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RUSI VI

*To promote national defence and security issues
through discussion and engagement*

**Newsletter of the Royal United Services Institute
of Vancouver Island**

The Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island is a member of the Conference of Defence Associations. The CDA is the oldest and most influential advocacy group in Canada's defence community, consisting of associations from all parts of the country.

The CDA expresses its ideas and opinions with a view to influencing government security and defence policy. It is a non-partisan, independent, and non-profit organization.



Jan 2023

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President's Message

All eyes are still focused on the Russo-Ukrainian War as the US and NATO turn to discussing the provision of modern Western tanks to Ukraine. The donation of 14 Challenger 2 tanks by the UK will not be enough to make any difference, but seem more calculated to break the political logjam to get Germany to provide large quantities of the modern and highly respected Leopard 2 tank. This is something Germany has so far not agreed to do. Even if Germany provides the Leopard 2 in quantity, it will be months and months before they can arrive, and complete their crew and maintenance training. Even then, can they change the course of this war? Or will they be followed by more and more demands for weapons and ammunition by President Zelensky.

Anecdotal evidence from the front of reduced artillery expenditures by both sides seems to support a slow down in military activity on Ukraine's Eastern Front. Thus, this Winter may continue to be a stalemate with only limited attacks such as those ongoing at Soledar and Bakhmut. Artillery ammunition and weapons shortages for Ukraine are now compounded by the US need to replenish its own 'war' stocks, NATO stocks and also stockpiling weapons and ammunition to support against a possible attack on Taiwan. Predictions of Ukraine liberating Crimea by end Summer 2023 (US LGen (Ret'd) Ben Hodges- late commander US Army Europe) seem extremely optimistic, perhaps even naive. Are we getting closer to victory for Ukraine (whatever that might look like), should NATO be forcing Ukraine to negotiate, or are we sleepwalking into World War Three?

Finally, don't forget to read the Book Review at the end of this Newsletter from our next speaker, Dr. Barry Gough, on *Churchill and Fisher: Titans at the Admiralty*.

Scott H. Osborne
President
Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island

Upcoming Speakers:

- **8 February, 2023** Dr. Barry Gough- *Churchill and Fisher: Titans at the Admiralty*. Books will be available for sale
- **8 March, 2023** Rear-Admiral Christopher Robinson, Commander MARPAC- *Update on MARPAC and the Indo-Pacific*
- **12 April, 2023** LCol (Ret'd) Adele Donaldson and Capt (N) (Ret'd) Gary Paulson- *100 Years of Service: The Canadian Corps of Commissionaires*
- **10 May, 2023** Dr. Serhy Yekelchuk- *Understanding Ukraine's History as an Independent State*. Books may be available for sale, TBC

Editor's Comment

Here we are in the New Year and although we are thinking of all the good resolutions we have made, occasionally its worth the effort to look back at some enduring issues and see where they might impact the greater world.

Haiti has had a long relationship with Canada both as Haiti being a failed state and in response to Natural Disasters such as the earthquake that hit them very hard in Jan 2010. In one of this issue's articles "Haiti's Last Resort", we see where Haiti stands today, and whether there is an appetite for international intervention and Canada's possible involvement.

As well, we look at the Congress of the Chinese National Party and how it sees China's future. Then, some thoughts on China's potential for failure and the effect that will have on the world economic system. We have seen the supply chain issues but wait, there is more on the way.

The manning shortages in the CAF, but more specifically the RCN, and the impact of new policy initiatives by the Government, perhaps at exactly at the wrong time for the Navy. And it isn't only Canada so impacted.

Finally, with the world order turned on its head – in an article by the German Chancellor, he considers that the world is facing a Zeitenwende: an epochal tectonic shift, and he looks at "How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era".

That should give you enough to ruminate on during the dull days of January.

Craig L. Cotter, Editor

Letter to the Editor in response to last issue's DART article

Dear Editor

I read with interest the note you published in the RUSI November newsletter about Canada's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).

I was serving as our high commissioner in Islamabad when an earthquake hit Kashmir in October 2005. When Canada considered how we might offer practical assistance to the many people who were injured or displaced by the earthquake, the DART came immediately to mind. The process to deploy followed the description in the article, and it happened very quickly.

Some two hundred CAF personnel, mainly engineers and medical, arrived in Islamabad and were billeted in the extensive basement of the high commission before moving up to Kashmir. That sounds worse than it was. They were victualled in a huge shamiana (marquee) set up in the front garden of the high commission. In typical Pakistani fashion, the tables were decorated with candelabra and flowers - all very unmilitary like. Many soldiers ran back to their kit bags to find cameras with which to take pictures.

Once in the mountains, our engineers used their osmosis water producing gear to generate fresh water for the affected. Our medical staff provided medical care to those injured. As roads were badly damaged, we contracted a Russian helicopter to take the medics far up into the mountains where they checked on injured people.

We were not the only nation which provided emergency response support to Kashmir. I can recall being given some MREs (meals ready to eat) by my Spanish colleague. All in all, we were received well and with appreciation. The DART team comported itself extremely well bringing great credit to them and to Canada.

Sincerely

LCdr (Ret'd) David Collins

Haiti's Last Resort: Gangs and the Prospect of Foreign Intervention

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BRIEFING 48 / LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN 14 DECEMBER 2022

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/b048-haitis-last-resort-gangs-and-prospect-foreign-intervention>

Criminal gangs are wreaking havoc in Haiti, nudging public opinion toward accepting the idea of an international force that would help restore security. Outside powers should prepare a mission only with solid backing from the country's politicians, including their pledges to form a transitional government.

What's new?

Violent gangs have taken the opportunity presented by Haiti's prolonged political crisis to seize control of much of the country, bringing its economy to a halt. With cholera resurgent, Haiti's government has called on the UN and foreign partners to deploy a public security force to push the gangs back.

Why does it matter?

Decades of foreign interventions in Haiti have instilled reluctance in the country and abroad to contemplate a public security mission. Operational risks and the country's political divide have also cooled foreigners on a possible deployment, but interviews suggest that popular support for it, especially in gang-controlled areas, is rising.

What should be done? The collapsing Haitian state and the severity of the humanitarian emergency justify preparations for a mission. But its deployment should hinge on adequate planning to operate in urban areas and support from Haiti's main political forces, including their firm commitment to work together in creating a legitimate transitional government.

Overview

Foreign powers are considering whether to deploy a public security force to Haiti as rampant violence spearheaded by gangs and high-level political gridlock tips the country toward catastrophe. Made up mostly of young men from poor urban areas, the gangs have massively

expanded their ranks and influence in recent years. Following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, gangs exploited the vacuum generated by a disputed line of political succession to grab even more power. Formerly dependent on elite patrons, these outfits have grown more autonomous; acquired larger arsenals; widened their territorial footprint; stepped up their political demands; and become increasingly bold in frontal combat with security forces. Despite fears among Haitians about repeating past mistakes, foreign intervention may be required to break the gangs' grip on the country. But these forces must be prepared to operate in dense urban areas and should not deploy until a critical mass of Haiti's main political forces commit to support the mission and work together to create a legitimate transitional government.

Across the country, gangs have mounted an offensive aimed at seizing control of crucial thoroughfares and hubs for the flow of goods, including markets, ports and main roads, fuelling waves of unrest. The capital Port-au-Prince, home to almost one third of Haiti's 11.5 million population, has seen most of its connections to the rest of the country severed, with gun battles flaring between rival gangs as they vie to control its main gateways. Following an alarming spike in violence caused by clashes between two feuding gang coalitions on the capital's outskirts between May and July – which killed nearly 500 people, most of them civilians – protests erupted in several cities. Demonstrators railed against the lacklustre state response to the gangs' onslaught, which has made it even more difficult for households to put food on the table amid surging inflation and fuel shortages. Protests intensified after the acting prime minister, Ariel Henry, announced sweeping cuts in fuel subsidies on 11 September, paralysing several cities.

A day after this announcement, one of the two gang coalitions operating in the capital, the G9 an Fanmi e Alye, also known as the G9, blockaded the country's main oil terminal. Jimmy "Barbecue" Chérizier, a former police officer who has led the G9 since it was formed in mid-2020, said the group would maintain the blockade until Henry resigned as prime minister. The resulting shortages, and their knock-on effects on a national energy system that depends almost entirely on oil-based products, brought the country to a halt.

Compounding the country's hardships, cholera re-emerged in October, recalling the horrific outbreak in 2010 that has been attributed to the UN force then in the country. Most of the suspected cases are found in the capital's gang-controlled slums. Limited access to drinking water, disruptions in the flow of essential goods, blockages of humanitarian aid and the difficulties faced by health clinics, such as lack of fuel, have provided fertile ground for transmission of this lethal disease. Though few people are travelling, cholera has already reached nine of Haiti's ten departments, with almost 15,000 suspected cases and nearly 300 deaths; the real number of cases is likely to be substantially higher.

Unable to temper these interwoven and intensifying crises, Haiti's government called for an urgent international mission. Henry made a first official request on 7 October to foreign partners, asking them to immediately deploy a specialised armed force to fight the gangs. Mindful of the country's history of failed interventions, many Haitians took to the streets and social media to voice their opposition. But support for the plan has emerged in some quarters, due to recognition that foreign troops might be indispensable to any return to safety and normality.

Security conditions, meanwhile, have slightly improved over recent weeks. After two days of clashes, and amid rumoured negotiations between the government and the gangs to ease the oil terminal blockade, Haitian authorities announced on 3 November that security forces had regained control of the port. Fuel distribution soon resumed in the capital, but the gangs still control the main roads to the north and south, obstructing supply to other regions.

