Royal Canadian Artillery Association *The Canadian Gunner News* 28 September 2023

Royal Canadian Logistics Service Newsletter *The Logistician* September 2023  
<https://sway.office.com/pA4cFB1V3YMF4WNI>

**New:** Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*, October 2023

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies New South Wales *Newsletter*, Issue No.87 August 2023

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*, Volume 55, 3rd Quarter 2023




**New:** Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*, Volume 21, Issue 1, 2 October 2023

**New:** Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver *Members News* 3 Oct 2023

**New:** Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*, September 2023, <https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/about-vac/news-media/salute>

**@RUSI NS on X:**

@RUSI\_NS posts may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or reposted, email RUSI(NS).

<p>"PH  allowed to use CAN  satellites vs 'dark' ships" <a href="https://globalnation.inquirer.net/220080/ph-allowed-to-use-canadian-satellites-vs-dark-ships">https://globalnation.inquirer.net/220080/ph-allowed-to-use-canadian-satellites-vs-dark-ships</a> Dark Vessel Detection= @FishOceansCAN, @NationalDefence &amp; other CAN depts program to detect vessels engaged in illegal, unreported &amp; unregulated #IUU fishing <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/fisheries-oceans/news/2021/02/government-of-canada-launches-international-program-to-track-illegal-fishing-using-satellite-technology.html">https://www.canada.ca/en/fisheries-oceans/news/2021/02/government-of-canada-launches-international-program-to-track-illegal-fishing-using-satellite-technology.html</a> Other collaborations <i>Another report:</i> Philippines To Track, Chase &amp; Hunt Chinese Warships 'Going Dark' In Its Waters Via Canadian Satellites <a href="https://www.eurasiantimes.com/philippines-to-track-chase-hunt-chinese-warships-going-dark/">https://www.eurasiantimes.com/philippines-to-track-chase-hunt-chinese-warships-going-dark/</a></p>	
<p>CIGI @CIGIonline 1 Oct posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: As AI advances, eliminating online disinformation will likely become harder. "Artificial intelligence systems can provide innovative solutions to problems, but they can also facilitate nefarious activities," writes Ronald Crelinsten. Read more: (Humanity Must Establish Its Rules of Engagement with AI — and Soon <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/articles/humanity-must-establish-its-rules-of-engagement-with-ai-and-soon/">https://www.cigionline.org/articles/humanity-must-establish-its-rules-of-engagement-with-ai-and-soon/</a>)</p>	

CIGI @CIGIonline 2 Oct posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Space-cyber attacks are a low-risk, high-yield tool that can affect both national security and civil society. @dr\_tepper\_ discusses how Canada can prepare for and defend its security and economy against space-cyber attacks. Read the paper: (Addressing Canada's Exposure to Space-Cyber Threats <https://www.cigionline.org/publications/addressing-canadas-exposure-to-space-cyber-threats/>)



"To maintain or replace? That is the question for Canada's tank fleet" <https://www.defensenews.com/land/2023/10/03/to-maintain-or-replace-that-is-the-question-for-canadas-tank-fleet/> If @NationalDefence program cannot allow buying new tanks because of other projects costs, what alternative is there for battlefield armoured gun vehicle for @CanadianArmy?



NAADSN\_RDSNAA @NAADSN\_RDSNAA 3 Oct posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: 📖 Latest Primer is out by Suzanne Lalonde. Have you ever wanted to understand the different positions on the Northwest Passage? Look no further! [https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/23sep-Lalonde-NWP\\_Policy-Primer.pdf](https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/23sep-Lalonde-NWP_Policy-Primer.pdf) (The Debate over the Legal Status of the Northwest Passage)



Canadian Armed Forces Operations @CFOperations 3 Oct posted: Welcome home #HMCSMontreal! Here's a snapshot of the great work accomplished by the crew: RUSI(NS) quoted: Great depiction of naval strategy/@CFOperations missions in support CAN🇨🇦 international relations & defence policy. Engaged! Example of capability - globally-deployable/long-endurance @RoyalCanNavy frigates & crews as ambassadors of CAN. #BlueWaterNavy

## HMCS Montréal ➤ Indo-Pacific

Canadian Armed Forces deployments to the Indo-Pacific region demonstrate Canada's engagement to strengthen its contribution to peace, resilience and security.

**Length of deployment:**  
**Six months**  
(late March to early October)

**Continents:** 4  
**Nations visited:** 10

**Embarked CH-148 Cyclone helicopter:** 105  
**Sorties:** 105  
**Hours flown:** 300

**HMCS Montréal participated in:**

- Operation SAVANNE, 23 April to 6 May, Coast of Sudan; and
- Exercise TALISMAN SABRE, 22 July to 4 August, Coral Sea near Cairns, Australia.

