



## Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches

4 April 2025

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security, and safety issues.*

*Dispatches* is a periodic collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

*Editor's Notes:* The next issue will be **18 April 2025**.

### Quick links:

[Events](#)

[Publications](#)

[@RUSI NS on X](#)

[Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia on Facebook](#)

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[SAC Notes](#)

### Contributions to RUSI(NS) social media

You are also encouraged to send material to be posted to the RUSI(NS) X and Facebook accounts to [rusinsdispatches@gmail.com](mailto:rusinsdispatches@gmail.com). Preferably, send the material ready to post. We are still looking for a volunteer(s) to be editor(s) for these accounts in order to keep them active.

## Events

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

### RUSI (NS) Events:

Media blackouts due to the calling of a federal election are impacting the short-term speaker engagement calendar.

**21 May**, Wednesday: Maritime Air presentation by Col Holmes. TBC, details to follow.

**18 June**, Wednesday: CBSA presentation at CBSA, Bayers Lake.

**16 July**, Wednesday: Historical presentation with Tom Tulloch/Meet and Greet.

**17 September**, Wednesday: Col Labbe, CAF Drone projects, virtual event.

### Other Events:

**10 April**, Thursday: Dr Adam Coombs, Historian, DND Directorate of History & Heritage will present Royal Air Force Museum lecture "Fighting the Third Battle of the Atlantic from the Air." 1800hrs, UK time. Online (Livestream). To register: <https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/london/whats-going-on/events/virtual-lecture-fighting-the-third-battle-of-the-atlantic-from-the-air/>

**New 11 April**, Friday: the Digital Trade and Data Governance Hub presents Data Governance Disconnect: the US lacks plan for Data Supporting AI, which explores the implications of U.S. data policies for AI development. A virtual event, 1100hrs ADT. Register online at: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/webinar-50-data-governance-disconnect-us-lacks-plan-for-data-supporting-ai-tickets-1300934623479?aff=oddtcreator>

**16 April**, Wednesday: RAUSI presents MGen Ménard and "Hidden in plain sight: the subtle but concerning threat to Canada's national security and prosperity." MGen Ménard (ret'd) will examine three critical challenges shaping Canada's security landscape. This zoom event, at 2100hrs AST (1800hrs MST), requires registration: <https://www.rausi.org/info-events/rmcscd/782-hidden-in-plain-sight>.

**New 17 April**, Thursday: [RAND Epstein Family Veterans Policy Research Institute](#) present "Innovations in Veteran Suicide Prevention." Online event, 1700hrs ADT. Register at <https://www.rand.org/events/2025/04/veteran-suicide-prevention-innovation.html>

**New 25 April**, Friday: Queen's University Centre for International and Defence Policy presentation "Eat Strategy for Breakfast" When it Comes to National Security?" by Colonel Kris Purdy. 1200-1300 EDT. Online. To

register: <https://www.queensu.ca/cidp/events/idp-speaker-series/eat-strategy-breakfast-when-it-comes-national-security>

**3 May, Saturday:** As part of the annual series “Jane’s Walk” this year a guided walking tour of the various historical sites within CFB Halifax (Stadacona) will be conducted beginning at 1300 on Saturday 3 May 2025. The tour is open to all, however participants will be required to show a government-issued photo ID (such as driver’s license) to be able to enter the base. It will commence at 1300 at the RCR Gate on Gottingen Street at Bilby, and will include sites such as Wellington Barracks, the Royal Naval Burying Ground and Admiralty House, lasting about 1.5 to 2 hours. There will be an opportunity to visit the Royal Canadian Naval Museum inside Admiralty House afterwards, for those interested. Details can also be found here: <https://www.janeswalkhalifax.com/schedule>.

**New 26-27 September:** Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN - <https://www.cmsn.ca/>) conference on the future of Canadian Seapower. Live, Calgary. This will bring together academics, experts and serving and retired naval and coast guard personnel to examine the emerging maritime security threats facing Canada today, and the complex challenges that will define our future. At the end of *Dispatches* is a Save the Date poster, with more information to follow soon. CMSN welcomes further dissemination of the event to any colleagues that you think may be interested.

### **Wargaming Events:**

Georgetown University Wargaming Society long-range schedule:  
<https://www.guwargaming.org/guwsevents>

**8 April, Tuesday** - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Spyships, Satellites, and SAMs" 7-8:30pm ADT. Online. "A summary of 3 games run in Canada in 2024" by **RUSI(NS) member Dave Redpath**. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/spyships-satellites-and-sams-tickets-1060415745039>

**15 April, Tuesday:** Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Experiential Learning in Action – Wargaming at AOC." 7-8:30pm ADT. Online. How wargaming has been integrated into the Canadian Army Operations Course "to enhance analysis, decision-making, risk management, and synchronization in tactical planning." To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/experiential-learning-in-action-wargaming-at-aoc-tickets-1256901739939>

**20 May 2025, Tuesday** - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Cobalt Rocks: Wargaming Seabed Operations." 1-2:30pm ADT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/cobalt-rocks-wargaming-seabed-operations-tickets-1101179159509>

**16 September 2025, Tuesday** - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Naval Wargaming and Quantitative History." 1-2:30 pm ADT. Online.

To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/naval-wargaming-and-quantitative-history-tickets-1052463264957>

## Publications

**New** RUSI(NS) Comments "Recruiting and Retention in the Reserve Force" by David Swan, 29 March 2025, <https://rusi-ns.ca/recruiting-retention/>

RUSI(NS) Paper "We Were America's Best Friend" by Tim Dunne, 22 February 2025, 26 November 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/we-were-americas-best-friend/>

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) presentation "Submarine Cables – a hidden weakness?" by Dr Samuel Bashfield, 27 February 2025, video recording: <https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/why8ij7udf7kuh7tj8sky/RUSIA-Vic-Dr-Samuel-Bashfield-Submarine-Cables-a-hidden-weakness-Feb-2025-SD-480p.mov?rlkey=lqvzot42ll4rcwyw7nj1ka0rz&dl=0>

RUSI(NS) Presentation "Drydocking Technology" by Robert Taylor, 29 January 2025, [https://rusi-ns.ca/drydocking\\_technology/](https://rusi-ns.ca/drydocking_technology/)

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Canada's Militia and National Defence Acts" by Tim Dunne, 20 January 2025, [https://rusi-ns.ca/militia\\_national\\_defence\\_acts/](https://rusi-ns.ca/militia_national_defence_acts/)

RUSI(NS) Paper "Common Law, Civic Law, Martial Law and Military Law" by Tim Dunne, 8 December 2024, [https://rusi-ns.ca/common\\_civic\\_martial\\_military\\_law/](https://rusi-ns.ca/common_civic_martial_military_law/)

RUSI(NS) Paper "China and the Maritime Shipping Industry", 7 December 2024, [https://rusi-ns.ca/chinese\\_maritime\\_shipping/](https://rusi-ns.ca/chinese_maritime_shipping/)

The following publications are received by RUSI(S) from other associations. The latest edition, where not otherwise indicated, may be requested by emailing RUSI(NS). To readers of Dispatches from other associations, sharing of your publications is appreciated.

weekly:

Naval Association of Canada

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) Defence Update

Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver Members News

bi-weekly: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association On Watch

monthly:

Canadian Gunner News

Edmonton United Services Institute President's Enews

Military Institute of Windsor Communiqué

Naval Reserve Association of Canada Mess Deck ConneXions

Royal Alberta United Services Institute Dispatches

Royal Canadian Logistics Service The Logistician

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch Scuttlebutt

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island Newsletter  
Veterans Affairs Canada Salute!

quarterly:

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) Quarterly Newsletter

### @RUSI\_NS on X

@RUSI\_NS posts may be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>.

To have something posted or reposted, email RUSI(NS).

