



## Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia Dispatches

21 February 2025

*The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security, and safety issues.*

*Dispatches* is a periodic collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to [RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINSDispatches@gmail.com). Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

### Annual Membership renewal

Please note that this year's renewal process inserts an initial step requiring members to fill out a membership renewal form before moving on to payment. Members should find the renewal process relatively straight forward, starting with the renewal page at <https://rusi-ns.ca/membership/>.

All members, even those who are exempt from the membership fee, are required fill out the online Membership Renewal Form. If you are not comfortable with completing the online form, please email us at [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com) and provide your phone number. One of our volunteers will contact you to assist with the renewal process.

To keep up with inflation and maintain the quality of our programs and services, the membership fee has increased to \$35.00 CAD. Recognizing the diverse preferences of our members, we continue to offer multiple payment methods: credit card, electronic money transfer, and cheque.

### Editor's Notes:

I am on the front lines of the global West's Indo-Pac strategies and from my perspective, we have already lost.

I posted an explanation and pictures under [Odds and Sods](#). We are headed to Singapore, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Malaysia next. Looking forward to seeing how the great and emerging powers manifest their presence in these nations.

On a different yet related note, the Arctic is a discussion topic for the political parties as we head to the next election. Different as a geographical region, related in the sense of the power dynamics and players but also in what Canada decides is important. We are dislocated with our neighbour to the South, great power competition and state level conflict are occurring across the globe, and a portion of the Arctic, an area of global interest, is within Canada's integral territory. Where do we allocate limited resources?

What does this mean for the Arctic and how it is treated by the Canadian political parties? If nothing else, what should be remembered by all is that the perspectives and concerns of those living in the North and "southerners" are different. There is an underlying ranker with the South and their ideas of what to do with/about the North, as it usually serves Southerners' goals. Addressing this goes beyond consultation. A colleague often asked at the start of CAF Arctic discussions what is the number one issue for the Arctic. His answer: identity with and connection to Canada. Greenland's drive for independence from Denmark is being watched by many Arctic peoples, including Canada's. Allegiances in the Arctic circle are across people groupings, less bounded by lines on the map. And the Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut are not alike either. There was a Nunavut News article (<https://www.nunavutnews.com/home/inuit-rights-integral-to-future-arctic-policy-says-lori-idlout-7788991>) earlier this month, by a sitting Nunavut NDP MP, who's words are an indicator:

"Sovereignty means more than control over borders – it embodies self-determination, the protection of our land and the empowerment of our people. Sovereignty is also built on trust: trust in our leaders..., in our communities..., and trust in ourselves..."

There is a long way to go before there is trust between Northerners and the south, but that is where to start. How does defence and security factor in, especially when control of borders is the least of their concerns? Ideas abound, several you will find throughout the newsletter.

The next issue will be **7 March 2025**.

#### **Quick links:**

[Events](#)

[Publications](#)

[@RUSI NS on X](#)

[Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia on Facebook](#)

[Other Sources](#)

[Odds and sods](#)

[SAC Notes](#)

#### **Contributions to RUSI(NS) social media**

You are also encouraged to send material to be posted to the RUSI(NS) X and Facebook accounts to [rusinsdispatches@gmail.com](mailto:rusinsdispatches@gmail.com). Preferably, send the material ready to post. We are still looking for a volunteer(s) to be editor(s) for these accounts in order to keep them active.

## Events

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email [RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com](mailto:RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com). RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

### RUSI (NS) Events:

**New 19 March**, Wednesday: BGen Mark Parsons, Comd 5 Div. This will be a hybrid event, in-person and virtual with MS Teams. More to follow.

**25 March**, Tuesday: AGM at 1900hrs AST, using Zoom. Please see the Save the Date poster at the end of the newsletter.

April and May to be confirmed.

**New 18 June**, Wednesday: CBSA presentation at CBSA, Bayers Lake.

**New 16 July**, Wednesday: Historical presentation with Tom Tulloch/Meet and Greet.

**New 17 September**, Wednesday: Col Labbe, CAF Drone projects, virtual event.

### Other Events:

**New 24 February**, Tuesday: The Royal Military College Saint-Jean (RMC Saint-Jean) and the NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE) present the Leadersphere Conference. Experts from the scientific, academic, military, and governmental sectors will hold three strategic panels: Preparing Canada for the Consequences of Climate Change, Preparing Canada's Defence Team for 2060, and NATO in the Era of Climate Change. The conference will be held in a hybrid format and is open to the public for free. All event details are available on the [website](#). RSVP by February 24 via [Le Point de vente](#).

**5-6 March**, Wednesday and Thursday: Conference of Defence Associations' Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence will be livestreamed on [CPAC](#), no registration required, and will also be available to view in the [CPAC video archive](#). This year's theme: From policy to action in an unpredictable world. For more information, please visit <https://cdainstitute.ca/events/93rd-ottawa-conference-march-5th-6th-2025/>.

**New 10 April**, Thursday: Dr Adam Coombs, Historian, DND Directorate of History & Heritage will present Royal Air Force Museum lecture "Fighting the Third Battle of the Atlantic from the Air." 6 pm UK time. Online (Livestream). To register: <https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/london/whats-going-on/events/virtual-lecture-fighting-the-third-battle-of-the-atlantic-from-the-air/>

**New 16 April**, Wednesday: RAUSI presents MGen Ménard and "Hidden in plain Sight: the subtle but concerning threat to Canada's national security and prosperity."

MGen Ménard (ret'd) will examine three critical challenges shaping Canada's security landscape. This zoom event, at 2100hrs AST (1800hrs MST), requires registration: <https://www.rausi.org/info-events/rmcsd/782-hidden-in-plain-sight>.

### **Wargaming Events:**

Georgetown University Wargaming Society long-range schedule:  
<https://www.guwargaming.org/guwsevents>

**4 March**, Tuesday – Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Professional Wargaming in France." 1-2:30 pm AST. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/professional-wargaming-in-france-tickets-1060419526349>

**18 March**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Tactical Wargame Design." 7-8:30 pm ADT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/tactical-wargame-design-tickets-1052472612917>

**8 April**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Spyships, Satellites, and SAMs" 7-8:30pm ADT. Online. "A summary of 3 games run in Canada in 2024" by **RUSI(NS) member Dave Redpath**. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/spyships-satellites-and-sams-tickets-1060415745039>

**20 May 2025**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Cobalt Rocks: Wargaming Seabed Operations." 1-2:30pm ADT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/cobalt-rocks-wargaming-seabed-operations-tickets-1101179159509>

**16 September 2025**, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation "Naval Wargaming and Quantitative History." 1-2:30 pm ADT. Online. To register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/naval-wargaming-and-quantitative-history-tickets-1052463264957>

## **Publications**

RUSI(NS) Presentation "Drydocking Technology" by Robert Taylor, 29 January 2025, [https://rusi-ns.ca/drydocking\\_technology/](https://rusi-ns.ca/drydocking_technology/)

RUSI(NS) Information Note "Canada's Militia and National Defence Acts" by Tim Dunne, 20 January 2025, [https://rusi-ns.ca/militia\\_national\\_defence\\_acts/](https://rusi-ns.ca/militia_national_defence_acts/)

RUSI(NS) Paper "Common Law, Civic Law, Martial Law and Military Law" by Tim Dunne, 8 December 2024, [https://rusi-ns.ca/common\\_civic\\_martial\\_military\\_law/](https://rusi-ns.ca/common_civic_martial_military_law/)

RUSI(NS) Paper "China and the Maritime Shipping Industry", 7 December 2024, [https://rusi-ns.ca/chinese\\_maritime\\_shipping/](https://rusi-ns.ca/chinese_maritime_shipping/)

RUSI(NS) Comments "Arctic security report deems Yukon relatively 'safe, secure and prepared'" by Cate Belbin, 24 November 2024, [https://rusi-ns.ca/yukon\\_security/](https://rusi-ns.ca/yukon_security/)

RUSI(NS) Comments "NATO Interoperability When Targeting Indispensable Objects" by Cate Belbin, 24 November 2024, <https://rusi-ns.ca/nato-interoperability-when-targeting-indispensable-objects/>

RUSI(NS) Comments "Thoughts on New Vessels for the Royal Canadian Navy" by David Swan, 20 November 2024, [https://rusi-ns.ca/rcn\\_new\\_vessels/](https://rusi-ns.ca/rcn_new_vessels/)

The following publications are received by RUSI(S) from other associations. The latest edition, where not otherwise indicated, may be requested by emailing RUSI(NS). To readers of Dispatches from other associations, sharing of your publications is appreciated.

weekly:

Naval Association of Canada

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) Defence Update

Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver Members News

bi-weekly: Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association On Watch

monthly:

Canadian Gunner News

Edmonton United Services Institute President's Enews

Military Institute of Windsor Communiqué

Naval Reserve Association of Canada Mess Deck ConneXions

Royal Alberta United Services Institute Dispatches

Royal Canadian Logistics Service The Logician

Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch Scuttlebutt

Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island Newsletter

Veterans Affairs Canada Salute!

quarterly:

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) Quarterly Newsletter

### **@RUSI\_NS on X**

@RUSI\_NS posts may be viewed by clicking on the icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>.