**Nautical miles sailed:** 45,000

**Oceans:** 2  
**Seas crossed:** 13

1. Halifax, Canada
2. Lisbon, Portugal
3. Souda Bay, Greece
4. Salalah, Oman
5. Singapore
6. Okinawa, Japan
7. Singapore
8. Surabaya, Indonesia
9. Cairns, Australia
10. Sydney, Australia
11. Perth, Australia
12. Diego Garcia
13. Salalah, Oman
14. Aqaba, Jordan
15. Valletta, Malta
16. Ponta Delgada, Azores

Canada

**“Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia” on Facebook:**

RUSI(NS) posts may also be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS).

**Federal government looking to cut \$1 billion from National Defence budget**

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/department-national-defence-budget-billion-1.6981974>

"Word of the planned cuts, which have not been specified, comes just weeks after the Liberal government agreed with other NATO allies on a pledge to make the alliance's defence spending benchmark of two per cent of gross domestic product an 'enduring commitment.'"

There is a disconnect between Canadian aspirations/statements and commitments/funding.



**New aircraft expected to fix Canada's transport plane woes**

<https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/canada/new-aircraft-expected-to-fix-canada-s-transport-plane-woes/ar-AA1hyoR6>

An update on the acquisitions of aircraft for the Royal Canadian Air Force under the Strategic Tanker Transport Capability project (<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/strategic-tanker-transport-capability-project.html>). At least the timelines are now becoming known. The CC150 Polaris aircraft in Guam, as noted, will most certainly be written off.



*An image of CC330002 from another post:*



**BAE Systems awarded \$7.6 billion contract to develop SSN-AUKUS-class attack submarines**

<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-10-02/bae-systems-awarded-7-6b-contract-develop-aukus-submarines/102926354>

Though nuclear-powered submarines are different than conventionally-powered submarines in many ways other than propulsion, the detailed design work awarded to BAE means that company is current in designing submarine boats and leads one to wonder how that might affect the company and its Canadian branch and any BAE proposal for the Canadian Patrol Submarine project.



**Russia using ‘shadow fleet’ to keep oil revenues flowing**

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russia-using-shadow-fleet-to-keep-oil-revenues-flowing/>

1. Sanctions don't seem to be working well enough.
2. Assuredly Canada can track such vessels. Can Canada do something about them?



**Other Sources:**

**#Australia**

Australian Government announces major restructure of Australian Army

<https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/transcripts/2023-09-28/press-conference-lavarack-barracks-townsville-qld>

A comparison. The concerns expressed during the event were very people and housing oriented.

Australian Army Shifting Priorities to Amphibious, Littoral Operations

<https://news.usni.org/2023/10/02/australian-army-shifting-priorities-to-amphibious-littoral-operations>

Makes sense given their geo-strategic situation. From our Australia correspondent: The Australian Army is refocusing on littoral operations. This shift will take time, money and people.

**#Canadian Armed Forces**

Canada's military training 'not for sale,' minister says after top brass warning

<https://globalnews.ca/news/9991534/canadian-forces-wayne-eyre-warning/>

**#Department of National Defence #defence policy**

Federal government looking to cut \$1 billion from National Defence budget

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/department-national-defence-budget-billion-1.6981974>

Cutting \$1B from our already underfunded military is preposterous

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/cutting-1b-from-our-already-underfunded-military-is-simply-preposterous>

We can't increase Canada's security capacity if we cut the defence budget

<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-we-cant-increase-canadas-security-capacity-if-we-cut-the-defence/>

Blair steals a page from the Harper playbook to justify cuts to National Defence

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/department-national-defence-budget-bill-blair-1.6985796>

Defence cost-cutting jeopardizing Canada's armed forces

<https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/gunter-defence-cost-cutting-jeopardizing-canadas-armed-forces>

### **#exercises**

COVID-19 – Emergency Plans and Readiness Exercises

<https://domesticpreparedness.com/articles/covid-19-emergency-plans-and-readiness-exercises-2>

### **#Indo-Pacific**

How Taiwan's new subs could complicate a Chinese invasion

<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/09/28/asia-pacific/politics/taiwan-submarines-deter-china-analysis/>

It would be interesting to read an analysis of potential employment of Canadian submarines in the Pacific.

### **#information operations**

#### **#artificial intelligence**

Artificial Intelligence-Enhanced Disinformation and International Law: Rethinking Coercion

<https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/news/artificial-intelligence-enhanced-disinformation-and-international-law-rethinking-coercion>

Taiwan is using generative AI to fight Chinese disinfo

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2023/09/taiwan-using-generative-ai-fight-chinese-disinfo/390573/>

#### **#China**

How the People's Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment

<https://www.state.gov/gec-special-report-how-the-peoples-republic-of-china-seeks-to-reshape-the-global-information-environment/>

### **#intelligence**

Intelligence and the Military: Introduction

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2023.2215690>

### **#land warfare**

"An attack without a Schwerpunkt ..."

<https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/an-attack-without-a-schwerpunkt>

"... is like a man without character"

<https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/is-like-a-man-without-character>

## **#legal #cyber operations**

Rules of engagement issued to hackers after chaos

<https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-66998064>

## **#marine security**

US backs Pacific undersea internet cable amid China competition

<https://www.reuters.com/world/us-backs-pacific-undersea-internet-cable-amid-china-competition-2023-09-28/>

The building of communications infrastructure on the seabed/sea bottom is a significant international relations and undersea warfare matter.