Adam Lajeunesse @adam\_lajeunesse 1 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: The United States Risks Opening the Arctic Door to China <https://deft9.com/news-and-analysis/f/the-united-states-risks-opening-the-arctic-door-to-china>



Canadian Maritime Security Network @cmsnminds 3 Apr posted: Kate E. Todd and Alan Lockerby have written an iDEAS paper about 'C2 at Sea, Embarking Modular, Scalable, and Mobile C2 Centres Aboard the AOPV'; check out the article

here: [https://cmsn.ca/files/ugd/0bcbee\\_caf5abb279284e009370cc804ec7d6d4.pdf](https://cmsn.ca/files/ugd/0bcbee_caf5abb279284e009370cc804ec7d6d4.pdf)

RUSI(NS) quoted: #Arctic & Offshore Patrol Vessels #AOPV capable of carrying multiple containers, have work/living spaces for add'l embarked pers. May lack comms & power / heating / ventilation / a-c for command node. @RoyalCanNavy ships previously served as extension of continental early warning lines



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 2 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: The speed of invasion now outpaces the speed of procurement—Canada can no longer afford to wait on national defence. Read our list of defence policy recommendations and learn what's needed to secure Canada's

future. ➡ EN: [https://cdainstitute.ca/cda-institute-defence-policy-recommendations/?utm\\_source=socials&utm\\_medium=twitter&utm\\_campaign=fe2025](https://cdainstitute.ca/cda-institute-defence-policy-recommendations/?utm_source=socials&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=fe2025) ➡ FR: [https://cdainstitute.ca/cda-institute-defence-policy-recommendations/?utm\\_source=socials&utm\\_medium=twitter&utm\\_campaign=fe2025](https://cdainstitute.ca/cda-institute-defence-policy-recommendations/?utm_source=socials&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=fe2025)



David Pugliese @davidpugliese 1 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Canada's top generals met with American counterparts in late March as the U.S. president vowed to harm the Canadian economy. <https://ottawacitizen.com/public-service/defence-watch/canadian-generals-military-u-s-trump> via @ottawacitizen





NAADSN\_RDSNAA @NAADSN\_RDSNAA 1 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: If you've been following the news on Canadian Arctic #defense and #foreignpolicy, we have a special collection of reflections on the 2024 Defence Policy Update and its Arctic Foreign Policy. <https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Cdn-Arctic-Def-For-Pol-Recent-Developments-PWL-mar2025.pdf>  
(Canadian Arctic Defence and Foreign Policy - Recent Developments)

## Canadian Arctic Defence and Foreign Policy

Recent Developments

Edited by  
P. Whitney Lackenbauer



NAADSN\_RDSNAA @NAADSN\_RDSNAA 31 Mar posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: In ordinary combat, the risk is usually enemy fire. But in the Canadian Arctic, it's "about knowing how to survive in extreme conditions" while carrying out your mission, says @WhitneyLackenb1  
(How Russia and China are seizing on Canada's carelessness in the Arctic)



<https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-china-seizing-canada-carelessness-194737415.html>)

RUSI(NS) quoted: There needs to be more public discussion about how confrontations in #Arctic could occur (envision scenarios) & what forces & non-military capabilities should therefore be developed. What is nature of threats? What capability developments work for Northern peoples?

"UK open to Canadian involvement in new fighter jet project" <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-open-to-canadian-involvement-in-new-fighter-jet-project/> "All three Global Combat Air Programme nations have highlighted an openness to working with other nations..."



CTV National News @CTVNationalNews Mar 28 posted: Canada to spend up to \$100M on new drones for navy warships (<https://www.ctvnews.ca/vancouver/article/canada-to-spend-up-to-100m-on-new-drones-for-navy-warships/>)  
RUSI(NS) quoted: .@RoyalCanNavy to procure uncrewed aerial systems #UAS #drones to provide near real-time intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition & reconnaissance information #ISTAR for over-the-horizon situational awareness <https://apps.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-capabilities-blueprint/project-details.asp?id=1297>



National Post @nationalpost 26 Mar posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Tom Lawson: Dumping the F-35 would hurt Canada far more than the U.S. <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/dumping-the-f-35-would-hurt-canada-far-more-than-the-u-s>




"Canada tees up military helicopter investment worth almost \$13 billion" <https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2025/03/27/canada-tees-up-military-helicopter-investment-worth-almost-13-billion/> Next Tactical Aviation Capability Set (nTACS) project to provide tactical helicopters for @RCAF\_ARC @CanadianArmy Canadian🇨🇦 Special Operations Command <https://canadiandefencereview.com/ntacs-next-tactical-aviation-capability-set/>



A (knowledgeable) blogger's comments: Let's talk very briefly about NTACS <https://noahscornerofrandomstuff.substack.com/p/lets-talk-very-briefly-about-ntacs>

The Royal Alberta United Services Institute @TheRAUSI 26 Mar posted: "Due to the Federal Leaders' Debate in French on 16 April, we've rescheduled MGen Ménard for 23 April. The shift ensures everyone—including Sylvain's fellow #Québécois—can tune in to both events. Haven't registered yet? <https://t.co/2c4ceTqAeF> #MilitaryLeadership #RCAF #CAF <https://t.co/0cweUiYF3j>" <https://x.com/TheRAUSI/status/1904896186865033299>



CTV Atlantic @CTVAtlantic 25 Mar posted: Science in steel boxes: how research teams hitched a ride with navy to Antarctica (<https://www.ctvnews.ca/atlantic/nova-scotia/article/science-in-steel-boxes-how-research-teams-hitched-a-ride-with-navy-to-antarctica/>)



RUSI(NS) quoted: Lab-in-a-box/research-equipment-in-a-box good means for @RoyalCanNavy, other CAN🇨🇦 gov't vessels & civil 'vessels/craft of opportunity' to contribute to CAN oceanographic research. Not just containerized weapons/sensors #MEOPAR #MORI @HawboldtIND

David Pugliese @davidpugliese posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: No deadline set for F-35 review as Carney repeats pledge to explore alternatives to U.S. fighter jet <https://ottawacitizen.com/public-service/defence-watch/deadline-f-35-review-u-s-carney> via @ottawacitizen



Murray Brewster @Murray\_Brewster 25 Mar posted: Canada and Allies studies options on how to Ukraine peacekeeping post-ceasefire #cdnpoli (Canada and allies study how to create Ukraine peacekeeping force in the face of skepticism <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-ukraine-russia-peacekeeping-1.7491994>)



RUSI(NS) quoted: Concerning whether @CanadianForces have 'depth' to sustain a peacekeeping force in Ukraine. Brigade Group in Latvia consumes much @CanadianArmy & other resources. What would be time/grounds if any to shift focus of effort from LVA to UKR?

Murray Brewster @Murray\_Brewster 24 Mar posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Security and national defence are often afterthoughts in Canadian elections. Not this time #cdnpoli (National defence is often an afterthought in Canadian elections. Not this time

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/national-defence-canada-election-1.7490509>)

*Comment from the contributor:* "The NATO spending target — and the fact Canada only hit 1.37 per cent last year — has been the most easily identifiable metric of defence spending for Canadians..." More metrics could/should add to the public's understanding/debate.



NAADSN\_RDSNAA @NAADSN\_RDSNAA 24 Mar posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: What is Russia's game plan in the Arctic? How do its strategic capabilities match up?

@sergeysukhankin answers these and more questions in his recent

report [https://cmsn.ca/files/ugd/0bcbee\\_6037476e01f44c348ad9c99da8279868.pdf](https://cmsn.ca/files/ugd/0bcbee_6037476e01f44c348ad9c99da8279868.pdf)

(The "Fourth Battle" for the Arctic – Russia's Capabilities, Strategic Thinking, and Game Plan)



NAADSN\_RDSNAA @NAADSN\_RDSNAA 24 Mar posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: "We can't think of this Iron Dome system like what the Israelis have, because we're talking about a huge area," @AndreaCharron said. "We know the missiles are going to come over us," she added, referring to Canada. (Canada rushes to fund its neglected military after Trump threats

<https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/world/2025/03/21/canada-rushes-to-fund-its-neglected-military-after-trump-threats/82591055007/>)



frank Reardon @FrankReardon1 7 Mar posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Just In case people were wondering what the #Iqaluit "Forward Operating Location" (FOL) looks like. Here are a few photos of the hanger and office/housing buildings. This will be upgraded to a "northern military operational support hub" #IqaluitBuildings #Nunavut #RCAF



"Military reserves 25% below target after unspent funds" <https://www.westernstandard.news/news/military-reserves-25-below-target-after-unspent-funds/63219>

Considering global situation, now is time to build up @CanadianForces Reserves people & equipment. Modern conflict shows that countries need 'depth', wars are rarely short.





