



## Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches

18 April 2025

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security, and safety issues.*

*Dispatches* is a periodic collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

*Editor's Notes:* Please note there is a call from the Shearwater Aviation Museum for presenters. There is a note under [Odds and Sods](#) as well as a poster at the end of the newsletter.

The next issue will be **2 May 2025**.

Military historian and an editor of *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Lawrence Freedman on pairing military strategy with **clear and limited** political purpose:

“The prevalence of ‘forever wars’ in the contemporary era calls for a fundamental shift in military thinking. Great powers tend to assume that their significant military superiority will quickly overwhelm opponents. This overconfidence means that they fail to appreciate the limits of military power and so set objectives that can be achieved, if at all, only through a prolonged struggle. One of the great allures of military power is that it promises to bring conflicts to a quick and decisive conclusion. In practice, it rarely does.”

This, from Freedman’s latest article in *Foreign Affairs*, is available as one free article a month to any reader: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/age-forever-wars>

### Quick links:

[Events](#)

[Publications](#)

[@RUSI NS on X](#)

[Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia on Facebook](#)

[Other Sources](#)  
[Odds and sods](#)  
[SAC Notes](#)

**Contributions to RUSI(NS) social media**

You are also encouraged to send material to be posted to the RUSI(NS) X and Facebook accounts to [rusinsdispatches@gmail.com](mailto:rusinsdispatches@gmail.com). Preferably, send the material ready to post. We are still looking for a volunteer(s) to be editor(s) for these accounts in order to keep them active.

**Events**

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

**RUSI (NS) Events:**

Media blackouts due to the calling of a federal election are impacting the short-term speaker engagement calendar.

**21 May**, Wednesday: Maritime Air presentation by Col Holmes. TBC, details to follow.

**18 June**, Wednesday: CBSA presentation at CBSA, Bayers Lake.

**16 July**, Wednesday: Historical presentation with Tom Tulloch/Meet and Greet, which has a nominal charge of \$10.

**17 September**, Wednesday: Col Labbe, CAF Drone projects, virtual event.

**15 October**, Wednesday: BGen Mark Parsons, Commander 5 Cdn Div.

**5 November**, Wednesday: Remembrance Dinner.

**9 November**, Sunday: Remembrance Sunday at the RA Park Memorial.

**Other Events:**

**New 22 April**, Tuesday: Foreign Policy Research Institute presents "The China-Russia relationship: The dance of the Dragon and the Bear." 16-1700hrs ADT. Online. To register:  
[https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN\\_0lt45XQLRMmsyT4jb1\\_8vA](https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_0lt45XQLRMmsyT4jb1_8vA)

**New 24 April**, Thursday: Institute for Peace & Diplomacy presents a panel "Charting Canada's Submarine Future: The Path to a Modern Naval Fleet." 17-1830hrs

ADT. Online. To register:

[https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN\\_jV4xkWzYTgmAY8vY\\_7HQ3Q#/registration](https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_jV4xkWzYTgmAY8vY_7HQ3Q#/registration)

**25 April**, Friday: Queen's University Centre for International and Defence Policy presentation "Eat Strategy for Breakfast" When it Comes to National Security?" by Colonel Kris Purdy. 1200-1300 EDT. Online. To register: <https://www.queensu.ca/cidp/events/idp-speaker-series/eat-strategy-breakfast-when-it-comes-national-security>

**3 May**, Saturday: As part of the annual series "Jane's Walk" this year a guided walking tour of the various historical sites within CFB Halifax (Stadacona) will be conducted beginning at 1300 on Saturday 3 May 2025. The tour is open to all, however participants will be required to show a government-issued photo ID (such as driver's license) to be able to enter the base. It will commence at 1300 at the RCR Gate on Gottingen Street at Bilby, and will include sites such as Wellington Barracks, the Royal Naval Burying Ground and Admiralty House, lasting about 1.5 to 2 hours. There will be an opportunity to visit the Royal Canadian Naval Museum inside Admiralty House afterwards, for those interested. Details can also be found here: <https://www.janeswalkhalifax.com/schedule>.

**26-27 September:** Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN - <https://www.cmsn.ca/>) conference on the future of Canadian Seapower. Live, Calgary. This will bring together academics, experts and serving and retired naval and coast guard personnel to examine the emerging maritime security threats facing Canada today, and the complex challenges that will define our future. At the end of *Dispatches* is a Save the Date poster, with more information to follow soon. CMSN welcomes further dissemination of the event to any colleagues that you think may be interested.

### **Wargaming Events:**

Georgetown University Wargaming Society long-range schedule:  
<https://www.guwargaming.org/guwsevents>

**20 May 2025**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Cobalt Rocks: Wargaming Seabed Operations." 1-2:30pm ADT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/cobalt-rocks-wargaming-seabed-operations-tickets-1101179159509>

**16 September 2025**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Naval Wargaming and Quantitative History." 1-2:30 pm ADT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/naval-wargaming-and-quantitative-history-tickets-1052463264957>

## **Publications**

**New** Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Spyships, Satellites, and SAMs" by Canadian Joint Warfare Centre staff [and RUSI(NS) member] David

Redpath, discussing several professional wargames exploring a wide range of topics from spyships to satellites, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dhx48Xj8V2Y>

**New** RUSI(NS) Comments "A Ground Force Option for an Arctic Policy" by John McLearn, Cate Belbin, 10 April 2025, [https://rusi-ns.ca/arctic\\_ground\\_force/](https://rusi-ns.ca/arctic_ground_force/)

**New** RUSI(NS) Paper "Future Aircrew Training for the RCAF" by Murray Lee, 7 April 2025, [https://rusi-ns.ca/future\\_aircrew\\_training/](https://rusi-ns.ca/future_aircrew_training/)

RUSI(NS) Comments "Recruiting and Retention in the Reserve Force" by David Swan, 29 March 2025, <https://rusi-ns.ca/recruiting-retention/>

RUSI(NS) Paper "We Were America's Best Friend" by Tim Dunne, 22 February 2025, 26 November 2023, <https://rusi-ns.ca/we-were-americas-best-friend/>

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) presentation "Submarine Cables – a hidden weakness?" by Dr Samuel Bashfield, 27 February 2025, video recording: <https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/why8ij7udf7kuh7tj8sky/RUSIA-Vic-Dr-Samuel-Bashfield-Submarine-Cables-a-hidden-weakness-Feb-2025-SD-480p.mov?rlkey=lqvzot42ll4rcwyw7nj1ka0rz&dl=0>

RUSI(NS) Presentation "Drydocking Technology" by Robert Taylor, 29 January 2025, [https://rusi-ns.ca/drydocking\\_technology/](https://rusi-ns.ca/drydocking_technology/)

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Canada's Militia and National Defence Acts" by Tim Dunne, 20 January 2025, [https://rusi-ns.ca/militia\\_national\\_defence\\_acts/](https://rusi-ns.ca/militia_national_defence_acts/)

The following publications are received by RUSI(S) from other associations. The latest edition, where not otherwise indicated, may be requested by emailing RUSI(NS). To readers of Dispatches from other associations, sharing of your publications is appreciated.

weekly:

Naval Association of Canada

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) Defence Update

Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver Members News

bi-weekly: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association On Watch

monthly:

Canadian Gunner News

Edmonton United Services Institute President's Enews

Military Institute of Windsor Communiqué

Naval Reserve Association of Canada Mess Deck ConneXions

Royal Alberta United Services Institute Dispatches

Royal Canadian Logistics Service The Logistician

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch Scuttlebutt

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island Newsletter

Veterans Affairs Canada Salute!

quarterly:

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) Quarterly Newsletter

## @RUSI\_NS on X

@RUSI\_NS posts may be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>.  
To have something posted or reposted, email RUSI(NS).

CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 15 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: In a recent @FinancialTimes feature, CDA Institute Fellow Dr. Rob Huebert warns that Canada is “completely exposed in the North” as U.S. support for Arctic defence grows uncertain under a potential Trump return. <https://financialpost.com/feature/want-canada-to-win-unlock-the-arctic-now>  
(‘We are completely exposed in the North’: Why Canada needs to unlock the Arctic — now)




Further to a couple of RUSI(NS) X posts in February 2025 about the article "Britain planning fleet of drone vessels to patrol Atlantic" (<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britain-planning-fleet-of-drone-vessels-to-patrol-atlantic/>)



*Comment from a retired senior naval officer:* The idea of uncrewed platforms is certainly gaining traction. I’m in favour of using them to extend the network of sensors and weapons but I think we are a long way from cutting the human out of the loop or even having that human too remote. A double-hulled submarine can only be eliminated by a heavy weight torpedo, so the weapon delivery platform has to be in the water but underwater communications are not reliable enough to enable a decision maker to be remotely positioned. And it would be a crime against humanity to allow artificial intelligence to sink the strategic nuclear capability of an enemy who could respond by starting World War Three.