Despite this modicum of respite from the gangs' stranglehold, demand for an international mission to Haiti continues. Government officials insist that the national police cannot curb gang violence on their own. They say the police need the support of foreign forces to wrest back control of the streets and ensure that humanitarian relief reaches those who need it. While not all Haitians agree, dozens of Crisis Group interviews in Port-au-Prince suggest that an increasing number of them, particularly in areas wracked by violence, see in the prospect of intervention hope of loosening the gangs' life-threatening hold at long last.

That said, many Haitian political and civil society groups voice grave misgivings. They regard the proposed mission as a relic of colonial dependence and a potential reprise of unpopular past foreign operations. They also worry that the arrival of international forces would enable Henry to reinforce what they see as his illegitimate grip on power. Henry has been acting prime minister since July 2021, when soon after Moïse's killing he received the blessing of foreign powers – notably members of the Core Group, an informal body made up of representatives from the UN and the Organization of American States, as well as ambassadors from the U.S., Canada, France, Brazil, Germany, Spain and the European Union. His adversaries portray him as an obstacle to resolving the country's political divisions, corruption and violence. They fear that the show of support implied by the deployment of foreign troops or police would allow him to avoid negotiations with the opposition on restoring political stability or paving the way to fresh elections. In their view, the most important step toward shoring up security would be Henry's exit.

Against this backdrop, prospects for intervention remain up in the air, with Haiti's foreign partners struggling with fundamental questions about whether to intervene and, if so, how. Should the severity of the humanitarian emergency convince foreign governments to move ahead with these plans in order to prevent a major loss of life, they should follow a number of guiding principles to make sure the eventual mission can meet its goals. The most important is to guarantee that both government and a sufficient cohort of opposition leaders agree on the basic terms for the mission's mandate so as to mitigate any backlash. As a further precondition, Henry and the opposition should firmly commit to a blueprint for a transitional government that could plot the way to fresh elections and begin the job of rebuilding the state and providing much needed services to citizens. Foreign states involved in planning the mission should encourage all sides to reach such a deal.

Any mission will also need to have sufficient and properly equipped personnel, as well as robust operational planning. The latter will be essential if the mission is to liberate economic lifelines and urban arteries, weaken the connections between gang combatants and their support networks, and avoid harming civilians or violating human rights. The threat of foreign armed intervention should be exploited to encourage the gangs to surrender, with Haitian authorities ready to offer paths to demobilisation and reintegration into law-abiding society for those gang

members who opt for this path. Lastly, a comprehensive international aid plan should also include a raft of other measures to address Haiti's decades of institutional malaise and instability.

Hurdles in the way of the proposed mission's establishment and eventual success make it understandable that so many Haitians and international partners are hesitant about it. But the scale and speed of the country's violent breakdown may well require an extraordinary response. For any mission to have a hope of bringing the gangs to heel, Haitian political forces and civil society groups should as a matter of priority foster broad backing for it and ensure it has the legitimacy to underwrite difficult operations on hostile ground.

Contemplating a Rapid Action Force

The Haitian government called for an outside force to help release the country from the gangs' clutches only after years of rising criminal violence, culminating in the move by the largest gang coalition to seize control of its main oil terminal. The gangs' power grew notably under the late president, Moïse, with a number of independent investigations finding that his government collaborated with crime rings to stifle huge protests demanding that he step down. Since Moïse's still unsolved murder in July 2021, the gangs have gained even more clout.

Haiti's Request

Over the past two years, an estimated 200 or more gangs operating in the country have increasingly ventured from their historical bastions in poor neighbourhoods to occupy zones that are crucial to the functioning of the national economy or the justice system. Armed clashes triggered by their expansion reached new heights in June 2021, when fighting in the Martissant neighbourhood involving three gangs cut off the main road linking Port-au-Prince to the south. While the police tried to re-establish control of the area, incursions by gangs progressively blocked the main gateways to the capital from the north and east.

The paralysis became even more serious in September when, just hours after Henry announced a sharp, sudden hike in fuel prices, gangs affiliated with the G9 coalition began their blockade of the Varreux terminal on the northern outskirts of Port-au-Prince, which accounts for 70 per cent of the country's oil storage capacity. Although the police have carried out a number of successful operations against the gangs, including the liberation of the Varreux terminal and its fuel stock facilities almost two months after the blockade began, the Haitian police and its new anti-gang task force are hard pressed to contain the violence that has proliferated in the capital and beyond.

Evidence of a new cholera outbreak, with the first suspected cases cropping up in two gang-controlled areas of Port-au-Prince, prompted Henry's government to call in October for the "immediate deployment of a specialised armed force" to combat gang violence and counter its humanitarian effects. In short order, UN Secretary-General António Guterres sent a letter to the Security Council proposing deployment of a "rapid action force" to reinforce the Haitian National Police's anti-gang campaign, stressing the urgent need to provide security for relief efforts for the cholera outbreak's victims. The proposal underscored that the force would be temporary (the U.S. has said it would last six months); autonomous of UN command, if need be; and limited to ensuring public access to basic services as well as safe use of key roads, ports, airports and oil

terminals. It would withdraw once Haiti's security forces had regained control of critical infrastructure, to be succeeded by a mission aimed at supporting the national police.

At a special Security Council meeting held on 17 October, the U.S. and Mexican delegations announced they were drafting two resolutions to address Haiti's insecurity. The first, unanimously adopted at a second meeting four days later, provided for sanctions against gang leaders and their sponsors, including an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo. Although these sanctions will only be imposed by early 2023, when a group of experts advising the Council establishes who will be targeted (only gang leader Chérizier is included right now), the U.S. and Canada have already adopted their own sanctions against several of Haiti's most powerful politicians, including former President Michel Martelly, two ex-prime ministers and two Senate presidents, as well as three high-profile members of Haiti's business elite.

The second draft resolution prepared jointly by the U.S. and Mexico is far more ambitious in scale, though so far it has not been submitted to the Security Council. It proposes a "non-UN mission led by a partner country with the deep, necessary experience required for such an effort to be effective". In keeping with the terms of Henry's request and the UN secretary-general's written proposal, the initial goal would be to restore security to allow for humanitarian aid to flow freely. The U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, Brian Nichols, stated in late October that the mission under consideration "would be largely a police force with a military component".

Reactions in Haiti

The first reactions of many Haitians to the proposal that foreign troops be invited to fight the country's gangs were overwhelmingly negative. Many politicians and public figures were quick to condemn the plan as redolent of colonial interventions, while reiterating that the country needs a "Haiti-led solution". The Montana Accord group, the main opposition coalition, declared that "history teaches us that no foreign force has ever solved the problems of any people on earth". Critics also claimed that Henry, as acting prime minister, had no legal standing to call for foreign assistance.

Resistance to the proposal also arose from citizens, many of whom resent a history of foreign meddling that they say has done little to improve their lives. Crowds took to Port-au-Prince streets in late October, chanting, "Down with the prime minister! Down with the occupation!".

More than a few critics outside Haiti also disparaged the proposal. A U.S. media outlet stated that "under the current conditions, any foreign military intervention could likely do more harm than good", while a former U.S. envoy to Haiti warned that a foreign military foray into such complicated terrain could result in a bloodbath.

But, at least in Haiti, some of the initial opposition appears to have waned. Slowly, and with a degree of reluctance, more Haitians have started to speak up in favour of a foreign mission, although very few unreservedly endorse the deployment of foreign troops on Haitian soil. A growing number of civil society groups have begun to insist that international partners need to assist national authorities in dealing with the humanitarian emergency, arguing that the priority should be to fight gangs that hamper the flow of basic goods and medical aid. At the same time,

even many supporters of intervention caution that it would not provide a long-term solution to the conditions giving rise to mounting gang violence.

Despair at the country's acute overlapping political, security, economic and now health crises – all linked in some way to the gangs – seems to be driving some members of the public to reconsider their opposition to intervention. Several interviewees in Port-au-Prince who now support the idea drew a direct connection between the gang clashes in the impoverished Cité Soleil slum of Port-au-Prince in July and the resurgence of cholera. Cases started to appear in Cité Soleil's Brooklyn neighbourhood, which has been bereft of even the most basic sanitation services since it was isolated by fighting in July. From there, the disease spread to the rest of Cité Soleil and to Port-au-Prince, which now account for more than half the country's suspected cases. As blockades of the main roads have prevented the transport of medical supplies, cases in the rest of the country have gone untreated.

Cholera is not the only humanitarian need going unaddressed. Many international humanitarian officials have left the country due to dire security conditions in recent months. As a result, survivors of sexual violence have less access to time-sensitive care, such as treatment to prevent HIV, sexually transmitted diseases or unwanted pregnancies and urgent surgery for severe traumatic injuries resulting from collective rape.

A number of Port-au-Prince residents defended the proposal for a foreign force out of a growing sense of hopelessness. "Bandits roam all over the city without the police being able to do anything about it, and this happens in plain sight", a civil society leader said. There is widespread fear of the way in which gangs use sexual violence against women, members of the LGBTQI+ community and, to a lesser extent, straight men, to assert power in the neighbourhoods they control, coerce those who resist their orders and humiliate their opponents, among other reasons. Human rights organisations have denounced gangs using collective rape of children as young as ten, as well as women, to inflict punishment and intimidate the population. Many parents refuse to let their children leave the house for fear of what might befall them.

Most people living in the ... lawless zones would support a mission able to defeat the gangs.