National Defence @NationalDefence 12 Mar posted: The Strategic Tanker Transport Capability Project has reached two key milestones! ✈️ Last month, Canada received the fifth and final used CC-330 Husky aircraft. Meanwhile, the first new A330 is in the final stages of production in Toulouse, France. Next, both aircraft will head to Getafe, Spain, where they will be converted into Multi-Role Tanker Transport aircraft. Stay tuned for more updates! <https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/strategic-tanker-transport-capability-project.html>

(Strategic Tanker Transport Capability project)



"What scientists are looking for in Antarctica's water" <https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/video/9.6691376> Featuring scientists, @RoyalCanNavy sailors & @HawboldtInd launch&recovery system. Canadian🇨🇦 #Antarctic Research Expedition #CARE H/T @CBCNews @OrmistonOnline



### **"Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia" on Facebook:**

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

America's arsenal is failing. We need an industrial mobilization board now.

<https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/americas-arsenal-is-failing-we-need-an-industrial-mobilization-board-now/>

"If our country fails to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan — or worse — loses to China in a shooting war, the most likely culprit will be insufficient defense industrial capacity."



Self-sufficiency in steel is a subset of national strength in defence industries and of industry overall.

We tried 'fighting China' with lower budgets. It didn't go well.

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/04/we-tried-fighting-china-lower-budgets-it-didnt-go-well/404251/>

"Tabletop exercises hosted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments offer one big lesson for the fiscal 2026 spending plan." They "conducted an exercise to assess how to adjust defense spending to meet the China challenge." Participants "wrestled with what to fund based on different strategies for stopping a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and different trajectories for defense budgets."



Would the 'exercise' be considered a wargame or financial/budgetary planning? Difficult to discern from the information of the article. What does Canada do that is similar?

"The strategy of mortgaging present preparedness for future preparedness had its heyday, but that heyday is over."

Some have already declared it is a time like the late 1930s. This needs public and government attention: how ready are the Canadian Armed Forces to fight now? What is the balance of effort and expenditure between being ready now and building forces for the (maybe too far) future?

Defence pledges have unprecedented electoral spotlight, but more ambition may be needed to match allies: experts  
<https://www.hilltimes.com/story/2025/04/01/defence-pledges-have-unprecedented-electoral-spotlight-but-more-ambition-may-be-needed-to-match-allies-experts/455721/>

"There is no strategic vision that comes with that (lack of ambition by parties) [which] is a little bit problematic ... "



There needs to be an articulation of Canada's grand strategy. Whilst Canada's geo-strategic situation has long dictated our defence policies and grand strategies, so they have remained relatively constant over the decades, there is not enough public and political discussion and understanding. That is needed in order to put our current and proposed actions and procurements into perspective.

Grand strategy: "The art of applying the whole power of a nation (or a coalition of nations) in the most effective manner towards attaining the aim. It includes the use of diplomacy, economic pressure, arrangements with allies, the mobilization of industry and the distribution of manpower, as well as the employment of the three fighting services in combination. The term is conveniently used in connection with planning affecting operations in more than one theatre." (Termium+, Government of Canada's terminology and linguistic data bank <https://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/>)

China's Mahanian Naval Strategy – And Why America Needs One Too

<https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/chinas-mahanian-naval-strategy-and-why-america-needs-one-too/>

"In Mahanian fashion, China's leaders understand that wealth and sea power reinforce each other: secure the sea lanes fuel the economy and growing wealth furthers expand naval strength."



The author shows an appreciation of the relationship between elements of seapower: navies, trade, geography, bases, people, etc. I take a little exception to her "America must reinvest in its fleet to regain both qualitative and quantitative advantages at sea. This means expanding the number of high-end warships and integrating next-generation technologies" as it appears to belittle the utility, especially for other than high-end conflict, of middle and low-end warships (and non-warships) for the protection of shipping and all the other-than-battle missions.

"A renewed American maritime strategy must refocus on the Navy's historic role of safeguarding trade routes and the global commons."

I'm not sure current American foreign policy and grand strategy, with their distancing from allies, will allow the US Navy to undertake completely that safeguarding role.

*From a senior Canadian naval officer:* I one hundred percent agree with the author's call for defending maritime choke points, patrolling sea lanes of communication and having the ability to conduct sustainment forward. The author lightly dances around the fleet roles and vessel types that she's calling for, other than deriding the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (which I also agree with). That being said, the problem with using Mahan as a guide for naval strategy is that it focuses almost exclusively on a decisive battle at sea between capital ships. It entirely ignores the reality of DIME

(diplomatic, informational, military, economic) and pan-domain warfare. Once a strategy is determined, Booth's triangle is more useful for determining fleet mixes, in my opinion. Mahan is one of those topics that is much debated by a small group of US academics located at US Naval War College (USNWC) and the Centre for Maritime Strategy but few elsewhere. It is also frequently claimed, with scanty evidence, that the Kaiser, Imperial Japan, and now Chinese Communist Party were/are unabashed fans and thus by implication we should be too. Even as a USNWC graduate, I would describe myself as a Corbettian and not Mahanian.

The untold story of the 2009 defence white paper  
<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-untold-story-of-the-2009-defence-white-paper/>

This article is interesting because of its use of 'force expansion' (as compared to 'force development' and 'force employment,' terms in use in the Canadian Armed Forces), something that Canada needs now to consider and which could now serve as an element of defence policy planning and of public messaging.

The apparently regretful reminiscence serves as a lesson for the future, but a lesson that applies to other states such as Canada.



Russian networks flood the Internet with propaganda, aiming to corrupt AI chatbots

<https://thebulletin.org/2025/03/russian-networks-flood-the-internet-with-propaganda-aiming-to-corrupt-ai-chatbots/>

"... LLM (large language model) grooming with the potential intent of inducing AI (artificial intelligence) chatbots to reproduce Russian disinformation and propaganda."

LLM grooming - now, that's taking disinformation operations to a new level.



Australia to Speed Up \$1 billion in Defense Spending, Including AUKUS Submarine Base and Frigates  
<https://gcaptain.com/australia-to-speed-up-1-billion-in-defense-spending-including-aukus-submarine-base-and-frigates/>


"Australia will bring forward A\$1 billion in defence spending in Tuesday's federal budget to boost its military capability..."

The lesson from Australia (and Europe) for Canada is to look at bringing forward some of our defence spending. Not just because of US pressure but mainly in consideration of the global geo-political situation and potential action by threat states.



China Discloses Powerful Deep-Sea Cable Cutter, SCMP Reports  
<https://gcaptain.com/china-discloses-powerful-deep-sea-cable-cutter-scmp-reports/>

"China revealed for the first time that it has developed a compact deep-sea cable cutting device that is powerful enough to sever communication lines ..." "The tool is able to operate at a depth of up to 4,000 meters (13,123 feet) and has been





designed for use with the country's advanced manned or unmanned submersible vehicles ..."

Seabottom/seabed operations are increasingly an issue. And navies and countries like Canada increasingly need to ensure that they have the capabilities to operate for the defence of critical (it's almost all critical) seabottom infrastructure.

Donald Trump's Anti-Houthi Campaign Comes Up Short  
<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trumps-anti-houthi-campaign-comes-up-short>

"The current (air offensive) strategy views a good offense as the best defense of the sea lanes."



"Control represents the prime goal of military strategy, and air bombardment — no matter how relentless — cannot replace the power of boots on the ground." "But Wylie would remind us that destruction is not control — and without control, military strategy falls short."

Interesting. And I would view this as more of air warfare meets shoot-and-scoot! Most missile systems today are relatively mobile. Even ballistic missiles can be put on a mobile launcher - though large and cumbersome it's doable. So really, the idea of firing then moving the system faster than overhead intelligence can be gathered presents a problem for strike operations, which, make no bones about it, this what the US is conducting. Air campaigns have always been fraught with what the author describes, an inability to maintain constant waves of offense over a prolonged period of time if there are no boots on the ground to take advantage. In this case one is faced with some strikes from Yemen going inland but the majority are sea bound. So I completely agree with the author: the air campaign (really a strike op) is not necessarily going to achieve the desired end state.

Consider that in this day and age, the littoral arena is no longer what it once was described. Simply put, technology is such now that maritime assets are at a disadvantage when they are within 100 kilometres of the shoreline. That is an arbitrary number for it depends on the range of a weapon being launched from shore. Thus the key is to not only lay down strikes, but also put boots on ground to reduce the arena from which offensive systems can operate. In essence, push them back! Personally this is more disruption than anything, at least with conventional weapons. It remains to be seen what actually comes of this given the area, the Houthis' desire and creative efforts, and the ability of the US systems to eradicate missile systems. For the bean counters, is the cost in terms of weapons expenditure, wear and tear on aircraft, and for the diplomats and generals, is the potential 'loss of face,' worth the result?