Solving for the Missing Element of Maritime Campaigning

<https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/solving-for-the-missing-element-of-maritime-campaigning/>

A call for maritime civil affairs teams.

## **#NATO**

Transatlantic Defense during Wartime

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/transatlantic-defense-during-wartime>

## **#naval warfare**

Better Command and Control for Theater Undersea Warfare

<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/october/better-command-and-control-theater-undersea-warfare>

## **#NATO**

NATO Floats Idea for Mission Module Approach to Delivering Seabed Warfare Capability

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/10/nato-floats-idea-for-mission-module-approach-to-delivering-seabed-warfare-capability/>

## **#policing**

Predictive policing software terrible at predicting crimes

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2023/10/predictive-policing-software-terrible-predicting-crimes/390867/>

## **#professional development**

Thoughts on Professional Development

<https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/line-sight/articles/2023/09/thoughts-on-professional-development.html>

## **#reading**

The Commander and the Staff

<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/war-books-commander-staff/>



## **#Russia**

### **#maritime security**

It's Russia's (Maritime) World – We're Just Living in It

<https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/its-russias-maritime-world-were-just-living-it>

### **#warfare**

In the Shadow of Ukraine: Russian Concepts of Future War and Force Design

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/shadow-ukraine>

## **#Russia-Ukraine War**

Weakness is Lethal: Why Putin Invaded Ukraine and How the War Must End

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end>

Ukraine: Russia's Black Sea Fleet struggling to defend southern flank, UK says

<https://www.forces.net/russia/ukraine-russias-black-sea-fleet-struggling-defend-their-flanks>

It's Time For The West To Embrace Ukraine's Way Of War, Not Doubt It

<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/it%E2%80%99s-time-west-embrace-ukraine%E2%80%99s-way-war-not-doubt-it>

“Russia's Achilles heel remains its inability to rapidly pivot when faced with relentless pressure or consecutive setbacks.”

### **#drones**

Ukraine's "Army of Drones" tells CBS News \$40 million worth of Russian military hardware destroyed in a month

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-drone-unit-tells-cbs-40-million-dollars-russia-military-hardware-destroyed/>

### **#navigation warfare**

Russian GPS 'jamming' causing collision risk in Black Sea, Romania says

<https://www.tradewindsnews.com/casualties/russian-gps-jamming-causing-collision-risk-in-black-sea-romania-says/2-1-1526852>

## **#space**

Missed Opportunity to Curb Security Threats in Space Leaves All More Vulnerable

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/missed-opportunity-to-curb-security-threats-in-space-leaves-all-more-vulnerable/>

## **#strategy**

Problems of Strategy in Wars of Honor

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/problems-of-strategy-in-wars-of-honor/>

## **#United Kingdom #land warfare**

The Universal Infantry Battalion

<https://wavellroom.com/2019/08/29/the-universal-battalion-possible-future-infantry-unit-structures/>

## #warfare

Understanding the “Victory Disease,” From the Little Bighorn to Mogadishu and Beyond  
<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/karcher.pdf>

Sneaky War: How to Win the World Without Fighting  
<https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/sneaky-war-how-to-win-the-world-without-fighting/>

Wither Political Warfare: The Future of Grey Zone Competition  
<https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/wither-political-warfare-the-future-of-grey-zone-competition/>

## #China #Russia

Russia and China Look at the Future of War  
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-and-china-look-future-war>

## Other:

### Force (Fleet) Design


The article “With delay of fleet review, RAN must be prepared to fight with what it has now” (<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/with-delay-of-fleet-review-ran-must-be-prepared-to-fight-with-what-it-has-now/>) was featured in *Dispatches* 29 Sep 23 with a long contributed comment. Comments about the topic of fleet design continue.



*From RUSI(NS) member Dusty Miller:* Fun to remember the process used to develop the Canadian Patrol Frigate project fleet. A series of multi-branch exercises involving sea goers, engineers, air, logistics and even army, all came together to determine what we thought the government needed to do in Defence both domestically and internationally. The team came up with numbers to control/patrol the 200 mile limit, the numbers required to provide relief/maintenance and the ability to contribute to NATO and handle two crises spots in the world at the same time using a task group concept which included aviation, etc. The number of 12 ocean going multi purpose warships, four command-capable ships, 12 coastal defence vessels, three replenishment oilers and six submarines all went up to government and was largely agreed. But the costing - the government came back to say you can have ten ships with the weaponry you have recommended or 12 ships with lesser capability. No choice there; we went with 12 hulls, could always add capabilities after! We live with what we have and go with what we've got. Looking forward to the Canadian Surface Combatant project ships!

