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RUSI

**Newsletter of the Royal United Services Institute
of Vancouver Island**

Our Mission:

To Promote Canadian National Defence and Security
Issues through discussion and engagement.

The Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island is a member of the Conference of Defence Associations. The CDA is the oldest and most influential advocacy group in Canada's defence community, consisting of associations from all parts of the country.

The CDA expresses its ideas and opinions with a view to influencing government security and defence policy. It is a non-partisan, independent, and non-profit organization.



Mark Your Calendar!

See last page, please.

President's Message

Canada-China relations have taken a drastic turn since our December Newsletter. That newsletter focused on growing Chinese security challenges in the Pacific. Paradoxically we can thank the heavy-handed reactions of the PRC, to the US extradition request and arrest of Meng Wanzhou CFO of Huawei, for de-masking China's true nature to the Canadian public. China has decided to bully the weaker partner in this incident and that is us. Chinese authorities have arbitrarily arrested two Canadians, and threatened execution for a third. From taking hostages, ongoing concerns about global Chinese espionage and influence activities, and island-building in the South China Sea, the West is forming a consensus that China is no friend. Consequently, a recent Nanos Poll, found 83% of Canadians see China negatively. I suspect that once our own Jonathan Manthorpe's new book *Claws of the Panda: Beijing's Campaign of Influence and Intimidation in Canada* becomes widely read, those negative poll numbers will go even higher.

Closer to home is an article on the current state of Canada's Defence Policy, a subject to be reviewed by our own Don Macnamara at our April luncheon. Specifically, the article, from Macdonald-Laurier Institute Senior Fellow, Richard Shimooka, addresses the reasons behind Canada's never-ending failures regarding defence procurement of major weapon's platforms such as ships and fighter jets. Although readers will be disappointed with Richard's conclusion, they also won't be surprised.

Scott Osborne, President
March 2019

About the Sovereign's Medal for Volunteers

As an official honour created by the Crown, the Sovereign's Medal for Volunteers is part of the Canadian Honours System. The Sovereign's Medal for Volunteers recognizes exceptional volunteer achievements from across the country and abroad, celebrating a wide range of voluntary contributions.



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BGen Larry Gollner, OMM, CD (Retd)

The President of the Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association, Ray Kokonnen, made this announcement on 25 April 2018:

I have a very happy announcement to make. Our Patron, BGen (Retd) Larry Gollner, has been awarded the Sovereign's Medal for Volunteers for his decades of deeply dedicated volunteer service on behalf of veterans and his community. Larry's most recent contribution was the Afghan Memorial in Victoria, a project in which he provided overall leadership in planning and directing the design and installation of the monument.

Hearty congratulations from all of us, Larry, for this highly deserved recognition of your invaluable volunteer work

MGen Ed Fitch, OMM, MSM, CD (Retd)

At the 5 December 2018 Commissionaires (CVIY) Awards Dinner, Lieutenant Governor of BC, Jane Austin, conferred on Past President of RUSI-VI, Ed Fitch, the Sovereign's Medal for Volunteers.

There is a continuum of involvement for Ed within the military and veterans. He has transitioned from being an active member of the CF, to one who has supported those who have retired but who still seek employment, to an advocate of military ideas, issues, and history, and finally to supporting and easing both veterans and their families in the last stages of life. Throughout this involvement with members of the military, both active and retired, he has continuously been active within his synagogue, continuing to give freely to the community he has worked so tirelessly to serve. All of these organizations, and the lives of so many individuals, are the richer for his involvement.

Life Governor of both the Dominion Rifle Association of Canada and the British Columbia Rifle Association (2006 to Present).

Former Past President and member of the Royal United Services Institute - Vancouver Island

(RUSI-VI) (2008 to 2017).

As President, he was instrumental in advocating for and establishing an endowment to support the Military Oral History programme at the University of Victoria. These histories will assist in educating and enriching the current knowledge of students as part of the Canadian Forces living history and ensuring that the voices of our veterans and families will be heard, recorded, and maintained, within the archives of the University.