*From a colleague:* I always appreciate reading Dr Holmes although in this case I'd argue that while boots on the ground is the ultimate measure of control, it's not necessary to have control in order to defeat the Houthi threat. Similar to the Somali piracy threat of the mid to late 2000s (see: "Going Ashore to Address Somali Piracy – A Step Too Far?" <https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/296/286/robinson.pdf>).

What if Europe had to fight tonight – without the Americans?  
<https://wavelroom.com/2025/03/19/what-if-europe-had-to-fight-tonight-without-the-americans/>

"The challenge, therefore, is not whether Europe can fight effectively without the United States – it can, and it might soon have to. The real question is whether Europe will invest today, while it still has the choice of how it wants to fight before circumstances dictate the way it has to."





The points of this Euro-centric article apply to Canada, too.

Does raise some thoughts: What would Canada's approach be if war broke out in Europe and the US declined to get involved? We'd still need to ensure protection of our trans-Atlantic shipping for our own economic health and to move military material. But what changes to our strategies would have to be made in the absence of US intelligence, forces, sustainment, etc.?

Similarly, what would Canada's approach be if war broke out between the US and China and we declined to get involved?

Germany Confiscates Tanker Belonging to Russian 'Shadow Fleet'

<https://gcaptain.com/germany-confiscates-tanker-belonging-to-russian-shadow-fleet/>

"Germany has confiscated a decrepit tanker found adrift off its northern coast in January that is believed to be part of a shadow fleet used by Russia to circumvent oil sanctions..."

Confiscation of a Russian shadow fleet tanker would make an interesting staff talk/tabletop exercise for Canadian authorities. There would be many departments and agencies involved. Would Transport Canada be the lead?



Why China's Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance is Important to the United States

<https://gcaptain.com/why-chinas-targeting-of-the-maritime-logistics-and-shipbuilding-sectors-for-dominance-is-important-to-the-united-states/>

"...the failure to adequately have a commercial merchant marine and maritime industrial base would be a major handicap should a great power confrontation emerge in the Pacific. It appears that Chinese efforts to dominate these sectors has the goal to give China superiority and dominance in key areas of oceanic trade, shipbuilding, and shipping ..."

A (the?) major function of navies is to protect the movement of trade by sea, whilst clearing the trade of the enemy. But if the enemy already dominates shipping and controls the ports between which shipping moves, might protection be irrelevant and the confrontation already lost? There needs to be a greater approach to defence than just building and operating naval forces.



Norway's coastal rangers eye fresh drones to find threats at sea  
<https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/03/21/norways-coastal-rangers-eye-fresh-drones-to-find-threats-at-sea/>

"The ship-boarding scenario has turned front and center in the alliance's recent defense planning. Western officials fear that NATO adversaries employ ships under the guise of research missions or civilian cargo runs to damage undersea cables and energy infrastructure in the waters around Europe."

Are Canadian federal departments and agencies planning for and



practicing boardings of foreign civil and government 'research' and cargo ships that threaten our seabed infrastructure (communications and energy lines)? Especially if a major foreign state is involved? Is our government sector engaging with Canadian scientists to ensure expertise is available during boarding incidents to determine what constitutes real research or not?

New support ships redesignated as Multi-Role Strike Ships  
<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/new-support-ships-redesignated-as-multi-role-strike-ships/>

"The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has confirmed that the Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS) programme has been renamed the Multi-Role Strike Ship (MRSS) to better reflect its combat capabilities and mission profile."



The title of a project to build 'support' ships (which are to replace landing ships and a primary casualty receiving ship) changed to 'strike' (which my copy of AAP-6 defines as "an attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective"). Does there appear to be some messaging, particularly political messaging, entering into project titling?

Thankfully Canadian project titling seems to be more focused on general descriptions, with at the most the River-class and corvette projects appealing to public historical memories.

## Other Sources

#AI #Canada

AI strategy for the federal public service

<https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-government-innovations/responsible-use-ai/gc-ai-strategy-overview.html>

Canada moves toward safe and responsible AI

<https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2025/03/canada-moves-toward-safe-and-responsible-artificial-intelligence.html>

#AI #energy security #national security

Podcast: AI, energy and robots: Where to bet in the boom (~45 min listen)

<https://www.exponentialview.co/p/ai-energy-and-robots-where-to-bet>

*Comment:* A wide-ranging discussion hosted by a global expert (*Economist*, *WSJ*, *Financial Times*) that also looks at the European strategic shift in the past year.

#AI #innovation

Second wave of AI factories set to drive EU-wide innovation

<https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/second-wave-ai-factories-set-drive-eu-wide-innovation>

China announces high-tech fund to grow AI, emerging industries

<https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/06/tech/china-state-venture-capital-guidance-fund-intl-hnk/index.html>

*Comment:* A state-backed fund to support innovation. Of note, the inclusion of hydrogen energy storage as an emerging technology alongside the usual suspects of

AI and quantum computing. Interestingly, Canada adopted a hydrogen strategy in December 2020 and is one of the leading in countries in the development of hydrogen technology and grey hydrogen. Again, when considering what is needed to be a credible, relevant, and influential middle power, is our technological expertise in several areas a pathway? What is needed to make greater gains in and exploit it better?

#AI sovereignty

Kazakhstan's bid for AI sovereignty

<https://thediplomat.com/2025/03/kazakhstans-bid-for-ai-sovereignty/>

*Comment:* There are plans for a supercomputer cluster in the country, part of a set of initiatives from the government to position Kazakhstan as a regional leader in artificial intelligence. The aim is economic growth but there is also a cultural aspect: a strong domestic AI industry is seen as vital for linguistic preservation. However, there is a delay and among other things, one of the constraints is the limited amount of Kazakh data from which AI can learn. AI sovereignty: how much digital sovereignty does Canada have? (see #digital weaponization)

#airpower

ME-11B Official Designation Of Army's New Intelligence Gathering Business Jets

<https://www.twz.com/air/me-11b-official-designation-of-armys-new-intelligence-gathering-business-jets>

May be of interest to those who are aware the US Army High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES) intelligence-gathering aircraft is based on a modified Bombardier Global 6500 business jet.

#Arctic

'Games within games:' China hints at withdrawing its Arctic claims

<https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/games-within-games-china-hints-at-withdrawing-its-arctic-claims/>

Putin outlines Russian plans for Arctic

(Caution: RT webpage) <https://www.rt.com/russia/614888-putin-arctic-forum-speech/>

*Comment from contributor:* Hafta read between the lines and in the context of what Russia is actually doing in the Arctic. They continue to build their 'Northern Front.'

#border security

Canada–United States Border Security: Drug Trafficking and Irregular Migration

<https://hillnotes.ca/2025/03/12/canada-united-states-border-security-drug-trafficking-and-irregular-migration/>

#China

Bridges Over Troubled Waters: Shuiqiao-Class Landing Barges in PLA Navy Amphibious Operations

<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/14/>

*Comment from contributor:* Further to comments in last *Dispatches* about the Chinese 'invasion barges' (really, ship-to-shore connectors/piers).

Jennifer Parker @JAParker29 23 Mar posted

(<https://x.com/JAParker29/status/1903905314279485660>): A guide to China's critical maritime infrastructure (CMI) protection | Helpful new summary by @IISS\_org.

'CCP policymakers have promised greater safeguarding of key sectors, including those that relate to communications, energy, trade and food security, among others'

*Comment:* The graphic that goes with this X post may be of interest to those studying China's strengths and weaknesses.

#cyber security

Typhoons in cyberspace

<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/typhoons-cyberspace>

*Comment:* BLUF: the threat from China is significantly more serious than at any point in the digital age. The article states China's cyber capability has changed in three ways: the objectives shifted from economic to political ones, its operations have changed from being opportunistic to strategic, and it is no longer simply a passive actor but an active one. In other words, it does not just spy and steal anymore but is conducting disruptive cyber operations against western critical infrastructure, which it had shown no signs of doing before now. The author proposes five courses of action: improvements in detection, resilience and the quality of infrastructure; reforms to policy; and a realistic approach to deterrence. However, the challenges of domestic protection of critical private sector assets is noted as the highest priority as it holds the majority of the national security risk yet the private sector is left mostly on its own to manage it.