### Russia-Ukraine War

Ministry of Defence @DefenceHQ 2 Oct posted: In Russia, civilians are increasingly being exposed to the Kremlin's 'Special Military Operation' despite Kremlin assurances back in February 2022. Society is becoming more militarised as Russia's situation worsens. Civilian volunteers are being asked to patrol an air base.



The nature of the war is getting increasingly concerning for long-term effects

## Decoys

Tu-95 Decoys Are Being Painted On Russian Air Base's Apron

<https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/tu-95-decoys-are-being-painted-on-russian-air-bases-apron>

Hopefully:

1. Defence Research is studying decoy and counter-decoy measures as part of sensing and targeting; and
2. The Forces is developing doctrine, maybe considering what it would take to stand up an organization, to use such decoy measures on a major scale.




## Counter-bureaucracy Operations

Are we all process monkeys now?

<https://wavellroom.com/2023/03/17/process-monkeys/>

"Any deviation from the test – any activity, order or behaviour that is not directly contributing to our ability to plan and execute operations – must be explained and rationalised as to why it is the higher priority."

Yes!



## Security Affairs Committee Synopsis

### O Canada

The Government of India has been less than happy with Canada's assertion that agents of an Indian intelligence agency likely killed the alleged head of the separatist Khalistan Tiger Force outside a Sikh gurudwara on 18 June 2023. India already had ordered the removal of one Canadian diplomat in retaliation for the removal of an Indian diplomat. On 3 October, India ordered the removal of 41 of 62 Canadian diplomats. The Canadian Prime Minister stated that there will be no retaliation from Canada. India has also stopped the processing of Canadian visa requests to visit India. Internally to Canada this incident has set Sikhs and other Indians against each other which could end in violence. The issue is still very fresh and people within the two communities are sensitive to alleged wrong doings by the other side.

Since the Air India event in June 1985 killing 329 passengers, Canada has had a less-than-healthy view of the incident, considering it an international event and ignoring the actual problem was internal to Canada. The case was haphazardly conducted and was eventually thrown out of court - a true legal debacle. Canada continues to have an almost indifferent attitude towards the Khalistan separatist movement and has actually provided a home to what India considers a terrorist threat. They fought a very brutal anti-terrorist action in the 1970s and 80s, mainly suppressing the separatist movement in India. It is largely quiet. Canada has provided a safe haven for these separatists and despite India's requests for extradition, Canada has remained indifferent to India's point of view. No concrete action has been taken by Canada to resolve this part of the issue and it is likely that this will continue to be a

major irritant in the ongoing relationship with India. One is likely to expect further retaliatory acts by India. The situation was not handled well.

The Canadian Armed Forces is once again being used as a piggy bank by the government which has asked for close to a billion dollars in cuts despite the fact that the service is chronically underfunded. The Defence Minister has called it savings not a cut. Knowledgeable observers consider the cuts unwarranted and state quite bluntly that these cuts will affect the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces. The exact cuts are not known at this point only that it will hurt.

The second of the multi-role tanker transport aircraft based on the very successful A-330 is here. These will replace the current fleet of five A-310 aircraft acquired in the early 1990s. One A-310 was badly damaged in Guam recently and is likely to be written off as not being economical to repair. The first two replacements have been delivered and are decked out in Government of Canada livery vice RCAF low observable paint scheme. One hopes that this political vanity will stop and that they return to military colours. The new A-330 should start being available by 2027. They are a marked improvement over the current fleet on a well proven and developed airframe.

There is no recent word on the Aurora replacement, the P-8 Poseidon, which seems to have fallen away from the news after the unexpected and totally bizarre attempt by Bombardier to intervene with an untried undeveloped aircraft. It will be interesting to see how this ends up. One wonders if political interference and lack of support will damage a vital program. The numbers are already too small to deal with our vast areas of responsibility. It is likely to be another interesting debacle.

### **United States**

The US narrowly averted a government shutdown last week by a last-minute effort by both the moderate Republicans and the Democrats, allowing for a 45 day extension of funding to keep the government afloat. It has hampered the ongoing efforts to create areas of bipartisan agreements on some key issues and possible negotiations between the two parties on other issues. This has been delayed but this problem is not going away.

One of the compromise positions was the removal of funding for Ukraine's war with Russia. This is not as bad as it sounds as many previous funding approvals are still in place and constitutes billions in continuing funding. This will be a problem if it continues beyond the end of the year. Another victim was the Secretary of Defence's salary which was reduced to 1 USD. He still has a healthy pension from his military service. This too is a problem in the longer term.

As this was being written, the CBC and others announced that the Speaker of the House had been removed from office as eight Republicans voted with the Democrats; only five were actually needed. This was the first time a US Speaker of the House was removed in this fashion although several attempts had been previously tried in the past.

### **Moldova**

The pro-Russian Shor Party headed by a convicted fraud artist, Ilan Shor, is allowed to run in the next election in a decision by the Constitutional Court of Moldova. The party had been banned for five years due to its pro-Russian position and alleged assistance to Russian covert forces operations including disinformation, low level violence and demonstrations. An interesting decision at best.