Past Chair and member of the Board of Governors for the Commissionaires, Victoria the Islands and Yukon. (2008-2019)

Past National President, Last Post Fund (2006-2018)

Director, Congregation Emanu-El (2007-2017) (2018 - Present) and Trustee, Victoria Jewish Cemetery Trust (since 2013 – Present)

Chair of the National Community Security Committee of the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs (CIJA) (2016 – 2022)



Can MV Asterix Be used in a War Zone

DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN

Updated: March 5, 2018

There has recently been a flurry of discussion about the Asterix, the new supply ship being leased by the federal government to support the Royal Canadian Navy. The ship is expected to see much use as the RCN no longer has any supply ships of its own.

But there was some discussion about whether Asterix, a commercial vessel converted to a supply ship configuration, could be used in a combat zone. The RCN says no. That is because the ship does not carry defensive weapons.

The company behind Asterix, Davie Shipbuilding, says the ship can be used in a war zone.

So how would a supply ship be used in a conflict? Would it normally go into combat or stay on the outer perimeters of a conflict zone? Is Asterix much different from the RCN's previous class of supply ships?

I turned to the Navy League of Canada for those answers. They weren't of any help though, and instead responded with a talking point that looked like it had been approved by the government. (The League was confident the RCN would not send forces into harm's way without proper preparation.)

Thankfully the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia was able to provide information that the Navy League couldn't. Colin Darlington, a retired commander in the Royal Canadian Navy, who is now vice-president of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, sent this information in a background paper on the subject:

- *The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has previously deployed contracted employees in dangerous areas (recall the very-Canadian Tim Horton's in Afghanistan).*
- *Whilst Asterix's first line of defence is not to be put in harm's way, that can be done at a tactical (local) level, not precluding her deployment into a danger zone (which tend to be wide area).*
- *Asterix's best defence is an escort (e.g., frigate), as it is for any logistics ship.*
- *Asterix lacks weapons and combat sensors plus dedicated operations spaces. She can, however, be fitted with sensors and weapons (e.g., containerized point missile defence system) and with additional working spaces. It is understood she has points for heavy machine guns and strengthened decks for heavier systems. Fitment could take time which may affect the speed with which the ship could be deployed. However, it can be foreseen at this time that by far the majority of likely missions for her would not involve high-intensity combat, so she is unlikely to need much outfitting.*
- *Asterix is more survivable than her three immediate predecessors. She has a double bottom. Of course, any ship carrying significant amounts of ship fuel, aviation gas and munitions is very vulnerable.*
- *Whilst Asterix has modern merchant ship damage control systems (firefighting and the like), she is not compartmented like a naval ship nor has she a chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear defence 'citadel.' She also lacks a large crew capable of undertaking significant damage control as is the company in a naval ship. These are major factors that differentiate her from a naval design replenishment oiler.*
- *Asterix is an excellent interim replenishment oiler and, once the Protecteur-class replenishment oilers are built by the Joint Support Ship (JSS_ project, would make a great second line oiler, especially for operations off North America.*

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) needs the Protecteur-class replenishment oilers as they will be even more capable of operating in danger zones than Asterix, and ultimately the CAF needs to procure equipment and train people to fight in high intensity conflicts. For that, it is Canada's responsibility to have the best and be as ready as possible.

Major decisions of defence procurement are the purview of the Government of Canada. It is evident that the government sees the necessity of two replenishment oilers as a steady state for the RCN, but also assesses that until then one interim oiler will suffice. Ultimately the numbers and capabilities of the ships is the result of decision based on geo-strategic-economic cost-benefit risk analyses.

Editor's Note: RUSI VI was fortunate to have had a tour of Asterix. For those who missed the recent tour, photos of the ship tour are available at our website at <http://rusiviccda.org/tour-of-asterix/>. Also on the website is a super video (thanks to John Azar) of Asterix in action. She conducts a refueling of HMCS Vancouver during RIMPAC 2018 at 14+ knots!



China's hottest new read: 'On Protracted War' by Mao — with a Trump-era twist



A portrait of the late Chinese leader Mao Zedong at the Tiananmen Gate in Beijing on Dec. 12, 2018. (Andy Wong/AP)

By [Anna Fifield](#)

December 22 at 9:06 AM, The Washington Post - *Yang Liu contributed to this report*

BEIJING — The book is so popular that the publishers have ordered print run after print run. A Chinese thriller? A romantic page turner?

Not even close. It calls for the Chinese people to gird themselves for a long war against a hostile foreign force and suffer short-term setbacks along the way to final victory. It's about resilience and perseverance, refined fighting skills and an absolute belief that you can win.