#defence policy

US allies question extended deterrence guarantees, but have few options

<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/03/us-allies-question-extended-deterrence-guarantees-but-have-few-options>

No mention of Canada amongst the 'allies'.

#defence policy #strategy

Britain's defence delusions - Its fatal flaw is wishful thinking

<https://unherd.com/2025/03/britains-defence-strategy-is-pure-cakeism/>

*Comment from contributor:* Points of reflection for Canada. 'Grand strategy' is a term the definition of which sees a lot of argument. The Government of Canada's Termium+ (<https://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/>) has: "The art of applying the whole power of a nation (or a coalition of nations) in the most effective manner towards attaining the aim. It includes the use of diplomacy, economic pressure, arrangements with allies, the mobilization of industry and the distribution of manpower, as well as the employment of the three fighting services in combination. The term is conveniently used in connection with planning affecting operations in more than one theatre." A SJS colleague advises that the term is rarely used in practice and staff



normally refer to a national security strategy as grand strategy or similar is not something for which the Government sees use. (Had to look up 'cakeism': refers to the belief that it's possible to have or enjoy two desirable but mutually exclusive things or outcomes at the same time, essentially "having your cake and eating it too.")

#defence spending

Making Sense of Canada's Defence Spending

<https://hillnotes.ca/2025/03/13/making-sense-of-canadas-defence-spending/>

Note the NATO analysis.

#digital weaponization

The brutalist web

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/the-brutalist-web/>

*Comment:* Stating this as the norm rather than an exception, the author unpacks the strategic implications of digital dependency. Did you know that [64 percent and 70 percent of Canadian internet traffic routes through the](#) US, with a typical email crossing the border multiple times before reaching its domestic destination? Or that all 13 trans-Pacific fibre-optic cables land on the US West Coast, with none terminating in Canada? And, of the 14 trans-Atlantic fibre-optic cables, 12 make landfall on the US East Coast, [while only two connect directly to Canada?](#)

#disinformation #hybrid warfare

Understanding Russian hybrid warfare: Elections in Moldova and Georgia

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/russian-hybrid-warfare/>

*Comment:* Using these two examples as case studies, the author recommends the standard activities to counter Russian, or any, disinformation. Disinformation campaigns start with a false narrative, then broad amplification of the narrative, and finally, concealment of the narrative's origins. To protect a community from falling victim to a narrative, identify it before its amplification, construct an early and aggressive counter-narrative that highlights the false narrative, and educate people on their own vulnerability to disinformation.

#drones

Drones in a Box

<https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2022/06/drones-in-a-box/>

#economic security #energy security

Canada should protect a strategic asset for driving economic growth

<https://cleanprosperity.ca/canada-should-protect-a-strategic-asset-for-driving-economic-growth/>

*Comment:* Industrial carbon pricing is described as the most cost effective way of encouraging investment in new technologies. Repealing the *Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act* "...undermines the policy certainty that businesses need to make large investments," and Canada's efforts to diversify trade when trading partners like the European Union have adopted tools that put a price on carbon emitted while producing imported goods.

What a nationwide grid network would do for clean energy in Canada

<https://www.corporateknights.com/energy/what-a-nationwide-grid-network-would-mean-for-clean-energy-in-canada/>

*Comment:* Interprovincial barriers also impact energy distribution across Canada. In the past, north–south trade was so beneficial there was also little incentive to break down barriers to east–west trade. A key takeaway is that we can use the existing infrastructure, just do so in better ways: the current interprovincial connections aren't used to capacity due to regulatory and political challenges. This can be changed now without immediate major infrastructure projects.

#economic warfare

The President's Inbox Recap: The New Era of Economic Warfare

<https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-recap-new-era-economic-warfare>

#financial innovation [*and human security*]

Policy pathways for integrating fast payment systems with digital currencies

<https://www.cigionline.org/publications/policy-pathways-for-integrating-fast-payment-systems-with-digital-currencies/>

*Comment:* Fast payment systems (FPSs) and digital platforms that facilitate instant, secure transactions with minimal fees promote financial access for underbanked populations. Digital currencies, particularly stablecoins and central bank digital currencies, are another innovation. The article calls for collaboration and coexistence rather than competition, combining the strengths of both technologies to create better benefits. To do this, global standards and cross-border agreements are key, as well as harmonizing regulations for FPSs and digital currencies and investing in digital infrastructure and the development of open application programming interfaces.

#financial policy #economic security

Modernizing the CPTPP e-commerce chapter

<https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/article/ftas/modernizing-the-cptpp-e-commerce-chapter/>

*Comment:* An in-depth look at why and how this can be achieved, timely as the General Review of the CPTPP that launched in 2023 is due to conclude this year. There is a long and growing list of nations who want to join but only Costa Rica received an invitation to start the accession process last November. China, Taiwan, Ecuador, Uruguay, Ukraine, and Indonesia are still waiting in line, while Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines have informally signalled their interest. There is likely to be a considerable dividend for global coherence if these candidates, including some very large economies, join an updated CPTPP agreement with a modernized e-commerce chapter.

#future casting

Strategic Trends 2025 - Key Developments in Global Affairs

<https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/ST2025.pdf>

#grand strategy

Fighting with Allies: Transforming Multinational Strategic Planning in the U.S. Department of Defense

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/fighting-allies-transforming-multinational-strategic-planning-us-department-defense>

## #Indo-Pacific

The Golden Dome is not ready to stop a Chinese attack on the US

<https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2025/03/27/the-golden-dome-is-not-ready-to-stop-a-chinese-attack-on-the-us/>

*Comment from contributor:* Note the authors, especially John Warden.

The recommendations are strongly oriented to public information action.

(And would Golden Dome work without Canada?)

## #intelligence

Podcast: Intel imperatives: Securing the homeland

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/intel-imperatives/>

*Comment:* The discussion highlights the critical importance of interagency coordination, information sharing, open-source intelligence, and public trust. It also looks at the threat from China, particularly the potential for cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructure.

2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community

<https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2025/4058-2025-annual-threat-assessment>

## #land warfare

Battlefield analysis: On the AOC, a greater emphasis on major combat operations

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/battlefield-analysis-on-the-aoc-a-greater-emphasis-on-major-combat-operations/>

*Comment from the contributor:* Good, back to large-scale combat operations (LSCO - 'cause ya gotta have an acronym).

Nice to see the wargame in the picture.

## #leadership

Why you should collaborate across boundaries

<https://www.ccl.org/articles/leading-effectively-articles/boundary-spanning-the-leadership-advantage/>

“The best leaders don’t manage just within their own sphere. They lead across boundaries, positioning teams to drive innovation, solve complex problems, and achieve mission-critical results.”

Podcast: Write it down: General Randy George (US Chief of Staff of the Army) on reflection, reading, and readiness (~42 min listen)

<https://www.buzzsprout.com/1410526/episodes/16834365>

The 4 types of executive teams.

<https://nobl.io/changemaker/the-four-types-of-executive-teams/>

“Is your leadership model designed by choice – or just by tradition?”

## #logistics

Rebuilding ammo stocks

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/rebuilding-ammo-stocks/>

#maritime security

Maritime Industry Security Threat Overview

<https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/a3311bcm/2025-03-31-misto.pdf>

Shipping Industry Unveils New Maritime Security Playbook as Global Threats Escalate

<https://gcaptain.com/shipping-industry-unveils-new-maritime-security-playbook-as-global-threats-escalate/>

#people #human resources

Delivering Advantage: People as a Capability

<https://wavelroom.com/2025/03/26/delivering-advantage-people-as-a-capability/>

"We need to stop seeing people as a function or an asset to be managed, but instead treat people as a capability to be invested in, both in time and resource."

#reading

*On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century* by Timothy Snyder.

Available on Amazon.

"The history of 20th-century Europe shows us that societies can break, democracies can fall, ethics can collapse, and ordinary men can find themselves standing over death pits with guns in their hands. Fascists rejected reason in the name of will, denying objective truth in favor of glorious myth articulated by leaders who claimed to give voice to the people."