"Canada, other allies play a key role in some military AI experiments" <https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2025/03/allies-canada-play-key-role-some-military-ai-experiments/403672/> "...intelligence is going to be used as a negotiating tool" Exercise Shadow Operations Center-Nellis ShOC-N #AI




"Progress of the Joint Support Ship Project: Building HMCS Protecteur and HMCS Preserver" <https://readyayeready.com/progress-of-the-joint-support-ship-project-building-hmcs-protecteur-and-hmcs-preserver/> Replenishment oilers allow @RoyalCanNavy "to operate globally without need to rely on partner nations or port visits" @Seaspan #JSS



NAADSN\_RDSNAA @NAADSN\_RDSNAA 13 Mar posed and RUSI(NS) reposted: Our latest Quick Impact by Ryan Dean and @WhitneyLackenb1 analyzes the reassuring messaging found in Gen. Guillot's posture statement: [https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/25mar-Defending-the-North-American-Homeland\\_RD-PWL-QI.pdf](https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/25mar-Defending-the-North-American-Homeland_RD-PWL-QI.pdf)  
(Defending the North American Homeland: Reassuring Messaging from the NORAD USNORTHCOM Perspective)






"F-35s or Typhoons? There's only one answer for those who'd have to do the fighting" <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/04/08/fighter-jets-uk-f35-typhoon-tempest-5th-6th-gen-tech/> A UK perspective for those who are considering Canada's  acquisition of F-35 fighters. @RCAF\_ARC @RCAFAssociation




Canadian Global Affairs Institute @CAGlobalAffairs 8 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: In this #PolicyPerspective, Dr. James Fergusson highlights the vitality of Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IMAD) to Canadian defence. As the U.S. integrates new capabilities of IMAD, Canada's access to NORAD becomes significantly restrained. [https://cgai.ca/th\\_pp\\_canadian\\_ballistic\\_missile\\_dilemma](https://cgai.ca/th_pp_canadian_ballistic_missile_dilemma)



(The Canadian Ballistic Missile Dilemma)

CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 8 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: NEW THREAT ASSESSMENT —  The Ukraine Wake-Up Call: Adapting Canada's Defence Posture to Meet Strategic Objectives, authored by Justin Massie (@justinmassie1) and Nicolas-François Perron (@nfperron). Read the full article: <https://cdainstitute.ca/the-ukraine-wake-up-call-adapting-canadas-defence-posture-to-meet-strategic-objectives/>



(The Ukraine Wake-Up Call: Adapting Canada's Defence Posture to Meet Strategic Objectives)

RUSI(NS) Paper "Future Aircrew Training for the RCAF" by retired fighter pilot Murray Lee [https://rusi-ns.ca/future\\_aircrew\\_training/](https://rusi-ns.ca/future_aircrew_training/) @RCAF\_ARC @RCAFAssociation




RUSI @RUSI\_org 7 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: 'If Europe wished to deter war, it must demonstrate that it is developing the capacity to wage it... The current fragmented approach to defence production leaves Europe vulnerable' write Oleksandr V Danylyuk and @Jack\_Watling. (Winning the Industrial War: Comparing Russia, Europe and Ukraine, 2022–24



<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/winning-industrial-war-comparing-russia-europe-and-ukraine-2022-24>)

UK Defence Journal @UKDefJournal 5 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Quietly operating from the Scottish west coast, a growing Canadian military presence has transformed Prestwick into a key hub for transatlantic airlift, NATO logistics, and support to Ukraine.  
(Canada's 'Air Base' in Scotland – Glasgow Prestwick Airport <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/canadas-air-base-in-scotland-glasgow-prestwick-airport/>)



CDN Defence Academy/L'Académie cdn de la défense @CDACanadaACD 10 Mar posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:  Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo–Ukrainian War. This paper outlines tactical developments by Russian and Ukrainian forces during 2024 and highlights areas where military–technical assistance to Ukraine can be improved. <https://static.rusi.org/tactical-developments-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2205.pdf>




National Post @nationalpost 4 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Peter MacKay and David Pratt: Bolstering national defence is critical <https://nationalpost.com/opinion/opinion-bolstering-national-defence-is-much-more-critical-than-tax-cuts>



Defense One @DefenseOne 3 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: How NORAD could be hurt by US-Canada tensions | US commander says a Canadian exit would partially blind the Pentagon to enemy missiles—at least until new defenses could be built.



<https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/04/how-norad-could-be-hurt-us-canada-tensions/404210/?oref=d1-homepage-top-story>

CDN Defence Academy/L'Académie cdn de la défense @CDACanadaACD 3 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:  Canadian Military Journal [Vol 24, No 4] Infantry Primary Army Reserve – Regular Force Integration Via Mission Tasks: Approach and A Way Ahead by Donna Pickering, Jerzy Jarmasz, and Timothy Lam <https://journal.forces.gc.ca/cmj-article-en-244page35.html>



Seaspan @Seaspan 3 Apr posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Construction Begins on Made-In-Canada Polar Icebreaker!  Today, Seaspan is proud to share that we have cut steel on the Canadian Coast Guard's new heavy Polar Icebreaker, the most complex and capable ship in their fleet. (Built in Canada for Canada: Seaspan Begins Construction on Heavy Polar Icebreaker, the Most Capable Ship in the Canadian Coast Guard's Fleet)



<https://www.seaspan.com/press-release/built-in-canada-for-canada-seaspan-begins-construction-on-heavy-polar-icebreaker-the-most-capable-ship-in-the-canadian-coast-guards-fleet/>

and

(Seaspan Cuts Steel on Advanced Polar Icebreaker for Canadian Coast Guard

<https://gcaptain.com/seaspan-cuts-steel-on-advanced-polar-icebreaker-for-canadian-coast-guard/>)

### **"Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia" on Facebook:**

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Manitoba's northern port could strengthen Canada's trade  
<https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/manitobas-northern-port-could-strengthen-canadas-trade/>

and

The set of multi-use infrastructure with the port, railway, tank farm and an airport with a 9,200-foot runway capable of handling any transport or passenger aircraft in the world, also supports the assertion of Canada's sovereignty in the North. The town of Churchill also has municipal infrastructure to support defense personnel that would be needed for a northern supply base.



Canada needs an Arctic/North infrastructure development policy/plan that considers civil and defence needs.

Also: Churchill, Man. could become major Arctic shipping hub

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/video/2025/04/13/ctv-national-news-churchill-man-could-become-major-arctic-shipping-hub/>

and

The Port of Churchill plays into Canadian sovereignty

<https://www.manitobacooperator.ca/op-ed/the-port-of-churchill-plays-into-canadian-sovereignty/>

"...the vision behind the creation of Canada's Arctic tidewater port serviced by rail always made sense for national sovereignty." Interesting to tie development of Churchill to national sovereignty (that word needs debate).

A second port would even be better: Manitoba premier floats idea of 2nd Hudson Bay port to increase trade with Europe

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/manitoba-port-hudson-bay-european-trade-1.7510603>

Powerful New US Microwave Weapon Fries Drone Swarms And Boats In A Single Blast

<https://wonderfulengineering.com/powerful-new-us-microwave-weapon-fries-drone-swarms-and-boats-in-a-single-blast/>

*Comment from contributor:* Might we see such a device mounted on Canadian River-class destroyers? They're going to need something more than missiles and guns for a counter-





UAS (drone) capability. The Royal Navy – convening force to protect UK maritime infrastructure

<https://www.navylookout.com/the-royal-navy-convening-force-to-protect-uk-maritime-infrastructure/>

"There are four main areas where the RN is involved in directly securing the UK mainland and its economy. These include protecting territorial waters and the wider Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ), securing ports, harbours and their approaches, contributing to the air defence of the UK and policing Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI)."



A take on what it actually means for a navy to defend and/or secure a country and its economy.

Navies and infrastructure. Navies have always been involved in defending and securing infrastructure. The infrastructure, though, is different now. Fewer ports able to handle massive merchant ships. Seabed energy pipelines and communications cables. Navies need to be structured differently to defend these.

So, Does China's Shipbuilding Capacity Concern You?

<https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/so-does-chinas-shipbuilding-capacity>

*Comment from contributor:* Of interest (applicability) to Canada. To some people, a shocking difference in capacity. Concerning, too, because if a major conflict erupts in the next few years, the West will be unable to build the necessary civil and naval shipping. Have Canadian shipyards considered what it would take for an emergency expansion, like yards had to do at the start of the Second World War?