“We should be prepared to see this stage last a comparatively long time and to weather its hardships,” the author implores. “It will be a very painful period for China.”

The book, however, is not entirely new.

It’s called [“Re-reading On Protracted War.”](#) referring to the collection of speeches that communist leader Mao Zedong gave in 1938. That was 11 years before the founding of the People’s Republic of China and amid a Japanese invasion that would take eight years for China to repel. Known as the Pacific theater of World War II to the outside world, it is still known here today as the “War of Resistance Against Japan.”

Earlier this year, with the 80th anniversary of Mao’s speeches approaching, the state-run People’s Publishing House decided to reprint the book, supplementing it with historical background and applications to contemporary times.



A Chinese vendor stands beside a portrait of Mao at the Panjiayuan antique market in Beijing on Dec. 6, 2018. (Wu Hong/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock)

“It is of great significance for us to scientifically analyze the situation at home and abroad in the new era, to plan the path of development and progress in contemporary China, to carry forward the spirit of making unremitting efforts in the new era, and to uphold and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics,” the state-run Xinhua News agency reported in its trademark turgid style.

A modest run of 10,000 copies was planned to commemorate the classic “On Protracted War.”

Little did the publishers know that President Trump was gearing up for a trade war that would make Mao’s lessons of 1938 strangely relevant today. They ordered 30,000 more copies printed. Then 50,000 more.

“I hope we don’t have to print too many of these books,” Ren Chao, the executive vice president of the People’s Publishing House, said with a laugh. “If we print a lot, it’s a sign of how tense the situation is.”

Trade friction between China and the United States is unlikely to go away. The two sides are working under a temporary tariff truce to try to reach an agreement by March 1 on rebalancing their trading relationship.

But even if they agree to a deal — and China agrees to buy large quantities of American products — it will not address the broader structural issues about market access and fair competition.

In other words: A protracted war, trade style.

So Ren is finding his decision to republish the Mao classic rather prescient.

“The trade fractions between China and the United States can’t be compared with this war between China and Japan,” he said in an interview.

December marked the anniversary of the beginning of 1937-1938 Nanjing massacre, during which Imperial Japanese soldiers went on a killing and raping spree that left some 300,000 Chinese people dead.

“But still, we can learn from his strategic thinking about battle strategies,” Ren said.

Those lessons include maintaining strategic patience, playing the long game and making unremitting efforts, he said.

Faced with an invasion from a much richer and more advanced adversary, Mao formulated a strategy to use China’s one big advantage: its geographic size. Mao drew the Japanese invaders out into China’s vast interior. Then he urged a guerrilla-warfare approach, with a steady onslaught of small confrontations to cut supply lines and cripple the invaders.

This message to focus on the bigger picture and the longer term is being applied to the trade war, both in Mao’s original words and through China’s state media.

China is prepared for a protracted trade war and does not fear sacrificing short-term economic interests for long-term gain, the nationalist Global Times wrote in an editorial. “Considering the U.S.’s unreasonable demands, the trade war is an act that aims to crush China’s economic sovereignty and tries to force China to become an American economic vassal state.”

The Guangming Daily, a party mouthpiece, said in an editorial about the publication of the book: “We should work on long-term plans and better strategies, make our voices heard, draw our sword and bravely fight back.”

Many Chinese readers seem to agree that Mao’s lessons of 1938 can be applied to modern economic warfare.

“Republishing this book now has profound political significance,” [Mozhouboya wrote](#) on the Weibo microblog, using an alias as is customary on the Chinese Internet. “Since the trade war started, there are many theories online about how we are bound to lose or to win a quick victory. At the moment it is really necessary for our society to reread ‘On Protracted War!’”

Another Weibo user noted that the book was relaunched on Oct. 16, the anniversary of China’s first test of a nuclear bomb.

“Choosing to publish it today is to announce to the Chinese people that China will not be an appendage of the West but will firmly take its own path,” [the reader wrote](#). “All things owned by Chinese people — our creativity, culture, thought, products, lifestyle and so on — will emit huge amount of energy, like the explosion of the atomic bomb.”