#recruiting

Expert warns military readiness at risk despite recruitment rebound

<https://thenationaldesk.com/news/americas-news-now/expert-warns-military-readiness-at-risk-despite-recruitment-rebound-rand-expert-calls-for-enhanced-military-recruitment-strategies-to-attract-high-aptitude-youth>

*Comment:* This article correctly links recruitment to readiness but rather than support necessary change, harkens back to and desires the bounty of the past. That is not evolution and hinders progress. Heard from a CAF Commander of Military Personnel Generation Group, echoed somewhat by a Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy, that the idea isn't about lowering standards but recognizing that people have different lived experiences and opportunities. Those with less opportunities should not be penalized when they want to serve. What is important is that the end standard is met, ie the one needed to be employed/deployed – and that means how we get there is no longer a single pipeline. The realities of who we want to attract and who walks through the door means that the whole system needs to be modified, not just the front end. The RCAF watched its recruitment and pers generation trends steadily fall for two decades. It isn't just about recruiting better. Additional supports are likely required; the training system needs to adapt and provide multiple pathways to reach the end standard. This may also mean that not everyone showing up at the unit is immediately employable in all areas, which requires a flexible, tiered employment model (just in time training not just in case) ...and more resources. Change is never a zero-sum game. There is a cost in one form or the other, but what is key is that which is gained: different perspectives, which can spur innovation/modernization, and more people who want to serve (for 3-5 years is good, 10-15 better, 25 years...few and far in between but no longer an ideal upon which to base a pers system).



#Russia

Russian Railways Becoming a Growing Political and Geopolitical Problem for Moscow

<https://jamestown.org/program/russian-railways-becoming-a-growing-political-and-geopolitical-problem-for-moscow/>

*Comment from contributor:* Front line no good if replacements and supplies can't get to it.

#Russia-Ukraine war

The impending collapse of Russian sanctions: The cost of inaction

<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/impending-collapse-russia-sanctions-cost-inaction>

*Comment:* A dissection of how the war sanctions have played out and why, but the most insightful statement is one that speaks to a flaw seen often in decision space, regardless of issue: "Ultimately, the EU has fallen into the trap of overstating the risks of action while being oblivious to the risks of inaction."

How a beatdown at sea turned Russia's navy into China's junior partner

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/03/ukraines-beatdown-sea-turned-russias-navy-chinas-junior-partner/404063/>

#strategy

Donald Trump's Anti-Houthi Campaign Comes Up Short

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trumps-anti-houthi-campaign-comes-up-short>

"The current (air offensive) strategy views a good offense as the best defense of the sea lanes."

"Control represents the prime goal of military strategy, and air bombardment — no matter how relentless — cannot replace the power of boots on the ground."

"But Wylie would remind us that destruction is not control — and without control, military strategy falls short."

#United States

Tracking Their Wake: How Strong Is the U.S. Navy Today?

<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=cmis-translations>

*Comment from contributor:* Chinese perspective. How does one measure a navy's strength?

#warfare

Timeless Lessons from Cannae to D-Day: Operational Art on the Sensor-Rich Battlefield of the Twenty-First Century

<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/timeless-lessons-from-cannae-to-d-day-operational-art-on-the-sensor-rich-battlefield-of-the-twenty-first-century/>

#warfare #environment

Beyond Bullets, Bombs, Raids, and Rockets: The Environmental Impact of War

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/environmental-impact-of-war/>

#wargaming

The 'reveal and conceal game': Air Force wargamers see value in mid-conflict deterrence

<http://breakingdefense.com/2025/03/the-reveal-and-conceal-game-air-force-wargamers-see-value-in-mid-conflict-deterrence/>

Wargaming - Military Meets Fiction

<https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/further-fmod-departments/bundeswehr-command-and-staff-college/wargaming-military-meets-fiction-5570824>

Wargaming the information environment

<https://canadianarmytoday.com/wargaming-the-information-environment/>

## Odds and sods...

The unknown ally: Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS)

<https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2025/03/unknown-ally-osiss.html>

### **Britain to introduce new inflatable warships to expand fleet**

It was April Fools this week, gotta have a little fun: <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britain-to-introduce-new-inflatable-warships-to-expand-fleet/>



There was a slew of ship-related 1st of April posts on @UKDefJournal on X. Though the footnote to this article is quite serious.

### **US Army University Press *Military Review* March-April 2025**

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2025/>

contents:

Exploring Artificial Intelligence-Enhanced Cyber and Information Operations Integration

Lessons on Public-Facing Information Operations in Current Conflicts

Prioritizing Maintenance Restructuring and Resourcing for Autonomous Systems

Leveraging Data for Warehouse Distribution Success During Operation Allies Welcome: A

Retrospective on Operationalizing Data

What Constitutes a Capability? Leveraging the Ukraine Experience to Define an Overused Term

Theater Armies: Complex Yet Indispensable to Multidomain Operations

Authorities and the Multidomain Task Force: Enabling Strategic Effect

Army Fires: Enabling Joint Convergence in a Maritime Environment

Invest in Battlefield Obscurity to Win During Large-Scale Combat Operations

What Can We Learn from Measuring Unit Culture? Preliminary Evidence from a Data-Centric Approach to Organizational Performance

Nine Narratives Destroying American Diplomacy and How to Counter Them

Sino-Vietnamese Defense Relations

The Army Civilian Corps' Elusive Culture of Commitment  
Terminological Terrain: How to Map and Navigate Jargon in Professional Writing  
Vietnam Combat: Firefights and Writing History  
Medal of Honor: Pvt. Philip G. Shadrach and Pvt. George D. Wilson, U.S. Civil War

Defense investment advice from a retired USN (hence 'defense' rather than 'defence') friend for those adapting to the US becoming an unreliable ally:

- Invest in your people (human capital capabilities), including individual and collective training, domestically and with key allies. . . interoperability with dependable allies.
- Invest in counter-AI capabilities and strategies (we might have called this “cyber” before, but it is so much more than that today).
- Invest in UAV technologies (in high quantities) with long range swarming capabilities.
- Pass on large investments in high-cost aircraft in favor of higher quantities of “good enough” aircraft while compromising the “bright, shiny object” capabilities. . . it is all about balance.
- Blend naval capabilities with less expensive, longer range shore based weapons for coastal defense.
- Invest in cost effective subsurface capabilities that support your strategy (ex: battery powered subs with cost/capability that support your needs).
- Partner for nuclear umbrella in ways that are not dependent on the US.
- Adapt the fiscal aspect of defense investment (where you spend your money) to fit current global reality and dependability of supply chain. Not a new issue, just a changing one.
- Don't neglect the potential role of the northern passage, with impact of climate change, as a strategic part of future defense thinking.
- Bottom line: DON'T expect that you can follow a US defense investment and posture approach.

Now, let's hope that the US once again becomes a responsible world leader and defense ally in the not too distant future (our lifetime)!

## SAC Notes

O Canada

A minority Government is not what Canada needs.

After years of missed opportunities, the Liberal government has finally discovered the Arctic and defence. The last major investments were made by the previous government of Stephen Harper including the naval station at Nanisivik, the Arctic exercises called Nanook, and the Arctic and Offshore Patrol vessels now known as the Dewolfe class. Within the past two weeks, the Liberals announced three new military hubs at Inuvik, Iqaluit and Resolute along with the purchase of an over the horizon radar system from the Australians. These announcements came just days before the Prime Minister dissolved Parliament and no money is yet attached to any of these projects at present.

Here is an explanation of Over the Horizon Radar from the AI Co Pilot:

How does the OTH radar technology function?

Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar technology is fascinating because it allows radar systems to detect targets far beyond the line of sight, overcoming the Earth's curvature.

Here's how it works:

Skywave Propagation: OTH radars transmit high-frequency radio waves that bounce off the ionosphere—a layer of Earth's atmosphere filled with charged particles. These waves refract back to Earth, enabling the radar to detect objects located hundreds or even thousands of

kilometers away.

Surface Wave Propagation: Some OTH radars use low-frequency radio waves that travel along the Earth's surface, following its curvature. This method is particularly useful for maritime surveillance and detecting low-altitude targets.

Advanced Signal Processing: OTH radars use sophisticated algorithms to analyze the returned signals, filtering out noise and identifying potential threats with high accuracy.

This technology is especially valuable for early warning systems, maritime monitoring, and tracking long-range threats like ballistic or hypersonic missiles. If you'd like, I can dive deeper into its applications or history!