The article declares that the USA was and could be again an arsenal of democracy. It was in a biography of Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to Roosevelt in World War II, that noted that it was an advisor to the President who came up with 'Arsenal of Democracy' shortly before Roosevelt's December 1940 radio chat when he first publicly used the expression. Apparently the advisor was told not to use it until the President did. Whatever, it underplays the significant role Canada had in producing material (I'm thinking ships, particularly, even if many were only tugs) during the war. Canadian history that should be remembered and highlighted.

Train like you fight: Taiwan comes to grips with an old military adage

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/04/11/train-like-you-fight-taiwan-comes-to-grips-with-an-old-military-adage/>

"...training events"... "often resembled formulaic and choreographed drills divorced from the fog of war in modern warfare."



*Comment from contributor:* This lesson was learned, too, in Ukraine. Hopefully the Canadian Armed Forces have sufficient funding to train realistically. Yes, train like you fight. (Just make sure how you fight is relevant.)

Study a Forgotten War to Glimpse the Pacific Future  
<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/study-a-forgotten-war-to-glimpse-the-pacific-future>

"And U.S. naval commanders should get used to Corbettian active defense, a strategy of the weaker pugilist. The odds range from slim to none that America will be the stronger contender at the outset of a Pacific war."



What will Canada's national and naval strategies be in a Pacific war, assuming Canada even joins the US (and allies?) in such a conflict? Likely, considering our geo-strategic situation and the strength of the Canadian Armed Forces, to be limited to defence (strategic and operational) in the north-east Pacific.

*Comment from a RUSI Australia colleague:* Good article. When you're not the USN one has to think in those terms anyway. My own expression of this fact was 'small but smart.' A comment I think needs a bit more airplay is that the very concept of two fleets slogging it out at sea is probably dated. As I never tire of reminding my country-people, if the Chinese (our biggest and most important trading partners) either don't send the merchant ships with all the stuff that's needed to keep Australia going or stop other countries' merchant ships delivering their goods and taking away what they ordered from us, we've got about two weeks before we surrender. Australia imports 94% of the manufactured goods it thinks it needs. We've probably got the supplies of military kit and ammo to last three weeks and the fuel to steam or fly for about the same time. We don't have any option but to conserve our effort for attacking the weakest link a potential enemy presents. That's not as big an issue for Canada, sitting atop two continents brimming with food, fuel and manufacturing capacity – but they may not all think it's a good idea to sell stuff to Canada if Beijing tells them not to. Of course, there is another side to that coin. If we (collectively) stop all the merchant ships going to and coming from China then they are up the same creek without a paddle. And you can do that along way away from the East China Sea, so that any PLA expeditionary force sent to uncork the bottleneck is in the same boat as the Russian Baltic Fleet.

NATO's 'drone wall' that would see Russia's invasion coming  
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/13/nato-drone-wall-would-see-russia-invasion-coming/>

"The wall, also known as a 'drone nexus' in defence industry circles, would consist of hundreds, if not thousands, of unmanned aircraft that would survey the border, act as an early detection system and deter Russian aggression."



Will drone nexuses ('walls' reads so much simpler) also be considered for non-defence border surveillance and control?

Are Ships Obsolete in an Age of Drones and Missiles?  
Admiral Stavridis Says NO  
<https://gcaptain.com/are-ships-obsolete-in-an-age-of-drones-and-missiles-admiral-stavridis-says-no/>

"The rise of unmanned systems doesn't mark the end of surface warships, but it does signal the need for navies around the world to evolve. For the U.S., that means accelerating shipbuilding, advancing missile and laser defenses, and ensuring we're not outpaced in drone warfare."



What is the navy that Canada is/should be building? That is, what mix of crewed ships and uncrewed aerial, surface, underwater and seabottom vehicles?

[ADM (ret'd) Stavridis' opinion piece "More surface warships or more drones? Both, please." <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/10/18/drones-ships-navy-ukraine-china/> is available on request to RUSI(NS) as it is behind a subscription wall.]

After Trump's promise of 40 'big' icebreakers, Coast Guard says it'll take eight or nine for polar ops  
<https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/after-trumps-promise-of-40-big-icebreakers-coast-guard-says-eight-or-nine-will-do/>

"...current assessments show that eight or nine of that size are necessary for polar operations..."



*Comment:* What are the factors for an assessment of the desired size of an icebreaker fleet? Particularly, what is the Canadian Coast Guard assessment? Additional icebreakers are being bandied about by election contenders right now, how would they fit into CCG planning?

These ships require highly-qualified navigating & engineering officers, as well as experienced crew and support personnel.

Adding high numbers of large specialty vessels adds to existing challenges in terms of crewing and support.

One of the simplest and most effective solution is to target under-represented demographic groups such as: women, Indigenous peoples and other cultural groups (BIPOC), LGBT+, and individuals with disabilities in roles where they are fully capable (e.g. for shore support roles, freeing up fully-abled persons for seagoing positions ... some minor disabilities might also be suitable for seagoing positions).

Seagoing service has always been dominated by mostly male employees from a fairly narrow range of cultural groups, excluding more than 50% of the population.

The Canadian Coast Guard targets under-represented groups for recruitment, and has long welcomed "non-traditional" demographics through the principles of Inclusion, Equity, and Diversity.

Removing barriers maintains the highest standards.

In a nation like the USA which is actively diminishing so-called "DEI hires" - who are all fully qualified and are able to carry out their role with full effectiveness - the risk is that vessels might not meet crewing requirements, or will be left with less-competent employees.

Excluding fully qualified and competent personnel, and refusing to target under-represented groups for recruitment and retention, is simply bad policy.

It's stupid and unproductive.

IMO Legal Committee addresses key maritime issues at the 112th session  
<https://www.bimco.org/news-insights/bimco-news/2025/04/01-imo-legal-committee/>



*Comment from contributor:* Note the section "Considerations on Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships" - how far has Canada taken legal considerations on maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS)? Have

we developed laws/regulations? In response to this query, a maritime legal colleague advised: "No, not yet. NRC and TC have started a process of dialogue, but no regulations on the horizon yet. TC has been talking to some ports. In any case, I would not expect anything to happen before IMO/MSC adopts the MASS code on a voluntary basis in 2026. The mandatory MASS Code is planned for adoption by July 1, 2030, with an expected entry into force on January 1, 2032." A mariner colleague wrote: "Canada, through TC, is part of the working group that has been developing the 'non mandatory' MASS code. When passed this code will allow countries to develop and evaluate use of MASS to gather evidence and experience for the development of a future mandatory code for operations. From a domestic development view, Canada is well behind other countries when it comes to MASS development, but given our enormous regional differences in terms of the diverse nature and intensity of maritime traffic this isn't too surprising. here are activities underway. I think we are well placed give the broad geography and climate challenges to explore MASS usage. I know that a national strategy seeing test beds across the country is formulating. For our own part the Marine Institute is moving ahead with development of an area here in Newfoundland to deploy the technology we have. I am not an advocate for replacing people on ships. The more I've seen as part of the IMO sessions the more this is certain to me, MASS will have its place, but its unsure yet."

Defiant Drone Ship Gets Closer To Months-Long DARPA At Sea Demonstration

<https://www.twz.com/sea/usx-1-defiant-drone-ship-gets-closer-to-months-long-darpa-at-sea-demonstration>

"So tier three shipyards [that could produce *Defiant*], there's more than 35 tier three shipyards in the United States."



*Comment from contributor:* Had to look up 'tier 3 shipyard,' found: "...PEO/S (USN Program Executive Office for Ships) works with some 25 to 30 shipyards nationwide: Tier 1 yards build surface combatants and amphibious assault ships, Tier 2 builds smaller ships, and Tier 3 yards build even smaller special-use craft." (<https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009/december/naval-systems-peo-ships-shipbuilding-primer#:~:text=Landay%20points%20out%20that%20PEO,even%20smaller%20special%2Duse%20craft.>).

I don't know of the tier graduation being used in Canada, nearest would be the NSS pillar 1 and pillar 2, with 'boatbuilder' maybe somewhat similar to the US tier three.

Hmm, if their modular construction allow USV (sloops?) and UUV (chariots?) to be built in facilities other than traditional ship and boat yards, will there be a need for new terms? <grin> Drone yard?

Has Canadian industry come together to look ahead at mass production of UxV?

Besides the uncrewed aspects, I noted one salient paragraph: "We have delivered a vessel in a reasonable time frame, at a reasonable cost, which is somewhat rare in today's industry. We did that by being the designer and the prime [contractor] of the vessel, and procuring almost all the material from the industrial base, and integrating it ourselves," according to Maatta. "Rather than it being a shipyard-led prime, it was the government and their system integrator working together to procure all the materials and to pivot when things got tough and get the ship delivered, which is more how we used to do ships in the [19]80s than how we do ships nowadays." Assuming that's not just misleading boasting, it's an approach I've been advocating for decades that Canada should adopt. Designing a vessel in-house and tendering it to be built to spec seems so much more efficient and effective than the current "partnerships" with shipyards, which seem to encourage delays and cost overrun



## A Neglected Region? The Strategic Value of the South Atlantic

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2025.2480518#d1e139>

"The risk is that the increasing focus on US-China competition is leading policymakers to adopt a narrow view of the world, neglecting the global ramifications of imbalance within the world's indivisibly interdependent maritime orders. The notion of a strong US role helping develop regional governance for the South Atlantic maritime order is likely to be off the table under President Trump, but there is still much that regional governments and local actors can work toward."