GPS III and demands of a dangerous new space age

C4ISRNET.com 23 Dec 2018

CAPE CANAVERAL — After an aborted launch Tues., Dec. 18, SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket successfully carried its payload into orbit Sun., Dec. 23. With the launch begins the installation of a new constellation of GPS satellites and a looming question over the entire enterprise: Can communications in space be secured by good satellite design alone?

“Launch is always a monumental event, and especially so since this is the first GPS satellite of its generation launched on SpaceX’s first national security space mission. As more GPS III satellites join the constellation, it will bring better service at a lower cost to a technology that is now fully woven into the

fabric of any modern civilization,” Lt. Gen. John F. Thompson, commander of the Space and Missile Systems Center and Air Force program executive officer for space, said in a released statement.

“It keeps GPS the gold standard for positioning, navigation and timing information, giving assured access when and where it matters. This event was a capstone, but it doesn’t mean we’re done. We’re going to run a series of procedures for checkout and test to ensure everything on Vespucci functions as it was designed.”

The day the launch was aborted, Vice President Mike Pence [announced](#) that the president had signed an order to create U.S. Space Command, a sign that maybe design alone is insufficient for stability in orbit. The [memorandum](#) assigns to Space Command, among other responsibilities, “the space-related responsibilities previously assigned to the Commander, United States Strategic Command.”

A Space Command [previously existed](#) from 1985 through 2002, when it was reorganized and its responsibilities were folded into Strategic Command. Worth noting, too, is that this is a distinct move from the possible creation of a distinct Space Force as an independent branch.

In the meantime, as the administration debates how and if it wants to transfer from a [subtle](#) to an explicit militarization of space, the satellites are going into orbit. GPS III satellites, made by Lockheed Martin, cost [\\$577 million apiece](#) for the first 10. The program’s costs [continue to rise](#), so that unit price may [inch upward](#).

Each satellite is over half-a-billion dollars of vital asset, as expensive as a [half-dozen F-35As](#). When the Air Force talks about the alternatives it’s developing to GPS constellations, the conversation is often about finding ways to achieve the same effect without the singularly large expensive vulnerable targets. If there is a Plan B for GPS, it might be in [clouds of smaller satellites](#). But GPS III remains Plan A and, for Plan A to work, it has to survive in an increasingly hostile orbit.

Here is the threat environment faced by satellites: The United States and China have both destroyed deorbiting satellites of their own with missiles and other nations are developing missiles that might be capable of shooting down satellites. To the extent that a vulnerability to missiles is managed, it is managed by deterrence, the threat of retaliation and the uncontrolled danger that debris in orbit poses to all satellites.

Yet it’s the non-kinetic attacks that remain the likely vulnerability and pathway into disrupting the functions of a satellite network. To that end, Lockheed Martin and the Air Force boast that the GPS III satellite has up to [eight times](#) improved [anti-jamming capabilities](#), a metric that reveals the threat environment far more than it describes the measures taken against it. Reached for comment, Lockheed Martin decline to comment on what, exactly, was eight-times improved.

Adversaries who want to degrade the usefulness of GPS can do so in a [variety of ways](#), and most of them involve obscuring or interfering with the signal. Nations such as Iran and North Korea, as well as expected players [China and Russia](#), have electronic warfare capabilities that can interfere with the signals from commercial satellites, though their capability against existing and future military satellites is unknown. Cyber means of satellite interference were demonstrated by the Tamil Tigers in 2007, and other nonstate actors may also be able to interfere in a similar way, though one hopes cybersecurity for satellites has improved in the decade since. Spoofing signals can also fool GPS receivers into following false and deliberately malicious coordinates.

What GPS III’s anti-jamming capabilities acknowledge is that electronic warfare is hardly a terrestrial-only affair. The moves toward a [Space Force](#), a unified Space Command and, even more ominously, an

Air Force that declares space a “war-fighting domain” acknowledge the vulnerability of satellites to a variety of means of interference, disruption or destruction poses real security risks to the military narrowly and the functioning of the modern world broadly.

What is yet to be determined is if space, like cyber before it, will remain primarily a domain of espionage, surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare, with the satellites regarded as physically inviolate nodes. The alternative is the space becomes a domain for kinetic war fighting, with massive, powerful, jamming resistant satellites a target for destructive missiles or other physical means. However, it plays out, from the unified Space Command to the launch of GPS III, 2018 marks a change in how the United States views the role of the military in space.