Support for a foreign deployment seems particularly high in areas worst afflicted by gang violence. Reflecting on the risks of gun battles between foreign troops and gangs in his neighbourhood, a man living in an area controlled by armed groups stated: "There will certainly be people killed, but fewer than what is happening day after day". A member of a Haitian civil society organisation stressed that most people living in the zones de non-droit (lawless zones) would support a mission able to defeat the gangs. Inhabitants of Cité Soleil and other gang-controlled areas also betrayed a streak of impatience with political elites who oppose foreign troops: "The people who speak out against armed intervention, you have to see what their social status is and where they live. In these areas [under gang control], they prefer an intervention that would be far from perfect, but which would at least allow some security".

Residents and businesses also cite economic reasons to make the case for foreign troops. Haiti's leading business associations said in a statement that they "understand and support the Haitian government's difficult but responsible decision to ask for some form of robust humanitarian

support from friends in the international community ... since the Haitian national police, in spite of all its efforts, has not been able to face alone the destructive actions of armed gangs”.

Operational Challenges

Specialised international forces could provide the support that many Haitians claim the police needs to meet the increased firepower of the gangs, which have obtained large quantities of ammunition and high-calibre weapons via arms trafficking.²⁸ At the same time, the prospect of high-intensity clashes in densely populated urban areas, where gang members and civilians are hard to tell apart, poses many operational challenges. A strategy based on concrete objectives to be achieved in coordination with the Haitian police, while causing the least possible collateral damage, will be essential to the success of any eventual mission.

Among the short-term security objectives of any mission, the most urgent and perhaps the most challenging would be cracking down on gang strongholds such as Cité Soleil, where relentless turf wars have raised food insecurity to the most severe levels ever recorded in Haiti. If any such operation takes place, it would be essential that the risks of using armed force in densely populated urban environments are fully anticipated and managed. Haiti’s gangs have increasingly targeted civilians in battles with rival groups, using murder, rape and destruction of homes in a bid to compel residents to collaborate in their campaign to seize territory. These tactics suggest that the gangs could try to coerce or co-opt civilians into helping them defend themselves from police assault.

Protecting civilians while fighting for control of these areas will be not easy. Neighbourhoods where gang members take refuge are often located at the heart of overcrowded slums criss-crossed by narrow streets, and gang members are not visibly distinct from civilians. Furthermore, the lack of facilities to accommodate internally displaced persons means that most residents have no option but to remain where they are, even when under the gangs’ yoke; the inability to escape is particularly alarming in the case of women forced by the gangs into sexual servitude. Instead of counting on brute force of numbers and arms, security operations should rely on intelligence to gauge the extent to which gangs’ strongholds can be entered without endangering civilian lives.

Protecting civilians is also likely to preclude the security mission from turning immediately to the sort of urban tactics that might appear to be the most effective. An element of surprise, for example, might prove critical to success in a raid targeting a gang bastion. But given the risk that these operations could result in the death of civilians and minors who have been recruited by the gangs, some Haitian analysts suggest that priority should be given instead to using the threat of armed intervention as a deterrent. For example, if and when a mission is deployed, authorities could push gang leaders to leave certain neighbourhoods by threatening that the forces will move in if they do not comply.

Despite the operational difficulties, members of these beleaguered communities and security experts suggest that the arrival of troops would make an immediate difference. In fact, some argue that just the credible threat of a strong foreign armed intervention to support the police would make some gang leaders reconsider and try to negotiate their own surrender. In those areas where gangs remain steadfast after troops have arrived, the prospect of stronger law

enforcement could still weaken community tolerance of the gangs. Currently, a code of silence prevails in gang-controlled territories, as residents know that denouncing the gangs or sharing information with security forces carries with it the risk of dire punishment. But sources in Port-au-Prince believe that the arrival of foreign troops and the possibility that they could stage raids would shift the balance of power, spurring residents to share intelligence and even leading some gang members to give up voluntarily.

Prior to any eventual operations, force commanders would also have to think through how residents can get out of areas where fighting is raging. They could mount a communications campaign through social media to announce anti-gang operations and assistance for civilians who seek to leave their homes and for gang members who prefer to lay down their arms. In this case, authorities would need to establish camps equipped to accommodate a large number of displaced people. Given that girls and women have been victims of sexual violence in existing camps, planning would need to incorporate measures to prevent assaults and provide services to survivors. It would also need to create safe spaces where intelligence units could collect information on gang members, the areas in which they operate and any other information useful for armed operations.

Any potential force should also provide a strict protocol prescribing the exact security procedures that should be employed in the event of being confronted with protests from civilian groups unrelated to gangs. Parts of the Haitian public are outspoken in their criticism of past peacekeeping missions because of mistakes and crimes committed, such as sexual exploitation and abuse cases involving dozens of UN peacekeepers as well as the introduction of cholera to the country via the mission's troops. The resentment that many Haitians feel toward foreign forces could again lead to protests. In the past, gang leaders have joined marches against Henry, and should they do so again security personnel would have to respond carefully; confrontations leading to loss of life could be politically explosive. At the same time, one way to allay public concern would be to create clear reporting mechanisms providing local people with the opportunity to share information about alleged human rights abuses by international police and troops.

Meanwhile, to prevent leakage of information from undermining potential joint operations between foreign forces and the Haitian police, vetted and specially trained local anti-gang units would have to be prepared to take part in these operations. A fully vetted anti-gang task force has been established: it was 150-strong by October. But this force is still not large enough for Haitian police to assume a major role in joint operations, considering that the strongest gangs have up to 500 members and are intimately familiar with the territory they control. The Haitian police should continue to vet and train new recruits to the anti-gang unit, even as discussions about a foreign mission continue. They should also keep these efforts going if and when such a mission deploys, thus helping pave the way for the police to take over from the foreign troops sooner rather than later.

More broadly, efforts by the Haitian state to bolster the national police would have to be ramped up to ensure that any security improvements in the course of foreign intervention endure under a potential future UN mission. This endeavour would not be new for the UN, since strengthening the police stood at the heart of MINUSTAH's mandate. Those efforts failed to achieve the desired results, however, because corruption, lack of resources, failings in coordination between donors

and national authorities, as well as the devastation wrought by the 2010 earthquake caused reforms to falter. Likewise, initiatives to vet police officers and prevent their co-optation by criminal groups have been undermined by conditions in a force that finds itself underfunded, poorly equipped and saddled with low pay. Future international support for the Haitian police could be accompanied by the creation of an expenditure monitoring team led jointly by Haitian officials and international experts to ensure that funds are dedicated to strengthening police officers' professional standards, improving remuneration and increasing the size of the force.

Political Pushback

Acting Prime Minister Henry's appeal for international police and military support was met with consternation by his critics, who fear that a foreign intervention could prop up an extremely unpopular government. This concern is especially prevalent among Henry's political opposition – most prominently, the coalition known as the Montana Accord. The Montana Accord was created around an agreement outlining a plan for a political transition in Haiti, signed in August 2021 by nearly 200 political parties and civil society organisations.⁴⁶ It has accused Henry of having tolerated the gangs' spread, without offering resistance, and of using the violence they generate as a means to hold on to power. It has further described Henry's call for international military support as an act of treason.⁴⁷ Fritz Alphonse Jean, chosen by the Montana Accord in January to lead a transitional government, has condemned Henry for preferring the intervention of foreign forces to talks about a political agreement with his own compatriots.

Sticking points between Henry and the Montana Accord – which shape the latter's views on intervention – include his unwillingness to discuss an arrangement for handing over power. Representatives of the Montana Accord have met with Henry and his allies for discussions on numerous occasions. But Henry has refused to budge on whether future talks should take on the issue of his departure from high office.

The feasibility and timing of elections has also been a hot topic since Moïse's assassination. The late president had cancelled the 2019 legislative elections, and many foreign partners, including the UN, pressed Henry to call new polls soon after he took power. Instead, the acting prime minister dismissed the electoral authorities in September 2021. Deteriorating security conditions have made it impossible to conduct reasonably fair elections since then, but government critics have urged Henry to agree to a power-sharing scheme that would allow for creating a stable transitional administration. Nevertheless, despite the weakness of his ruling coalition and protesters' demands for his resignation, Henry has rejected the notion of handing over power to other political leaders ahead of organising fresh polls.

Many in Haiti and even a number of foreign diplomats are concerned that the acting prime minister appears still to enjoy the full support of the above-mentioned Core Group of foreign states and international bodies, and thus feels secure in his post notwithstanding his government's perceived failings. Other political platforms and civil society groups, meanwhile, complain that they have not received enough attention from foreign representatives, particularly the U.S. Henry, for his part, appears determined to reach a political agreement with opposition forces that, having won the approval of certain private-sector and civil society figures, would enable him to continue leading the government during a transitional period ending in elections.

He may yet succeed. Having campaigned so far unsuccessfully to force the prime minister from power, the Montana Agreement has begun to suffer internal splits. These pit those who will not accept, under any circumstances, that Henry stays on as head of government against others who are open to considering the possibility under certain conditions. Henry has turned these differences to his advantage, negotiating separately with different sectors of the Montana group.⁵⁷ The best hope for an agreement would likely involve a power-sharing deal between Henry and those factions willing to see a role for him in some future transitional government, although this course would risk leaving the acting prime minister's more intransigent opponents on the sidelines.

If such a deal becomes feasible, Haiti's foreign partners should support it. The deadlock has hindered creation of a transitional government, and also imperils the necessary conditions for deployment of an international security force. Foreign states are extremely wary of supporting a mission and deploying troops without the explicit approval of the country's main political forces, which would help reduce the risk of protests, shore up public support and curb the danger that a mission might exacerbate the country's tensions, perhaps bringing even greater instability once its mandate is over. States contemplating the formation of a mission, including potential financial and troop contributors, should keep insisting that these plans can move ahead only with backing from both the government and a critical mass of the opposition, as well as a commitment by those forces to work together in forming a transitional government that can restore services to the public and pave the way for fresh elections.