To have something posted or reposted, email RUSI(NS).

SA Defensa @SA\_Defensa 19 Feb posted: 📍 Punta Arenas, #Chile 🇨🇱 The @RoyalCanNavy 🇨🇦 Harry DeWolf HMCS Margaret Brooke (AOPV 431) has arrived in Punta Arenas. She is docked alongside @Armada\_esp 🇪🇸 BIO Hespérides (A-33) & @RoyalNavy 🇬🇧 HMS Protector (A173). RUSI(NS) quoted: #HMCSMargaretBrooke continues deployment en route #Antarctica with embarked scientific expedition on #OpPROJECTION2025. 😊 Re-type ship as "A2OPV" (#Arctic & #Antarctic & Offshore Patrol Vessel)?



"Operation Nanook about to begin in Inuvik and elsewhere" <https://cabinradio.ca/222742/news/beaufort-delta/largest-operation-nanook-about-to-begin-in-inuvik-and-elsewhere/> Larger & with more challenging objectives #OpNANOOK <https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-nanook.html> "demonstrate ability to project & sustain forces in High #Arctic



Canadian Maritime Security Network @cmsnminds 19 Feb posted: Please check out Sergey Sukhankin's Analysis on Russia in the Arctic: What to Expect and how to Respond: <https://cmsn.ca/files/ugd/0bcbec6d31b5c9987c40f0a543080d77da732b.pdf>



RUSI(NS) quoted: #Arctic is CAN🇨🇦/#NATO 'front' with Russia. Need ensure defence & security by building infrastructure to serve Northern people & military. Procure appropriate equipment, all gov't depts/agencies, for demanding conditions. Train Arctic-capable @CanadianForces units

Canadian Armed Forces @CanadianForces 19 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: We're modernizing our enrolment process. This means less delays for applicants, but the same high standard for our members. It's part of our ongoing efforts to build a modern, effective, and diverse military. <https://canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/news/2025/02/canadian-armed-forces-recruitment-process-modernization-update.html>



UK Defence Journal @UKDefJournal 18 Feb posted: Britain is planning to patrol the Atlantic using a fleet built around the new Type 92 Sloop – a drone vessel – and the Type 93, a drone submarine. This, they hope, will free up crewed warships for other missions.



(Britain planning fleet of drone vessels to patrol Atlantic <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britain-planning-fleet-of-drone-vessels-to-patrol-atlantic/>)

RUSI(NS) quoted: Will 'sloop' become term for uncrewed surface vehicle? Will 'chariot' become term for uncrewed underwater vehicle? #Drone a broad term, maybe best applied to #USV #UUV #UGV generally/together

UK Defence Journal @UKDefJournal 18 Feb posted: Britain is planning to patrol the Atlantic using a fleet built around the new Type 92 Sloop – a drone vessel – and the Type 93, a drone submarine. This, they hope, will free up crewed warships for other missions.



(Britain planning fleet of drone vessels to patrol Atlantic <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britain-planning-fleet-of-drone-vessels-to-patrol-atlantic/>)

RUSI(NS) quoted: What would @RoyalNavy force of uncrewed surface & underwater vessels #

USV #UUV mean for multi-national integration into #NATO North Atlantic anti-submarine barrier? Not all nations at same level of #drone development. How coordinate with crewed aircraft, ships & #subs in barrier?

Dr Elizabeth Buchanan @BuchananLiz 31 Jan posted: 🇨🇦 Antarctic bound: “making a meaningful scientific contribution during times of intense geopolitical relationships” (First of its kind collaborative scientific expedition departs for the Antarctic <https://meopar.ca/portfolio/first-of-its-kind-collaborative-scientific-expedition-departs-for-the-antarctic/>) RUSI(NS) quoted: Might future CAN🇨🇦 scientific expeditions to #Antarctica be embarked in @CoastGuardCan #Arctic & Offshore Patrol Ships with government/civil sectors personnel incl from like-minded states?



NAADSN\_RDSNAA @NAADSN\_RDSNAA 30 Jan posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: What are the conversations Canadians should be having re: continental #defence and #Arctic policy under a new Trump presidency? @WhitneyLackenbl addresses both in his latest Quick Impact. <https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/25jan24-Trump-QI-PWL.pdf> (Turning the World on its Head: Trump Returns)



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 10 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: 🇨🇦 Canada faces a defining moment as President #Trump's tariff crisis exposes our vulnerabilities, demanding urgent action to strengthen security, defence, and economic independence. 📖 Read the latest from Tony Battista and Christopher Coates: <https://cdainstitute.ca/why-waste-a-crisis-a-national-strategy-for-canada/> (Why Waste a Crisis? A National Strategy for Canada)



SA Defensa @SA\_Defensa 16 Feb posted: 📍 South Atlantic Ocean. The @Armada\_Arg (🇲🇪) frigate ARA Almirante Brown (D-10) conducted maneuver operations with the @RoyalCanNavy (🇨🇦) offshore patrol vessel HMCS Margaret Brooke (AOPV 431) during her transit journey. 📸: @Armada\_Arg RUSI(NS) quoted: Inherent flexibility of warships & engagement of CAN🇨🇦 with like-minded states evident in navy-to-navy operations (naval diplomacy, peacetime strategy) as @RoyalCanNavy #HMCSMargaretBrook deploys to #Antarctica on scientific expedition then circumnavigates South America



"On its way to #Antarctica, the #Arctic patrol vessel #HMCSMargaretBrooke arrived in Argentina🇲🇪" <https://www.zona-militar.com/en/2025/02/12/coverage-on-its-way-to-antarctica-the-arctic-patrol-vessel-hmcs-margaret-brooke-arrived-in-argentina/> @RoyalCanNavy deployment is mix of scientific expedition & traditional naval diplomatic mission, to region needing more CAN🇨🇦 attention



National Defence @NationalDefence 7 Feb posted: The Honourable Bill Blair issued this statement reaffirming Canada's commitment to NATO's collective defence and security, and welcoming Sweden to the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade Latvia. <https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2025/02/canada-reaffirms-commitment-to-natos-collective-defence-and-security-and-welcomes-sweden-to-the-canadian-led-nato-multinational-brigade-latvia.html>



(Canada reaffirms commitment to NATO's collective defence and security and welcomes Sweden to the Canadian-led NATO Multinational Brigade Latvia)

RUSI(NS) quoted: RUSI(NS) Info Notes "Brigade and Brigade Group" [https://rusi-ns.ca/brigade\\_brigade\\_group/](https://rusi-ns.ca/brigade_brigade_group/) and "What is a Battle Group in the Canadian Army?" <https://rusi-ns.ca/battle-group/>

NATO ACT @NATO\_ACT 4 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: #NATO's situational awareness in the maritime domain is getting a boost!

A new @NATO initiative, MAINSAIL, safeguards critical undersea infrastructure by collecting & employing data to build situational awareness. This is how NATO adapts. 📌

<https://act.nato.int/article/natos-mainsail/> #WeAreNATO

(NATO's Mainsail: Enhancing the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure through Advanced Data Exploitation) Hopefully Canada is involved.



CDN Defence Academy/L'Académie cdn de la défense

@CDACanadaACD 4 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: 🇨🇦🇨🇳

CSDS Policy Brief | The Long Shadow? China's Military Rise in the Indo-Pacific and its Global Implications

(The Long Shadow? China's Military Rise in the Indo-Pacific and its Global Implications

<https://csds.vub.be/publication/the-long-shadow-chinas-military-rise-in-the-indo-pacific-and-its-global-implications/>)



NAADSN\_RDSNAA @NAADSN\_RDSNAA 4 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: A new survey from Mathieu

Landriault and Jean-François Savard just dropped in time for us to read more into what Canadians think about the strategic

role of the region, territorial autonomy, environmental protection, and Indigenous issues in the #Arctic

(The great paradox of the North

<https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/february-2025/great-paradox-north/>)



The War Zone @thewarzonewire 14 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Canada Joining Iron Dome Missile Defense Plan

Would Be Welcome: NORAD Boss. Cooperation on new space-based sensors might be a starting place for the U.S. and

Canada on joint missile defense, but major hurdles remain.