What remains to be seen is if the change is durable and how the rest of the world adapts.

Looking Up: The Security Implications of UAV Proliferation

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 1

By: *James Pothecary*

January 11, 2019 05:30 PM Age: 18 hours



Introduction

In the ebb and flow of the Afghanistan war, international coalition forces have historically had sole access to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has regularly used UAVs to monitor and neutralize Taliban forces ([Khaama Press](#), May 16, 2018). Although insufficient to turn the tide of conflict by themselves, UAVs have given coalition forces a distinct tactical advantage.

Recent indications, however, suggest that Taliban forces are making their first forays into this space. In October 2018, during a demonstration of counter-UAV (CUAV) technologies, a USAF official revealed that Taliban fighters have been using drones to conduct reconnaissance on coalition bases. [1] This fits with current assessments of Taliban UAV capability; sufficient to monitor and surveil—as demonstrated by a 2016 propaganda video of a Taliban attack recorded by drone—but not enough, yet, to pose a kinetic threat to international or Afghan forces.

As evidenced with Islamic State (IS) actions in Iraq and Syria, this status quo could rapidly change. IS militants defending Mosul repeatedly used modified drones to drop small explosives on advancing forces ([Iraqi News](#), February 21, 2017). It takes minimal engineering skills to augment easily accessible, commercially available drones with low-grade armaments, and militants with more sophisticated technical abilities could seek to upgrade them with more advanced weapons or even build weaponized models from scratch. Meanwhile, lone operators can also wreak havoc with off-the-shelf UAVs.

From Afghanistan to London: The ‘Lone Operator’ Threat

The acquisition of “terrorist drone fleets” by non-state armed groups is a phenomenon that has been well-documented ([Terrorism Monitor](#), September 11, 2017). The proliferation of UAVs, however, has security implications far beyond the world’s conflict zones. In December 2018, the United Kingdom’s Gatwick Airport—the country’s second busiest air transport hub—was forced to suspend operations for an unprecedented several days after a UAV was sighted within the airport perimeter. Over 1,000 flights were delayed and around 140,000 passengers impacted, with costs running into the tens of millions of pounds ([Evening Standard](#), January 7). The chaotic state response shows how even first-world countries with advanced, robust security apparatuses are woefully unprepared to detect and neutralize a basic UAV flown with malicious intent.

This breach should be seen as particularly serious as there is no indication that the UAV was deployed by a non-state armed group or any trained militant ([Brighton and Hove Independent](#), December 20, 2018). The ability of lone operators to cause widespread chaos with commercially available drones will only escalate in the future, as drones become cheaper, more advanced and more operable. The role of autonomous operating modes was neglected in reporting on the recent incident. It is a simple matter to program one or more UAVs to operate remotely, making it potentially very difficult to track down a determined operator.

How a lone operator—either deliberately or by accident—has not caused a disaster with major loss of life already is purely a question of luck. Over the past twelve months, there have been repeated near miss incidents between commercial aircraft and UAVs. For example, in October 2018, a Virgin Atlantic jet on final approach to Heathrow narrowly missed a drone by a matter of meters ([Sky](#), October 23, 2018).

This risk is also not restricted to aircraft close to the ground. In December 2018, a drone operator flying a UAV at a distance of 10,000 feet—violating UK law—almost collided with Boeing 737 approaching Stansted Airport, Essex ([BBC](#), December 15, 2018). Amateur hobbyists have even managed to fly homemade UAVs at 33,000 feet—the same altitude as a cruising civilian airliner ([Gizmodo](#), March 29, 2018). The ease with which operators could bring down an airliner is a serious gap in aircraft security, one that is impossible to easily or quickly rectify and could easily be exploited by both non-state groups or radicalized lone operators.

Neither is it solely airports or aircraft at risk. Any critical infrastructure—power plants, transport hubs, ports to name a few—could find themselves impacted by hostile UAVs, as could soft targets, such as shopping centers. Furthermore, militants could utilize a small handful of UAVs to completely overwhelm host-nation security forces by simply flying them within the restricted areas of airports. This would divert law enforcement and military resources away from normal duties, potentially leaving other, more vulnerable targets open for attack. Similar tactics have been employed by IS in Iraq. IS operated drones distracted Iraqi soldiers from an inbound suicide vehicle-borne explosive device ([The New Arab](#), February 23, 2018). While this is an extreme case, it is likely only a matter of time before tactics used in the battlefield make their way to civilian spaces, and a distraction of half the magnitude of the Gatwick incident could still prevent security forces from quickly responding to a less sophisticated attack on a soft target.