The International Angle

Lack of agreement between Haiti's political forces, in combination with the daunting challenges posed by gangs, underpin foreign reluctance to commit resources and manpower to the proposed rapid action force. The U.S. and Mexico, which have taken the diplomatic lead in pressing for the deployment of foreign troops or police, have sought to identify states willing to volunteer personnel and, perhaps most importantly, lead a mission to Haiti. But their task has been complicated by a sequencing dilemma. These two countries want to avoid tabling the draft resolution before the Security Council until they have real commitments to staff the mission, yet the lack of a resolution defining the mandate makes it difficult to confirm the participation of potential troop contributors.

While diplomats in New York suggest that some potential contributors have been identified – eg, Trinidad, Kenya and Rwanda – it has been more difficult to convince capitals to take on the costly task of leading a mission. Washington, acutely aware of the backlash that its previous interventions in Haiti have provoked, and no doubt conscious that a war-fatigued public might be less than supportive, is reluctant to send troops itself. At the same time, U.S. policymakers are acutely aware that further deterioration of conditions in Haiti could create a refugee crisis, which could in turn change their cost-benefit calculations with respect to intervention

As a result, the U.S. has turned to Canada. In late October, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken travelled to Ottawa to meet with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly, in an attempt to convince them to assume the lead of the mission. Canadian officials are considering the proposal; in private, they voice concern that Haiti will suffer even worse

calamities in the absence of a foreign mission.] But they also understand the difficulties of dispatching their own nation's forces at the invitation of a head of state whose grasp on power is feeble and contested. Trudeau has declared there will only be an intervention if all Haitian political parties agree to it.

Given it is unlikely that every single party in Haiti will support a foreign intervention, the question of how broad an agreement would need to be remains pending. While the more inclusive the better, the mission should not deploy absent a deal that includes Henry and a critical mass of those opposition factions, welcomes foreign troops and clearly establishes the boundaries of a security mission's mandate. As noted above, deployment should also hinge on a firm commitment by these parties to work together in creating a transitional government.

At the same time as mulling an armed intervention in Haiti, the U.S. and Canada have moved decisively to sanction several of the country's leading politicians for allegedly funding gangs. A month after the U.S. revoked visas for several current and former Haitian government officials, Henry's justice and interior ministers were forced to resign on 11 November. Following the announcement by the two countries of joint financial sanctions on the current and a former president of the Senate – the second most powerful post in Haiti's political system – Canada unveiled further measures against eight of the country's most influential politicians, including former President Martelly and two of his prime ministers. These politicians are seen by many as major figures in the Haitian Tèt Kale Party, which ruled the country between 2011 and 2021. By stepping up sanctions, these two nations appear to be meeting demands Henry's opponents have made for sweeping measures against public figures believed to have armed and funded gangs.

Even if Canada resolves to push forward, a short-term international mission in Haiti could be affected by broader geopolitical concerns. During the Security Council session convened by the U.S. and Mexico to discuss the proposed mission, Russia and China expressed reservations about possible reactions in Haiti to the arrival of foreign troops. Additionally, a number of Security Council members are worried that, given the short-term mandate envisaged for the rapid action force, it might be followed by a request for a costly UN peacekeeping mission, for which there is little appetite in New York. Furthermore, given U.S. involvement in presenting this initiative to the Security Council, the proposal could be treated by Russia and China as a new opportunity to block Western initiatives to resolve armed conflicts, as well as inflict a diplomatic defeat on Washington.

Beyond Immediate Needs

Haiti's security dilemmas are the product of longstanding failings in its police forces and state institutions, as well as the country's dire poverty rates, and will not be solved in any lasting way by a rapid international mission to combat gangs. Even if foreign states reach an agreement to deploy a security force to open humanitarian corridors that allow fuel, food, water and medicine to reach the people in greatest need, preventing a recurrence of the current crisis will hinge on a more prolonged commitment to addressing its deeper causes. Careful consideration would have to be given in particular to the design of a longer-term police support mission of the kind proposed by the UN secretary-general. Preparation for the handover to such a mission and an exit strategy for foreign troops will also be essential to avoid overstretch of the force and accusations that it infringes on Haitian sovereignty.

Despite the immediate focus on the terms of an international security mission, strengthening the national police remains the sole viable long-term strategy for subduing Haiti's gangs. Steps in this direction will depend on recruiting more police officers and improving their living and working conditions. Foreign donors should also provide assistance aimed at bolstering the force's intelligence-gathering capabilities through training and deployment of international specialists, as well as funding the purchase of better equipment, notably armoured vehicles, high-calibre weapons, protective gear and high-tech material for operations against armed groups. Material and financial assistance should in turn be accompanied by training programs in anti-gang and community-oriented policing techniques. Again, a comprehensive vetting of special units directly involved in combating gangs is indispensable in order to prevent collusion between these groups and the police.

Outside actors should also take action to curb their own contributions to Haiti's instability. In particular, Haiti's regional partners should step up their efforts to combat illicit trafficking of arms and ammunition to gangs in the country, including by helping Haitian land and maritime customs guards to reinforce controls of incoming shipments. Considering that most of the arms, including the high-calibre weapons, circulating illegally in Haiti come from the U.S., especially from ports in southern Florida, U.S. customs should enforce mechanisms to check all shipments heading to Haitian ports.

Aside from security, Haiti faces a tough road ahead as it seeks to achieve stability and re-establish effective state institutions that draw on public support. Come January 2023, when the mandate of the ten last sitting senators ends, there will be not one official with an electoral mandate left in the country. As mentioned earlier, Haiti's main international partners should not just demand the support of government and opposition for any future security mission, but also launch a unified diplomatic push to encourage establishment of a transitional government that might pave the way to fresh elections by helping the main political forces forge a political agreement to this end. Once there is clarity about the government's composition, rebuilding electoral institutions and the justice system will be vital steps in regaining public support for and trust in the state. A specialised judicial unit devoted to tackling high-level corruption and politician malfeasance should be a vital part in the process of reconciling Haitians with the authorities. It should receive financial and technical support from international partners.

Finally, a main cause of gang membership remains the lack of economic opportunities for young people living in poor neighbourhoods affected by a chronic lack of public services. With expected growth of a meagre 1.4 per cent in 2023, the combination of poverty, unemployment and inequality is likely to continue to push new recruits into the hands of criminal groups. Assembling support from Haitian businesses, the country's large diaspora and foreign donors for a program to kickstart economic growth and generate jobs remains the best route to avoiding the recurrent bouts of instability that the country has suffered for decades.

Conclusion

Oppressive gang violence, cholera, hunger and a government lacking public support conspire to turn Haiti's predicament into one of the most complex emergencies facing the Western Hemisphere. The nation's foreign partners are earnestly debating how to respond to the Haitian

government's request for a foreign security intervention, with the U.S., Mexico and Canada wrestling with their own reservations as they explore how to staff, fund and lead such a mission.

The reasons for their doubts are clear and compelling. Fighting fast-moving criminal bands in crowded shantytowns could result in significant casualties, ill-will and reputational damage. At the same time, while some Haitians see these risks as outweighing the potential benefits of such a mission, others – seemingly especially those in gang-held areas – do the same calculation and arrive at the opposite result. While many politicians and public figures, particularly those who reject Henry, are adamant in their opposition to the deployment of foreign troops, a growing number of citizens despair at the hostile environment in which everyday life is conducted. These people look to international intervention as the last hope for a swift improvement.

Foreign forces may be able to shift the balance of power against the country's gangs, but for a mission to be effective, certain minimum conditions will need to be in place. Troops must be trained and equipped to protect civilians in the densely populated urban environments where they will be operating. Moreover, at the political level, any decision to put foreign boots on the ground should at the very least depend on the explicit consent of a critical mass of Haiti's main political forces – including government and opposition – and on their reaching a firm agreement that they will create a transitional government. The risks of deploying an international security mission are undeniable, but so are the perils of protracted inaction in the face of Haiti's humanitarian emergency. Haiti's foreign partners should urge the country's duelling political factions to create the conditions that would make a successful deployment possible, and should they do so, be prepared to act.

How China Views the World: An Analysis of the 20th CPC Congress Work Report

Mayuri Banerjee

<https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/how-china-views-the-world-mbanerjee-011222>

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1 December, 2022

The Work Report delivered by President Xi Jinping at the 20th Party Congress has three broad aspects—it reviews the work done by the government in the past five years; it is a framework for future policy measures that will be implemented and goals that will be adopted; and finally, it is a detailed assessment of the international environment and socio-political and security challenges facing China. The Work Report is a significant document enumerating Xi's vision regarding China's economic and political development, at a time when Xi begins his third term in office. As regards the foreign affairs, military and national security aspects of the Work Report, two major trends regarding China's perception about its external environment are notable. First is a concern about systemic uncertainty and growing instability and the second relates to the perception about a hostile external environment.

Uncertainty And Instability A Major Concern of CCP

The 20th Party Congress Work Report flags concerns about rising uncertainty and instability at the international level. The document notes that since the last Congress in 2017, China's external environment has been turning increasingly uncertain and unstable. It goes on to elaborate that China has entered a period where risks and challenges are concurrent with strategic opportunities and uncertainties. It indicates the possibility of outbreak of major conflict due to the cumulative impact of various crises. It warns that "various black swan and gray rhino events may occur at any time" and China should be ready to "withstand high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms".