Story: <https://www.twz.com/air/canada-joining-iron-dome-missile-defense-plan-would-be-welcome-norad-boss>






Canadian Joint Operations Command @CJOC\_COIC 14 Feb posted: On 12 February HMCS OTTAWA (FFH 431) participated in the 7th Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity with the Philippine Navy's BRP Andrés Bonifacio (PS-17) and US forces, demonstrating a collective commitment to strengthen regional and international cooperation. RUSI(NS) quoted: "Canada and Philippines are in final negotiations for defence pact to boost joint military exercises" <https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/article/canada-and-philippines-are-in-final-negotiations-for-defence-pact-to-boost-joint-military-exercises/> CAN🇨🇦 increasing its WESTPAC presence. Part of Indo-Pacific Strategy? #MaritimeStrategy #BlueWaterNavy



Royal Canadian Air Force @RCAF\_ARC 7 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted (video [https://x.com/RCAF\\_ARC/status/1887878991375478975](https://x.com/RCAF_ARC/status/1887878991375478975)): Check out the Twin Otter's fresh new look – Air Mobility Grey! First aircraft in the fleet received a fresh coat of paint to better align with its mandate of air mobility support in Canada's North. The design features black paint to absorb the sun's energy to help with de-icing!\*



Ross Ermel, ADM(DS)/SMA(SN) @DSGDND\_GSNMDN 6 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: Did you know? The CAF Digital Campaign Plan outlines the vision for a digitally transformed military. It details the operational framework for managing, employing, and supporting the CAF to achieve #digital excellence. <https://canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canadian-armed-forces-digital-campaign-plan.html> (Canadian Armed Forces Digital Campaign Plan)



Jackson Walling @JacksonWalling 10 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: After @PierrePoilievre Arctic Security and Defense announcement this morning, please consider reading my public opinion analysis on Arctic Infrastructure. Survey Finds Canadians Overwhelmingly Support Building Arctic Infrastructure | Trent News (<https://www.trentu.ca/news/story/41921>)



CDA Institute @CDAInstitute 11 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: #Canada's defence strategy must evolve in the era of AI, cyber threats, and digital warfare. In the latest ON TRACK issue, @DanCiuriak argues that military modernization isn't just about defence—it's key to our economic future. Read now: <https://cdainstitute.ca/volume-35-national-security-in-the-age-of-ai-and-robotics/> (Military Modernization in the Age of Machine Knowledge Capital)



Adam Lajeunesse @adam\_lajeunesse 11 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: As the Conservative Party promises naval icebreakers I thought I would repost this article looking at the last naval icebreaker attempt, and how we got from there to the AOPV. <https://adamlajeunesse.ca/wp-content/uploads/go-x/u/17a056c9-ffdd-4f9c-8b34-1d17fd0cddc0/AOPS-Marine-Policy-Lajeunesse.pdf>



(Canada's Arctic Offshore and Patrol Ships (AOPS): Their history and purpose)

Brian Santarpia @BrianSantarpia quoted: For anyone looking to understand why defence procurement is so challenging, this paper does a great job of explaining how seemingly simple government policy has to be adjusted and compromises made to match technological and strategic realities before capability can be delivered.

#Arctic&Offshore Patrol Vessel #HMCSMargaretBrooke fitted for scientific expedition to #Antartica incl @HawboldtIND Launch & Recovery System Marine Mission Module for research <https://shorturl.at/e3Gbg> Similar LARS can be used to operate #drones #UUV for @RoyalCanNavy



BCRCMP @BCRCMP 7 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: #BCRCMP - RCMP Black Hawk helicopter to conduct border patrols in BC <https://bc-cb.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=2087&languageId=1&contentId=86956>



Canadian Joint Operations Command @CJOC\_COIC 8 Feb posted: As part of #OpPROJECTION 2025, HMCS MARGARET BROOKE hosted a roundtable discussion titled "From the Arctic to Antarctic: A Canadian Perspective" while alongside Rio de Janeiro, Brazil from 1 to 4 Feb. 🇧🇷🇨🇦 This discussion brought together academics, diplomats, and defence personnel from Canada and Brazil to compare challenges affecting both regions.



RUSI(NS) quoted: Part of #HMCSMargaretBrooke diplomatic efforts on deployment to #Antartica & circumnavigate South America on #OpPROJECTION 2025/01 <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-projection.html> First of its kind scientific expedition embarked <https://meopar.ca/portfolio/first-of-its-kind-collaborative-scientific-expedition-departs-for-the-antarctic/>

Canadian Army Today @CdnArmyToday 6 Feb posted and RUSI(NS) reposted: This summer, Canada became the fifth NATO country to test above-the-horizon lasers to defeat drone threats. Here's a look at that and some of the other tech that was on trial during the third IDEaS Counter UAS sandbox at DRDC's Suffield Research Centre. <https://canadianarmytoday.com/drone-defence-on-trial/> (Drone defence on trial)



Dave Perry @DavePerryCGAI 8 Feb posted: Great feature by @nvanderklippe on how the @RoyalCanNavy will use new submarines in the Arctic. Need to keep the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project moving @NationalDefence @CAGlobalAffairs (Future of Canada's Arctic patrol lies in diesel-electric submarines) <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-future-of-canadas-arctic-patrol-lies-in-diesel-electric-submarines/>



Brian Santarpia @BrianSantarpia 8 Feb quoted and RUSI(NS) reposted: A great article that helps to inform Canadians of the value of diesel subs in securing sovereignty in the Arctic. The key is to deny potential enemies the ability to use our waters as a hiding spot to hold North America at risk of missile attacks from their subs.

### **"Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia" on Facebook:**

RUSI(NS) postings may also be viewed by clicking on the Facebook icon at <https://RUSI-NS.ca>. To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday.

Britain planning fleet of drone vessels to patrol Atlantic <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britain-planning-fleet-of-drone-vessels-to-patrol-atlantic/>



"...a deployable and persistent wide area ASW search capability' built around the new Type 92 Sloop – an uncrewed surface vessel..."

Interesting, the Royal Navy seems to be re-introducing 'sloop' as a naval vessel type.

Historically, a "sloop-of-war was a warship of the British Royal Navy with a single gun deck that carried up to 18 guns" (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sloop-of-war>). The type

name lapsed in the 19th century and was resurrected in the 20th century for small warships intended for convoy escort and minesweeping but not fleet work and therefore they were not fast. They were too complex to build in sufficient numbers in the Second World War and were supplanted by corvettes and frigates.

NATO APP-20 Standard Ship Designation System now defines sloop as a "sailing vessel of a sloop design" which means "a sailboat with a single mast and fore-and-aft rigging." However, that does not preclude re-introduction of the type, which the RN has done. So the question now is whether the name will take and be used to mean uncrewed surface vessels. (Another question is whether simple terms will be introduced for uncrewed aerial vehicles, uncrewed ground vehicles and other vehicles covered by the general term 'drones.)

*Comment from a senior RCN officer:* I don't see sloop catching on unfortunately. I think the confusion with a sailing vessel will cause it to fail as a term. But I am curious to see how the Type 92 Sloop does play out.

*Comment:* Type 92 fits into the RN system in "Types 81-99, general purpose frigates/destroyers/sloops"

([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type\\_system\\_of\\_the\\_Royal\\_Navy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_system_of_the_Royal_Navy)).

*From a senior naval officer with experience working with the Royal Navy (RN):* One of the neat things about the RN is that they are not afraid to experiment, and in the greater UK cultural context, they're not afraid to try something, and if it doesn't work, to kill it without a second thought. In comparison, Canada is very conservative in terms of announcing anything until it is pretty much a certainty. Fanciful names for things are also a RN tradition. The 'chariot,' of course, was a two-man submersible/torpedo with which the RN had some successes sinking a number of ships during the Second World War. I think the UK is more comfortable with 'sloop' because it's a vessel they had in some numbers during the war, and because of HMS Starling's connection with Capt Johnnie Walker as the most successful sub-hunter. Of course the sailing sloops of the RN were light and fast, and were predominantly used as the messengers of the fleet carrying dispatches (or despatches in the Victorian world!), so I can see where the meaning resonates with Britons who cannot be separated from historical allegory! All that to say, just because the RN announces something with a whimsical title doesn't mean that it will see use beyond the experimental!

Canada's military must learn to love risk or become ineffective

<https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/sauve-canadas-military-must-learn-to-love-risk-or-become-ineffective>

"The military's inherent hesitance to change, while rooted in tradition and stability, is becoming an obstacle. Military life thrives on routine, discipline, and order — values that have helped ensure success on the battlefield for centuries."



This article is mistitled. I didn't understand the embracement of 'risk' statement. In truth, the article is really only a continuation of the following one ("How to fix the CAF's recruitment and retention crisis"). Thus, more of the same. I think more to the point is that the CAF is no longer what could be considered the 'employer of choice' within the job community. The truth is, the CAF is competing with industry, and this needs to be understood. Moreover, for as long as I have been in the CAF, 40+ years, the CAF has continued to work on promises and deal with aging and obsolete equipment and,

importantly, infrastructure. If one was to take a walk around Canadian Forces Base Halifax, you can see history, to be sure. Unfortunately most of the buildings are in extremely rough shape. Expensive simulators in ancient buildings with substandard heating, ventilation and air-conditioning systems that more often than not fail during hot summer months and impact the simulators. Yes, new jetties have been built - a good thing - yet the majority of buildings in which people work are simply old and being maintained on shoestring budgets. Consider the new sailor coming into the Navy being trained in one of the Fleet Schools, typically old buildings, with old classrooms that in many cases do not meet the accepted standards for connectivity in terms of networking, etc. In the Royal Canadian Navy's case, it's not just new ships that we should be focused on, it must also be the infrastructure that supports those ships, from Fleet Schools to hospitals (now clinics) to headquarters buildings.