Mitigation

Governments have a role to play in protecting their countries from UAVs. Law enforcement and military forces must be prepared and equipped with the necessary training and technology to bring down UAVs quickly and safely. On a political level, nations must take steps to regulate the use of drones—in many countries a legal grey area—and ensure that their own security forces are sufficiently empowered to take action to protect life and property.

Site managers also have a key role to play. CUAV, whether in the Afghan mountains or suburban London, must adhere to some key principles. No single bit of equipment, no matter how cutting-edge, will be sufficient to mitigate UAV risk. Systems should be well-thought out and multi-layered, with radar systems supported by active tracking technology where feasible, passive tracking where not, and a variety of neutralization responses. These systems must also be supported by appropriately trained personnel; the most advanced CUAV kit is next-to-useless without the human infrastructure to maintain, monitor and operate it. Furthermore, given the limited time-frames inherent in a UAV attack, operators must be pre-authorized by the competent decision maker to escalate and deploy active countermeasures as soon as the threat necessitates action.

Moreover, stakeholders in the civilian and military communities are behind the curve with respect to developing a sense of urgency about this problem. The threat posed by UAVs to all facilities, regardless of the local security environment, is here *now*. Practitioners must respond immediately by factoring the aerial dimension into their security plans and investing in the technologies and personnel needed to mitigate this risk. As drones proliferate, local security managers in the UK will be united with base commanders of Iraq and Afghanistan in one key aspect—they will be failing to manage one of the key security risks of the 21st century.

Written with input from ISS Aerospace.

Notes: [1] USAF video of experiments with directed energy to take down UAVs. <https://youtu.be/6y5Kh47nq2Q>

RCAF commander recaps 2018

The following is excerpted from the 2018 holiday message that LGen Al Meininger, commander of the RCAF, sent to Air Force personnel and the extended RCAF family.

We can honestly say that 2018 has been an extraordinary year for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF).



The year was bookended by the Sea King, with the last east coast operational flight of our maritime helicopter taking place in January and the official farewell and final flights taking place in December. It's hard to say farewell to an old friend such as the Sea King, but the Cyclone is proving to be a tremendous asset to the RCAF and the Royal Canadian Navy, and the first operational deployment of the Cyclone onboard HMCS *Ville de Quebec* was a tremendous milestone.

This year also brought our participation in a major UN peacekeeping operation, with stellar work being carried out by our Air Task Force personnel in Mali under Op Presence. We also continued our contributions to Op Caribbe and Op Impact. On the space aspect of "air and space power," we are now an integral part of the Combined Space Operations Centre in California, with a member of the RCAF serving as the combined deputy director.

Meanwhile, at home, our ongoing, essential search and rescue (SAR) missions continued, as well as sovereignty operations and exercises in the North. We responded to several Op Lentus missions, including fires in British Columbia and Manitoba, flooding in Kaschechewan, Ont., and storm damage on les Îles de la Madeleine.

We also participated in marking a number of significant anniversaries this year, including the 60th anniversary of NORAD. We also marked the 100th anniversary of the Royal Air Force and, as part of those celebrations, sent a contingent to the United Kingdom to undertake Public Duties—guarding the residences of Her Majesty the Queen.

2018 also brought the 100th anniversary of the end of the First World War, as well as the 75th anniversary of the Dambusters Raid. In April, I was privileged to attend the opening of the International Bomber Command Centre in England, which is mandated to preserve and honour the memory of all those who served in the Command. I was reminded powerfully of the courageous contributions of our RCAF personnel, noting that we lost some 10,000 RCAF personnel during the bombing campaign.

As we look forward to 2019, we must continue to focus on our anchor points: our people, our defence policy, our program and our posture.

First and foremost, among these are you, our people. Successful delivery of air and space power relies on well-led, robust, healthy and inclusive squadrons and tactical units. You and your families are our lifeblood, and your leaders will continue to create the right conditions to support you, retain your exceptional talents and attract personnel with the right skills and energy to continue your excellent work and move us into the future. We are extremely grateful for and proud of your enthusiasm, your dedicated service and your unparalleled professionalism. You may also rest assured that your work is deeply appreciated by Canadians, by your colleagues throughout the Canadian Armed Forces and Department of National Defence, and by our allies.