*Comment from contributor:* The Royal Canadian Navy's Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessel HMCS MARGARET BROOKE is returning from a circumnavigation of South America, having exercised with South American navies and conducted civil research in Antarctica along the way. Canadian public reporting focused on the research, whilst South American news (at least, to the extent it made it to Canada) noted the navy-to-navy interactions. But (quietly?) behind it all was the (little and late?) attention Canada is paying to South America. Canadian foreign policy for the region is not something in the general public's attention.

Photo: Chilean Icebreaker ALMIRANTE VIEL Viel (left) and HMCS MARGARET BROOKE berthed beside one another in Punta Arenas, Chile, during Operation PROJECTION 25-01 on 23 March 2025. Photo by: Corporal Connor Bennett, Canadian Armed Forces.



## Is Britain right to sacrifice capability today for 'jam' tomorrow?

<https://www.britainsworld.org.uk/p/the-big-ask-15-2025>

*Comment from contributor:* This is a piece about force (fleet) development. There are points herein as applicable to Canada as to the UK, even if the cue for the commentary is the disposition by the Royal Navy of amphibious (= landing) ships, something the Royal Canadian Navy has not had in many decades. Do we build/maintain now for the imminent threats, or do we build some some years in the future?



## Britain's future laser ship?

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britains-future-laser-ship/>

"While no official designs have been released, an unofficial concept image from 2023 suggested a ship much larger than the Type 45, perhaps closer to China's Type 055 or the U.S. Zumwalt class."

Have to be careful in releasing concept images - 'sketches' with their lack of detail may be more useful for initial messaging about a new ship.

"The term 'destroyer' might not fully describe what the Royal Navy is planning. While global navies stick with DDG (guided-missile destroyer), perhaps Britain is heading toward a DDL — a directed-energy destroyer — with the upcoming Type 83."

NATO APP-20 Standard Ship Designator System has no 'L' in its list of suffixes for ship type designators (at least, the 2016 edition doesn't). To apply the 'L' the system would have to be a 'force weapon,' able to defend more than just the ship with the system. It appears the Type 83 is meant to do that. So maybe, maybe more so for introduction of the system, it makes sense to apply the suffix.



Australia sizes up a continent-size gap in air defenses  
<https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/04/03/australia-sizes-up-a-continent-size-gap-in-air-defenses/>

"For now it appears that military leaders are prizing sensors over interceptors in what will be Australia's future network of weapons for defending would-be targets in a conflict."

"We're already working with our civilian sector and our industry sectors in the northern half of Australia using non-military airfields to land, refuel and, in the future, rearm, combat aircraft or other aircraft in order to regenerate airpower from non-military bases."

*Comment from contributor:* Lessons for Canada for the Arctic.



## Other Sources

#air warfare

Can Canada afford to rethink the F-35 acquisition? (Listen, ~43 min)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E2VMAN9Xelo&t=343s>

A conversation with 2 ex-RCAF Comds and 1 RCAF DComd: LGen (ret'd) Lawson, MGen (ret'd) Keiver, and LGen (ret'd) DesChamps.

#Canadian Coast Guard

The Canadian Coast Guard and the RCN: Roles and Responsibilities

<https://www.navalassoc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/BN-CCG.pdf>

*Comment from contributor:* Timely - Naval Association of Canada is adding to public understanding as political parties talk about armed icebreakers, etc

#China #digital governance

Conference report: Digital Governance in China: Trends in Generative AI and Digital Assets

<https://www.cigionline.org/publications/digital-governance-in-china-trends-in-generative-ai-and-digital-assets/>

*Synopsis:* The conference started with the evolving landscape of AI development and governance in China, then shifted to the interest around technologies such as blockchain, as well as digital assets more broadly, like central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), cryptocurrencies, stablecoins and others. The conference also noted that innovation in digital assets is growing in East Asia, India and the Middle East.

#command

The Modern Military Commander Part I, Section A

<https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/the-modern-military-commander>

The Modern Military Commander Part I, Section B

<https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/the-modern-military-commander-d6b>

The Modern Military Commander Part I, Section C

<https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/the-modern-military-commander-ecb>

The Modern Military Commander Part I, Section D

<https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/the-modern-military-commander-664>

The Modern Military Commander Part II, Section A

<https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/the-modern-military-commander-0d6>

The Modern Military Commander Part II, Section B

<https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/the-modern-military-commander-466>

The Modern Military Commander Part II, Section C

<https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/the-modern-military-commander-819>

The Modern Military Commander Part II, Section D

<https://tacticalnotebook.substack.com/p/the-modern-military-commander-198>

#defence

Unpacking the Liberals latest defence announcement (Listen, ~45 min)

<https://cdainstitute.ca/unpacking-the-liberals-latest-defence-announcement/>

*Synopsis:* The panelists reflect on the feasibility of the Liberal proposals. They also explore opportunities for Canadian industry to expand in the EU, the viability of meeting NATO's 2% target while pivoting away from US suppliers, and compare the Liberal and Conservative defence plans.

#defence policy (policies)

2025 Federal Election Resources

<https://cdainstitute.ca/events/2025-federal-election-resources/>

#defence procurement

MoD outlines new National Armaments Director Group

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/mod-outlines-new-national-armaments-director-group/>

*Comment from contributor:* Re-organizing for increased defence capability? Lessons for Canada?

Pentagon Acquisition System Needs Heavy Dose of Agility, Modernization

<https://defenseopinion.com/pentagon-acquisition-system-needs-heavy-dose-of-modernization/861/>

#diplomacy

The problem with thinking in DIME

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/problem-with-dime/>

*Comment:* A perspective that puts diplomacy above all other policy instruments, with an argument of why this must be the case.

#drones

Inside the Navy task group testing drone boats in the Red Sea

<https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2025/04/11/inside-the-navy-task-group-testing-drone-boats-in-the-red-sea/>

#drones #China

Autonomous Battlefield: PLA Lessons from Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

<https://jamestown.org/program/autonomous-battlefield-pla-lessons-from-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/>

#drones #Ukraine

The development of unmanned systems in Ukraine

<https://euro-sd.com/2025/04/articles/43553/the-development-of-unmanned-systems->

[in-ukraine/](#)

#drones #Russia-Ukraine War

Flying Aircraft Carriers: Ukraine Refines FPV Mothership Tactics

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2025/04/09/flying-aircraft-carriers-ukraine-refines-fpv-mothership-tactics/>

#environment #warfare

Beyond bullets, bombs, raids, and rockets: The environmental impact of war

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/environmental-impact-of-war/>

*Synopsis:* LCol Chaveso “Chevy” Cook’s article in the *War Room* looks at the long-term environmental degradation and infrastructure destruction resulting from conflict, particularly in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. It also examines how these factors intersect with political and economic dynamics.

#grand strategy

Unlike China’s flotilla, the Great White Fleet came in friendship

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/unlike-chinas-flotilla-the-great-white-fleet-came-in-friendship/>

Starting to read this article, it’d appear just to be historical and/or applicable to Australia what with recent Chinese naval activities near that continent. Progressing, there are aspects of it that are grand strategy and applicable to Canada.

#grand strategy #artificial intelligence #China #wargaming(?)

How PRC Grand Strategy AI Model Analyzes Chinese Strategy and Global Influence

<https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/prc-grand-strategy-ai-model/>

Are such AI-driven analyses a form of wargaming?

#immigration

Immigration Detention in Canada

<https://hillnotes.ca/2025/03/21/immigration-detention-in-canada/>

#information supply chain

Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2024

[https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2024-06/RISJ\\_DNR\\_2024\\_Digital\\_v10%20lr.pdf](https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2024-06/RISJ_DNR_2024_Digital_v10%20lr.pdf)

*Comment:* Troubling: The report found the proportion of people who say they selectively avoid the news to some degree increased by ten percentage points since 2010 (and three percentage points from last year) to 39%, across 17 countries.