The French nuclear hunter killer submarine FS Tourville paid a visit to Halifax. It is in Canadian waters to test its ability to operate in very cold waters as well as conduct exercises and drills with the Royal Canadian Navy. The message to the Canadian Government was also clear; French technology belongs to the French and not the US. The French have been much freer and more open about the use of their technology. PM Trudeau mentioned that he would not dismiss acquiring nuclear submarines for the RCN.

China has followed up with many countries affected by the inexplicable decision to end USAID. The agency was an essential part of the US soft power approach which was highly effective. China has taken advantage of the Trump administration's gross incompetence. Canada is no exception to this activity. China has a long history of interfering in Canada's politics. Up to 80% of the Chinese language press in Canada is funded by the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) United Front, their propaganda arm. China's envoy was very quick to push China's view after Trump's disastrous tariff program. China was a particularly negative player, which interfered in the 2019 and 2021 elections as well as also operating against lower levels of government. China is not a friend but an adversary. No politician of any party should encourage any form of more complex relationship especially something such as a free trade accord.

Speaking of China and others, Canada is very weak at present. It is under economic attack by both the US and China by way of unjustified tariffs. Canada's crippling deficit spending and large debt makes our country ill-prepared for the attacks it now is under. We are also being called out on our lack of defence spending and support to NATO. Despite all the rhetoric from all the parties, no actual money has actually been spent to pay for any of the announced initiatives. We continue to be an unreliable partner in the defence of our allies. They will not help us if we are not willing to invest in ways and means to defend them as well as a true partner in NATO.

Australia

[https://gcaptain.com/us-starts-to-build-submarine-presence-on-strategic-australian-coast-under-aukus/?subscriber=true&goal=0\\_f50174ef03-118e4e7794-170491534&mc\\_cid=118e4e7794&mc\\_eid=9fc66b041f](https://gcaptain.com/us-starts-to-build-submarine-presence-on-strategic-australian-coast-under-aukus/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-118e4e7794-170491534&mc_cid=118e4e7794&mc_eid=9fc66b041f)

The article forwarded and bring the US-Aus plan up to date

[https://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/news/first-collins-lote-may-be-descoped?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=ADM%20Today%20-%2019%20March%202025&utm\\_content=ADM%20Today%20-%2019%20March%202025+CID\\_12a486df0a7e1c4efe3400f9d60937dc&utm\\_source=Email%20marketing%20software&utm\\_term=Read%20more](https://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/news/first-collins-lote-may-be-descoped?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ADM%20Today%20-%2019%20March%202025&utm_content=ADM%20Today%20-%2019%20March%202025+CID_12a486df0a7e1c4efe3400f9d60937dc&utm_source=Email%20marketing%20software&utm_term=Read%20more)

Older boats are expensive to update and that justifies pursuit of new construction, if money can be found!



[https://gcaptain.com/australia-to-speed-up-1-billion-in-defense-spending-including-aucus-submarine-base-and-frigates/?subscriber=true&goal=0\\_f50174ef03-14d6e11cf6-170491534&mc\\_cid=14d6e11cf6&mc\\_eid=9fc66b041f](https://gcaptain.com/australia-to-speed-up-1-billion-in-defense-spending-including-aucus-submarine-base-and-frigates/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-14d6e11cf6-170491534&mc_cid=14d6e11cf6&mc_eid=9fc66b041f)

Aus is putting more money into defence. AUKUS and more frigates are in the spending plan

[https://gcaptain.com/chinese-newnew-shipping-line-to-expand-arctic-container-service-after-profitable-2024-operation/?subscriber=true&goal=0\\_f50174ef03-14d6e11cf6-170491534&mc\\_cid=14d6e11cf6&mc\\_eid=9fc66b041f](https://gcaptain.com/chinese-newnew-shipping-line-to-expand-arctic-container-service-after-profitable-2024-operation/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-14d6e11cf6-170491534&mc_cid=14d6e11cf6&mc_eid=9fc66b041f)

The Chinese are expanding Arctic container shipping. Canada needs to get its act together!

[https://gcaptain.com/india-to-hold-naval-drills-with-african-nations-to-counter-china/?subscriber=true&goal=0\\_f50174ef03-14d6e11cf6-170491534&mc\\_cid=14d6e11cf6&mc\\_eid=9fc66b041f](https://gcaptain.com/india-to-hold-naval-drills-with-african-nations-to-counter-china/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-14d6e11cf6-170491534&mc_cid=14d6e11cf6&mc_eid=9fc66b041f)

India is expressing serious interest in challenging China in the African coastal nations. The Indian Navy will be a key player in this initiative

<https://globe2go.pressreader.com/article/281526526846339> If Canada is to reduce its dependencies on the US, it needs to encourage trade and defence relationships with European nations, not only NATO members as well as Pacific nations. South America may present additional trade opportunities.

[https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-untold-story-of-the-2009-defence-white-paper/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm\\_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID\\_5cc424772d99017bff5e66b2f4cf804e&utm\\_source=CampaignMonitor&utm\\_term=The%20untold%20story%20of%20the%202009%20defence%20white%20paper](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-untold-story-of-the-2009-defence-white-paper/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID_5cc424772d99017bff5e66b2f4cf804e&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=The%20untold%20story%20of%20the%202009%20defence%20white%20paper)

The above article is an interesting review of what might have been if Australia had fully implemented its 2009 White Paper on Defence.

<https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/turning-canberra-class-lhds-into-aircraft-carriers/news-story/1f135571e6677236a19a48335bff9913>

The RAN could get back into the aircraft carrier business.

<https://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/news/aucus-submarine-industry-strategy-unveiled>

The Australia submarine industry strategy unveiled

United States

One has to wonder about the mental gymnastics required to take the Russian position as an American. Russia started and is continuing the war in Ukraine starting in 2014 not 2022 with the occupation of Crimea. Mr Witkoff sounds more like a Russian stooge than a patriotic American. The actual truth of peace negotiations is they are a farce of the worst order. They are more a product of a chaotic mind than statesmanship. The real answer is one that most people are tiptoeing around is that peace will only come with a detailed defeat of the Putin regime, otherwise we are just providing opportunities for Russia to continue the conflict by other means.

The US continues its attacks on allies, as most allied countries will be placed on tariffs on 2 April 2025. The Trump administration continues this policy despite knowing that this type of effort is as damaging to the US as much as the country targeted and the US public is now starting to understand the effects. One hopes that members of Congress and Senate will take action to prevent the worst of the effects of the administration's chaotic actions. This is not a

sustainable action.

In my last tour overseas, I had the privilege to work with some of the best I have ever worked with in the US forces. They were great friends and were generous in their support and their ability to listen to alternative ideas. There were also those who I ungenerously called Kentucky Fried Colonels; they were folks who never served with allies and never served in a multi-national headquarters. They were a problem as they didn't understand they were not in the continental US and their decisions were always suspect. Fortunately, there were adults in the room to keep their decisions in check. Most senior folks understood the concept that we were no longer the good guys in certain situations and countries and acted accordingly. We now are facing an administration where study, preparation, planning are a foreign concept. The outcome is always an unintended consequence. Time will tell whether the liberal democracies can rearm in time and take the necessary action. They will be hampered by the US administration. The bottom line is that the US will be chaotic for at least the next four years.

#### Moldova

Within the past twelve months the Government of President Maia Sandu has weathered elections and Russian disinformation campaigns. The country narrowly won the referendum on joining the EU and Maia Sandu won her presidency with a 10% margin. The biggest issue was ensuring sufficient gas and oil to her country when Russia stopped delivery based on "unpaid bills." The regime in the self-declared separatist state of Transnistria called for Russian assistance but were horrified when Russia refused and Moldova using European resources offered to help them out. Russia relented and has renewed deliveries to Transnistria. The Moldovan authorities are now acting against Moscow financed pro-Russian groups. This week they arrested the semi-autonomous state of Gagauzia leader and supporter of the pro-Russian Shor Party, Eugenia Gutul. She was arrested at the Chisinau airport on charges of taking financial aid from a banned organization, the Shor Party of Ilan Shor. Mr Shor is currently in exile in Moscow. He is a convicted criminal thought to have stolen up to 1 B USD from the Moldovan banking system. Russia has denounced the arrest. The information was provided by a Reuters article by Alexander Tanas on 27 March 2025.

Moldova has expelled three Russian diplomats who were accused of helping a pro-Russian politician escape, Alexander Nesterovschii to prevent him being jailed in a case over illegal political funding according to a Reuters article titled: "Moldova expels diplomats after accusing Russia of helping MP escape jail term" dated 31 March 2025. Russia has denied the allegations of political meddling.