The US Navy's surface fleet: Here's what's ahead in 2019

Defense News, 26 December 2018

WASHINGTON — The [U.S. surface fleet](#) has a big year in store for 2019, and we're going to start getting more details very soon on what the future has in store for surface warriors.

But surface leadership has been dropping clues on where things are going. Here's a handy reference guide for heading into January's Surface Navy Association annual symposium and for what the fleet has up its sleeve for the coming months.

The Chief of Naval Operations' Surface Navy Director Rear Adm. Ron Boxall forecast what was on his mind at a recent training and simulation conference in Orlando.

The focus for Boxall and the N96 shop will be to get more sensors and weapons into the battlespace, distributed and networked, so that a smaller number of larger warships can act as command and control for smaller units.

“If you think about what we are trying to do with the surface force, we have large and small surface combatants that will [ultimately make up part of the 355-ship Navy] but we have no requirement for unmanned surface vessels right now, which I see as an absolutely critical part of distributed lethality, distributed maritime operations environment that we are moving into,” Boxall said. “Ultimately I need more nodes out there.”

N96 is looking closely at what might be needed for a large unmanned surface vessel, much like [the Sea Hunter drone](#) developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

“I think these are what you need to go in the water and carry large things and be more places at less cost,” Boxall said. “So, in that nodal structure, we are looking at them becoming large sensors or large shooters, but we are still working out the requirement.”

Developing unmanned vessels for military use was a key component of a recent agreement with [NATO forged during the July summit](#).

Next year is the crucial year for FFG(X), the year when the Navy finalizes its requirements and puts the first hull out to bid for a 2020 detailed design and construction award.

Look for news to creep out on this ship throughout the year but Boxall had some remarks on how it will fit into the fleet now in development. Boxall hinted that the planned 20 hulls may be a low-ball figure, and that he's looking to maybe keep the program going beyond that.

“It will be a very capable ship, but it won't have a lot of capacity,” he said. “But it will be able to both sense and shoot and do command and control at a smaller level. It will be a much less expensive platform and I can have more of them.”

Training is a major focus of Surface Navy boss Vice Adm. Richard Brown, and some ongoing efforts will start to bear fruit in 2019.

Earlier in 2018, the Navy reprogrammed \$24 million to build [a Maritime Skills Training Program](#), which will be heavily reliant on simulators to bring together officer and enlisted watch-standers from both the bridge and the combat information center to train on equipment and work as a unit.

“We've secured the funding for the maritime skills training centers, which is going to do two things: individual officer training through the [officer of the deck training],” Brown said earlier this year. “So

that, in conjunction with building out the navigation, seamanship and ship-handling trainers in the fleet concentration areas, will give us integrated bridge and [combat information center] training at the high end. That's my No. 1 priority."

Those facilities will be ready for use by the waterfront in the 2021-time frame, Brown said. Upgrades to existing simulators are being rolled out this month.

Look for news on the future of DDG-1000.

The first of the class, the Zumwalt, is wrapping up its combat systems installation in San Diego and will start the process of integrating the three-ship class into the fleet. We're going to find out more about its new mission – surface strike – and how the Navy plans to employ its behemoth new surface combatant.

The Navy [has pivoted away from its](#) long odyssey to find a use for its advanced gun system, with requirements boss Vice Adm. William Merz saying in testimony in April [that the Sisyphian task](#) of getting a working gun on Zumwalt was holding the ship back.

"Even at the high cost, we still weren't really getting what we had asked for," he said. "So, what we've elected to do is to separate the gun effort from the ship effort because we really got to the point where now we're holding up the ship."

Instead, efforts are going to focus on getting Zumwalt into the fleet and on the hunt for ships to kill.

Large surface combatant

Last up, the [Large Surface Combatant](#) should start getting some meat on its bones in 2019.

Boxall and company are aiming to put the fleet on a course to buy its cruiser and destroyer replacement in 2023 or 2024, which means a request for information from industry could be in the near future.

What we know is that, like the small surface combatant, the Navy wants commonality with other nodes in the network. That means a similar radar as on FFG(X), the same combat system and as much overlapping equipment as the fleet can manage to tamp down on compatibility issues and on how much specialized training sailors need to be on one platform or another.