Moldova doesn't buy Russian gas at present, however, this could change if "conditions" are right. Moldova has been able to purchase gas from Western European sources at a higher price. Russia has

used "cheap gas prices" as a method of fostering pro-Russian views. Moldova could still get Russian gas through pipelines that cross separatist, pro-Russian Transnistria. They had received 5.7m cubic metres of gas prior to stopping, to prevent undue Russian influence and to support Ukraine. Russia maintains 1500 "peacekeepers" in the breakaway area; Russia uses the region to create dissension in Moldova.

### **Belarus**

Belarus has gained notoriety once again by holding Ukrainian children from occupied areas. This was supported by the Belarus branch of the Red Cross. The governing body of the International Red Cross has given Belarus until 30 November to replace the current head of the Belarus branch, Dzmitry Shautsou. The penalty for non-compliance would entail suspension from partnerships, loss of international funding for projects and suspension from the international organization. Mr Shautsou is also under investigation by the International Criminal Court for the forcible transfer of children from Russian-occupied area of Ukraine.

The Ministry of Defence of Belarus announced nation-wide military exercises commencing 3 October 2023. Details are as yet unknown. Belarus did host Russian troops that later were involved in attacks from Belarus territory. Currently approximately 2000 Russian troops are still in Belarus. Russia does retain approximately 25 nuclear weapons in Belarus under Russian control but to be deployed by Belarus air force assets.

### **Slovakia**

On 30 September 2023, Slovakia held an election in which the pro-Russian Smer Party received the largest percentage of the popular vote. The party leader is a former Prime Minister, Robert Fico, who has publicly stated that if Smer forms part of the governing coalition, it will not provide any more support to Ukraine. Slovakia's change in attitude is similar to Hungary's leadership in its views which tend to be more pro-Russian. Slovakia however has sent virtually everything it could send to Ukraine and thus the cupboard is bare. Slovakia was promised more than over one billion USD in military equipment and aid to reconstitute its armed forces. This alone will be a limiting factor to any real move towards Russia in the near term.

### **Russia-Ukraine War**

The war continues. The ridiculousness of some Western commentary about Ukraine's lack of progress is disturbing. The West has restricted giving Ukraine the tools for success such as ATACM and Taurus missiles. The numbers of Western tanks provided is small as are the number of infantry fighting vehicles and of course there's restricting Ukraine from getting modern fighter aircraft in a timely fashion. The West and specifically the US has vast quantities of equipment sitting in storage; even Canada could have provided armoured vehicles that were recently retired from Canadian service if we kept them in reserve and in some form of storage maintenance level. This is not what happened and much of the equipment is still not delivered, despite early promises. Ukraine had asked for equipment for this offensive but they only had a portion of the actual requirements. Yet they are criticized for taking their time to save troops lives rather than hurl them against prepared positions in the true fashion of the First World War. Lack of progress is directly related to the Western reluctance of providing the necessary resources. It is not the only factor but it plays a large part in the alleged lack of progress.

One has to wonder if the Western powers, meaning the US and NATO for the most part, have a desired end point. Given the lack of effort in providing key equipment, one has to assume that some thought has been given to this issue. Putin doesn't need to be happy yet that was assumed to be an early factor

in this reluctance. Putin cannot be trusted and the survival of his regime should not be a consideration - that is his problem. His defeat on the battlefield is absolutely necessary for the hope of a peaceful Europe. The defeat must be decisive and unequivocal in order to guarantee Ukraine's peace and renewal. The current situation requires clear thought and clarity of action and execution of the conflict. Ukraine and Europe did not ask for the conflict, Russia did and it must bear that responsibility and consequence; nothing else makes sense.

The war of attrition that is the nature of the war at present continues unabated in the north with a much larger Russian force alleged to be approximately 110k troops which has been largely ineffective, but neither side seems to be making any significant changes either gains or losses on the Kupiansk-Svatova-Krimmena front. Near Bakhmut, Ukraine has made some progress in the southern part of that front, achieving the crossing of the rail line used as a defence position for the Russian forces - this puts most Russian positions around Bakhmut under Ukrainian observation and long range fire by conventional artillery. Near Robotny, Ukrainian forces also had success around Verbove and Novoprekopivka, gaining entry into both towns. The Kherson front remains fairly static.

The biggest news is the damage created by Ukrainian drones and missiles around Sevastopol. It calls into question the continued viability of this major harbour as the main fleet base. Major Russian units are now moved towards Rostov-on-Don and Novorossiysk in Russia territory. Russian warships are now not able to operate in waters north of Cape Tarkhankut just north of Sevastopol. This is a major victory by anyone's standards - this is especially rich given Ukraine's lack of major combatants. The asymmetrical battle that Ukraine has fought will give good material for historians and naval strategists.