The wariness exhibited by the latest Work Report was not visible in the recent past Congresses of the CPC. For instance, the 17th Party Congress in 2007 emphasised that in China's external environment, the balance of power was changing in favour of maintenance of world peace, notwithstanding the presence of volatile elements. Similarly, the 2012 and the 2017 reports had only vaguely mentioned about volatile developments and complex changes and highlighted primarily the strategic opportunities that were favourable to China. None of these three reports projected China as facing any major systemic instability or uncertainty that could adversely impact it. Moreover, the overall international environment was seen as balanced and stable and geopolitical challenges and resource competition was not seen as disruptive.

However, recent series of events like the outbreak of the pandemic and its continuing politico-economic impact, the security vacuum caused by the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, economic disruption caused by the Ukraine crisis, Sino-US trade war and increasing major power tension in the Indo-Pacific has evoked a feeling that the international situation is fast moving towards unpredictability. As China considers a stable international situation as an essential prerequisite for its national rejuvenation, the high degree of volatility has emerged as a major concern for the CCP.

Rising Threat Perception

Along with being concerned with international instability, Beijing also appears to consider that the external environment has become hostile to China's interests. The threat perception is notable as there is pointed emphasis on ensuring "national security" in every respect to combat "risk" and "challenge" emanating from external actors. Further, in the context of describing China's geostrategic environment, the report states that China is confronted with drastic changes in the international landscape, especially external attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade and exert maximum pressure on it. Also, it states that "external attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time".

It is noteworthy that this is the first time such phrases have been included in the work report to convey the nature of the threat China perceives. While previous work reports do refer to hegemonism of the West and bullying of weaker states by powerful ones to define the negative features of the international environment, they do not delve into specific threats posed to China. The worsening relations with the US and other major Western countries over different issues including trade, origin of COVID-19, allegations of violation of human rights in Xinjiang, status of Taiwan, apart from increasing geostrategic and economic competition in the Indo-Pacific, are viewed as the causes of China's rising threat perception. This in turn has evoked fears of blackmail, containment, and blockade.

Beijing's Darkening World View

It is noteworthy that concern about international instability, threat perception about the external environment and sense of crises has been underway post-2017. The onset of the trade war with the US, Western criticism of China's crackdown in the restive regions of Xinjiang and Hong Kong and increasing pushback against China's power projection in Asia-Pacific has instilled a sense of insecurity in Beijing which has grown in the subsequent years. Various public documents and statements made by Xi himself and other high-level officials proves this.

For instance, China's threat perception about hostile external environment was evident in the 2019 Chinese National Defence White Paper which underscored the rising threat of militarisation in the Indo-Pacific. The document contended that US actions were undermining the region's strategic balance, charged that Japan was trying to circumvent post-war mechanisms and develop offensive capabilities, and held that Australia was bent on military expansion. Subsequently, in 2020, as a warning of the impending crisis, the Central Party School (which trains Chinese diplomats) in an article published in its flagship journal Study Times stated that a 'long-term' struggle was ahead and called on Chinese diplomats to be prepared to fight through adversity.

Further, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in an interview in 2021 observed that international instability has been exacerbated due to the pandemic and various events like the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Taliban's victory in Kabul, as well as intensifying confrontation between major powers like Russia and the US.¹¹ Later, in April 2022, Chinese ambassador to the US Qin Gang wrote in the National Interest that the post-war international system has come under the heaviest pressure since the Cold War.

At the BOAO Forum for Asia in 2022, hinting towards possibility of major conflict between countries, Xi, in his inaugural address stated that while the international community was reeling from the after-effects of the pandemic, traditional security risks are already emerging. Xi was more direct at the BRICS conference held few months later where he stated that "Our world today is overshadowed by the dark clouds of Cold War mentality and power politics and beset by constantly emerging traditional and non-traditional security threats..." Thus, Beijing has been closely following the evolving international situation while debating its impact on Chinese national interests. The work report can therefore be seen as a culmination of China's recent world view which seems to have further darkened.

Double Down On National Security

One of the important implications of China's negative perception about its external environment is Beijing's heightened sensitivity towards national security. Breaking the traditional pattern, this year the work report has a separate section on national security titled Modernizing China's National Security System and Capacity and Safeguarding National Security and Social Stability. Some of the notable aspects relating to enhancing security across a wide spectrum including economy, major infrastructure, financial institutions, cyberspace, are highlighted and it declares the government's intent to counter foreign sanctions and interference. It calls for maintaining a high-alert against systemic security risks while stringently cracking down upon infiltration and separatist activities by hostile forces.

Such an extensive note on augmenting national security in various aspects was seen for the first time in such reports. Previous reports only contained broad affirmations regarding the Party's focus on strengthening political, military, economic and social stability. More importantly, for the first time, the issue of foreign sanctions and long arm jurisdiction featured prominently in the context of national security.

The document, consistent with previous work reports, holds a strong military as the primary means for strengthening national security. It also elaborates on the national security goals of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and continuing modernisation of the armed forces and national defence. However, unlike the 18th Party Congress work report, it does not talk about increasing mutual trust and cooperation with other countries or active participation in regional and international security affairs. Instead, it discusses at length the need to improve synergy between different departments of the military to enhance combat capabilities. Further, in contrast to the 19th Congress work report, which had simply mentioned the party's responsibilities towards strengthening the army, this year's work report calls for a centralised and proactive approach by strengthening Party's control over the military and urgent development of strategic deterrence, combat capabilities and enhancing joint operations reconnaissance and joint strike capabilities.

Considering China's grim perception of the international situation and external threat environment, sensitivity towards national security and focus on harnessing military power was hardly surprising. The concerning aspect is that China could frame national security threats more broadly and be more willing to take risks. Xi Jinping, for instance, could resort to risky strategic manoeuvres to retain his strongman image. Furthermore, the proposals regarding strengthening strategic deterrence (used primarily with regard to nuclear forces) and deployment of military forces on a regular basis and in diversified ways could mean that China is normalising the use of military force in dealing with its neighbours or asserting its territorial or maritime claims through military means.

Conclusion

The 20th Party Congress exhibited a number of exceptions. These include Xi Jinping continuing into his third term, delivering a shorter speech than usual and choosing a governing body solely made of his loyalists. Similarly, the work report also differed from previous reports in terms of conveying China's negative assessment of the international situation, high threat perception and sensitivity towards national security, the leadership's intent to exercise greater control over the military, urgent development of China's strategic deterrence and normalisation of use of military forces.

Given the above, the growing insecurity and threat perception as articulated in the work report could lead to tighter controls in the domestic space and especially in the restive regions of Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet. Secondly, China might increasingly strive to reduce its international dependence on critical technologies, energy supplies and other essential goods to counter US pressure. Finally, Beijing is likely to become more assertive in its international dealings and project military belligerence in the Indo-Pacific region.

China's crash will have world- effecting consequences

RUSI Nova Scotia Security Affairs Committee Synopsis on China 9 December 2022

China seems to be allowing some lifting of Covid restrictions caused in part by ongoing demonstrations throughout the country. The restrictions although moderated are still capable of being ramped up quickly. There is realization that the temporary hospitals have proven to be less than sanitary and may even be a source for further infection including Covid and allow for other diseases to take hold. China's excess deaths is very high. People were restricted from getting proper care for heart, diabetes, cancers, pneumonia. etc., which are far more prevalent cause of deaths. China is currently seeing increases in the number of Covid infections now exceeding 30k a day. China is woefully unprotected and these numbers are likely to rise significantly. China still has refused to accept Western vaccines, relying on its ineffective Chinese versions. The Covid situation is likely to become much worse before it gets better.

Apple is moving a large portion of its iPhone production out of China to other countries such as India and Vietnam. Last week saw the demonstration by Foxconn employees followed by the brutal attack by police clad in protective gear. China is an authoritarian state, it relies on brute force as the first and last resort. Chinese authorities also have used the social credit system coupled with face recognition to identify key protesters. Once identified the police then track the individual to their home and arrest them as opposed to doing so at the demonstrations and thus causing more violence.

China's economy continues to slip especially in the property development sector but also banking. The Communist Chinese Party has "dumped" nearly two trillion dollars into the economy mainly on infrastructure. This infrastructure is not needed and adds to an already desperate situation. Economists within South-East Asia are pessimistic about China's actions which may lead to a further deterioration of the economy. The new Standing Committee and Politburo are unlikely to change Xi's course and make better choices in investments. The new folks are less likely than ever to speak truth to power and China's situation will deteriorate further in at least the near term. China's crash will have world- effecting consequences. Will they recover from this action in the longer term depends on whether they remove the Communist Chinese Party.

NZ Navy Idles One-Third of its Fleet Due to Manning Shortage



HMNZS Wellington (NZ Defence Force)

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<https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/nz-navy-idles-one-third-of-its-fleet-due-to-manning-shortage>

New Zealand's small navy has had to sideline three of its ships to conserve staff as private-sector competition peels off an ever-growing number of its sailors. It is an extreme version of the staffing challenge facing other navies in an unusually strong jobs market.

Wage growth has soared in New Zealand in the post-pandemic era. Median wages rose by a record-setting rate of nine percent in June, reaching annualized pay of US\$40,000 (and a bit higher for those with technical skills). By contrast, the annual salary for an enlisted sailor in the Royal New Zealand Navy is about US\$33,000-38,000.

During the pandemic, navy personnel were also pulled off regular duty to staff New Zealand's COVID-19 quarantine centers, reducing the number of available sailors to keep up the fleet. The quarantine operation ended in May 2022, but it reportedly had a lasting effect on morale.

These factors are adding up to a substantial staff shortage. The Navy's attrition rate for the year through November was nearly 17 percent, officials told local media, and those who remain have an increased workload to keep up with the service's aging fleet.