Update on Canada's Defence Policy.

PS- Just a reminder that our own BGen (Retd) Don Macnamara will be the speaker at our upcoming April luncheon. His topic will be- *Are We Strong, Secure and Engaged? An Assessment of Canada's 2017 Defence Policy*

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI), one of Canada's top think tanks, just released a paper critiquing Canada's current Defence Policy. MLI has provided a much shorter 'Report Card' summarizing the report.

OTTAWA, ON (December 6, 2018): In a dangerous and changing world, getting Canada's defence policy right is as important as ever. From Russia, to China, to North Korea, and more, Canada is facing global challenges for which Ottawa must be prepared.

With that in mind, MLI is pleased to release a new report by Jeffrey F. Collins titled *First Principles and the National Interest: Report Card on Canadian Defence Policy 2018*. MLI's report card is the first study to broadly take the pulse of Canada's defence policy since the last election and assess the government's progress. It grades the Trudeau government's approach to defence based on whether it has adhered to 26 expert recommendations across the themes of defence priorities and principles, the security environment, alliances, UN involvement, and future capabilities.

So far, the government has delivered on only eight of the recommended priorities.

“Given the absence of clear metrics and a thorough, independent assessment by the government,” Collins explains, “this report [offers] a rare, high-level overview of the actions that have – or have not – taken place since the 2015 election.”

Based on recommendations from a previous MLI paper, this report assesses each recommendation as either ‘complete,’ ‘ongoing,’ or ‘incomplete and prognosis poor.’ It finds that the Trudeau government has completed eight of the expert recommendations, 11 remain ongoing, and seven are incomplete with no indication that the government will resolve them.

For the recommendations that are completed, Collins argues that the government is keeping with long-standing defence policy practices in Canada. This includes prioritizing defence policy along domestic, continental, and international lines as well as responding to immediate allied operational concerns, such as in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

“Chief among the eight completed recommendations are those actions that are in keeping with longstanding defence policy practices in Canada,” Collins writes. “Significantly, the Trudeau government has remained committed to those missions that have their origins in the Harper era. This continuity speaks to the structural pressures and realities facing Canada.”

Recommendations that remain ongoing generally have more to do with the impact of the Trump presidency and the growing uncertainty over America’s role in the world.

“The emergence of great power rivalries and nativist US foreign policy are challenging the international norms relied upon for stability since 1945. For Canada, questions remain over US interest in maintaining NATO and the continental alliance represented by NORAD.”

Lastly, for the seven recommendations that are incomplete with poor prognoses, Collins argues that “procurement woes, domestic political sensitivity, and money,” are all playing a role. “The unwillingness and inability for successive Canadian governments to replace the aging CF-18s is an endemic problem... Ballistic missile defence is another issue that remains unresolved for domestic political considerations despite the seriousness of the North Korean ballistic missile threat.”

Jeffrey F. Collins is a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, as well as a research fellow with the Centre for the Study of Security and Development at Dalhousie University, and the University of Manitoba’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies. He received a PhD in Political Science from Carleton University in 2018 and a law degree from the University of Aberdeen in 2009

New Report from Crisis Watch – “Watch List 2019.”

Howard Coombs, CDAI

Crisis Group’s early-warning Watch List identifies up to ten countries and regions at risk of conflict or escalation of violence. In these situations, early action, driven or supported by the EU and its member states could generate stronger prospects for peace. The Watch List 2019 includes a global overview, regional overviews, and detailed conflict analyses on Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, South Sudan, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela and Yemen.

<https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/EU%20Watch%20List%20January%202019.pdf>

Mark your Calendar

RUSI-VI SPEAKER'S SCHEDULE Mar to May 2019

1. 10 Apr, 2019- ***Are We Strong, Secure, and Engaged? An Assessment of Canada's 2017 Defence Policy*** by BGen (Ret'd) Don Macnamara (Includes AGM)
2. 8 May, 2019- ***RCMP E Division's Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (Counter-Terrorism)***- by Staff Sergeant David Strachan, RCMP

NEW MEMBERS!

Please join us in welcoming two new members to the Institute:

Frank Bucknum
and
Alex Greer

The views expressed by the authors of articles in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of RUSI-VI.