Both countries are continuing long range attacks by missile and drones. Russia seems to be attacking civilian targets with little or no useful purpose and a significant portion of these attacks are intercepted and defeated in some form. Ukraine has attacked Russian military and industrial targets supporting the war effort. Ukraine has also used special forces and partisans, their own and Russian sympathizers, to target and conduct sabotage as well. This is likely to continue for the entire war. It will be interesting to see if Russia will once again attack civilian power supplies as they did last winter. It is likely, but other targets may become more obvious. Ukraine has imported significant numbers of generators and alternate power supplies and is therefore more resilient than last year.

One last item here, there is an excellent YouTube video of a Ukrainian battalion commander calling the Russian manufacturer of the T-72 B3, the newest version of that tank. The Ukrainians had captured the tank in combat relatively intact and had dragged it off the field to their maintenance area. They were unable to start the tank, so as a joke (in part) they called the Russian manufacturer to help troubleshoot the problem and listed the symptoms of the problem. The company immediately apologized and started offering suggestions. Later in the call he mentioned who he was when they asked for his contact information. It was cheeky!

## **Armenia**

Armenia has just passed legislation agreeing to join the International Criminal Court. Russia should not be surprised, as Russian peacekeepers failed to protect Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) from Azerbaijanian attacks. Armenia has been undergoing considerable unrest due to the loss of NK. It was suspected that pro-Russian forces were causing some of this unrest. This unrest is being further enhanced by the arrival of more than 100k refugees from NK, more than 80% of the population of NK and more to follow out of an original population of around 120k. Azerbaijan was part of the original Ottoman Empire which also conducted the Armenian genocide of 1915. Is one really surprising that an Armenian would be unwilling to trust the word of the Azerbaijan Government? Pashinyan the Prime

Minister is not the desired leader from Putin's point of view, so he was very much subject to the abuse and comments from these demonstrations.

## **China**

China's economy continues to deteriorate despite efforts to support the economy by the government. Investors have chosen to continue to take a negative view of Chinese investment vehicles. China's economy is expected to continue to slow and fail to rebound due to property development issues plus the regulatory attacks on the private sector. The latest official growth estimate for the coming year is expected to be 4.5%. The actual growth rate for this year will likely be negative and the following year is expected to be the same. Some Western scholars at Chinese universities are now saying that 2 to 3% is a best case scenario, but an official growth rate of even 4% would cause considerable consternation and complaints from inside the Party. There appears to be a running story line that Xi has been subjected to a warning from the Communist Chinese Party's (CCP) elders that is not going away. Although Xi has managed to take most powerful positions for himself, he does not have the ruthlessness of Mao. If this is true then other factions are now sensing some level of weakness in Xi's own faction that can be exploited. As Xi has accumulated power, he also becomes responsible for both the successes and consequently the failures even if they are not totally his blame. He is the "Core Leader."


China's Peoples' Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is continuing to grow coupled with an immense merchant marine, Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. The actual numbers of vessels with military potential is astronomical. The PLAN has in recent figures has had over 350 major naval combatants as opposed to the US Navy at 278 major naval combatants. The tonnage is different with the PLAN weighing in around 2m tonnes and the US Navy about 3.5m tonnes. China is supported by a shipbuilding industry capable of out producing the US and for that matter the entire West. It does lack combat experience and has never met a major power on the seas since the turn of the 19th to 20th centuries and it did not go well for China. A rising Japan made short work of the Imperial Chinese naval forces. This is not say that China would face defeat but rather it would not be a "cakewalk" if China were to land in Taiwan and the West decided to retaliate. Damage and loss of life would be horrific on both sides. Why mention this? Xi wants China "reunited" by 2027, apparently on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. If one assumes that he is egomaniacal, this may be possible as an option. This is especially true now as internal problems and squabbles continue in the country. What better way to keep the masses focused on anything else but failures than a "good war?"

China has continued to harass countries around the South China Sea including Taiwan and the Philippines. This week saw incursions by eight aircraft and up to five ships past the median line. The Chinese Coast Guard placed a floating barrier around Mischief Reef and Philippines divers removed it. China has threatened action if it happens again. This will be interesting in that a large fleet of Western ships coupled with local friendly navies are participating in a Philippines-run exercise. It could get interesting if things go a little strange.

The other concern for China is the state of the Army. Generally it is hard to tell what shape it is actually in, their equipment is heavily based on the original Russian versions which have been less than totally successful in Ukraine, in particular tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. One aspect that China is trying to mimic from the war is the development of an NCO corps; they too use a Russian/Soviet model but now look to the very serious faults of lack of training in junior leaders as well as the very serious loss rate of junior and middle grade officers in operations even when successful. China also retains the role of the political commissar who actually outranks his operations counterpart; there is no equivalent in Western doctrine. This is a new concept for them and they have little time to sort it out to

meet a 2027 timeframe. It is a big ask. Still, one can expect them to give it a good college try before reverting to form.

Lastly, as mentioned in previous notes the military is currently undergoing a purge. As mentioned the Navy and now the Strategic Rocket Forces are undergoing removal of several layers of command. Replacements are usually Party loyalists, loyal specifically to Xi. The timing is not good for a 2027 action. The Soviets under Stalin did the same thing in 1938 just prior to the Russia-Finnish War and the attack on Poland as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Russia did relatively poorly and were in desperate shape for the German attack on 22 June 1941. Will China be in the same position? Will Xi find new employment (due to an offer he could not refuse, as an example) prior to 2027, it is possible.