Short-handed operation forced the patrol vessel HMNZS Wellington to head back to her home port early from a recent fishery patrol, according to ABC. She has now entered long-term layup,

or "care and custody" storage status, which will make it easier to maintain the 2010-built ship with fewer personnel.

Wellington joins two other laid-up ships, the offshore patrol vessel HMNZS Otago and the inshore patrol vessel HMNZS Hawea. Together, they make up a third of the service's small nine-ship fleet and nearly half of its armed combatants.

Indo-Pacific Strategy Adds More Pressures to Navy Amid Ship, Sailor Shortages

<https://globalnews.ca/news/9310761/indo-pacific-strategy-navy/>

By Lee Berthiaume. The Canadian Press

Global News -28 November 2022

The Liberal government's new Indo-Pacific strategy has sparked concerns about added pressure on the Royal Canadian Navy at a time when it is already dealing with a shortage of sailors and warships.

The new strategy includes a promise of millions of dollars of additional funding to boost Canada's military presence and operations in the Indo-Pacific, alongside more trade and diplomatic investments.

One of the hallmarks of the new plan is for the Canadian Armed Forces to maintain a semi-permanent naval footprint while laying the groundwork for closer military co-operation and collaboration with traditional and non-traditional allies in the region.

Yet officials acknowledged during a background briefing on Monday that they have been "grappling" with how to fulfill the government's requirement to keep a constant rotation of frigates in the Indo-Pacific.

That's because the navy has several other commitments, including in Europe, and a limited number of frigates. The navy is also short about 1,300 sailors as the military writ large struggles with what senior officers have described as a personnel crisis.

"We don't have the operational plans yet," said one official, who could not be named as a condition of the briefing. "This is a strategy. The operational plans will get done, will be developed every single year as we look ahead to the sailing season."

Even before the new strategy was unveiled, the navy was forced to make a difficult choice on where to send its frigates.

HMCS Vancouver and HMCS Winnipeg were both deployed to the Indo-Pacific in June, the first time two Halifax-class frigates have sailed in the region together. Both are returning home now.

That deployment, along with the return of two minesweepers from a stint with a NATO naval task force earlier this month, has left Canada without any warships in European waters for the first time since Russia annexed Ukraine's Crimea peninsula in 2014.

Royal Canadian Navy commander Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee told The Canadian Press in September that Canada's inability to deploy more frigates to Europe when it has two in the Indo-Pacific region was due to a lack of warships.

The navy's capabilities are also being stretched as its aging frigates require more maintenance to operate safely, with only six available to both defend Canadian waters and operate abroad. The rest are docked for repairs and refits.

Irving Shipbuilding was tapped in 2010 to build a new fleet of 15 warships. But while the first of those ships was expected in the water by 2025, officials now say the first Canadian surface combatant won't arrive until the early 2030s.

On Monday, the official insisted that the government has been able to "strike a balance where we can have an additional frigate in the Indo-Pacific while also meeting our commitments elsewhere in the world."

Dalhousie University defence expert Adam MacDonald, who previously served in as a naval officer, said the new Indo-Pacific strategy represents a major adjustment for the military and navy.

"If you're going to try to create a continuous year-round presence in a region, which we don't really do elsewhere other than in Europe ... that's a big thing," he said.

"There is now political direction. And it's not just operational discretion. There's political direction now being given to the navy by the government that this is what's going to happen."

The fact the navy is being tasked to take the lead makes sense given the geography of the region, MacDonald added.

Yet he questioned how long the navy will be able to maintain such focus given the numerous other challenges and commitments on its plate, and the threat of new priorities should the war in Ukraine or the situation in Haiti become more severe.

"This might be something like the peacekeeping initiatives that the Trudeau government first announced, which kind of sounded big and ambitious, and then were kind of really truncated and very small," he said.

The navy's current limitations in terms of people and ships means "there's not a lot of room for more ambitious outcomes," agreed University of Calgary naval expert Timothy Choi.

"While even more funding might help, it would take time to convert monies into capabilities, and in the near term, I would've been surprised if there was much more military commitment to the region."

The Global Zeitenwende

How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era

By [Olaf Scholz](#) German Chancellor

Foreign Affairs Magazine [January/February 2023](#)



German Chancellor Olaf Scholz during a television interview in Bali, Indonesia, November 2022
Kay Nietfeld / Getty Images

The world is facing a *Zeitenwende*: an epochal tectonic shift. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has put an end to an era. New powers have emerged or re-emerged, including an economically strong and politically assertive China. In this new multipolar world, different countries and models of government are competing for power and influence.

For its part, Germany is doing everything it can to defend and foster an international order based on the principles of the UN Charter. Its democracy, security, and prosperity depend on binding power to common rules. That is why Germans are intent on becoming the guarantor of European security that our allies expect us to be, a bridge builder within the European Union and an advocate for multilateral solutions to global problems. This is the only way for Germany to successfully navigate the geopolitical rifts of our time.

The *Zeitenwende* goes beyond the war in Ukraine and beyond the issue of European security. The central question is this: How can we, as Europeans and as the European Union, remain independent actors in an increasingly multipolar world?

Germany and Europe can help defend the rules-based international order without succumbing to the fatalistic view that the world is doomed to once again separate into competing blocs. My country's history gives it a special responsibility to fight the forces of fascism, authoritarianism, and imperialism. At the same time, our experience of being split in half during an ideological and geopolitical contest gives us a particular appreciation of the risks of a new cold war.

END OF AN ERA

For most of the world, the three decades since the Iron Curtain fell have been a period of relative peace and prosperity. Technological advances have created an unprecedented level of connectivity and cooperation. Growing international trade, globe-spanning value and production chains, and unparalleled exchanges of people and knowledge across borders have brought over a billion people out of poverty. Most important, courageous citizens all over the world have swept away dictatorships and one-party rule. Their yearning for liberty, dignity, and democracy changed the course of history. Two devastating world wars and a great deal of suffering—much of it caused by my country—were followed by more than four decades of tension and confrontation in the shadow of possible nuclear annihilation. But by the 1990s, it seemed that a more resilient world order had finally taken hold.

Germans, in particular, could count their blessings. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall was brought down by the brave citizens of East Germany. Only 11 months later, the country was reunified, thanks to far-sighted politicians and support from partners in both the West and the East. Finally, “what belongs together could grow together,” as former German Chancellor Willy Brandt put it shortly after the wall came down.

Those words applied not only to Germany but also to Europe as a whole. Former members of the Warsaw Pact chose to become allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and members of the EU. “Europe whole and free,” in the formulation of George H. W. Bush, the U.S. president at the time, no longer seemed like an unfounded hope. In this new era, it seemed possible that Russia would become a partner to the West rather than the adversary that the Soviet Union had been. As a result, most European countries shrank their armies and cut their defense budgets. For Germany, the rationale was simple: Why maintain a large defense force of some 500,000 soldiers when all our neighbors appeared to be friends or partners?

The world is not doomed to once again separate into competing blocs. The focus of our security and defense policy quickly shifted toward other pressing threats. The Balkan wars and the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, heightened the importance of regional and global crisis management. Solidarity within NATO remained intact, however: the 9/11 attacks led to the first decision to trigger Article 5, the mutual defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty, and for two decades, NATO forces fought terrorism shoulder to shoulder in Afghanistan.

Germany's business communities drew their own conclusions from the new course of history. The fall of the Iron Curtain and an ever more integrated global economy opened new opportunities and markets, particularly in the countries of the former Eastern bloc but also in

other countries with emerging economies, especially China. Russia, with its vast resources of energy and other raw materials, had proved to be a reliable supplier during the Cold War, and it seemed sensible, at least at first, to expand that promising partnership in peacetime.

The Russian leadership, however, experienced the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and drew conclusions that differed sharply from those of leaders in Berlin and other European capitals. Instead of seeing the peaceful overthrow of communist rule as an opportunity for more freedom and democracy, Russian President Vladimir Putin has called it “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.” The economic and political turmoil in parts of the post-Soviet space in the 1990s only exacerbated the feeling of loss and anguish that many Russian citizens to this day associate with the end of the Soviet Union.

It was in that environment that authoritarianism and imperialistic ambitions began to re-emerge. In 2007, Putin delivered an aggressive speech at the Munich Security Conference, deriding the rules-based international order as a mere tool of American dominance. The following year, Russia launched a war against Georgia. In 2014, Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and sent its forces into parts of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, in direct violation of international law and Moscow’s own treaty commitments. The years that followed saw the Kremlin undercut arms control treaties and expand its military capabilities, poison and murder Russian dissidents, crack down on civil society, and carry out a brutal military intervention in support of the Assad regime in Syria. Step by step, Putin’s Russia chose a path that took it further from Europe and further from a cooperative, peaceful order.

EMPIRE STRIKES BACK

During the eight years that followed the illegal annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of conflict in eastern Ukraine, Germany and its European and international partners in the G-7 focused on safeguarding the sovereignty and political independence of Ukraine, preventing further escalation by Russia and restoring and preserving peace in Europe. The approach chosen was a combination of political and economic pressure that coupled restrictive measures on Russia with dialogue. Together with France, Germany engaged in the so-called Normandy Format that led to the Minsk agreements and the corresponding Minsk process, which called for Russia and Ukraine to commit to a cease-fire and take a number of other steps. Despite setbacks and a lack of trust between Moscow and Kyiv, Germany and France kept the process running. But a revisionist Russia made it impossible for diplomacy to succeed.