How to fix the CAF's recruitment and retention crisis

<https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/armed-forces-recruitment-retention>

I don't disagree with the majority of the article, however, what has to be considered as it relates to universality of service is that the Canadian Armed

Forces (CAF) is a fighting Force. That in itself demands that there is a standard established that ensures soldiers, sailors and air force personnel are capable of defending the nation. That is not debatable. But what the organization should be considering, at least from a business perspective, is a means to employ people who don't meet that standard but who could still contribute to the overall force structure and operational effectiveness. Consider how much time, effort and, yes, money that has been spent training people. In today's personnel challenged environment within the CAF, the argument could and should be made to employ those people in some capacity to fill staff training positions in order to free up healthy individuals for operations. Thus, why not employ retirees in those positions? From a business perspective it makes sense. They are already knowledgeable of the CAF, in many cases have the training and importantly have the experience, and could meet the requirements of the supporting tail for operations. Consider the following use case: There is a requirement for doctrinal and strategy planners currently filled by uniformed individuals, many of whom are deployable. We are short personnel to fill operational billets. Why not fill those 'staff' related jobs with retirees or at least make the attempt to? In many instances staff positions only require knowledge and experience.

The recruiting question remains a conundrum. We want more people and yet we have failed to streamline the process. There are wait times that run the gamut from three months to 18 months. Indeed, in many instances this is related to poor staff communications with prospective recruits, but also with the requirement for individuals to provide all the related paperwork, particularly medical paperwork. The longer the waiting period for recruiters to get back to people interested, the less likely they are to remain in the waiting queue. Perhaps the CAF should consider going back to the old school means where prospective recruits are only required to provide the bare minimum paperwork, citizenship, identification, education background, etc., and then they are put through a CAF medical screening process with CAF doctors. Of course, the issue with this is Canada on the whole is short medical people so plussing up the CAF medical units would be problematic. However, it does not remove the basic fact that the recruiting system overall remains largely 'clunky' and overly bureaucratic in nature.



Op UNIFER and REASSURANCE improve their knowledge of counter-uncrewed aircraft systems in Poland

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2025/01/operation-unifier-improves-poland-knowledge-counter-uncrewed-aircraft-systems.html>



“...modern camouflage works well against the naked eye and other optical sensors but doesn’t allow troops to hide their heat signature from thermal imaging. Understanding how drones leverage infrared sensors will be incorporated into ETE (Engineer Training Element) training provided to AFU (Armed Forces of Ukraine) members, helping them survive these threats and ultimately enabling them to achieve their objectives.”

Camouflaging against drone sensors is becoming much more challenging.

Rolling Back Naval Forward Presence Will Strengthen American Deterrence

<https://warontherocks.com/2025/02/rolling-back-naval-forward-presence-will-strengthen-american-deterrence/>



“Operational’ readiness refers to the ability of existing military units to fight tonight. ‘Structural’ readiness refers to a military’s ability to generate sufficient mass for multiple rounds in a prolonged fight, including factors like the health of the defense-industrial base.”

Operational and structural readiness are not terms that may be used broadly within the Canadian Armed Forces, certainly not within the general public, media and government. But the terms are well understood by the military leadership as they build (‘develop’) the forces of the future whilst also ensuring today’s forces are ready to fight. Balancing the two efforts, as funding cannot well support both efforts simultaneously, is challenging. The distinction may be something that needs to be better understood outside the military, so people can weigh what they understand to be threats to our country now and on the horizon, and be in a better position to support expenditures and operations accordingly.

*Comments from a retired flag officer:* While no one should argue against balancing operational readiness with structural readiness, Dr. Panter’s article misses some important points as it would relate to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN):

1. With so few ships available, only the forward deployment of ships with Standing NATO Maritime Groups or 7th Fleet can provide Canadian sailors with in-company, at-sea, multi-threat experiences.
2. It’s those experiences that reveal operational and tactical deficiencies that the RCN needs to focus on. They can’t learn without access to allied operations.
3. The structural readiness challenge was and is caused not by over investment in operational readiness but by late and inadequate investment in new ships and recruitment. Old ships and a shortage of sailors have resulted in fewer opportunities to gain operational experience at sea. Less experience is de-motivating for sailors and compounds the personnel challenge. And it does nothing to increase structural readiness as old ships need lots of maintenance

whether they go to sea or not.

The only choice to maintain the Navy and be ready for the future fleet is to speed up procurement as much as possible, invest whatever is needed to keep the current fleet going until then and maximise the at-sea experiences to motivate and prepare the next generation of sailors.

*Comments from a serving colleague:* Although the article is presented as commentary on the US Navy, one could make similar arguments for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). Consider the material crisis that the RCN is now in. RCN frigates are beyond their best-before date, which is problematic when one considers that they are a general purpose frigate primarily built for anti-submarine warfare with, at the time of commissioning, a very good layered self-defense system which met the threat level of the day. However, today's environment is very different, with drones, hypersonics, etc. Moreover, the Kingston-class ships and submarines are in a failing state, the former soon to come to end of service and the latter holding on, barely. The new Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels, although useful, are only so in a peacetime context. They are not armed, have limited sensors, are limited in speed, etc. Indeed, everyone is waiting with bated breath not only for the River-class destroyer (RCD) but with hopes for corvettes and new submarines. Despite promises made, and arguably still on the horizon, the RCN is suffering one of the most debilitating personnel crises since the early sixties.

I will only address the RCN, but suspect the other services, the Canadian Army and Royal Canadian Air Force, too are suffering from equipment rust out or plain obsolescence. Despite government policy to the contrary, the RCN is not able to meet the requirement to be able to conduct task group operations at home let alone abroad. So where are we now? We have in essence become a 'single' ship navy focused on deploying either with NATO to meet that commitment, or to the Asia-Pacific to show our 'one' ship presence. Because of the continued, for Canada, operational tempo of these deployments, the RCN is incapable of returning to a structured fleet (task group) training cycle and, importantly, being able to provide platforms solely focused on training and providing experience to new sailors. This argument is based on a number of issues:

1. The RCN Trained Effective Strength continues to fall. Normal attrition, dissatisfaction with pay, housing and morale are only a few of the factors. However, more concerning is that the majority of people leaving the RCN are those in what could be termed middle management. These are the sailors who have the rank, qualification and importantly, experience that enables mentorship and guidance to new sailors coming into the RCN.

2. In order to address training shortfalls in the RCN, frigates now are relying on what is termed a 'reduced crewing concept,' in essence reducing the crew size of the frigates by 20% (not including the Air Detachment) in order to free up bunks during a deployment. This allows new sailors with On-Job-Training (OJT) requirements to be rotated in and out of deployed ships to get their training done. This concept is principally designed to retain some "combat" capability, albeit limited in time whilst at the same time providing a means to continuing training of sailors with the limited number of operational fleet units that the RCN currently has. Thus if a deployed ship were to encounter 'hostilities' it would need to be pulled out of the theater, the crew brought up to full strength, provided a small window of training/certification then sent into 'battle.' Granted, some of the sailors on OJT could ostensibly fill in for empty spaces within the ship's crew in order to mitigate the shortages created by the 20% reduction in the overall crew size.

The question posed then: Is Canada actually providing operationally prepared 'fully 24/7 combat-capable warships' for the missions assigned? From a simple diplomatic standard the answer is yes, in the current benign environment, provided all that is desired is a Canadian

naval presence. But this misses the larger point of what a navy is for in terms of homeland requirements (sovereignty and presence in our maritime estate) as well as the broader requirement of providing a combat capable warship to a maritime coalition if circumstances dictate. To the former point, the argument could be made that the RCN could, if required, get all frigates into service, at least as a 'fleet in being.' As Sir Julian Corbett pointed out, this is a legitimate method of disputing command of the sea, in essence having a fleet in all respects ready to sail, particularly when considering our own waters. But the reality is that regardless of a conflict occurring, modern warships of today require significant time to be pushed through deep refits, industry led. Once out of the commercial shipyard, ships are returned to the Navy, fully crewed, and unit training and certification conducted. This takes several months in the normal course of events. During times of conflict could this be shortened? There would be significant time required for Canadian shipyards to spool up production significantly in order to shorten the time required to prepare (refit) 30 year old warships. This is, of course, a 'what if' kind of question without doing the requisite deep dive on all the variables. However, suffice it to say that the modern technically advanced nature of today's warships dictate, both from a material and personnel perspective, that this all takes considerable time to achieve.