Canada needs advanced monitoring to combat disinformation

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canada-needs-advanced-monitoring-to-combat-disinformation/>

*Comment:* In addition to the usual, an issue noted by the article is that “...one of the greatest vulnerabilities to disinformation in Canada stems from its fragmented media ecosystem.” As a result, “...Canada’s diverse population, spread across linguistic and cultural enclaves, often receives news through niche channels, making it particularly susceptible to targeted disinformation.” Likewise, the suggested related action is “...proactively countering foreign narratives [through] the development of strong, credible Canadian media voices. Investing in local media platforms, independent



investigative journalism, stars and digital influencers who can produce engaging content with a uniquely Canadian perspective is essential.”  
Sounds to me like a call, in part, for more investment in CBC, not less.

#### #information technology

The Signal and the noise: Why the messaging app is great for privacy but not for war plans

<https://thebulletin.org/2025/04/the-signal-and-the-noise-why-the-messaging-app-is-great-for-privacy-but-not-for-war-plans/>

#### #intelligence

Signals, cyber, and strategy: Retired General Paul Nakasone (Listen, ~32min)

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/nakasone/>

*Comment:* The discussion highlights the transformative power of AI for intelligence and the necessity of strong partnerships between the public and private sectors.

#### #international relations

Broken Trust: Managing an Unreliable Ally

<https://www.policymagazine.ca/brokentrust/>

*Comment from contributor:* Note "De-risk defence procurement and production" and "De-risk intelligence-sharing." Also note the authors.

Sabotage as Signal: Why Attacks on Maritime Infrastructure Challenge our Model of Sense-Making

<https://csds.vub.be/publication/sabotage-as-signal-why-attacks-on-maritime-infrastructure-challenge-our-model-of-sense-making/>

*Comment from contributor:* At first glance this appears to be an operational/tactical level article about seabottom operations, then it becomes apparent it is at the level of international relations and strategy.

#### #legal

The So-Called Principle of Equal Treatment of Belligerents by the Neutral State

<https://lieber.westpoint.edu/so-called-principle-equal-treatment-belligerents-neutral-state/>

#### #military evolution

From Ukraine's ambassador to the UK: How drones, data, and AI transformed our military and why the US must follow suit

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/04/how-drones-data-and-ai-transformed-our-militaryand-why-us-must-follow-suit/>

*Comment:* “Lulled by decades of multi-domain dominance, Western militaries have slumbered too long. Meeting adversaries armed with mass-deployed, attrition-optimized autonomous weapons they may end up as the proverbial victims of the German WW2 Blitzkrieg.” With a hyper-illuminated battlefield and the long-range attacks that can occur without notice, the battlefield is locked into defensive strongholds. The article states that three main developments are responsible for turning modern warfare on its head: small tactical drones, which are used to target military forces and equipment (even other drones) across air, land, and sea; electronic warfare, which now encompasses tracing, jamming, and taking over drone signals that can eliminate specialized, difficult-to-replace crews; and remote-controlled sensors of

varying complexity, which, when generously deployed in contested but undefended “white spaces,” create protective buffers preventing the enemy from sneaking through.

#mineral resource security #China

Kazakhstan and the People’s Republic of China collaborate in critical minerals sector

<https://jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-and-peoples-republic-of-china-collaborate-in-critical-minerals-sector/>

*Comment:* Key takeaways: Kazakhstan is positioning itself as a strategic hub for critical minerals, leveraging its vast reserves to attract foreign investment and diversify economic partnerships amid growing global demand and geopolitical competition; and deepening cooperation with China is bringing Kazakhstan technical and economic benefits, including job creation, technology transfer, and new export channels. Kazakhstan is challenged to independently develop its mineral resource capacities by technological limitations and insufficient specialized human capital for exploration, extraction, and processing operations, instead relying on foreign investment to monetize its assets through raw material exports. Kazakhstan’s resource strategy is evolving. The nation now seeks partnerships that extend beyond extraction to include value-added processing capabilities—a strategic pivot designed to diversify the country’s export portfolio and capture more of the value chain domestically, which China is adapting to and meeting. Thus, China is positioning itself as the preferred partner. There is growing anti-Chinese sentiment in Kazakhstan and a globally shared concern that PRC investment may constrain Kazakhstan’s control over its strategic mineral resources. The so what? As in the Indo-Pacific, it isn’t enough to express concern. Countries needing support want and need more than one option to go to because they will take what opportunities present themselves rather than just languish. Everyone desires something more than just survival.

#national security #national strategy

How to save Canada

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/how-to-save-canada/>

*Comments:* A wide-ranging essay that doesn’t shirk in the face of realities but understands the complexities and still offers tangible courses of action. Calling out the US actions as a hybrid warfare threat, the author’s closing statement is rallying: “...our strategy can’t be reactive. It must be proactive, strategic and unflinching. No appeasement policy, please. No more Canadian nice. Our approach will need to be multi-dimensional, given the many pressure points available for exploitation by the United States. It will need political leadership, decisive planning, money and, above all, the support of the country.”

#Royal Canadian Air Force

Combat Aircraft Numbers

<https://x.com/gregbagwell/status/1910279438350098775>

*Comment from contributor:* Enlightening thread. Helps puts the RCAF 88 CF35A into perspective.

#Russia-Ukraine War #armour

German tanks are failing in Ukraine for the same reasons they lost the Second World War

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/04/14/german-leopard-tanks-ukraine-war->

[russia-armour/](#)

linked to:

German Leopard 2 tanks flop on battlefield in Ukraine

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/14/german-leopard-tanks-vulnerable-drones-ukraine-artillery/>

#Russia-Ukraine War #drones

Russia and Ukraine Are in a Race to Put Robots on the Battlefield

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-and-ukraine-are-in-a-race-to-put-robots-on-the-battlefield>

#space

Space Force releases vision for fighting in space

<https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/04/space-force-releases-vision-fighting-space/404640/>

*Comment:* So much for the peaceful use of space. Space Force has been advocating for weapons in space and gaining “space superiority.” To achieve this, officials say the service will conduct counterspace operations in three main areas: orbital, electromagnetic, and cyberspace warfare.

#space #China

Chinese military view of low earth orbit: Proliferation, Starlink, and Desired Countermeasures

[https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RRA3139-1.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3139-1.html)

*Comment:* Some of the conclusions eerily remind me of recent revelations of the inflated beliefs the two great powers had of the other’s capabilities, driving arms races to unsustainable heights. Key takeaways include: PLA observers of the United States assume an extremely high degree of coordination between U.S. policy, military doctrine, and commercial development; the PLA takes Starlink as a model for the capabilities it wants to develop in or regarding LEO; proliferated constellations such as Starlink directly and significantly undermine the PLA’s preferred method of conducting operations; and China has designated a national priority of developing Project SatNet, a proliferated LEO megaconstellation intended to function as “China’s Starlink.”

#space #missile defence

Canada should resist Trump’s “Golden Dome” fantasy

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canada-should-resist-trumps-golden-dome-fantasy/>

*Comment:* The author argues that this concept of missile defence is a failed one and the article’s leading statement succinctly lays out the rest of her thesis: “Aligning with space-based missile defence would contradict Canada’s commitment to responsible behaviour in space and trigger an arms race on Earth and in space.”

#sustainment

Could this breakthrough in robot manufacturing reshape warfare?

<https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2025/04/could-breakthrough-robot-manufacturing-reshape-warfare/404531/>

*Comment:* The initial hypothesis that AI and robotics advances in manufacturing may enable high-volume manufacturing close to front lines is tempered by the

acknowledgement of existing limitations in the US: skilled workers, the current state of factory robotics that would need to transition, and materials. China is the market-share leader in key components that robots need and more access to the materials required to print and build products.

“Robots will enable the United States to build more things. But they won’t build themselves.”

#warfare

China is waging cognitive warfare. Fighting back starts by defining it.

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/03/china-waging-cognitive-warfare-fighting-back-starts-defining-it/403886/>

#warfare #drones

How drones, data, and AI transformed our military—and why the US must follow suit

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/04/how-drones-data-and-ai-transformed-our-militaryand-why-us-must-follow-suit/404444/>

#warfare #strategy

Attrition and Its Opposites: A Rectification of Names

<https://dispatch.bazaarofwar.com/p/attrition-and-its-opposites-a-rectification>

#wargaming

Should I use AI in my wargame?

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/04/should-i-use-ai-my-wargame/404627/>

*Comment:* A balanced article that delves into the foundations of wargaming and how AI can or cannot be used effectively.

The Meteoric Rise of Professional Wargaming in NATO

<https://wargamingco.blogspot.com/2024/05/the-meteoric-rise-of-professional.html>

Why this Marine general says it's OK to lose your war game

<https://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-military-plays-loses-wargames-2025-4>

## Odds and sods...

### Shearwater Aviation Museum Spring/Summer Lecture Series

My name is Kelsey Bullock, and I am writing to you on behalf of the Shearwater Aviation Museum. I am an education student with Lakehead University in my final placement at the museum. I am working through some programming additions for the museum to help promote local and aviation history in the community.