Russia’s brutal attack on Ukraine in February 2022 then ushered in a fundamentally new reality: imperialism had returned to Europe. Russia is using some of the most gruesome military methods of the twentieth century and causing unspeakable suffering in Ukraine. Tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have already lost their lives; many more have been wounded or traumatized. Millions of Ukrainian citizens have had to flee their homes, seeking refuge in Poland and other European countries; one million of them have come to Germany. Russian artillery, missiles, and bombs have reduced Ukrainian homes, schools, and hospitals to rubble. Mariupol, Irpin, Kherson, Izyum: these places will forever serve to remind the world of Russia’s crimes—and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

But the impact of Russia's war goes beyond Ukraine. When Putin gave the order to attack, he shattered a European and international peace architecture that had taken decades to build. Under Putin's leadership, Russia has defied even the most basic principles of international law as enshrined in the UN Charter: the renunciation of the use of force as a means of international policy and the pledge to respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all countries. Acting as an imperial power, Russia now seeks to redraw borders by force and to divide the world, once again, into blocs and spheres of influence.

A STRONGER EUROPE

The world must not let Putin get his way; Russia's revanchist imperialism must be stopped. The crucial role for Germany at this moment is to step up as one of the main providers of security in Europe by investing in our military, strengthening the European defense industry, beefing up our military presence on NATO's eastern flank, and training and equipping Ukraine's armed forces. Germany's new role will require a new strategic culture, and the national security strategy that my government will adopt a few months from now will reflect this fact. For the last three decades, decisions regarding Germany's security and the equipment of the country's armed forces were taken against the backdrop of a Europe at peace. Now, the guiding question will be which threats we and our allies must confront in Europe, most immediately from Russia. These include potential assaults on allied territory, cyberwarfare, and even the remote chance of a nuclear attack, which Putin has not so subtly threatened.

The transatlantic partnership is and remains vital to confronting these challenges. U.S. President Joe Biden and his administration deserve praise for building and investing in strong partnerships and alliances across the globe. But a balanced and resilient transatlantic partnership also requires that Germany and Europe play active roles. One of the first decisions that my government made in the aftermath of Russia's attack on Ukraine was to designate a special fund of approximately \$100 billion to better equip our armed forces, the Bundeswehr. We even changed our constitution to set up this fund. This decision marks the starkest change in German security policy since the establishment of the Bundeswehr in 1955. Our soldiers will receive the political support, materials, and capabilities they need to defend our country and our allies. The goal is a Bundeswehr that we and our allies can rely on. To achieve it, Germany will invest two percent of our gross domestic product in our defense.

These changes reflect a new mindset in German society. Today, a large majority of Germans agree that their country needs an army able and ready to deter its adversaries and defend itself and its allies. Germans stand with Ukrainians as they defend their country against Russian aggression. From 2014 to 2020, Germany was Ukraine's largest source of private investments and government assistance combined. And since Russia's invasion began, Germany has boosted its financial and humanitarian support for Ukraine and has helped coordinate the international response while holding the presidency of the G-7.

The Zeitenwende also led my government to reconsider a decades-old, well-established principle of German policy on arms exports. Today, for the first time in Germany's recent history, we are delivering weapons into a war fought between two countries. In my exchanges with Ukrainian

President Volodymyr Zelensky, I have made one thing very clear: Germany will sustain its efforts to support Ukraine for as long as necessary. What Ukraine needs most today are artillery and air-defense systems, and that is precisely what Germany is delivering, in close coordination with our allies and partners. German support to Ukraine also includes antitank weapons, armored troop carriers, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, and counterbattery radar systems. A new EU mission will offer training for up to 15,000 Ukrainian troops, including up to 5,000—an entire brigade—in Germany. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia, and Slovenia have delivered or have pledged to deliver around 100 Soviet-era main battle tanks to Ukraine; Germany, in turn, will then provide those countries with refurbished German tanks. This way, Ukraine is receiving tanks that Ukrainian forces know well and have experience using and that can be easily integrated into Ukraine's existing logistics and maintenance schemes.

NATO's actions must not lead to a direct confrontation with Russia, but the alliance must credibly deter further Russian aggression. To that end, Germany has significantly increased its presence on NATO's eastern flank, reinforcing the German-led NATO battle group in Lithuania and designating a brigade to ensure that country's security. Germany is also contributing troops to NATO's battle group in Slovakia, and the German air force is helping monitor and secure airspace in Estonia and Poland. Meanwhile, the German navy has participated in NATO's deterrence and defense activities in the Baltic Sea. Germany will also contribute an armored division, as well as significant air and naval assets (all in states of high readiness) to NATO's New Force Model, which is designed to improve the alliance's ability to respond quickly to any contingency. And Germany will continue to uphold its commitment to NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, including by purchasing dual-capable F-35 fighter jets.

Our message to Moscow is very clear: we are determined to defend every single inch of NATO territory against any possible aggression. We will honor NATO's solemn pledge that an attack on any one ally will be considered an attack on the entire alliance. We have also made it clear to Russia that its recent rhetoric concerning nuclear weapons is reckless and irresponsible. When I visited Beijing in November, Chinese President Xi Jinping and I concurred that threatening the use of nuclear weapons was unacceptable and that the use of such horrific weapons would cross a redline that humankind has rightly drawn. Putin should mark these words.

Our message to Moscow is very clear: we are determined to defend every single inch of NATO territory.

Among the many miscalculations that Putin has made is his bet that the invasion of Ukraine would strain relations among his adversaries. In fact, the reverse has happened: the EU and the transatlantic alliance are stronger than ever before. Nowhere is this more evident than in the unprecedented economic sanctions that Russia is facing. It was clear from the outset of the war that these sanctions would have to be in place for a long time, as their effectiveness increases with each passing week. Putin needs to understand that not a single sanction will be lifted should Russia try to dictate the terms of a peace deal.

All the leaders of the G-7 countries have commended Zelensky's readiness for a just peace that respects the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and safeguards Ukraine's ability to

defend itself in the future. In coordination with our partners, Germany stands ready to reach arrangements to sustain Ukraine's security as part of a potential postwar peace settlement. We will not, however, accept the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory, poorly disguised by sham referendums. To end this war, Russia must withdraw its troops.

GOOD FOR THE CLIMATE, BAD FOR RUSSIA

Russia's war has not only unified the EU, NATO, and the G-7 in opposition to his aggression; it has also catalyzed changes in economic and energy policy that will hurt Russia in the long run—and give a boost to the vital transition to clean energy that was already underway. Right after taking office as German chancellor in December 2021, I asked my advisers whether we had a plan in place should Russia decide to stop its gas deliveries to Europe. The answer was no, even though we had become dangerously dependent on Russian gas deliveries.

We immediately started preparing for the worst-case scenario. In the days before Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine, Germany suspended the certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which was set to significantly increase Russian gas supplies to Europe. In February 2022, plans were already on the table to import liquefied natural gas from the global market outside Europe—and in the coming months, the first floating LNG terminals will go into service on the German coast.

The worst-case scenario soon materialized, as Putin decided to weaponize energy by cutting supplies to Germany and the rest of Europe. But Germany has now completely phased out the importation of Russian coal, and EU imports of Russian oil will soon end. We have learned our lesson: Europe's security relies on diversifying its energy suppliers and routes and on investing in energy independence. In September, the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines drove home that message.

To bridge any potential energy shortages in Germany and Europe as a whole, my government is bringing coal-fired power plants back onto the grid temporarily and allowing German nuclear power plants to operate longer than originally planned. We have also mandated that privately owned gas storage facilities meet progressively higher minimum filling levels. Today, our facilities are completely full, whereas levels at this time last year were unusually low. This is a good basis for Germany and Europe to get through the winter without gas shortages.

Russia's war showed us that reaching these ambitious targets is also necessary to defend our security and independence, as well as the security and independence of Europe. Moving away from fossil energy sources will increase the demand for electricity and green hydrogen, and Germany is preparing for that outcome by massively speeding up the shift to renewable energies such as wind and solar power. Our goals are clear: by 2030, at least 80 percent of the electricity Germans use will be generated by renewables, and by 2045, Germany will achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, or "climate neutrality."

PUTIN'S WORST NIGHTMARE

Putin wanted to divide Europe into zones of influence and to divide the world into blocs of great

powers and vassal states. Instead, his war has served only to advance the EU. At the European Council in June 2022, the EU granted Ukraine and Moldova the status of “candidate countries” and reaffirmed that Georgia’s future lies with Europe. We also agreed that the EU accession of all six countries of the western Balkans must finally become a reality, a goal to which I am personally committed. That is why I have revived the so-called Berlin Process for the western Balkans, which intends to deepen cooperation in the region, bringing its countries and their citizens closer together and preparing them for EU integration.

It is important to acknowledge that expanding the EU and integrating new members will be difficult; nothing would be worse than giving millions of people false hope. But the way is open, and the goal is clear: an EU that will consist of over 500 million free citizens, representing the largest internal market in the world, that will set global standards on trade, growth, climate change, and environmental protection and that will host leading research institutes and innovative businesses—a family of stable democracies enjoying unparalleled social welfare and public infrastructure.

As the EU moves toward that goal, its adversaries will continue to try to drive wedges between its members. Putin has never accepted the EU as a political actor. After all, the EU—a union of free, sovereign, democratic states based on the rule of law—is the antithesis of his imperialistic and autocratic kleptocracy.

Putin and others will try to turn our own open, democratic systems against us, through disinformation campaigns and influence peddling. European citizens have a wide variety of views, and European political leaders discuss and sometimes argue about the right way forward, especially during geopolitical and economic challenges. But these characteristics of our open societies are features, not bugs; they are the essence of democratic decision-making. Our goal today, however, is to close ranks on crucial areas in which disunity would make Europe more vulnerable to foreign interference. Crucial to that mission is ever-closer cooperation between Germany and France, which share the same vision of a strong and sovereign EU.