Circling back to the article: "Operational demands should fall in tandem, to buy time to increase the fleet's size and restore the structural readiness of the existing force." This statement equally applies to the current state of the RCN. There is a requirement now to build a personnel force, sailors, through training and experience, before the new River-class destroyers are upon us. As it stands, the loss of experience in the middle rank structure will have a significant downside to preparing the newly recruited sailor for what is about to come. It has to be considered there are components to the experiential side of the sailor equation; ship operations and leadership, outside of the normal being able to carry out the duties specific to your occupation. The technical aspects of warships today mean they are not the corvettes of the Second World War. Significant time is required to train sailors to a required level of knowledge, technical, practical and experiential in order to operate not only the current frigates but the future River-class destroyers. Critical personnel shortages and maintenance intensive ships demand that meeting diplomatic presence missions should be reduced in favour of restoration of the structural readiness and operational effectiveness of the Navy.

## Other Sources

#AI

DeepSeek's disruption: Geopolitics and the battle for AI supremacy

<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/deepseeks-disruption-geopolitics-and-battle-ai-supremacy>

*Comment:* Three key things DeepSeek did: decouples AI from chip supremacy; redefines cost structures, disrupting US AI business models; and erodes US leverage through trade policies. AI is an instrument of soft power. If China can offer AI-driven solutions at lower costs, it will become the preferred partner for emerging economies where AI costs are a barrier to adoption. [Aligns with my comments re: Indo-Pacific] "If DeepSeek becomes embedded in key sectors such as finance, logistics and governance, China will shape AI standards and protocols in ways that challenge the US-led digital order."

What DeepSeek really changes about AI competition

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/02/what-deepseek-really-changes-about-ai-competition.html>



“What DeepSeek's emergence truly changes is the landscape of model access: their models are freely downloadable by anyone.”

*Comment:* The article highlights the security risks, including the gap in AI security research, without which there are insufficient tools to detect backdoors and verify model safety just as AI systems play an increasing role in developing the next generation of models and potentially cascading security vulnerabilities across future AI generations.

AI's power requirements under exponential growth

[https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RRA3572-1.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3572-1.html)

“If exponential growth in chip supply continues, AI data centers will need 68 GW in total by 2027 — almost a doubling of global data center power requirements from 2022 and close to California's 2022 total power capacity of 86 GW.”

*Comment:* An eye-opening report. If no time to read the full report, the link's cover page provides an excellent summary of the findings and recommendations, such as: the impending potential for demand to overwhelm existing infrastructure, which could drive expansion to other countries and increase security concerns, and the need for research into more energy-efficient AI chips and emerging power sources.

Artificial General Intelligence's five hard national security problems

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA3691-4.html>

(1) wonder weapons, (2) systemic shifts in power, (3) nonexperts empowered to develop weapons of mass destruction, (4) artificial entities with agency, and (5) instability

#AI #machine learning #innovation

Data-driven defense: the Maven Smart system. (40 min listen)

<https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/data-driven-defense/>

Developed for intelligence analysis, now also applied to targeting, logistics, and disaster relief. The discussion also touches on the development process and what type of leaders are needed for such innovation.

#Arctic

We don't declare sovereignty, we build it: Investing in Canada's Arctic defence (22 min listen)

<https://cdainstitute.ca/we-dont-declare-sovereignty-we-build-it-investing-in-canadas-arctic-defence/>

Northerners question Conservatives' pledge to build a military base in Iqaluit

<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/northerners-questions-conservatives-military-base-iquait-1.7455548>

*Comment:* It is these types of actions that solidify mistrust by Northerners of southern Canadians and our politicians, on all sides. Ill-informed policy, words without demonstrated resources for non-Northern aims. Having found out about the Conservatives' plan the morning of the announcement, “...Nunavut Premier P.J. Akeegok said he's heartened to see political attention on the North, though he reminds Poilievre that northerners must have significant input into any decisions about the North.”

Anne Raphaelle Audouin: Building the North is critical for a stronger Canada.

<https://thehub.ca/2025/02/10/anne-raphaelle-audouin-building-the-north-is-critical-for-a-stronger-canada/>

“While Canada talks, other Arctic nations act. There is no access to renewable modern energy systems, vital transportation networks, or high-speed internet—basic services that other Arctic nations have had for years. At the heart of Arctic sovereignty are the people who call the North home. Canada’s Arctic policy must go beyond symbolic gestures.”

Melting Frontiers: A Bold Vision for US Strategy in a Warming Arctic

<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/melting-frontiers-a-bold-vision-for-us-strategy-in-a-warming-arctic/>

*Comment by contributor:* No mention of allies of any sort. It is all US, all the time. Timelines will be long to achieve this level of organization. We won't even mention the time it takes to build facilities and conduct the training for new organizations.

Is the polar silk road a highway or is it at an impasse?

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/02/is-the-polar-silk-road-a-highway-or-is-it-at-an-impasse.html>

*Comment:* The article reviews China’s progress in the seven years since it published its Arctic policy and concludes that Arctic is not one of China’s strategic priority, but a long-term investment. Many of its Arctic ambitions are as yet unrealized but it is building its capacities to operate in the region and “...is using all tools of soft power—from economic investments to science diplomacy—to establish itself as a legitimate Arctic stakeholder.”

#China

China’s Vulnerabilities Should Not Breed Complacency

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-real-vulnerabilities-should-not-breed-complacency>

Focus on the new economy, not the old: Why China’s economic slowdown understates gains

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/02/focus-on-the-new-economy-not-the-old-why-chinas-economic.html>

Military Content Restrictions Could Indicate Trouble Ahead

<https://jamestown.org/program/military-content-restrictions-could-indicate-trouble-ahead/>

Infosec.

The Dragon and Phoenix: How Beijing is Winning Battles in Its “Peaceful War” with the United States

<https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-dragon-and-phoenix-how-beijing-is-winning-battles-in-its-peaceful-war-with-the-united-states/>

*Comment by contributor:* Somewhat dated but the general analysis still applies.

#cyber operation

Canada's National Cyber Security Strategy: A "D" For Effort

[https://www.cyberincontext.ca/p/canadas-national-cyber-security-strategy?r=5xqw3&utm\\_medium=email](https://www.cyberincontext.ca/p/canadas-national-cyber-security-strategy?r=5xqw3&utm_medium=email)

#defence industry

America Must Untangle Its Defense-Industrial Base from China

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/america-must-untangle-its-defense-industrial-base-from-china/>

*Comment by contributor:* An analysis of sources for Canada's defence industries could be revealing.

#defence policy

Government reaffirms defence spending commitment

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/government-reaffirms-defence-spending-commitment/>

"Luke Pollard, Minister for the Armed Forces, responded by confirming that the government will publish the path to 2.5% defence spending alongside the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in the spring."

*Comment by contributor:* Canada would do well to do the same.

Two ways to boost Canadian defence spending and minimize Trump's tariff threats

<https://nationalpost.com/opinion/two-ways-to-boost-canadian-defence-spending-and-minimize-trumps-tariff-threats>

#electronic warfare

Competitive electronic warfare in modern land operations

<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/competitive-electronic-warfare-modern-land-operations>

*Comment:* Beyond interesting in its own right, the paper's approach to integration into the joint fight and how the Force is prepared is a model force development process, not limited to hardware or platforms.

#Indo-Pacific

Bridging civilizations: India's dharmic democracy and the liberal paradigm

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/bridging-civilizations-indias-dharmic-democracy-and-the-liberal-paradigm/>

"A genuine engagement with India necessitates a shift in perspective."

Canadian naval vessel transits Taiwan Strait

<https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6038494>

Interesting, the *Taiwan News* coverage. The article links to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan)

release: [https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News\\_Content.aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=119143](https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=119143) (ignoring the translation error that upgrades *Ottawa* from frigate to cruiser.) At least the *Taiwan News* didn't call it a FONOP. There does not appear to have been a GAC release about the transit.

#information operations

Memes or Missiles? Should We Invest More in Information Operations?

<https://wavellroom.com/2025/02/05/hooper-prize-second-place-memes-or-missiles/>

UK losing 'fake news war' risks greater strategic defeat

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-losing-fake-news-war-risks-greater-strategic->

[defeat/](#)

"If we lose the fake news war, if you like, the social media war, we will be halfway to losing some of the other battles that we will fight,"

*Comment by contributor:* This is just not an issue for the UK.

#land warfare

Field Defences — Series Summary

<https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2025/01/field-defences-series-summary/>

#logistics

The future of military logistics is predictive

<https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/02/future-military-logistics-predictive/402939/>

#naval warfare

Thinking Well: Royal Navy Doctrine in the Cold War

<https://www.kcl.ac.uk/thinking-well-royal-navy-doctrine-in-the-cold-war>

linked to:

National, Bilateral and Multinational: The Development of Royal Navy Tactical Doctrine in the Cold War

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09683445241301727>

#public affairs

War, Words, and the Fourth Estate

podcast: <https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/war-words/>

"...explores how the military has grappled with integrating media considerations into its operations."