One of my initiatives is a lecture series where I invite local historians to share their knowledge. We will be hosting weekly lectures that are advertised to the public through social media, and local billboards. We hope to include a wide range of topics for people to enjoy. If you would be interested in presenting for one of the weeks, please fill in the form attached below, and we will contact you with more details as we get closer to the start of the series.



<https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScObCATyJXvq-v720rdi8IIE6RywAp4FpFqCRfuPoy8P74N4A/viewform?usp=header>

We hope to hear from you soon and can't wait to learn from you!

Thank you for your time and consideration,

Kelsey Bullock

## Decoy

South Korean firm unveils “transformer fighter jet” <https://defence-blog.com/south-korean-firm-unveils-transformer-fighter-jet/> We're going to need—among other measures like hardening—a lot of decoys like this if we expect to be able to operate within range of the bulk of the PLA Rocket Force.

*Comment:* A US post but may be applicable to Canada? Hmm, do we need decoy units in the three services?



## Critical Industry Supply Chain

Don't forget about the ports!

Dr Phil Weir @navalhistorian posted 8 Apr (thread <https://x.com/navalhistorian/status/1909518869225517273>):

Piece by @mattotele & @MontyTele for

@Telegraph on the debate over Britain's steel industry & the defence argument for its survival, with particular reference to its contribution to warship & submarine construction (£)

<https://telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/04/07/very-best-british-engineering-but-built-with-french-steel/>

(‘The very best of British engineering’ (but built with French steel))

*Comment:* Note the bit about ports (or lack thereof for bringing in ore). Can't just look at the smelters and foundries, the whole supply chain has to be looked at. Same applies with other industries.



## Naval Diplomacy

Italian Navy frigate Luigi Rizzo bolsters Mozambique ties with port call and new agreements.

<https://www.defencweb.co.za/featured/italian-navy-frigate-luigi-rizzo-bolsters-mozambique-ties-with-port-call-and-new-agreements/>

*Comment:* During the visit, Italy and Mozambique signed a military cooperation agreement, which outlines joint training, capacity building, and potential expansion to other armed forces sectors. Italy has been busy. We were docked across from another frigate, the Antonio Marceglia (picture below), when in Manila. That ship was showcasing “Made in Italy” as well as promoting the strategic value of the newly established National Underwater Hub (PNS), “...a unique entity in the global landscape for its ability to create synergy among multiple actors interested in operating and developing new underwater capabilities.”



[https://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/Conosciamoci/notizie/Pagine/20250326\\_Marceglia\\_Manila.aspx](https://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/Conosciamoci/notizie/Pagine/20250326_Marceglia_Manila.aspx) And yet another instance, this time in Albania where it was announced that the Italian Navy’s Libra (P402), a Cassiopea-class offshore patrol vessel, will be transferred to the Albanian Naval Force, and a strategic joint venture will be undertaken between the Italian shipbuilding group Fincantieri and the Albanian firm KAYO as part of a broader strategy to deepen defense cooperation, enhance naval capabilities, and strengthen industrial partnerships between Albania and Italy.

<https://armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2025/former-italian-cassiopea-class-patrol-vessel-libra-becomes-albanias-strongest-naval-ship#:~:text=The%20ship%20is%20now%20expected,vessel%20in%20Albania's%20naval%20fleet.>

### Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (one-way attack ground drone)

SIMPLICIUS Ψ @simpatico771 16 Apr posted (video <https://x.com/simpatico771/status/191254105446694525>

2) : 🇷🇺🇺🇸 Combat engineers equipped with a surface kamikaze drone ruined a stronghold of the AFU in Kharkov region. A hostile stronghold halting advance of Russian assault detachments was detected during

reconnaissance. 🌟 The Kamikaze drone rolled into the dugout of the enemy and detonated there a TM-62 anti-tank mine. Thus, AFU manpower was eliminated.


Think Defence @thinkdefence replied: I hope NATO defence engineers are absorbing the lessons painfully learned by others. ECM is one thing, but cheap physical barriers with pickets and wire are another. H/T @bobbobboobing



### DATA-CENTRE ENERGY GROWTH

China and the United States are predicted to account for nearly 80% of the global growth in electricity consumption by data centres up to 2030\*.

United States China Europe Asia excl. China Rest of world



\*Predicted trajectory under current regulatory conditions and industry projections.

©nature

Nature; Source: IEA (CC BY 4.0)

Generative AI is just not increasing energy usage by data centres: by 2027 the amount of water AI uses in one year worldwide is projected to be on par with what a small European nation consumes.

In a related item, RAND looks at the future of an AI relationship between the US and Brazil: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/04/digital-dams-how-us-brazil-ai-cooperation-could-help.html>

Brazil has positioned itself as an AI-ready nation powered by clean energy—with [93.6 percent](#) renewable electricity generation and partnerships forming with

American companies and the Chinese government. Brazil's AI infrastructure advantages include possessing nearly one-fifth of the world's water reserves, critical for both hydropower generation (accounting for 80 percent of its electricity) and cooling the server farms that power AI systems. RAND highlights that Brazil's projected \$5.96 billion data centre market will be built by 2029 with or without a U.S. partnership.

Another analysis connection: a report from the International Energy Agency [Energy and AI](#) looks at emerging themes, including the energy-AI nexus in emerging market and developing economies.

Influence, and who has it, continues to develop and evolve, driven by technology.

## SAC Notes

### O Canada

There is an article asking whether Canada should have a foreign intelligence service. The answer is yes, and its responsibilities should be human intelligence in foreign countries, and it would operate in foreign countries. It should be a separate organization from CSIS. The most important piece would be what does the government want the organization to do? This is the vital piece without any effort would be pointless. From there one can determine resources required to operate efficiently.

CSIS should be related to internal security plus liaison with foreign partners to deal with foreign interference, espionage, terrorist groups, organized crime from a security point of view as opposed to the RCMP's responsibility for criminal prosecution.

The other issue is with the proliferation of various agencies performing information gathering and analysis there will be a requirement for a national organization that brings all the agencies into a single point. It can no longer be the Privy Council. The Privy Council no longer has the skills or organization to deal professionally with intelligence issues.

Foreign interference is a problem in Canada. As we are seeing with the election the Chinese seem to be concentrating on getting candidates elected that are supportive of China and the Communist Chinese Party. As we saw in previous elections, the weight of this effort seems to be more supportive of the Liberal party. The Chinese use their United Front to fund Chinese language press in Canada, Confucious Institutes, Chinese Associations and other means to gain influence. The interesting thing is that they apply this throughout our electoral system from the municipal level, provincial and Federal level. It is a long-term approach. Given recent difficulties with the US, it is expected that the Chinese will increase efforts to take advantage of the weakness of the US to push their agenda.

Iran and Russia are also participating and likely India. India is somewhat different in that India has previously asked politely for Canada to deal with the Sikh Separatist Movement which supports the creation of Khalistan within the Indian state of Punjab. It created the same movement which conducted the Air India bombing.

Canada was also known for supporting the Tamil Tigers, a particularly nasty piece of work that devastated Sri Lanka with suicide bombers until finally defeated by Sri Lankan Government forces. Now we have groups supporting Hamas actively operating within Canada



and other groups supporting various issues advocating for violent actions or actions that severely damage the economy such as a blockade of major rail lines, roadways, crossing points such as bridges and overpasses. Various Canadian Governments have kept a blind eye to violent guerrilla movements based here in Canada. Our relations with India is an excellent example of how this affects our well-being as a nation when we fail to act. Imagine if India supported the modern equivalent of the FLQ or an Alberta separatist movement. What do we expect when we choose political expediency over our responsibilities to allies?

The battle over whether we should meet the 2% of GDP on defence continues. This is a sore point with our allies. Canada is one of the richest countries in the world yet consistently failing to meet our agreed obligations. NATO is about to raise the basic level to 3% soon and we still are well below 2% without any money being set aside to actually achieve these goals. The Trump administration raised this issue when the first rounds of tariffs were announced, yet we did nothing to meet our agreed obligation to NATO. There is also the impending increase to achieve 3% or even as high as 5% soon. Canada's inertia will be further evident. In NORAD we persist in the stupidity of ignoring ballistic missile defence. This is a self-inflicted wound which creates unnecessary friction with the US. If Canada is going to remain part of NORAD it should be "all in" as opposed to picking and choosing as if ballistic missiles will not affect us as well.

These are just some of the areas that Canada has shown less than a mature attitude towards defence and foreign policy.

Australia

A considerable contribution from our Australian correspondent.

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/open-australia-versus-closed-united-states/>

This is an interesting commentary on the revised US behaviour.