#### Georgia

The article, As Georgia slides into authoritarianism, protesters vow to keep fighting Russian pivot dated 15 February 2025 found at link: <https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/15/europe/georgia-protests-authoritarianism-fears-intl-cmd/index.html> gives a good overview of the situation in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. It is older yet provides a good overview leading up to the continued protests within Georgia.

The Georgia Dream Party continues its spiral to authoritarianism despite widespread opposition to the policies of the party. The 27 October 2024 election was widely seen as illegitimate, although to be blunt the Georgia Dream party has a large loyal base nearing 35 to 45 % of the population. It would have been the largest single party due the fractured state of the opposition parties. Demonstrations are continuing daily. Authorities are waiting for the demonstrations to end then arresting leaders at home away from any possible support. Bearings and torture are widely used allegedly.

This issue is ongoing and is likely to continue with the opposition becoming weaker by the day. The Georgia Dream Party is in no danger of collapse unless a significant event occurs to reinvigorate the opposition. The Trump Administration attacks against USAID, Voice of America have also been a major blow to the opposition. In the long term, pro-Russian forces will have an advantage.

#### Belarus

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has called on the US to keep the Voice of America Europe on the air. It has been a beacon to the people in the Russian Federation and Belarus. The radio network has been highly effective at getting the Western message of peace, justice and freedom across borders both during and after the Cold War. In doing so, it also ensures the message of the Belarus opposition also continues to get through to the people of Belarus despite the actions of the security forces.

The speaker of the Belarusian Coordination Council, Anzhalika Melnikava was reported missing on 25 March and there has been no contact with her since. The Council is based in Poland and coordinates the opposition council's efforts with foreign governments under the leadership of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Belarus security forces' main effort is to target foreign based opposition forces. There is no confirmation this is the case at present.

#### Türkiye

The opposition leader, and current Mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu was arrested on what are thought to be politically motivated charges. He was likely to have been nominated by the opposition as the candidate for the next Presidential election. President Erdogan was behind in the polls and was desperate to find a way to retain power.

A Turkish journalist has been arrested by security forces. The UN has inquired about both incidents but have not openly condemned Türkiye's actions.

#### Israel-Iran Conflict

This war is between Israel and Iran. Iran has supported various proxies including the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is within this scope that any action must be examined. Israel did not start this current conflict; it was a deliberate act of Hamas on 7 October 2023. Hamas was aided and abetted by the United Nations which allowed the development of a massive underground fortress under their nose. Hamas built facilities under facilities normally protected by the Geneva Conventions. Israel did not build these fortifications. Hamas has deliberately put their own population at risk.

Currently, Israel has restarted its military campaign on specific targets based on the lack of action on the part of Hamas to free Israeli hostages or their bodies. There is a proposal for a ceasefire in which Hamas would free five living hostages every week for the length of the ceasefire. Currently Hamas continues to hold 59 Israelis: 24 are thought to be still alive and the remaining 35 are presumed dead. Israel is suggesting that half the remaining living hostages be released at one time as an alternative and that Hamas surrender its weapons. Hamas has rejected this proposal stating that their weapons constitute a red line. Hamas has stated that they will accept a national unity government.

In the meantime, Israel is preparing for ground operations near the Rafah crossing and has warned Palestinians to move for their own safety. Local Palestinians are protesting Hamas as well. This is a new development. Hamas is a major stumbling block to peace within the area. Israel will continue both negotiations and combat operations at the same time.

Israel continues to hold land in Lebanon and has carried out air and artillery attacks including

on Southern Beirut. This part of the conflict is not over either.

#### Ukraine- Ukraine War

The ceasefire as proposed by the US is the most critical item currently occurring in the war. Although there is in theory a ceasefire in particular against energy infrastructure, the ceasefire is more “honoured” in its breach. The conversation has turned to a possible ceasefire on the sea and in the air, but nothing has been officially agreed at present. Ukraine has agreed to a ceasefire without conditions. Russia has demanded more and has refused to back down from its maximalist requirements. Allegedly Trump is upset with the Russian position.

The war on the ground continues unabated with increasingly heavy losses suffered by Russian forces. Ukraine continues to hold part of Kursk and also launched new operations within the Belgorod oblast of Russia. Ukraine has also made small but significant advances across the front especially in the East and have maintained a stabilized front in the South.

NATO has been able to deliver more modernized aircraft to Ukraine including F 16s, and Mirage 2000s. It has been able to utilize modern weapons systems on their older modified Russian built aircraft to conduct bombing operations and use the F 16s as top cover for their operations. Ukraine has also received two Air Early Warning aircraft from Sweden which are now in operation, greatly enhancing Ukraine’s ability to coordinate both air defence and offensive operations. Although a smaller air force, Ukraine has been able to gain at least air parity and at times a level of air superiority over the battlefield when necessary. Russia’s air force remains largely ineffective by comparison to its size.

Unmanned systems whether on the water, on the ground and in the air have taken on new importance. Ukraine is now able to build over a million and a half drones per year within its own capability plus whatever is delivered by allies. Russia appears unable to innovate fast enough to make a difference, noticed by very disaffected Russian soldiers and vloggers. Ukraine has been able to leverage its comparable capability to great extent allowing for Ukraine to isolate, attrit and later successfully attack depleted Russian units. Targets that took Russia months to capture have been retaken by Ukraine.

Russia’s economy continues to decline. Foreign sales continue to dry up including for oil, Defence industries are now failing to persuade their usual clients to purchase new equipment. France has now taken over the number two position in arms sales. The bank rate is now 21% for loans and inflation is officially over 10% although many commentators suggest it is much higher than the official figure. Recent suggestions is that the government is simply going to “freeze” current savings in Russia now estimated to be around 57 T rubles. This will likely mean that the central government will simply take the money to finance the war. What is increasingly clear is that Russia cannot afford to stop the war. If they do, their entire economy will collapse quickly and there will be many disaffected soldiers looking for jobs that no longer exist. Putin has much to lose if peace comes.

#### China

It is good to remind ourselves what China is as a country especially in view of the recent comments by a Liberal party candidate suggesting that his Conservative Party rival be turned over to the Chinese Consulate in Toronto for a cash reward or bounty. The problem became worse as the new Liberal Party leader seemed content to sweep such a horrifying comment under the rug.

The Canadian Liberal party has had a long term “love affair” with China overlooking its genocidal and murderous tendencies such as the executions of four Canadian dual citizens for alleged drug crimes. One should be reminded that China’s judicial system has nearly a 98%



conviction rate whether or not the evidence as we would know is actually there. Rule of Law is a slogan in China, not a reality

China has continued to be a major source of the precursors of fentanyl. It is regularly brought into Canada and the US for the purpose of producing the drug. Canada has been the alleged “factory” for this effort. Canada has taken action against the labs producing the drug with some success. It has been a part of the excuse used by the current US administration to ramp up tariffs against Canada, although seizures at the border have been miniscule heading to the US. Still China has done little to stop the provision of the precursors despite diplomatic efforts.

Canada is conducting a Federal election, with election day on 28 April 2025. It is highly likely that foreign interference will take place. China has always been one of the top contenders. China is different in that it takes a longer, more subtle approach. It is just as damaging, easing countries into their thinking often using various types of coercion. They have developed a specific method of operating called the “three Wars Concept” using methods other than a direct conflict. Canada has been under such attack for decades. It involves disinformation more subtle than the Russian blunt force trauma method, lawfare often using the country’s own legal system as we saw during the Meng Wanzhou trials and lastly, economic warfare as we have seen against various Canadian exports such as seafood, canola, beef and pork. China has a current tariff regime against Canada taking advantage of the ongoing US assault on our economy to gain extra leverage.

Canada is an adversary to China. It will use any means possible to separate not only Canada from its relations with the US but with all other democracies. China is not a friend while under the Communist Chinese Party (CCP). Although there is a temptation to take advantage of Chinese offers of “friendship” Canada would be wise to be wary. One looks forward to a reinvigorated RCMP with greater power and scope to conduct counter-espionage operations against Chinese efforts and those of others. We could start by reducing the size of the Chinese Embassy to the same size as Canada’s in China about 50 diplomats and down from the bloated mission of 178 only two less than its embassy in Washington DC.

**SAVE THE DATE**

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University of Calgary

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