#Russia-Ukraine war

Russia's options to rebuild its military are knotty

<https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-military-reform-options-after-ukraine-are-challenging-2025-2>

Something Old and Something New: Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia War

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2024-OLE/Lessons-Ukraine-Russia-War/>

#Russia-Ukraine War #armour

Kontakt-1 and Grilles on Leopard Tanks in Ukrainian Service Confuse the Germans—But They Offer No Better Alternative

[https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/kontakt\\_1\\_and\\_grilles\\_on\\_leopard\\_tanks\\_in\\_ukrainian\\_service\\_confuse\\_the\\_germansbut\\_they\\_offer\\_no\\_better\\_alternative-13372.html](https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/kontakt_1_and_grilles_on_leopard_tanks_in_ukrainian_service_confuse_the_germansbut_they_offer_no_better_alternative-13372.html)

#Russia-Ukraine War #drones

New RUSI Report: Drones Now Inflicting Two Thirds Of Russian Losses

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2025/02/18/new-report-drones-now-destroying-two-thirds-of-russian-targets/>

#US relations

When Trump pushes, push back: A discussion with VAdm (ret'd) Mark Norman on strategy in the face of provocation

<https://paulwells.substack.com/p/when-trump-pushes-push-back>

#wargaming #NATO

NATO's Largest CBRN Wargame Exercise STEADFAST WOLF 2025 Concludes

<https://www.jwc.nato.int/article/steadfast-wolf-2025-concludes/>

## Odds and sods...

Royal Canadian Navy *Our Navy Today* Volume 8 | Issue 1

<https://www.canada.ca/en/navy/corporate/navy-news/our-navy-today/volume-8-issue-1.html>

Failing in Indo-Pacific – A ground perspective

In military circles, the second island chain is often discussed as the critical line

(<https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/taiwan-frontier-chinese-dominance-for-second-island-chain/>, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2020/09/america-is-betting-big-on-the-second-island-chain.html>).

Having just visited Samoa and Tonga this past week, economically China is well outside that box. We know this intellectually, but it is something else to see it.




In the Samoa port of Apia, our ship was parked alongside a pier where no less than 7 small Chinese fishing vessels were tied up. From one perspective, I understand that China's ~1.4B population need to eat so protein security is a very real concern and not easily satisfied within

and close to its shores. On the other hand, the tragedy of the commons means that to sustain resources we must look beyond the needs of any one country, whether that one is fishing, in this case, comes from afar or are locals within their EEZ. The fact that any “private” vessel can be dual purpose is the disconcerting part. There was an 8<sup>th</sup> boat just down the way, much larger and with an interesting suite of antennae. The Chinese embassy just outside of Apia was a razor wire topped compound where the little we could see included great satellite dishes, similar to the UK listening posts we saw in Cyprus. An article on these points from a US Army officer, dated but still interesting: <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2021/Landreth-Chinese-Fishing-Fleet/>.

The fishing vessels were interesting, but as we drove around Samoa and Tonga, our guides pointed out every Chinese-owned franchise. There were many, often advertising 5G. Albeit anecdotally, while our guides highlighted the discomfort with Chinese businesses and economic influence, concern on the communication side was non-existent. Cellular coverage meant people could stay in their villages and still execute critical functions like paying bills or talking with medical professionals instead of having to travel to the capital cities. How that coverage materialized was immaterial as long as it was affordable. A fascinating duality.

Chinese development projects were everywhere, particularly in Tonga. They are between a rock and a hard place with their immense development debt to China coming due, yet they are not recovered from the economic damage of the COVID pandemic combined with a devastating volcanic eruption/tsunami in 2022. Some examples: China built Tonga’s government house, the commercial pier, and the multiple medical clinics in downtown Nuku’alofa. In contrast, the government clinic was on the outskirts of town, built in front of the city’s landfill. Even some of the newer tour buses had the China Aid stamp. The next biggest visible investors in the area are churches, particularly their schools. In comparison, the Australia aid signs were on the small sea level monitoring equipment attached to the commercial pier and the tarps that overhung roadside market stalls. There was a NZ aid poster related to agricultural investment. The World Bank is constructing a public building for the Meteorological Department related to the Pacific Resilience Economic Program (PREP). This is what we saw. Australia does provide millions in budget support, which frees up the enough of Tonga’s budget to make its repayment while still providing services to its citizens (<https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpretor/tonga-walks-tightrope-its-Chinese-debts>). However, which story is more compelling: the prolific sign of Chinese and religious support that speaks to quality-of-life improvements or the much quieter investment in long term capacity-building?



These two countries are members of the Commonwealth. They have different versions of democracy. They are also pragmatic and will take help from those who offer. And here is where I believe Canada and its Indo-Pacific strategy could improve:


1. You can't eat values. Values don't provide a roof over your head. Values and survival aren't mutually exclusive but there is a hierarchy of needs and a priority order of their satisfaction for good reason. China is spreading its influence by stepping in where there are gaps or, if there are other offers, the price is too high. Development aid is a tool of soft power. Use it.
2. There is no single way to be democratic. There are ideals and there are realities. There needs to be acceptance that other nations may execute something they call democracy that doesn't match our ideals. You must be present to respectfully influence what this looks like. Work with it.
3. There is the saying, "If everyone is special, no one is." In trying to be friends with many, we are trusted friends to few. The Canadian foreign policy tendency to sprinkle a little in a lot of places translates into few significant outcomes and makes no one happy. Make hard choices, do something meaningful, tell the story.

I am not saying Tonga is a priority for Canada, although the Space angle is interesting given its location and needs, notwithstanding the TongaSat scandal. (<https://cil.nus.edu.sg/blogs/space-law-the-kingdom-of-tonga-and-the-late-comer-problem/>, <https://www.satellitetoday.com/connectivity/2022/01/21/satellite-operators-restore-critical-communications-to-tonga-after-volcanic-eruption/>) However, Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy reads as a brochure to Canadians of what we get out of developing relationships in this region. An outward mindset, one that looks to others' needs/objectives and how we can help meet those goals, goes a long way to understanding motivations and how/where best to engage (the empathy step in the design process). Not a one-way flow of benefits, but a start point that feels absent in the current strategy.

# US relations

### Opinions on which politicians would do the best job negotiating with U.S. President Donald Trump

Question: Which of the following politicians would do the best job at negotiating with President Trump?



From CTV News and journalist Jeremie Charron:

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/article/mark-carney-preferred-by-canadians-to-negotiate-with-donald-trump-rather-than-pierre-poilievre-chrystia-freeland-or-karina-gould-nanos->

[survey/](#)

Why the Liberals are not a complete right-off for the next election. In the same article, poll results are presented related to the question of increased defence spending with the majority of Canadians, 64% in the latest Nanos survey, support increasing defence spending to reach the current target of two per cent. On top of that, 12 per cent support increasing it further to the potential new target of five per cent.

What percentage would vote for an increase if the question stated that to do so would cost either a comparable increase in personal taxes or equal decrease in healthcare funds? To discuss strategy without their costs is disingenuous and stifles bipartisan acceptance as each party then negotiates options based on political base acceptance of spending.

#energy security

Analysis: What are the US options if Canadian oil imports stop

<https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/analysis-what-are-the-us-options-if-canadian-oil-imports-stop/ar-AA1ysJxK>

*Comment:* Follow the bouncing ball: Canadian oil exported to US, US refines, US exports diesel to the EU (to counter Russian loss as source since 2022). Begg the question, what would it look like for Canada if we invest more in domestic processing capability, not just leveraging raw resources? Here is one perspective, pre-2022 Russian invasion and 2019 US oil independence, on why it didn't make sense then:

<https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/tristin-hopper-why-canada-shouldnt-refine-the-oil-it-exports>

And Canadians are changing their minds on pipelines, too:

New data from the non-profit Angus Reid Institute finds Canadians largely showing support for increasing pipeline capacity through two dismissed developments – Energy East and Northern Gateway. Half (49%) say the federal government is not doing enough to build pipeline capacity, the same number who said so in 2019. Two-thirds say they would support the renewal of Energy East – a project terminated in 2017 – that would have carried oil from the west to New Brunswick and Quebec. This pipeline is controversial in Quebec, but Premier Francois Legault recently stated that his government would consider the project if it became appealing to Quebecers. Support for Energy East in Quebec has risen from 33 to 47 per cent since 2019.