[https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/reviewing-the-intelligence-reviews-so-far/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm\\_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID\\_458616fc92d160d348d190221929cfbb&utm\\_source=CampaignMonitor&utm\\_term=Reviewing%20the%20intelligence%20reviews%20so%20far](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/reviewing-the-intelligence-reviews-so-far/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID_458616fc92d160d348d190221929cfbb&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=Reviewing%20the%20intelligence%20reviews%20so%20far)

A brief review of intelligence organizational history in Aus. Canada and allies are discussed in the review.

[https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-food-security-needs-national-security-frameworks/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm\\_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID\\_458616fc92d160d348d190221929cfbb&utm\\_source=CampaignMonitor&utm\\_term=Australias%20food%20security%20needs%20national-security%20frameworks](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-food-security-needs-national-security-frameworks/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID_458616fc92d160d348d190221929cfbb&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=Australias%20food%20security%20needs%20national-security%20frameworks)

To complete the day, the last item is an article on Australian food security and matters of concern with it.

[https://breakingdefense.com/2025/03/no-theres-no-kill-switch-pentagon-tries-to-reassure-international-f-35-partners/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=hs\\_email&utm\\_campaign=hs\\_email&utm\\_content=353219751&utm\\_term=hs\\_email](https://breakingdefense.com/2025/03/no-theres-no-kill-switch-pentagon-tries-to-reassure-international-f-35-partners/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=hs_email&utm_campaign=hs_email&utm_content=353219751&utm_term=hs_email)

This story clarifies the kill switch issue but maintaining a small fleet of 16 aircraft will not get a country the actual level of support that a country with 88 or more aircraft would enjoy.

**Note:** Canada has not cancelled the contract for 88 aircraft. It is examining alternatives, but the penalties would be punishing and remove Canadian companies from bidding on any future

contract. It would not be wise.

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2025/04/03/australia-sizes-up-a-continent-size-gap-in-air-defenses/>

It appears that Aus realizes that it is largely unprotected from air attack.

[https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-world-order-changes/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm\\_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID\\_5b108e7bfc3aa65035e858e41c907e99&utm\\_source=CampaignMonitor&utm\\_term=How%20world%20order%20changes](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-world-order-changes/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID_5b108e7bfc3aa65035e858e41c907e99&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=How%20world%20order%20changes)

Another interesting article today. Are we heading into a period of major world change or is it more transitional.

[https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/think-laterally-government-air-and-shipping-services-can-boost-australian-defence/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm\\_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID\\_5b108e7bfc3aa65035e858e41c907e99&utm\\_source=CampaignMonitor&utm\\_term=Think%20laterally%20government%20air%20and%20shipping%20services%20can%20boost%20Australian%20defence](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/think-laterally-government-air-and-shipping-services-can-boost-australian-defence/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID_5b108e7bfc3aa65035e858e41c907e99&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=Think%20laterally%20government%20air%20and%20shipping%20services%20can%20boost%20Australian%20defence)

The attached article is very interesting. This type of thinking is needed in Canada and other nations.

<https://thewest.com.au/news/chinese-warships-re-enter-australias-exclusive-economic-zone-department-of-defence-says-c-17851702.amp>

At least one Aus senator is aware of this.

[https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-untold-story-of-the-2009-defence-white-paper/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm\\_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID\\_5cc424772d99017bff5e66b2f4cf804e&utm\\_source=CampaignMonitor&utm\\_term=The%20untold%20story%20of%20the%202009%20defence%20white%20paper](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-untold-story-of-the-2009-defence-white-paper/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID_5cc424772d99017bff5e66b2f4cf804e&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=The%20untold%20story%20of%20the%202009%20defence%20white%20paper)

The above article is an interesting review of what might have been if Australia had fully implemented its 2009 White Paper on Defence

[https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/australia-canada-should-build-out-polar-partnership/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_source=hsenc=p2ANqtz--G0Z3RrCp49wDA\\_YuFKSw65INhS4fGoj1Z9ZFTOnSHoel2QD2e0d2tMPo\\_rG\\_pugNmnTVeqwk8mFz28PAKvy8Bqykpnw&utm\\_content=355184256&utm\\_source=hs\\_email](https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/australia-canada-should-build-out-polar-partnership/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=hsenc=p2ANqtz--G0Z3RrCp49wDA_YuFKSw65INhS4fGoj1Z9ZFTOnSHoel2QD2e0d2tMPo_rG_pugNmnTVeqwk8mFz28PAKvy8Bqykpnw&utm_content=355184256&utm_source=hs_email)

Attached is a most interesting article. I wonder if the suggestion that Canada should work closely with Australia in Antarctica is an idea that we might encourage the two countries to pursue.

[https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/unlike-chinas-flotilla-the-great-white-fleet-came-in-friendship/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm\\_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID\\_3dc4db107ddc71d78c2d69e1338b361f&utm\\_source=CampaignMonitor&utm\\_term=Unlike%20Chinas%20flotilla%20the%20Great%20White%20Fleet%20came%20in%20friendship](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/unlike-chinas-flotilla-the-great-white-fleet-came-in-friendship/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Daily%20The%20Strategist+CID_3dc4db107ddc71d78c2d69e1338b361f&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=Unlike%20Chinas%20flotilla%20the%20Great%20White%20Fleet%20came%20in%20friendship)

Another interesting article from down under.

[https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/its-past-time-to-get-serious-about-funding-australias-defence-and-security/?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm\\_content=D](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/its-past-time-to-get-serious-about-funding-australias-defence-and-security/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=D)

[aily%20The%20Strategist+CID\\_fa58ef9856af12e5d18b648ccb733c45&utm\\_source=CampaignMonitor&utm\\_term=Its%20past%20time%20to%20get%20serious%20about%20funding%20Australias%20defence%20and%20security](https://gpcaptain.com/aukus-nuclear-submarine-sale-under-scrutiny-as-trump-tariffs-rattle-australia/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-d9d64b5416-170491534&mc_cid=d9d64b5416&mc_eid=9fc66b041f)

If you read the attached document, you will see similar defence issues to the issues in Canada. This is not good news as it puts both countries into further reliance upon the USA for military security

[https://gpcaptain.com/aukus-nuclear-submarine-sale-under-scrutiny-as-trump-tariffs-rattle-australia/?subscriber=true&goal=0\\_f50174ef03-d9d64b5416-170491534&mc\\_cid=d9d64b5416&mc\\_eid=9fc66b041f](https://gpcaptain.com/aukus-nuclear-submarine-sale-under-scrutiny-as-trump-tariffs-rattle-australia/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-d9d64b5416-170491534&mc_cid=d9d64b5416&mc_eid=9fc66b041f)

Aukus may be in jeopardy due to US tariff decisions.

[https://gpcaptain.com/aukus-nuclear-submarine-sale-under-scrutiny-as-trump-tariffs-rattle-australia/?subscriber=true&goal=0\\_f50174ef03-d9d64b5416-170491534&mc\\_cid=d9d64b5416&mc\\_eid=9fc66b041f](https://gpcaptain.com/aukus-nuclear-submarine-sale-under-scrutiny-as-trump-tariffs-rattle-australia/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-d9d64b5416-170491534&mc_cid=d9d64b5416&mc_eid=9fc66b041f)

The attached article is important as it reveals some real concerns about Aukus and its implementation considering recent events concerning China

[https://gpcaptain.com/aukus-nuclear-submarine-sale-under-scrutiny-as-trump-tariffs-rattle-australia/??mc\\_eid=9fc66b041f&goal=0\\_f50174ef03-567483d5f9-170491534&mc\\_cid=567483d5f9&mc\\_eid=9fc66b041f](https://gpcaptain.com/aukus-nuclear-submarine-sale-under-scrutiny-as-trump-tariffs-rattle-australia/??mc_eid=9fc66b041f&goal=0_f50174ef03-567483d5f9-170491534&mc_cid=567483d5f9&mc_eid=9fc66b041f)

More AUKUS news. Australia has announced their plan for the Hobart Class DDG upgrade. Aegis Block 9 and Tomahawk missiles are the core mods.

United States

In the first 100 days of Trump's second mandate as President, we have seen what many media outlets around the world as chaos. Some were not as charitable, calling it criminally incompetent. What can one say about someone who has resurrected the 19<sup>th</sup> century and set conditions for worldwide conflict. Elon Musk, one of the authors of this debacle has decided to leave, even stating that he thought his efforts had failed. His efforts to find "fat" in government has largely caused stress to all citizens of the US and crippled key government services. He now has called Trump's tariffs a mistake. The fallout from the actions of this administration will be significant and long lasting. It will hurt those least able to handle the changes. The US has lost its moral compass and its role as the leader of the free world angering allies and enemies alike without understanding the implications. It is not a recipe for success.

The US is continuing to batter the Houthis in Yemen, spending hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons for limited success. The Houthis are still able to fire the occasional missile at Israel and at ships in the Red Sea.