More broadly, the EU must overcome old conflicts and find new solutions. European migration and fiscal policy are cases in point. People will continue to come to Europe, and Europe needs immigrants, so the EU must devise an immigration strategy that is pragmatic and aligns with its values. This means reducing irregular migration and at the same time strengthening legal paths to Europe, in particular for the skilled workers that our labor markets need. On fiscal policy, the union has established a recovery and resilience fund that will also help address the current challenges posed by high energy prices. The union must also do away with selfish blocking tactics in its decision-making processes by eliminating the ability of individual countries to veto certain measures. As the EU expands and becomes a geopolitical actor, quick decision-making will be the key to success. For that reason, Germany has proposed gradually extending the practice of making decisions by majority voting to areas that currently fall under the unanimity rule, such as EU foreign policy and taxation.

Europe must also continue to assume greater responsibility for its own security and needs a coordinated and integrated approach to building its defense capabilities. For example, the

militaries of EU member states operate too many different weapons systems, which creates practical and economic inefficiencies. To address these problems, the EU must change its internal bureaucratic procedures, which will require courageous political decisions; EU member states, including Germany, will have to alter their national policies and regulations on exporting jointly manufactured military systems.

One field in which Europe urgently needs to make progress is defense in the air and space domains. That is why Germany will be strengthening its air defense over the coming years, as part of the NATO framework, by acquiring additional capabilities. I opened this initiative to our European neighbors, and the result is the European Sky Shield Initiative, which 14 other European states joined last October. Joint air defense in Europe will be more efficient and cost effective than if all of us go it alone, and it offers an outstanding example of what it means to strengthen the European pillar within NATO.

NATO is the ultimate guarantor of Euro-Atlantic security, and its strength will only grow with the addition of two prosperous democracies, Finland and Sweden, as members. But NATO is also made stronger when its European members independently take steps toward greater compatibility between their defense structures, within the framework of the EU.

THE CHINA CHALLENGE—AND BEYOND

Russia's war of aggression might have triggered the *Zeitenwende*, but the tectonic shifts run much deeper. History did not end, as some predicted, with the Cold War. Nor, however, is history repeating itself. Many assume we are on the brink of an era of bipolarity in the international order. They see the dawn of a new cold war approaching, one that will pit the United States against China.

I do not subscribe to this view. Instead, I believe that what we are witnessing is the end of an exceptional phase of globalization, a historic shift accelerated by, but not entirely the result of, external shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war in Ukraine. During that exceptional phase, North America and Europe experienced 30 years of stable growth, high employment rates, and low inflation, and the United States became the world's decisive power—a role it will retain in the twenty-first century.

But during the post-Cold War phase of globalization, China also became a global player, as it had been in earlier long periods of world history. China's rise does not warrant isolating Beijing or curbing cooperation. But neither does China's growing power justify claims for hegemony in Asia and beyond. No country is the backyard of any other—and that applies to Europe as much as it does to Asia and every other region. During my recent visit to Beijing, I expressed firm support for the rules-based international order, as enshrined in the UN Charter, as well as for open and fair trade. In concert with its European partners, Germany will continue to demand a level playing field for European and Chinese companies. China does too little in this regard and has taken a noticeable turn toward isolation and away from openness.

In Beijing, I also raised concerns over the growing insecurity in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and questioned China's approach to human rights and individual freedoms. Respecting basic rights and freedoms can never be an "internal matter" for individual states because every UN member state vows to uphold them.

Meanwhile, as China and the countries of North America and Europe adjust to the changing realities of globalization's new phase, many countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America that enabled exceptional growth in the past by producing goods and raw materials at low costs are now gradually becoming more prosperous and have their own demand for resources, goods, and services. These regions have every right to seize the opportunities that globalization offers and to demand a stronger role in global affairs in line with their growing economic and demographic weight. That poses no threat to citizens in Europe or North America. On the contrary, we should encourage these regions' greater participation in and integration into the international order. This is the best way to keep multilateralism alive in a multipolar world.

That is why Germany and the EU are investing in new partnerships and broadening existing ones with many countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Many of them share a fundamental characteristic with us: they, too, are democracies. This commonality plays a crucial role—not because we aim to pit democracies against authoritarian states, which would only contribute to a new global dichotomy, but because sharing democratic values and systems will help us define joint priorities and achieve common goals in the new multipolar reality of the twenty-first century. We might all have become capitalists (with the possible exception of North Korea and a tiny handful of other countries), to paraphrase an argument the economist Branko Milanovic made a few years ago. But it makes a huge difference whether capitalism is organized in a liberal, democratic way or along authoritarian lines.

Take the global response to COVID-19. Early in the pandemic, some argued that authoritarian states would prove more adept at crisis management, since they can plan better for the long term and can make tough decisions more quickly. But the pandemic track records of authoritarian countries hardly support that view. Meanwhile, the most effective COVID-19 vaccines and pharmaceutical treatments were all developed in free democracies. What is more, unlike authoritarian states, democracies have the ability to self-correct as citizens express their views freely and choose their political leaders. The constant debating and questioning in our societies, parliaments, and free media may sometimes feel exhausting. But it is what makes our systems more resilient in the long run.

China's rise does not warrant isolating Beijing or curbing cooperation. Freedom, equality, the rule of law, and the dignity of every human being are values not exclusive to what has been traditionally understood as the West. Rather, they are shared by citizens and governments around the world, and the UN Charter reaffirms them as fundamental human rights in its preamble. But autocratic and authoritarian regimes often challenge or deny these rights and principles. To defend them, the countries of the EU, including Germany, must cooperate more closely with democracies outside the West, as traditionally defined. In the past, we have purported to treat the countries of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America as equals. But too often, our words have not been backed by deeds. This must change. During Germany's

presidency of the G-7, the group has coordinated its agenda closely with Indonesia, which holds the G-20 presidency. We have also involved in our deliberations Senegal, which holds the presidency of the African Union; Argentina, which holds the presidency of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States; our G-20 partner South Africa; and India, which will hold the G-20 presidency next year.

Eventually, in a multipolar world, dialogue and cooperation must extend beyond the democratic comfort zone. The United States' new National Security Strategy rightly acknowledges the need to engage with "countries that do not embrace democratic institutions but nevertheless depend upon and support a rules-based international system." The world's democracies will need to work with these countries to defend and uphold a global order that binds power to rules and that confronts revisionist acts such as Russia's war of aggression. This effort will take pragmatism and a degree of humility.

The journey toward the democratic freedom we enjoy today has been full of setbacks and errors. Yet certain rights and principles were established and accepted centuries ago. Habeas corpus, the protection from arbitrary detention, is one such fundamental right—and was first recognized not by a democratic government but by the absolutist monarchy of King Charles II of England. Equally important is the basic principle that no country can take by force what belongs to its neighbor. Respect for these fundamental rights and principles should be required of all states, regardless of their internal political systems.

Periods of relative peace and prosperity in human history, such as the one that most of the world experienced in the early post-Cold War era, need not be rare interludes or mere deviations from a historical norm in which brute force dictates the rules. And although we cannot turn back the clock, we can still turn back the tide of aggression and imperialism. Today's complex, multipolar world renders this task more challenging. To carry it out, Germany and its partners in the EU, the United States, the G-7, and NATO must protect our open societies, stand up for our democratic values, and strengthen our alliances and partnerships. But we must also avoid the temptation to once again divide the world into blocs. This means making every effort to build new partnerships, pragmatically and without ideological blinders. In today's densely interconnected world, the goal of advancing peace, prosperity, and human freedom calls for a different mindset and different tools. Developing that mindset and those tools is ultimately what the *Zeitenwende* is all about.

Book Review: Churchill and Fisher: Titans at the Admiralty

Strategy Page: The News as History, February, 2018

by Barry Gough Barnsley, Eng.: Pen & Sword / Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2017. Pp. xl, 600. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., indices. ISBN: 1526703569

The Contentious Giants Who Prepared the Royal Navy for the Great War

British maritime and naval historian Gough, author of such works as *Fighting Sail on Lake Huron and Georgian Bay* and *Pax Britannica*, examines the role Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty (1911-1915) and Admiral of the Fleet John Fisher, who twice served as First Sea Lord

(1904-1910, 1914-1915), parsing the complex and often contentious relationship between these two brilliant and eccentric men to help us understand how they influenced the development of the Royal Navy from 1910 through the outbreak of war in 1914 and onward through its end in 1919.

Gough draws on a remarkable command of both men's papers, as well as many other documents. He discusses how each of these energetic innovators worked to modernize and prepare the fleet for war, usually working together, but often at odds. He fits their activities within the broader framework of events, so we see how their actions affected and were affected by political and military developments not only in Britain but in Germany and elsewhere, and we also get looks at a lot of the other interesting people of their age.

Gough notes that despite their efforts, which yielded a very powerful, effective fleet, the war developed in unforeseen ways. The anticipated decisive sea fights, a new Trafalgar as it were, never took place, while air attacks on Britain and the *U-boat* menace threatened the homeland directly, diverting and overstressing resources. And then there was the failure of the Dardanelles initiative, arguably not actually their fault, which not only caused them to fall from power but also to fall out.

Clearly rather fond of both men, Gough is by no means an apologist for their errors, and subjects both to some serious criticism at times, notably in his detailed look at Churchill's improbable escapades at Antwerp in the opening weeks of the war.

Churchill and Fisher is required reading for anyone with an interest in the Royal Navy and the Great War at sea.