Figure 1 - US sources most of its crude oil imports from Canada and Mexico

X

in thousand barrels per day





Figure 2 - US exports large quantities of gasoline and diesel

X

in thousand barrels per day



### Europe's military-AI complex

Two of Europe's largest startups, Mistral AI and Helsing, have announced a partnership to develop AI systems for military use. The cordon sanitaire that used to exist between tech companies and weapons makers is dissolving, thanks not least to economic nationalism. The pivot to defence tech illustrates a fear that the continent is falling behind in AI, plus governments turning to technology as an antidote to lacklustre growth.

France hosted an "AI Action Summit" in which President Macron appeared in a deepfake video, announced €109 billion in AI investment and implored companies to "buy European". The sour note was the US and UK both refusing to sign the final declaration on AI safety.

The partnership with Helsing, a Munich-based manufacturer of autonomous attack drones valued at €450 million, will focus on building vision-language-action models that allow

defence platforms to “understand their environment, communicate with humans and speed up decision making”. This comes after:

- OpenAI announced a new partnership with the defence tech startup Anduril. Anduril and Palantir, a data analytics firm, are in talks to form a consortium to bid for US defence contracts;
- Meta has announced plans to make its AI models available to defence contractors Lockheed Martin and Booz Allen; and
- Google ditched a longstanding ban on using AI to develop weapons and surveillance tools, seven years after it caved to staff pressure to drop “Project Maven” with the Pentagon.

## Persons Permanently Bound to Secrecy – To Protect National Security

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2025/01/persons-permanently-bound-to-secrecy-to-protect-national-security.html>

DND/CAF units, sections or elements, and individuals (both current and former), are now being designated as Persons Permanently Bound to Secrecy (PPBS). Once an individual is designated a PPBS it is for life.

**Persons Permanently Bound to Secrecy (PPBS) TO PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY**

Updates to the Foreign Interference & Security of Information Act

**What is a PPBS?** It is a designation given to those who have access to information which is vital to national security. If you're a PPBS, there are more severe penalties for unauthorized disclosure of Special Operational Information (SOI).

**PPBS is lifelong** There are two new offenses related to the unauthorized disclosure of SOI:  
– Offence 1: Up to 5 years less a day in prison  
– Offence 2: Up to 14 years in prison

– DND/CAF units, sections or elements, and individuals (both current and former) are now being designated as PPBS.

**How do you become designated?**

- **UNIT-BASED:** All individuals in identified units are automatically designated.
- **INDIVIDUAL-BASED:** You work with SOI or are deemed to be vital to national security. Your chain of command must nominate you.

**Final approval comes from:**

- Deputy Minister for DND employees and contractors.
- Chief of the Defence Staff for CAF members.

– **SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION ACCESS:** You're automatically designated with SOI.

**What happens next?** Individuals will receive a Notice of Designation and other documents from their Chain of Command and will be required to ask questions as part of the process.

**Need more info?** National Defence Security Order and Directives: Chapter 4, Standalone. +DGDS-Policies@VCDS DGDS@Ottawa

**\*A CANFORGEN WITH ADDITIONAL DETAILS TO BE PUBLISHED SHORTLY\***

A-S1-007-000(DA)181 OPI:DDDS 2025-02



Conference of Defence Associations Institute  
L'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense

*Now Accepting: Submissions for Publication*

The CDA Institute is opening submissions from experts, scholars, military professionals, and students to contribute to our Op-Ed and Policy Paper series. We welcome insightful, well-researched contributions that advance critical discussions on defence and security issues.

We encourage authors to focus on their core areas of expertise, covering topics such as Canadian and foreign defence policy, grey-zone conflict, cyber and space security, military technology and procurement, and the impact of climate change on security.

**Op-Eds** should be between 700 and 1,400 words, offering concise and thought-provoking perspectives on key security and defence topics.

**Policy Papers** provide a more in-depth analysis, ranging from 4,000 to 10,000 words, and explore strategic issues shaping Canadian and global security. All submissions will undergo a rigorous peer-review process to ensure quality and relevance.

Those interested in contributing can submit their work or request further details by contacting [publications@cdainstitute.ca](mailto:publications@cdainstitute.ca).

Learn more about our publications process and submission guidelines below.

[Learn more](#)

## SAC Notes

### O Canada

Canada is in a difficult position. The current government and leader seem more intent on remaining in power rather than trying to bring the nation together to face circumstances that were never expected. The hostile actions of the US have been an unpleasant surprise. Canada also finds itself in poor economic shape to face huge tariffs from our key trading partner. Nor are we able to face a Russia that apparently is being given a free pass by the new US administration.

Canada is more in line politically and economically with the European Union. We do have the CETA agreement that has been negotiated with the EU. Our laws and world attitudes are also more closely aligned as well. Discussions are underway with our European allies for better relations. Some have even suggested that Canada start negotiations to join the

EU. Most Canadians are surprised that Canada actually has a land border with the EU and France's Exclusive Economic Zone touches Canada's.

A little-known negotiation took place between Denmark and Canada about a small 1 square kilometre Han Island. It had been a long-standing irritant between the two nations. Each country occasionally landed personnel. Canadians would leave whiskey and the Danes, Aquavit. Finally, after the loss of several bottles of liquor on both sides an agreement was reached dividing the island in half, thus Canada now has an official land border with an EU country. The French islands of St Pierre and Miquelon are just off the south coast of Newfoundland, thus our EEZs meet in the Gulf of St Lawrence. Some commentators from Europe have thought that Canada is better equipped to join than many other candidates for accession to the EU. Interesting option, but the devil is always in the details.

On Tuesday afternoon, the CDS Gen Carignan led a briefing on changes to the recruiting system to help streamline the overall recruiting system. It was a pleasant surprise. It appears that considerable thought and effort in dealing with issues is paying off. It is anticipated that this year it is likely that the recruiting system will achieve 100% of its goals this year. Many old ways of doing things have been eliminated in favour of more modern techniques more familiar to the younger generation. Medical issues were also discussed and common sense seems to be applied. It was refreshing to hear and see some very real progress on this issue. One can only hope that this will continue.

#### Australia

Some articles from our Australian correspondent for your reading pleasure. He is in our bad books of late. As we were in the middle of a rather nasty storm with cold weather, he passed on that it was warm and sunny in Perth Australia...not helpful and definitely not kind as we suffer!

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-drops-flares-ahead-of-raaf-plane-sends-ships-to-australias-northern-approaches/>?

The Chinese are in the neighbourhood of Australia again.

<https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/red-alert-for-british-submarines-program-a-blow-for-aucus/news-story/421fa8895a5f83679075ff85071b816b>

There appears to be trouble brewing with the UK side of AUKUS

<https://www.australiandefence.com.au/news/news/defence-signs-272-million-contract-with-cea-technologies?>

More technology for the Australian forces

#### United States

The new US Administration has been in place for nearly four weeks. It has been a period of great uncertainty across the globe. The administration appears erratic and made up of people with little knowledge of the Constitution or a clear understanding of the secondary and tertiary effects of their actions. One was the firing of all the nuclear safety folks and those working on the nuclear weapons programs, nor have they figured out the key role of the Centre for Disease Control. Anti-vaccination movement has made the world safe for many well controlled diseases such as measles. One can only imagine the devastation that will be after four years.

The question is, is the US the leader of the free world? Probably not in its present state. The most telling example is the administrations conduct of negotiations on the Russia Ukraine

war without Ukraine. The initial announcements seem to indicate that the war will continue as Russia seemed to be getting rewarded for its attack and Ukraine punished for defending itself. The US administration appears to be fully enslaved by the Putin Regime. The only solution is a Ukrainian victory and regime change in Moscow with the arrest and trial of key Putin regime figures. Any future negotiations must include the EU and Ukraine, and they must be the lead. The US is no longer trusted to ensure the well-being of the Ukrainians or Europe. They are right on one issue; Europe must sort this out. It is an unfortunate situation but a real solution is needed, the US is no longer a trusted negotiator.

#### Moldova

Moldova has decided that it will not continue to pay the dues to remain a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an organization set up by Russia as a way to keep the community of nations of the former Soviet Union. Moldova will negotiate independent bi-lateral agreements with individual countries of the CIS. Moldova will be spending money on the Council of Europe, the UN and UNDP.

Several drones have entered the airspace of Romania and Moldova and subsequently crashed. Remains of two drones were found in the countryside in Moldova and two more inside Romanian territory. No casualties were reported in either country.

Transnistria is once again receiving Russian natural gas. It became apparent that Moscow's efforts to threaten Moldova failed because of Western assistance.

#### Belarus

A US representative made an unannounced visit to Belarus despite current sanctions. According to the article on MSN, Belarus has agreed to release political prisoners for the easing of key sanctions. The visit was not discussed with US allies. This visit only occurred a day after the US President's telephone call with Vladimir Putin. Once again the US has conducted itself as an untrustworthy ally.