The ceasefire negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have had little to no success as Russia continues to hit civilian infrastructure most recently in the Palm Sunday attack on Sumy with two ballistic missiles into the downtown of the city killing 34 civilians. The chief negotiator, Steven Witkoff, has no credibility with Ukraine and is willing to carve up Ukraine mainly following Russian demands. Ukraine, Europe and most of the rest of the free worlds are unlikely to accept this appalling effort. It seems clearer to many European leaders that the war will only end with Putin and his odious regime gone. The US effort is tainted and will not be successful. Russia cannot survive a peace economically. The conditions are set for a significant conflict.

## Moldova

The UK announced that it would impose sanctions against the Russian organization, Evrazia and its leadership, founder Nelli Parutenco and board member Natalia Parasca according to an Al Jazeera article published 5 April 2025 by the staff. It can be found at link: <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/uk-sanctions-pro-russian-group-over-alleged-moldova-vote-interference/ar-AA1CaGDM?ocid=BingNewsSerp>. The group is alleged to have used money generally believed to have been provided by pro-Russian “Shor Party” leader Ilan Shor to bribe people for a ‘no’ vote in last year’s referendum on joining the EU. Approximately 13000 people took advantage of the bribes totalling more than 15M USD according to the article.

In our last SAC Notes we discussed the expulsion of three Russian diplomats who spirited a Moldovan MP out of the country. Moldovan security services provided video evidence of the convicted MP being taken by a Russian diplomatic vehicle to Transnistria.

Russia has denied any wrongdoing about both efforts. European sources commented that Russia is continuing its destabilization efforts in Moldova and in Europe.

## Georgia

The anti-Government demonstrations are continuing with the last major demonstration taking place ON 5 April 2025. The government of the Georgia Dream Party have cracked down on opposition party leadership to stifle further protests. Like several other authoritarian regimes, they arrest these leaders at their homes at quiet times of the day thus avoiding major confrontations.

Georgia Dream did apparently win the election although by how much is in question. Certainly, their tactics were in question. The real reason is that the opposition was splintered between too many parties thus they split the vote. Georgia Dream is continuing a pro-Russia policy that is not supported by either the population or the Georgian Constitution which clearly states a pro-Western approach.

Two French Journalists refused entry to Georgia who wrote about these demonstrations. Photojournalist Jerome Chobeaux and Clement Girardot, a freelance reporter who has worked for Le Monde and Al Jazeera, were denied entry at Tbilisi airport in March and February respectively, the Reporters Without Borders watchdog said.

The link to the article on Reuters dated 11 April 2025 titled, “Two French journalists denied entry to Georgia after covering protests,” is found at link: <https://www.reuters.com/world/two-french-journalists-denied-entry-georgia-after-covering-protests-says-rights-2025-04-11/>

It is expected that this will continue to occur and in fact, the crackdown may increase to support the current government.

## Belarus

Strangely there is little real activity that is different than normal. Belarus is still causing issues at the Polish border with “refugees” but they have been doing so at greater rates before this time. It is expected that this will continue.

Belarus as mentioned in many previous notes, has walked a very fine line during the Russia-Ukraine War. It should be remembered that Russian troops were allowed to use Belarusian soil to launch attacks into the Kyiv oblast. They have also received access to Russian built

nuclear weapons. The Lukashenko regime appears to be continuing the policy of their own survival, but this may also cause the regime to allow Russian access once again in future Russian efforts.

#### Israel-Iran War

The real conflict is not the battle in Gaza, Lebanon or Yemen; it is with Iran. Iran has provided most of the material to harass and kill Israelis. All aspects of this conflict should be taken in the context including Israel's current operations in Gaza. What is important to note is the UN's lack of action which has led to the necessity for conflict. It continues to be of limited value as a negotiator.

#### Russia-Ukraine War

The war continues in its normal bloody manner. The notes that follow is based on a video by Anders Puck Nielson called "Russia needs a Spring Offensive" dated 9 April 2025 but enhanced with my own research and thoughts. There are changes in the Northern part of the Eastern front where Ukraine has made some significant efforts to stop Russian assaults. Russia is still able to move forward using dismounted infantry pushing forward along the line although with significant losses. The latest point of view is that Russia will attempt to launch a major offensive in the area of Sumy. The attack on Palm Sunday plus efforts on the ground in the Sumy area seems to support this point of view. The thought is that this will give the Russians a bargaining chip closer to Kyiv.

Kyiv on the other hand has been able to utilize the equipment provided by allies and their own ingenuity to produce effective weapons systems capable of hitting more than 2000 kms away. Russian air defence is not capable of covering such large areas thus Kyiv has been able to inflict damage on distant, one-of-a-kind targets such as the manufacturer of fibre optic cable which apparently burned brightly this week. Kyiv does not have the air defence assets either and Russian attacks by drone and missile are usually huge, often at least a couple hundred launched in a short period.

Russia has just authorised the largest number of conscripts in recent history. 160 k are being called. These ones will be somewhat different, they will come from European Russia, Moscow and St Petersburg as examples. Russia normally calls up conscripts twice a year, usually around 140 k so the new number is not outlandish. Russia has taken immense casualties amongst Russian ethnic minorities. Russian dissidents have claimed that whole villages have been left without any men especially in the Far East. These new conscripts are the sons of European Russians, the key supporters of the Putin regime. A normal call up is likely less complicated for Putin than a mobilization call.

The Ukrainians have recently announced that they believe Russia can mobilize an immediate 5 M men with the ability to call on up to 20 M more. The Russian male population is only around 65 M in total at the start of the war. Russian casualties have been high and getting higher as the war continues to increase in its violence. This is not possible in real terms; the 65 M figure is suspect at best. Russian budget for service estates seem to indicate a much higher level of fatalities than officially reported. The numbers seem to indicate a best guess based on Russia's population, not the reliability, health, criminal past, age, mental capacity etc. It is strongly suspected that Russia's actual numbers are much lower than the Ukrainian figures. We also do not know whether the Russian population would handle such a call up or would it be the end of the regime? One suspects such a mobilization might cause sufficient internal conflict to end the war.

Equipment simply cannot be replaced, and Soviet stocks are nearly gone. Russia no longer can replace it nor the technology to modernize the Russian armed forces. Russia is a



superpower by virtue of its nuclear weapons alone. One has to wonder about the state of these weapons given Russia's lax attitude to maintenance. Recently, highly trained technicians found themselves in infantry units, not a good sign. The nuclear stockpiles exist but... The other aspect beyond technological improvements and attrition is the state of the Russian economy. It has no friends, no source of more funding in sufficient amounts to change the situation from a steadily downward path towards bankruptcy of the nation. Even if the war were to end tomorrow, the ability of Russia to return to a peacetime economy is almost non-existent. They do not have the money to invest in this conversion. A move towards a peacetime economy would crush Russia, especially if sanctions remain in place. Russia is on borrowed time. Peace is not in their interest.

## China

The tariff war is a disaster for both the US and China both now imposing tariffs well over 100% on all goods although the US exempted chips, Apple products and computers. China has ramped up by no longer allowing the export of rare earth minerals. China's economy is not in good shape. Its three main pillars are property development, exports and domestic consumer activity. None of these is in truly healthy shape and it appears it may get much worse with tariffs. The next few weeks will be telling whether the world can pull out of a steep decline in activity and trade. With the mercurial decisions of the Trump administration looking more like the actions of a five-year-old pushing buttons to see what they do; it is not certain that anyone can predict the future at this point. Recession seems to be the likely answer or worse.

One benefit to China with the current tariff war, is that they appear to be the "rational" partner. The current US administration's actions have now placed China in a position with the EU and others as a viable partner or at least one that seems to have a more coherent strategy for the global economy. Time will tell whether China can keep up the façade of being reasonable.

China continues to harass its neighbours. Many neighbours are increasing defence spending and their ability to defend their interests. China has also continued to build more ships, aircraft and other military equipment. They have shown the ability and intent to ramp up their efforts as well against key targets such as Taiwan. Some sources now suggest that current Chinese exercises around Taiwan are no longer exercises but rather rehearsals for their invasion. While a Chinese invasion is possible, it is not a good idea given Xi's purge of senior commanders and staff especially in the Rocket Force and the Navy.

Taiwan is not without its own capability. One estimate is that up to 7 M Taiwanese males are in the reserve on top of a large regular military. The landing will be difficult at best and if Taiwan retains the ability to move inside the country, China will not be able to succeed in the near future especially if Taiwan's allies also come to their aid.

2027 is still the best estimate of when China would be fully able to undertake such an operation so there is a window of opportunity but is it really feasible. At present, given the information available, the answer is 'no.'

The unknown ally: Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS)

<https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2025/03/unknown-ally-osiss.html>



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