The slide features a dark blue background with a faint map of Ukraine. In the top left corner is the Defence Intelligence logo, which includes a crown and a shield. In the top right corner, the text reads 'UPDATE ON UKRAINE' and '29 September 2023'. A yellow horizontal bar with the text 'INTELLIGENCE UPDATE' is positioned below the logo. The main content consists of three bullet points in white text.

Defence Intelligence

UPDATE ON UKRAINE  
29 September 2023

### INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent weeks, up to hundreds of fighters formerly associated with the Wagner Group private military company (PMC) have likely started to redeploy to Ukraine as individuals and small groups, fighting for a variety of pro-Russian units.
- Wagner withdrew from combat operations in Ukraine by early June 2023, prior to the abortive mutiny of 24 June 2023, and the subsequent death of Wagner owner Yevgeny Prigozhin and other senior leaders in a plane crash on 23 August 2023.
- The exact status of the redeploying personnel is unclear, but it is likely individuals have transferred to parts of the official Russian Ministry of Defence forces and other PMCs. Several reports suggest a concentration of Wagner veterans around Bakhmut: their experience is likely to be particularly in demand in this sector. Many will be familiar with current front line and local Ukrainian tactics, having fought over the same terrain last winter.



## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 29 September 2023, Russian authorities published footage of President Putin meeting former Wagner Group Chief of Staff Andrei Troshev, tasking him with overseeing and establishing new 'volunteer fighting units'. Deputy defence minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was also at the meeting.
- Around the time of the June 2023 insurrection, Troshev took up a role in the official security forces; Troshev was probably involved in encouraging other Wagner personnel to sign contracts, contributing to the insurrection. Many Wagner veterans likely consider him a traitor.
- Yevkurov has recently been pictured touring African states. Presidential endorsement of Troshev and Yevkurov indicates Russia's continuing utilisation of volunteer units and private military companies, and planning for the future of Wagner. It is prepared to draw on the experience of veterans who can demonstrate their loyalty to the state and continued involvement in the Global South, but probably with greater oversight from the Kremlin.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Documents, apparently leaked from Russia's Finance Ministry, suggests that Russia's defence spending is set to surge to approximately 30 per cent of total public expenditure in 2024.
- The ministry proposes a defence budget of 10.8 trillion roubles, equivalent to approximately 6 per cent of GDP and a 68 per cent increase over 2023.
- It is highly likely that Russia can support this level of defence spending through 2024, but only at the expense of the wider economy. Full details on Russian defence spending are always classified, but these figures suggests that Russia is preparing for multiple further years of fighting in Ukraine. This follows public comments by Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu on 27 September 2023, suggesting he was prepared for the conflict to continue into 2025.

Is Canada ready for a long war?

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent weeks, the Naval Aviation component of Russia's Black Sea Fleet has assumed a particularly important role in the Fleet's operations as it struggles to deal with concurrent threats on the southern flank of the Ukraine war.
- Naval Aviation is emphasising maritime air patrol operations, highly likely with a primary mission of the early identification of uncrewed surface vessels. A key Russian asset in these operations is the Be-12 MALL amphibious aircraft, designed in the 1950s, flying out of bases in occupied Crimea.
- Su-24 FENCER and FLANKER variant combat jets conduct maritime strike operations, including at least one recent air strike on the strategically located Snake Island. With more Fleet activities likely relocating to Novorossiysk in the face of threats to Sevastopol, Russia is attempting to use naval air power to project force over the north-western Black Sea.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- New polling by Russia's state-owned Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM) suggests that the authorities are successfully using the 'foreign agent' designation as a tool to manipulate public opinion behind the state's anti-West, pro-war narratives.
- On 26 September 2023, VTsIOM reported the results of a poll of Russians' attitudes towards people and organisations registered as 'foreign agents'. VTsIOM claimed 61% of those surveyed said that they considered 'foreign agents' to be 'traitors' who 'disseminate lies' about Russia.
- Russia has broadened the foreign agent legislation since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The measures significantly narrow the information space within Russia, making it increasingly difficult to articulate any viewpoint, including dissenting about the war, which deviates from the official line.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- On 28 September 2023, Russian air defence forces highly likely shot down one of their own Su-35S FLANKER M multi-role combat jets over Tokmak, approximately 20km behind the current front line.
- Although Russia has lost around 90 fixed wing aircraft since the start of the invasion, this is probably only the fifth loss of a Su-35S, Russia's most advanced combat jet in widespread service. The location is relevant because Tokmak is a heavily fortified town which often hosts Russian headquarters commanding one of the most intensely contested sectors of the front line.
- These headquarters would typically be protected with dedicated short and medium range air defence systems. These are almost certainly held at very high readiness, as Ukraine continues to conduct effective deep strikes against such locations.

## INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- In recent days, Russia has been conducting civil defence exercises across much of the country, based on a scenario of large-scale international armed conflict.
- These exercises have taken place annually since 2012 and coincide with Russian Civil Defence Day on 4 October. This year's exercises are unlikely to have been dramatically changed or expanded.
- For generations, the USSR, and then Russia, has paid attention to domestic preparations for a major conflict. However, even with the ongoing war in Ukraine, it is unlikely Russia has significantly changed its posture of national preparedness in recent months.





















## Long-range Strike

Missiles, Deterrence and Arms Control: Options for a New Era in Europe

<https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2023/09/missiles-deterrence-and--arms-control-options--for-a-new-era-in-europe/>

Granted the article is Euro-centric, but note that Canada is not on the ‘NATO’ list of capabilities.

# Selected NATO members’ long-range conventional precision-strike capabilities

Country	Equipment	Classification	Range (kilometres)	Warhead (kilograms)	Platform	Initial operating capability
 Finland	AGM-158A Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)	LACM	370	454	F/A-18C/D <i>Hornet</i> FGA	2011
 France	SCALP EG	LACM	500 (estimate)	450	<i>Mirage</i> 2000D, <i>Rafale</i> FGA	2004
 France	<i>Missile de Croisière Navale</i> (MdCN)	LACM	1,000+	c. 300	<i>Aquitaine</i> -class FREMM frigate; <i>Suffren</i> -class SSN	2008
 Germany	KEPD-350 <i>Taurus</i>	LACM	500+	481	<i>Tornado</i> IDS; <i>Eurofighter</i> FGA	2006
 Greece	SCALP EG	LACM	500 (estimate)	450	<i>Mirage</i> 2000-5 FGA	2007
 Greece	MGM-140A Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)	SRBM	165	560 (APAM bomblets)	M270 MLRS	1996
 Italy	<i>Storm Shadow</i>	LACM	500 (estimate)	450	<i>Tornado</i> IDS; <i>Typhoon</i> FGA	2007
 Poland	AGM-158A JASSM	LACM	370	454	F-16 FGA	2017
 Romania	MGM-168 ATACMS	SRBM	300	227	M142 HIMARS MLRS	2022
 Spain	KEPD-350 <i>Taurus</i>	LACM	500+	481	F/A-18A <i>Hornet</i> FGA	2008
 Turkiye	<i>Bora</i>	SRBM	280+	470	MBRL	c. 2019
 Turkiye	J-600T <i>Yildirim</i>	SRBM	150–300	Unknown	F-600T TEL	From 2007
 Turkiye	MGM-140A ATACMS	SRBM	165	560 (APAM bomblets)	M270 MLRS	1996
 UK	<i>Storm Shadow</i>	LACM	500 (estimate)	450	<i>Typhoon</i> FGA	2002
 UK	UGM-109 <i>Tomahawk</i>	LACM	1,600	454	<i>Trafalgar</i> -class, <i>Astute</i> -class SSN	1998
 US	AGM-158A JASSM	LACM	370	454	B-1B <i>Lancer</i> , B-2A <i>Spirit</i> , B-52H <i>Stratofortress</i> bomber; F-16C/D <i>Fighting Falcon</i> , F-15E <i>Strike Eagle</i> , F-35A <i>Lightning II</i> FGA	2005
 US	AGM-158B JASSM-ER (JASSM-Extended Range)	LACM	930	454		2014
 US	AGM-86C/D	LACM	1,100	544–907	B-52H <i>Stratofortress</i> bomber	1991
 US	MGM-140A/B, MGM-168 ATACMS	SRBM	165–300	162–560	M270/M270A1/ M270A2/M142 HIMARS MLRS	From 1990
 US	U/RGM-109 <i>Tomahawk</i>	LACM	1,600	454	<i>Ohio</i> -class SSGN; <i>Los Angeles</i> -class Flight I/II/III, <i>Virginia</i> -class Flight II/III, <i>Sea Wolf</i> -class SSN; <i>Ticonderoga</i> -class, <i>Zumwalt</i> -class CGHM; <i>Arleigh Burke</i> Flight I/II-class DDGM; <i>Arleigh Burke</i> -class Flight IIA DDGHM	1984

APAM anti-personnel and anti-materiel; CGHM cruiser with surface-to-surface missile, hangar, and surface-to-air missile; DDGDM destroyer with surface-to-surface missile, hangar, and surface-to-air missile; DDGM destroyer with surface-to-surface missile and surface-to-air missile; FGA fighter ground attack; FREMM Frigate Européenne Multi-Mission (European multi-purpose frigate); HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System; IDS interdictor/strike; LACM land-attack cruise missile; MBRL multi-barrel rocket launcher; MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System; SRBM short-range ballistic missile; SSGN nuclear-powered submarine with dedicated launch tubes for guided missiles; SSN nuclear-powered general-purpose attack submarine; TEL transporter erector launcher.  
Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 2023*