#### Georgia

Although demonstrations continue, security forces continue to attack the demonstrations often violently. The US decision to cut foreign aid has crippled the opposition. Several key opposition leaders have been arrested and are incarcerated; a further group of more than 300 other demonstrators have been reportedly arrested and beaten. The regime continues its crackdown and moves towards the Russian orbit of influence. Approximately 80% of the population support closer integration with the West and EU membership. Unless there is more specific action to support the democratic movement in Georgia, it is likely authoritarian forces will prevail.

#### Israel-Iran Conflict

IRGC Brigadier-General Amir Ali Hajizadeh has stated that it will rebuild an advanced rocket force and that the conflict with Israel will continue. He also justified the attacks against Israel with two mass missile attacks in April and October last year according to today's Jerusalem Post.

While this may be true, Israel did incur major damage on Iran's air defence systems. Given the Regime's past actions, they will continue to attack Israel using its proxies and by direct action.

Hamas will be releasing the last six live hostages on Thursday. The remaining hostages are

dead. Israel has always attempted to bring even its dead home. Hamas has been very active during this ceasefire. One has to wonder what will happen once the ceasefire ends. Marco Rubio, the new Secretary of State stated there is no place for Hamas in the future governance of Gaza. There are doubts that this is possible as Hamas is widely popular in Gaza and the West Bank.

Israel did a partial withdrawal from Lebanon this past week. They have retained control of five areas from which they overlook the previously held areas of Hezbollah. In the past Hezbollah, have returned and set up new fortifications, bases, caches in order to attack Israel despite UN resolutions stating they had to withdraw North of the Litani River. They were allowed to return where they set up massive fortifications along the Lebanese Israel border despite UNIFIL and Lebanese Army requirements to enforce this agreement. Some fortifications were within a few feet of UNIFIL positions. To date, the Lebanese Army has cooperated in dealing with Hezbollah activities and Israel was able to deal with the remainder. Removal and disarmament is absolutely vital for Israel and Lebanon.

This is not over. One can expect increasing activities from Iran's proxies although they are badly attrited by recent actions. Iranian bases in Syria have also been removed which will make reconstitution more difficult for both Hamas and Hezbollah.

Israel is conducting military trials on Israeli troops which were accused of severe prisoner abuse. Although somewhat embarrassing for Israel. It is a stark contrast to the actions of Iran's proxies.

#### Russia-Ukraine War

The war continues with a brutal level of attrition on both sides. What has changed is that the Russian offensive in the East has slowed, and in some cases, have resulted in successful Ukrainian counterattacks. Russian forces have also taken severe losses in Kursk as well. Ukraine has also conducted a more strategic campaign against key industries supporting the Russian war effort.

Sanctions have continued to place pressure on the Russian economy. Major bankruptcies are now starting to occur even in companies providing military equipment. Key equipment is still dependent on Western providers for important equipment and parts including jet engines, fire control systems, IT systems and so on. Russia cannot provide this on its own; it simply can't be produced in Russia. Inflation is out of control estimated at over 20% and the Russian central bank is forced to "print money." Prices are out of control and the ability to provide consumer goods is declining.

We are about to enter the fourth year of war. The original excuse for the unprovoked attack was to denazify Ukraine. It was suggested that the Jewish President, Volodymyr Zelensky, was going to impose a Fascist government on Ukraine and later Europe. It was a poor excuse at the start of the war and it still is poor now. The war was a Russian invention. Peace could be achieved by Russia withdrawing from Ukraine.

It was a satisfying announcement that one of the biggest supporters and mouth pieces, Andrei Grulov, a former armed forces LGen was demoted to a position in regional politics as opposed to his very visible position on the defence council. He was a constant presence on Russian TV, often calling for nuclear strikes on various NATO nations. His bombast was famous. He apparently called out some criminality and corruption recently and therefore he was removed from sight. At least he did not fall out a window or off a boat or suffer a major heart attack. This is a fairly recent event so there is still time.

Now, we have the recent negotiations between Russia and the US. In his pronouncements

on Tuesday evening Trump spouted almost all the Russian talking points. The only redeeming fact is that politicians from both sides of the aisle in the US were horrified with the President's comments. There seems to be little confidence that Putin's word can be trusted. There are ample examples of Putin's duplicity in negotiations such as the original security guarantees if Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons. Why the Trump team thinks he can be trusted this time is beyond belief.

The US and Russia started negotiations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on Tuesday. Sergei Lavrov's statement after the initial talks seem to indicate that the two nations had fruitful talks and that the Trump administration had a much better understanding of the Russian position. Keith Kellogg, the US special representative for the Russia Ukraine talks is visiting Kyiv for the next three days. He will be discussing the discussions to date with President Zelensky and listening to Ukrainian concerns and demands.

Zelensky responded to Trump's comments with a statement that Trump lived in a Russian "disinformation space" and Trump has since stated that Zelensky was an unelected dictator. It does not bode well for the success of any future peace talks. Trump has lost the confidence of the Ukrainians and almost certainly the Europeans as a person that will be able to negotiate on their behalf. There were some uncertainties before, now their suspicions seem to be confirmed.

On the face of it, it seems that Ukraine is in a poor position. The Europeans will not accept a solution without their participation. It is also clear that Russia needs the war to end to prevent the total collapse of their economy. A longer war may be the best option.

17 February 2025, was the first anniversary of the death of Alexei Navalny at the hands of Russian authorities. Putin is the criminal, why is the West negotiating with him at all? Leaving him in power will guarantee further conflict.

## China

China's economy has been on a downhill slope for some time, mainly due to the specific reaction to changes to regulations, intellectual property theft, corruption at all levels of government, financial failure of the property development sector, the crack down on private enterprise and the effect of having the national security apparatus deal with the economy. Each decision made by President Xi has caused massive and, in some cases, irreparable damage to the reputation of the Chinese economy.

The outcome of bad decisions after bad decisions have been most felt and apparent at the provincial level. Provincial debt has soared, and several provinces have now entered into national supervision of their finances. The provinces have tried other methods to find new sources of revenue. One of which is to charge companies with tax evasion, criminality and charging fines to "refresh" local finances. Some have even gone across provincial borders to "arrest" businessmen and essentially ask for a ransom based on trumped up charges. It is common for businesses to be visited, and the business "captured" by the local government then sold for past taxes as an example with the proceeds going to the local government. It has finally reached the stage when the national government can no longer ignore the issue. This is official criminality, and it has the potential to destabilize society. Survival of the Party is paramount, and stability is the key. Corruption is a key to the end of the party if it gets out of hand. Can Xi's government stop the issue? The jury is out, whatever eventually happens it will not be pretty.

China is continuing to harass vessels sailing through the South China Sea. Most recently as last week, HMCS Ottawa was followed and watched as it transited the Taiwan Strait. A Chinese task group sailed inside Australia's EEZ. It consisted of a cruiser, a frigate and a support ship. The message was clear. The Philippines has had a significant number of

incidents in area within their own EEZ both from Chinese coast guard ships and this week a near miss by a Chinese naval helicopter following a Philippine's patrol plane China has also amped up activity surrounding Taiwan. It is part of China's outgoing series of intimidation tactics against virtually all its neighbours. It is likely to continue but recent events make it clear that it is only a matter of time before a major incident occurs.

As a last funny point for this week's notes, China has offered to become a peacekeeper for the Russia-Ukraine War. Given China's activities and past history as a supporter of Russia in this conflict, one can only wonder if they think anyone is fooled. In African peacekeeping missions China's troops fled when pushed. They cannot be serious.



# **SAVE THE DATE**

## **2025 RUSI(NS) AGM 20 March 2025**

This is an early warning order for all Royal United Services Institute (Nova Scotia) members to let you know that the 2025 Annual General Meeting will take place at 1900 on Thursday, 20 March, 2025. The meeting will be held online using *Zoom*.

Supporting documents, including the agenda and financial statements, will be made available to members in advance of the meeting, along with instructions for joining the online meeting.

Please mark your calendars for this important meeting in the RUSI(NS) calendar.

Capt(N) Stuart Andrews RCN (Ret)  
Secretary

**Operational Stress Injury Social Support (OSISS), 1-800-883-6094, [www.osiss.ca](http://www.osiss.ca)**

Serving CAF Members, Veterans and their Families since 2001

The role of the Family & Peer Support Coordinator is to provide outreach, inform, and connect families and friends whose loved ones (members & veterans) are living with Operational Stress Injuries (OSIs); which can include but are not limited to; stress, anxiety, depression, addictions, as well as post traumatic stress injury (PTSI).

The OSISS program provides an opportunity for individuals to learn to deal with the effects of OSIs on their lives, and to develop healthy coping strategies. We come together to find support and understanding of a common reality. Through our strength and hope we can move forward on our journeys.

Family members supporting a loved one with an OSI can receive information and resources by calling the Family Peer Support Coordinator in their region, members / veterans can contact the Peer Support Coordinator.

**Confidentiality** is an integral key to the success of the program.

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Family Peer Support Coordinator, Nova Scotia

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